District Assessment

Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province

November 2009

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................i

Recommendations........................................................................................................................v

1 Purpose and Methodology........................................................................................................1 1.1 Overall Purpose ...................................................................................................1 1.2 Research Methodology ........................................................................................2

1.2.1 Data limitations and Management of Bias........................................................3 1.2.2 Estimation Methods .........................................................................................4

2 District Context......................................................................................................................5

2.1 Overview of Kandahar Municipality ..................................................................6 2.1.1 Administrative Divisions and Population ..........................................................6 2.1.2 Loya Wiala – the melting pot............................................................................6 2.1.3 Historical Sites.................................................................................................7

2.2 Historical Background .......................................................................................7 2.2.1 The mujahideen in Kandahar...........................................................................7 2.2.2 The rise of the Taliban ...................................................................................11 2.2.3 The fall of the Taliban ....................................................................................13

2.3 Economy...........................................................................................................15 2.3.1 Markets - Export/Import Goods ......................................................................16 2.3.2 Agricultural Production...................................................................................17 2.3.3 Poppy Economy.............................................................................................18

2.4 Services ............................................................................................................18 2.4.1 Education.......................................................................................................18 2.4.2 Health ............................................................................................................19 2.4.3 Electricity .......................................................................................................21 2.4.4 Communication and media ............................................................................21

2.5 Reconstruction .................................................................................................22

2.6 Security Situation.............................................................................................23

3 Actors Analysis...................................................................................................................28

3.1 Afghan Government Structures ......................................................................29 3.1.1 Provincial Governors .....................................................................................31 3.1.2 Afghan National Police (ANP) ........................................................................33 3.1.3 Provincial Council ..........................................................................................34 3.1.4 Kandahar Tribal Council ................................................................................36 3.1.5 Municipal Government ...................................................................................40 3.1.6 Judiciary ........................................................................................................40

3.2 Pashtun tribes ..................................................................................................41 3.2.1 Zirak Durrani Tribes .......................................................................................43

3.2.1.1 Popalzai ....................................................................................................43 3.2.1.2 Barakzai ....................................................................................................45 3.2.1.3 Alkozai ......................................................................................................49 3.2.1.4 Achekzai ...................................................................................................52 3.2.1.5 Mohammadzai...........................................................................................54

3.2.2 Panjpai Durrani Tribes ...................................................................................55 3.2.2.1 Nurzai........................................................................................................55 3.2.2.2 Other Panjpai tribes...................................................................................57

3.2.3 Ghilzai ...........................................................................................................57 3.2.4 Kuchi .............................................................................................................58

3.3 Shia population ................................................................................................58

3.4 Religious and spiritual figures ........................................................................59

3.5 Insurgency ........................................................................................................61

3.6 International Military Actors ............................................................................63

4 Conflict Analysis..................................................................................................................65

4.1 Tribal rivalry......................................................................................................65 4.1.1 Tribal rivalry in the 18th and 19th century ........................................................65 4.1.2 Tribal rivalry during the mujahideen ...............................................................66 4.1.3 Tribal rivalries and the current Taliban insurgency .........................................67

4.2 Political economy of Kandahar-city ................................................................68 4.2.1 Economic sectors and administration.............................................................68 4.2.2 Land grabbing................................................................................................69

Appendix.................................................................................................................................71 Table 1: Kandahar Government............................................................................................71 Table 2: Business Associations ............................................................................................73 Table 3: Important Businessmen of Kandahar......................................................................75

i

Executive Summary The plans for the political reorganisation of Afghanistan became a reality in Kandahar after

9/11 when the US-led invasion removed the Taliban regime from their capital Kandahar-city.

Many Kandahar residents had high hopes for the newly emerging governance structure,

instead yet another chapter in the long history of power struggles over the control of southern

Afghanistan’s political and economic centre was opened. Rather than ushering in a new era

of peace, opportunities and prosperity, developments since 2001 point to continued violence

and struggles over who is to rule the province.

Acts of political violence (assassinations of pro-government religious figures or government

leaders) continue to shake Kandahar-city as the Taliban once again struggled for the control

of their former capital. Since 2005 the security situation in the city began to deteriorate more

rapidly when the Taliban insurgency increased its grip on surrounding rural districts and

increasingly began to infiltrate urban areas. In 2009, the operational radius of the Taliban

insurgents reaches into the very heart of the city where they stage impressive operations

undermining the confidence in the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) to protect its citizens.

Although they have not attempted a large-scale invasion of the city (except the Sarpoza

jailbreak), the potential for direct urban guerrilla warfare against Afghan government and

international forces inside the city is increasingly likely. The situation in and around

Kandahar-city resembles more and more the early 1990s when the communist People’s

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government only held on to the city centre and the

major transportation routes while cutting deals ‘left and right’ with the mujahideen in order to

stay in power and prevent a hostile take-over. Many city residents have already started to do

the same, believing that the most effective protection against the Taliban insurgents is not

the number of police or international forces in the city, but the payment of protection money

to the insurgency. It is open to speculation if these payments have contributed more to the

Taliban from refraining to take control of Kandahar-city than other efforts taken so far.

The new and old distribution of power

There are two main fault lines or divisions in Kandahar: one runs among Pashtun

confederations and tribes, especially the traditional Zirak Durrani tribal establishment vs. the

Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes; the other lies in the opposition against supporters of the 1990s

Taliban regime and pre-Taliban power holders of the mujahideen era (including newcomers

on both sides). The international intervention in Afghanistan neither understood nor

addressed these underlying political struggles that characterize Kandahar resulting in a

highly unstable political situation. Moreover, due to their ignorance of the situation, they

ii

became entangled in local power struggles that pre-dated their intervention, sometimes

linked to century old “ways of doing things”.

The traditional political system of Kandahar has never been conceived of as representing

tribes proportionally but rather as a system of domination of the Zirak Durrani tribal

establishment over others. This started in 1747 when the Ghilzai ruler, Mirwais Hotak, lost

power and Popalzai and Barakzai families cemented their dominance. While the communist

and Taliban government attempted to break the “tribal logic” of the social order, the current

government re-established the domination of Zirak tribes for two reasons. First the Barakzai

under the leadership of Gul Agha Sherzai were instrumental in helping the US-led

intervention to defeat the Taliban in Kandahar, and the Popalzai benefited from the fact that

the new Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, came from within their ranks.

This reversal of history to long-standing political arrangements was effectively imposed with

the help of international actors, because of a lack of understanding of the complexity of the

situation and buying into a simplistic friend and foe schemata that stigmatized Panjpai and

Ghilzai tribal leadership collectively as Taliban, and Zirak Durrani as allies. The prominence

of Ghilzai and Panjpai tribesmen among the former Taliban leadership cannot be denied but

this in turn does not mean that the Zirak collectively opposed the former Taliban.1 Yet, as

Zirak Durrani (Popalzai, Barakzai, Alkozai and Achekzai)2 allied with the US-led intervention

into Afghanistan that took down the Taliban and the continuous struggle against “Taliban and

Al-Qaeda” terrorists, cards were stacked against other tribes from the beginning. This

allowed Zirak Durrani commanders to become very powerful and act with impunity, harassing

former Taliban (from all tribes) and extorting lootable resources (money, weapons, cars,

drugs) from them.

While the reliance on anti-Taliban commanders made sense as a short-term military strategy

to remove the Taliban regime, it had long lasting political consequences in the South and did

little to pave the way for an inclusive future structure in Kandahar with political and

economical power monopolised by Zirak Durrani tribes. Reconciliation with the Taliban

leadership willing to break link with global jihadists such as Al-Qaeda was not considered.

1 The current Taliban insurgency and the pro-government camp are better analysed along two

oppositions: the first between Zirak vs. Panjpai and Ghilzai; and the second between mujahideen era vs. Taliban era power holder. This results in four spaces that offer a more complete perspective. For example, the Barakzai who are often considered pro-government are the strongest backers of the insurgency in Shah Wali Kot for the same reasons as Panjpai and Ghilzai in other areas do. 2 The fifth Zirak tribe, the Mohammadzai, lost most of its influence as a consequence of the Afghan

wars after 1978 and do not play an important role in Kandahar-city anymore. When we speak of Zirak tribes in relation to power, the Mohammadzai are not included.

iii

Zirak Domination of the Political Economy

The domination of the Zirak Durrani tribes in Kandahar is impressive. While they make up

only 50% of the city population (and an estimated 50% of the provincial population), they

established a near monopoly on powerful political positions, key economic sectors and the

security apparatus of Kandahar. The only sector they so far have not yet monopolised is

business with less strategic goods such as dry and fresh fruits, textile, and other items of

daily use.

o Afghan government political power is dominated by the Barakzai (Sherzai family) and

Popalzai (Karzai family). Governors, provincial council, municipality government, as well

as provincial and district administrations are close to either the Sherzai or Karzai family or

had to establish links to them. Aside from this, a few technical experts have served under

every past government.

o The Barakzai were strongest in the Kandahar government during the

governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai (2002-2005), a Barakzai strongman.

o The Popalzai used their leverage from being the tribe of the newly appointed

interim leader Hamid Karzai. When he was elected as president in 2004 their

power grew even stronger. From 2002 on, Hamid Karzai’s half-brother Ahmad

Wali Karzai headed the Kandahar shura, a sort of parallel power structure to the

provincial government through which he exerted great influence until he was

selected head of the elected provincial council of Kandahar in 2005. Ahmad Wali

Karzai’s power increased further when Sherzai was removed as Governor.

o The Alkozai (late Mullah Naqibullah and Khan Mohammad) and Barakzai (as well as

Achekzai linked to Sherzai) took a leading role in the security apparatus, by

integrating their tribal militias into the police force; both are also involved in narcotics

trade. The Barakzai via Sherzai also have many security contracts with international

military forces, including guarding Kandahar Airfield (KAF).

o Alkozai (late Naqibullah) and Popalzai (Lalay) strongmen were prominent in grabbing

and distributing government land in close proximity to Kandahar-city and strengthened

the power of their tribes even further as they settled their constituencies in the Kandahar

municipality.

o The political reorganisation of Kandahar after the Taliban was also linked to an

economic reorganisation, with external resources (development, aid, contracts,

logistics for internationals) also being distributed in a highly unequal way. There is a

strong perception among the population that the concentration of income and wealth in

the hands of a few increased drastically over the last seven years with Zirak Durrani (who

are considered wealthy) being able to grab the biggest share of the pie while Panjpai and

iv

Ghilzai tribes (who are considered poor) are left with mere crumbs. For example, the

Barakzai but also the Popalzai monopolise key economic sectors such as fuel,

attracting development funds, contracting and logistics to foreign military as well as

narcotics trade.

In light of the above, there has been a backlash of those left out squarely from the access to

resources and power in the current government. The excluded have reactivated or turned to

the Taliban insurgency networks that build on the feelings of marginalization as well as the

growing discontent of the population in the districts due to civilian casualties in operations

conducted by foreign forces, which are seen very closely allied with Zirak power holders.

Zirak Rivalry

o The tribal (confederation) system often presents unity against outsiders despite internal

rivalries. Thus, while on a greater scale the Zirak Durrani tribes exclude the Panjpai and

Ghilzai from power, they were never unified enough to effectively govern or suppress

increasing revolt. Old rivalries persist, with each Zirak tribe trying to gain the upper hand.

o Especially the Popalzai (Karzai) have tried to cement their leadership by sidelining

other Zirak tribes, mainly rivalling with the Barakzai (Sherzai) over political and

economic power since the fall of the Taliban, but also with the Alkozai (for example in

Ghorak and Khakrez districts).

o The Barakzai and Alkozai tribes could not or did not want to improve their less than

friendly relationship that goes back at least to the mujahideen government and

instead continued to rival, at present mostly over the control of the government

security apparatus.

The insurgency quickly realized that the increasing marginalization of the Alkozai in the pro-

government camp made it the weakest link in the Zirak chain and began to target their

leadership through assassinations in order to weaken them and possibly bring them onto

their side. The power vacuum that was created after several main Alkozai leaders were

assassinated or died, most recently the strongman Naqibullah, has created a situation where

the Alkozai have become increasingly under the influence of the Taliban standing in front of

the choice whether they need to accommodate the Taliban in order to protect their own

communities. Much of the current insecurity and increased reach of the insurgency operation

radius into Kandahar-city is linked to the inability or unwillingness of the Alkozai to stop them

from doing so.

v

Recommendations The security situation in Kandahar-city has deteriorated considerably in recent years and

reduced the presence of national and international development actors. Any response needs

to be backed by sufficient political commitment and cooperation among the different

international actors present in Southern Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan.

Efforts to stabilize the situation in Kandahar-city should also take on a regional perspective

and be linked to the surrounding districts and provinces.

Development of infrastructure, capacity building and civil society

As the main urban centre of southern Afghanistan, Kandahar-city requires improvement of its

infrastructure. This is particularly the case of the Loya Wiala area where the occupation of

government land led to an unplanned rapid urbanization in the form of slum dwellings.

• A detailed survey of the Loya Wiala is desirable to assess the needs of the local

population including the many internally displaced persons and economic migrants

that have settled there.

• Based on such a survey an integrated strategy for assistance to urban poor and

displaced persons could be developed, including protection strategies for IDPs.

Especially the lack of an adequate and stable provision of electricity is a main obstacle to a

more thriving economy and the development of industry. Access to electricity also improves

security and protects communities against petty crime.

• Bridge the current efforts to rehabilitate the Dahla Dam (that will bear fruits only in

some years) with the expansion of the diesel generators currently providing

electricity. Once larger electricity generation projects supply power, diesel generators

can be shifted to other areas.

Kandahar-city is considered the economic centre of the South and one of the main trade

centres of Afghanistan. Agricultural infrastructure and farmer’s access to markets still lag

behind neighbouring countries as the continued lack of cool storage space, handling,

packing, grading, storing, processing facilities as well as marketing hinders competitive

business development, especially for export, in the entire south.

o A strategy for an industrialization of the agriculture of Kandahar Province in general,

and Kandahar-city in particular should be devised in order to improve Afghanistan’s

export potential. This should include the setting up of cool storage and processing

facilities.

o Especially industries that add value to local produce should be developed.

vi

Kandahar-city is the seat of the provincial government, the regional centre of southern

Afghanistan and the seat of courts, schools and clinics. However, the infrastructure needs to

be matched with the capacity-building of lawyers, health care workers and teachers.

• Increase efforts to build the capacity for civil servants.

• Improve adult education level through increased efforts in adult literacy programs in

the city.

The justice system of Kandahar-city is overwhelmed by the amount of cases it must handle

and suffers from a lack of staff. The example of the mobile judge operating out of Kandahar-

city and also covering Daman, Takhtapul and Spin Boldak illustrates this problem.

• In order to alleviate the overburdened state justice system, the possibilities of out-

of-court mediation/arbitration systems performed by traditional justice

providers should be explored. A possibility might be to learn from the experience of

the Commission on Conflict Mediation dealing mainly with land conflicts in Khost.

Past experiences in civic education outreach in Afghanistan (mostly around elections),

including Kandahar, have shown that the general population often neither understand the

rights and obligations of government or citizens. Civic education programs conceived of as

long-term processes can help build a vivid civil society and transform them into informed

citizens that can build a grassroots process for a democratisation process. Revive civic

education programs by

• Surveying the numerous existing associations and interest groups in Kandahar-city

and their capacity to provide civic education.

• Developing a uniform curriculum development (one for government bureaucrats and

one for the general citizenship) for civic education providers.

• Training a core task force of civic educators and make funds available for ongoing

programs.

Diplomacy/Governance

Any kind of program dealing with stabilization in Kandahar-city needs to respond to two main

problems concerning weak governance: corruption and exclusion. In order to work against

corruption, the following specific recommendations can be made:

• Set up an oversight mechanism that controls civil servants’ prevalence to extract

hidden fess and taxes on basic economic transactions.

• Set-up a transparent and accessible complaint mechanism with clear

accountability structures for poor government performance.

vii

• Introduce merit based incentive systems in the public administration.

• Increase of salary for government officials should be considered in order to decrease

the incentive for corruption (with reward for good behaviour).

• Set incentives for local government officials to engage in capacity building programs

in order to increase their ability to serve the community.

A serious effort to create participatory and politically inclusive political structures must

be undertaken to counterbalance the feeling of marginalization among different tribes, in

particular the Panjpai and Ghilzai but also other ethnic or religious minorities. To address

these shortcomings, two directions can be taken: improve sub-national governance and

possibility of reconciliation with Taliban insurgents.

• In consultation with local community leaders, explore ways and means of creating

a sense of balance and representation in appointed provincial and district

government structures without reinforcing tribal division or creating unnecessary

rigidity.

• Consider the appointment of outsiders to sub/national governance positions and use

leverage to ensure that de facto power holders cannot meddle in or subvert the efforts

of these government officials.

• Favor merit based appointment system in the administration and the police.

Explore/support reconciliation efforts aimed at including Taliban and other opposition to the

government.

• This effort should be lead by persons with political clout and good-will on both

government and Taliban side.

• To maintain neutrality, international actors should not be directly involved in the

reconciliation efforts (or are seen as leading it).

• Explore if the GoA can appoint prominent and trusted tribal elders and religious

figures to conduct the reconciliation efforts on behalf of the government.

Security

As one of the main desires of the population is security, the international community should

support the government in setting up a trust-worthy and professional ANP in the city, and

continue to bolster the ANA. Local respondents reported a positive change in behaviour of

trained police and appreciate increased professionalism in the police forces.

o Police training and mentoring should be expanded

viii

o A transparent complaints mechanism for policy corruption and misbehaviour should

be devised and made accessible to the general population.

o As parts of the community are unwilling to send their sons to the police forces until a

more inclusive political process has begun, a more representative local government

needs to b linked to improving the police force.

o One could explore ways of reintegrating Taliban fighters that have laid down their

weapons into Afghan National Security Forces.

1

1 Purpose and Methodology

1.1 Overall Purpose

This assessment of Kandahar-city was commissioned by the Canadian Department of

Foreign Affairs and International Trade in order to increase the understanding of

development actors about existing social, political, economic, security, and conflict dynamics

in selected areas of Kandahar Province. Working with the “Do-no-Harm”3 framework that

aims to increase understanding regarding the complexity of conflict environments, this

assessment provides baseline data and ground realities about a district in which the

Government of Afghanistan’s (GoA) still has some control.

The Do-No-Harm methodology recognizes first and foremost that assistance in conflict or

post-conflict environments, regardless of motive, is not neutral; and that aid and development

which does not benefit the community as a whole can hinder reconciliation efforts, embolden

spoilers, and re-ignite conflict. A first step towards ensuring that aid does not make a fragile

situation more precarious is to gain an understanding of the current environment in light of

the following areas included in this assessment:

o A better understanding of the district context and community needs, especially

economy and service delivery

o An understanding of social structures (ethnic, religious, tribal), inter-group relations

and power dynamics

o An overview of governance, rule of law and security from the perspective of district

residents

o A background of key actors in Kandahar-city, including those who may seek to “spoil”

development and/or peace initiatives; but also potential capacities for peace

3 See Annex 1 for CDA Collaborative Learning Project “Do No Harm” key principles

Chapter

1

2

This assessment should be considered a primer for development actors seeking to develop

sustainable engagement strategies. It can serve as an initial guide for navigating the district’s

fractured political and tribal landscape and identify possible entry points for undertaking

community driven development.

