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TThomas Reid, Hume and Theology

Joseph Houston

ThomasReid(1710–96)wasabelieverinGodwhosephilosophicalresponse to Hume’s philosophical scepticisms and religiousagnosticismpresents,orcontains,reasonsofakindforaffirmingthe-isticbelief,aswe’llsee.Butwhathewrote,andarguedinhislectures,waspresentedwithlessoftheexplicitandup-frontprominencegivento‘ThequestionofGod’thanthatwhichweseeinHume.

Hume pursues his philosophical labours explicitly with theintention of establishing the nature and proper limits of humancognitive powers and so de-legitimizing what he mostly calls‘superstition’. Where that word is most used it is plain that thesuperstitions to which Hume is most opposed are religious, or arepretentiousphilosophiesofferedbysomeassupportiveofreligion.1AndReiddidnot,asHumedid,publishworkswhosespecifictopicistheimplicationsofhisphilosophicalviewsforbeliefinGod.Relatedly,asthepassagesfromHumewhichhavejustbeenreferredto,asalsomanyothers,illustrate,Hume’selegantwittywritingdoesnotobscurea spirit which in the opposing cause might be called evangelistic.‘Superstition’,‘absurdity’,‘sophistry’and‘illusion’arestrongwordswhosehearersorreaderswill,iftheyarebelieversinGod,feelgotateverybitasmuchasasinnerbeingharanguedinthechurch.Hume’smuchtouted(byhisadmirers)equabletolerantgenialityofdispositionhas tobesetagainst suchwritingsas these,asalsoe.g.hiswrittenremarktohispublisherabout‘thatbigotedsillyfellowBeattie’.Notthathisdispositions,genial,edgy,ortetchy,haveanybearingonthesoundnessorotherwiseofhisargumentorhisphilosophy.Stillittoooftengetsmentionedasifitmight,orasiflikingHumemightinclineustolikewhathesays,asin‘loveme,lovemydog’.CompareReid,whoinhisuseofhumourandridiculeseemsaltogethermorelaidback,and,whichismypresentpoint,whoseinterestinreligiousconvictionscomesout,lessthaninHume,asthemotivatingorfocalconcern.As

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aconsequence,ifwearetoseeReid’sreasonsforbelievinginGod,wehavetograspthecorepointsofhisphilosophicalsystemanditscentralargumentsandaffirmations.

What Reid published, even when he comments on the longerhistoryofphilosophicalwork,iswithaviewtorespondingtoHume.SoweneedtoremindourselvesaboutHume’sreasonings.Inhisfirstpublication, theTreatise of Human Nature (1738),Humeconfessesthatheexperiencestroublingdespair.We’lllookat:(i)Hume’sreasonsfordespair,andthenhisownremedyforhiscondition,andthenhisdirectionoftravelfromthatdespair;(ii)Reid’swaysofavoidingor,asnecessary,dealingwiththeproblemswhichledtoHume’sgloomyplightandtheirimplicationsforbeliefinGod.Promptedbythiswecanreflectalittleonpossibledifferingwaysofengaginginapologetics.

Hume’s despair

Humehasshown,hesays,that

[…] theunderstanding,when it acts alone, andaccording toitsmostgeneralprinciples,entirelysubvertsitself,andleavesnotthelowestdegreeofevidenceinanyproposition,eitherinphilosophyorcommonlife.Wesaveourselvesfromthistotalscepticismonlybymeansofthat[…]propertyofthefancy,bywhichweenterwithdifficultyintoremoteviewsofthings,andarenotabletoaccompanythemwithsosensibleanimpression,aswedothose,whicharemoreeasyandnatural.2

– i.e. abstract arguments, ‘remote views of things’, notablyconsiderationsofaprofoundlyphilosophicalsort.Theconclusionsofsuchreflectiondonothavesuchanimpactonusastomakeusactuallyset aside ‘easy and natural’ concerns which avoid reference to theabstruse.Butwhilewecananddofindattentioncommonlydivertedfromabstruseanxietiesbytheeveryday,we’reboundtohave–andquiteproperlyboundtohave–somethinglikeatroubledconscienceaboutit;thisparticularlybecausetheundealt-withtheoreticalissuesraiseseeminglyunanswerablequestionsabout thepresumednature,andeventheveryexistence,oftheeverydayworld.

