Thayer Vietnam's Relations With China, North Korea and the United States

8/9/2019 Thayer Vietnam's Relations With China, North Korea and the United States

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Vietnams Relations with China,

North Korea and the United StatesCarlyle A. Thayer

Presentation to the Conference on Authoritarianism in East

Asia, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong

Kong, Hong Kong, June 29July 1, 2010


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VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINAANDNORTHKOREA:THENEXTFIVEYEARSCarlyleA.Thayer

ThisreportpresentsaforwardlookinganalysisoflikelyVietnameseforeignpolicy

initiativestowardsChinaandNorthKoreaoverthenextfiveyears.Itexplorestwomajor

questions.WhatisHanoiseekingtogainfromdiplomatic,militaryandeconomic

exchangeswithBeijingandPyongyang?WhatsortofinfluencedoesChinaandNorth

KoreaassertoverVietnam?

BackgroundIn January 1950, both the Peoples Republic of China and the Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea extended diplomatic recognition toVietnams fledgling communist

regime, theDemocraticRepublicofVietnam (later renamed the SocialistRepublicof

Vietnam).ChinasupportedtheVietnamesecommunistsintheirsuccessfulresistanceto

French colonialism.Relationsweredescribed as closeas lipsand teeth.BothChina

andNorthKoreaprovidedmaterialandpersonnelsupporttoNorthVietnamduringthe

VietnamWar(196573).

HanoisrelationswithBeijing,andtoalesserextentPyongyang,deterioratedduringthe

Cambodian conflict (197991).When Vietnam invaded Cambodia China retaliated by

attacking Vietnam and providingmilitary support to the Khmer Rouge. North Korea

providedasanctuarytoCambodiasPrinceNorodomSihanouk.

Vietnam and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1991 after an international

conferenceinParisreachedacomprehensivepoliticalsettlementinCambodia.InMarch

1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the

CommunistPartyofVietnam (CPV)adopteda fourteencharacterguideline calling for


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2

longterm, stable, futureorientated, goodneighborly and allround cooperative

relations. The following year at a summit meeting of state presidents, China and

VietnamcodifiedbilateralrelationsinaJointStatementforComprehensiveCooperation

intheNewCentury.Thisdocumentservedasaframeworkforlongtermstatetostate

relations.

In 2006, Vietnam and China agreed to coordinate all aspects of their bilateral

relationshipthroughaJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperationwhichmeton

anannualbasisatdeputyprimeministerlevel.InJune2008,followinganothersummit

ofpartyleadersinBeijing,bilateralrelationswereraisedtothatofstrategicpartners,

andayearlaterthiswasupgradedtoastrategiccooperativepartnership.Atthethird

meetingoftheJointSteeringCommitteeinMarch2009,VietnamandChinasetupahot

linetodealwithurgentissues(particularlyclashesintheSouthChinaSea).

In sum, SinoVietnamese relationshavebeen structured through the frameworkof a

longtermcooperationagreement,aJointSteeringCommitteeonBilateralCooperation,

and regular highlevel summit meetings between party and state leaders. This has

resulted in a dense network of agreements between party, state,military andmass

organizations at all levels. In2009,Vietnam andChina exchanged 267delegationsof

which108wereatdeputyministerlevelorhigher.

VietnamsrelationswithNorthKoreapalebycomparison.In1958,HoChiMinhandKim

IlSungpaid reciprocalvisitsmarking thehighpoint inbilateral relations. In1989, the

two countries set up an Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Scientific and


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3

TechnologicalCooperation.Itmetannuallyforthefirstthreeyearsandthenwentinto

hibernationforadecadeasNorthKoreareactednegativelytothewarmingofVietnams

relationswithSouthKoreaand theestablishmentofdiplomatic relations in1992.No

highlevel delegations between Vietnam and North Koreawere exchanged for eight

years.

In2000,NorthKorearesumedhighleveldiplomaticcontactswithVietnambysending

itsforeignministertoHanoi.TheIntergovernmentalCommitteewasrevivedandheldits

fourthmeetinginOctober2001.ThefollowingyearVietnamsstatepresident,TranDuc

Luong,visitedPyongyangand signed sixcooperationagreements.The fifth,andmost

recent,meetingoftheIntergovernmentalCommitteewasheldinNovember2003.

Bilateralrelationshavecontinuedtheirslowupwardtrajectory; in2007Vietnamsparty

SecretaryGeneral,NongDucManh,andDeputyPrimeMinister/ForeignMinister,Pham

Gia Khiem, visited North Korea. North Koreas Deputy PrimeMinisterjourneyed to

Hanoi.In2008 itwasanticipatedthatKimJong IlwouldvisitVietnamtomarkthe50th

anniversaryofhisfathersfirsttriptoHanoi.Butnosuchvisiteventuated.

VietnamandChinaThe relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all

dimensionsofpower.Vietnam,with apopulationof 89million, ranks as theworlds

thirteenthmost populous country, yet it is only amiddle sized Chinese province by

comparison.ThemajorstrategicpreoccupationoftheVietnameseleadershipishowto

use the levers of diplomacy,military ties and economic relations tomaintain their

autonomyandindependenceandpreventfrombeingpulledintoChinasorbit.


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Vietnamuseshighlevelpartyandstatevisitsasadiplomatictooltocodifyitsrelations

with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and

treaties in order tomakeChinesebehaviormorepredictable and less likely toharm

Vietnamsnationalinterests.