1.2 Research Methodology

In addition to desk research in Kabul, qualitative research was conducted through semi-

structured interviews and focus group discussions. The methodology used for this

assessment reflects a pragmatic approach to conducting research in a difficult and insecure

environment where obtaining information is not without danger. This is reflected in the

selection of surveyors, sampling techniques and triangulation of data.

First, due to an environment characterized by volatility and mistrust of outsiders, surveyors

were not selected based on their previous research experience, but were carefully chosen

according to the following criteria:

o Prior knowledge of the district context and ability to gather information efficiently

without drawing too much attention to themselves (this biased selection to individuals

from Kandahar-city).

o Surveyors had to be known either to TLO staff or trusted focal points – hence only

individuals considered as honest and trust-worthy were hired. If the surveyor was not

well-known, background checks were conducted with other individuals of trust to

assure that the surveyors were fit for the job.

After surveyors were selected they were trained on the survey questionnaire and information

to be collected. A comprehensive training was issued at the beginning of research and

subsequently surveyors were re-trained twice, after the completion of the first and second

phases of data collection respectively when data was delivered to TLO’s regional office in

Kandahar.

Second, for security reasons only a few formal interviews were conducted. The interview

methodology was adjusted to informal discussions where surveyors used their knowledge

about individuals in the district to engage them into an informal discussion covering various

topics. Furthermore, again due to security, surveyors did not disclose that they were

conducting formal research, the organization they worked for, or the donor that

commissioned the research.

Third, representative and random sampling was not used for this assessment; rather

surveyors relied on a mix of non-probability sampling techniques in order to reduce risk to

their person:

3

o Purposive/stratified sampling, where a subset of the population is selected that share

at least one common characteristic. For this assessment tribal elders, government

employees, teachers and individuals with relevant knowledge (e.g., farmers) on the

district were selected for interviews. Men from all tribes within the district were

interviewed.

o Convenience sampling, where those individuals known to the surveyor, or readily

available to participate in the research, are interviewed. Here surveyors also relied on

snowballing technique, where they relied on referrals from initial interview partners to

identify additional ones.

o Judgment sampling whereby surveyors used their best judgment on whom to include

in the interview process. This only worked due to the careful selection of the

surveyors based on their previous experience and knowledge of the districts included

in this study.

Two surveyors conducted 45 individual informal interviews in Kandahar-city ranging from 30

minutes to three hours with: tribal elders (16), NGO staff (4), shopkeepers (6), merchants (3),

medical doctors (2), spiritual figures (3), mullahs (3), former jihadi commanders (2), staff of

the Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (2), Afghan National Police (ANP) officers (2),

and health professionals (2, one veterinary and one vaccinator).

Surveyors supplemented interview data with information gathered through participant

observation. This helped, at times, to put information into the relevant social, political and

economic context, and is an important part of triangulation used in research to verify

information through various methods of data collection.

Additionally, the Kabul research team evaluated the data as it was collected and sent the

surveyor back into the field twice to fill gaps and collect details during which any remaining

gaps, inconsistencies, or contradictions were identified. In order to verify information, the

Kabul research team conducted four individual interviews lasting approximately four hours

each with key informants in Kandahar and Kabul.

1.2.1 Data limitations and Management of Bias

This assessment was limited by several factors, all linked to conducting research in an

insecure and difficult environment. In conflict contexts, the well-being of surveyors needs to

be balanced against scientific standards and rigor. Even though we attempted as much as

possible to double-check and triangulate information, we cannot fully guarantee the accuracy

of data presented here.

4

First, even though surveyors were rigorously screened and subsequently trained, their

potential bias towards other tribes/ethnic groups/communities, international military actors,

and the GoA must be taken into account.

Second, while sampling techniques used dramatically reduced risks to the surveyor, it may

have introduced bias, as those interviewed likely do not represent a perfect cross-section of

the population. As a result, findings by no means reflect the views of the entire population in

the areas studied, even though interview partners were selected as the most adequate

sources to reflect the views and experiences of the local population.

Third, the surveyor had to first memorize parts of the questionnaire and could not

immediately write down, much less record, respondents’ answers. The delay between

receiving and recording information may have resulted in the omission of details or the

oversimplifications.

1.2.2 Estimation Methods

This assessment includes two types of estimates, those for the general district population, as

well as population groups within the district. Due to the fact that big cities such as Kandahar-

city lack the cohesion of villages, with populations intermixing, it was much harder to obtain

good information on the overall population and the social groups within them. Nevertheless,

the following methods were used to arrive at the final estimate, which differ from those of the

Central Statistics Office (see later discussion):

Population estimates: Surveyors estimated the population numbers with the help of the

number of mosques. They estimated that there are 2,000 mosques in the 11 precincts of

Kandahar-city. Every mosque represents an average of 100 households with an average size

of 10 members. This resulted in an estimated 2 million inhabitants on municipality ground.

Tribal Group estimates: Surveyors held a total of 20 interviews between 45 minutes and

one hour with tribal elders from different precincts of the city to gather estimations of the tribal

composition of the city. These individual estimations were compared with each other and an

averaged was taken. Estimation were first made on the level of tribal confederations and

ethnic groups, and then within confederation for individual tribes. In general, there were few

discrepancies between estimations. This resulted in the following tribal/ethnic breakdown:

Zirak Durrani 50%, Panjpai Durrani 15%, Ghilzai 15%, Shia 8% and 12% others, such

Wardak, Mohmand, Sayed, Tajik, Baluch, and other small tribes. Within the Zirak Durrani,

40% are Popalzai, 30% are Barakzai, 15% Alkozai, Achekzai 10% and Mohammadzai 5%.

5

Figure 1: Location of Kandahar-city

2 District Context

Kandahar-city is located 280

miles southwest of Kabul at an

elevation of 1,000 meters above

sea level.4 Spin Boldak, the only

legal border crossing to Pakistan

in Kandahar Province is located

120 kilometres or a two hours

drive to the Southeast of

Kandahar-city. The Kandahar

International Airport is located

about 25 km south of the city in

Daman District and connects

Kandahar to national and

international destinations such

as Mashad (Iran) and Dubai

(United Arab Emirates).

The city areas is mainly (70%) comprised of roads, houses, markets, schools, government

buildings and parks (70%), with only 30% (2,500 ha) remaining as irrigated agricultural land.

The most important source of water for Kandahar-city is rivers and canals, especially the

Arghandab irrigation network that feeds water from the Arghandab River through canals to

the city. Similar to Kabul, most drinking water for the city population is supplied by deep

wells.

4 Adamec Ludwig. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, Manas Publication, Delhi.

Chapter

2

6

2.1 Overview of Kandahar Municipality

2.1.1 Administrative Divisions and Population

The Central Statistic Office estimates the population of Kandahar-city at 500,0005, with TLO’s

estimate being four times as high (2 million). Given that Kandahar-city has shown a drastic

growth in the post-Taliban period and is considered one of the biggest cities in Afghanistan,

the CSO estimates seem unrealistically low.

For administrative purposes, Kandahar-city is divided into ten precincts or nahiya. Nahiyas 1-

4 are the “old city” that had originally been populated by the traditional pre-war elite of the

Zirak Durrani Pashtun Mohammadzai, Barakzai and Popalzai tribes, Shia mostly of Qizilbash

and Hazara descent (nahiya 1) and the merchant Hindu community (nahiya 4). Shia still

make up an estimated 40% of nahiya 1 and in nahiya 7 there is a small population of Sikhs

(0.5%) that moved to Kandahar from Tirin Kot after mujahideen grabbed their land and shops

after the fall of the government of Dr. Naqibullah in 1992. They are mostly money changers

and shopkeepers. Other non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Kandahar-city include Baluch and

farsiwan (Persian speaking Sunnite Tajiks) and religious families (such as sayeds, pirs). The

Sayed claim direct descent from the Prophet Mohammad’s family (PBUH) and stand outside

the tribal and ethnic order.

2.1.2 Loya Wiala – the melting pot

Loya Wiala is a large suburban area located north of the city centre (and old town) and the

melting pot of the city. Since 1992, it has been the gravitational centre for newly arriving

population from different tribes and provinces, be they economic migrants or internally

displaced persons (IDP). Many of the economic migrants were landless people who migrated

to the city after the khan system broke down as a consequence of both the policy of the

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and population growth in rural areas.

Labourers who were no longer employable in the agricultural sector moved into the city in

search for new economic opportunities. The IDPs in Loya Wiala come from different

provinces of Afghanistan and fled to Kandahar in different phases since 1992. Since 2006,

IDPs from the Zhari Dasht IDP camp and conflict-induced IDPs from other provinces such as

Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul have moved to Loy Wiala, melting in with the urban poor.6

Local respondents describe parts of Loya Wiala as the most insecure area of the city, where

there is less social control with easier infiltration by Taliban insurgents. They have been able

5 Central Statistics Office (2008)

6 Susanne Schmeidl, Alexander D. Mundt and Nick Miszak, 2009, Beyond the Blanket: Towards more

Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, a Joint Report of the Brookings/Bern Project on Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

7

to establish networks in this area of the city because of the insecure land tenure rights (more

details in chapters 2.6 and 4.4).

Today, Loya Wiala consists of two different parts.

• The area now constituting Loya Wiala I was state land developed under the government

of Dr. Najibullah as part of urban planning and development schemes. There is water

supply and streets are paved.

• The areas now making up Loya Wiala II have been populated continuously since 1992

mostly by Alkozai and migrants from Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul after the government

land was occupied by commanders Mullah Naqibullah (Alkozai, Jamiat) and Amir Lalay

(Popalzai, Mahaz) who subsequently sold it off. Some of the land is made up of irregular

squatter settlements.

2.1.3 Historical Sites

Kandahar has a rich history and a number of historic sites are located on municipality

grounds:

o nahiya 2: Khirqa Mubaraka west of the city centre, Ahmad Shah Baba Shrine, Mullah

Azla Baba and Speen Kosee Baba Shrines

o nahiya 3: Moee Mubarak

o nahiya 4: Mir Wais Nika Shrine, Mullah Dawran Baba and Sheenaghzai Aghsabee

Shrines

o nahiya 6: Akhtar Mazaree Ziarat Shirne

These historic sites are popular places for pilgrimage. Some of the sites are linked to the

strong popular belief that visits to these places help to recover from sickness, assure healthy

animals and fertility.

2.2 Historical Background

The communist coup d’etat and ensuing Afghan wars changed the face of Kandahar-city by

sparking population movements and the destruction of property. The significance of the city

elite in Kandahar-city declined as executions targeting the royal family (mostly of the

Mohammadzai tribe) led to an exodus of many khans from the city and the surrounding

districts. At the same time, new leaders emerged from the war and took their place in the

power structure.

2.2.1 The mujahideen in Kandahar

The surrounding districts fell to the mujahideen faction before the city. From 1979 on, armed

struggle against the government of the PDPA spread from rural areas to the west of

Kandahar. While they were initially popular uprisings linked to khans negatively affected by

8

the communist land redistribution decrees, they became increasingly organized and linked to

jihadi factions channelling resources from Pakistan to fighting groups inside Kandahar. The

main jihadi factions operating around Kandahar-city are described in the Box 1 below:

Box 1: Main jihadi factions operating around Kandahar-city

Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society) was led by the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund, an

Alkozai of modest standing (former shopkeeper/mullah) from Arghandab. He later became

corps commander in the mujahideen government. Support by the Alkozai of Arghandab, the

possession of heavy and light weapons as wells as 6,000 armed fighters forces made Jamiat

the strongest faction in the Kandahar-city area.

Mahaz-e Milli-e Islami (National Islamic Front) had strong support of the Barakzai and

Popalzai tribal establishment, but their strongest commanders were of modest social

standing. The most important Mahaz commanders were Haji Latif, the father of Gul Agha

Sherzai (Barakzai), and Amir Lalay (Popalzai) from Shah Wali Kot. Amir Lalay later

established links to Jamiat and was involved in heavy fighting in the city with Mullah

Naqibullah after 1992. While Mahaz counted around 5,000 fighters it had fewer weapons than

Jamiat.

Hizb-e Islami - Gulbuddin (Hekmatyar) faction (HIG) was led by Sarkatib Atta

Muhammed, a Lodin from Dand District of Kandahar. HIG had little power inside the city and

its troops of about 1,500 fighters were concentrated on the western city border. Its support

was stronger among the Ghilzai tribes.

Ittehad-e Islami was led by Ustad Abdul Halim, a Nurzai from Panjwayi who commanded

about 1,000 armed forces. He became the first Chief of Police of the mujahideen government.

In addition to Nurzai backing, support for Ittehad was also strong among the Kakar tribe.

Harakat-e-Islami was the faction supported by the Shia population in the city and was led by

Ali Yawar, a Shia of Qizilbash descent resident of Top Khana, Kandahar-city.

Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami was led by Mullah Azizullah in the city. The party was strong

among religious leaders (mullahs) and later largely integrated into the Taliban movement.

Mullah Mohammad Omar (Hotak), the leader of the Taliban, used to be a member of Harakat-

e-Inqilab.

Kandahar-city stayed a safe haven for pro-government individuals until the fall of the

government of Dr. Najibullah in 1992. The PDPA government was able to keep their

presence for so long mostly because PDPA leaders channelled resources into the city and

made deals with the mujahideen forces.7

The mujahideen forces took control of Kandahar-city on 28 April 1992, after the collapse of

the government of Dr. Najibullah. As in many places around Afghanistan, the mujahideen 7 A prominent PDPA supporter was the former Minister of Defence and Governor of Kandahar under

Dr. Najibullah, Nur-ul Haq Ulumi of the Barakzai tribe. Under his leadership in Kandahar-city (1989-1992), mujahideen fighters were allowed to enter the city at night without weapons to visit their families. He is to this day one of the most important leader of the Barakzai tribe next to Gul Agha Sherzai and member of the Wolesi Jirga. He received most votes of the Barakzai tribe in the parliamentary elections.

9

government in Kandahar was highly unstable as different power struggles shook the city.

Armed conflict between rivalling commanders broke out as they sought to expand their

respective areas of control, killing hundreds of people. The mujahideen factions divided the

city, street-by-street (see Box 2), taxed people arbitrarily, looted ministries and committed

revenge killings. Gul Agha Sherzai, who became the governor of Kandahar during the

mujahideen government, was unable to manage the rivalries and effectively assert his

leadership.8

Box 2: Areas of control and check posts of different commanders

o Haji Ahmed (Achekzai from Spin Boldak, son of Haji Maghash)

o Captured the airport region

o Check post (patak) on the Kandahar-Spin Boldak Highway

o Amir Lalay (Popalzai from Shah Wali Kot)

o Captured the area of the textile factory and the customs house, Qishla-e-Jadeed, Dafi-e-Hawa Ghund, Manzil Bagh, Deh Khwaja, Baro Darwaza and many other areas.

o Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Kabul, close to the textile factory

o Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (Alkozai from Arghandab, Jamiat, head of the mujahideen army corps)

o Captured Firqa, Darwaza-e-Herat, Chonay, and Shahr-e-Naw (Jamiat, Alkozai tribe); head of the mujahideen army corps.

o Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Uruzgan in Kotal Marcha village located north of Loy Wiala and known as the boundary between the city and Arghandab district

o Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai, Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami from Dand)

o Captured the areas in the south, Ikhkarpur Darwaza, Arg, Charsu, Kabul Bazar.

o Ustad Abdul Alim (Nurzai, Ittehad from Panjwayi)

o Captured Mirwais Maidan and Sarpoza,

o He became the first CoP until fighting with Mullah Naqibullah forced him to flee.

o Sarkatib Atta Muhammed (Lodin, Hizb-e Islami, from Arghandab)

o Captured Baghpul

o HIG also captured the cantonment (chawni). When the other factions turned on HIG they retreated to the west.

o Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Herat province in Baghpul, Mirwais Meena village

8 According to Giustozzi, this failure to manage tribal rivalries and assert his leadership was essentially

repeated during his governorship from 2002-2005.

10

The failure of the mujahideen government in Kandahar-city to establish law and order and

unified governance allowed the more powerful commanders Amir Lalay (Popalzai) and

Mullah Naqib (Alkozai) to occupy state land located north of the army garrison (Qishla-e-

Jadeed) as well as the Loya Wiala desert (now nahiya 9). Subsequently they sold plots to

their sub-commanders.9 Coming from modest social standing, both commanders used the

land not only to enrich themselves but also to build up constituencies.10 Mullah Naqibullah

distributed land among Alkozai who moved into the city and today make up a majority of

nahiya 9, while Amir Lalay built his constituency not only among his sub-commanders but

also Popalzai landowners and farmers, and former PDPA clerks and factory workers

(discussed further in Chapters 3). At the same time both commanders engaged in violent

clashes against each other that destabilized the city.

Numerous conflicts other fault lines centred on Mullah Naqibullah, the Alkozai commander of

Jamiat-e-Islami were created at that time:

o Power struggle between Provincial Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and Mullah

Naqibullah (see Figure 2), the Corps Commander of the mujahideen government.

This power struggle continued with the Taliban takeover and collapse and soured

relations between the Alkozai and the Barakzai tribes to this day (see chapter 3).

Gul Agha Sherzai

Mahaz-e

Milli

Mullah Naqibullah

Barakzai Alkozai

Jamiat-e

Islami

Figure 2: Power struggle between Amir Lalay and Mullah Naqibullah

9 The occupation and selling of state land was repeated in the beginning of the current government.

10 This is very similar to other commanders such as Mullah Nasim Akhundzada from Helmand, who

used the drug trade and the distribution of its benefits as a way of asserting his continued leadership large areas of northern Helmand.

Conflict Line

Alliance or affiliation No relation

11

o Ustad Abdul Alim (Nurzai, Ittehad), the first CoP of Kandahar was forced to flee the

city after armed clashes with Mullah Naqibullah; he later supported the Northern

Alliance.

o Mullah Naqibullah struggled with Sarkattib Atta Mohammad, because the latter was a

HIG commander. The defeat of HIG (and thus the marginalization of the Ghilzai

support base) finds a continuation today in Arghandab district where the Alkozai

marginalize the Ghilzai tribes (see Chapter 3).

HIG against the rest

With the common PDPA and Soviet enemies gone, the old Zirak Durrani - Ghilzai rivalry in

and around Kandahar-city over regional leadership resurfaced as HIG and the other

mujahideen factions began opposing each other. HIGs support base was strongest among

the Ghilzai tribes, the Kandahar tribal “underdogs” since 1730 (see also Chapter 4.1) while

the Zirak Durrani establishment (Barakzai and Popalzai) had been closer to the traditionalist

Mahaz-e-Milli and Jabha-e-Nejat (the Alkozai were divided between Jamiat and Mahaz,

further discussed in Section 3). The “Zirak factions” agreed on a loose alliance against HIG

and pushed them to the western border of the city (see Figure 3).

Mahaz, Nejat, Jamiat

HIG GhilzaiZirak

Durrani

Figure 3: Simplified major fault lines between HIG and other factions

The Panjpai tribes such as the Nurzai, Alizai and Ishaqzai were strongly fragmented and split

among different factions. This is a continued feature today particularly concerning the Nurzai

tribe (see Chapter 3).

