Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy || From Counter-Revolution to Majority Rule: Can U.S. Policy Change?

From Counter-Revolution to Majority Rule: Can U.S. Policy Change?Author(s): George W. Shepherd, Jr.Source: Africa Today, Vol. 23, No. 3, Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (Jul. - Sep.,1976), pp. 5-16Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185613 .

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From Counter-Revolution to Majority Rule:

Can U.S. Policy Change?

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

With the sudden success of the democratic revolutions in the former Portuguese colonies reverberating throughout "settler Africa," Henry Kissinger, like his mentor Metternich, has sought to change the image but not the substance of policy. Did the famous speech of April 28th herald real change? Is the United States really switching from the "counter- revolutionary policy" discussed by the contributors to this issue to real support of majority rule in Southern Africa? If so, will this policy be supported by State Department, Defense and Intelligence policymakers and by Congress? And, even more important, can the powerful corporate interests, now so extensively entrenched in Southern Africa, be persuaded that the white elite must give way to an African majority system?

If it envisages them at all, the Ford Administration has obviously tabled such major policy changes for the duration of the election,' while Carter and Mondale have demonstrated some interest in a new African and southern African policy of majority rule and aggressive diplomacy on behalf of human rights. 2 The American public seems scarcely aware of the gravity of the threat to peace in Southern Africa. Unless the pro-African constituency of non-governmental organizations, whose activities are assessed by Walters, Johnson, and Leighton in these pages, find renewed vitality and make Southern Africa an issue of human rights, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to move very far from what Bill Minter describes here as the use of Zaire, Kenya, and South Africa to help carry out a systemic commitment to a "low key destabilization campaign" in Southern Africa.

1. Kissinger faced attacks by the Republican and Democratic right wings. Ronald Reagan criticized his Rhodesian policy during the height of the Presidential primary, See Washington Post, April 29, 1976 and Senator Byrd, (D-Va.) attacked his policies in a Senate Foreign Relations hearing, See New York Times, May 14, 1976.

2. See extensive discussion of Presidential political possibilities in Francis Kornegay "Election '76" Africa Report, July-August, 1976.

George W. Shepherd, Jr. an editor of Africa Today, is Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Denver.

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Because the same determinants which led the U.S. into its sorry adventure in Angola are operative in Southern Africa as a whole the restraining forces of the Congress and human rights groups may not be capable of pitlling the U.S. back again from the brink in the supercharged racial atmosphere of the besieged settler societies of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa.

The tendency of the press in analyzing present tensions to attribute responsibility to Soviet colonial ambitions3 overlooks the long history of anti-nationalist warfare carried on by the West and the settler societies of Southern Africa. It is imperative that the roots of American policy be fully understood, if an effective alternative is to be found.

American relations with Southern Africa should be seen in their historic, economic, racial, and security dimensions, with the U.S. as a major Atlantic core power controlling and exploiting the Southern African dependency area.' The U.S. does not stand outside this dependency system, exercising independent moral judgement, as so many in- terpretations have suggested.5 Instead, American business, finance, missions, and security systems have been intimately involved for generations in assimilado-apartheid politics of the area.

Kissinger's counter-insurgency policy in the Third World, including de-stabilization in Chile, counter-revolution in Angola, and a pro-settler tilt in Rhodesia and South Africa, has been a structure of historical interests of which Kissinger and Moynihan are only the contemporary spokesmen. They were ably preceded by Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, and a legion of underlings who span several administrations.

This conglomerate of interests has been challenged for years by populist and anti-apartheid groups in American society who lack levers on foreign policy power and decision.' Did the Angolan case demonstrate the growing influence of this group in Congress or was Congressional reaction to intervention in Angola nothing more than a neo-isolationist reaction derived from the shell-shock of Vietnam? Is there leadership in Ameri- can society prepared to implement an alternate policy? Or is the pattern of "mercenary warfare"7 and counter-revolution in Southern Africa inevitable, with the danger of racial war in which the U.S. supports white supremacy and the Communists support African interests?

3. The Manchester Guardian stated, February 22, 1976, "It is one thing for the Russians to win a civil war for their allies. It is another for them to threaten a larger part of the Continent with conflagration."