Vietnam has built on the normalization of political relations through a diplomatic

strategy that stresses the legacy of past close relations and mutual benefit over

contemporarydifferences.A prime examplemay be found inVietnams approach to

managing territorial disputes with China. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to

detach these issues from highlevel consideration and to relegate them to technical

workinggroups,andtosolvetheeasierproblemsbeforethemoredifficult.Vietnams

diplomaticstrategyemphasizedcommoninterests,suchasmakingthelandbordersafe

andsecuresothatbothsidescouldbenefitfromcrossbordertrade.Asaresultatreaty

onthelandborderandagreementdemarcatingtheGulfofTonkinwerereached.

Over the next five years Vietnam will set a priority on ensuring that its territorial

conflictswithChinaintheSouthChinaSeaarekeptpeacefulandthatamodusvivendiis

workedout tojointlyexploittheresourcesof theGulfofTonkinand theSouthChina

Sea.Vietnamwillrelyprimarilyondiplomacy,butitwillalsobackthisupwithenhanced

maritimedefensecapabilities.

Vietnamwillpursue three strategies. First, itwill continuebilateralnegotiationswith

Chinatoconcludeanagreementontheprinciplestogoverntheiractions incontested


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waters. Discussions are already in train. Once agreement is reached Vietnam will

explorewithChinathepossibilitiesofjointdevelopmentinlesssensitiveareas.

Vietnams

second

strategy

will

be

to

promote

multilateral

efforts

to

maintain

peace

and

stabilityintheSouthChinaSea.Vietnamwillseektoinvolveotherforeigncompaniesin

jointdevelopment inordertoensure that theirhomegovernmentshaveacontinuing

interest in stability in this region.Thechallenge forVietnamwillbe toworkouthow

much foreign involvement China will tolerate. Vietnam will also seek to upgrade

ASEANs 2002DeclarationonConductofParties in the SouthChina Sea into amore

bindingCodeofConduct. AsASEANChairin2010Vietnamhasawindowofopportunity

topromoteanASEANChinaCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea.

Vietnams third strategywillbe todevelop sufficientmilitarycapacity todeterChina

fromusing force.Forexample,Vietnamwill takedeliveryof sixKiloclass submarines

fromRussiaoverasixyearperiod.Vietnamwillalsodevelopintegratedorjointairnaval

forcesandcommandheadquarters.Thisisadefensivestrategyaimedatareadenial.

VietnamsmilitaryrelationswithChinaareatanascentstage.Overthenextfiveyears

Vietnamwill seek to graduallyexpanddefense cooperation forpolitical andpractical

reasons.Vietnamwill seekenhancedmilitary tieswithChinaasa formof confidence

building,but

also

as

ameans

to

develop

influence

with

the

Peoples

Liberation

Army,

an

importantactor inChinaspoliticalsystem.Confidencebuildingmeasureswilltakethe


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formofbordersecuritycooperationinremoteareas,increasednavalportvisits,1search

andrescueexercisesandsteppedupjointnavalpatrolstoprotectfisheriesintheGulfof

TonkinandlatertheSouthChinaSea.

On the practical side, Vietnam will seek to build on recent agreements to expand

training exchanges at all levels and to promote cooperation by national defense

industries inmilitary technology, lightarmsandammunitionproduction.Vietnamwill

seekmaterial benefits from defense cooperation; butwill usemilitary relationswith

ChinaaspoliticalcoverforenhancedmilitarytieswiththeUnitedStates.Vietnamwill

alsoseektoshapeitsdefenserelationswithChinathroughmultilateralchannelssuchas

the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the ASEAN

DefenseMinistersMeetingwith dialogue partners. This process hasjust got off the

groundandVietnam,asASEANChairfor2010,isplanningtohostitsfirstmeeting.

When Vietnam normalized relationswith China smuggling became amajor issue as

ChinesegoodsfloodedintoVietnamsdomesticmarket.Theopeningofthelandfrontier

quicklyledtoincreasedcrossbordertradeandgreaterautonomyforlocalgovernment

authorities.RegularizingtradewithChinahasservedtoreinforceHanoisauthorityover

thelocalities.Since1991,tradebetweenChinaandVietnamhasgrownastronomically.

ChinaisnowVietnamslargesttradingpartner.ChinasuppliesVietnamwithmachinery,

refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies Chinawith unrefined oil, coal and

rubber.The singlemost important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in

1Sincenormalizationin1991,thePeoplesLiberationArmyNavyhasmadeonlythree

portcallstoVietnam,andtheVietnamesenavyhasvisitedChinaonlyonce.


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Chinas favor ($11.1billion in 2008). In 2008, China exported $15.7 billionworth of

goodstoVietnam,whileVietnammanagedtoexportonly$4.6billiontoChina.

Chinas

trade

surplus

has

figured

at

every

high

level

summit

in

recent

years.

Party

and

state leadersagree thatefforts shouldbemake tomake itmorebalanced.Buthow?

RestrictingChineseimportsisnotonthecards.ThestructureofVietnameseexportshad

changed little over the years and nomajor change is expected in the coming years.

Vietnamesedomesticmanufacturerscannotproducequalitygoodsthatarecompetitive

in the Chinesemarket place. Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese

investment;althoughChinahasrespondedthetotalamountofinvestment($3billion)is

modestwhencomparedtootherforeigninvestors.