2.2.2 The rise of the Taliban

These power struggles in Kandahar during the short-lived mujahideen rule paved the way for

the Taliban movement that started when (minor) jihadi figures Mullah Rabbani (Kakar)11,

Mullah Omar (Hotak), and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif (Alizai) formed the nucleus of the Taliban

movement and moved against check posts violence and hung Commander Mansur

(Achekzai) in Takhtapul. Haji Basher, a former HIG commander and narcotics pusher of the

11

He was allegedly killed by ISI because of his moderate stance on religious issues.

12

Nurzai tribe, was one of the first major jihadi commanders to support the Taliban movement

with weapons and money, which gave them a decisive momentum.12

Initial support for the Taliban movement seems to have come from Panjpai, Ghilzai and other

smaller tribes who had historically not been part of the tribal establishment. As the Taliban

grew in strength, members of the Zirak Durrani tribes (Popalzai, Barakzai and Alkozai) began

supporting them as well. At that time a faction of the Taliban supported the return of the king

from exile and thus fit well with the political platform of the Zirak Durrani.13 This provided the

Taliban movement with a broad support base from different tribal confederations, with the

Zirak Durrani mostly supporting the pro-royalist wing of the Taliban.

The only mujahideen commanders who actively fought the Taliban were Commander Amir

Lalay (Popalzai) and Sarkatib Atta Muhammed (Lodin; see Figure 4). Sarkatib Atta

Muhammed Lodin’s forces fought shortly against the Taliban in the west of the city but

eventually abandoned their positions and weapons caches in Nawrozi Ghar.14 Amir Lalay

was not looked upon favorably by the Taliban because of the openly anti-Pakistani stance he

had taken in opposition to the continued influence of the ISI on Afghanistan after the Soviet

withdrawal in 1989.15 Lalay staged a battle in the airport region against the Taliban whom he

saw as Pakistan’s proxies. When the Taliban moved on Kandahar-city they targeted

commanders loyal to Lalay such as Baro Popalzai from Kandahar-city who was caught and

executed publicly. Wishing to maintain at least some power, Lalay fled to Iran and later joined

the Northern Alliance. Lalay’s rival Mullah Naqibullah was allowed to stay in Arghandab

District by the Taliban despite his former affiliation with Jamiat-e Islami as he handed over

weapons and ammunition. The then mujahideen governor and Barakzai commander Gul

Agha Sherzai went into exile in Quetta without a fight.

12

There are different local accounts of the genesis of the Taliban. Some claim it was a rather spontaneous event while others claim the ISI orchestrated everything from the beginning. 13

see Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1. 14

He is now a businessman in Dubai. 15

Local respondents claim that Lalay was approached by the ISI who asked him to sabotage the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot which was under his control as a way of disrupting the Afghan economy. Lalay refused to destroy Kandahar’s biggest asset and denounced Pakistan’s meddling in Afghan affairs on public TV by tearing up a check he had received from the ISI.

13

Amir Lalay

Mullah

Naqibullah

we

ap

on

s

Land

Taliban

Anti-Pakistan

Sar Katib

Atta

Power

Factional fights

HIG

Figure 4: Alliances and opposition to the Taliban

The handover of Kandahar to the Taliban forces is subject to speculation. Some local

respondents claim that while Gul Agha Sherzai and the Taliban were still negotiating, Mullah

Naqibullah switched sides to the latter and weakened the position of the mujahideen

government. Those who believe this version of events see Naqibullah as a traitor and his

opportunism as an explanation for the bitter rivalry between the Alkozai and the Barakzai in

the current government.16 Others maintain that the entire Zirak Durrani establishment was

bought off on 2 November 1994 at a meeting in the Pakistani consulate, attended by

Azizullah Wasifi (Alkozai), Abdul Ahad Karzai (Popalzai) and Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai),

where millions of Pakistani Rupees changed hands and a decision was made to hand over

the city to the Taliban. The versions are not necessarily irreconcilable, as a switching over of

Naqibullah to the Taliban could have forced Sherzai to accept an “out of battle settlement”.

The differing accounts do, however, express the views of locals about the possible complicity

of the jihadi leadership in the Taliban takeover as well as the centrality of Pakistan’s

involvement.

2.2.3 The fall of the Taliban

As noted earlier, the Zirak Durrani tribal establishment initially supported the political wing of

the Taliban movement that promised the return of the king from exile.17 Over time however,

16

Some Alkozai also claim that this rivalry is much older. In their account, the power of the Alkozai in Kandahar-city and its surroundings used to be much bigger in the distant past and they had been pushed out by the Barakzai tribe when they became more powerful. 17

See Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. In: Südasien Information Nr.1.

14

the influence of the pro-monarchist camp within the Taliban movement was weakened.18 The

pro-royal Zirak Durrani tribes, among them the Karzai family, increasingly turned away from

the Taliban movement and began to be active in a network of exile Afghans known as the

Rome group that planned a post-Taliban political reorganisation of Afghanistan.19

After 9/11 the US-led Coalition Forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

from power in Afghanistan. In addition to support from the Northern Alliance in northern

Afghanistan, militias led by some of the old power holders of southern Afghanistan such as

the Karzai family and Gul Agha Sherzai who prepared the run on Kandahar-city were

instrumental to the strategy of the US-lead Coalition Forces.

Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai) entered Afghanistan with a tribal militia from his exile in Quetta

and his forces captured the airport and moved into Kandahar-city. Hamid Karzai (Popalzai)

had entered Afghanistan from Shah Wali Kot to rally support against the Taliban among the

Pashtun tribes in Uruzgan and approached Kandahar-city. Amir Lalay (Popalzai) returned

from the north to regain control of the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot.

Mullah Naqibullah, the Alkozai leader who had stayed in Arghandab District during the

Taliban, exhibited his political opportunism once again and took on the role as key negotiator

between the Taliban and the new powers to be. With the exception of foreign Taliban or Al

Qaeda fighters of Arab descent no one put up a fight and Gul Agha Sherzai's troops took

control of the city following negotiations. The entire Taliban leadership escaped. While the

circumstances are not entirely clear, some local respondents claim that while Sherzai

approached the city from the south, Mullah Naqibullah provided the Taliban leadership with

an escape route to the west and northwest.

Defeating the Taliban proved easier, however, than to share power as the different victors

positioned themselves to claim key positions in the post-Taliban political set-up. The question

of who would have control over Kandahar City pinned the Zirak leaders Gul Agha Sherzai

and Hamid Karzai against each other.20 Karzai wanted to install Mullah Naqibullah as

Provincial Governor while Sherzai opposed this, as he resented the role Naqibullah had

played in the Taliban take-over of Kandahar. Although Karzai allegedly favoured Mullah

Naqibullah as provincial governor he was forced to compromise and appoint Sherzai upon

pressure of tribal elders and other influential regional leaders. Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali

Karzai would become the informal ruler of Kandahar-city.

Disunity among the victors plagued the post-Taliban government from the onset.

Furthermore, the opportunity for reconciliation with the Taliban was missed and Kandahar

18

Again, some local respondents stressed the role of Pakistan in this context. They claim the ISI assassinated pro-monarchist Taliban because the royal family had not accepted the Durand line. 19

see Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1. 20

CNN December 6, 2001

15

(and Afghanistan) is currently bearing the consequences. Even though Hamid Karzai

proposed the currently debated reconciliation and amnesty for the Taliban leadership already

in 2001, if they were to renounce their association with Al-Qaeda, Gul Agha Sherzai, then

already governor was unable to partake due to pressure from the Americans. Former US-

Defence Minister Rumsfeld publicly declared: “It has been communicated to us that if we

arrange a peace plan that allows for the release of Mullah Omar, Karzai would lose support

from America, and the northern alliance would lose the support of the coalition."21

2.3 Economy

Kandahar-city’s strategic location on trade routes between Iran and the Indian subcontinent

have made it an important trading hub for many centuries and many conflicts throughout

history have been related to the control of the flow of economic goods through the area.

Today, Kandahar is the main trading centre of southern Afghanistan with businesses of all

sorts. All surrounding districts are closely linked to the bazaars in Kandahar-city. The major

sources of income in the municipality, according to local respondents, are linked to shop

keeping and trade with food items (especially orchard products), import-export businesses of

Pakistani, Chinese, and Iranian goods by Afghan merchants, illegal poppy trade (albeit there

is no poppy bazaar in the city), daily wage labour, Afghan government and NGO

employment, agriculture and transportation.

In addition, two stone quarries are located on municipality ground: Baba Sahib Ghar lies to

the south of the city and Chalzino Ghar is located 7 km to the west of the city. The rocks and

stones of the mountains are used for construction purposes such as retaining walls and for

the production of gravel for roads and sand for pavement.

The average income level of each family is between 4,500 and 5,000 Afghani per month

(US$ 90 to 100) in the city, more than double the World Bank poverty line (US$ 1.25/day).22

Trade associations

There are a great number of trade associations and interest groups in Kandahar-city

including associations for perishable goods, non-perishable goods, and services. Their main

purpose is price control and lobbying, with the key associations listed below (for a full list see

Table 2 in the annex):

o Perishable goods associations include fresh fruit, dry fruit, butcher, and bakers

associations;

21

December 7, 2001, Friday, BC cycle 22

http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/poverty-around-the-world#WorldBanksPovertyEstimatesRevised

16

o Non-perishable goods associations include textile, gasoline, construction material,

car dealers, jewellery, gas sellers, and wood sellers associations;

o Service associations include money exchange, tailors, hotels, truck drivers,

teachers, doctors, writers and poets associations;

Money – banks, money markets

Kandahar-city is the main financial centre of southern Afghanistan. There are several banks

in Kandahar-city and the largest money exchange market of southern Afghanistan. The main

currency used in Kandahar-city is the Pakistani Rupees (PKR) as most goods are imported

from Pakistan. Local respondents estimated that almost 80% of the sum of business

transactions is done in PKR and only 20%, mostly involving smaller sums, in the official

currency, the Afghani. There are almost 90 roadside money exchangers in the city centre,

but many are concentrated in the Sarafi market in nahiya 1.23 The money exchangers and

lenders use the hawala system and charge one percent on every transaction to Kabul (see

money changers association in Table 2 of the annex).

2.3.1 Markets - Export/Import Goods

There are many shops and bazaars in the city where items of daily use are bought and sold.

There is no particular scarcity of goods and most things are readily available if the price is

right. The main trading partner is Pakistan from where most items are imported; the main

export product to Pakistan is dry fruit.

The main problems traders confront are the effects of road insecurity, road blocks, unclear

expectations towards the future, arbitrary bureaucratic ‘taxation’ of business transactions

(see more in Section 4) and inadequate infrastructure (lack of reliable electricity, cool

storage, processing and packaging facilities).

Especially the lacking infrastructure causes a sub-optimal use of Kandahar’s export potential.

Especially fresh and dry fruits such as raisins of different kinds are in high demand in

Pakistan, India, and UAE and have a great export potential. The problem is that local

standards regarding food safety and quality do not meet international export standards. While

there is an industrial park located on the Kandahar to Spin Boldak highway close to

Shorandam (Daman), it is underused (few enterprises making cooking oil) because there is

not enough electricity.

There are four main bazaars in Kandahar-city listed according to their size:

o Shah bazaar south of the governor’s house with 2,000 shops

o Herat bazaar west of the governor’s house with 2,000 shops

23

The most important exchange rates are: 1,000 AFN for 1,500 PKR, 1,000 Iranian Toman equal 82.5 AFN and $1 is equal to 80.60 PKR.

17

o Ikhkar-pur Darwaza south of the governor’s house with 1,200 shops

o The Kabul bazaar east of the governor’s house with around 1,000 shops

The products available are mostly of Pakistani or Chinese origin (especially textile, clothes)

while Pakistan and Iran is important for food items. Fuel is imported form Iran and medicine

and farming items from India, Pakistan, Iran, and China. Farming items also come from

Russia. Closures of the border with Pakistan lead to increased prices of imported goods such

as meat, fertilizer, sugar and rice.

There are also a number of specialized bazaars. Dry fruits such as raisins, almonds and figs

are sold in nahiya 4 and the former customs house. In nahiya 5 and 6 there are 40 and 30

car dealerships, respectively.

2.3.2 Agricultural Production

An estimated 30% (2,500 ha) of municipality land is arable and mostly located to the west of

the city in nahiya 6, the south in nahiya 2 and the east in nahiya 5. About 10% of the

municipality population is engaged in agriculture and some people living mostly in nahiya 2

and 6 (5%) keep livestock such as cows and goats, selling excess produce in city bazaars.

The main crops are pomegranates, carrots, alfalfa, spinach, and cauliflower. Pomegranates

are the most important crop and cultivated on an estimated third of all arable land.

The most important source of irrigation water for Kandahar-city comes from the Arghandab

canal network that feeds water from the Arghandab and Aliband Rivers to other canals. The

main canals are:

o The Pirpaimal Wiala located to west of the centre in nahiya 6; it extends to Salihan

located on the eastern border of Panjwayi District

o The Noshi Jan and Robat Wiala flow from the Aliband and Arghandab Rivers to Noshi

Jan village (nahiya 6) and the Robat Wiala to Robat village (Dand District).

o The Loya Wiala (‘big canal’) connects the Aliband and Arghandab Rivers to the north

of the city centre and reaches Qalamtar and Khoshab in Daman District.

An additional 15 deep wells located to the east, west and south sides of the city are used

when there is no water in the wialas.

The problems with agricultural production are similar to surrounding districts. Water is

available in sufficient amounts but the agricultural sectors lacks “industrialization”. There are

insufficient amounts of tractors, professional farming equipment, fertilizers, improved seeds,

pesticides as well as processing and marketing of agricultural products. Agricultural

infrastructure and farmer’s access to markets still lag behind neighbouring countries as the

continued lack of cool storage space, handling, packing, grading, storing, processing facilities

18

as well as marketing hinders competitive business development, especially for export, in the

entire south. There used to be a big state-owned fruit-processing factory called Shirkat-e

Miwa that is fully destroyed now. With a strategy for an industrialization of the agriculture of

Kandahar Province, the city could become the centre of an industry addressing these deficits

by developing a seed production industry and cooperatives to get tractors, loans, water

pumps and marketing. A recent initiative has been the creation of a cooperative in the city

centre that sells milk, yoghurt, etc.

2.3.3 Poppy Economy

Kandahar is a key transit route for opium poppy to factories in Afghanistan that refine it to

heroin. The narcotics industry in Afghanistan is best described/understood as an economic

activity with competition between rivalling networks often structured along tribal lines that

may be pro- or anti-government. Thus, members of all tribes, including largely pro-

government, are involved in drug trafficking. Nonetheless, because Panjpai tribes are often

marginalized from opportunities in the legal economy they have a higher likelihood to be

involved in illicit smuggling activities of all kind. There are no poppy bazaars in the city,

however, as these were already closed down in 2002 by the order of US Special Forces.24

2.4 Services

The service provision In Kandahar-city is good by Afghan standards. There are open schools

for boys and girls, health clinics and hospitals, communication infrastructure and media and

interest groups for women, athletes, and persons with disabilities. The electricity supply,

however, is still insufficient. This section provides a first quick overview of the service

provision in Kandahar-city, but given the size of the city and complexity of services offered it

is possibly some elements were missed here.

2.4.1 Education

Literacy and education levels are relatively high in Kandahar-city with an estimated two-thirds

of the population having at least basic skills in reading and writing. UN Habitat has been

active in Kandahar since the Taliban regime of the mid-1990s. Their good reputation aids

them to continue to provide services even in a deteriorating security environment. According

to local respondents, in the beginning of 2009, they started a six months daily adult literacy

courses for 25 students each morning and afternoon in all precincts of the city. There are

also six months vocational courses for carpenters, metal working, tailoring, mechanics and

electricians.25

24

Press Worldstream February 11, 2002 25

http://www.unhabitat.org/list.asp?typeid=13&catid=245

19

According to local respondents there are 22 open schools in Kandahar-city with 1,180 female

teachers and 1,796 male teachers accommodating a total of 38,220 boys and 23,500 girls.

Table 1 provides an overview of schools in Kandahar-city. The relative high number of high

schools suggests that the city is an important centre for higher education for surrounding

districts, especially girls.

Table 1: Open Schools in Kandahar City

Mixed (boys &

girls) Boys only Girls Only Total

High School 9 1 4 14

Secondary School

3 1 1 5

Primary School 2 1 -- 3

Total 14 3 5 22

2.4.2 Health

Tables 2-4 provide an overview of health services in Kandahar-city by service provider.

There is a mix of government, private and NGO-run hospital and clinics. There are two

government-run hospitals (Table 2) and nine private hospitals (Table 3). The Mirwais

Hospital is also known as Chinese Hospital due being financed and supported by China. The

Nizamai Shafakhana (Military hospital) is located on the Kandahar- Kabul Highway near the

Kabul bus station. It is no longer a military hospital because the Ministry of Defence sold it to

the Kandahar University Medical Branch where graduate students can start their last

practical year in this hospital.

Table 2: State-run hospitals and clinics in Kandahar-city

Name Indicate type of facility:

Male/Female Male Doctors

Male Nurses

Female Doctors

Female Nurses

Chinese Shafakhana

Hospital Both male and female

60 100 30 90

Nizamai Shafakhana

Hospital HC Both male and female

50 4 0 2

Campaign Malaria And Lashmania office

Malaria treatment

TB Treatment and control centre

Tuberculosis treatment

20

Table 3: Private hospitals

Name Male

Doctors Male

Nurses Female Doctors

Female Nurses

Alhadi Farhad Roghtoon 20 6 0 4

Bilal Roghtoon 22 9 9 10

Alhajir Khidmat Roghtoon 9 6 0 0

Ayoubee Roghtoon 15 18 10 4

Alsina Roghtoon 12 9 0 0

Itihad Roghtoon 8 0 14 0

Hila Roghtoon 50 30 20 12

Alhadee Roghton 3 3 2 1

Noor Shafakhana 20 10 3 5

Information of the Ministry of Public Health also indicates the existence of an additional 16

clinics of different type supported by the government (2) and NGOs (14): four

Comprehensive Health Clinics, seven Basic Health Clinics, and five specialized clinics (see

Table 2 for government-run clinics and Table 4 for those run by NGOs). The local NGO

Afghan Health & Development Services (AHDS) run by far the highest number of clinics (8):

four Basic Health Centres and four Comprehensive Health Centres. The Afghan Red

Crescent Society (ARCS) also runs a clinic. Four other NGOs are in charge of the remaining

five clinics: Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Program (CDAP), Coordination of Afghan

Relief (COAR), and Alternative Development and Agriculture (ADAG) run one each, and the

Islamic Aid Health Centre (IAHC) runs two.