4. Derived from John Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 1971.

5. Patrick Moynihan has suggested this in his article, "Was Woodrow Wilson Right?", Commentary, May 1974.

6. See Africa Today, "Apartheid and Imperialism," Vol. 17, No. 5, Sept., Oct. 19/0.

7. Michale Klare defines this intervention as "mercenary warfare" in War Without End, Alfred Knopf, N.Y. 1972, pp. 21-31.

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George W. Shepherd Jr.

The Angolan Intervention

To answer any of these questions a look at past practice is necessary, particularly American intervention in Angola from 1960 to 1976 which was a classic case of counter-revolution.

Portugal's membership in NATO at the onset of and throughout its colonial wars greatly facilitated its counter-insurgency ability. Through NATO, Portugal was entitled to arms aid and training, and could pur- chase western arms with few restrictions, save for the official proviso that their use was limited to areas north of the Tropic of Capricorn. Little or no serious effort was made to enforce this provision, however, and ex-Prime Minister Caetano once said "When I buy a car no one will tell me where to drive it."

There was apparent sincerity in American support for the gradual transfer of political authority to responsible African nationalists, particularly in the Kennedy administration.8 However, not only the weight of the NATO alliance and the concern for the continuance of a U.S. Naval and air base in the Azores, but the alliance of many special U.S. right wing interests with the Portuguese ruling class and economic interests,9 resulted in the support of a policy of counter-revolution beginning under Eisenhower and intensifying in succeeding administrations. There is ample evidence today that the official Kennedy policy, perhaps at first innocently but in later administrations deliberately, deceived the American public and the world by masking a more fundamental counter- revolutionary policy, based on a belief among Cold War strategists and corporate interests that African communism was threatening a vital interest area of the United States. '

The Cold War mentality of the '50s and '60s undoubtedly strongly influenced American attitudes, particularly towards the MPLA, many of whose leaders came in close contact with the Portuguese Communist Party while studying in Lison,11 and who found it necessary, once the struggle began, to turn to anti-Salazar and anti-NATO sources, notably the Soviet Union and its allies, for aid.'2 Although the USSR briefly supported FNLA--then known as the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE) in the early '60s, when it was the only OAU-recognized movement--it consistently supported the CONCP alliance, (PAIGC,

8. William Minter Portuguese Africa and the West, Penguin, London 1972, pp. 80-81.

9. Kenneth Maxwell, New York Review of Books, June 13, 1974, "Portugal eo Futuro: Analise Conjuntura"

10. Minter, Op. Cit., quotes George Ball assessing Angola and Mozambique as "strategically important territories", p. 96.

11. Interview with Augustinho Neto in Afriscope, Nigeria, Dec. 1975.

12. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, MIT Press 1969, contains the best analysis

of the origins of these exiled movements.

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FR_ELIMO, and MPLA) from the beginning of the struggle. Soviet aid (to MPLA) is estimated to have come to about $54 million prior to the 1974 coup in Portugal.'3 Cuba also provided active support, training, equip- ping and supplying militants. Despite fourteen years of Soviet and Communist resistance, Dr. Neto and independent observers, such as John Marcum,'4 insist the organization is primarily nationalist rather than Marxist and neither a Soviet puppet or instrument of the Portuguese Communist Party. 5

Recent evidence indicates that CIA support for MPLA's chief rival, Zaire-based FNLA, begun under Kennedy in 1962, was undertaken at least in part as a counter-insurgency effort with the objective of preventing Soviet penetration in the area. There is some evidence of support for the same purpose later in thie period of Portuguese rule for MPLA's other rival, UNITA.'7 The People's Republic of China, also interested in countering Soviet influence, followed a similar course. Wallerstein and Weissman have traced a similar pattern in U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in The Congo (now Zaire) in the early '60s, similarly based on exaggerated assumptions about Soviet and other Communist influence. 8

U.S. assistance to the Portuguese fitted many categories of Michael Klare's concept of "proxy warfare."'9 Counter-insurgency training was given to Portuguese officers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The "strategic hamlet" design developed in Southeast Asia became the "aldeamento" program in Mozambique and Angola. Much equipment supplied through NATO--helicopters, F-64 Thunderjets, F-66 Sabrejets, C-47, C-54, and DC-6 transports and T-6 Trainer "work horses"--was usable in Africa and encountered there by the liberation movements.'0 American counter- insurgency advisors made numerous field visits. CIA counter-insurgency in Africa was carried to the extreme of complicity in assassination attempts against Lumumba in the Congo and possibly other major liberation leaders."

