Schmitter Still the Century of ism

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Still the Century of Corporatism?Author(s): Philippe C. SchmitterSource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1, The New Corporatism: Social and PoliticalStructures in the Iberian World (Jan., 1974), pp. 85-131Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of PoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406080 .

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Still the Century of Corporatism?"

Philippe C. Schmitter

The twentieth centurywill be the centuryof corporatism ustas the nineteenth was the centuryof liberalism ..

Mihail Manoilesco

Until recently, Manoilesco'sconfident predictioncould easilybe dismissedas yet anotherexampleof the ideologicalbias, wishful

thinkingand overinflatedrhetoricof the thirties,an evenementielle

responseto a peculiar environmentand period.1 With the sub-

sequent defeat of fascism and National Socialism,the spectre of

corporatismno longerseemed to haunt the Europeansceneso fatal-

istically. For a while, the concept itself was virtuallyretiredfromthe active lexicon of politics, although it was left on behavioral

exhibit,so to speak, in such museumsof atavisticpolitical practiceas Portugaland Spain.

Lately, however,the

spectreis back

amongst us-verballyat

least-haunting the concernsof contemporaryocial scientistswith

increasingfrequencyand in multipleguises. Almost forty yearsto

the day when Manoilesco declared that "the ineluctablecourseoffate involves the transformationof all the social and political in-

stitutions of our times in a corporatistdirection,"2perhaps we

should again take his prediction seriouslyand inquirewhether we

might still be in the centuryof corporatism-but only just becom-

ing aware of it.The purposesof this essayare to explorevarioususagesof the

concept of corporatism, o suggest an operationaldefinitionof itas a distinctive,modernsystemof interestrepresentation,o discussthe utilityof distinguishing ubtypesof corporatistdevelopmentand

practiceand, finally,to set forth some generalhypotheses"explain-ing" the probablecontext of its emergenceand persistence.

*An International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Rela-tions (New York) for the academic year 1973-74 and the generousinfrastruc-

tural support of the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace have made this research possible. Specifically I would like tothank Ms. BarbaraBishop of the European Center for having deciphered myhandwriting and prepared a legible manuscript.

1 Mihail Manoilesco, Le Siecle du Corporatisme,rev. ed. (Paris, 1936).The original edition was publishedin 1934.

2 Ibid., p. 7.

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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

I

The firststep,

Ipropose,

s to rescue theconcept

ofcorporatismfrom varioususagesof it which have crept into the literatureand

which seem (to me) to do more to dissipateor to disguisethan toenhanceits utility. On the one hand, it has becomesuch a vaguelyboundedphenomenonthat, like clientelism, t can be found every-where and, hence, is nowherevery distinctive;on the other hand,it hasbeen so narrowlyattached to a singlepoliticalculture,regime-

type or macrosocietalconfigurationhat it becomes,at best,unique-

ly descriptiverather than comparativelyanalytic.Undoubtedly,the most difficulttask is to strip the concept of

its pejorativetone and implication. This is made all the more dif-ficult by the fact that-unlike the thirties-there are very few

regimes today who overtly and proudly advertise themselvesas

corporatist. It, therefore,becomes a tempting game to unveil and

denounce as corporatistpracticeswhich regimesare condoningor

promotingunder other labels, such as "participation,""collabora-

tive planning,""mixedrepresentation," nd "permanentconsulta-tion." On the other hand, if corporatism s left to mean simply"interest-groupbehavior or systems I do not like" and/or used

synonymouslywith such epithetsas "fascist"and "repressive,"henit can become of little or no utilityfor purposesof systematiccom-

parison. This is not to say that those who use the concept mustsomehow be enjoinedfrom utteringevaluativestatementsor evenfrom

expressingstrongnormative reactions to its role or conse-

quences. I have now studiedseveralcorporatist ystemsand come

openly to quite firm personal judgments about each of them.

But, I hope that those who disagreeon its desirabilitycan at leastarriveat somecommonprior agreementas to the empiricalreferentswhich identifyits basicstructureand behavior. They then can dis-

pute the costs and benefitsand the intrinsic"goods"and "bads" t

produces.

In my work I have found it useful to considercorporatismasa system of interest and/or attitude representation,a particularmodal or ideal-typical institutional arrangementfor linking the

associationally rganized nterestsof civil societywith the decisionalstructuresof the state. As such it is one of severalpossiblemodern

configurationsof interestrepresentation, f which pluralism s per-haps the best-knownand most frequentlyacknowledgedalternative-but more about that below.

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STILL THE CENTURY OF CORPORATISM?

Restrictingthe concept, so to speak, to refer only to a specificconcrete set of institutional practices or structuresinvolving the

representation (or misrepresentation)of empirically observablegroup interests has a number of important implications. These

sharplydifferentiatemy preferredusagefromthoseof severalotherswho have recently employedthe same conceptual abel.

First,by definingcorporatismn terms of its praxis,the conceptis liberatedfrom its employment n any particular deologyor sys-tem of ideas.3 While, as will become manifest in later sections of

this essay,I am quite interested n the argumentsput forthby par-

ticularproponentsof modernor neocorporatism,my readingof itsuse in the recent history of ideas suggeststhat an extraordinaryvariety of theorists, deologuesand activists have advocatedit for

widely divergentmotives, interestsand reasons.These range from such romantic,organictheoristsof the state

as FriedrichSchlegel, Adam von Miiller, G. W. FriedrichHegeland Rudolf Kjellen; to the pre-Marxist,protosocialistsSismondi,Saint-Simonand

Proudhon;to the Social

Christian,ethicallytradi-

tionalist thought of Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl von Vogelsang,the Marquis de la Tour de Pin, Albert de Mun and, of course,

Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI; to the fascist authoritarianismof

GiuseppeBottai, Guido Bortolotto,Giuseppe Papi and Francesco

Vito; to the secularmodernizingnationalism of a Mihail Manoi-

lesco; to the radical (in the Frenchsense) bourgeoissolidarismofLUonDuguit, Joseph-PaulBoncour, Georges Renard and Emile

Durkheim; to the mysticaluniversalismof an Ottmar Spann; tothe internationalistfunctionalism of Giuseppe de Michelis andDavid Mitrany; to the reactionary,pseudo-Catholic ntegralismofCharles Maurras, Oliveira Salazar, Marcello Caetano and JeanBr&the e la Gressaye; o the technocratic,procapitalistreformismof Walter Rathenau, Lord Keynes and A. A. Berle, Jr.; to the

anticapitalistsyndicalismof GeorgesSorel, Sergio Panunzio, UgoSpirito,EdmondoRossoni,Enrico Corradiniand GregorStrasser;

to the guild socialism of G.D.H. Cole, the early Harold Laski,S. G. Hobson and Ramiro de Maeztu; to the communitarianism

3 For an example of such a definition by ideology, see James Malloy,"Authoritarianism,Corporatismand Mobilization in Peru," elsewhere in thisvolume. Also Howard Wiarda, "The Portuguese Corporative System: BasicStructures and Current Functions" (Paper prepared for the ConferenceGroup on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., Oct. 10-14, 1973). In both casesthe authors were heavily, if not exclusively, influenced by "Social Christian"versions of corporatist thought.

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THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

or bourgeois ocialismof a FrancoisPerrouxor an Henri de Man-not to mention such contemporaryadvocates as Bernard Crick,

W. H. Ferry,PierreMendes-Franceand David Apter.All of these-and the list is by no means completenor are theabove groupings by any means sharply distinctive4-have con-

verged upon the advocacyof an institutionalrelationshipbetweenthe systems of authoritativedecision-makingand interest repre-sentationwhich can be consideredas genericallycorporatistby mypraxiologicaldefinition (and frequently defined as such by theauthorsthemselves),although they conceived of this arrangement

as involvingradicallydifferentstructuresof power and influence,as benefiting quite distinct social classes, and as promoting dia-

metricallyoppositepublic policies.A French student of corporatismdescribedthe situation quite

well when he said:

The armyof corporatistss so disparatehatone is led to thinkthat the word,corporation,tselfis likea labelplacedon a whole

batch of bottleswhich are then distributedamong diversepro-ducerseach of whomfillsthem with the drinkof his choice. Theconsumerhas to lookcarefully.5

The situation is even furtherconfusedby the fact that many con-

temporary heorists, deologuesand activistsare peddlingthe same

drink under yet other labels.Not only is corporatismdefinedas an ideology (or worse as a

weltanschauung)difficultto pin down to a central set of values orbeliefs and even more difficultto associatewith the aspirationsor

interestsof a specific social group, but virtually all detailed em-

pirical inquiriesof corporatistpraxis have shown its performanceand behavior to be at considerablevariance-if not diametrically

opposed-to the beliefsmanifestlyadvancedby its verbal defenders.As another French scholar of the forties (himself an advocate of

corporatisma sa maniere) observed,"The reality of existing cor-

poratisms s, without a doubt, infinitely essseductivethan the doc-trine."6 Contemporary conceptualizationsof corporatismbased

4 To this article I have appendixed a working bibliographyof some 100titles which seem importantto an understandingof the ideological and praxio-logical bases of corporatism up to and including the interwar period.

5 Louis Baudin, Le Corporatisme. Italie, Portugal, Allemagne, Espagne,France (Paris, 1942), pp. 4-5.

6 Auguste Murat, Le Corporatisme (Paris: Les Publications Techniques,1944), p. 206. For excellent critical treatments of corporatistpractice in the

88




exclusivelyon the stated motivesand goalsof actors or their apolo-gists tend only to obfuscate this "less than seductive" reality in

praxis.In short, I find thereis simplytoo much normativevarietyandbehavioralhypocrisy n the use of the corporatist deologicallabelto makeit a usefuloperational nstrument or comparativeanalysis.

Nor do I find it very productiveto considercorporatism o bean exclusivepart or a distinctiveproduct of a particularpoliticalculture,especiallyone linked to some geographicallycircumscribedarea such as the Iberian Peninsula7or the Mediterranean.8This

approachto corporatismnot only runs up against the usual (andin my view, well-founded) criticismsraisedagainstmost, if not all,

political-cultural "explanations"9-especially against those basedon impressionisticvidence and circularreasoning0?-but also fails

1930's, see Roland Pre, L'Organisationdes rapports economiques et sociauxdans les pays a re'gimecorporatif (Paris, 1936); Louis Rosenstock-Franck,L'Economie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait (Paris, 1934; and

FranCoisPerroux, Capitalisme et Communautede Travail (Paris, 1937), pp.

27-178.7 For a subtle, institutionally sensitive presentation of this argument, seeRonald Newton "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation' and 'Pluralism'in Spanish American Political Society," Hispanic American Historical ReviewL, no. 1 (February, 1970), 1-29. For an approachwhich relies essentiallyonan ill-defined, Catholic weltanschauunglich argument, see Howard Wiarda,"Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-LatinTradition," WorldPolitics XXV, no. 2 (January, 1973), 206-235.

8 See especially the argument by Kalman Silvert, "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," in K. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples (New York,

1967) pp.358-61. Also his Man's Power

(New York, 1970), pp. 59-64,136-

8; "National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers,"InternationalSocial Science Journal XV (1964), 560-70; "The Politics of Economic andSocial Change in Latin America," The Sociological Review Monograph XI(1967), 47-58.

9 As Max Weber scornfully put it to earlier advocates of political culturalexplanations, "the appeal to national character is generally a mere confessionof ignorance." The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 88, ascited in Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait [New York,1962] p. 63, fn. 29).

10 Such reasoning has been particularly prevalent amongAnglo-Saxonstudents of Latin America where, from the start, these area specialists seem

to have drawn the following syllogism: "Latin Americans behave differentlyfrom North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal;North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Amer-icans are predominantlyProtestant; ergo, Latin Americans behave differentlyfrom North Americansbecause of their Catholic-Iberianheritage!"