Table 4: Clinics supported by NGOs26

Facility Name Facility Type NGO

Angoryan Clinic Basic Health Centre AHDS

House Madad(Ashoqa) Clinic Basic Health Centre AHDS

Mansoor Kalay Clinic Basic Health Centre AHDS

Zakir Sharif Clinic Basic Health Centre AHDS

Fatema Zhara Clinic Basic Health Centre CDAP

Central Poly Clinic of Kandahar Basic Health Centre COAR

26

Source: Ministry of Public Health

21

Facility Name Facility Type NGO

Mia Sahib Clinic Basic Health Centre IAHC

Loya Wiala Clinic Comprehensive Health Centre AHDS

MirZa Muhamad Khan Comprehensive Health Centre AHDS

PirKalacha Clinic Comprehensive Health Centre AHDS

Rawani Clinic Comprehensive Health Centre AHDS

ADAG, MCH Clinic Other ADAG

Kandahar Health Clinic of ARCS Other ARCS

Nazwana Clinic Other IAHC

Medicine of Pakistani, Iranian, Indian and Chinese origin is available in over 730 private

pharmacies located in different parts of the city. Most of them are staffed with pharmacists

but some also run by businessmen.

2.4.3 Electricity

The main sources of electricity are 14 diesel-run generators in Brikhna Kot (nahiya 6) located

to the north of the city centre. They provide six hours of electricity in a 24-hour period. More

affluent people, NGOs and business rely on private generators.

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) implemented by UN Habitat provided electricity

through solar panels and generators in nahiyas 2, 5, 6, and 9. More recently, six solar panels

and two generators for people in an area called Naw-e Hawza to the north of the city centre

that did not have access to the city electricity grid. As a result, 10% of the population in Naw-

e-Hawza now has electricity.

2.4.4 Communication and media

While the offer of different media products with a selection of print-media, radio and TV on

offer is greater than in rural areas (or other southern provinces), people say that media

freedom is limited and contents censored. Local respondents provided the example of a

disabled person who wanted to read a critical piece of society in a poetry forum. Allegedly

government officials did not let him and he was beaten. Despite the fact that the case went to

the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and UNAMA nothing

happened.

All of Kandahar-city’s population has access to FM radio channels such as BBC, Radio

Azadi, Voice of America and Radio Kandahar (government radio). Radio Kilid (from Kabul) is

22

popular with younger persons. There are also some print media, such as Sur Ghar (monthly

magazine) and Tolo Afghan. Tolo Afghan is sold at a price of 5 Afghani and published three

times a week (Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday) by the Directorate of Information and Culture

and distributed among government officials. Sur Ghar is published in Pashtu with some

pages in English.

The major mobile phone providers in Kandahar-city are Afghan Wireless (AWCC), Roshan,

Areeba, and Etisalat. According to local respondents Roshan is more expensive but provides

better quality than the less expensive AWCC. Some more affluent people use satellite

phones as well. There are 2,000 public call offices (PCOs) located in different places of the

city.

Several transmitters of mobile phone providers reportedly have been damaged. In separate

incidences, the Etisalat transmitter located to the east of the centre and two transmitters of

the Roshan Company in the south and west were damaged by explosive devices planted by

Taliban insurgents. The latter had warned the companies to not operate services during

nights but as the companies did not stop their operation the Taliban decided to blow up the

transmitters.

2.5 Reconstruction

This section provides a first quick overview of the reconstruction efforts in Kandahar-city, but

given the size of the city it is possibly some elements were missed here.

According to local respondents, large reconstruction projects were implemented during the

governorships of Gul Agha Sherzai and Yusef Pashtun between 2002 and 2005. Prominent

examples were the construction of the Eidgah road, the road to Arghandab district, the repair

of Bai road, as well as the construction of Ghazi Park. During the governance of Asadullah

Khalid, however, many projects stopped and were blocked.

During the governorship of Yusef Pashtun (2003-2004),27 the National Solidarity Project

(NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) implemented by UN-

Habitat started its work in Kandahar, with a focus on urban planning and development.28

Together with the Ministry of Urban Development & Housing UN-Habitat established an

Urban Management Consultative Group (CG) to support the ministry in its efforts. A key area

of intervention was the upgrading of informal settlements in Loya Wiala where large

vulnerable groups with insufficient shelters and service provision live (e.g., returnees,

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) vulnerable families and widow-headed households). As

27

Pashtun also used to be the Minister of Urban Development and returned to this post after Gul Agha Sherzai became provincial governor for a second time. 28

This section draws heavily on http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=4907&catid=298&typeid=13&subMenuId=0

23

noted earlier, NSP also provided solar panels and generators to some neighbourhoods (see

2.4.3 above).

The focus of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar-city lies

on larger infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and schools. The above mentioned

Eidgah road, the road to Arghandab district, the repair of the Bai road, the Sarai Jamai road,

the road from Khakarpur Darwaza and Kabul Darwaza as well as 2 km road from Loya Wiala

to the 2nd nahiya of the city were constructed by them. The PRT also constructed retaining

walls from Zarsanzarai Ada up to Pirqa and the Malalai School beside Khalqa Sharifa in the

1st nahiya of the city.

The PRT works through a public bidding system and implements its projects with local

contractors, a business-sector dominated by Barakzai and Popalzai tribes. Khalid Pashtun,

for example, a close friend to Gul Agha Sherzai is a big contractor with the international

military. Some local respondents accuse the PRT of involvement in corruption (mainly over-

billing, for example buying trucks for construction at higher than market prices). While this is

a common allegation, no specific examples or evidence was provided.

2.6 Security Situation

"It's getting worse and worse... everybody in Kandahar-city can see the pressure."29

Kandahar-city is one of the three areas of the province (besides Daman and Spin Boldak)

that still remains under Afghan government control. The notion of control, however, needs to

be considered with care. Due to its geography, Kandahar-city is difficult to defend militarily as

the flow of persons in and out of the city is nearly impossible to control. This is even more the

case in the north and the west of the city, where the Loya Wiala area has turned into a

massive suburban sprawl extending into neighbouring districts. The Soviet army had already

learned this some twenty years ago and decided not to seal off the city but rather relied on

financial deals with mujahideen groups to keep them out. Often day and night time control

was passed between the two conflict parties, with the government ruling during the day and

mujahideen during the night.

The same is happening today. The Taliban insurgents (or groups operating in their name)

stage impressive operations in the city centre but have so far not attempted a large scale

invasion of the city or direct urban guerrilla warfare. Many city residents believe that currently

the most effective protection against the Taliban insurgents is not the number of police or

international forces, but the payment of protection money, a practice that is already

widespread. This demonstrates that the operational radius of the Taliban insurgents already

reaches into the very heart of the city.

29

Agence France Presse – English June 25, 2006

24

The concentration of government institutions and local pro-government leaders in the city has

made it the site of political violence throughout the current Afghan government. While the

Taliban insurgency never held any permanent territory in the city and large scale attacks like

the Sarpoza jailbreak on 13 June 2008 are an exception, convoys of international military

forces passing through the city have made Kandahar-city the site of many suicide attacks. To

the population, other main components of insecurity are criminality that target wealthier

people through robberies, kidnappings and extortion. In addition, night raids and house

searches by international military forces (allegedly Special Forces) are also perceived as a

source of insecurity.

How did it come to this?

In the years 2002-2005, Taliban insurgents carried out occasional high profile assassinations

to undermine the credibility of the new government:

o In April 2002 Qari Obaydollah (of Daman), an influential figure in Kandahar was killed

by gunmen. He was considered to be a serious supporter of the late Afghan King

Mohammad Zaher Khan.30

o In July 2003, a grenade attack targeting the compound of Khalid Pashtun, the

spokesman for provincial governor Gul Agha Sherzai, was carried out.31

o President Karzai escaped two assassination attempts: September 2002, and April

2004.32

o On 9 April 2005, Haji Granay from the Alkozai tribe was shot by unidentified gunmen

in the Loya Wiala area. He died of the injuries later.

o On 1 June 2005, General Muhammed Akram Khakrezwal, a famous commander of

the Alkozai tribe, the first chief of police of Kandahar and at that point of Kabul, died in

a suicide attack bomb blast in the Mullah Abd-u-Rab congregational mosque during

the funeral of the Head of the Ulema shura, a prominent and outspoken pro-

government cleric, Mullah Abdul Fayaz33, who had been assassinated three days

earlier.34

The situation in Kandahar deteriorated after 2005 when plans to expand ISAF to southern

Afghanistan coincided with the removal of three strongmen provincial governors: Gul Agha

Sherzai (Kandahar), Jan Mohammad Khan (Uruzgan), and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada

30

Text of a report by Iranian radio from Mashed on 26 April 2002 31

Agence France Presse –July 7, 2003 32

Agence France Presse – English June 2, 2002 33

The Associated Press June 1, 2005 34

N.C. Aizenman, 2005, “Suicide Bomber Kills 20 in Afghan Mosque,” Washington Post Foreign Service, June 2, 2005; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060100263.html

25

(Helmand). Coinciding with their removal, the western Kandahar districts Maywand,

Panjwayi, and Zhari started to slip out of government control into the hands of the Taliban

insurgency negatively affecting the security situation in Kandahar-city.

During the governorship of Asadullah Khalid from June 2005 to August 2008, who had been

moved from his centre of influence in Ghazni where he served as a governor until then, the

security situation in the city (as in the province) deteriorated rapidly. This is not to suggest

that Gul Agha Sherzai had been a better governor than Khalid. Rather, the repercussion of

actions undertaken during the Sherzai governorship and the regrouping of the insurgency

(inability to become a uniting figure and reaction by Taliban to the Kandahar strike force/CIA

(see more Chapter 3) simply materialized in the governorship of Khalid.

In 2006, the city population witnessed 26 suicide attacks that killed at least 42 Afghan

civilians and twelve soldiers or policemen in six months.35 Attacks on international

development actors and the UN mounted and politically motivated assassinations striking

mostly non-Popalzai, continued (see also Box 3).

o On 10 March 2007, Mullah Naqibullah Akhund, a very important Alkozai leader, was

seriously wounded in a mine explosion and died later in September of 2007.36

o On 18 February 2008, Abdul Hakim Jan of the Alkozai tribe was killed in a bomb blast

while attending a dog-fighting contest in Bagh Pul village of Kandahar-city.

o The infamous peak of insecurity was probably the widely publicised Sarpoza jailbreak

in June 2008 that allowed over a 1,000 prisoners, many of them Taliban, to escape

and re-join insurgency fighting forces.37

o In late 2008, acid attacks on school girls were reported.38

o The provincial council and its members have been the target of four spectacular

attacks.

o On 12 November 2008 an attack claimed six lives and 43 injured people.

o On 16 April, 13 people were killed and more than 30 injured when four suicide

attackers exploded themselves at the PC headquarters while two further were

shot by police.

o An attack on 1 April 2009 killed 13 people.

35

Agence France Presse – English June 25, 2006 36

The Globe, March 10 2007. 37

ABC Transcripts (Australia) June 17, 2008 38

Canwest News Service November 12, 2008

26

o In addition, in mid April 2009, Sitara Achekzai, a provincial council member

and clerk and women activist, was shot dead by four armed Taliban riding

motorbikes on Manzil Bagh Boulevard in Achekzai Kalacha.

Box 3: High noon in Kandahar

On June 29, Kandahar CoP Matiullah Qatea, an Achekzai, was killed in a shootout with what

is believed to be members of an “armed support group” – an unregistered militia force – run

by US Special Forces (SF) out of Camp Gecko in Kandahar-city.39

The circumstances of the killing are unclear but local respondents were convinced that the

action was planned and not spontaneous as earlier that day gun battles between ANA and

ANP had taken place in Herat Square at around 7:45 for unknown reasons. After the killing of

CoP Matiullah, police forces were disarmed by the ANA who took control of the city and even

occupied the police headquarter.

According to local respondents, most of the arrested were Popalzai. This could have serious

repercussions as the Achekzai tribe may reconsider its support for Karzai.

Loya Wiala

Loya Wiala has been the gravitational centre for newly arriving population from different

tribes and provinces, be they economic migrants or internally displaced persons (IDP) that

have come from different provinces of Afghanistan and have fled to Kandahar in different

phases since 1992. Since 2006, IDPs from the Zhari Dasht IDP camp and conflict-induced

IDPs from other provinces such as Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul have moved to Loya Wiala

melting in with the urban poor.40

Local respondents describe parts of Loya Wiala as the most insecure area of the city for two

main reasons: there is less social control due to a lack of cohesive communities living in a

melting pot, and the area is easier to infiltrate by Taliban insurgents establishing networks in

the city because of insecure land tenure rights. In the words of a police officer: “If someone

lives in the area for a long time, their neighbours usually know something about him and what

kind of person he is. But most people in Loya Wiala have been here less than six or seven

years and they often change houses. Therefore it is hard to track each and every one to what

he is up to.”

39

Jake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico (2009), The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan. Briefing Paper, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University. 40

Susanne Schmeidl, Alexander D. Mundt and Nick Miszak, 2009, Beyond the Blanket: Towards more Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, a Joint Report of the Brookings/Bern Project on Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

27

Some Kandahari also believe that the squatters in Loya Wiala are illegal, and many of the

new-arrivals fear that if the government gets stronger it is very likely that the government

would take the land back from them, so they financially or physically help insurgents as a

form of protection.

28

3 Actors Analysis This section focuses on those individual and collective actors who significantly shape the

situation, events and future of Kandahar-city and by extension Kandahar Province. The aim

is to present individual key actors and the larger social groups to which they belong.

The importance and influence of actors comes from their ability to control resources and

mobilize support by redistributing these resources to their respective constituencies. Scarcity

and unequal access to resources is often the reason why different actors engage in armed or

non-armed conflict. In general, power is often based on an accumulation of the following

resources:

• Networking: connections with national and sub-national government actors and

foreign sponsors;

• Tribal membership – as much of the historic section showed, membership in specific

tribes (and their respective population size, power alliances and combined land

holdings) greatly influences political allegiance, power and status;

• Family status (inherited) – membership of prominent families (including landed elite)

also remains important;

• Land: cultural status symbol; economic benefit via agricultural production, etc;

• Other economic resources: which allows for less dependence on daily work and the

ability to gain clients through distribution of assets;

• Control and access to the means of violence: which allows for control of territory

and illicit trading routes;

• Knowledge: traditionally this was primarily knowledge of pashtunwali and/or sharia,

increasingly it has become a knowledge of how to access or ‘win’ resources from

internationals or the government);

o Personal leadership skills

Chapter

3

29

o Knowledge (e.g. different customs of the customary law - pashtunwali, or

religious knowledge such as sharia);

o Mitigation and conflict resolution skills;

o “Good reputation“ as a source of moral authority and power;

o Military skills (e.g., leadership skills during conflict) as well as control and

access to arms and ammunition that allows control of territory and trade);

o Administrative skills/technical expertise for government bureaucrats.

3.1 Afghan Government Structures

Kandahar-city is the seat of all provincial wide government institutions as well as the

municipality government (sharwali wolayat). The most important among them are the

Provincial Governor, Chief of Police, the 15-member Provincial Council, National Directorate

of Security (NDS), and provincial line departments (see overview of the directors of these

departments in Table 1 in the appendix). Municipal government structures exist as well in the

city.

Of the 33 provincial government position, include the heads of provincial departments,

provincial governor, provincial chief of police and head of the provincial council (see Figure

5):

o Twenty (20) are held by Zirak Durrani (seven Achekzai, five Popalzai,

four Mohammadzai, three Alkozai, one Barakzai)

o Two (2) are held by Panjpai Durrani (one Alizai, one Nurzai)

o Five (5) are held by Ghilzai, three of which are not natives of Kandahar

(two are Suliman Khail from Laghman; one is Ahmadzai) and two are

Tokhi

o Six (6) are held by members of other tribal confederations (Barets, Tarin,

Kakar, Zazai), a Dari speaker and one is unknown

30

Zirak Durrani

61%

Panjpai Durrani

6%

Ghilzai

15%

Other

18%

Figure 5: Distribution of government positions among tribal confederations

Of the total 34 positions of district governors and district chiefs of police in the 17 districts41

(see Figure 6) over half (26) are held by Zirak Durrani (11 Popalzai; 6 Achekzai; 4 Alkozai; 5

Barakzai); five by Panjpai Durrani (3 Alizai; 2 Nurzai); two by other Pashtun tribes (1 Barets, 1

Kakar) and one from another ethnic group (Baluch). None are held by members of the Ghilzai

confederation.

Zirak Durrani

76%

Panjpai Durrani

15%

Other

9%

Figure: 6 District governors and CoP distribution among tribal confederations

41

Note that in Miya Nishin no district governor or chief of police has been present since 2007 but the numbers include the last ones.

31

In light of the above, the government is clearly dominated by the Zirak Durrani confederation,

and within the Zirak confederation increasingly by Popalzai, while the Panjpai and Ghilzai are

strongly underrepresented compared to their population size (see more in section 3.2).

According to local respondents this domination is also manifest in the overall provincial

government administration with a majority of Zirak Durrani bureaucrats.

3.1.1 Provincial Governors

Kandahar has had five governors in eight years. According to local respondents, the

replacement of governors, with the exception of Gul Agha Sherzai, has not changed the

balance of power significantly and they claim the city is under the authority of Provincial

Council Head Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter already wielded a considerable amount of

power as head of the Kandahar shura when Gul Agha Sherzai was provincial governor, and

some local respondents spoke of the ‘two governments’ of Kandahar (Karzai vs. Sherzai). It

is alleged that most governors since Sherzai had to arrange themselves with Ahmad Wali

Karzai in order to stay in power, as none were strongmen in their own right, at least not in

Kandahar (see Figure 7):

Asadullah Khalid

Gul Agha Sherzai and Yusef Pashtun

Ahmad Wali Karzai

Rahmatullah Raufi

Barakzai, Mahaz-e-Milli

Taraki, Ittehad-e-Islami

Wardak, PDPA Popalzai

Toryali Vesa

Mohammadzai

Figure 7: Competition between governors and Ahmad Wali Karzai

32

Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai) served as Governor of Kandahar three times: from 1992 to

1994 during the mujahideen government and twice during the current administration: the first

time 29 months (2002-September 2003) and the second time only six months (December

2004 - June 2005). During the 15 months between his tenure he switched positions with

Yusef Pashtun, the Minister of Urban Affairs. In June 2005 he was appointed the Governor of

Nangarhar and replaced with Asadullah Khalid (see Section 3.2 for more information of

Sherzai).

Yusef Pashtun (Barakzai) is from Kandahar and served as Provincial Governor in Kandahar

from September 2003 to December 2004. He had worked with the Demining Agency for

Afghanistan during the mujahideen government and lived in Quetta during the Taliban

government. He returned to Kandahar in 2001 and was advisor and spokesman of Gul Agha

Sherzai. He is currently Minister of Urban Development, a position he also held before his

governorship.

Asadullah Khalid, a Taraki (Ghilzai) from Ghazni, served as Governor of Kandahar province

over three years (from June 2005 to August 2008). He was previously the Governor of

Ghazni Province (2001 to 2004). Khalid was a controversial governor and there were

allegations of torture of prisoners and corruption under his tenure and the security situation

worsened (bandits, assassinations, kidnappings).42 He escaped an assassination attempt in

early 2007 when he was targeted by a suicide bomber. He was replaced by Rahmatullah

Raufi in August 2008 and appointed Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. Assadullah Khalid was

affiliated with the Ittehad-e Islami faction that had allied itself with the Northern Alliance

against the Taliban. During the Taliban time he spent time in the USA. He maintains close

links to the Karzai family but his greatest source of power were good relations to Coalition

Forces.