13. Harsch and Thomas, Op. Cit., p. 103

14. John Marcum, Testimony to the Clark Sub-Committee on Africa of the United States Senate, Jan. 14, 1976 (tape).

15. Lawrence Henderson of the Board of World Ministries, The United Church of Christ suggests in his testimony to the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, January 14, 1976, tape, that Christianity is at least as important as Marxism as a bais for liberation belief syp- toms.

16. Leslie Gelb in the New York Times Sept. 25, reports that Pres. Kennedy determined that Roberto of FNLA was to be given aid as a counter force to MPLA, and cites 5 separate administration sources to this effect.

17. Savimbi had broken with Roberto and FNLA and seemed to U.S. Administrators to be "the best of the lot", See Gelb, Ibid.

18. Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-64, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1974. I. Wallerstein, "Luanda is Madrid", Nation, Jan. 3, 1976.

19. K lare, Op. Cit.

20. Angola, MPLA, UN-OAU Conference, Oslo, April 1973.

21. The Church Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate has reported this and re- affirmed its report, despite a challenge. Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1975.

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In this period the Portuguese wooed American corporate investment in Angola, with the cooperation of the U.S. government. Gulf Oil in Cabinda was the best known, but interest grew in diamonds and copper. Later U.S. Steel and Morrison-Knudson built bridges, and the American banking community became involved. Also, the U.S. became the largest importer of Angolan coffee, much of it enriched by the blood of Angolan patriots, unknown to American coffee drinkers. Gulf provided Portugal, through the Angola Government, over $100 million a year in royalties. Gulf and other American corporations ignored requests of liberation leaders to stop subsidizing military operations of the Portuguese government through royalty payments and taxes.2

All of this was carefully documented by a variety of Western non- governmental organizations such as the Angola Comite in the Netherlands, The American Committee on Africa, and a variety of British groups utilizing the work of Basil Davidson and others. Most of this, however, was presented in pamphlets and journals with limited cir- culation23and failed to influence policy.

The Breakdown of Unity

The three liberation movements, with OAU ssup)ort, agreecd to form a unity government in the Alvor egreenment of January 17, 1975. Howvever, a unified government of an independent Angola did not fit into the counter-insurgency scenario of the CIA and Mr. Kissinger. The objective of the U. S. policy, lespite sonme dissenting voices in the State Department, was that friendly forces must take power to protect the mineral and energy resources of Angola. Its strategic loca- tion next to Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia, undoubtedly figured in these calculations. The concern of both Kaunda and MobLutu about an MPLA government and their fear of Soviet influence also played a part.24 But most important was. the perceived threat to South Africa, whose strateg) ot detente in Southern Africa attempted to secure U.S. and Western support for her "social change" in return for security against "the Ruqssian threat. "" A Soviet-backed Government in Angola appeared to them to be

22. The Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ condemned Gulf's complicity and urged a boycott, Gulf Oil campaign Resolution, Feb. 1970.

23. Typical was the July-August 1970 issue of Africa Today, Vol. 17, No. 4, "Allies in Empire," published in cooperation with ACOA. Facts and Reports, Angola Comite, Amsterdam, was another important source. 24. Kaunda was primarily concerned about access to the Lobito railway to the West Coast which he feared would be shut down by MPLA on Russian advice, New York Times, Jan. 29, 1976.

25. Prime Minister Vorster said in his famous "Detente plea": "South Africa harbors no aggressive intentions against anyone." Bulletin of the Africa Instit. of South Africa No. 1, 1975.

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as intolerable as it did to the American administration.26 This attemipt to hold Angola in the Western camp was therefore

lauinched 1) a deliberate policy of the U.S. arid Soutlh Africa 27 to give nmajor support to FNLA and UNITA, prior to the Rtussian and Cuban mqajor build-tip of suipport for MPLA, in violation of the Alvor agreement. The U.S. National Security Council Committee of Forty appears to have triggered the civil war by its January 1975 decision to increase by tenfold its support of Holden Roberto.28. Once the Soviets learned of this action they immediately escalated their arms supply and the MPLA called upon the Cubans to resist the counter-revolution.