The few systematically comparative studies of attitudes which have in-cluded both Latin and North American sampleshave generally concluded thatonce one controls for education, class, center-peripheryresidence, age, etc.,residualdifferencesthat could be assignedspecificallyto culture are statistically

89




completelyto explain why similarconfigurationsand behavior ininterestpoliticshave emergedand persist n a great varietyof cul-

turalsettings,stretching romNorthernEurope,across he Mediter-raneanto such exotic placesas Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Indonesiaand Taiwan, to name but a few. This form of pseudoexplanationalso cannot contribute much to answeringthe question of why,even within the presumedhomeland of such an ethos, that is, theIberianPeninsula and its "fragments," orporatismhas waxed andwaned during differenthistoricalperiods. Are we to believe that

politicalcultureis a sort of "spigotvariable"which gets turnedon

every once in a while to producea differentsystemof functionalrepresentation?Also we might ask, why do societies supposedlysharing the same general ethos exhibit such wide diversityin in-

terest-group alues,practicesand consequences?By all empiricallyavailablestandards,Spain is more Catholicthan Portugal,Colom-bia more so than Brazil,yet in each case it is the latter which has

by far the more corporatist ystem. At best, then, culturalistargu-ments must be

heavily supplementedto account for such embar-

rassingdeviations n outcome.

Finally, since those who have advanced such an explanationalso tend to placea greatdeal of emphasison ideology (occasionallyeven acceptingword for fact), we might wonder why the majorideologues of corporatismhave not come from this part of theworld. A quick glance at the admittedlyincompletebibliographyattached to this essay will show that the intellectual origins of

corporatismare predominatelyGerman,Belgian,French and Aus-trian and, secondarilyand belatedly,English, Italian and Ruma-

nian. Those who advocatedcorporatismn the Iberian and Latin

Americanareasunabashedlyand unashamedly mportedtheirideas

from abroad. Moder, nonmedieval,corporatismwas diffusedto

the Iberian-Mediterraneanrea, not created within it.ll

insignificant. See especially Joseph Kahl, The Measurement of Modernity

(Austin,Texas, 1968).

11 It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists ofmodern corporatismhave not been Catholics. Many were in fact militantlysecular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by "SocialChristian"ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfuss, followed a much more bureau-

cratic, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among"Social Christians" or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by anymeans advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritainand Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Henri Guitton, Le CatholicismeSocial (Paris, 1945).

Also worth mentioning is that corporatism has been considered quite

90




Another tendency which has cropped up in recent discussions

of corporatism is to define or, better, submerge it into some wider

political configuration such as "the organic state" or "the author-itarian regime."12 The "organic state" concept runs up against

many of the criticisms of definitional vagueness, lack of potential

empirical specificity and circularity of argument leveled above at

the political cultural approach. More importantly, it fails to take

into account the historical fact that many "organically conceived"

states were not composed of corporatist subunits, but built upona great variety of "organs" ranging from the curies and phratries

of Fustel de Coulange's ancient city,13 to the "metallic" orders ofmoral excellence in Plato's ideal polity,14 to the three to five estate

systems of various anciens regimes,15 to the phalanges of Fourier,16to the rigions of Robert LaFont,17 even to the autonomous, pluralcommunities of Percival and Paul Goodman or Gar Alperovitz.18If one accepts that a special characteristic of modem corporatism

(this in both ideology and practice) concerns the role of functionalinterest associations, then it is but one of

many possiblestructural

units, for example, familial, territorial-communitarian, moral, reli-

gious, "productionist," etc., which may go into the establishment

of an "organic state." Emphasizing that macrocharacteristic does

little to specify concrete relations of authority, influence and repre-

sentation, except to differentiate them from equally vague notions

of the "mechanical state."

compatiblewith

manynon-Catholic, on-Iberianultures.See, for example,SamuelH. Beer,BritishPolitics n the CollectivistAge (NewYork, 1969) andThomasAnton,"Policy-Makingnd PoliticalCulture n Sweden," candinavianPoliticalStudiesIV (Oslo, 1969), 88-102.

12 See the conceptof "limitedpluralism"n JuanLinz,"An AuthoritarianRegime: Spain," n E. Allardtand S. Rokkan, ds.,MassPolitics(NewYork,1970), pp. 251-83,374-81.

In subsequent onversationswith this author,Linz has advancedanddefended he idea of an "organic tate model"as the appropriaterameworkfor the discussion f corporatism.See also the essaycited above'(fn. 3) byJamesMalloy n this volume.

13 Fustelde Coulange,La CiteAntique, th ed. (Paris,1872).14 Plato, Laws 5-6.15 Emile Lousse, Organizafo e representaf5ocorporativas(Lisbon, 1952),

a translation of his La SociJtI d'AncienR4gime (Bruxelles, 1943).16 F. Charles Fourier, Theories de l'Unitd Uniti Universelle (1822) and

Le Nouveau Monde industrielet sociitaire (1829).17 Robert LaFont, La Revolution Regionaliste (Paris, 1967).18 Percival and Paul Goodman, Communitas (Chicago, 1947) and Gar

Alperovitz, "Notes toward a Pluralist Commonwealth," Warner ModularPublications,Reprint No. 52 (1973).

91




The relation of corporatismin interest politics to a specific

global type of political regime is a much more complicated(and,

in my view, interesting)issue. For reasonswhich will, I hope, be-come apparent in the course of this essay I have found it more

useful to define it as a concrete,observablegeneralsystemof in-

terest representationwhich is "compatible"with several different

regime-types, .e., with different party systems,varietiesof ruling

ideology, levels of political mobilization,varying scopes of public

policy, etc. Then I will endeavorto specify distinct subtypesof

corporatistrepresentationwhich seem to have at least an elective

affinity for, if not to be essential defining elements of, specificregime-typesduring specificperiodsof their development.19

Yet another tendencyin the revived discussionof corporatismwhich differsfrom that proposedhere is that which submerges he

concept, not in some wider concept of regional political culture,state form or regime-type,but in some marcosocietalcharacteristic

such as the presenceof visual stigmata,20or the existenceof reli-

giously, ideologicallyor

linguisticallydeterminedzuilen

lager,or

familiesspirituelles.21Here the problemis simplythat stigmatizedor pillaredsocieties exhibit quite differentdegrees of corporatismin the senseused herein and that, vice versa, many heavily corpo-ratized systemsof interest representationexist in societies which

have no markedvisualstigmatizationor pillaredsocialand cultural

structures. Sweden is no less corporatizedbecause it lacks both

19In earlierworks, I tended to define corporatismexclusivelyin relation toauthoritarianrule. See the concluding chapter of my Interest Conflict and

Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971); also, "Paths to Political Develop-ment in Latin America,"Proceedings of the American Academy XXX, no. 4

(1972), 83-108 and "The Portugalizationof Brazil?" in A. Stepan III, ed.,AuthoritarianBrazil (New Haven, 1973).

20 Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring,Does Political DevelopmentExist? Corporatism n Old and New Societies (BeverlyHills, Sage Professional

Papers, II, no. 01-024, 1971).21 For example,Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation(Berkeley,

1968)-wherein all fairnessthe

conceptof

corporatismtself does not

appear.In a forthcoming essay by Martin Heisler, however, these "pillared" notionsare expresslylinked to a corporatistmodel of European politics: "Patterns of

European Politics: The 'European Polity' Model," in M. O. Heisler et al.,Politics in Europe: Structuresand Processes (New York, forthcoming).

Also relevant are Arend Lijphart "Consociational Democracy," WorldPolitics XXI, no. 2 (January, 1969 ), pp. 207-25; Val R. Lorwin "SegmentedPluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller Euro-pean Democracies,"ComparativePolitics III, no. 2 (January, 1971), 14-75;Gehard Lembruch,Proporzdemokratie:Politisches System und politische Kul-tur in der Schweiz und in Osterreich (Tiibingen, 1967).

92




dimensions;22Belgiumno more so becauseit suffersfrom both.23These are interestingand salient dimensionsof societies,in and by

themselves,but they do not seemto bear any closeassociationwiththe phenomenonupon which I recommendwe focus our attentionwith the concept of corporatism.

In the presentstate of nominalisticanarchyprevailingin the

discipline, t is absurd to pretendthat scholarswill somehow"rally"to a particularconceptualization, purnalternativeuses of the term,

and, henceforth,agreeto disagreeon the basis of a commonlexicaldefinition. About all one can expect from an introductorydiscus-

sion such as this may be to gain a few recruitsfor a more specificand bounded use of the concept of corporatism,and to warn thereader that a great deal of what has recentlybeen written about

corporatismand of what will subsequentlybe discussed in this

essay may be of no mutualrelevanceat all.

II

Having rejecteda seriesof alternativeusagesof the conceptof

corporatismand expressed a preference for a more empiricallybounded specificationwhich focuseson a set of relatively directlyobservable, institutionallydistinctive traits involving the actual

practice of interestrepresentation,t is now incumbent upon meto producesuch a conceptualspecification:

Corporatisman be definedas a systemof interestrepresentationin which the constituent nits areorganizednto a limitednumberof singular,compulsory,noncompetitive,hierarchicallyorderedand functionallydifferentiated ategories,recognizedor licensed(if not created) by the state and granteda deliberate epresenta-

22 Roland Huntford, for example, argues that is is precisely social andeconomic homogenizationwhich contributes to the thoroughnessof Swedishcorporatism;see The New Totalitarians (New York, 1972), pp. 86-87ff. AlsoOlaf Ruin, "Participation, Corporativization and Politicization Trends inPresent-daySweden" (Paper presentedat Sixty-secondAnnual Meeting of theSociety for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study, New York, May 5-6,1972).

23 On the contrary, a recent analysis of Belgium's associational structureargues persuasivelythat multipillaredconflicts in that polity serve to sustain amore pluralist (i.e., nonmonopolistic, competitive, overlapping) system ofinterest representation;see A. Van Den Brande, "Voluntary Associations inthe Belgian Political System 1954-1968," Res Publica, no. 2 (1973), pp. 329-356.

93




tionalmonopolywithin theirrespective ategoriesn exchange orobserving ertaincontrolson theirselectionof leadersand articu-lationof demandsand

supports.24

Obviously,such an elaboratedefinition s an ideal-typedescrip-tion,25 a heuristic and logicoanalyticalconstruct composed of aconsiderablevariety of theoreticallyor hypothetically nterrelated

components. No empiricallyextant system of interestrepresenta-tion may perfectlyreproduceall these dimensions,although twowhich I have studied in some detail (Brazil and Portugal) come

rather close.26 While the whole gestaltor syndrome s not directly

24 At this point it is perhaps worth repeating that this constructed defini-tion does not correspondto any of the ones advanced by specificallycorpora-tist theorists. Moreover, it ignores a number of institutional and behavioraldimensionsthey tended to stress. For example, it does not specify the existenceof singular associations (corporations) grouping both employersand workers.

(These rarely exist and where they have been formally established-Portugal,Spain and Italy-they do not function as units.) Nor does it say anything

about the presence of a higher council or parliament composed of functionalor professionalrepresentatives. (Many polities which are not otherwise verycorporatist,France or Weimar Germany,have such a Conseil Economique etSocial or Wirtschaftsrat;many heavily corporatist countries which do have

them, e.g., Portugal, do not grant them decisional authority.) Nor does thedefinitionsuggest that corporatistassociationswill be the only constituent unitsof the polity-completely displacing territorialentities, parties and movements.

(In all existing corporatistsystems,parties and territorialsubdivisionscontinueto exist and various youth and religiousmovementsmay not only be toleratedbut encouraged.) These institutional aspects as well as the more importantbehavioral issues of how

and who would form the unique and hierarchicalassociations,what would be their degree of autonomy from state control andwhether the whole scheme really could bring about class harmony and con-stitute a tertium genus between communismand capitalism were the subjectof extensive debate and considerablefragmentation among corporatist ideo-logues.

The ideological definition closest to my analytical one is MihailManoilesco's: "The corporation is a collective and public organization com-posed of the totality of persons (physical or juridical) fulfilling together thesame national function and having as its goal that of assuringthe exercise ofthat function by rules of law imposedat least upon its members"

(LeSiMcledu

Corporatisme, p. 176).25 Actually, the concept is more "a constructed type" than an ideal type.

The former has been defined as: "a purposive, combination,and (sometimes)accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referentsthat serves as a basisfor comparisonof empirical cases"'(John C. McKinnes, ConstructiveTypologyand Social Theory [New York, 1966], p. 3).

26 See my Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (fn. 19) and

"CorporatistInterest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal"(Paper presented at the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, Durham,N.H., October 10-14, 1973). Also "The Portugali7ationof Brazil?" (fn. 19).