Future tradebetweenChinaandVietnamwillbe influencedby theASEANChinaFree

Trade Agreement that took effect in January 2010. Chinese tariffs will be lowered

makingiteasierforVietnamtosellitsgoodsinChina.AndVietnamwillalsobeableto

take part in a regional division of labor by producing components for assembly

elsewherewithinthefreetradearea.ForVietnamtofullytakeadvantageofthesetrade

opportunities itwill have to get its domestic house in order andmake Vietnamese

businessesmorecompetitiveintheChinesemarket.

Vietnamsmassive

trade

deficit

with

China

must

be

placed

in

the

context

of

Vietnams

current tradedeficitof $19billionwith the restof theworld (2009).Vietnamneeds

continuedaccesstomarketsintheUnitedStateswhereithasa$9billionsurplus(2009).


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In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geostrategic

considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive

upgrading and construction of infrastructure roads, bridges, railwaysmuch of it

fundedbytheAsianDevelopmentBankandWorldBankaspartoftheGreaterMekong

Subregion.IncreasinglymainlandSoutheastAsiaisbeinglinkedtosouthwesternChina.

Inaddition,VietnamandChinaarepromoting thedevelopmentof thetwocorridors

and one economic beltway linking southern China, Hainan island and northern

Vietnam. From Hanois point of view, this not only serves Vietnams development

needs, but also enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for cooperative

behavior.

Vietnam utilizes diplomatic, military and economic means to achieve the strategic

objective of obtaining Chinas acknowledgment of Vietnams independence and

autonomyinreturnforwhichVietnamrecognizesChinasregionalprimacy.

VietnamandNorthKoreaVietnams diplomacy towardsNorth Korea is guided by its foreign policy principle of

becomingafriendandcrediblepartnerofallnationsintheinternationalcommunity.

NorthKoreas failedeconomyandstatusasa roguenationpresentsopportunities for

Vietnamese diplomacy. Vietnam supportedNorth Koreasmembership in the ASEANRegional

Forum

and

later

sponsored

North

Korean

Japanese

reconciliation

talks.

Over

the next five years, when the occasion arises, Vietnam can be expected to play a

constructiverole inencouragingNorthKoreatocomeoutofitsselfimposed isolation.


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9

HanoiwillquietlycounselPyongyangandwillalsoconsidersympatheticallythirdparty

requeststouseitsgoodofficesasadiplomaticgobetween.

In

the

1990s

North

Koreas

famine

conditions

presented

Vietnam

with

the

opportunity

toengage inbarter trade. In 1996 this resulted in a riceforweapons swap.Vietnam

acquired Igla (SA16 Gimlet) portable air defense missiles, two Yugoclass mini

submarinesandasmallnumberofScudCballisticmissiles.Defenserelationsthenwent

intothedoldrumsforsixyearsbeforetheywererenewed.Currentlythedevelopment

of certain defense ties is restricted by UN sanctions against North Korea. Vietnam

supportedthesesanctionsandcanbeexpectedtofullyobservethem.Whilefuturerice

forweapons barter agreements cannot be ruled out, Vietnamwill be extraordinarily

circumspectandattentivetointernationalreactionsbeforeproceeding.

VietnamandNorthKoreahaveneverhada robust trade relationship.Twoway trade

hasprobablyneverexceeded$30millioninvalueinanyoneyear.Vietnamhassoldrice

in the pastbut the relationship soured in 1997 in adisputeover terms ofpayment.

North Korea even rejected emergency aid from Vietnam in response to domestic

famine. BecauseNorth Korea lacks hard currency barter agreements are likely. The

mostpromisingavenue for futurerelations lie inVietnamsstatusasa rolemodel for

economicdevelopmentunderaonepartysystem. InpastyearsNorthKoreahassent

study missions to Vietnam to see how Vietnams economic success was achieved.

Vietnamwilldefinitelybeopened to similarapproaches in the future,butprogress is

contingentonNorthKoreaswillingness.


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ChinaandVietnamChina asserts considerable direct and indirect influence on Vietnam. Probably no

major decision of any nature is made in Hanoi without taking Chinese interests and

likely responses into account. China exerts direct pressure through highlevel

meetings by national leaders. Partytoparty relations represent a special conduit

for Chinese influence. Vietnams model of economic development borrows heavily

but not exclusively from Chinese experience. Vietnamese foreign policy also infused

mimics Chinese formulations, such as the general strategic trend in Asia Pacific is

one of peace, cooperation and development. Hanoi also adapts Chinese ideology to

its own needs, such as the threat of peaceful evolution. Entire Chinese books on

the subject have been translated into Vietnamese and made compulsory reading for

Central Committee members and delegates to national party congresses. The slow

pace of U.S.Vietnam militarytomilitary relations can be attributed in part to

concerns about Chinas reaction. The 2009 Defense White paper makes no mention

of the 1979 border war with China so as not to offend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy

regularly intervenes to protest any publication or action that is seen as infringing

Chinese sovereignty, especially in the South China Sea. No other foreign state is as

assertive or influential in Hanoi than China.

NorthKoreaandVietnamIn contrast, North Korea asserts what might be termed negative influence in its

relations with Vietnam. It can oppose and block bilateral cooperation but little else.

Vietnam is privately disdainful of North Koreas cult of personality and failed model

ofjuche. North Korea must play the role of suitor for the relationship to advance.


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VIETNAMSRELATIONSWITHCHINA:DOMESTICDIMENSIONSCarlyleA.Thayer

Vietnams management of relationswith China has always been the prerogative of a small

groupwithinthepartyandstateelite.Vietnamselitehasnotalwaysbeenunifiedonhowto

manage

relations

with

its

northern

neighbor.