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Inthismostautobiographicalportionofhisphilosophicalwritingshe seems to be trying to find a third way between the mind of theordinary person in the street with her everyday beliefs, concernsand pleasures, and that of the rigorous rather sceptical philosopherwho has exposed clear error and groundlessness in all or much ofthe ordinary person’s less reflective take on the world. He wishesto avoid mere mental oscillation according to circumstance or themoodbetweenthese two(logically incompatible)waysof thinking,andbeing.Because it’s impossible to liveoutone’s life inpracticeinawaythatisconsistentwithbeingthescepticalphilosopheroftheunderstanding, the stance or the path of the ordinary person in thestreetseems,practicallyspeaking,theonlyoption.ButHumeinsiststhatthatreallywon’tdo.Foronething,it’s‘almostimpossibleforthemindofmantorest,likethoseofbeasts,inthatnarrowcircleoftheobjects,whicharethesubjectofdailyconversationandaction’.3Foranother,ifwecouldrestthereinthenarrowcircleofthemattersofeverydayconcerntousall,andaccordingtosomeprincipleexcludereflectionofthatmoretroublingscepticalkindwhichunderminestheverycredentialsofourunderstanding, thatprinciplewouldexcludescience and all philosophy. For yet another, in our reading andexperiencewemeetdisputesaboutmorality, theprinciplesofgoodgovernment, what’s reasonable and what’s folly, what’s worthy ofbeliefandwhatisn’t;andHume,forhispart,is‘uneasy’tothink,forexample,thathedecides‘concerningtruthandfalsehood,reasonandfolly,withoutknowinguponwhatprinciplesIproceed’.4Hedesires,infacinguptohisdilemma,tohelpinthebetterresolutionofsuchdisputes.(Thoughhefindsnofaultinthose,liketheEnglishcountrygentleman, to whom philosophical issues do not occur.) Humanbeingsdooftenfeeltheneedofguidanceanditisnotgoodforthemtobeledbysuperstitionandbetterthattheyshouldturntosomesortofmodestphilosophy–modestincomparisonwiththeunconstrained,unprincipledexcessesofsuperstition.

Oneproblemwithallthisis:onwhatprincipledoesHumethinkhecanexcludetheseriouslyworrisomecriticalaspectsofhisphilosophythathavereducedhimtoblackdespairwhile retainingabeneficentfumigatingscepticismwhichwillfreeusfromtheextravagancesof‘superstition’andthelike?Theprincipleseemssofartobelittlemore

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thanthatourordinarynaturalbeliefsabouttheworldshouldnotbetoomuchdisturbed,northeeventenorofourmindsscandalizedbydeepanxieties.Surely,though,whethertheconclusionofacourseofreflectionorreasoningisfoundtroublingornotisnotagoodgroundfordemarcatingthegoodphilosophyfromthebad.Apropercriterionforgoodphilosophywilldifferentiatebetweenwhatreliablyleadsusto truth,andwhatdoesnot.Whetherourconclusions then leaveuscalmortroubledisirrelevanttotheirvalueasphilosophy.

Recently,inthesportspagesofThe Times of16thNovember2011,I readanallusion toHume’s angst.MatthewSyed iswritingaboutsportspeoplewhohavebeentroubledpeople,evensuicidal.Hethinksthat anobsessiveperfectionism is the reason, and that if onehas a‘hinterland’onecanrelaxintoandinit.Hewrites,

‘Sporthastobethemostimportantthingintheworldifyouaregoingtobethebest’,MartinaNavratilovaoncetoldme,‘Butit also, at times, has to be the least important thing.’ Hume,the great British [sic] philosopher, made the same point.Asathinkerhereachedsomedarkconclusionsaboutthehumancondition,but(unlike,say,BeckettorNietzsche)neverallowedthemtoaffecthisdaily life. Insteadheforgotabout them.‘Idine, Iplayagameofbackgammonandammerrywithmyfriends;andwhen,after threeor fourhoursofamusement, Ireturntomyphilosophicalspeculations,theyappearsocold,andstrained,andridiculous,thatIcannotfindinmyhearttoenterintothemanyfurther.’5

However, theproblemforHumeisnot thathe isobsessionalaboutbeingasgoodaphilosopherashe,oranyone,canbe.Theproblemisthatifphilosophicalreasoningcompellinglyleadsustoconcludethatwecanknowverylittleeven,orespecially,aboutthingsfundamentaltoourconceptionofoursituationandnature,andaboutmanythingswehadthoughtwereobviouslytrue,wecannotjustturnawayfromthat to diversions because that is too unsettling or uncomfortablefor us. If the mood of anxiety or despair is alone the problem, apsychological solution (distracting social life and good food) mayserve.Humeisnodoubtsensibletoleaveoffforabitfromreckoning

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with theseconclusionsandgrapplingwith them, leavingoffso thathedoesn’tbecometoodespairing,losinghiswitseven.Butwhatifitonlymakesdefensiblesensetocarryonourordinary,asitseemsnot speciallyphilosophical, livesat all ifwecandealwithand seeoffthosephilosophicalworries,defeatthereasoningwhichconcludesthatwhatwetaketobetheordinaryworldofcommonexperienceisn’tatallwhatitseems–maybeevenisn’tatall,doesn’texist.Surelywecannotjust leavethem,stopworryingaboutthemandturntoenjoyordinarylife.Turningtoengageinandenjoyordinarylifeishardlypossiblewithintellectualintegritywhenwehaveitontheauthorityof philosophical reason that we have no justification for thinkingthattherearephysicalobjects,thatwearepersistingselves,andthattheseareothersentientselves.Thesewereconclusions,withothersastroubling,towhichHumehascomeandtowhichhehastocometoterms.