Rahmatullah Raufi (Wardak, Mir Khail) from Wardak was Provincial Governor for a mere

four months only (August – December 2008). He had completed his military studies in the

Soviet Union and was a pro-PDPA army commander in the Afghan wars. In the current

government he became the commander of the 205 Atal (Hero) corps, was a senior military

commander of the Afghan Nation Army (ANA) and a main commander in Operation Mountain

Thrust. On 15th of August 2008, he became the new governor of Kandahar province. He was

allegedly replaced because of a tense relationship with the head of the provincial council

Ahmad Wali Karzai (see also Section 3.1.4).43 Local respondents perceived him well but his

short time in office makes any evaluation difficult.

42

Canwest News Service April 14, 2008 Monday 43

Canwest News Service January 23, 2009

33

Tooryalai Wesa, a Mohammadzai originally from Arghandab, has been the Governor of

Kandahar since 18 December 2008.44 A native of Kandahar, he was appointed as the Dean

of Kandahar University and served there until the collapse of Dr. Najibullah’s regime. He left

Afghanistan in 1991 for Canada and only recently returned to follow the call of President

Karzai to the governorship. An expert of agriculture, he holds Afghan and Canadian

citizenships. He has good connections to foreign forces and the local and central government

as he is a friend of President Karzai and his brother Qayum Karzai.

3.1.2 Afghan National Police (ANP)

“Why should our sons die for you when you do not share political power with us?”

Kandahar Province has seen eight police chiefs between 2002 and 2009, most being

appointed for one year only, with some staying only a few months (see Table 5). All of them

had good relations with Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN) and Karim Khan

Achekzai (KKA) and some also with Gul Agha Sherzai. The Kandahar-city police force itself

has members from many different tribes but the Alkozai and Barakzai dominate. This is due

to the fact that Sherzai (Barakzai) and Khakrezwal (Alkozai, see Table 5 below) integrated

their former fighting forces into the ANP after the establishment of the current government.

There are fewer Popalzai in the police, but they play an important role in Kandahar-city

because of the political support of Ahmad Wali Karzai. The other tribes have few members in

the police, as they are not willing to send their sons to do dangerous police work as long as

political and economical power is distributed more equitably.

Table 5: CoPs of Kandahar

Name Tribe Background

General Mohammad Akram Khakrezwal

Alkozai

2002 – August 2003 He is from Khakrez and was with Mahaz. During the Taliban regime he lived in Pakistan. After his tenure he became the police chief of Kabul. He had good relations with key Kandahar figures such as Ahmad Wali Karzai (AKW) and Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN). He was killed in June 2005 by a suicide bomber inside a mosque in Kandahar-city during a funeral of a famous pro-government religious leader who was killed three days earlier. Khakrezwal’s brother was killed in 2008.

Mohammad Hashim Salangi

Tajik

August 2003 - March 2004 From Parwan, he was associated with Jamiat-e-Islami and the northern alliances. He had good relations with AWK, Gul Agha Sherzai (GAS), Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN) and Karim Khan Achekzai (KKA).

Khan Mohammad Mujahed

Alkozai March 2004 - March 2005 See more in Section 3.2.1.3

44

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/

34

Name Tribe Background

Abdel Malik Wahedi Tajik/Shia

March 2005 - August 2006 He is a resident of nahiya 4. During the jihad and Taliban time he lived in exile in Pakistan and Germany. He has good relations with AWK, AKN and KKA.

Sayed Aziz Ahmad Wardak

Wardak

August 2006 - December 2006 Resident of Said Abad district in Maidan Wardak. He was affiliated with Mahaz. He has good relations with AWK, AKN and KKA.

Ismatullah Alizai Alizai

December 2006 - November 2007 He is from Musa Qala, Helmand. He has a communist (Khalqi) background and maintained good relations with AWK, AKN, and KKA.

Sayed Agha Saqib Nurzai

November 2007 - June 2008 From Farah Province. Was non-aligned during jihad and Taliban. He had good relations with AWK, GAS, and AKN and KKA.

Matiullah Qatea Achekzai

June 2008 – June 2009 From Khas Uruzgan with a PDPA/Khalqi background. Son of Anif Khan, a former senator from Uruzgan Province On June 29, 2009 he was killed in a shootout with what is believed to be Afghan Special Forces linked to the international military. He had good relation with AWK, GAS, AKN and KKA.

3.1.3 Provincial Council

The Provincial Council (PC) was elected in September 2005 and is composed of 15

members (see Table 6). The members are elected by popular vote and four seats are

reserved for women. There are no fixed quotas for representatives from the different district

however. According to an AREU Briefing Paper, the rights and obligations of the Provincial

Council fall into three categories: “Participation in provincial development planning,

monitoring and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions, participation in three

inter-related activities of conflict resolution, the elimination of customs “contrary to the law

and shari’a” or human rights standards, and the reduction of illicit drug activity.45

The composition of the provincial council clearly shows a) the dominance of the Zirak Durrani

tribes who hold 10 of 15 seats (66%) and b) the weak representation of Panjpai Durrani

tribes (2 of 15 seats; 13%) as well as a complete absence of Ghilzai tribes from Kandahar.

Notable is also a skewed geographic representation due to the fact that those with the

highest votes take all. The northern, southern and eastern Kandahar districts are not

represented at all.

As noted earlier (Section 2.6), there have been four attacks on provincial council members

since 2008: the Shiite member from Kandahar-city was killed by unknown gunmen in

Kandahar-city in 2006 and the female clerk was assassinated on the street in 2009. Ten of

45

AREU Briefing Paper Series, Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision? 2006.

35

the 17 members ran again for the 2009 PC elections for a total of 14 seats, nine were re-

elected (in bold), with five new comers.46

Table 6: Provincial Council members (women are indicated with a *)

Name District Tribe or ethnic group

Background

Ahmad Wali Karzai

Dand Popalzai

He was the head of the provincial council and re-elected into the council in the 2009 elections with the highest score of 27,147 votes (11%). (See Section 3.2.1.2)

Mohammad Ehsan

Maywand Nurzai

He was the deputy head of the provincial council. He comes from a khan family. He was a supporter of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar then Ittehad. He is known as neutral, honest and considered an intellectual and has a good personality. He is a friend of Sherzai and Karzai and a nationalist. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 10

th score 9,884 (4%)

Ahmad Shah Khan Spin Boldak Achekzai

He is a tribal elder and was affiliated with Nejat-e Milli and is also a member of the provincial council. Close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, he is well liked by the people. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 9th score 10,676 (4.3%).

Haji Fazel Mohammad

Takhtapul Achekzai

He comes from a khan family. His brother was commander of the airport area in the mujahideen time. He was a commander with Jabha-e Nejat and Mahaz. He is close to Karzai and Sherzai. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 8th score 11,169 (4.5%).

Sitara Achekzai (*,killed in 2009)

City Achekzai She grew up in Germany, close to Afghan Millat and comes from a well known Kandahar-city family.

Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir

Panjwayi Alkozai He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 5

th highest score 15,709 (6.4%).

(See Section 3.2.1.3)

Dr. Mohammad Qasim Dand Barakzai

He has studied some medical courses. He is considered an honest man and has good conflict resolution skills. He did not run again for the 2009 elections.

Janan Gulzai unknown Barakzai He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not among the top 11 men qualifying for the council.

Mullah Sayed Mohammad

Dand Barakzai

He was a Mahaz-e-Milli commander of Sherzai. He used to be against Ahmad Wali but is now his friend. He is not well liked by the people. He is a big enemy of the Taliban.

46

The total mount of candidates was 47.

36

Name District Tribe or ethnic group

Background

Zarghuna Kakar (*) City Kakar

Women's delegate. When she was young she was in the Khalq faction of the communist party. She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 14

th score of 566 votes (0.2%).

Omar Sherzad Zhari Khogiani

He is a naqilin (migrant). He is an open minded person. He is the representative of Kandahar Province to the Senate. Also a member of the security council (shura amniat) in Kandahar.

Soria Barna (*) City Laghmani Originally from Laghman, but has married a Kandahari and lived there for a long time. She was a teacher in the past.

Bismillah Afghanmal City Mohmand

He is also a member of the provincial council. He is affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar and presently claims to be a member of the Afghan Millat Party. He is ready to do every thing for the sake of his reputation. He is accused of many things, among them being a narcotics trafficker, collusion with Qanuni and known to have links to the Iranian Consulate in Kandahar. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 3

rd score

19,231 (7.8%).

Haji Neamatullah Khan

Spin Boldak Nurzai He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not among the top 11 men qualifying for the council. (See Section 3.2.2.1)

Haji Sayed Jan Khakrez Popalzai

Very close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, has no independent power base. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 2nd score 22,462 (9.1%).

Mariam Durrani (*) City Popalzai

Friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai. She is also the member of a youth organization in Kandahar. She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the highest female score, 12

th overall of 948

votes (0.4%).

Mohammad Younes Husseini (�)

Kandahar-city Shia Shiite from Kandahar-city killed by unknown gunmen in Kandahar-city in 2006. He was a member of the Harakat-e-Islami faction.

Newly elected:

• Haji Rahmatullah Khan, 4th place, 18,408 votes (7.5%)

• Haji Mukhtar, 6th place, 11,730 votes (4.7%), a Shia from Kandahar-city

• Haji Saleh Mohammad Pahlawan, 7th, 11,187 votes, (4.5%)

• Haji Mohammad, 11th, 7,958 votes, (3.2%)

• Shekila Selahi (*), 13th place, 877 votes (0.4%).

3.1.4 Kandahar Tribal Council

In 2005, Qayum Karzai, the brother of President Karzai and former Member of Parliament,

created a “Shura for Security and Reform” in Kandahar, composed of 29 tribal elders. The

37

purpose of the shura was not entirely clear to local respondents and some dismissed it as a

tool to support the president’s brother in the province, an election campaign shura for

President Karzai (as all members are seen as close to Ahmad Wali Karzai) or simply as a

way of getting donor money. The shura was widely seen as a failure. In 2008, Provincial

Governor Rahmatullah Raufi attempted to create a larger tribal council that was perceived as

a reconciliation shura, but it met the opposition of Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter proceeded

to create another shura called the Kandahar “Tribal council” that held its first session on 11

March 2008.

Local respondents claim the Kandahar Tribal Council, is more balanced in tribal composition

than the provincial council (see Table 7). There are: Achekzai (3), Alizai (2), Alkozai (2),

Barakzai (2), Kakar (2), Ishaqzai (3), Popalzai (3), Nurzai (4), Tokhi (2) one each Sadat,

Farsiwan, Mohmand, Mohammadzai, Mojaddidi/Hazrat, and one unknown; thus, 38% (11 of

29) are Zirak Durrani, 31% are Panjpai, 7% are Ghilzai, and 24% from other Pashtun tribes

or ethnic group.

As in the provincial council, representatives of the northern, southern and eastern Kandahar

districts are largely absent displaying a strong geographic inequality of political power. Six

members (bold) are also part of the Provincial Council (until 2009).

Table 7: Tribal council or Qayum shura

Name District Tribe/Ethnic

group Background

Saranwal Mohammad Isa Khan

Spin Boldak, but lives in the City

Achekzai

He is a tribal elder from an influential khan family, has higher education and is government official. He was a member of Mahaz-e Milli, and was in the country during the jihad and the Taliban time.

Haji Ahmad Shah Khan

Spin Boldak Achekzai See Table 6.

Karim Khan Panjwayi Achekzai

He is a member of the district council and an elder of the Achekzai council. He was a commander in the jihad time with links to Ittehad-e Islami, Ahmad Wali Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai.

Haji Ali Shah Khan

Zhari Alizai

He is a member of the Zhari district council and a tribal elder of the Alizai. He was a commander of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He had good relations to the Taliban government and of but the mentioned person did not have formal job. He is linked to Ahmad Wali.

Haji Saidullah Khan

Zhari Alizai

He is the brother of Habibullah Jan, the late commander of the Mahaz-e Milli faction. His family is accused of war crimes and has bad reputation among the people.

38

Name District Tribe/Ethnic

group Background

Haji Agha Lalai

Panjwayi Alkozai

He is a member of the Qayum Karzai council and was re-elected to the provincial council. He is a friend of the Taliban and was a commander of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami. He is presently involved in preparing a new council by the stimulation of the Karzais. He is head of the reconciliation commission.

Haji Khan Kaka

Arghandab Alkozai

He is an elder of both the Alkozai and the district council. He was a Jamiat-e Islami commander, supporter of Mullah Naqibullah and opponent of the Taliban. He has great support from his tribe.

Dr. Mohammad Qasam

Dand Barakzai He has some knowledge of medicine and is known as a good man. Close to Gul Agha Sherzai.

Haji Nusrullah City Barakzai He is a tribal elder and businessman and linked to Gul Agha Sherzai.

Haji Mukhtar City (nahiya 1) Farsiwan He has been accused on assassination and on robberies during the jihad. He is an illiterate person and has good ties with Ahmad Wali Karzai.

Shahabuddin Akhundzada

City (nahiya 4) Ishaqzai He is from a religious family, tribal elder and a distinguished person.

Haji Abdur Rahim

Panjwayi Ishaqzai

He is the assistant of the Panjwayi district council and an influential member of the Ishaqzai council. He is a former Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar commander and presently a member of Afghan Millat party and a close friend of Ahmad Wali and Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir.

Haji Fazal Mohammad

Panjwayi Ishaqzai

He is a tribal elder. He was a mujahideen of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar and is currently in charge of the district's Afghan Millat party. He is popular among the people.

Haji Hayatullah "Kakar"

Panjwayi Kakar

He is a tribal elder and was regional commander of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He is linked to Ahmad Wali and Agha "Lalai" and has no special status. He came to the council by district support. He was an ordinary person and had no job during the Taliban government.

Haji Sardar Mohammad

City Kakar

He is a member of the Kakar council. He is head of the cadastre department and a member of the Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar's Chaman office, now also in charge of Kandahar province. He has close ties with Gul Agha Sherzai and Ahmad Wali. He is also a friend of the Taliban insurgency.

Sardar Mohammad Osman

Maywand Mohammadzai

He is an elder of the Mohammadzai tribe and comes from a khan family. He is known and trusted by the people in the government, strong supporter of Gul Agha Sherzai and the family of late Zahir Shah.

39

Name District Tribe/Ethnic

group Background

Bismillah Afghanmal

City Mohmand See Table 6.

Haji Masoom Agha

City Mojaddidi (Hazrat)

He is a government official, member of Nejat-e Milli, and friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He has allegedly seized both communal and governmental land, especially a Kandahar graveyard and is a known as a corrupt person.

Haji Neamatullah "Shirdal"

Spin Boldak Nurzai See Table 6.

Haji Wali Mohammad

Maywand Nurzai Assistant of the district council.

Haji Ehsan Maywand Nurzai See Table 6.

Haji Isa Jan "Nurzai"

Panjwayi Nurzai

He comes from an influential khan family. He was a fighter affiliated with Ittehad-e Islami. Presently he is a mediator and has good behavior with the people. He is also closely linked to Arif Nurzai.

Haji Said Jan Khakrez Popalzai See Table 6.

Jan Mohammad "Popalzai"

City Popalzai

Head of the writers and poets association. Came to the council by the representation of cultural people and was not invited back after the first session.

Zaiqullha "Akhunzada"

Shah Wali Kot Popalzai

He comes from a religious (ulema) family and is a member of the Shah Wali Kot district council. He was a member of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami during the jihad. He is an alim (scholar) and has a good reputation among the people.

Haji Fazul-u-din Agha

Dand Sadat

He was a farmer and a commander of Mahaz-e-Milli and linked to Sherzai. In the current government he was district governor of Spin Boldak for some few years. He has links to smugglers. He has a good reputation with the people.

Toran Nik Mohammad

City Tokhi

He is a former military officer and was a key member of the Khalq/PDPA. He is a member of both the Ghilzai and Qayum Karzai Council. He is an opportunist and joins any government.

Haji Mohammad "Isa"

Zhari Tokhi

He is a member of the Zhari district council. He was affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He has a good reputation among the district population.

Haji Abdul Ahad

City unknown He has a membership in the traders' association.

40

3.1.5 Municipal Government

The municipal government is composed of a city mayor who works with nahiya councils. The

latter are a link of the population to the head of the municipality, but often the people address

him directly. The municipal government is perceived to be little more than an extension of the

power of the head of the provincial council Ahmad Wali Karzai. Except for the first mayor of

Kandahar, the other three city mayors were ‘suggested’ by Qayum Karzai and are very close

to the Karzai family. There have been four majors to date (see Table 8).

Table 8: Mayors of Kandahar

Name Tribe District Background

Abdullah Popal Popalzai Dand

Son of Munshi Abdur Rauf. During the jihad he was spokesperson of Hamid Karzai. During the Taliban he was in exile in Pakistan and the USA. Appointed in interim government. Close to Karzais, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.

Azizullah Khan Sardar

Mohammadzai City

Son of Sardar Abdullah Khan, resident of nahiya 2. He was in Pakistan during the jihad, came back in mujahideen time without particular job. He has good relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.

Zmaray Usmani Suliman Khail City

Resident of nahiya 6. During the jihad he went to Pakistan and Germany. He has good relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.

Ghulam Hayder Hamidi

Mohammadzai Arghandab

He is from Kohak Village. During Zaher Shah he was in the Ministry of Finance and went to Pakistan and USA during the jihad. He has good relations Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan and even better relation with Qayum Karzai. He belongs to an elite family. He survived a bomb attack in the city on 15 March 2009.

3.1.6 Judiciary

Two types of court have currently a presence in Kandahar City: the Provincial Civilian Court

and a Military Court.

The civilian court consists of three different courts that handle all of Kandahar-city and its

surrounding districts cases: a primary court, a litigation court (murafia), and the istinaf court,

the appeals court. The primary court is the first instance of the judiciary that hears a case and

consists of five persons: a head of court, two members (aza) and two assistants to the head

of the court. The primary court makes the decision about the case and refers it to the

secondary court known as murafia (litigation) court where judges evaluate the decision of the

primary court. This second court is also called upon for appeals. If both side of the conflict

are happy with the decision of the primary court, and it is reviewed and approved by the

litigation court, the decision is signed and stamped. The istinaf court is the final instance of

appeals and evaluates both decisions of the primary and murafia courts.

41

Each province has its own provincial civilian court, but bigger cases are also sent to

Kandahar City from surrounding provinces such Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. For example

if a high-profile drug dealer is arrested in Helmand, the Helmand court refers it to Kandahar

then to Kabul in order to do full justice to the case. Sometimes judges also feel that Kandahar

and Kabul are more secure places to carry out such high profile trials.

In general, people are not happy with the performance of the judiciary system because cases

take a very long time to be handled. There is not enough capacity which badly affects the

judiciary system. The bad security situation was also mentioned as a deterrent to work in

courts or even to take cases there, especially from the districts. Most of Kandahar district

courts are located inside the Kandahar-city provincial court for security reasons. There is also

a mobile court consisting of a judge who also deals with Spin Boldak and Daman.

According to members of the provincial court there are some civil cases, such as divorce

issues, which are referred to traditional conflict resolution bodies by the state courts. This is

primarily done for cultural reasons and to protect the honour of the family. Traditional conflict

resolution bodies are said to have a good track record in this field. Some cases are referred

back to the state courts however.