Historically

internal

party

contention

on

relations

with China has been insulated from the general public through party discipline and strict

controls on themedia and publishing industry. Since 2007, the emergenceof an antiChina

backlashamongawideningcircleofVietnamspoliticalelitehasbrokenthroughthisinsulation

andposedtwomajordifficultiesfortheVietnameseleadership.

1.ThefirstdifficultyisgainingconsensuswithinthepartyCentralCommitteeaboutthebest

waytorespondtoChinasincreasinglyassertiveactionsintheSouthChinaSea.

InJanuary2007,thepartyCentralCommitteesfourthplenumresolvedtodrawupanational

Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020 to integrate economic development of coastal

areas with the exploitation of marine resources in the East Sea. Vietnamese economists

estimatedthatby2020,themarineeconomywouldcontributeup to55percentofGDPand

between5560percentofexports.Vietnamsmaritimedevelopmentstrategywascompleted

during2007butwasnot releasedpublicly.According toa very seniorpartyofficial,Chinese

intelligenceacquiredacopyofthisclassifieddocumentandthenbegantoapplypressureon

foreign companies, suchasExxonMobiland IndiasONGC, thatwere likely tobe involved in

developingVietnamsmaritime sector.These companieswerewarned that their commercial

interestsinChinawouldsufferiftheydevelopedareasclaimedbyChina.

This report analyses the difficulties faced byVietnamese authorities in their efforts to

maintain control over rising domestic antiChina sentiments among Vietnamese

intellectualsandcollegestudentswhoviewChinaasVietnam'shistoricenemy.


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Chinas actions impacted negatively on Vietnamese party conservatives who had gained

influence during theglobal financialcrisisby touting theChineseeconomicmodeland the

threatofpeacefulevolution.Prior to2007,partyconservativessupportedproChinapolicies

andputabrakeon foreignpolicy initiativestowardsclosersecurityrelationswiththeUnited

States.After2007,partyconservativessupportedselfhelppoliciesindefensethroughmajor

equipmentprocurements(KiloclasssubmarinesandSu30multirolefighters)andcontinuedto

warnofthethreatofpeacefulevolutionindomesticaffairs.

ThekeydifficultyinforginginternalpartyconsensusliesintheextenttowhichVietnamshould

movebeyondselfhelptosolicitingexternalsupportfromtheUnitedStatesandothercountries

tocounterChineseassertiveness.Developingdefenseandsecurityties(asdistinctfrompolitical

anddiplomatic

relations)

with

the

U.S.

is

likely

to

be

the

most

contentious

foreign

policy

issue

tobeconsideredinadvanceoftheforthcomingeleventhnationalpartycongress.

2.TheseconddifficultyforVietnamrelatestothedomesticmanagementofrisingantiChina

sentiment. Inshort,howshouldtheregimeharnessrisingpatrioticantiChinasentimentto

buttressonepartyrulewithoutoverplayingtheirhandandprovokingsanctionsfromChina.

In 2007, student demonstrations elicited a protest from the Chinese Embassy. Vietnam

respondedby

assuring

China

(and

all

ASEAN

ambassadors)

that

the

protests

were

spontaneous

andnotofficiallysanctioned.Chinahaskeptup itsdiplomaticpressurebycontinually lodging

objectionstoanyactionthatchallengesChinesesovereignty intheSouthChinaSea,including

revisionsinprovincialhistorytextbooksandpressreporting.

TheemergenceofantiChina studentprotests in2007presentedVietnamese leaderswitha

uniquedilemma.Should theysuppress independentpoliticalactivity?Orshouldtheyharness

thestudentsnationalismtobolsterregimelegitimacy?

The Vietnamese state routinely exercises censorship over media reporting that could harm

relations with China. This policy is pragmatic but it is also shaped by repeated Chinese

diplomaticinterventionsprotestinganyslightsonChinesesovereigntyingeneralandtheSouth

ChinaSeainparticular.In2007,Vietnamesestudentswereabletodemonstratethattheycould

bypassstatecontrolsoverthemediatoobtainindependentinformationonChineseactionsin


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theSouthChinaSea.Notonlythat,butthestudentsalsodemonstratedtheywereabletouse

cellphonesand internetchatroomstocreateanetworkandorganizepublicdemonstrations

completewithcolorcodedtshirts(bearingthegoldstaronaredbackground).

Thedilemma

for

Vietnamese

authorities

was

how

to

respond

to

student

protests.

Clearly,

the

governmentcouldnotbeseenasrepressingactionsthatwerewidelyviewedaspatrioticbya

growing number of Vietnams political elite. But from the point of view of officialdom, if

studentswerepermittedtoindependentlyaccessinformation,formnetworks,andstagepublic

protestsagainstChina,wherewouldthislead? Indeed,in2006politicalactivistsformedapro

democracy network known as Bloc 8406 on the same basis. Vietnamese authorities quietly

clampeddownonstudentactivismbysendingsecurityofficialstouniversitiesandcollegesto

warnadministrators

and

the

students

involved

of

the

consequences

of

further

protests.

Propaganda sessionswereheld inparty cellsandunits to reinforce thepartys line towards

China.