Let’snowseehowhecametothe(tohim)mosttroublingfeaturesofhisviewofoursituation.Humebeginsbytalkingofthecontentsof our awareness: our ‘perceptions’, as he calls them (meaning toincludenotonlytheexperiencesweassociatewiththeeyes,butthosewhichweattributetoothersenses,andalsowiththeeyeofthemind:reveries,dreamsandsoon),andourimpressionsorideas.Theseareour subjective awarenesses; they exist insofar as we have them inconsciousness.Anditisthese,andonlythesewhichweareimmediatelyawareof.Impressionsorideas,then,arethecontentsofourconsciousminds, the immediate content of consciousness.Whether our ideasdoordonotprovidealinktoaworldbeyondthemind,wecanstillconsiderandcontemplatethem.Furtherwecanrecognisepropertiesoftheideasandrelations,resemblancesordifferencesbetweentheseideas.Thethought-modelisasortofinnerperception–theeyeofthemind–bywhichweareawareofideas.Byintrospectionweareawareofideas,whilereason,morethanmereawarenessofideas,recognises,intuitspropertiesofideasandrelationsbetweenideas.Intuitiongivesus tosee/notice/recognisepropertiesand tograsp relationsbetweenthem,logicalandnon-logicalrelations.

Hume,then,followsaleadgivenbyLockeandBerkeleyinholdingthatwecan legitimatelyclaim toknowonlywhatwecanestablishby theuseof introspectionand intuition(i.e.,by inferringfromthe

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contentsofourawareness):impressionsandideas.Theremaybeanynumberoffurtherdeductive,inferential,stepsderivingfromthebasicscrutinyofideas;andknowledgewillbebuiltonideasandreason’sscrutiny of them.Thus, for Hume, knowledge, like an edifice, willhave to reston,dependon, the resultsofourscrutinyofour ideas.Thefoundationalpropositionsforthestructureofknowledgeexpresstruthsabouttheideasweareawareof,truthsrecognizedbyreasonasitcontemplatestheseideas.

Locke and Berkeley also thought this way, as remarked. Onebigattractionof it is itsseemingtosecurecertaintyforknowledge.Whether,inordertoknowyoudohavetobecertainisamootpoint;indeedIthinkthatwhatcertaintyisisopentodiscussion.Butithasseemedcleartomanythatwhatwe’reawareofintrospectivelyinourconsciousawarenessissomethingwecanbecertainof.Supposewehavebeforeourminds,whetherbyconjuringuptheideaorreceivingit somehowwhat seems tousayellowishpatchorobject.Wemaynotknowexactlywhat tocall it:gamboge,ochre,orwhat.Butweknowhow it seems tous, even ifwearenotgoodatdescribing it,andthatmustbehowitdoesseemtous.Sothereiscertaintythere.Andifbyintrospectionand/orreasonwerecognisethatitiscolouredandextended,orthatithasaweightifitisanobject,thesesortsofjudgementsseemcertain,certainly true.Thissortoffoundationalistapproach (‘classical modern foundationalist’ in the jargon) requiresthatourknowledge,thestructureofknowledgerestsonourgrasp–byreasonscrutinizingtheideaswe’vereceived–ofbasicpropositions.Thesearepropositionswhosetruthweseebytheeyeofreasonasweareawareofourgivenideas.Hume’sangstovercomeshimbecausesolittlecaninfactbeestablishedascertainknowledgebythismeans.Hisworryextendsoverahugerangeofareaswherewejusttakeitthatwehaveknowledge.We’llconsidersomeobviouscases.

There’s our knowledge (as we suppose it to be) of a world ofphysicalobjectswhichexist,wesuppose,quiteindependentlyofourminds’awarenessofthem:tablesandchairs,applesandplanets,ourown bodies, and so forth. These sorts of things constitute what inthiscontextiscalled‘theexternalworld’.But,now,ifallthatwe’redirectlyawareofareideas,mind-dependentmentalentities,howcanwegainaccess to,knowledgeof, thisallegedworldof independent

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things, theexternalworld?Accordingto theaccountsofLockeandespeciallyHume,weseemtobeononesideof,andviewing,apassingshowofideas,butweareneverabletoaccesswhatever,ifanything,mightlieontheothersideofwhatisineffectabarrierofideas.Onthisconstructionofoursituationwecannotgetatanexternalworld,ifindeedthereisone.

Berkeley thought that we don’t get at it, because actually thereisn’tanexternalworld,andthatweknowonlyideas;whatwethinkofasphysicalobjectsareideaswhicharegiventousstructuredincertainsortsofconsistentwaysbyGod.Godgivesustheseideasorderedsothat theyconstituteforus theworldweexperience.Noneedforan‘externalworld’onthatview.