94




accessible o measurement, ts postulatedcomponentscan be easily

assessed, f not immediatelyquantified. Such detailedinquiryinto

the extent to which a given systemof representations limited innumberof componentunits, compulsory n membership,noncom-

petitive between compartmentalizedectors,hierarchicallyordered

in internalstructure,recognizedor certified n some de jure or de

facto way by the state, successfulin exercisinga representational

monopolywithin functionallydeterminedcategoriesand subjectto

formal or informal controls on leadershipselection and interest

articulationwill not only enable us to distinguishwhat type of in-

terest system it belongs to, but may help us gauge the extent towhich thesemultipledimensionsare empiricallyas well as logicallyinterrelated. It is, of course,quite conceivableat this early stagein research nto these mattersthat what I have found to be a set

of interrelated nstitutionalpracticescoalescinginto a distinctive,

highlycovariantand resistantmodem systemof interestrepresenta-tion may be quite limitedin its scope of applicability, or example,

onlyto Iberianauthoritarian

egimes,or restricted o

onlyone sub-

type of corporatism,such as ones "artificially"establishedfrom

above by the state.One purpose n developing his elaborategeneralmodel,beyond

that of describing he behaviorof a certainnumberof politicalsys-temswhich have interestedme, is to offerto the politicalanalystan

explicit alternative to the paradigmof interest politicswhich has

heretoforecompletelydominatedthe disciplineof the North Ameri-

can politicalscience: pluralism. While a considerablenumberandwide varietyof scholarshave discoveredthat pluralism(and with

it, the closelyassociated iberaldemocraticregime-type)may be of

little utility in describingthe likely structure and behavior of in-

terest-group ystems n contemporarydevelopingpolities,and while

some have even gone so far as to suggestthat it may no longerbe

of much utilitywhen appliedto the practicesof advanced ndustrial

polities, few if any of these scholars have proposedan alternative

or contrasting model of modem representativeassociation-staterelations. Most of them merelymournthe passingor degenerationof pluralismand eitheradvocate its return,27 ts replacementwithsome more formalistic,authoritative(if not authoritarian)"jurid-

27 For example, Henry Kariel (ed.), Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New

York, 1970), and his, The Decline of American Pluralism '(Stanford, 1961);also Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York,

1966).

95



96 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

ical democracy,"28or its periodic bouleversementby spontaneoussocial movements.29

Pluralism and corporatismshare a number of basic assump-tions, as would almost any realistic model of modem interest

politics: (1) the growing importanceof formalassociationalunits

of representation;(2) the persistenceand expansionof function-

ally differentiated and potentially conflicting interests; (3) the

burgeoningrole of permanentadministrative taffs, of specializedinformation,of technicalexpertiseand, consequently,of entrenched

oligarchy; (4) the decline in the importanceof territorialand par-

tisan representation;and (5) the seculartrend toward expansionin the scope of public policy and interpenetrationof private and

public decision arenas. Nevertheless,despite this wide area of

mutual agreement,pluralismdiffersmarkedlyfrom corporatismas

an ideal-typicalresponse o these facts of modem politicallife.

Pluralism an be definedas a systemof interestrepresentationnwhich the constituentunitsareorganizednto an unspecified um-

ber of multiple,voluntary,competitive,nonhierarchicallyrderedand self-determinedas to type or scope of interest) categorieswhichare not specially icensed,recognized,ubsidized,reatedorotherwise ontrolledn leadership electionor interestarticulation

by the stateand whichdo not exercisea monopolyof representa-tionalactivitywithin theirrespective ategories.

Practitionersof corporatismand of pluralismwould heartily

agreewith

JamesMadison that

"amongthe numerous

advantagespromised by a well-constructedunion, none deservesto be more

accuratelydevelopedthan its tendency to breakand control (my

emphasis) the violence of faction." They would also agree that

"givingto every citizen the same opinions,the same passionsand

the same interests . . . is as impracticableas [suppressing hem

altogether PCS] would be unwise." Where the two practitionerswould begin to diverge is with Madison's further assertionthat

"it is in vain to say that enlightened tatesmenwill be able to adjustthesecashing interestsand renderthemall subserviento the publicgood." Corporatists,basing their faith either on the superiorwis-dom of an authoritarian leader or the enlightened foresight of

technocraticplanners,believe that such a publicunity can be found

28 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism:Ideology, Policy and the Crisis

of Public Authority (New York, 1969).29 Theodore Lowi, The Politics of Disorder (New York, 1971).




and kept. Their "scheme of representation," o use Madison's

felicitous phrase, instead of extending the "number of citizens"

and the "sphereof interests"would compress hem into a fixed setof verticalizedcategorieseach representinghe interdependentunc-tions of an organicwhole. Madison'smetaphorwas more mecha-

nistic,and moredynamic. Hence, he was lesssanguineabout limit-

ing and orderingthe sourcesof faction-whether from above by

imposition or from below by elimination. Corporatistsof what-ever stripeexpressconfidence that an "enlightened tatesman"(oran "enlightened tate") can co-opt, controlor coordinatenot only

those "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions[which] have beensufficient o kindleunfriendlypassionsand excite their mostviolent

conflicts,"but also that "mostcommon and durable sourceof fac-tion ... the various and unequal distributionof property."30

In short,both pluralistsand corporatists ecognize, accept and

attempt to cope with the growing structural differentiationandinterest diversityof the modem polity, but they offer opposing

politicalremedies and

divergent imagesof the institutionalform

that such a modem systemof interestrepresentationwill take. Theformer suggest spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation,horizontalextensionand competitiveinteraction;the latter advo-cate controlledemergence,quantitativelimitation,vertical stratifi-cation and complementarynterdependence.Pluralistsplace theirfaith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersectingforces;

corporatistsappeal to the functionaladjustmentof an organically

interdependentwhole.While time and space limitationspreventme from developing

the idea further,I suspectthat these two contrastingbut not dia-

metrically opposed syndromesdo not by any means exhaust the

possiblealternativesystem-types f modem interestrepresentation.For example, the Soviet experiencesuggests the existence of

a "monist"model which could be defined as

a systemof interestrepresentationn which the constituentunitsare organizednto a fixednumberof singular,deologically elec-tive, noncompetitive,unctionallydifferentiated nd hierarchicallyorderedcategories,created,subsidizedand licensedby a singlepartyand granteda representationalole within that partyandvis-a-visthe state in exchangefor observingcertaincontrolsontheir selectionof leaders,articulation f demandsandmobilizationof support.30 The quotationsare all from The FederalistPapers,no. 10.

97




Much more difficult to specify in terms of the componentdimensionswe have been using for the other three because of its

radical and utopian nature is the syndicalistalternative. Barelysketched n by a number of theorists(severalof whom subsequentlybecame corporatists),this projectedmodel seems to reject or to

seek to transformsubstantiallymany of the given characteristics f

the modern political process-more or less accepted or even en-

couraged by the other three syndromes. Nevertheless,a brief de-

scriptionof its characteristicswill be offeredbelow, partlybecause

it has emergedwith increasing requency (if not specificity) in re-

cent discussionsof participationand representation,31nd partlybecause it seems to round out in logical terms the combinatorial

possibilitiesof the variablesused to define the other threetypes.

Syndicalism ould be defined as a systemof interestaggregation(morethan representation)n which the constituentunitsare anunlimited number of singular, voluntary, noncompetitive(orbetterhived-off)categories, ot hierarchicallyrderedor function-

ally specialized,neitherrecognized, reated nor licensedby stateor party,nor controlled n their leadership electionor interestarticulationby state or party, not exercisinga representationalmonopolybut resolvingheir conflictsand "authoritativelyllocat-

ing their values"autonomouslywithout the interferenceof thestate.

With this last definition-modelwe have moved some distance

from our stated limited concernwith specifyingthe characteristics

of corporatismas a distinctiveand self-sustainingystemof interestrepresentation, nd not confusingit with a whole systemof politi-cal domination. Nevertheless, his excursionhas servedto remind

us that the processof capturing, organizingand articulatingthe

demandsof civil society as well as those of receiving,interpretingand even applying the "imperativecoordinations"of the state is

only part of the politicalprocess,and hence only intelligible n pur-

poseand

consequencewhen considered n relation to other

politicalsubsystems nd whole regimeconfigurations.This widerset of con-

cerns, ironically,leads us to a considerationof possiblesubtypesof corporatism.

31 See especiallythe article by Gar Alperovitzand works cited therein (fn.18), even though the author associates his proposals with the tradition of

pluralism,rather than that of syndicalism. Also Jaroslav Vanek, The Participa-tory Economy (Ithaca, 1971).

98




III

To illustrate that the skeletonal connotation of corporatismoffered above accuratelydescribesthe systemof interestrepresen-tation of a largenumberof countries, ncludingmanywhoseglobal

political systemsdiffer markedly,would not be difficult-even atthe existinglamentablestate of our empiricalknowledge. Hence,it has been arguedand ratherconvincinglyshown that Sweden,32Switzerland,33the Netherlands,34Norway,35 Denmark,36 Aus-

tria,37 Spain,38 Portugal,39Brazil,40 Chile,41 Peru,42 Greece,43

Mexico44and Yugoslavia45have, by and large, singular,noncom-82 Nils Elvander, Interesse-organisationer Dagens Sverige (Lund, 1966);

Thomas J. Anton (fn. 11), Olaf Ruin (fn. 22) and Roland Huntford (fn.22). Also Hans Meijer "Bureaucracyand Policy Formulation in Sweden,"Scandinavian Political Studies, no. 4 (Oslo, 1969), pp. 103-16.

33 Hans Huber, "Swiss Democracy" in H. W. Ehrmann, ed., Democracyin a ChangingSociety (New York, 1964), esp. p. 106.

84 P. E. Kraemer, The Societal State (Meppel, 1966). Also John P.

Windmuller,LabourRelations in the Netherlands (Ithaca, 1969).35

Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Plural-ism" in R. Dahl, ed., Political Opposition in Western Democracies (NewHaven, 1966), pp. 105-106ff.

36 Kenneth E. Keller, Governmentand Politics in Denmark (Boston, 1968),esp. pp. 169-70ff.

87 Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic. Democracy,Capitalismand the Social Order 1918-1934 (Princeton, 1960). Also, GehardLembruch (fn. 21) and Frederick C. Engelmann, "Haggling for the Equilib-rium: the Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959," American PoliticalScience Review LVI, 3 (September,1962), 651-620.

38 In addition toJuan Linz,

"An AuthoritarianRegime: Spain" (fn. 12),see Juan Linz and Armandode Miguel, Los Empresariosante el Poder Puiblico

(Madrid, 1966); Juan Linz, "FromFalange to Movimiento-Organizacion:The

Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968" in S. P. Huntingtonand C. H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York,1970), esp. pp. 146-183. Also Fred Witney, Labor Policy and Practices inSpain (New York, 1964).

39 Schmitter, "Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal" (fn. 26).

40 Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil and "ThePortugalizationof Brazil?" (fn. 26).

41 Constantine Menges, "Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile,"Journal of International Affairs XX (1966), 343-65. Also James Petras,Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 199-203, 209-19.

42 Julio Cotler, "Bases del corporativismoen el Peru," Sociedad y Politica,I, no. 2 (October, 1972), 3-12; also James Malloy (fn. 3).43 Keith Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, 1969).4 Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Illinois,1959), esp. chapters5 and 6.