ThestudentdemonstrationsspecificallyprotestedChineseactions intheSouthChinaSeaand

werenotovertlycriticalofgovernmentpolicy.Someforeignaffairsofficialsprivatelywelcomed

the student protests as strengthening their hand in negotiations with China. But security

officials showed no sympathywhen political dissidents expanded their agenda by criticizing

Chinadomestichumanrightsrecordandraisingquestionsaboutthegovernmentshandlingof

relationswithChinaonVietnamese languageblog sites.Vietnamese securityofficialsmoved

swiftly to repress such actions, especiallywhen dissidents sought to disrupt the carrying of

ChinasOlympictorchthroughHoChiMinhCity.

In200809,VietnamsdomesticantiChinabacklashspreadfromthepoliticalfringetoawider

circleof thepoliticalelitewhonotonlycriticizedChineseactionsbutalsobegan toquestion

theirgovernmentshandlingofrelationswithChina.Twodevelopmentsspurredthisshift.The

first was related to the governments decision to grant a Chinese company rights to mine

bauxiteoreintheCentralHighlands.Whatbeganasaprotestaboutenvironmentalprotection

quicklybecamehighlypoliticalwhennationalsecurityconcernswereraisedbynolessafigure

thanGeneralVoNguyenGiap.GeneralGiapsintervention,intheformofthreeopenlettersto

partyandstate leaders,servedasacatalyst forother retiredhighrankingstate,militaryand


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4

partyofficialstovoicesimilarconcerns.TheseviewswerewidelycirculatedinVietnamoverthe

internetandinphotocopyform.

The second development to elicit an antiChina response in Vietnam arose from increased

Chineseassertiveness

in

the

South

China

Sea,

especially

the

aggressive

manner

in

which

China

enforced itsunilateral fishingban inMayAugust2009at theexpenseofVietnamsdomestic

fishing industry. AntiChina sentiment thus spread from the political elite to fishing

communitiesalongthecoast.Provincialofficialsreportedexpressedfrustrationatthecentral

governments inability to secure thequick releaseof fishermenheld indetentiononHainan

island.Fourprominentbloggersweredetainedandquestionedabouttheirinternetsiteswhen

theypostedcommentary,interalia,criticizingVietnamshandlingofrelationswithChina.

Thespreading

anti

China

backlash

resulted

in

pressures

on

the

national

leadership

to

take

action to standup toChina.ThesepressureswereamplifiedbyoverseasVietnamesewho

criticized theHanoigovernment fornotdoingenough todefendVietnamese sovereignty. In

sum, theVietnamese regime found that its appeal to nationalism asone of the basis of its

legitimacywasbeingundermined.Theregimerespondedbychangingitsmediastrategytogive

more coverage to the governmentsdiplomaticprotests toChina,bypublicizing stories that

documentedVietnams longhistoricalclaimstotheSouthChinaSeaandtheviewsof foreign

analysts sympathetic to Vietnam. The press also was permitted to report on the negative

impactofChinasunilateralfishingbanonthedomesticfleetattheheightoftheVietnamese

fishingseason.In2009,however,whentwoVietnamesepaperspublishedretrospectaccounts

ofthe2007antiChinaprotestsanddescribedthestudentsaspatriotstheyweretemporarily

shutdown.

DespiteattemptsbytheVietnameseregimetocooptantiChinapatriotismfor itsownends,

the nationalist genie may be out of the bottle. In August 2009, when Chinese netizens

published an invasion plan on the internet showing how China could attack and conquer

Vietnaminanamphibiousinvasion,Vietnamesenetizensfiredsalvosintocyberspacedefending

theircountryssovereignty.Areviewofsomeofthemoreaccessiblewebsiteindicateshitsin

the tens of thousands. Later in the year security officials blocked Facebook and imposed


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5

restrictionsonTwitterandYouTube inpart to restrictdiscussionofVietnams relationswith

China.

Conclusion

Itis

clear

that

aloose

network

has

emerged

in

Vietnam

among

university

students

and

the

politicalelitethatisunitedbyitsconcernsoverChinasthreattoVietnamsterritorialintegrity

and sovereignty.Thenetwork canbeexpected tobeactivated in response toanyactionby

Chinathatthreatenstheseinterests.

Vietnams oneparty state rests on multiple sources of legitimacy (rationallegal, economic

performanceandnationalism).Sincelate2007risingantiChinesepatriotismhasopenedanew

front in challenges to the legitimacy of Vietnams oneparty state. The antiChina backlash

quickly spread from the political fringe to the center of the political elite (intellectuals,

journalists,academics,retiredofficials,bloggers,unionleaders,retiredseniormilitaryandparty

officials,NationalAssemblydeputiesandpartymembers)whobegan toquestion the states

perceivedinadequateresponsetoChinesederogationofVietnamesesovereigntyandnational

security. Insum,theVietnamesepartystatesclaimtonationalismasoneofthemainstaysof

regime legitimacy has come under challenge over its handling of relationswith China (with

respecttobauxiteminingintheCentralHighlandsandChineseassertivenessintheSouthChina

Sea).TheemergenceofpopularopinionaddsanewdimensiontothefunctioningofVietnams

onepartystate.


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1

VIETNAMS DEFENCE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

Carlyle A. Thayer

This reply provides a comparative assessment of Vietnams military relations with China and the

United States under six headings: highlevel exchanges, naval port visits, professional military

education and training, other defense cooperation, arms and equipment sales and strategic

cooperation.