The CIA and the National Security Council staff had little difficulty in persuading the Secretary of State to continue the counter-insurgency strategy. They portrayed the FNLA and UNITA as the majority under attack from Marxist guerrillas who were Soviet puppets led by Cuban soldiers out to embarrass the United States. Kissinger and Ford accepted this argument because it reassured them that "the counter-MPLA policy" was sound and workable in the national interest. One White House aide is reported as saying, "Henry wanted to be told why we should intervene, not why not."29 Kissinger maintained he was not opposed to MPLA Marxism but to the Soviets and Cubans "recolonizing" Angola. Nathaniel Davis, the hardliner with a counter-insurgency record in Latin America, who had been brought in by Kissinger to implement this policy, resigned becaue he came to the conclusion that FNLA and UNITA "wvere a couple

'of losers." The Africa Bureau was apparently split and some undercut Davis by supporting Kissinger.

The CIA and the National Security Council recognized that the public would not support a direct program of intervention, after Vietnam. Therefore, they adopted a policy of indirect support. Financial aid went to FNLA and UNITA through Zaire. American CIA technicians were used and an extensive program of recruiting and training mercenaries from Africa, the U.S. and Great Britain was launched.30 Care was taken to

26. Despite denials, many reputable reports indicate the U.S. and South Africa collaborated in sending South African troops to support UNITA in Southern Angola against the MPLA and Cuban troops. Pieter Botha, South African Defense Minister, stated in Parliament, "South Africa's involvement in Angola is part of the involvement of the Free World," New York Times, Jan. 25, 1976.

27. In an interview with Prime Minister Vorster by DeBorehgrave, in response to a direct question on U.S. solicitation of South African intervention, Vorster said, "if you are making the statement, I won't call you a liar" Newsweek, May 17, 1976.

28. This decision was fully discussed by Roger Morris in his article in The New Republic, "The Proxy War in Angola," Jan. 31, 1976. Also, see the Congressional Report of the Pike Conmmittee on the CIA (suppressed) published by The Village Voice, Feb. 20, 1976.

29. "CIA's Secret War in Angola", Intelligence Report, op. cit., p. 2.

30. New York Times, Jan. 31, 1976, reported that over 200 Americans had been recruited. The FBI investigated the violations of The Federal Neutraility Statutes, but inconclusively. See also the Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 4, 1976.

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recruit non-American nationals, except for Black Americans,3" who were exploited because of the asset of their race.

This curious association of some American Blacks through CORE with the Kissinger counter-revolution was denounced by the founder of CORE, James Farmer, and the Black Foreign Policy Group, led by Ronald Walters."3

Hundreds of mercenaries poured into Angola. This mercenary element dramatized the reality of the use of large amounts of Inioney by private corporate interests and governments for the counter- insurgency cause. Western mercenaries, however, proved no match for the better-trained and equipped MPLA forces, led by Cubans, who were brought in by the newly-constituted Peoples Republic of Angola. 33

South African intervention proved, as Nathaniel Davis had predicted, to be the most embarrasing and weakening aspect of the alliance. According to a report by Sean Gervasi of the Center for National Security Studies, the South African forces numbered 4-5,000 fully-equipped; ar- mored troops34 collaborating primarily with the Chipenda faction of FNLA in the South. Though FNLA and UNITA sought this intervention the South African intrusion appears to have been in collaboration with Washington security councils which seriously miscalculated the con- sequences. This is denied by Washington but several South African statements indicate their clear assumption of support.35

African leaders all over the continent, as well as in Angola, rebelled at the notion that South Africa could fight for African freedom. As President Nyerere expressed it at the January, 1976 OAU meeting: "At present, the conflict in Angola is not a fight between Commuriists and anti- Communists. It is a fight for real independence and against racialist South Africa."36 He went on to warn America to get out of this struggle.

31. The Denver Post, Dec. 10, 1975. Ray Innis claimed the men would serve as "a police force" on behalf of the OAU. This was later denied by Gen. Amin, Pres. of the OAU at the time. Innis also claimed to be independent of the U.S. Government.