Hume cannot follow Berkeley because, for one (big) thing, wecan’tonthebasisoftheideasweexperiencegraspaconceptofaselformind,nor, thereforeaffirmtheexistenceofcontinuingpersistingselvesorminds–ourmind,othermindsorGod’smind.Whenwelookintoourideastockwefindideasofheatorcold,lightorshade,painorpleasure,butnosuchideaasthatofaselfnorourownself.There are bundles of ideas, ideas of all sorts; the member ideas ofthesebundleschangeastimepasses.Sosuchbundlesdonotconstituteanypersistingmindorself.Sincewemusthaveanidea(inHume’ssense)ofanythingaboutwhichwecanmeaningfullyspeak,beliefinpersonalidentitylacksrationalbasis.

More:Iftheaccessibilityofanyobjectsinthesupposedexternalworld‘outthere’atpresentisdeeplyproblematic,howmuchmoresoistheaccessibilityofanexternalworld,oranything,inthepast?Itspastnessaddsanotherbarrierbetweenusanditasdistinctfromandinadditiontoitsbeingexternal:Humecannotseehowtodistinguishideasofthepastandthoseofthepresentexperienceexceptinrespectof‘forceandvivacity’.Andthatsurelydoesnotgiveusareliablebasisfordistinguishingrememberedideasfromimaginedideas,whichonHume’sviewalsolackforceandvivacityascomparedwithideasoftheactual.

Then,causationisanimportantconceptionforourunderstandingof how the world works. A great proportion of human effort tounderstand the world is devoted to our identifying the causes ofthingsorevents.Scienceofonesortoranotherisintocauses.Hume

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finds this, too, deeplyproblematic.Wedon’t have anybasis inourexperienceofAandBwhenwesaythatAcausedB:thereisnothingexperiencedwhenBfollowsAinadditiontothesequenceofA,thenB–nothingtojustifyoursayingAcausedB.Anditisnotalogicalconnectionwhich,ifitwereso,mightbegraspedbyintuition.Thereisnoreason,then,toattributeacausallinkbetweenevents.Attributingcausallinksis,thus,problematic.

Surveyingthewreckageofwhatwethoughttobetheedificeofourknowledge,Humedespairs:

The intense view of these manifold contradictions andimperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me,andheatedmybrain, that I amready to rejectallbeliefandreasoning,andcanlookuponnoopinionevenasmoreprobableor likely than another. Where am I, or what? From whatcausesdoIderivemyexistence,andtowhatconditionshallI return?Whose favour shall I court, andwhose angermustIdread?Whatbeingssurroundme?andonwhomhaveIanyinfluence,orwhohaveanyinfluenceonme?Iamconfoundedwithallthesequestions,andbegintofancymyselfinthemostdeplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepestdarkness,andutterlydepriv’doftheuseofeverymemberandfaculty.6

When he manages to put this mood of hopelessness behind, hereturns, the wings of intellectual pretension clipped, to considerthe operations of human minds; he is aiming to construct a thirdwaybetweenoverconfidenceaboutourcognitivepowers(whichhehasnowexposedanddemolished) andblackhopelessness.Hewilldescribehowourmindsactuallyworkasweacquirethebeliefsthatwe do form and adopt. He believes that by accurate description oftheworkingsofthemindwecanstilldiscoverwhattheproperlimitsofourunderstandingare,soas toavoidoverreaching,and toavoidsuperstition.Withamodestscepticismweshalleliminatesophistry,illusionandsuperstitionwhileaffirmingwhatwemayproperlyaffirmgiven the limitations of our powers of understanding. Describingpreciselyhowourmindsactuallywork,howourbeliefscomeabout,

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will,hehopes,giveusreasonstodeterminewhatsortsofconclusionsour intellectual capacities are fitted to reach. We can see how thisproposedthirdwayworksasHumeemploysitinoneoftheseveralproblematictopicstowhichhereturns.Let’stakecausation,causalityasourexample.

WhenwesayAcausesB,we’reawareofAand(then)B;butwhatjustifiesourclaimingthatthereisconnectionbetweenA’soccurrenceand(then)B’s?WehavenoexperiencedideaofalinkbetweenAandB(sothere’sevenaquestionofwhatwecanmeanby‘cause’).Sofarasreasongoes,anyeventofitskindmaybecausedsofarasreasongoes–thatisinrespectofwhatevercanbededucedfromtheverynaturesof theevents involved–byanykindofevent.Reason,scrutinizingthe ideaof some thingoranevent in itself recognisesnonecessitythatitcanbecausedinthisway,orthat.Further,andagainsofarasreasongoes,aneventmaynothaveacauseatall.Sofarasreason(asitscrutinizesideas)goes,theveryideaofsomeeventisconsistentinreasonwithanykindofcause,ornonewhatever.Ideasaredistinct,andthere’snothingintheidea,say,ofaflamethatnecessitatestheflame’scausingheatandpain.Nor,sofarasitsideagoes,doesheathavetocomeaboutinsomeparticularway.Onfoundationalistgrounds,it’shardtoseehowbeliefsaboutcausalconnectionscanbejustifiedwhenthenecessityofconnectionsbetweenideasislacking.Hume’sansweristhatexperienceleadsustoconnectcausesandeffectsaccordingtothewayinwhichwearehabituatedtothink,habituatedbyexperienceofideasfoundtogetherincertainways.Thehabitualexperienceofthesuccessionsofideas,togetherwithourmind’stendencytoassociateideasthushabituallyencountered,givesustorelatecausesandeffects.Weputintheconnectionbetweencauseandeffect.