Background

Vietnam has fought wars with both the United States (196573) and China (the FebruaryMarch

1979 border war and, by proxy, the Cambodian conflict 197989). China granted diplomatic

recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1950. Unlike the United States, Vietnam

and China maintained diplomatic relations throughout armed hostilities. Although Vietnam

withdrew all of its formed military units from Cambodia in September 1989, China refused to

normalize political relations until Vietnam agreed to a comprehensive political settlement. The

two sides explored the restoration of friendly diplomatic relations at a secret summit held in

Chengdu in southern China in September 1990. Formal restoration of political relations took

place in November 1991 at a summit meeting in Beijing.

The first defense contacts between Vietnam and China since their 1979 border war were

initiated in 1992 with the exchange of delegations from the External Relations Departments of

the Vietnamese and Chinese defense ministries in February and May, respectively. Nine years

elapsed before Vietnam and China formally agreed to multilevel military exchanges (Joint

Statementon Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century, December 2000).

In contrast, the United States withheld diplomatic recognition from Vietnam for over two

decades following the end of the Vietnam War. In 1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo and in

July 1995 extended diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The main


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2

impediment to normal diplomatic relations was Vietnams satisfactory progress in providing a

full accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missing in action or were held as prisoners of

war (MIA/POW). A further six years elapsed before the United States could negotiate its first

substantive agreement with Vietnam, the Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001. It was only in

mid2003, thirty years after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, that Vietnam decided to upgrade its

defense relations with the United States (decision of the eighth plenum of the Vietnam

Communist Party Central Committee, July 212, 2003). Vietnams Minister of National Defense

made an official visit to Washington late that year.

It is significant that Vietnam agreed to an annual defense dialogue with the United States in

2004 and bilateral defense security consultations with China in 2005. Vietnam and China

upgraded their bilateral relations to strategic partners in 2008 and comprehensive strategic

partners the following year. At the same time, in October 2008, U.S.Vietnam bilateral defense

ties took a significant step forward with the holding of the first politicalmilitary dialogue in

Washington convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. HighLevel Visits

The United States and Vietnam have exchanged two reciprocal visits by defense

ministers/secretary of defense. These have been spaced at threeyear intervals (see table

below). In contrast, the patterns of ministerial level visits between Vietnam and China is more

erratic and heavily weighted Chinas favor. Vietnams defense minister has journeyed to China

on seven occasions since 1991. A sixyear gap occurred between the second and third visits and

a fiveyear gap took place between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not reciprocal.

Chinas defense minister has visited Vietnam only twice with a thirteen year gap between visits.

Vietnam hosted its most recent ministeriallevel visits from China in April 2006 and the United

States in July of the same year. Vietnams Defense Minister visited the United States in

November 2009 and China in April 2010.


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3

Table 1

Exchanges of Defense Ministers, Vietnam, China and the United States, 19912009

Visits to China by

Vietnams Defense

Minister

Visits to Vietnam by

Chinas Defense

Minister

Visits to the United

States by Vietnams

Defense Minister

Visits to Vietnam by

the U.S. Secretary of

Defense

1991 July

1992 December 1993 May

1998 January

2000 July 2000 March

2005 October 2006 April 2003 November 2006 July

2007 August

200809 no visits 200809 no visits 2009 November 200809 no visits

April 2010

A review of highlevel defense exchanges below secretary/minister level for the period 2002

mid2009 reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equal delegations from China (ten) and the

United States (eleven).*

But there is a marked imbalance in delegations from Vietnam. Eleven

highlevel Vietnamese delegations visited China, while only four visited the United States.

Highlevel exchanges between Vietnam and China may be classified into three broad

categories: general staff, general political department and regional military commands. There is

a rough balance in exchanges at general staff and general political department level. China has

dispatched three delegations of regional military commanders to Vietnam and received only

one return visit.

*Data on exchanges was taken from Vietnams 2004 and 2009 Defense White Papers. Data for

the year 2004 was omitted from these publications. See Appendices A and B.


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Because Vietnam and China are both communist states and maintain a system of political

control over their armed forces, they have an avenue of defense cooperation not available to

the United States. Also, Vietnam and China share a common border and both have put in a

major effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.

Highlevel exchanges between Vietnam and the United States are markedly different because

the U.S. Defense Department and armed forces are not structured that same way as China.

There have been no exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Vietnamese counter

parts, for example. U.S. delegations to Vietnam may be grouped into three categories: (1) visits

by the Commander U.S. Pacific Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

level; and (3) visits by component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command.

The United States has sent an equivalent number of highlevel delegations to Vietnam as China

has between 2002 and mid2009 (eleven as compared to Chinas ten). U.S. delegations reflect a

greater diversity of interest and potential for cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S. visitor

to Vietnam is the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command who logged four visits between

2002 and mid2009 (and a total of seven visits from 1994). In addition, Vietnam has received

visits by the commanders of the U.S. Army Pacific (May 2004), 13th

Air Force (May 2008), Pacific

Fleet (March 2009) and Pacific Air Force (June 2009).*

It is notable that visits by component

commanders are a relatively new feature of U.S.Vietnam defense relations.

U.S.Vietnam defense relations are poised to enter a new phase following the visit of Defense

Minister Phung Quang Thanh to Washington in late 2009 with agreement for Hanoi to host

direct militaryto military talks in 2010. This may prove to be the venue for advancing concrete

proposals for defense cooperation.

2. Naval Port visits

In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were normalizing their political relations, a Peoples

Liberation ArmyNavy (PLAN)JiangweiII guided missile frigate made the first visit by a Chinese

*Vietnams 2006 Defense White Paper lists a visit by the Commandant of the United States

Marine Corps in SeptemberOctober 2002 but this visit appears to have been cancelled.