33. Drew Middleton discussed the role of the Cuban soldier, March 3, 1976, New York Times, estimating 10-12,000 were used. The MPLA claims the figure was much lower and contradicts the American assessment of the decisive role of Cuban and Soviet nationals. Southern Africa, Feb. 1976, p. 11.

32. Statement of Black Foreign Policy Group.

34. Southern Africa, Feb. 1976, p. 10.

35. Henry Kamm of the New York Times in Cape Town in a dispatch, Feb. 5, 1976, stated Pretoria received encouragement from the U.S. and "acted on the understanding that the United States would rush sufficient supplies to make it possible to counter the Soviet-supported movement." The Pretoria official said 'we had been in touch'. They accepted Kissinger's promises. South African Defense Minister Botha hinted at these contacts at a news conference Feb. 3, 1976.

36. Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1976.

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Congressional Action

The Congressional action against the Administration's "proxy war" in Angola was unprecedented. The refusal to appropriate CIA funding destroyed the momentum and the morale of the interventionists. The impetus for Congressional action lies only partly in the reactions against Vietnam and the concurrent revelation of the CIA scandals. Congressional leadership, especially in the Senate, has become profoundly suspicious of the Kissinger interventionary doctrine and was ready to scrutinize any new version of the domino theory in Africa, as a result of the Chile anti- Allende campaign and the furor over the earlier secret NSSM 39 policy. The secrecy of the Angola campaign bothered Mansfield, Humphrey, Kennedy and Clark, who felt that Congress was denied correct information and misled by the Administration. Their initial intent was to investigate. When they again found a major contradiction between what they were being told and what was being done, they rebelled and carried Congress overwhelmingly with them.

Several NGO grouips helped precipitate this decision by their vigorous opposition to the U.S. counter-revolution. Their representatives testified before Sen. Clark's Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, presenting detailed analyses of liberation groups. Their information added to the growth of anti-interventionist sentiment. Most of the specialists, including John Marcum, Gerald Bender, George Houser, and Lawrence Henderson, concurred in the assessment that the MPLA was not a Soviet puppet. They urged that the U.S. discontinue the covert and overt support of UNITA and FNLA and denounced South Africa for its intervention.37 These assessments, along with MPLA and Cuban field victories, helped to assure that vigorous majorities in both houses of Congress would not support the Administration's interventionary policy.

The recent veto of Angola's admission to the U.N. by the U.S. in face of overw helming wN orld-w%vide recognition raised serious doubts, however, al)out how much the Foid Administration had learned, as it clearly has not as yet come to terms with the victorious MPLA in Angola.

The "New Southern Africa Policy"

This rebellion of Congress, the widespread press criticism of the Admlinistrationi's blunders, and the new reality of a major Soviet and Ctban military presence in Sotuthern Africa, plus the humiliating wvith- di-wval of lx)th Zaire and Souith Africa from Angola, which spread alarm 0111011ti the settler p)opulations of Souithern Africa and the breakdown of negotiations in Rhodesia, caused the administration under Kissinger's leadershil) to lauinch a so-called new "majority rule" approach. The object was to convince African nationalists that the U.S. was not opposed to their cause while at the same time reassuring the friends of the U.S. that they

37. Tapes of the Hearings of the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, Jan. 14, 1975.

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would not be abandoned to the Communists or to extremists.38 The clearest summary of the new policy was Kissinger's Lusaka address, in which he struck 10 major points.39 Most aimed at the Rhodesian crisis though several dealt with Namibia and South Africa. Only one or two could be said to be particularly new, as Walters, Good, and Minter point out in their articles in this issue. The assurance of subsidy to African states for hardships arising from the implementation of sanctions was significant for Mozambique and Zambia. But admonitions about majority rule with minority protection and repeal to the Byrd Amendment had been heard before under less dramatic conditions, from lesser foreign policy spokesmen. 40

The most encouraging pronouncement was that the U.S. would not assist the Rhodesians in their final death struggle. The admonition to South Africa not to use force on behalf of the Rhodesians and to grant the Namibians speedy independence were also long overdue. However, none of these new steps seemed either possible for the Ford Administration to implement, or, more seriously, to be effective in dealing with the primary issues of the revolutions welling up in all three of the remaining white- ruled lands.