Analogous moves are made by Hume to deal with his range ofproblems,e.g.overbeliefinaworldofobjectsexternaltoourmindsand over belief in personal identity. The subjective quality of ourexperiences,theirforceandvivacity(comparedwithmerefantasizingor,aswewouldputit, imagination)willservetotriggerourbelief-forming disposition so that we judge there to be physical objectsaffectingus.Againthecontentsofwhatwejudgetobeourmindareheldtogetherinwhatweareawareofasourpersistingselfbyaspeciesof association of ideas. Hence, our beliefs in causal connections,

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physical objects and in our ‘selves’ are generated by the ways ourmindsdealwithideaswhichtheycometohave.Ourmindsfunctioninthoseways,andwecannothelpbutbelieveintheseways.

Humegoesontomaintainthat,giventhisthirdway,thereremainsceptical implications for some areas of supposed knowledge, orsupposedly justifiablebelief.Notably,givenHume’saccountofourminds’workings,knowledgeorwell-groundedbeliefsaboutGodortheworldtocomearebeyondus.Returningtoargumentsemployingtheconceptofcausation,astheseareadvancedtoestablishtheexistenceofGod,Humepointsoutthatonhisaccountwecanformbeliefsaboutwhat causes what (or what will be causes what) only on the basisof, asaconsequenceof, relevantexperience.Recall theanalysisofcausaljudgementstotheeffectthatexperience,habitualexperience,isformativeandneededforustoarriveatcausalconclusions.Hume’swell-knownobjectionstocausalargumentsforGod’sexistence(likethe‘firstcause’argument)aretotheeffectthatwelackthenecessaryrelevantexperienceofcausalconnectionswhereGodisexperiencedas a cause. The Humean critique of design arguments makes ananalogouspoint:wehaveinsufficientrelevantexperience,ofworldsbeing caused, to have a properly foundedviewon thematter; and,Hume tells us, such distantly relevant experience as we do have ismorevariedinitsguidancethantojustifyarobusttheisticconclusion.

Reid’s response

WhatdoesThomasReidmakeofHume’sreasonings?First,herejectsthe‘WayofIdeas’,whichholdsideastobetheonlyimmediateobjectsofexperience,awarenessorthought.HumedoesbelongsquarelyintheWayofIdeastraditionre-vivifiedbyDescartes(butgoingmuchfurther back). Reid sees this starting point as inevitably leading toscepticism, first about the character, and even the existence, of thematerial world beyond, and independent of, our minds. Then alsoscepticismaboutthepastfollowsatoncefromadoptionoftheWayofIdeas–theIdeal(inonesenseanyway)Philosophy.Butwhyonearthadoptthisstartingpointasjustobviouslyappropriate?ReidsaysthisaboutDescartes,thegiverofnewmomentumalongtheWayofIdeas:

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Itmighthavebeenexpected, thataPhilosopherwhowassocautiousasnottotakehisownexistenceforgranted,withoutproof,wouldnothavetakenitforgranted,withoutproof,thateverythingheperceivedwasonlyideasinhisownmind.7

WhydidpeoplestepoutontheWayofIdeassoreadily,uncritically,andwithdireconsequences?Partlyithasbeenbecauseofacommonmannerofspeech. Insteadofsaying thatJohn is thinkingabouthishouseorperhapsthathewantstoimproveit,it’ssaid‘Johnhasanideaofhishouse’;‘Janesawthetumbler’canbeexpressedas‘Janehadaview(oraglimpse)ofthetumbler’.Sotohaveanideaofsomethingisnotmerely,asitshouldbe,engaginginanoperationofthemind;itbecomeshavinga thing there in themind. ‘Havingsomething inthemind’ isnowbeing takenquite literally. In suchways, ideasorglimpsescometobetreatedasentities.Buttheuseofthenoun‘idea’misleadsusifitinclinesustothinkthatwhenJohnissimplythinkingabouttheactualhousetherearethenthreethings:(i)John;(ii)anidea;(iii)John’shouse.

Ofcourse,theWayofIdeasphilosophershaveofferedargumentsforthisapproach,andReidconfrontsthese.Thereisanargumentfromtherelativityofperception.Itgoeslikethis:whatIseewhenIlookata10pcoindirectlyfromaboveisround;whatIseefromanangle,asImovetoonesideiselliptical;andthirdly,whatIseewithmyeyeslevelwith the coinwhenonly the edge is visible, is a short, thick,line.But thecoin isnotallof these, round,ellipticaland linear.SothatwhichIseeineachofthesecasesisnotthecoin.WhatIseeissomethinginthemind.

ButReidasks:WhynotsayIamseeingthecoineachtimebutthatitlooksdifferentfromdifferentangles?Bysuchreasonings(thereareseveralarguments)ReidrejectstheWayofIdeasandassertsthatwhenweseethings,likeapplesortables,usuallyweseethemdirectly:wedoseeapplesandtablesratherthanideasorimagesofthem(leavingasidephotographicimages,drawingsormirrorimages).