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warship to a Vietnamese port since unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi Minh City. No

further port calls were made until November 2008 and August 2009.

In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin and on fisheries.

In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and

nine patrols have been conducted between then and the June 2010. The last joint patrol also

included the first Search and Rescue Exercise between China and Vietnam.

In June 2009, in an historic first, two Vietnamese naval ships made a visit to Zhanjiang port in

Guangdong province in Southwestern China.

VietnameseChinese naval exchanges pale in comparison to the regular annual visits by U.S.

Navy warships supplemented by a slowly growing number of noncombatant and humanitarian

ships (see Table 2).

Table 2

U.S. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports, 20032010

Date of Visit Ships Involved Port Visited

2003 November USS Vandergrift Ho Chi Minh City

2004 July USS Curtis Wilbur Da Nang

2005 MarchApril USS Gary Ho Chi Minh City

2006 July USS Patriot and USS Salvor Ho Chi Minh City

2007 July USS Peleliu Da Nang2007 October USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang

2007 November USS Patriot and USS Guardian Hai Phong

2008 June USNS Mercy Nha Trang

2009 June USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang

2009 AugustSept. USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh City

2009 November USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Da Nang

2010 Feb.March USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port

2010 May USNS Mercy Qui Nhon

*U.S. 7th

Fleet Flag Ship and escort.

In addition to the show the flag and protocol nature of these visits, the U.S. adds value to port

calls by providing humanitarian and medical assistance to the surrounding community. The

visits by the USNS Safeguardin 2009 and USNS Byrdin 2010 for ship repairs may be harbingers

of more permanent arrangements. Now that the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to

Thailand, Malaysia and China it is possible they may agree to visit a U.S. port such as Guam.


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Finally, the United States has added a new dimension to naval relations by flying Vietnamese

military officers out to the USS John Stennis to observe flight operations in the South China Sea

in April 2009.

3. Professional Military Education and Training

VietnameseChinese cooperation in the area of professional military education and training is at

the nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their respective General Political

Departments invariably include discussions on exchanging experiences in armybuilding on their

agenda. In 2008, Vietnams Deputy Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on cooperation

in personnel training. Both sides also have discussed Vietnamese participation in courses

offered by Chinas National Defense University.*

Vietnamese participation in professional military education and training with the United States

is of longer standing but involves only limited number of Vietnamese personnel. Perhaps the

first opportunity for military education was offered by the AsiaPacific Center for Security

Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s. Incomplete data suggests that numbers have slowly risen:

1998 (2), 1999 (4), 2000 (1), 2001 (3), 200203 (no data), 2004 (13) and 2005 (9).

Since 2005, Vietnam has been eligible for Extended IMET and later IMET (English language and

medical training). Eight Vietnamese military personnel participated in FY2005.

In 2007 the United States asked Vietnam to accept U.S. officers and cadets for training in

Vietnamese universities. The status of this proposal is uncertain.*

4. Other Defense Cooperation

As noted above, defense cooperation between Vietnam and China has been mainly of a

confidence building nature involving demining and demarcating their common land border and

joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tokin.

*A major delegation from Chinas National Defense University first visited Hanoi in late 2004.

*For comparison, Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defense visitors and

over 150 Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. During the same period over 900

Australian Defence officials have visited Vietnam.


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By contrast, Vietnams other defense cooperation relations with the United States have been

and continue to be more extensive. Obviously MIAPOW full accounting has been the main

focal point for decades. But Vietnam and the United States also cooperate on other programs

designed to address the legacies of the Vietnam War such as demining and unexploded

ordnance removal and joint research into Agent Orange. Other areas of defense/security

cooperation include: military medical research (HIV/AIDS), humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief (flood control), counterterrorism (including information sharing), and counter drug

trafficking.

The United States also funds Vietnamese participation at a number of defenserelated seminars

and exercises in the region such as COBRA GOLD, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and U.S.

Southeast Asia bilateral joint exercises in 200708.

In the past, Vietnam has turned down a number of requests for small joint exercises. In 1997,

for example, the U.S. unsuccessfully proposed tactical discussions and joint training exchanges

in jungle warfare. More recently (2009), the United States has invited Vietnam to participate in

search and rescue exercises.

5. Arms Sales and National Defense Industry

In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at ministerial level on cooperation between

their respective national defense industries. That year a delegation from Chinas Commission

for Science, Technology and Industry visited Vietnam. It was later reported that NORINCO, a

Chinese stateowned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell ammunition for small arms, artillery

and military vehicles to Vietnam. NORINCO was also reported to be discussing coproduction

arrangements for heavy machine guns and ammunition with a Vietnamese counterpart. In

2008, Vietnams Deputy Defense Minister held discussions with Chinas Commission for

Science, Technology and Industry in Beijing. No doubt that the prospects for Chinese defense

industry cooperation with Vietnam have been limited by recent arms and servicing agreements

between Vietnam and the Russian Federation.

Military equipment sales between the United States and Vietnam have been raised over a

number of years. In 1994, for example, the Commander in Chief Pacific Command proposed


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equipment exchanges and sales while on a visit to Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassador to

Vietnam raised the possibility of joint cooperation in repair and maintenance and the purchase

of supplies by the U.S. Navy. The following year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while

on a visit to Vietnam, suggested that Vietnam might buy military spare parts.