45 International Labour Office, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia

99






subordination of political parties and, hence, broad aggregative

party goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan

ideologies;absenceof stable hierarchiesof organizationalnfluenceand, hence, irrelevanceof classor rulingelite as politicalcategories;low barriersof entry into the policy processand, hence, key roles

assignedto "potential groups" and absence of systematicbias or

exclusion;major importanceattached to lobbyingand, hence, con-

centration of attention upon parliament;assumptionthat policyinitiativesare producedby groupactivity"frombelow"and, hence,

passiveroles assumedon the partof state executiveand administra-

tive bureaucracies;wide dispersionof politicalresourcesand, hence,neither omnipotentveto groups nor powerlessmarginalelements;

and, finally,sheermultiplicityof interestand free associabilityen-

suring spontaneousemergenceof countervailing orces and, hence,a general tendency toward homeostasisor shifting equilibria.48Corporatist ystemsmay manageto acquireand sustainsimilarout-comesof demandmoderation,negotiatedsolutions, eader account-

ability, "deideologization,"nclusive

participation,countervalence

of powerand homeostaticbalance,but they do not do so throughthe processeswhich theoristsand analystsof pluralismhave em-

phasized. For example,in the studies I have conducted of one typeof corporatism, have found that such processfeatures as preemp-tion of issues; co-optation of leaders; vertical or sectoral policycompartmentalization;permanent institutionalizationof access;

"juridization"or legalizationof group conflictsthroughlabor and

administrativecourts; state technocratic planning and resourceallocation;extensivedevelopmentof functionallyspecialized,para-state agencies; political culturestressingformalism,consensusandcontinuousbargaining; symbioticrelation with clientelistand pat-rimonialistpractices n certain issue areasand regimelevels; delib-erate narrowingand encapsulationof "relevantpublics";periodicbut systematicuse of physicalrepressionand anticipatoryntimida-tion and, finally, the establishmentof what Dahrendorfcalled a

"cartelof anxiety" among restrictedelites representing he apexesof the differentiated hierarchic "orders" or "corporations"49 con-

tributedto the persistenceand viabilityof thosesystems-even over

protractedperiodsof economic and social change and when faced

48 These hypothesesabout the functioningof pluralistsystemsare developedfurther and contrasted with corporatist ones in my "Inventory of AnalyticalPluralist Propositions,"unpublishedMS, University of Chicago, 1971.

49 See the sources cited in fns. 19 & 26.

101




with acute, externallyinduced political crises. While comparisonsof institutional ongevityare difficult to make, thereis no evidence

I can see that corporatistsystemsof whatevertype are less stableor shorter ived than pluralistones. There is, however,very strongevidence that they function quite differently-if often to produce

generallysimilaroutcomes.This delineation of an equally elaborate,alternativemodel to

pluralismmay seem to some to be in and by itself sufficientjustifi-cationfor thisexercise,but most readersmust be feelingsomevaguesense of incompletenessif not of acute discomfort. After all,

Sweden is not Portugaland Switzerlandis not Greece; and yet,there they are-ignominiously grouped together under the same

rubric.The reason for this latent (or in some cases alreadymanifest)

sense of dissatisfaction ies, no doubt, in the stretch of the con-

ceptualdistinctionI havemade betweencorporatism nd pluralism.While this may be an indispensablepreliminary tep in classifyinginterest

systems, especially giventhe

ubiquityand

prestigeof the

pluralist abel, it is still one which, to use Sartori'sexpression,"doesnot travel well," or better, "travelstoo far too easily." If our re-searchobjectiveis not to make universalizing suprahistorical om-

parisons,but to exploremiddle-rangehypotheseswhich are explic-itly qualifiedas to cultural,historicaland even geographicalspace,then we must proceed further,per genus et differentiam, n our

taxonomictrip. We must, in short, developthe notion of possible

subtypes of corporatistinterest politics (just as, of course, weshould with pluralist ones, although that will not be attemptedhere) .50

That most original and stimulating of corporatisttheorists,Mihail Manoilesco,providedthe key distinction between two dif-ferent subtypes. The one he called corporatisme ur, in which the

legitimacyand functioningof the statewere primarilyor exclusivelydependenton the activityof singular,noncompetitive,hierarchically

orderedrepresentative"corporations."The second in contrast hecalled corporatismeubordonne, n which similarly tructured"cor-

porations"were createdby and kept as auxiliaryand dependentorgansof the state which founded its legitimacyand effective func-

50 I am following here the advice (and occasionally the vocabulary) ofGiovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformationin ComparativePolitics," AmericanPolitical Science Review LXIV, 4 (December, 1970), esp. pp. 1034-5.

102




tioning on other bases.51 This radical distinction s one which, as

we shall see, involvesnot only the nature of power and influence

relationsbut also the developmentalpatternby which corporatismemerges,has been reiterated,expandedupon and discussedat greatlength by Portuguesecorporatist heoristswhere the two subtypeswere labelled corporativismode associafao and corporativismode

Estado.52 For our purposeswe could label the former,autonomousand penetrative,as societalcorporatism; nd the second,dependentand penetrated,asstatecorporatism.

Some clues to the structural and behavioral elements which

differentiate hese two subtypesof corporatism an be found in ourinitial global connotation,or more specifically n what was delib-

eratelynot includedin that definition.

(1) Limited number: does not indicate whether established

by processesof interassociationalrrangement,by "politicalcartels"

designedby existing participantso excludenewcomers,or by delib-erate governmentrestriction.

(2) Singular: does not indicate whether the outcome ofspon-taneousco-optationor competitiveelimination s by survivingasso-

ciations, or by state-imposederadication of multiple or parallelassociations.

(3) Compulsory: does not specify whether de facto throughsocial pressure,contractual dues checkoff, provision of essentialservices and/or acquisition of private licensing capacity, or de

jure through labor code or other officially decreed, exclusively

concededauthority.(4) Noncompetitive: does not state whether the product of

internal oligarchic tendencies or external, treaty-like,voluntaryagreementsamong associations,or of the continuousinterpositionof state mediation,arbitrationand repression.

(5) Hierarchically ordered: does not indicate whether theoutcome of intrinsic processesof bureaucratic extension and/orconsolidation,or of state-decreedcentralizationand administrative

dependence.

51 Le Siecle du Corporatisme, p. 92. Manoilesco also noted the existenceof "mixedcorporatism"combiningthe two ideal-types.

52 Joao Manuel Cortez Pinto, A Corporagao,vol. I (Coimbra, 1955); alsoJose Pires Cardoso,QuestoesCorporativas(Lisbon, 1958).

A somewhat similar distinction, but one which placed primary emphasison its role in furtheringclass collaborationby differentmeans, is FrancoisPer-roux's between corporatisme lato sensu and corporatisme stricto sensu in

Capitalisme et CommunautJ de Travail (fn. 6), pp. 7-19.

103




(6) Functionally differentiated: does not specify whetherarrived at through voluntaristicagreementson respective"turfs"

and nonraidingprovisions,or by state-established nquadramento(framing) of occupational-vocational ategories.

(7) Recognition by state: does not differentiatebetweenrecog-nition granted as a matter of political necessity imposed frombelow upon public officialsand that granted from above by thestate as a condition for association ormation and continuousoper-ation.

(8) Representationalmonopoly: similar to above, does not

distinguishbetween that which is independentlyconquered andthat which is dependentlyconceded.

(9) Controlson leadershipselection and interest articulation:does not suggestwhether this is the product of a reciprocalcon-

sensuson procedureand/or goals, or of an asymmetric mpositionby the "organizedmonopolistsof legitimateviolence."

Through this exercise in intention-the further elaborationof

propertieswhich combineto form a

global concept-wehave con-

structed two quite distinctivesubtypes. The first, involving all or

most of the initial elements in the either/or dichotomiesmade

above, corresponds deally to what we have called societal corpo-ratism. Empirically, t is best exemplifiedby the casesof Sweden,

Switzerland,the Netherlands,Norway and Denmark, as well as

by emergent propertieswhich have been observedby scholarsin

such other, supposedlypluralist,systemsas Great Britain,Western

Germany, France, Canada, and the United States. The secondtype, describedby the latter elementsin each either/or distinction,coalesces nto a subtypewe have labelledstate corporatistand thisconformshistorically o the cases of Portugal,Spain, Brazil,Chile,

Peru, Mexico, and Greece-as well of course to the defunct expe-riences of Fascist Italy, Petainist France, National Socialist Ger-

many53and AustriaunderDollfuss.When viewed statically, descriptively, nstitutionally, hese two

subtypesexhibit a basic structuralsimilarity,one which sets themapart from pluralist,monist or syndicalistsystemsof interestrepre-sentation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealedas

53 Actually, Nazi Germany is an ambiguous case. For an excellent

analysisof the struggles involving competingconceptionsof interestpolitics andthe eventual demise of corporatist tendencies after 1936 in that polity, seeArthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Indiana,1964).

104




the productsof very differentpolitical, social and economic pro-cesses,as the vehicles for very differentpower and influencerela-

tions, and as the purveyorsof very differentpolicy consequences.Societal corporatism s found imbedded in political systemswith

relatively autonomous,multilayeredterritorialunits; open, com-

petitive electoralprocessesand party systems;ideologicallyvaried,

coalitionallybased executive authorities-even with highly "lay-ered" or "pillared"political subcultures. State corporatism endsto be associatedwith politicalsystems n which territorial ubunitsare tightly subordinatedto central bureaucraticpower; elections

are nonexistent or plebiscitary;party systems are dominated ormonopolizedby a weak singleparty;executiveauthoritiesare ideo-

logicallyexclusiveand more narrowlyrecruitedand are such that

politicalsubculturesbased on class, ethnicity,language,or region-alism are repressed. Societal corporatismappearsto be the con-

comitant,if not ineluctable,componentof the postliberal,advanced

capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatismseemsto be a

definingelement

of,if not structural

necessity or, theantiliberal,delayed capitalist, authoritarian,neomercantilist tate.

IV

Corporatismppearsundertwo verydifferentguises: the rev-olutionaryand the evolutionary.It is either the productof a"neworder"following rom a fundamental verthrow f the polit-ical and economic nstitutionsof a givencountryand createdby

force or special"collectivespirit";or the outcomeof a naturalevolution n economicand socialideas and events. In the lattercase,corporatismhenemergesas an aspectof a certain die-forceprogressing long with the amplification nd specification f theprocessof associationaldevelopment,generatingwhat one callstoday in several democraticcountries,"the corporative mys-tique."54

The Swiss author of these lines, himself rather caught up in

"the corporativemystique"which swept his countryin the 1930's,illustratesnot only that theoristswho contemplated he matter com-

parativelywere well aware of the distinctionbetweenthe two sub-

typeswe have defined above, but were also quite consciousof theneed for two essentiallyseparatetheoriesfor explainingthe emer-

gence of modem corporatism.One of these would be more likely4 Jean Malherbe, Le Corporatisme d'association en Suisse (Lausanne,

1940), pp. 13-14.

105




to emphasize ong-termtrends and slow, incrementalchange, cul-

tural and institutional continuity, gradual intellectual awareness

and passive political acceptance; the other more likely would beforged out of immediate conjoncture and impending collapse,

strong leadershipand repressiveaction, architectonicvision andinflatedrhetoric. In a nutshell,the originsof societal corporatismlie in the slow, almostimperceptibledecay of advanced pluralism;the originsof state corporatismie in the rapid, highly visible de-

miseof nascentpluralism.The task of constructing his set of dual theoriesis enormous

given the apparentlybewilderingvarietyof contextsin which onetype or the other of corporatismhas emerged,and the frustratingabsenceof empiricalstudieson the historicaldynamicsof whatever

type of interestgroup system. Complicatingthe task even further

is the naturaltendencyto confusethis problemwith the more gen-eral and clearlyinterrelatedone of the causes of the erosion/col-

lapse of liberaldemocracyand the advent/consolidationof author-itarian rule.55 Even if we focus

specificallyand

exclusivelyon

those factors which hypotheticallyaffect changesin the systemofinterestrepresentation,we must admit from the start that the bestwe can do is to identifysome probabilistically ecessarybut clearlyinsufficientconditions. We can only try post factum to strip his-torical cases of their idiosyncrasiesof personalityand culture, oftheir accidents of good and bad fortune, of their immediate but

superficialcatalystsand precipitants n order to reveal the under-

lying elements of structural conducivenesswhich led (and maylead in the future) to such similarand yet differentoutcomesassocietal and state corporatism.56I hardly need to emphasizethe

preliminaryand speculativenature of the followingdual theories.Nor should I have to stressthat they may not contributemuch

to explaining specificoccurrencesor nonoccurrences.For example,why did the halting and tentativeexperimentsn state corporatismby Sid6nio Pais in Portugal (1917-18), Primo de Rivera in Spain(1923-30), Pangalos n Greece (1925) and JoseUriburuin Argen-tina (1930-31) all fail to take hold when, ten to twelveyearslater,

55 Although I do not have them with me in my current voluntary exile,I do not recall that any of the case studies to be published shortly under the

editorship of Juan Linz on "The Breakdown of Democracy" specifically con-centrates on interest associations.

56 For the theoretical model underlying these distinctionsbetween "struc-tural conduciveness"and "precipitatingfactors," see Neil Smelser, Theory ofCollective Behavior (New York, 1963).