Zimbabwe The U.S., like South Africa, would like to have a majority gow(rn-

ment in Salisbury led by moderates wXho Xw-ould not distturb) the basic dependenc) of the economy on South African and WNestern multli-national corporations such as Union Carbide and the Anglo-American Cor- poration. They also seek assuLraneas for the lives and lproperty of the settler minority which the more militant African leaders are reltuctant to give. The more bitter the fighting, the greater will be the level of white emigration, already a stubstantial drain.

Since the breakdown of the Victoria Fall talks, as Good outlines in these pages, the leadership of the liberation nimoements has gradually slipped into the control of more militant younger leaders.

Zimbabweans will win their freedom, regardless of what American policy may be, even if it should take the AIngoIla intcrvcntionary formn. because that would the p)rovide the Iasis for callinig in thle ComimIutinist powers Nwhich liberation leaders anl African heads of state like Miachel and N\'erere have b)en relucitant to do. Suichi actioni could lead to a backlash of the right-wing Sotutlh Africans and another inva.sion b) the South African armied forces to save "Christian

38. New York Times, March 17, 1976. Henry Kissinger said that the United States "will do nothing to help the white minority exercise authority in Rhodesia".

39. New York Times Apr. 29, 1976.

40. David Newsom, "Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. Policy" Dept. of State Publication 8671, Aug. 1972.

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civilization" against the Communists. However, Angola has shown that such a policv is disastrouis.

The U.S. could speed the inevitable by direct action againCst American companies and their subsidiaries which have been indirectly and secretly aiding the white regime. Evidence of this complicit) has been documented in a recent study by Barbara Rogers-in which she lays to rest the illusion that American companies have observed the Administration's directives on sanctions.4' These observations have been confirmed by the recent revelations that Mobil Oil has been secretly supplying most of the Rhodesian air force requirements plus other transport support. 42

These reports have strengthened the case long made by many scholarly and political groups, including this journal, that the corporations are the major partners of white rule. The jeeps, the trucks, the helicopters and transport planes, all the necessary support equipment of a modern army, is derived and resupplied from Western, including American, sources.

Thus enforcement of existing legislation and administrative orders is all that is necessary to end the capability of the Rhodesian armed forces to cope with the spreading insurgency. It would not even be necessary to repeal the Byrd Amendment. South African companies and Western European firms could fill the gap in the economic system, btut are not likely to take this risk in the face of government crackdo%vn on American firms and their subsidiaries.

An associated step would be a firm American p)olicy of enforcing penalties against American citizens who, as mercenaries, are figlhting with the Rhodesian armed forces. Akbarali Thobhani, in this issue, outlines the legal basis and some of the problems connected with such a step. The morale as well as manpower factor is important in this kind of psychological warfare now being fouight in Souithern Africa. Many observers believe a fe! prosecutions of mercenaries by the Attorney General's office would cool the ardour of recruIting grotups who miislead 'ouing Americans about the cause, the conditions, and the conse(quiences of becoming a "dog of wvar."

A hitumiianitarian progranm for refuigees and victims of the conflict slhouilcl, as the State Dept. l)rolposes, incltude settlers w%ho leave or sell tlheir property as a imieans of induLcing a more conciliatory attituide. HIowe\v er, thlis should clearly be extended to the needs of the fanmilies of thle freeconi figlhters and their eduicational and wvelfare needs in refugee. camips in Zamibia, Mozamiibi(Iqie, and Tanzania.

Tangible steps in any of these directions have not vet been taken and anIy-thing less wvill leave the U.S. essentially on the side of Smith, whose d1ays are numibered.

41. Barbara Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty, Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1976 No. 2 Human Rights Series, Cl RR, Univ. of Denver, 1976. 42. The Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, developed the documentation of these violations with the help of a clandestine group "Okhela" in South Africa. See New York Times, Aug. 2, 1976. Mobil has not denied the charges and claims to be seriously checking the allegations.