Then, further, he complains that Hume’s foundationalism(inherited,aswesaw)isarbitraryinacceptingtwo,andonlythese,sortsofbelief-formationasbeingtrustworthy.ForanybeliefofourstoberationalonHume’sviewtheyhavetobepromptedandgeneratedby

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eitherorbothofthesebelief-formingprocessesorquasi-mechanisms:introspectionandintuition.Reidasks:Whyfavourthesetwomodesofbelief-productionwhilerejectingotherssuchasourbeliefsaboutmind-independentphysicalthingsasseenbyus,orourbeliefsaboutpast eventswhichwe remember,orourbeliefs incausal links–aswellastheseveralothersortsofbelief-producingdispositionwhosedubiousnessinHume’seyesgivesrisetoscepticismaboutthemandthe beliefs they generate? The favour shown, to these two modesonly,seemsarbitrary.TheHumeanscepticsaysthatweneedtofindareasontotrust,sayperceptionand/ormemory,beforeweacceptthebeliefstheygenerate,butthatwecanandshouldacceptintrospectionandintuitionwithoutanyneedforvalidation.However,Reidpointsout,therehasnotbeenshowntobeanyrelevantdifferencebetweenthe favoured, trustedways tobeliefand thosewhichareheld tobeunreliable, standing in need of vindication, justly under suspicion.Considerintrospection:IcaneasilygetwrongwhatIseemtobeawareof by inattention, perhaps by having my expectations about what IshouldbeseeingsostronglymisdirectedbywhatIhavebeentoldthatImis-see. Intuition, rational awareness can similarlyprove fallible:whenwerelyonrationalintuitivepowersratherthancalculatorstodoarithmeticwecangettheanswerwrong;andphilosophers’paradoxesraisegroundsforlackoftrustinour‘rational’intuitions.Infallibilitydoes not characterise and so does not mark off introspection orintuition from our other belief-forming mechanisms as distinctlywhollyreliable.

Reid’scontention,then,isthataswehumansareconstitutedwefind ourselves with belief-forming dispositions. None of these isinfallible;butthereisapresumptionintheirfavoursuchthatunlesswe have some reason to suspect that they may have misled us, orthat we have been careless in our use of them, we should acceptbeliefsformedbythem.Sowemayhaveformedfalsebeliefsduetoinattention,or the influenceofotherpeopleassuggestedabove.Oragain,iftheconditionsinwhichthey’reusedareinappropriate(poorlightmayunderminetheworthofperceptualbeliefs),wemayhavereasontodoubtourpowersofvision.Lackingsuchreasonsfordoubt,we should exercise a presumption in favour of the belief-formingmechanismswithwhichwe’reendowed.

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Itisn’t,onReid’sview,thatwecanprovideevidenceorgroundsfortrustinginthereliabilityofanyofthesebelief-formingdispositions.Ifwetrytodothattheeffortwillturnouttobefutilelycircular.Takeanexample, saymemory. Ifwewish toestablish thecredentialsofthe memory-belief-forming disposition, how can we check out itsreliability?Wecanonlycheckoutthecorrectnessofsomememorybyappealingtoothermemories.Ifwewonderwhetherwemisbehavedat Avril’s birthday party at Crieff we might check a diary or asksomeonewhowasthere.Butwehavetorememberthatwewroteadiaryentry, that this isourdiary, thatsomeoneelsewas there then,andthattheirmemoryistrustworthy.Thesamesortofcircularityisinevitablewheneverwemighttrytocheckthetrustworthinessofourother belief-forming dispositions. So, take perception: Suppose wecallintoquestiontheaccuracyofourperceptionthatthatwhichweseeisastatueofamanwithatophat,howcanwecheckthismatteroutwithoutusingandinsomewayrelyinguponperception?Wecan’t.Reidpointsoutthatthereisnonon-circularjustificationforeachofthemodesofbelief-formation.

Corresponding to these modes of belief-formation are whatReidcalls‘Principles’.Variously,thesearethe‘Principlestakenforgranted’, ‘First Principles’, or ‘Principles of Common Sense’, andtheyeachregister trust inoneofourbelief-formingpractices.Theyare Principles descriptive of our cognitive constitution. They havethreemarks:

(i) theyareuniversalamonghumankind–apart from lunaticsandexcessivelyscepticalphilosophers;

(ii) theyarenotgroundedinanyreasoningandtheycannotbesupportedinsuchways;

(iii) theyarepartoftheconstitutionoftheminditself;consequentlyno-onecansustainresistanceagainstthem.

Principles of this sort speak of: our capacity to perceive objects inanindependently(ofourminds)existingworld;ofourrememberingactual occurrences; that we converse with others of our fellows inwhomarelifeandintelligence;thatinthecourseofnaturewhatwillbewillprobablyresemblewhathasbeeninsimilarcircumstances.