There is also a military court in Kandahar-city responsible for trying military personnel as well

as police involved in legal cases. According to military court personnel most cases actually

involve members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), because they do not have proper

training and are often involve in illegal activities. The military court is located inside the

former Afghan National Corps station in the middle of Kandahar-city.

3.2 Pashtun tribes

The Pashtun tribal system is widely portrayed as being divided into different confederations,

tribes and sub-tribes. The most prominent confederations are the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlyani,

and Ghurghusht. The Durrani and the Ghilzai confederation subsume more than two-thirds of

all Afghan Pashtuns and predominate in southern Afghanistan.

The Durrani confederation is split into two main sub confederations: Zirak and Panjpai.

The Achekzai, Alkozai, Barakzai, Mohammadzai and Popalzai make up the Zirak Durrani

confederation. Afghan rulers since Nadir Shah (1747) traditionally came from the Zirak

Durrani confederation. Geographically, they are concentrated in Kandahar and eastern

Uruzgan, and western Zabul.

The Panjpai Durrani (literally five legs) is composed of Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai, Khogiani and

Maku tribes. The Panjpai were originally Ghilzai tribes and were slowly integrated into the

Durrani confederation in the South over the centuries and therefore retain a distinct

character, although this distinction may vary regionally. Large Panjpai populations live in

42

Helmand, western Uruzgan, Farah and Nimroz. When it came to power sharing, they usually

had to take a second seat to the Zirak Durrani.

The Ghilzai confederation is made up of the Ali Khail, Andar, Hotak, Kharoti, Naser,

Suliman Khail, Taraki, Tokhi and Tota Khail. They are most prominent in Ghazni, Paktika,

Zabul and parts of Kandahar.

The Ghurghusht tribal confederation in Afghanistan is mostly made up of the Kakar tribe.

There are few Kakar living in Uruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul. A much larger part of the Kakar

tribe lives in Pakistan.

The Karlyani tribes are prominent in southeast Afghanistan and the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

Pashtun tribes in Kandahar

The Panjpai Durrani (and Ghilzai) tribes have historically been in the shadow of the much

more powerful Zirak tribes. While the Taliban regime in the 1990s at least attempted to

bridge tribal divides, the current government returned back to the exclusionary style of ruling,

with the Zirak monopolizing government power to a large extent. Thus, with the fall of the

Taliban the tribal rivalries between the Zirak Durrani and the Panjpai and Ghilzai

confederations resurfaced. The Panjpai and Ghilzai were stigmatized as the backbone of the

Taliban movement and subjected to harassment and arrest. Only the business sector seems

to be open to all tribes (see Table 2 with a list of key businessmen and their tribal affiliation in

Annex). Of the 19 main traders, four are Achekzai, two Alizai, one Alkozai, one Barakzai, two

Kakar, four Nurzai, four Popalzai and of unknown background.

Given the rapid growth of Kandahar-city in the last decades due to urban migration, exact

numbers on tribal affiliation are difficult to obtain. There are members of an estimated 40

tribes living in Kandahar-city, and 20 of them have populations of less than one percent of

the total population. Estimations were first made on the tribal confederation level. This

resulted in the following breakdown: Zirak Durrani 50%, Panjpai Durrani 15%, Ghilzai 15%,

Shia 8% and 12% others, such Wardak, Mohmand, Kakar, Sayed, Tajik, Baluch, and other

small tribes (see Figure 8). For the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes, no percentages are provided

for individual tribes but among the Panjpai the Nurzai are most numerous and among the

Ghilzai the Hotak, Tokhi and Lodin. The most sizeable population among the other Pashtuns

tribes are the Kakar.

43

Durrani

Zirak Durrani (50%)

Alk

ozai

(7.5

%)

Bara

kzai (

15%

)

Ghilzai (15%)

Popalz

ai (2

0%

)

Moham

madza

i

(2.5

%)

Panjpai (15%)A

chekz

ai (5

%)

Other Pashtun tribes and ethnic

groups (20%)

Figure 8: Tribal tree of Kandahar-city.

3.2.1 Zirak Durrani Tribes

The Zirak Durrani tribes have been the most powerful actors in Kandahar’s history since

Ahmad Shah Durrani established the dynastic rule of the Popalzai tribe in 1747 (see also

Chapter 4). The rule of the Popalzai tribe lasted until 1818, after which Dost Mohammad of

the Mohammadzai (sub-tribe of the Barakzai) provided the leading figures until the

communist coup d’etat in 1978. This is the historical rationale for Zirak tribes to see

themselves as the “rightful” leaders of Kandahar. While they had to share power during the

Communist government and Taliban regime, they returned to an exclusionary style of rule in

the current government by monopolizing political power. They make up an estimate 50% of

the city population.

As noted earlier, however, the Zirak Durrani tribes are far from united and not all Zirak tribes

are equally influential. The Alkozai, for example, are less influential for three reasons: first

because of the “hand-over” of Kandahar-city to the Taliban by their most prominent leader

Mullah Naqibullah, something the then governor Gul Agha Sherzai interpreted as treason;

second, because parts of the Alkozai were allied with Yunus Qanuni of the Northern

Alliance/United Front; and finally while the Alkozai once used to be powerful in the security

apparatus, they are currently being pushed out by the Achekzai who are allied to the

Barakzai.

3.2.1.1 Popalzai

The Popalzai, the tribe of President Hamid Karzai, ruled Kandahar from 1747 to 1823 and

represents the biggest Zirak Durrani tribe (20%) in the city. They also have been influential in

government, education, business; they are large landowners and entertain good contacts

44

with the international actors. Besides the city they also live in Arghistan, Daman, Dand,

Ghorak, Khakrez, Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, and Zhari. During the jihad, the Popalzai tribe

was strong in the Hizb-e-Islami Khales (Abdur Raziq), Mahaz-e-Milli (Amir Lalay) and Jabha-

e-Nejat factions, while inside the city Lal Jan Allaqa Dar was the main PDPA supporter. The

Popalzai are also influential in neighboring Uruzgan province.

Main leaders

The Popalzai in Kandahar are currently led by Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of

President Hamid Karzai. He is married to Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister, which has allowed him to

co-opt parts of the internally divided Nurzai tribe. As noted earlier, during the governorship of

Gul Agha Sherzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai created and headed the “Eslahi shura” that

represented the Popalzai pole of power and counterweight to the provincial governor. He was

chosen as representative of Kandahar Province in the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga and in the

2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga. Since 2005 he is the head of the elected Provincial Council;

in the 2009 provincial council elections he received the highest score of all candidates.

Ahmad Wali Karzai comes from a respectable Popalzai tribal family with leadership tradition

from the village of Karz in Dand. Ahad Karzai, his father, was leader of the Popalzai tribe

during the jihad and mujahideen time. He had initially supported the royalist faction within the

Taliban who promised to bring back the king from exile. Over time however, the influence of

the pro-monarchist camp within the Taliban movement was weakened while the influence of

the Pakistani intelligence service ISI increased and Abdul Ahad Karzai distanced himself

from the movement. He was murdered by unknown gunmen in Quetta in 1999. Ahad Karzai

was succeeded by his oldest son Hamid Karzai as leader of the Popalzai tribe. Initially close

to the Taliban movement, he later became active in a network of exile Afghans (known as the

Rome group) planning a political reorganisation of Afghanistan from 1997 on.47 Well

positioned in different networks by 2001, he became the interim and then first President of

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, still running the country today. Ahmad Wali Karzai,

himself, only rose to power after Hamid Karzai took on the presidency, and his other brother

Qayum Karzai functioned in an advisory role.

The main rival within the Popalzai tribe is Amir Lalay (see Table 9). The differences between

them are best described as one of different social backgrounds, as Lalay represents an

achieved leader that rose to power during the jihad, rather than the traditional landed elite

from which the Karzai family hails. The Karzai clan resented Lalay’s increasing importance in

Kandahar. Furthermore, during the jihad, Lalay switched over to the Jamiat-e Islami faction

and become close to Rabbani. During the Taliban regime, after a short period in exile, he

47

Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1.

45

joined the Northern Alliance. He still has good relation with Jamiat-e-Islami and supported the

Northern Alliance candidates Yunus Qanuni and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in the 2004 and 2009

presidential elections against Karzai, respectively. Other Popalzai key actors are presented

in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Key Popalzai actors

Name Village/area Background

Haji Mawladad nahiya 10 He is the elder of his tribe and influential in nahiya 10. He only solves people’s conflicts and assumes neutrality.

Haji Abdul Ghani

Originally from Bala Karz, he now lives in nahiya 5

An influential man in the entire city, he is a tribal of elder of his tribe and area of residence. He has not been linked with any faction and now serves as a contact-person between the government and his people.

Abdul Qayum Karzai

Karz He is the brother of President Hamid Karzai and until recently was a representative of Kandahar in the Senate. Government.

Haji Doctor Hayatullah

Originally from Shah Wali Kot district but presently lives in 2

nd

Nahiya

He descends from a rich family and has inherited tribal eldership from his forefathers. During the years of jihad and the Taliban government he ran a drugstore in Khwaja Mulk. He is only influential in the district.

Amir Lalay Shah Wali Kot

He was an important Mahaz-e-Milli commander and led between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters. He does not come from a traditional tribal elite family. After the jihad, this put him at odds with the Karzai clan who resented his increasing importance. Lalay later switched factions to Jamiat-e-Islami and established links to Rabbani. He fought against the Taliban, fled to Iran and joined the Northern Alliance. He returned after the fall of the Taliban and since regained control over the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot.

Main rivalries: Popalzai vs. Barakzai

The main rivals of the Popalzai are the Barakzai (see description under 3.2.1.1 above).

Main alliances

The Popalzai have been much more successful than the Barakzai in co-opting parts of the

Panjpai tribes and also maintain better relations with the Alkozai as well as the Nurzai tribes.

Ahmad Wali Karzai is married to Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister and has good relations with the

main Alkozai leaders Agha Lalay and Karimullah Khan.

3.2.1.2 Barakzai

The Barakzai are the second largest of the Zirak tribes in Kandahar-city (15% of total

population) and have maintained influence through successive regimes from monarchy

46

(1823-1978), over the PDPA until today. The Barakzai tribe in Kandahar was close to the

Mahaz-e Milli faction that represented the interests of the tribal establishment and large

landowners. They have been influential in government, education, business, and dominate

also as large landowners. Besides the city, they also live in Arghistan, Daman, Dand, Maruf,

Nesh and Takhtapul districts of Kandahar and they are also influential in parts of Helmand

Province.

During the governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai (2002 until December 2004), the Barakzai were

the most powerful tribe in Kandahar. Many important political positions were filled with

Barakzai and they had established good contacts with international actors, especially military

ones. The Barakzai managed to control much of the logistics for the internationals as the

airport was occupied in 2001 by Gul Agha Sherzai's brothers Abdul Raziq and Haji Bacha.

Since then Gul Agha Sherzai’s Barakzai militia have been in charge of the security of the

airport and dominate the business surrounding the logistical support of the international

military forces stationed at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). They also have a quasi monopoly on the

gas business.48 Khalid Pashtun, a Barakzai close to Gul Agha Sherzai and his former

spokesman, owns a construction company that implements PRT projects. This said, despite

the fact that Barakzai and Popalzai contractors dominated the business, at least many

reconstruction projects were accomplished during the Sherzai’s governorship.

The Barakzai are also strongly present in the ANP as they rolled over some of their militia

into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Sherzai’s second corps merged into the

ANP after demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and is close to Coalition

Forces.

Main leaders

Gul Agha Sherzai is the main leader of the Barakzai tribe even though he does not come

from a traditional tribal elite family. He achieved his status, stepping into the footsteps of his

father, the late Haji Latif, a prominent and well-respected Barakzai commander of Mahaz-e

Milli who was poisoned in 1989.49 He is one of the main strongmen in the province, having

held the governor position trice, once during the mujahideen government, and twice during

the current one (See section 3.1.1 for a description of Sherzai’s background.) The family of

Gul Agha Sherzai is from the Nurdinzai sub-tribes of Dand district.

The main rival of Sherzai within the Barakzai tribe is Nur-ul Haq Ulumi (see Table 10 for

other Barakzai key actors); the two men have a different outlook and worldview. Nur-ul Haq

48

Giustozzi, Antonio; Ullah, Noor (2007): The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006. In: Central Asian Survey, Volume 26, Number 2, June 2007, pp. 167-184(18). 49 See: UNDP, 1991, Kandahar. A socio-economic profile. UNDP

47

Ulumi was a member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA during the communist government

and served as Minister of Defence and governor of Kandahar during the government of Dr.

Najibullah. Sherzai, as noted, fought against the PDPA on the side of the mujahideen.

Table 10: Key Barakzai actors

Name Village/area Background

Haji Abdul Majid

nahiya 7

He is a tribal elder and malik and a good conflict mediator. He is only influential in nahiya 7. He also represents his people in the government. During jihad he stayed in the city but assisted the mujahideen in secret. During the Taliban government he stayed at home and resolved conflicts. He is a tribal elder now.

Haji Hidayatullah

nahiya 4

He never had membership of any faction. He is a businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics. He is the twin brother of Haji Abdullah.

Haji Abdullah nahiya 2

He never had membership of any faction. He is a businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics. He is the twin brother of Haji Hidayatullah.

Haji Pacha Dand

He is the son of Haji Abdul Latif, the brother of Gul Agha Sherzai and leads the Barakzai council. He is influential among the Barakzai tribes, especially in Dand. During jihad years he fought alongside his father and emigrated to Pakistan during the Taliban. Tribe

Nur-ul Haq Ulumi

Maruf

He was a Parcham/PDPA in the past and served as Minister of Defence and governor of Kandahar during the government of Dr. Najibullah. He is a member of the Wolesi Jirga. His main source of influence is political power.

Engineer Yusef Pashtun

Miyandoshin Awsat/Arghandab

He is the son of Ghond Mashar Sahib. He was briefly the Provincial Governors in 2003-2004 (see section 3.1.1 for his profile). His main source of influence is political power.

General Gulalai

He is the brother of Senator Mullah Said Mohammad Akhund (Mahaz). During the jihad he was a commander with Gul Agha Sherzai. Gulalai is general chief commander of a garrison at the airport. His main source of influence is security provision.

Haji Sayed Mohammad Akhund

City, Originally a resident of Dand district, but now living in Khakarpur Darwaza

He built a huge mosque close to his house. During the jihad he was a sub-commander of Abdul Latif. During the Taliban government he stayed at home. He rose to become a tribal elder during the current government. His influence is limited to Kandahar-city. His main source of influence is conflict resolution and political connections.

48

Name Village/area Background

Dr. Qasam Khan

City

He is a khan and a tribal elder in his tribe and is important in resolving people’s conflicts. He was a mujahed during the jihad; he stayed at home during the Taliban government. Now he is a member of the PC. His influence covers Dand, Kandahar-city and all Barakzai tribes. His main source of influence is conflict resolution and political connections.

Hajji Abdullah Dand He is a resident of Kharpor Darwaza, and is a money-changer. His main source of influence is business.

Haji Musa Dand

He is a resident of Mullah Alam Akhund village and is from the Nurdinzai sub-tribe. He imports automobiles from Japan. His main source of influence is business.

On the intertribal level, the Barakzai are involved in rivalries with the two other largest Zirak

tribes: the Alkozai and the Popalzai. While the Alkozai rivalry dates back to the mujahideen

time, the Popalzai-Barakzai emerged after Hamid Karzai became the interim president,

making the Popalzai into the “ruling” tribe.

Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Alkozai

The Barakzai have a tense relationship with parts of the Alkozai since the jihad and

especially with the late Alkozai leader Mullah Naqibullah who supported the rivalling faction

Jamiat-e-Islami. More significantly, some local respondents attribute the bad relationship to

the role Naqibullah played in the handover of Kandahar-city to the Taliban in the mid 1990s,

when Sherzai was the mujahideen Governor of Kandahar. Mullah Naqibullah declared

support for the Taliban and weakened Sherzai’s position. This creating stories of treason and

provided an explanation for the bitter rivalry between the Alkozai and the Barakzai which

continues into the current government. Since both the Barakzai and Alkozai rolled over large

contingents into the police force, their rivalry has weakened the police internally.

By the end of 2002 the Alkozai and Barakzai militias came close to an all out war when Chief

of Police Khakrezwal (an Alkozai) tried to fire his Barakzai Deputy, Naser Jan leading to the

transfer of Khakrezwal from Kandahar to Kabul in 2003. In 2004 Khan Mohammed, an

Alkozai leader and former jihadi commander, lost his position as commander of the 2nd Army

Corps (Alkozai-dominated) when it was abolished as part of a country-wide DDR campaign.

Less than a year later Khan Mohammed, like Khakrezwal, was transferred outside the

Province.50 These transfers of key Alkozai leaders outside of Kandahar happened during the

governorship of Sherzai and Pashtun, both Barakzai, and were interpreted by the Alkozai

tribe as deliberate attempts by their Barakzai rivals to weaken them.

50

Giustozzi, Antonio; Ullah, Noor (2007): The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006. In: Central Asian Survey, Volume 26, Number 2, June 2007, pp. 167-184(18).

49

Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Popalzai

The Popalzai tribe led by Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK) is the main rivals to the Barakzai. While

Gul Agha Sherzai became the first provincial governor of Kandahar in the new government,

Ahmad Wali Karzai established a consultative council of 100-150 men called “Eslahi shura”

six months after the fall of the Taliban regime to create a counterweight to the provincial

governor. The Eslahi shura was dissolved once Sherzai was transferred to Nangarhar in

2005 and the Provincial Council was elected. Once Karzai was confirmed as president in the

October 2004 elections and AWK was elected as the PC head, the power in Kandahar

shifted from the Barakzai to the Popalzai.

Main allies

The main ally of the Barakzai tribe is the Achekzai tribe. The Achekzai were a Barakzai sub-

tribe until they were elevated to the status of a proper tribe during the reign of Ahmad Shah

Durrani (1747), the Popalzai leader whose tribal policies shaped southern Afghanistan

significantly.

To fight against the Taliban in Kandahar in late 2001, Sherzai allied himself with the Achekzai

tribal militia under the command of Abdur Raziq, the nephew of an infamous mujahideen

commander (Ismat Muslim)51 despite the fact that the Gul Agha’s father Haji Latif and Ismat

Muslim had been bitter enemies during the jihad. After Sherzai became provincial governor,

Raziq’s militia was integrated into the Spin Boldak border police. Sherzai was thus able to

form a strategic Barakzai–Achekzai alliance in Kandahar for the purpose of controlling the

Kandahar–Spin Boldak road, the economic lifeline of Kandahar, including the border crossing

to Pakistan in Spin Boldak.

Another main ally of Gul Agha Sherzai was the late Habibullah Jan, an Alizai from Zhari

district, whom he helped to carve out the new Zhari district from Maywand and Panjwayi (see

Zhari District Assessment). He was killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen and since then the

alliance between the Alizai and Barakzai in Kandahar has been weakened. The relationship

of the Barakzai with the Alizai, however, was always somewhat ambiguous, as Sher

Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai), the former provincial governor of Helmand (2002-2005) is

married to a sister of Arif Khan Nurzai, whose other sister is married to Ahmad Wali Karzai.