106






betweennational conomies,xpansion f the role of publicpolicyandrationalizationf decision-makingithin hestate to associate

or incorporateubordinate lassesand statusgroupsmorecloselywithin hepoliticalprocess.As for theabruptdemiseof incipient luralismnditsdramatic

and forcefulreplacement y statecorporatism,his seemscloselyassociatedwith the necessityo enforce"socialpeace,"not by co-

optingandincorporating,ut by repressingndexcludinghe au-tonomous rticulationf subordinatelassdemandsn a situationwherethe bourgeoisies too weak, internallydivided,externallydependentand/or shortof resourceso respondeffectivelyandlegitimatelyo thesedemandswithinthe frameworkf the liberaldemocratictate.

Of course,o thesegeneral lements,nemustadd several ther"overdeterminative"actorswhichcombinewiththe former,mak-

ing corporatismn increasinglyikelyoutcome:(1) secularrendstowardbureaucratizationndoligarchywithin nterest ssociations;

(2) priorratesof politicalmobilizationndparticipation;3) dif-fusionof foreigndeologies ndinstitutionalractices; 4) impactof international arand/or depression.Nevertheless,he coreof

myspeculationbout tructuralonducivenessestson theproblemsgeneratedby delayed, dependent capitalist developmentand non-

hegemonic lassrelationsn the case of statecorporatism,nd ad-

vanced,monopoly r concentratedapitalist evelopmentnd col-laborativelassrelationsn the case of societalcorporatism.

Turning o an explication f the advancedcapitalism-societalcorporatismelation, shallbe brief,partlybecauseof my lesser

familiaritywith this side, partlybecause hereexistsa seriesof

evocativelypresentedand excellentlydocumentedtudiesof the

subject.The firstmajortheorist o perceivecertainemergentmpera-

tivesofcapitalism

ndto linkthemexplicitly

withcorporatism

as

John Maynard Lord) Keynes.In a startling ssaypublishedn1926 entitled "The End of Laissez-Faire,"eynesfirst debunkstheorthodox laimsof liberalism:

It is not true that individualspossessa prescriptive"naturalliberty"n their economicactivities.There is no "compact" on-

ferring erpetualights n thosewhoHaveor thosewhoAcquire.The world s not so governedromabove hatprivate nd social

108




interestalwayscoincide. It is not a correct deductionfrom the

Principles f Economics hat enlightened elf-interest lwaysoper-ates in the publicinterest. Nor is it true that self-interests en-lightened;moreoftenindividuals ctingseparatelyo promote heirown ends are too weakto attaineven these. Experiencedoes notshowthatindividuals,whentheymakeup a socialunit,arealwayslessclear-sightedhan whentheyact separately.58

Given these negative results (and sous-entendu a growingawarenessof them among wider and wider publics exercisingtheliberal voluntaristicrights accorded them by the open franchise

and free associability), the agenda and nonagenda (as Keynescalled it) of the state must be modified. Or, as he put it more

bluntlyin anotheressay,"In the future,the Governmentwill haveto take on many duties which it has avoided in the past."59 The

objectiveof this imperativepolicyexpansion s to exercise"directive

intelligence through some appropriateorgan of action over the

many intricaciesof privatebusiness,yet ... leave privateinitiativeand enterpriseunhindered." More specifically,he noted the need

for (1) "deliberatecontrolof the currencyand of creditby a cen-tral institution,"(2) "dissemination n a greatscale of data relat-

ing to the businesssituations," (3) "coordinatedact(s) of intel-

ligentjudgement... as to the scale on which it is desirable hat the

communityas a whole shouldsave, the scale on which thesesavingsshouldgo abroad . . . and whetherthe presentorganizationof theinvestment market distributessavings along the most nationally

productivechannels"and, finally, (4) "a considerednationalpolicyaboutwhat size of Population... is most expedient."60For 1926,that was a prescientstatementabout the futurerole of the state in

capitalistsocieties-even down to the itemizedcontent and sequen-tial orderingof the new policyagenda.

Despitethe unorthodoxyof thesesuggestions or "improvementsin the technique of moder capitalism,"Keynes wisely observedthat "there is nothingin them which is seriously ncompatiblewith

what seems to me to be the essentialcharacteristicof capitalism,namelythe dependenceupon an intenseappeal to the money-mak-ing and money-lovinginstincts of individualsas the main motive

58 John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (London, 1952), p. 312.This essaywas initially publishedas a separatepamphlet in 1926.

59 Ibid., p. 331. The title of this essay, a speech delivered in 1925, is "AmI a Liberal?" Keynes's answer was, "Yes, faute de mieux."

60 Ibid., pp. 317-19.

109




force of the economic machine."61 The reason for his confidence

in their compatibility stems from the political instrumentality he

advocated to bring about this policy revolution, namely, societalcorporatism.

I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of con-trol and organization lies somewhere between the individual andthe modern state. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the

growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within thestate-bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is

solely the public good as they understand it, and from whose

deliberations motives of private advantage are excluded, thoughsome place it may still be necessary to leave, until the ambit of

men's altruismgrowswider, to the separateadvantage of particulargroups, classes, or faculties-bodies which in their ordinary courseof affairs are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limita-

tions, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of de-

mocracy expressedthrough parliament. I propose a return, it maybe said, towardsmedieval conceptions of separate autonomies.62

While there is no evidence (that I know of) that Keynes's slim

pamphlet exerted a direct, blueprint-like, influence or even pro-voked a general intellectual awareness of the issues he raised, in or

outside of Great Britain,63 the subsequent course of policy develop-ment in most developed Western nations confirmed his prognosis.The fundamental paradox involved has been excellently put by a

Dutch scholar:

The more the private citizens succeed in organizing themselvesinto powerful combines and associations for the promoting of theirmanifold and often conflicting interests, the more they underminethe conditions that are essential to the actual functioning of theclassical Liberalist concept of an automatically achieved equilib-rium of freely competing societal forces. And the more this spon-taneous harmonization proves to have little relation to reality, the

more the government is impelled to interfere in order to secure a

deliberatelyregulatedand

planned integrationof interests.64

61 Ibid., p. 319.62 Ibid., pp. 313-14 (my emphasis).68 The much later discussion of these issues in the United States was, as

might be expected, even more privatistic and antistatist than that of Keynes.For a critical evaluationof this literature,see Hal Draper "Neo-corporatists nd

neo-reformers,"New Politics (Fall, 1961), pp. 87-106.64 Kraemer (fn. 34), p. 83.

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To this I would simplyadd another: the morethe modem state

comesto serveas the indispensableand authoritativeguarantorof

capitalismby expanding its regulative and integrativetasks, themore it finds that it needs the professionalexpertise,specializedinformation,prior aggregationof opinion, contractualcapabilityand deferred participatory egitimacy which only singular, hier-

archicallyordered,consensually ed representativemonopoliescan

provide. To obtain these, the state will agree to devolve upon or

share with these associationsmuch of its newly acquireddecisional

authority,subject,as Keynesnoted, "in the last resortto the sover-

eigntyof democracyexpressed hroughParliament."This osmotic process whereby the modern state and modem

interest associations eek each other out leads, on the one hand, to

even furtherextensionsof publicguaranteesand equilibrations nd,on the other, to even further concentrationand hierarchiccontrol

within these privategovernments. The modalities are varied and

range from direct governmentsubsidiesfor associations, o official

recognitionof bona fide interlocuteurs,o devolved responsibilitiesfor such public tasks as unemploymentor accident insurance,to

permanentmembershipn specializedadvisorycouncils,to positionsof control in joint public-privatecorporations, o informal,quasi-cabinet status, and finally to direct participation n authoritative

decision-makingthrough national economic and social councils.

The sequence by which societal corporatismhas crept into the

polityprobablyvariesconsiderably aseby case,65but to the extent

that the Dutch patternis representative,t showsa peculiarcirculartrend. Thereit beganwith local and sectoral evel, jointlymanagedsocial insuranceschemes (1913); then moved to abortiveattemptsat establishingConciliation Boards (1919, 1923); to sectoral con-

sultative bodies (1933); to public extensionsof cartel decisions

(1935) and labor-management agreements (1937), obligatorilycovering nonmembers and nonparticipants;to sectoral licensingboardson investment(1938); to the reestablishment f a nationallycoordinatedwage determinationboard (1945); to indicative na-

tional planning (1945); then back to the establishmentof special-ized Product and Industrial Boards, along with an overall co-

65 A study which illustrates this particularly well in a nicely controlledcultural and developmental setting is Nils Evander, "CollectiveBargainingandIncomes Policy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis" (Paperprepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Sept. 4-8,1973).

111




ordinatingagency,the Social and Economic Council (1950); then

down to the establishment of consultative councils in each in-

dividualenterprise(1950) and, finally,to the creationof a nationallevel, joint coordinationcouncilfor social insurance(1959)-rightback where they startedin 1913.66 The resultantpatternevolved

pragmaticallyand unevenly, not by the unfolding of some con-

certed, grand corporatist design. It moved up and down from

enterprise o local to nationallevel; back and forth from a concernwith specificgoodsand services(insurance,health,apprenticeship),with specializedvertical productionareas (metallurgy,electronics,

chemicals,retailcommerce) and with broadhorizontalsectors (in-dustry,commerce,agriculture); and sidewaysfrom one issue areato another (wages, prices,investment, ndicativeplanning). Whilethe Netherlands'osmotic adaptationmay be unique in many re-

spects, I suspectthat a sequentialplottingof measuresof creeping

corporatismn otheradvancedcapitalistsocietieswould not be verydifferent.67

Thanksto the effortof AndrewShonfield,

thardly

seems neces-

sary to pursuethese speculationsmuch further. In his magisterial,Modern Capitalism,he has demonstrated n great detail how, in

orderto correct nherent defects linked to processesof internalcon-centration and external competition,the moder "positive"statefinds itself simultaneouslyattempting to foster full employment,promote economic growth, prevent inflation, smooth out business

cycles,regulateworkingconditions,cover individualeconomic and

social risks and resolve labor conflicts. This drastic modificationofthe governmentalagenda/nonagendahas in turn led to (and is in

part the product of) a major change in the relationshipbetweeninterestassociationsand the public bureaucracy,as advocatedand

predicted by Lord Keynes. Shonfield unhesitatinglylabels thisformulaas corporatist:"The majorinterestgroupsare broughtto-

gether and encouraged o concludea series of bargainsabout their

66 The work from which this primitive sequential account is drawn[Kraemer (fn. 34), pp. 54-65] leaves off in 1958. No doubt further private-public interpenetration has occurred since then.

67 Not all treatments of the emergence of societal corporatism place asmuch emphasis as I do on the role of advanced capitalism and the imperativetransformations it forces on the modem state. Huntford (fn. 22), pp. 87 ff.,for example, places most of his explanatory emphasis on the traditional agri-cultural system of Sweden, the role of temperance societies and a particular typeof industrial settlement (bruk). Thomas J. Anton bases his argument on adistinctive "Swedishpolicy-makingstyle and elite culture" (fn. 11), pp. 92-99.

112




future behaviour,which will have the effect of moving economic

eventsalongthe desiredpath. The plan indicatesthe generaldirec-

tion in which the interestgroups,includingthe state in its variouseconomicguises,have agreedthat they want to go."68

In postwarWesternEurope,Shonfieldfindsthis approachcom-

peting or combiningwith two others: (1) intellectualized, echno-

cratic "indicative"planning, and (2) reinforced,direct economic

control and ownership by the state. In a series of thoroughlyresearchedand well-constructed asestudies,he exploresthe extent

to which this societallycorporativeapproachhas creptdifferentially

into Europeanpolicy processes,alone or in combinationwith theother two. In specificinstances,he emphasizesgeneral historical-

institutional-legalvariables,69deologicalresidues,70prior levels of

voluntary associationalconsolidationand decision-making tyle,71seriousnessof demographic pressuresand economic reconstruc-

tion,72well-entrenched onceptionsof role on the partof organizedinterests,73as all providinga greaterincentivefor corporatization.

68 Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York, 1965), p. 231.Shonfield goes on to remark: "It is curious how close this kind of thinkingwas to the corporatisttheories of the earlier writers of Italian Fascism, whoflourished in the 1920's. Corporatismgot its bad name, which has stuck to it,essentiallybecause of its association with the one-party state" (p. 233).