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Several modern Christian apologists have taken up Reid’streatmentofourhumansituationinmatterscognitive,andhavemadeuse of his conception of distinct belief-forming dispositions whosereliabilitycannotbenon-circularlyassessedorestablished.

William Alston’s book on ordinary sense perception8 offersa Reidian case in that field, while his much fuller Perceiving God 9 maintainsthatwehave(i.e.havebeengiven)abelief-formingdisposition by which in appropriate circumstances we perceive(though not with our eyes, particularly) God.Alvin Plantinga and,perhapsmostcongenially toPresbyterians,NicholasWolterstorffofYale, inDivine Discourse10 (where the imageryofGodwhospeaksis central) have been advancing, with grateful acknowledgementto him, such Reid-inspired approaches to knowledge of God.

Alston maintains that a propensity to form beliefs about God,even specificallyChristianbeliefs, is amodeofbelief-formation, adispositionwhichisactivatedwhenthecircumstancesareright–i.e.whenwehavecertainsortsofexperienceinappropriatecircumstancesandtherearenocounter-considerations(drugs,madness,etc.)toraisedoubtaboutthetruthofthebeliefthusformed.Suchbeliefswillbeno lessdefensibleandrespectable thanourperceptualbeliefsaboutthephysicalworld,orourmemorybeliefsabouttherememberedpast.

On the major topic of causation, Reid has important things tosay which take their point of departure from Hume’s discussionof causation.Theyarenot (in thewayofmuchofwhathe says) acounteringorevenaridiculingofHume.Withregardtoridicule,Reidhadsaid thatsomeonewhoreallydoesbelieveas thephilosophicalscepticprescribes (i.e. thatmaybe therearenophysicalobjects,nopast,nosentientme,oryou)isactuallymad.Thephilosophicalsceptichimselfonlypretendstothinkthathecanknowaslittleashesayshecanknow.Reid says thatyoucannotarguewith the thoroughgoingphilosophicalscepticbecauseheallowsnofirmgroundforanyonetoarguefrom–butyoucanridiculehim.Andanypersonwhoreallydoesbelievethesceptic’steachingneedstreatment.Butbacktocausation.

Reidsays thatweacquire theconceptofone thing’shaving thepower to affect another fromour experienceofour exertingpowerwhenbyourvolitionanddeliberateagencywebringsomespecificthing about. Merely inanimate material things cannot have power

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tobringaboutspecificeffects.Notonly ishemakingapointabouthowwecanconceiveofcausalpower,i.e.asinvolvingawill,butheispickingupHume’scelebrated insistence thatwhenwescrutinizewhatweareawareofwhenwesaythatonematerialthing(oreventinvolving material things) causes another, there is no idea of anecessaryconnectionbetweenso-calledcauseand itseffect– thereisnoideaofpowerdetectableinsuchacausing,powersuchthattheeffectmustfollow.Infact,soReidcontends,onlyapossessorofawillcanbeconceivedofbyusashavingcausalpower.Theonlyexperiencewehaveofpower’sexertionandapplicationisinourbringingthingsabout by the exertion of our will.That is where our conception ofpowercomesfrom,whereitcanonlycomefrom.

Now, most changes in the world are not brought about by ourexertingourwill.Wehavetoattributemostofthepowerwhicheffectsphysical change in the world to God. Causal connections requirepower effectively directed towards a specific outcome (which weinclinetoseeasnecessitated).Atthispoint,Godentersexplicitlyandessentially(asReidseesit)intoReid’ssystem.ButtosayonlythataboutGod’sroleinReidwouldbetoleaveoutwhatWolterstorff(whoisprobablyReid’smostpenetratingandappreciativeadvocate)callsReid’s‘epistemologicalpiety’.What’sinmindhereisthatourhumansituationinrespectofourpossessionofknowledgehasbeenrevealedby Reid as one calling for humility, gratitude and trust. Humilitybecauseweknowso little abouthowourmindgains its awarenessof the world of objects: the objects themselves do not act upon us(lackingpowerastheydo).Thatignoranceisaparticularsortofcaseof thegeneral ignoranceas towhywhenonesortof thinghappensanotherspecificsortofthinggenerallyfollowsinaccordancewitharecurringpattern.Whythatpattern,andperhapswhyanypattern?Anexplanationofsorts in termsofGod’spowerandbenevolencemayhelpwiththelatterquestion–whyanypatternatall?Whynotachaosratherthanacosmos?

Applying the above to belief formation: we do not understandinanydeeperwaysthannotingrecurringpatternswhyinparticularour belief-formingmechanisms– those causal events – are as theyare.Nordoweunderstandwhywehavethese(sowehavememorywhichgivesusaccesstobeliefsaboutthepast:whydowenothave

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acapacitytoformbeliefsaboutthefuture?).Humilityisproperforthosephilosopherswhohave thought theycouldbaseallbeliefsonintrospectionand intuition.But these (foundationalist)philosopherscannot justify their believing in any such way. They must trust,like everyone else. Gratitude is called for because our belief-forming dispositions or ‘mechanisms’ are generally reliable whenappropriatelyemployed.Wecan trust them.Allofus,philosophersspeciallyincluded,havetotrustourbelief-formingdispositions.Thatisathumbnailsketchofepistemologicalpiety.