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Namibia

Kissinger's call in Lusaka for a time-table of independence for Namibia seemed to place the U.S. on the side of majority rule. How ever, as Johnson points out in this issue, the matter is more complicated. The United Nations, whose jurisdiction (de jure) the U.S. and the U.K. now accept, has demanded that South Africa hand over the transition to international authority under the direction of the Council for Namibia. The reason is not only legal. The South Africans are trying to install a pliable group of Africans and whites in power through the Trurnhalle Constitutional talks and have refused to deal with the most im-iportant liberation movement, SWAPO. There is no chance that the African states or SWAPO will accept a South African-imposed govern- merit of Namibia and the revolution will continue as Sam Nujoma has said, until the most representative group is accepted.43

Therefore U.S. policy, in order to deal with the realities of the reVolutionary change underway, should demand that the South Africans hand over to the U.N. the responsibilit)y for holding elections and establishing the transitional government. To facilitate this, full recognition of SWAPO, operating outside Namibia, should replace the existing "backdoor relationship." Assistance should be provided to SWAPO and Namibian exile programs through the Council for Namibia and the Namibian Trust Fund. The critical step is not so much U.S. membership on the Council for Namibia as direct acceptance of SWAPO. Once this is done, the Souith Africans mav well bow to the inevitable, and negotiate directly with SWAPO, if they are still unwilling to turn negotiations over to the U.N. Other representative liberation and political groups exist and should participate in the transition; but the tendency to accept them and reject SWAPO is the same dangerous counter-revolutionary intrigue the U.S. and South Africa sought to pursue in Angola and must be abandoned in Namibia under a majority rule policy.

South Africa

The Nationalist apartheid system w hich denies basic huimall rights to Africans and non-w%lhites is the central )roblem on Sotutlh Africa itself. hlie revolution has gripped the passions of youthl in the urban shanty towns and extended even into the reserves (homelands). The events of the past four months from Soweto to Fort Hare and Witbank" are the eruptions long predicted by those w ho hav'e arguied that apartheid has not refornied

43. Objective Justice, Sp. 1976. p. 7-9. SWAPO is now requiring a withdrawal of South African troops and police before talks. Also: X-ray, Nov.-Dec. 1975.

44. Students are the key agitators despite extensive arrests and imprisonment without charges or trial, New York Times: July 21, 1976.

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and revolution is the direction that tragic conflict must take.4" The attempts by the foreign policy establishment in the U.S. and Europe to obscure this reality and to base polic) upon false assuimptiorns of change and reform has been a classic example of psychological counter- revolutionary activity. The tendency of some social scientists to become the catspaw of this operation has been an African "Camelot" (the CIA code name for its Latin American Program involving university in- formers.) The Ford Administration, like its predecessors, has been a long way from coming to grips with this problem. Part of the difficulty is outlined in the article by Neil Leighton in this issue, on the corporate complicity in apartheid, a case of dependency. In addition, the security dimensions are touched upon by Ronald Walters in pointing out how nuclear energy and weapons have become a part of a U.S. pattern of involvement with and support for white rule in Southern Africa.

An alternative policy has long been advocated by the anti- apartheid movemnents of this country andl Europe which entails economic sanctions, restrictions on corporations, a compulsory arms em- bargo, cultural and athletic boycotts and recognition and support for liberation movements. The ANC and PAC obviously now have the backing of the courageous black youth who have opposed tanks and machine guns with bare hands and rocks in the shanty-towns all over South Africa. Students can be crushed, but this is turning into urban guerrilla warfare, which together with the increasing pressure on the borders, reveals in South Africa the same Achilles heel as in Rhodesia, inadequate white manpower to hold all the fronts and keep the economic system prosperous.

Kissinger's faint-hearted admonitions to Sotuth Africanis tlht they, too, nmtust ab)andon white rtile is hardly a new policy.

Conclusion

The Pro-African constituency in the U.S. of non-goNernnilentall organizations lhas, for mana Nears, 1)(n sulp)p)orting the ' revoluJtion11ary alternative of majorit) rule in Southern Africa. A situation at last exists where a great many Americans may be willing to listen and Southern African issues may now become among the major issues in our foreign' policy debates. If that happens, there is some hope that a new approach w%ill be taken which will enable the U.S. at least to move out from uinder the collapsing framework of apartheid, if not to participate in its destruction through an international program of sanctions in support of human rights.

45. Bernard Magubane, in his recent monograph The Continuing Class Struggle in South Africa, Studies in Race and Nations, Univ. of Denver, Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4, 1976, outlinqs the case.

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Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy || From Counter-Revolution to Majority Rule: Can U.S. Policy Change?