3.2.1.3 Alkozai

The Alkozai, the third largest tribe in Kandahar-city (7.5%) are part of the Zirak Durrani

“troika” forming the power elite of Kandahar. Historically, however, they have been weaker

than the Barakzai or Popalzai. Their main bases of power are located in Arghandab, Khakrez

51

Esmat Muslim was a militia leader during the jihad. While Muslim initially fought the PDPA and Soviets, he joined the PDPA in 1984 when he lost support of the ISI.

50

and Panjwayi district. Since the late commander Mullah Naqibullah Akhund grabbed and

distributed government land in Loya Wiala (Kandahar-city) in 1992 (see also 2.1) mainly

among the Alkozai, the tribe makes up much of the population of nahiya 9 of Kandahar-city.

The Alkozai tribes were mostly in Jamiat-e-Islami (Mullah Naqibullah) and to a lesser degree

Mahaz-e-Milli (Khakrezwal).

As the Barakzai, the Alkozai went more massively into the police than other tribes as they

initially held the position of chief of police. Zabit Akram Khakrezwal (Alkozai) from Khakrez

became provincial Chief of Police of Kandahar; Khan Muhammad (Alkozai) from Arghandab

became head of the Kandahar military corps and later pprovincial Chief of Police. The

Alkozai are one of the largest contributors to state security forces in Kandahar, a tradition

reaching back to the 18th and 19th century when the Alkozai gained fame due to their large

tribal militia. Alkozai power eroded when key Alkozai leaders were transferred out of their

positions during the governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai. They also came under pressure by

the rise of the Achekzai allied with Sherzai as a backbone of the police.

Internal divisions in the Alkozai tribe started to become apparent in 2004 when half the tribe

backed Mohammed Younes Qanuni (Tajik candidate of the United Front) in the presidential

elections while the other half, lead by Senator Wasifi, an inherited status Alkozai tribal elder

long-exiled in Europe, backed Karzai. Divided internally, and weakened by provincial power

holders, Alkozai leadership (all with jihadi background, see Chapter 2.6) was then targeted

for assassination by the insurgency from approximately 2005 onwards to further weaken the

tribe: Haji Granay, Muhammed Akram Khakrezwal, Mullah Abdul Hakim Jan, and Malim

Akbar were assassinated while Mullah Naqibullah Akhund was seriously wounded in a mine

explosion and died later in September of 2007.52 This has left the Alkozai vulnerable as the

new leadership still has to be consolidated.53

Main leaders

The main leaders of the Alkozai tribe that remain alive are Karimullah Khan from Arghandab

and Haji Agha Lalay from Panjwayi.

Karimullah Khan is the son of the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund. Mullah Naqibullah did not

come from the tribal establishment but gained his influence as a Jamiat-e-Islami commander

and was known as a political opportunist. Naqib used his influence to allow a blood-less take-

over of Kandahar to the Taliban and later from the Taliban to the new government. After his

father’s death, President Karzai intervened and selected Karimullah Khan as a successor. It

is not yet clear how much power Karimullah has, as power transfers from father to son are

52

The Globe, March 10 2007. 53

It should be noted that it is not entirely clear if all Alkozai leaders were killed by Taliban insurgents. Some local respondents suggested that rivals close to the Afghan government may also have been involved.

51

less predictable for achieved status holder rather than in tribal elite families. Karimullah Khan

is also an elder of the Alkozai tribe of nahiya 9. He is better connected with Ahmad Wali

Karzai than with Gul Agha Sherzai.

Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir is a member of the Provincial Council, the head of the Panjwayi

district council and a member of the Qayum Karzai council. He has good relations with

Ahmad Wali Karzai and is presently involved in preparing a new Kandahar tribal council upon

suggestion of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He has a better relationship with Ahmad Wali Karzai than

with Gul Agha Sherzai. He was also head of the new reconciliation commission but resigned

in May because he was running again for the provincial council. He was re-elected with the

5th highest score.

He comes from a very influential khan family that revolted against the PDPA because they

were heavily affected by land redistribution. During the jihad he switched factions frequently

and later became a Taliban commander.

He also used political marriage to create networks. One of his sisters is married to a Taliban

commander, the other with an Ittehad commander of the Nurzai tribe that was led by Ustad

Abdul Malim.

He is a regionally influential tribal elder with good links to both the government and the

Taliban insurgency. He is also said to be influential beyond the Alkozai tribe. His father was a

big khan, affected by the PDPA land distribution policies and killed by the PDPA

government.45 He successfully reclaimed the land of his family and is one of the wealthiest of

all Alkozai khans, owning 350 jeribs (70 ha) of land plus three vineyards. Other influential

elders are listed in Table 11.

Table 11: Key Alkozai actors

Name Village/area Background

Azizullah "Wasifi"

Arghandab

Advisor minister during the government of Zahir Khan. Within the Alkozai tribe he constitutes the second main pole of power and advocates for closer relations with the Popalzai as opposed to connections to Qanuni based on old factional ties (see Arghandab District Assessment).

Haji Mohammad Isa Sahibzada

Originally from Shah Wali Kot, now nahiya 9

He has been a respected conflict mediator from many years. During jihad he was a HIG commander. He was a conflict mediator during the Taliban government too. He is influential among all Alkozai tribes.

Mohammad Haq Jinabee Sahib

nahiya 2

He is the son of a reputable religious scholar, highly respected by the people of Kandahar City and often involved in conflict resolution. His area of influence entails the entire Kandahar province.

52

Name Village/area Background

Haji Abdul Manan khan

Originally from Khakrez, now nahiya 9

He is an elder and influential man of his tribe and the nahiya where he lives. He is a conflict mediator. During jihad he was a member of the Jamiat faction. During the Taliban government however he stayed at home. Now he is a tribal elder.

Haji Pacha Aka Panjwayi

He is a tribal elder. He rose to tribal eldership during jihad years. He is influential in his tribe and is considered the most active of all tribal elders. He used to be a commander of Mahaz faction during jihad. During the Taliban government he stayed at home. He plays a significant role in resolving conflicts. His influence is confined to his tribe in Panjwayi district.

Mohammad Haq Jinayee

City (nahiya 2)

His father was a famous religious scholar known as Jenabi Mawlawi Sahib. He called on people to wage jihad against the Soviet troops and was one of the most influential pirs of the Alkozai tribe. Upon his death Mohammad haq Jinayee became a tribal elder. Now he is a member of the Alkozai council and a respected tribal elder among others other tribes. During the Taliban government he stayed at home.

Khan Mohammed

Arghandab

He is a resident of Char Qulbi, Arghandab. He was the assistant of Mullah Naqibullah in the army and was also CoP. He has connection with Jamiat-e-Islami and is an advisor in the MoI. He supported Dr. Abdullah Abdullah during the 2009 presidential elections.

Haji Mohammad Isa Sahibzada

Resident of Shah Wali Kot district

He is a tribal elder. He has inherited spirituality from his forefathers. He is a popular amulet writer among the people. He also takes part in resolving disputes. During the Taliban government he stayed at home and resolved conflicts. He is a figure of regional influence.

Major Rivalry: Alkozai vs. Barakzai

The main rivals of the Alkozai are the Barakzai, see the description under 3.2.1.1.

3.2.1.4 Achekzai

The Achekzai were considered a Barakzai sub-tribe until Ahmad Shah Durrani elevated them

to a proper tribe to weaken his Barakzai rivals. They are a cross-border tribe and have large

populations in Spin Boldak, Takhtapul Pul districts and in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan.

They make up an estimated 5% of the population of Kandahar-city. Their influence and

power comes through links with the Barakzai and their effective control of the road from

Kandahar to Spin Boldak, their main power base. They are traditionally well established in

business and cross-border smuggling activities. They had three provincial council members,

one of which was assassinated in early 2009 (Sitara Achekzai). They also head several

provincial departments.

The killing in June 2009 of the Achekzai Chief of Police (CoP) of Kandahar Matiullah Qatea

has raised some concerns as to the further destabilization of the government. Local

respondents claim that the people involved in the killing of the CoP, who were subsequently

53

arrested by American forces, are mostly Popalzai. This may create future problems with the

Popalzai tribe. Table 12 provides an overview of other prominent Achekzai figures.

Table 12: Key Achekzai actors

Name Tribe Village/area Background

Haji Torjan Aka

Achekzai

Originally from Farah province, now nahiya 9

He is an old man who actively resolves people’s conflicts. He was a conflict solver during the Taliban government as well. He is influential among the community from Farah living in Kandahar.

Haji Ahmad Shah khan

Achekzai

He is tribal elder. And has influence in his own nahiya and in his tribe. He was member Mahaz. In the government of Taliban he stayed home and solved the conflicts of the people on that time. Now he is representative in provincial council of his tribe.

Haji Mohammad Isa khan

Achekzai nahiya 6 He is a businessman and a tribal elder in his tribe and the nahiya where he lives. He has never been associated with any faction.

Haji Abdul Wali

Achekzai Originally from Panjwayi, now nahiya 9

He is a tribal elder of his tribe and nahiya. Moreover, he is head of the municipality council. He is influential in nahiya of his residence. During jihad he was a member of the Mahaz faction. During the Taliban government he only led his tribe.

Main rivalries and alliances

Their main rival on the provincial level is the Nurzai tribe from the Panjpai Durrani sub-

confederation. They have been engaged in a century old conflict over political power and

economic resources in Spin Boldak. During the jihad, many Achekzai in Spin Boldak fought

under Ismat Muslim’s Fedayin faction that was known for switching between the mujahideen

and the PDPA government opportunistically. The Nurzai on the other hand were closer to

different mujahideen factions and later to the Taliban government whom they also used to

settle scores with the Achekzai.

When the Taliban government collapsed, the Achekzai tribe entered into an alliance with Gul

Agha Sherzai and the Barakzai tribe. Achekzai and Barakzai forces captured the airport as

they moved on Kandahar City and since then the Achekzai have been strongly present in the

border police led by Abdur Raziq. This has come at the expense of the Alkozai tribe, a tribe

traditionally known for mustering a strong militia. The alliance of the Achekzai with the

Barakzai has brought the Nurzai closer to the Popalzai (see Figure 9).

54

Barakzai

Nurzai

Popalzai

Achekzai

Figure 9: Main rivalries and alliances

During the post-Taliban period, Nurzai/Achekzai tribal tensions have not been confined to

Spin Boldak. The Afghan government used Abdul Raziq and his militia to fight the Taliban in

Nurzai dominated Panjwayi district. Raziq’s forces were defeated as Nurzai tribesmen from

across the south and southwest flocked to Panjwayi to assist their fellow tribesmen.54

3.2.1.5 Mohammadzai

The Mohammadzai are a sub-tribe of the Barakzai but are often considered as a proper tribe

because of their past importance. They lead the pre-war elite of Kandahar since Dost

Mohammad established the dynastic rule of the Mohammadzai in 1818, providing members

of the royal family. They influenced the creation of a much more hierarchical tribal system

than in the east and southeast of Afghanistan and the affairs of government became more

exclusively a Mohammadzai affair.55 The new hierarchy meant that on the very top were the

immediate families of Mohammadzai rulers and landowning aristocracy followed by non-

Durrani (Ghilzai, Farsiwan, and Qizilbash) who ran much of the administration.

Targeted by assassinations during the early PDPA years, a majority of the Mohammadzai

tribe emigrated and are part of the large Afghan Diaspora living in many different countries.

They make up 2.5 % of the city population. The two key Mohammadzai leaders in Kandahar-

city are mentioned in Table 13 below.

54

Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov, and Laptop: The neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan Hurst and Company, London (2007), pp. 55-56. 55

Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, Curzon Press, Richmond (1997), p.240.

55

Table 13: Mohammadzai leaders

Name District Background

Tooryalai Vesa

Arghandab, Kowok Village See Provincial Governors under 3.1.1

Abdul Hamid

Originally from Arghandab but presently lives in nahiya 2

He immigrated to Pakistan during the jihad and started his private business. Now he is head of the provincial court and a tribal elder of the Mohammadzai tribe.

3.2.2 Panjpai Durrani Tribes

The Panjpai Durrani tribes in Kandahar consist mostly of the Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai and few

Maku villages. They are mostly concentrated in Maywand, Panjwayi, Zhari, Maruf and Spin

Boldak. They make up an estimated 15% of the Kandahar-city population.

3.2.2.1 Nurzai

The Nurzai is the largest of the Panjpai tribes in Kandahar, but their exact numbers are hard

to estimate. They are mostly settled in Maywand, Panjwayi, Spin Boldak, Takhtapul and

Zhari district. Some of their leaders have been able to establish connections to the central

power holders, most notably Arif Khan Nurzai (see below). The Nurzai also have two

members in the provincial council and one head of a provincial government department.

Similarly to their main rival, the Achekzai, they are a cross-border tribe with a large

population in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. They are traditionally well established in

business and cross-border smuggling activities.

The Nurzai are said to be particularly divided and their leadership has good relations with

Afghan government power holders as well as the Taliban insurgency. The Nurzai are often

stigmatized as Taliban supporters which has made them the prime targeted of international

military forces despite their connections to the government.

Main leaders

Arif Khan Nurzai comes from a family of Nurzai tribal elders of Panjwayi. He is a member of

the provincial council and well connected to Ittehad-e-Islami. He maintains good relations

with other influential individuals and is linked to the Karzai family through the marriage of his

sister to Ahmad Wali Karzai. During the Taliban government he lived in Quetta city of

Pakistan. His forefathers were tribal elders. He is influential in the region. In the pre-2005

cabinet he served as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs.

He is the son of Haji Musa Jan Nurzai who was said to be one of the drug barons during

Zahir Shah’s time and his family has been allegedly involved in drug trafficking since the

1960s and thus managed to amass wealth from illegal and legal business. His uncle is

56

Muhammed Yunus, a resident of Nawi Khar city who became the first Director of the

Customs Office post 2001.

His cousin is Haji Basher, one of the first jihadi commanders to support the emerging Taliban

movement, was the former Taliban district governor of Maywand and is a major narcotics

dealer. He was arrested in 2008 in New York where he is currently serving a life sentence for

major narcotics offences.

Haji Neamatullah Khan is the main Nurzai leader from Spin Boldak. He is a member of both

the provincial and Kandahar tribal council. He was a Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli. He has good ties

with Ahmad Wali Karzai, Gul Agha Sherzai and Arif Nurzai. The connection to Arif Nurzai is

the main factor for his involvement in the council. He allegedly also has contacts with the

Pakistani intelligence service ISI, a reason for which he is mistrust by many. He is known as

an opportunist who is close to everyone with power and money.

Hafiz Majid is an old garde Taliban from the first Taliban regime. From a religious family, his

father Mullah Abdullah Jan was mullah of a mosque in Panjwayi (Safid Rawan area). During

the jihad he studied at a religious madrassa in Pakistan and memorized the Koran. He

became a group commander of Ittehad-e Islami by the end of the jihad and spent his time

during the mujahideen government as a sub-commander of Arif Khan Nurzai at the 7th

Division at Kandahar airfield. He rose to prominence during the Taliban government. Known

as a ‘right-hand’ to the Taliban leader Mullah Omer, he served as CoP of Kandahar province

during the Taliban government. During the old Taliban regime, he allegedly tortured

numerous potential opponents of the regime in Kandahar. Amid the Taliban collapse, he

reportedly stocked huge cashes of ammunition at an unknown location in Panjwayi. Now he

is the most powerful insurgency commander in Panjwayi and also in Kandahar, Helmand,

Uruzgan, and Zabul. He is reportedly the head of the Taliban insurgency military operations

in these provinces. He leads the insurgency activities in Panjwayi from Quetta, Pakistan.

Other prominent Nurzai figures are listed in Table 14.

Table 14: Key Nurzai actors

Name Area Background

Haji Shirin Agha nahiya 7 He is known as a spiritual figure and a conflict mediator among the people. He is an elder of nahiya 7.

Haji Qader Panjwayi He is Arif Khan's uncle and heads the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. He has a tense relationship with Arif Khan.

Haji Isa Jan Panjwayi He is a tribal leader and khan. He was the first CoP of Panjwayi after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

Abdul Samad Khan

Spin Boldak He is the son of Mohabub Khan, an important Nurzai from Spin Boldak.

57

Main rivalries and alliances

Their main rival on the provincial level is the Achekzai tribe (see earlier discussion under

3.2.1.4).

3.2.2.2 Other Panjpai tribes

Other Panjpai tribes include the Ishaqzai and the Alizai. The Ishaqzai is the second largest of

the Panjpai tribes in Kandahar settled mostly in western Kandahar districts Maywand and

Panjwayi. They have large populations in neighbouring Helmand. They are strongly

marginalized in the government and have no provincial council member or head of

government department.

The Alizai are not very powerful either but better connected to the central government

because of the marriage of Mullah Sher Mohammad Akhundzada an Alizai, previous

Governor of Helmand and ally of the Karzai family, to a sister of Arif Khan Nurzai. They head

one provincial government department and one of the Chiefs of Police of Kandahar was an

Alizai from Musa Qala in Helmand.

Their main tribal area is Maruf and Zhari District, but their population is more concentrated in

northern Helmand. Their main leader in Kandahar was Habibullah Jan from Zhari who was

killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen. One of the main reasons he created Zhari district was to

give the Alizai one area where they were in the majority (see Zhari District Assessment).

3.2.3 Ghilzai

The Ghilzai confederation tribes have shared much of the same predicament as the Panjpai

Durrani and have historically been in the shadow of the much more powerful Zirak tribes. The

Ghilzai are even weaker than the Panjpai in terms of connections to the provincial

government as they have no provincial council member or other important government

positions.

Even more so than the Panjpai, the Ghilzai tribes were associated with the Taliban regime,

as many of the old garde Taliban (including their leader Mullah Omar) were from the Ghilzai

confederation. This has been used as an excuse to sideline them from post-2001 politics,

and also made them a prime target for arrests by the international military forces. It is alleged

that the overwhelming majority of prisoners all across southern Afghanistan are Ghilzai.

The Ghilzai tribes created their own council in order to counter balance the influence of the

Durrani, but it is seen by many Ghilzai as mainly composed of pro-Karzai Ghilzai. While this

Ghilzai shura has an official status with the provincial government it holds less power than

the provincial shura. Currently, efforts are underway to create a new Ghilzai shura.

58

Among the Ghilzai tribes, the Hotak are the most prominent in Kandahar-city (5%), especially

among the religious figures. The overall percentage of the Ghilzai is hard to gauge due to

their diversity.

Mohammad Hassan Akhund is a Hotak, a prominent religious scholar and one of the most

famous mullahs of Kandahar province. He was never linked to any faction. Since the Taliban

government he is Khatib56 of the Moyi Mobarak Jamai Mosque where hair of the prophet

Mohammad (PBUH) is said to be kept. Another well known religious scholar of the Hotak

tribe is Haji Kari Sahib. He is a member of the ulema shura and the Mullah Imam of the Moyi

Mobarak Jamai Mosque and has good relations with the major Kandahar power holders.

Mohammad Haq Akhunzada is another elder of the Hotak tribe and lives in nahiya 11. He

was never linked to any party and is a conflict mediator known for his wisdom and

impartiality.