Whatistherelevanceofthis‘epistemologicalpiety’toapologeticsunderstood as giving reasons for belief in God? Reid clearly is abelieverinGod;butheisnotinthewritingswe’veconsideredofferingargumentswhosemainaimistogivereasonsforbelievingthatthereisaGod.NordoesheaddressHume’sargumentsspecificallyagainst‘superstition’.

Still, doesn’twhatwe’ve just seen about the appropriatenessoftheJudaeo-Christianteaching,whichotherwisecommendshumility,gratitude and trust, to what we have discovered of our epistemicsituation–doesn’t this constituteamodestmeasureof support andmaybeconfirmationforJudaeo-Christianity?WhatIhaveinmindisthis:Judaeo-Christianitystronglycommendshumility,gratitudeandtrust supposedly by plain injunction, and as implications of otherthingsGodis,orhassaidordone,ormaybeboththeseways(straightcommands,andinresponsetoGod’ssalvificaction).Thatbeingso,ifwenowfindthatourenvironmentandourrelationtoitthroughourcognitive endowments call for thesevirtues, does that not count asakindofsupport(farshortofclinchingproof)forJudaeo-Christianteaching?

ThenwhatReidsaysaboutpowermay,mosteasilyoftheReidianideaswe’ve touchedupon,be transposed intoareasonforbelief inGod.Theargumentwouldgolikethis:weacquiretheideafromourownexperienceofintentionallybringingthingsabout.ItiscommongroundbetweenReidandHume thatwhenweare acquaintedwithwhatwereckontobecausalconnections(ascontrastedwithmerelycoincidental sequences of events) we have no awareness, no ‘idea’ofanythingotherthanthatonekindofeventfollowsanother.Humeseemstohold,roughly,thatourconceptofacauserequiresonlythe

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facts:(i)ofthesequenceofeventsconformingtoacommonpatterninexperience;and(ii)ourhavingbecomehabituated to,orby, thatrecurringsequencesoastoexpectit.(Somerecentscholarssuggestthat Hume thought that there may well be a connection, but quiteunknowntous,betweenacauseanditseffect.)

Reidapparentlysays that there is surelymore thanexpectation-creating recurrence in causation: power to secure the effect isemployed.Andtheonlypowerofwhichwehaveacquiredarelevantconcept is thepowerof anagent; andagod is theonlyagentwhocouldhavetherequiredpowerorpowersincausalprocess.Perhaps,cautiously,Reidmaybereadytosayonlythatwhilepoweratworkin causal transactions remains a mystery, God would constitute apossibleexplanation.Therecouldbeadebateoverwhetherappealingto agod’spowerasofferingapossible explanationofwhat cannototherwise be explained counts as a good reason to believe in God.Perhaps,asRobertAdamssaysinanotherconnection,‘itisatheoreticaladvantageoftheisticbeliefthatitprovidesattractiveexplanationsofthingsotherwisehardtoexplain’.11

Reiddidbelieve inacausalargument for theexistenceofGod,depending rather on the need for some causal explanation of theworld’sexistencethanonanyone’sexperienceofworldshavingbeenprecededbyagod’saction.AccordinglythepartofHume’scritiqueofcausalargumentsfortheismwhichwillaffectReid’sviewisHume’scontentions thatwecan supposeaneventorobject tohavehadnocauseatall,anddonotrequire toproposeanycausefor theworld.Reidcanreplythatwhatwecansupposeorimaginemaynotbewhatourbelief-formingpowersleadustobelieve.Wecanimaginefairy-godmothers turning mice into horses, after all. We do not believethat there are or have been causeless events. If our belief-formingdispositions inrespectofcausationare tobe trustedalongwithourbelief-formingpowerswhich conform to standards required for thePrinciples of Common Sense, then a causal argument for God hasvalue.

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Notes

1 See the First Enquiry, Section One, para 6, second half, or thefamousconcludingparagraphofthatEnquiryattheendofSectionTwelve,orindeedtheearlierconcludingsectionofBookOneoftheTreatise,wheretheprincipalspeciesofthatsuperstitionwhichistobeunderminedisinplacesexplicitlyreligious.

2 DavidHume,A Treatise of Human Nature(ed.L.ᵒA.Selby-Bigge;2nded.,revisedbyP.ᵒH.Nidditch;Oxford:Clarendon,1978[1739–40]),267f.

3 Ibid.,271.4 Ibid.5 CitingHume,Treatise,269.6 Hume,Treatise,268f.7 ThomasReid,“OfthePowersWeHavebyMeansofOurExternal

Senses” inEssays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (ed.D.ᵒR.Brookes;Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress, 2002 [1785]),126.

8 William P. Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1993).

9 WilliamP.Alston,Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1991).

10 NicholasWolterstorff,Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks(Cambridge;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995).

11 Robert M. Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press,1987),218.