69 "The corporatistform of organizationseems to be almost second natureto the Austrians. It is not that they are undemocratic; they nearly all belongto their businessand professionalassociations,their trade unions, their religiousand other groups, indeed membership n some of them is compulsory. And theGovernment is in turn under legal compulsion to consult these organizations

before it takes legislative or administrative action of certain specified kinds"(Ibid, pp. 193-94).

70 "It is interesting to find the old corporatist ideal which was deeplyembedded in Italian pre-war thinking-the ideal of a balanced and responsibleeconomic group with quasi-sovereignpowers administeringitself-cropping upagain in this new guise" (Ibid., p. 192).

71 "In Sweden there is a society in which interest groups are so stronglyorganized, their democratic basis so firm and their habit of bargaining witheach one anotherindependentlyof the governmentso well established .. (yet)the Swedish Governmentstill managesto act in a decisivefashionwhen circum-stances

requireit

....It

just happensthat it is

theSwedish

wayto treat the

process of government as being in large part an extended dialogue between

experts drawn from a variety of bodies, official and unofficial,whose views are

expected to be merely tinged rather than finally shapedby those who pay theirsalaries" (Ibid., pp. 199-200).

72 "The remarkablewillingness of the trade unions to collaborate activelyin this policy of wage restraint is to be explained by their anxiety about thefuture supply of jobs for Dutchmen" (Ibid., p. 212).

73 "The general point is that German Verbande have traditionally seenthemselves as performingan important public role, as guardiansof the long-term interests of the nation's industries, and they continue to do so. The

113




Even more fascinatingare his explanationsof why certain Euro-

pean countrieshave resisted,or better,not so quicklyor thoroughly

succumbedto this approach. For France, he stresses the role ofspecializedtrainingand corporateself-consciousnessn the part of

higher civil servants;74for the United Kingdom, he finds theanswerin "the traditionalBritishview of the proper relationshipbetween public and private power (in which) the two . . . are

thought of as utterly distinct from one another,"as well as resis-tanceby industrialistso compulsorymembershipand jurisdiction.75In a brilliant discussionof the Americanparadox-"the Americans

who, in the 1930's, acted as the precursorsof the new capitalism,seemedto stall in their coursejust when the systemwas comingtofruition in the Westernworld-showing its full powersto providethe greatgiftsof economicgrowth,full employment,and socialwel-fare"-Shonfield searches or the causesof this abortiveattemptto

encouragecorporatistormsof policy-makingduringthe earlyNew

Deal (1933-35). He findsthem in the internallycompetitive,over-

lapping jurisdictionsof the federal and state

bureaucracies,the

preferred eadershipstyle of Roosevelt ("his penchantfor the roleof bargainer-in-chief,his evident delight in the exercise of a kindof administrativeathleticism"), in the active, intrusive role of

Congress n the administrativeprocess,the juridicaland legalisticimprint imposed on the Americanstate by the special role which

lawyershave playedwithin it, and in the absenceof a more profes-sionalized,self-confidentelite of civil servants.76 While Shonfield

does carryhis analysis nto the mid-1960's,it is too bad that it stopsbefore Lyndon Johnson and even more rapidly, Richard Nixon,who managed to transformthis "arm's-lengthrelationshipwith

privateenterprise" as Shonfielddescribes t) into somethingmore

closely resemblingthe sort of "active huddle" which the NRA

corporatistshad advocatedin the earlythirties.77Modern Capitalismprovidesus with a veritablegold mine of

interestinggeneralhypothesesconcerningthe emergenceof societal

development one observes since the war is that the approach to problems ofpolicy has become more consultative, with the emphasis on technical advice.Power and influence are still present; but the manner is different" (Ibid., p.245).

74 Ibid., pp. 122 ff.75 Ibid., p. 99; also pp. 231-33 for a more explicit contrast with the French

tradition.76 Ibid., pp. 298-329.77 Mark Green and Peter Petkas, "Nixon's Industrial State," The New

Republic, September 16, 1972, p. 18.

114




corporatismand specific, if somewhat ad hoc, subhypothesesex-

plaining its differentialrole in contemporaryWesternpolities and

its emergent relationswith other policy-mechanismsof advancedcapitalist management. From my admittedly less knowledgeable

vantage point, I would tend to emphasizea longer period of his-

toricalregress, or example,to include planning,rationing,mobili-

zation and reconstructionmeasurestaken during and followingWorld War I and their impact upon subsequent"public policy

paradigms."78Add to these a more explicit discussionof certain

political variables,such as degree of prior class consciousnessand

intensityof class antagonism,extent of prior party-interest ssocia-tion interpenetration (lager-typestructures), ideological diffusion

and internationalclimate,plus priorrates of politicalmobilization

and participation. Nevertheless, n our understandingof societal

corporatismwe are off to an impressive,f still speculative,start.

We are not so fortunatelyendowed at either the theoretico-

deductive or theempirico-inductive

evel withrespect

to state

corporatism. Of course, one reason is that there exists no com-

panion volume to Modern Capitalismentitled Dependent or De-rived Capitalism-not yet. But this lack of detailed comparativecase studiesor even good single country monographs s only partof the difficulty.

Theorists-apologistsor state corporatismare usually not very

helpful. This, not so much because they tended to be less per-

ceptive and personally objective than, say, Lord Keynes, butbecausethey were caught in a built-in contradictionbetweentheir

subjectivespeculativetask and the objective politicalfunctiontheywere indirectlycalled upon to perform.

So, for example, there is scarcely a single state-corporatisttheoristwho does not proclaimhis oppositionto statism,his com-

78 Shonfield concentrates almost exclusively on the post-World War II

period. Only in the case of the United States does he systematically probefurther back. Is it just a coincidence that those European countries whichwere neutral in World War I moved more rapidly and thoroughly towards

corporization (except Austria), than the belligerents? Also worth exploringin

greater detail are the diverse policy responsesto the Great Depression-as our

rapid sketch of the Netherlands illustrated.For the concept of "dominantparadigmof public choice" and its effect in

reducing alternative courses of action, see Charles W. Anderson, "Public

Policy, Pluralism and the Further Evolution of Advanced Industrial Society"(Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans,1973).

115




mitment to decisional decentralizationand his desire for eventualassociationalautonomy.79 Nevertheless,our theoristis aware that

given the fragmented,ideologicallycharged and class-dividedna-ture of the political system he is operatingwithin, singular,non-

conflictive, hierarchicallyordered and functionally compartmen-talized associationsare not likelyto be spontaneously orthcoming.He therefore advocates the temporaryuse of state authority to

establishthese compulsory tructures-and to removevoluntaristic,

competing ones-all, of course, in the name of national and/orpublic interest. Otherthan some vaguelyspecifiedreferenceto the

eventualemergenceof a "corporatist onsciousness"his equivalentto the New SovietMan), ourtheoristconveniently orgetsto specifythe politicalmechanismby which the state'sauthoritarianpresencecan be made to "fade out," leaving those imagined self-governingagentsof decentralizeddecision-makingbehind. Perhapsthe mostobvious case of this praxiologicalhypocrisyhas been Portugal, if

only because Oliveira Salazarso repeatedlyand (apparently) sin-

cerely expressedhis fervent

oppositionto statism or even to

anyform of governmentaleconomicintervention,while presidingoverthe creationof one of the most overbureaucratized,minutelyregu-

lated, centralized tate apparatuses ver observed.If such theoristscan hardlybe trusted with regardto the state,

then neither can one expect them to be entirely candid about

corporatism'selationto capitalismand specificclassinterests. Oneof their favoritethemes-admittedly one which is today somewhat

less loudly proclaimed-is that corporatism rom above constitutessomesort of tertiumgenusbetweenand distinct from eithercapital-ism or socialism-communism.Hence, while they are often capableof decrying,in lurid and quite convincing terms, the inequitableand rachiticperformanceof existingcapitalistinstitutions(and of

conjuringup terrible visions of life under godlesssocialism), theyare obviouslynot very concernedwith revealinghow the forceful

implantationof corporatismacts as an instrument or rescuingand

consolidatingcapitalismrather than replacingit. Given the unan-

79 A partial exception would have to be entered for the Fascists: Bottai,Bortolotto,Papi and Vito but not, for example, for Ugo Spirito who even wentso far as to suggest that corporazioneshould replace both private individualsand the state as the basis for propertyand decision-making,thereby causing aminor scandal at the 1932 Ferrara Congress on Corporatism. Capitalismo e

Corporatismo,3rd ed. (Florence, 1934). Interestingly, Spirito's works havebeen recently reedited.

116




imous emphasis hey place on functional nterdependencend

group harmony,we should hardlyexpect them to delve too deeply

into the elements of class conflict, status antagonismand center-peripherytension that such an imposed system of interest repre-sentation is designedto suppress, f not overcome.

In short, as we attempt to put together speculativelysome

hypothesesas to the contexts n which this state corporatist esponse

emergesand the possible range of variationand sequencesof im-

plantationit may encompass,we are not likely to get much helpfrom its manifest theorists-apologists, s we did in the case of

societalcorporatism.There is, fortunately, one interesting exception: Mihal3

Manoilesco. Manoilescowas a sort of Salazarmanque. A professorof political economy (although an engineer by training) and

ministerof commerceand industryfor a shortperiod in his native

Rumania,80he wroteLe Siecle du Corporatisme nd its companionwork,Le Parti Unique,after his politicalcareerhad been cut short

andpublished

them in Paris. In the formerhe notonly

advancedhis cosmic predictionabout the ineluctable future of corporatism,but he supportedhis positionwith a complex, if schematic,argu-ment-elements of which are strikinglymodern.81

First Manoilescoasserts(other corporatist heoriststo the con-

trarynotwithstanding)that his conceptionof this systemof interest

representation-actually he presents it as a complete system of

politicaldomination-has nothingto do, institutionallyor ideation-

ally, with an imagined revival of Catholic or medieval practices.Not only does he doubt the existence of naturalharmonyin such

anciensregimes,but he acceptsas definitiveand desirable he rup-ture performedby nineteenth-centuryiberalismand capitalistde-

velopment. His argument, then, is rigorouslysecular and, in his

view, both progressiveand realistic,looking forwardprospectivelyrather than backwardnostalgically.

Second, Manoilesco makes his case on materialist grounds.Whileconvinced, ikeDurkheim, hat properlyconstructedcorpora-

80 For a brief descriptionof his role in relation to Rumanian politics, seeAndrew Janos, "The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europebetween the Wars" in S. Huntington and C. H. Moore, eds. (fn. 38), pp.213-14.

81 In the following summaryof his argument I will not cite specific pagereferences,except in the case of direct quotes, since the elements of his positionare frequentlyscattered rather widely and I have synthesizedthem freely. All

quotes are from the 1936 edition (fn. 1).

117




tionswould providethe answerto overcomingmodem man's moral

and spiritual malaise, integrating him into society through new

communalbonds, the imperativeforces leading to corporatizationwere to be found in the politicaleconomyof his time, in the nature

of ownership,productionand distributionof capitalismitself. In

fact, at several reprises, Manoilesco approvingly cites Marx,

althoughin generalhe regardshim as a theoristof the past rather

than the present century.Third, Manoilesco denies that corporatisms merely a tempo-

rary defensemechanism for the mobilizationand/or protectionof

classegoismwhich will somehowfade away when the conjuncturalthreat has passed. Rather, he presents t as a permanentinstitu-

tional form, not intrinsicallybeholden to any social class or even

to the maintenanceof the statusquo, capableof subduing particu-lar interests to overridingnational goals and eventuallyof trans-

formingthe capitalistbasisof society tself.In contemporaryparlance, Manoilescowas a theoristof "ex-

ternal dependence."While he

occasionallyhints at essentially

internal political conditions,for example, "premature" adicaliza-tion of the workingclassthroughideologicaldiffusion,fragmenta-tion and loss of nerve on the part of the bourgeoisie,urban-rural

tensions, decline of local and regional loyalties, that might con-

tributeto provokinga corporatistresponse, ts essential "reason or

becoming" ies in the systemof unequalinternationalexchange.