All of these proposals were subject to legal restrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of State

approved the sale, lease, export and/or transfer of nonlethal defense articles and defense

services to Vietnam. This was followed by a Presidential Memorandum establishing Vietnams

eligibility under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was

excluded, however, from lethal end items or their components including nonlethal crowd

control and night vision devices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations were

amended to allow sales to Vietnam on casebycase basis.

The U.S. would like to see Vietnam take part in the Foreign Military Sales process. U.S. officials

have already explained the process involved and how to submit a Letter of Request for Price

and Availability. Vietnam could seek approval to acquire spare parts for its stock of captured

U.S. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and UH1 (Huey) helicopters which are presently

inoperable. In 2009, the head of the Pentagons Defense Cooperation Agency singled out

maritime patrol craft and coastal radar as possible items for sale. But U.S. officials have made

clear that nonlethal arms sales are contingent upon Vietnam engaging more fully with the

United Sates.

As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industry sources began to identify Vietnam as a

potentially attractive arms market. In 2007, the U.S.ASEAN Business Council opened an office

in Hanoi and hosted a visit by a U.S. Defense and Security Corporate Executive Delegation

representing ITT, Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.

6. Strategic Cooperation

The United States has engaged with Vietnam more fully to promote strategic cooperation than

China. Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its northern neighbor mainly through

multilateral channels such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN

Regional Forum. Vietnam is keen to promote what is known as the ASEAN Defense Ministers


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Meeting (ADMM) Plus process involving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialogue partners

(Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States).

Vietnam will host the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in 2010.

Vietnams strategic cooperation with the United States includes more channels for cooperation

than the ASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the AsiaPacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD)

meeting held in Tokyo for the first time. A Vietnamese observer reportedly attended a meeting

of the Proliferation Security Initiative held in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed, but

remained noncommittal on, its participation in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Vietnam continues to send defense officials to the ShangriLa Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008,

the Chairman of the JCS met with Vietnamese representatives for the first time.

Conclusion

Bilateral defense cooperation between Vietnam and China and Vietnam and the United States

are heavily tinged by political considerations. No doubt defense officials in both Beijing and

Washington would like to see an increase in bilateral militarytomilitary cooperation with

Vietnam. Vietnam moves slowly and deliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnam

decides to move forward, its policies towards China and the United States appear to move in

tandem. The initiation of defense dialogues with the U.S. and China is 200405 is an example.

Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency in the number of highlevel exchanges it receives

from both countries.

China is relatively new to the defense cooperation game. The scope of what China can offer is

limited in comparison to longestablished programs in the U.S. China and Vietnam share a

special politicalideological conduit for relations between their armed forces that is closed to

the United States. This conduit provides China a means to influence Vietnam but the extent of

Chinas ability to do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnam and China have made

concrete progress in addressing land and maritime (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues.

The United States engages in defense cooperation on a global scale. It can offer an

extraordinarily wide scope of programs that are of longstanding. The unique role of Combatant

Commanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S. Pacific Command a special edge in offering


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opportunities for cooperation with Vietnam. Although Vietnam has sent nearly three times as

many highlevel defense delegations to China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 to

mid2009, that has not resulted in greater Chinese influence or defense cooperation.


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Appendix A

HighLevel Defense Delegations from Vietnam to China and the United States, 2002mid2009

Date From Vietnam to China From Vietnam to USA

1991 July

1992 December

1998 January

2000 July

Defence Minister

Defence Minister

Defence Minister

Defence Minister

2002 July Chief of the General Political

Department

2002 October Chief of the General Political

Department

2003 OctoberNovember Chief of the General Staff

2003 November Defence Minister

2004 No delegation recorded No delegation recorded

2005 April Deputy Chief of the General

Staff

2005 June Deputy Minister of Defence

2005 October Defence Minister

2005 November Chief of the General Political

Department

2006 SeptemberOctober Vice Chairman National

Committee of Search and

Rescue

2006 October Chief of the General Political

Department

2007 April Commanders Military

Regions 1, 2, 3, 7 and

Capital Military Region

2007 August Defence Minister

2007 OctoberNovember Deputy Chief of the General

Staff

2008 January Deputy Minister of National

Defence

2008 April Navy Commander

2008 September Deputy Chief of the General

Staff

2008 NovemberDecember Chief of the General Staff

2009 May Standing Deputy Chairman

of the National Committee

on Search and Rescue


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Appendix B

HighLevel Defense Delegations from China and the United States to Vietnam, 2002mid2009

Date From China to Vietnam From US to Vietnam

1993 May Defence Minister

2000 March Secretary of Defense

2002 January Commander Pacific

Command

2002 April Commander of Border

Military Area Command

2004 February Commander Pacific

Command

2004 March Deputy chief of the PLA

General Staff

2004 May Commander US Army in the

Pacific

2004 June Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Defense POW/MIA

2004 December Deputy Director PLAs

General Political Department

2005 June Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defence ISA

2005 July Central Military Commission

2006 April Defence Minister

2006 June Secretary of Defense

2006 July Commander Pacific

Command

2006 December Cheng Du Military Command

2007 April Commander, Guangxi

Military Region

2006 MayJune Chief of the General Staff

2007 November Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense

2007 November Chief of the General Political

Department

2007 December Commander Pacific

Command

2008 May Commander 13th

USAF

2008 November Deputy Chief of the General

Political Department

2009 March Chief of the General Staff Commander US Pacific Fleet

2009 June Commander Pacific Air Force

Documents

Thayer Vietnam's Relations With China, North Korea and the United States