Just as Marx'stheoryleads us to understand he socialphe-nomenaof the capitalistworld and especially hat of exploitationby classes, his theoryof international xchangemakes us under-standthe inequalitybetweenpeoplesandrelationsof exploiterand

exploited hatconnectthem.82

Corporatism, s he understoodand advocatedit, is an institutional-

politicalresponse o a particularprocessof transformationhat the

world political economyand its attendantsystemof international

stratifications presentlyundergoing. Its "dominant cause"lies inthe relationsbetween peoples, rather than between classes withinnational units. In fact the latterareconditioned, f not determined,

by the former. The entirespectrumof politicalforceshas shifted:"The Nineteenth Centuryknew the economic solidarityof class.

82 Ibid., p. 30.

118




The Twentieth will know the economic solidarityof nations."83

Accordingto Manoilesco,the dynamicelement in this process

of world economic transformation onsistsof a radical "national"demandfor restructuringhe internationaldivisionof laborand itsdistributionof benefits. Peripheralcapitalistnationsare becomingincreasinglyaware of the disparityin returnsgenerated by their

exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs for the manufactured

goods producedby the advanced,earlierdevelopingeconomiesandare beginningto implementnew national economic policies,espe-cially ones aiming at import-substitutingndustrialization nd con-

trol of foreigntrade. This diffusion of industrialization nd policytechniques was greatly accelerated by World War I, but is anautonomoussecular trend which can be expected to continue on

throughoutthe century. In essence and embryo,Manoilesco an-

ticipated the general arguments and even many of the specificpoints of what twenty yearslater came to be known as the ECLA

(EconomicCommission or Latin Americaof the United Nations)doctrine

or,even

later,the UNCTAD

(UnitedNations Conference

on Trade and Development)position.To this, he added a second,more static observation: the end of

territorialexpansion. The twentieth century, he felt, would seethe exhaustionof both open internalfrontiersand manifestexternal

imperialism. While he by no means could be credited with fore-

seeing the formal decolonializationof Africa and Asia (his per-spectivewas strictlyEurocentric),he did see that the international

systemhad in a physicalsense filledout existingspace. Bordersandloyaltieswere becoming fixed; territorialityrom being a variablehad become a constant. Economic, social and political problemswould have to be tackledand especiallyorganizedwithin constant,zero-sumparameters.

These compound changes in interational relations-the col-

lapse of the prewarliberal economicorder, the risingdemand for

equalityof benefit and status between nation-states, he definitive

demarcationof territoriality- provided the materialistic (andspeculative)foundations or Manoilesco'sideologyof defensive,na-tionalistic modernization from above. Each national unit, each

state, must henceforthact exclusivelyas its own agent in its owninterests and with its own resources,bargaining continually forsurvival and self-advantagein a dangerousand unstably equili-

83 Ibid., p. 35.

119




bratedinternationalsystem. Nineteenth-century ssumptionsabout

liberty and initiative in the pursuitof individual self-interestand

the benevolent, self-correctiveoperation of free and competitivemarketsand political processeswere no longer valid. As a con-

sequence of these new tensions between central and peripheralcapitalismsand between all autarkicallyminded nation-states, hetwentieth century would impose new conceptionsof justice andforms of politicalorganization.

Corporatism, e argued,would be one of, if not the institutional

responseto these impe6ratifse P'poque. It alone would permitthe state to fulfil the new functions which were being thrustuponpublic policy by external exigences. It would emerge first wherethose imperativesand tensionswere the strongest,the southeasternand southern peripheryof Europe, but once successfulthere, itwould compel similartransformationsn the organizational truc-ture and policy practicesof the earlierdeveloping, liberal-pluralistsystems.

But why corporatism?Why this particularset of sous-instruments de 'Etat as Manoilesco unflinchingly called them? His

argumentsare multiple,if not equallyconvincingand consistent:

1) Such corporationswould fill out a continuoushierarchyof

authority,therebyprovidingthe isolated and impotent individualwith a set of well-defined ntermediaryranks and loyalties"drag-ging him into society" a la Durkheim and offering the politicalsystemthe means "to resolve from a unitary and logical point of

view all the specializedproblemsposed by the complex relationsbetween the individual and the state."84 To do this, Manoilesco

noted, these new units of representationwould have to be integral,not just cover economic interestsas in Fascist Italy, but spiritualand moralones as well.

2) The functional specialization of corporationswould be

"technologically elf-determining"dividing the polity into verticalunits of interest

aggregationwhich in turn would enhancethe role

of technical expertise, depersonalize leadership and bring out

naturallybalancedinterdependenciesetweenissueareas. Most im-

portantlyand specifically, hey would facilitatethe expandingroleof the state in national economic planning and internationaleco-nomic bargaining.

3) By devolving authorityfrom the state to "neatlydefined,"

84Ibid.,p. 74.

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"never contradictory" and "preestablished" interest hierarchies, the

state would be relieved of decisional and implementational re-

sponsibility over "nonessential" matters (welfare, health, etc.) andcould then devote more attention and effort to such "essential"

tasks as internal security, external defense, foreign affairs, and

national propaganda. In addition,

The multiplication of economic, cultural, intellectual andsocial functions of the state and the plurality of sources of publicpower creates a new function (or gives greater scope to a function

already existingin

embryonic form)which is the

function ofarbitration and coordination of all national activities. . . . The

imperativesof our time oblige the state to recognize these [conflictsof collective interests];they even oblige it to solve them. And theymake the state the most active and solicited of arbitrators . . .

[Even more] the state must have [its own power of initiative]. Itmust anticipate these conflicts of interest; it must have the initia-tive over all general decisions facilitating the coordination of na-tional activities. Initiative becomes a new function unknown bythe individualist state and embracing all manifestations of national

life.85

4) Corporatism through its compartmentalized vertical pillaringand internal hierarchy of authority would provide an antidote to

the "spirit of class." This latter, outmoded form of "horizontal con-

sciousness" would be replaced by the new spirit of national soli-

darity and functionally interdependent organization.

Despite the fact that corporative consciousness is presentlyweak, it will always triumph in the end. Because in the limitedworld we are entering today, where solidarity and organizationare imperatives for survival, there will be no place for artificialsocial differences. Or, differencesof class are mostly artificial and

temporary, linked to the exceptional circumstances of the nine-teenth century.86

While Manoilescoimplies

that this "benevolent"ninety-degreeswitch in the polarities of group consciousness would begin in the

periphery and come as the result of, rather than the prerequisite for,the forceful implantation of state corporatism, he hints that it will

85 Ibid., p. 131. This is the same author who thirty pages before hadclaimed: "Between the corporatist conception of the state and the pure in-dividualisticone, there is a certain coincidencein outcomes. Both systemsresult(aboutissent) in a minimal state"!! (p. 101).

86 Ibid., p. 107-8.

121






integrationthat "old" and "artificial"class and partisan loyaltieshad been eradicatedor, at least,severelyeroded. This, he admits,is

a long way off and, in the meantime, those "imperativesof theepoch" demand action, especiallyin the periphery. There, sub-ordinate corporatism s the only answer: "It is natural that the

corporationsmust be held in tutelage. The indicated tutor ... isthe single party. . . for a transitoryperiod."90

In the presentabsence of comparativecase studies, it is not

easyto evaluate the meritsof Manoilesco'sprototheoryof the emer-

gence of state corporatism,or to elaboratefurtherupon it. In a

very general way, there seems to be a correspondence etween thecontext of peripheral,delayed-dependent apitalism;awarenessof

relative underdevelopment;resentment against inferior interna-tional status; desirefor enhanced national economic and political

autarky; extension of state control through regulatory policies,sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more

professionalizedand achievement-oriented itus of civil servants;and the forced

corporatizationof interest

representationfrom

above. Manoilesco'sbelated remarkson the specific nstrumentalityresponsible or this change have been less well confirmed. In nocase was the single ruling party the primaryor exclusivetutelary

agent. Rather,state executiveand administrativebodies tended to

act directlyin both establishingand subsequentlycontrollingthese

new sous-instruments.The implantationof state corporatism, n

fact, was compatiblewith a wide range of party contexts-from

the no-partysystemsof Brazil, Greece and Austria, to the weak,reigningbut not ruling,single-party ystemsof Spain and Portugal,to the strongmonopolisticpartysystemsof Fascist Italy and Nazi

Germany.On the surface, state corporatismwas implanted much more

dramatically,quickly,thoroughlyand rationallythan was the casewith the hestitant,uneven, experimental, ncremental,"creeping"patternof its societalcousin. "Bornat the strokeof the legislativebaton," as one French criticput it,91overnight mmenseorganiza-tional hierarchieswith sonorousnames were created, covering allinterestsectorsand all levels of the politywith impressive ymmetryof representative nd equalityof access. Subsequently,hesemonu-

90 Mihail Manoilesco, Le Parti Unique (Paris, 1937), p. 134.91 Emile Coornaert, Les Corporations en France avant 1789, 4th ed. (Paris,

1941), p. 293.

123




ments of political architecture persisted for years virtually without

juridical or formal modification.

However, detailed analyses92 have not only revealed the ficti-tious physical existence of many of these sonorous organizationsand their marginal influence over public policy, but have also un-

masked their pretence of class symmetry and equality of access.

Moving ruthlessly to suppress all preexisting worker associations

and to fill the resulting organizational vacuum as quickly as pos-sible with the maximum number and most widely dispersed set of

new compliant worker sindilcatos,the state corporatists acted much

more cautiously and "understandingly" with respect to producerand owner interests. Preexisting, voluntaristically supported asso-

ciations were tolerated or incorporated with their leadership and

functions intact; strategically placed elites were granted special

organizational privileges and exemptions, for example, the right to

form specialized national associations independent of the generalsectoral hierarchies; rural landowners, except for those cultivating

certain export crops,were left

largely untouched,and associations

for rural workers, where allowed to exist, were placed under their

local control; no serious attempt was made to transform such pre-

existent, premodern corporations as the Church and the univer-

sities; corporatization of civil servants was expressly prohibited, as

well as other forms of associability for this situs; finally, either no

attempt was made to create "uniclass" peak associations of em-

ployers and workers (Brazil) or, where the attempt was belatedly

made (Portugal), the resultant corporaFoes have been run by andfor employers. In short, what appear at first sight to be architec-

tonic monuments of great scope, foresight and symmetry turn out

upon closer inspection to be just about as limited, improvised and

lopsided as those of their societally corporatist relatives.

Some of Manoilesco's prototheoretical assumptions about the

political functions and policy consequences of state corporatismseem to have been confirmed by its subsequent praxis. It has been

associated with the extension of state control over export com-

modities, sectoral policies of import substitution and attempts to

exert greater influence in international economic negotiations.While by no means successful in eradicating horizontal (class)

92 This and the following generalizations about the praxis of state corpo-ratism draw on my case studies of Brazil and Portugal (fns. 19 & 26). The

Italian Fascist case, however, does not appear to differ markedly. See Roland

Sarti, Fascism and Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940 (Berkeley, 1971).

124






"Shahsays,'Communism.'""No, Kuppo!" said Halyard vehemently. "The government

does not own the machines.They simply

tax thatpart

ofindustry'sincome that once went into labor, and redistributeit. Industry is

privately owned and managed, and co-ordinated-to prevent thewaste of competition-by a committee of leaders from private in-

dustry, not politicians. By eliminating human error through ma-

chinery, and needless competition through organization, we'veraised the standard of living of the average man immensely."

Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,Player Piano (p.28)

If we accept Manoilesco's belief in centennial longevity and myhunch that it all began during and immediately after World War

I, then we are presently right smack in the middle of the centuryof corporatism and hence condemned to live with it for another

fifty or so years. Kurt Vonnegut's poetic imagination offers us

the "comforting" thought that full corporatization will only come

in the aftermath of a third major world war. Nevertheless, barring

his vision of a future global conflagration precipitating furtherchange, and adopting a more surprise-free scenario, we may ques-tion whether corporatism, state or societal, will manage to fill out

its century.

State corporatism is everywhere revealing itself more and more

costly to maintain through repressive measures and less and less

capable of providing the accurate information, semivoluntaristic

complianceand contractual

complicityneeded for

managingthe

modern capitalist state. The obvious answer, an institutional shift

from the imposed, exclusionist to the invited, inclusionist type of

corporatism, has yet to be made peacefully and incrementally. But

the transition to societal corporatism seems to depend very much

on a liberal-pluralist past, involving the following: a history of

autonomous organizational development; authenticity of repre-sentation; protracted encounters between classes and sectors which

acquired distinct self-images and loyalties and, eventually, a mea-sure of mutual respect; the presence of competitive party and par-

liamentary arenas to which wider appeals could be addressed;

and, perhaps most importantly, on a previous pattern of relative

noninterference by the state which only gradually came to expandits role-and then usually at the request of organized private in-

terests.

Countries locked into state corporatism at an earlier stage of

126




developmentare likely to find it much more difficult to evolvetoward such a consensualsolution. There the establishedpattern

is one of asymmetric dependence, unauthentic and fragmentedrepresentation,weak associational oyalties, suppressedor manip-ulated conflict, little mutual respect among groups, no effectivemeans of appealing to wider publics and pervasivestate bureau-cratic control.94 Under these conditions,it is difficult to imaginea politicallycontinuous ransformation owardsocietalcorporatism;rather, one suspects that the state-corporatist ystem must first

degenerateinto openly conflictful,multifaceted,uncontrolledin-

terestpolitics-pluralism in otherwords-as appearsto be happen-ing in contemporarySpain.

Established,societallycorporatistsystemsare also facing new

tensionswhich they, too, seem incapableof resolving.95They are

being bombarded with demands for more direct and authenticforms of participation,underminingboth the stabilityof their estab-

lished internal hierarchiesof authorityand their claims to demo-cratic

legitimacy.More

importantly, heyare

being bypassedwith

increasingfrequencyby broad social movements on the one side

and specific spontaneousprotest actions on the other. The veryvalues and assumptionsabout society upon which corporatism

ultimately rests, functional specializationand hierarchicalorgan-

ization, securityand prevision, "productivism" nd efficiency,eco-nomic growth and mass consumptionas ends in themselves,are

being called into questionby these movementsand actions. Here,

the prospectiveassociationalansweris certainlynot further societalcorporatization,nor a reversionto past pluralism,nor even less a

regression o state corporatism,but may be some experimentationwith the sort of dispersed, nonspecialized,nonhierarchic,"hived-

off," voluntaristicunits, autonomouslyresponsiblefor allocatingtheir values and resolvingtheir conflicts,an interestsystemwhich

we earliertentatively dentifiedas syndicalist. Again, however,the

94 These conclusions about the difficulties inherent in the transformation

from one type of corporatism to the other are based on the study I have con-

ducted on Portuguese corporatism and are discussed more fully therein; see

"Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal"

(fn. 26).95 These and other tensions and contradictions of advanced societal corpo-

ratism are explored in Christopher Wheeler, "The Decline of Deference: the

Tension between Participation and Effectiveness in Organized Group Life in

Sweden," unpublished MS, Beloit College, 1972. Also Ruin (fn. 22).

127






Otto Von Gierke, Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht, vols. (Berlin, 1868).Georges Guy-Grand, "Vue sur le corporatisme,"Archives de Philosophie du

Droit et de Sociologie Juridique (1938), pp. 7-26.

Maurice Hanriou,La Theorie de l'Institution et de la Fondation (Paris, 1925).S. G. Hobson,National Guilds (London, 1919).PierreJolly, La mystiquedu corporatisme(Paris, 1935).W. E. von Ketteler,AusgewahlteSchriften,ed. J. Humbauer,3 vols. (Kempten-

Miinchen, 1911).John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire(London, 1926).Rudolf Kjellen, Der Staat als Lebensform,4th ed. (Berlin, 1924). Original

Swedish edition in 1916.Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven, 1917).Harold Laski,Authority in the Modern State (New Haven, 1927).

BernardLavergne,Le gouvernementdes democratiesmodernes,2 vols. (Paris,1933); especially vol. I, pp. 176 et seq.

Ramiro de Maeztu, La Crisisdel Humanismo,2nd ed. (Buenos Aires, 1951).Originally publishedas Authority,Liberty and Function in 1916.

Ramiro de Maeztu, Un Ideal Sindicalista (Madrid, 1953).Henri de Man, Corporatismeet Socialisme (Bruxelles, 1935).Mihail Manoilesco,Le parti unique (Paris, 1937).Mihail Manoilesco, Le siecle du corporatisme, "Nouvelle edition," (Paris,

1936). Original edition in 1934.

Eugene Mathon, La corporation, base de l'organisation iconomique (Paris,

1935).CharlesMaurras,OeuvresCapitales.EssaisPolitiques (Paris, 1973).Giuseppe di Michelis, World Reorganisation on CorporativeLines (London,

1935).David Mitrany, A WorkingPeace System (Chicago, 1966). Originally pub-

lished in 1943.Robert von Mohl, Politische Schriften, ed. by Klaus von Beyme (Koln u.

Opladen, 1966).Adam Muller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst, 2 vols. (Wien/Leipzig, 1922).

Originally published in 1809.Albert de

Mun, Discours,7 vols.

(Paris, 1895-1904).Albert de Mun, Ma vocation sociale (Paris, 1909).Auguste Murat, Le Corporatisme (Paris, 1944).

, L'organisationcorporative (Angers, 1935).Sergio Panunzio,Stato nazionale e sindicati (Milan, 1924).Giuseppe Ugo Papi, Lezioni di economiapolitica corporativa,5th ed. (Padua,

1939).Joseph-PaulBoncour, Le Federalismeeconomique, 2d. ed. (Paris, 1901).Pedro Teot6nio Pereira,A Batalha do Futuro, 2nd. ed. (Lisbon, 1937).Francois Perroux, Capitalismeet Communautede Travail (Paris, 1937).Jose Pires Cardoso, Questoes Corporatives.Doutrina e factos (Lisbon, 1958).Gaetan Pirou, Essaissur le corporatisme(Paris, 1938).GaetanPirou,Neo-Liberalisme,Neo-Corporatisme,Neo-Socialisme(Paris, 1939).A. Prins, La dimocratie et le regime parlementaire, etude sur le regime

corporatifet la reprisentationdes interets, 2nd ed. (1887).

Pierre-JosephProudhon,De la capaciti politique des classes ouvrieres (Paris,1873).

Walter Rathenau, La triple revolution (Paris, 1921).GeorgesRenard,L'Institution (Paris, 1933).Henri de Saint-Simon,Oeuvres,esp. Vol. XIX, (Paris, 1865-73).Henri de Saint-Simon,L'Organisateur(Paris, 1966).

129




A. de Oliveira Salazar,Discuros, 4th. ed. (Coimbra, 1948), esp. Vol. I.A. de Oliveira Salazar,Une rivolution dans la paix (Paris, 1937).Louis Salleron,Naissance de I'Etat corporatif (Paris, 1942).

Louis Salleron, Un rigime corporatifpour l'agriculture (Paris, 1937).Friedrich Schlegel, Schriften und Fragmente, ed. by E. Behler (Stuttgart,

1956).Aderito Sedas Nunes, Situafco e problemasde corporativismo(Lisbon, 1954).J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi, Etudes sur les constitutions des peuples libres

(Paris, 1836).Georges Sorel, Matlriaux d'une thJorie du prolitariat (Paris, 1919).Othmar Spann,Der WahreStaat, 3rd ed. (Jena, 1931).Ugo Spirito, Capitalismoe corporativismo,3rd. ed. (Florence, 1934).Ugo Spirito, I fondamentidella economiacorporativa(Milano-Roma, 1932).

Marcel Tardy and EdouardBonnefous,Le corporatisme(Paris, 1935).J. J. Teixeira Ribeiro, Lifoes de Direito Corporativo(Coimbra, 1938).M. de la Tour de Pin, Vers un ordre social chrJtien: jalons de route (1882-

1907), 6th. ed. (Paris, 1942). Originally published in 1907.M. de la Tour de Pin, Aphorismesde politique sociale (Paris, 1909).Union de Fribourg, Rlimpression des theses de lUnion de Fribourg (Paris,

1903).P. Verschave, "L'organisationcorporative aux Pays-Bas"in Semaine Sociale

d'Anger, L'organisationcorporative (Angers, 1935), pp. 465-482.F. Vito, Economia politica corporativa (Milan, 1939).

Karl von Vogelsang, GesammelteAufsatze iiber sozialpolitischeund verwandteThemata (Augsburg, 1886).Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by G. Roth and C. Wittich, 3 vols.

(New York, 1968); especially vol. I, pp. 40-56, 292-299, 339-354 andvol. III, pp. 994-1001, 1375-1380, 1395-1399.

II.-Works discussing Corporatisttheorists.

Ralph H. Bowen, GermanTheories of the CorporateState (New York, 1947).Richard L. Camp, The Papal Ideology of Social Reform (Leiden, 1969).Edouard Dolleans et

al., "Syndicalismeet

corporations,"Ed. speciale de

L'Homme Reel (Paris, 1935).Hal Draper, "Neo-corporatistsand Neo-formers,"New Politics (Fall, 1961),

pp. 87-106.Matthew H. Elbow,French CorporativeTheory, 1789-1948 (New York, 1966).G. Jarlot, Le regime corporatif et les catholiques sociaux. Histoire d'une

doctrine (Paris, 1938).Walter Adolf Johr, Die stindische Ordnung; Geschichte, Idee und Neubau

(Leipzig-Bern,1937).P. Keller, Die korporativeIdee in der Schweiz (St. Gallen, 1934).Peter Cornelius May-Tasch, Korporativismusund Autoritarismus (Frankfurt,

1971).

Ill-Works dealing primarilywith the practice of corporatistinstitutions

(often however heavily ideological):

Max d'Arcis,Les realisationscorporativesen Suisse (Neuchatel, 1935).Firmin Bacconnier,Le Salut par la corporation(Paris, 1936).Louis Baudin, Le Corporatisme:Italie, Portugal, Allemagne, Espagne, France

(Paris, 1942).GeorgesBourgin,L'Etat corporatifen Italie (Paris, 1935).

130




Simone Comes, L'organisation corporative de l'industrie en Espagne (Paris,1937).

Emile Coornaert, Les Corporations en France avant 1789, 4th ed. (Paris,

1941).Freppel Cotta, EconomicPlanning in CorporativePortugal (London, 1937).Fritz Ermath, Theorie v. Praxis des fascistisch-KorporativenStaates (Heidel-

berg, 1932).J. Felix-Faure,L'Organisationprofessionnelleaux Pays-Bas (Paris, 1938).Antonio Ferro,Salazar:Le Portugal et Son Chef (Paris, 1934).Jose Figuerola,La colaboracidn ocial en Hispanoamerica(BuenosAires, 1943).Herman Finer, Representative Government and a Parliament of Industry

(Westminster, 1923); especially pp. 3-34, 210-230.Daniel Guerin, Fascisme et grand capital, 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1945).

CarmenHaider, Capital and Labor underFascism (New York, 1930).J. E. S. Hayward, Private Interest and Public Policy: The Experience of the

French Economic and Social Council (London, 1966).Camille Lautaud and Andr6 Poudeux, La representationprofessionnelle. Les

conseils Iconomiquesen Europe et en France (Paris, 1927).Jean Lescure, Etude sociale comparle des regimes de libertl et des rigimes

autoritaires (Paris, 1940).Emile Lousse,La sociJtt d'ancien regime (Bruxelles, 1943).Jean Malherbe,Le corporatismed'associationen Suisse (Lausanne, 1940).JacquesMarchand,La renaissancedu merchantilisme2 l'Ipoque contemporaine

(Paris, 1937).Fr. Oliver-Martin, L'organisation corporative de la France d'ancien regime(Paris, 1938).

F. Pereira dos Santos, Un Etat corporatif:La Constitutionsociale et politiqueportugaise'(Paris,1935).

Roland Pre, L'organisationdes rapportsIconomiques et sociaux dans les paysa regime corporatif (Paris, 1936).

L. Rosenstock-Franck,L'Iconomie corporativefasciste en doctrine et en fait(Paris, 1934).

L. Rosenstock-Franck,L'ExpJrience Roosevelt et le milieu social americain

(Paris, 1937).Martin Saint-L?on,Histoire des Corporationsde mJtier depuis leurs originesjusqu'&eur suppressionen 1791, 4th ed. (Paris, 1941).

Carl T. Schmidt, The CorporateState in Action (London, 1939).William G. Welk, Fascist Economic Policy (Cambridge, 1938).

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