3.2.4 Kuchi

During the winter season, an estimated 6,000 Kuchi families from Ghazni (Muqur), Zabul

(Qalat) and Uruzgan provinces pass the Kandahar-city area on their way to Garamsir district

of Helmand province. They stay for about two or three days in the area of the Nisaji factory

located in the east of the city between the border of Daman district and the city. During the

summer months they return back to the highlands.

3.3 Shia population

There is a sizeable Shia population in Kandahar-city (8%) that lives mostly in nahiya 1. They

are most likely descendents of Qizilbash who came to Kandahar during the time of Nadir

Shah and Ahmad Shah Baba and constituted large parts of the administrative class in the

past. The Shia population is famous as potters and jewellers and are also strongly involved in

the import of construction materials such as farming tools and pipes. Today, they are strongly

represented in NGOs and many Shia women work. Local respondents estimated that most of

the girls in the schools of Kandahar-city are Shia.

During the jihad the Shia mostly supported Harakat-e-Islami, led by Ali Yawar, a resident of

Taop Khana in Kandahar-city. The Shia community has set up their own council in the city.

Tables 15 profile important Shia leaders in Kandahar-city.

Table 15: Key leaders of the Shia community

Name Village/area Background

Haji Sher Agha nahiya 1 He is an elder among the Shia and solves their conflicts. Since the Taliban government he resolves conflicts of the Shia community.

56

A khatib is a main speaker of the Friday prayers.

59

Name Village/area Background

Sheikh Haji Abdullah

Resident of Top khana

He is the son of Mohseni, the leader of the Harakat party and a tribal elder of the Shia. He is a member of the Shia council. During the Taliban government he migrated to Iran. He is influential and respected in his tribe.

Haji Sher Agha

57

Resident of Top khana

He is a big landholder whose lands are located in Zala Khan. His father was Malik Din Muhammad. He has inherited tribal eldership from his forefathers. During the Taliban government, he tended his farms and resolved people’s conflicts. He is only influential among the Shia of Kandahar.

Agha Mazfari Resident of Top khana He rose to tribal eldership during this government. During jihad he went to Iran. Upon return from Iran following the Taliban overthrow he became a tribal elder of the Shia.

Sayed Mukhtar Agha

Resident of Top khana

Known as a spiritual figure, tribal eldership has been endowed to him from his forefathers. During jihad years, he was a commander of Ali Yawar. He stayed at home during the Taliban government. Following the Taliban ouster from power he became a tribal elder.

3.4 Religious and spiritual figures

Kandahar-city is an important religious centre with holy several sites. The most important is

the mausoleum and mosque where the akherqa, the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad

(PBUH) is kept.58 A second site of great importance is the Moyi Mubarak Jamai Mosque

(where the hair of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) is kept). In the north of the city there is

the shrine of Hazrat Baba, a revered saint who lived in Kandahar 300 years ago.

Islam is deeply embedded in the life of all Afghans and religious and spiritual figures play an

important role in the Afghan social structure as formers of public opinion and legitimizers of

social order. The support of the ulema was very important for the newly forming Afghan

government. In turn, it has made the pro-government clergy the prime target of

assassinations by the Taliban insurgency. Attacks against religious leaders considered as

pro-government started in 2003 already. The first thee heads of the Kandahar ulema shura

were all assassinated, with the most famous of them being Mullah Faiz Mohammad, a Kakar

from Kandahar-city. Mullah Faiz was the son of Abd-u-Rab Akhunzada, the famous Mubaligh

and resident of Ikhkar-pur Darwaza. He was a teacher and religious scholar during the jihad

and mullah imam in his village during the Taliban regime. In the current government he was

the scholars and ulema council director. On 31 May 2005 he was assassinated and the

57

This is a different Haji Sher Agha, which is a common name. 58

It is also the site where Mullah Omar wrapped the cloak around himself before a crowd of religious scholars to have himself declared Amir al-Mu'mineen, (Commander of the Faithful); the last time it was used was when the city was struck by a cholera epidemic in the 1930s. www.wikipedia.org, Consulted July 2009.

60

attacks on his funeral one week later claimed the life of Alkozai leader Khakrezwal.59

Seventeen people were injured when a bomb exploded at a Kandahar mosque during

evening prayers aimed at Mullah Faiz.60 Other ulema shura heads assassinated by Taliban

insurgents include Mawlawi Qaba, a Popalzai from nahiya 4 and Sayed Imam, an Alkozai,

former Jamiat-e Islami supporter and son of the famous late religious scholar Nabi

Akhundzada.

Table 16 provides an overview of current ulema shura members, and Table 17 of other

famous religious scholars in Kandahar.

Table 16: Current ulema shura members

Name Tribe Position District Background

Mawlawi Sayed

Mohammad

Akhundzada

Barakzai Current Head of ulema shura

Dand Important in his tribe. Had no important post in the Taliban regime. Current head of the shura.

Mawlawi Shalu Akhundzada

Alkozai Member nahiya 1

Current imam of the Kharq-e Sharif (mosque where the cloak of the prophet PBUH). During jihad and Taliban regime he was mullah imam of a mosque.

Haji Kari Sahib Hotak Member nahiya 4 Mullah Imam of the muj mobarak (mosque where the hair of the prophet PBUH is).

Haji Kari Ahmad Akhundzada

Popalzai Member nahiya 4 He was mullah imam in the past governments.

Haji Mullah Matiullah Akhundzada

Nurzai Member nahiya 6 He was mullah imam in the past governments.

Table 17: Famous religious scholars of Kandahar-city

Name Tribe Village/area Background

Mohammad Hassan Akhund

Hotak Resident of 10th Nahiya

See 3.2.3

Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Sahib

Babar Arghandab

He is a famous religious scholar and a devout preacher. During the Taliban regime he was an imam but was never affiliated with any faction. Originally from Sozanyan village in Arghandab district, he now lives in nahiya 5 of the city.

Mawlawi Abdul Majid

Sayed Resident of nahiya 5

As his forefathers, he is a religious scholar in the Hazrat Sahib mosque and a spiritual leader. He was never

59

Other assassinated ulema are Mawlawi Hamdullah (Dand District), Mawlawi Abdul Manan (Panjwayi), Mawlawi Abdul Bari (Kandahar-city), Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Bali (Kandahar-city) See Kandahar Report. 60

Agence France Presse – English July 7, 2003

61

Name Tribe Village/area Background

Akhunzada affiliated with any faction.

Mawlawi Abdul Bari

Achekzai Resident of nahiya 8

As his forefathers, he is a religious scholar of the Haji Mohammad Jan mosque. He was not linked to any factions and he was an imam during the Taliban government.

Mawlawi Abdul Karim

Alkozai Arghandab

He is a very famous religious scholar in the Haji Mullah Naqibullah mosque. He is the cousin of the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund and he was also a mullah imam during the government of the Taliban. He is originally from Arghandab district but now lives in the 9th nahiya.

Spiritual leaders such as Sayed often play an important role in mediation and conflict

resolution. Table 18 provides and overview important spiritual figures in Kandahar-city.

Table 18: Spiritual figures of Kandahar

Name Tribe Village/area Back ground

Marach Agha Badar

Sayed Resident of nahiya 6

He is the son of Sayed Manak Agha. He is spiritual person in Kandahar city and gives amulets to people. He is also important in mediation and in conflict resolution. He had no factional affiliation in the past.

Haji Nanai Agha Sayed Resident of Zakir Sharif

He is a famous pir and Sayed and spiritual healer. He is known as an exorcist and trusted by the people.

Talib Agha Babar Resident of nahiya 9

He is a religious scholar and a wealthy man. He is also known as a spiritual figure who writes amulets to people. During the jihad and the Taliban regime he studied religious subjects. His vast religious knowledge is the base of his reputation.

Hazrat Sahib Mubarak

Sayed

Originally from Ghor province but lives in nahiya 9

He is a pir and a spiritual man and respected and trusted by the people. He is known as an exorcist of bad spirits. He was not linked to any faction. As an amulet writer he found popularity during the Taliban regime.

Bahaodden Jan Agha

Sayed Resident of nahiya 7

He is a grandson of Pir Mawlawi Mohammad Jan Akhund. He writes amulets and heals people and is trusted by the people of Kandahar. He has never been linked to any faction.

3.5 Insurgency

The current fault line between the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan government is primarily

a political and economic struggle. The lack of a meaningful reconciliation process at the

beginning of the current government translated into an exclusion of the former Taliban

leadership from the current government and associated economic opportunities. Added to

this came grievances of commanders affiliated with the past Taliban regime that were

arrested and tortured by forces linked to the GoA or international military actors. Lastly, it is

important to recall that Kandahar was the birthplace of the Taliban movement which started

in Sangi Hesar village of Maywand District (now Zhari District).

62

The current Taliban insurgency in Kandahar is composed of three main groups: Old garde

Taliban, opportunistic Taliban, and foreign fighters.

The old garde (or their close relatives) are prominent among the current Taliban insurgents.

They can be considered the hard core Taliban who belonged to the old Taliban regime of

Mullah Omar. These ideological Taliban are following a strategy of fighting against NATO

and Afghan forces. They are the most ideological group among the Taliban and supported

by Pakistan’s secret service, the ISI. They focus on propaganda, building of political support,

and some may also be commanders. The propaganda of Taliban insurgents combines the

old religious jihadist rhetoric against a foreign occupying force with Afghan nationalism. This

discourse is supported and legitimized by mullahs who benefit from taxes that are distributed

to them by the insurgents.

Three of the main positions in the current Taliban insurgency governance structure (as of

July 2009) are old garde Taliban (see Table 19).

Table 19: Taliban insurgency governance structure

Name Tribe District Background

Akhtar Mohammad Mansur

Ishaqzai Maywand

Provincial governor (July 2009). During the Taliban regime he was the security chief of Kandahar Airport and later minister of aviation until the collapse of the Taliban regime.

Mohibullah Akhundzada

Barakzai Shah Wali Kot Deputy Provincial Governor. During the Taliban government he was the provincial governor of Faryab.

Mawlawi Andul Ghaffur Akhund

Ishaqzai Grishk

Head of the administrative commission for Kandahar that appoints district governors. During Taliban time he was in charge of Battalion 93 of Helmand.

Mullah Zulgay Alizai Zhari Chief of Police of the Taliban insurgents.

The continuity between the current Taliban insurgency and the past Taliban regime is

highlighted by the fact that the Pashmul area of Panjwayi and Zhari districts and Sangi Hesar

in Zhari was (and is) the strongest support base of the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban

movement was supported by different tribes, but the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes from Pashmul

and Sangi Hesar were more prominent among the top leadership. Particularly strong were

the Nurzai, Ishaqzai and Kakar tribes who made up many of the field commanders. The initial

leading figures were Mullah Rabbani (Kakar)61, Mullah Mohammad Omar (Hotak), and Mullah

Abdul Salam Zaif (Alizai) and others. Haji Basher, a former Jamiat commander and narcotics

61

He was allegedly killed by ISI because of his moderate stance on religious issues.

63

pusher of the Nurzai tribe was one of the first major jihadi commanders to support the

Taliban movement with weapons, money and logistics.62

The most prominent jihadi commander in Kandahar Province who supported the Taliban

movement was the late Mullah Naqibullah (Mullah Gul Akhund) of the Alkozai tribe from

Arghandab district. Despite the fact that he was a member of Jamiat-e-Islami, he

strengthened his friendship with the Taliban. Commander Abdur Raziq, a Popalzai resident

of Arghistan district and commander of Hizb-e Islami Khales joined them as well. The Taliban

were strongly supported by the mullahs, as Mawlawi Nabi, a religious scholar and the leader

of Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami faction had joined the Taliban.

The second main group of local Taliban are opportunistic Taliban. They are the foot

soldiers of the Taliban and usually men under 20 years of age. This group of Taliban is not

specifically part of the Taliban insurgency out of adhering to a specific ideology, but more out

of political or economic opportunism.

Foreign fighters are a third group. Most of them also come from an ideological motivation.

Local respondents claim that there are at least 500 foreign insurgents from Waziristan

(Pakistan) and loyal to Mehsud in western Kandahar. They usually are trainers, explosives

and IED experts and support propaganda.

3.6 International Military Actors

Kandahar-city hosts a number of different international military actors with different mandates

ranging from American and Canadian Special Forces to the Canadian Provincial

Reconstruction Team (PRT). Most of the American and Canadian Special Forces are settled

in the former house of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Special Forces do

house searches and raids in the city. Since August 2005, the Canadian PRT comprised of

330 military and civilian personnel is stationed at Camp Nathan Smith in nahiya 5 of

Kandahar-city in Shirkat Miwa Amiryat.63 There are only Canadian forces that are charged

with security provision and the responsibility of reconstruction in Kandahar-city and districts

of the province. An additional location of international military forces is called the Joint

Coordination Centre (JCC) and is located to the south of the Kandahar provincial palace. At

JCC there are American forces, Canadian forces, as well as Afghan National Security Forces

from the National Directorate of Security (NDS), ANA and ANP. Their responsibility is

intelligence gathering and analysis.

About 25 km south of the city centre located in Daman District is the Kandahar international

airport or Kandahar Airfield (KAF). It is the biggest international forces centre in southern

62

He is the cousin of Arif Nurzai. He would later become a Taliban frontline commander in Shamali. He was also a major narcotics dealer and later arrested in New York; he is serving a life sentence. 63

www.afghanistan.gc.ca

64

Afghanistan and hosts American, Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch, and Romanian military

forces.

Canadian forces have the formal leadership for the security and reconstruction of Kandahar

Province but may be helped by other forces when needed. For example, in the summer of

2008, Taliban insurgents launched a large attack accompanied by suicide attacks on

Kandahar prison and after a few days of aggressive attacks captured Arghandab district and

the Mahalajat area of the city. Canadian forces were unable to maintain the control of

Kandahar province so British and Dutch forces settled for a few days in Kandahar centre,

new city areas and Warzashi Lobghari located close to the Mahalajat area to block the

movement of Taliban to the city. As a consequence insurgents left the mentioned areas.

Since the beginning of the current government, when ISAF troops settled inside Kandahar

airport, Gul Agha Sherzai's brothers Abdul Raziq and Haji Bacha as well as Zar Gulalay

(Barakzai) settled there, too. They are still there and responsible to deliver their supplies and

provide security.

Mandate and perception

According to local respondents the main responsibility of international forces is to stop

internal conflicts, fight the insurgency or to encourage them to peace, to build up Afghan

National Security Forces (such as ANA, ANP, NDS) and intelligence forces and start and

implement reconstruction projects.

Generally, the city population is not very happy with the international military forces because

they have not achieved what they set out to accomplish: the security situation has

deteriorated and people attribute the losses and damage inflicted by conflict to the

internationals. Furthermore, according to local respondents international military forces

behave badly with residents and the reconstruction projects are said to be of poor quality.

For example, in 2008 Special Forces entered a house in the city in the Mullah Guldad Street

during a night raid and gunned down an innocent butcher while he was sleeping. In a

separate incident international military forces (nationality unknown) shot and killed a woman

while she was crossing the road in broad daylight in December 2008. People especially

disapprove of actions undertaken without ANA or ANP presence. In an instance mentioned,

international military actors attacked the house of Pir Sayed Shah (from Sayed tribe, a

resident of Loy Wiala, nahiya 9) accusing him of being a Taliban supporter. They arrested

him and the people in his house without ANA or ANP presence.

65

4 Conflict Analysis The ongoing conflict in southern Afghanistan in general and Kandahar-city in particular, is

characterized by weak governance and expressed through two main inter-related conflicts.

The first major fault line/division runs between Pashtun tribes and confederations, especially

between the traditional Zirak Durrani tribal establishment and the Panjpai Durrani and Ghilzai

tribes. This conflict line is far more complicated at a district level than for Kandahar province

as a whole. The second division is between ex-mujahideen power holders who experienced

a renaissance in the post-2001 period and ex-Taliban actors from the first regime in the

1990s (including newcomers on both sides). While there is a clear overlap between these

two conflict lines, it is important to emphasize that it can be neither reduced to simple tribal

rivalries nor to political differences. Their complex interplay creates a highly unstable political

situation in Kandahar-city today.

From the onset the international intervention became entangled in these political fault lines

that pre-dated their intervention. Their reliance on mostly Zirak Durrani Taliban opponents

made sense as a short-term military strategy to remove the Taliban regime, but it had long

lasting political consequences in the South. Furthermore, the lacking political will to reconcile

with those elements of the Taliban leadership who were willing to break links with global

jihadists or Al-Qaeda hindered the creation of an inclusive political structure in Kandahar.

Political and economical power was subsequently monopolised by Zirak Durrani Taliban

opponents and their constituencies.

4.1 Tribal rivalry

4.1.1 Tribal rivalry in the 18th and 19th century

As the main nexus of power in southern Afghanistan, Kandahar-city has always been at the

centre of conflicts and power struggles between different tribes or tribal confederations.64

Tribal rivalry has been the norm rather than the exception in Kandahar-city at least since 16th

64

Afghanistan. Past, Present & Future. Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad 1997. pp 84.

Chapter

4

66

century C.E. when the Safavids and Moghuls quarreled over the possession of Kandahar

because of its strategic location on an important trade route connecting the Indian

subcontinent with Central Asia and Iran.65

In 1595 the city passed into the possession of the Moghuls until it was reconquered by the

Safavids in 1622 with the help of Sado, the leader of the Popalzai (Durrani) tribe who was

subsequently granted authority over all Durrani tribes. The Ghilzai confederation asserted

itself as the dominant force in Kandahar when Mir Wais of the Hotak tribe wrestled Kandahar

from the Safavids and the Pashtun Abdali (later Durrani) tribes in 1709 and invaded Persia.

The Hotak ruled over a vast empire stretching from Kandahar to Persia until 1730, when the

emerging Persian emperor Nadir Shah reconquered Persia and Afghanistan with the help of

Pashtun Abdali (later renamed Durrani) tribes. This allowed Ahmad Shah Durrani of the

Popalzai (Sadozai sub-tribe) tribe to found a new dynastic rule in Kandahar in 1747. He also

renamed the Abdali Pashtuns “Durrani”, (Pearls of pearls) the name under which they are

known today. Since then power in Kandahar has been wielded by the Zirak Durrani tribes

(especially the Sadozai sub-tribe of the Popalzai or the Mohammadzai, a Barakzai sub-tribe

from 1818 to the communist coup d’etat in 1978).

In the 18th and 19th centuries rivalries between Durrani and Ghilzai but also among Durrani

tribes (especially Alkozai, Barakzai and Popalzai) were exacerbated through policies of land

redistribution and political and administrative appointments. Ahmad Shah Durrani confiscated

Ghilzai land around Kandahar-city, expelled many of them from the city and distributed the

land among Durrani khans. The Ghilzai were pushed towards the region between Kandahar

and Kabul. Ahmad Shah Durrani also weakened the Ghilzai by “remodelling” their tribal

genealogy, splitting off five Ghilzai tribes (today known as Panjpai) and integrating them into

the Durrani confederation.

The political system of Kandahar was thus never conceived as a system representing tribes

proportionally based on to their population size but rather, at least since 1747, as a system of

domination by the Zirak Durrani tribes. This century old rule of the Zirak is the historical

rationale to the Zirak tribes’ claim that they are the “natural” leaders of Kandahar, still

impacting the conception of politics today.

4.1.2 Tribal rivalry during the mujahideen

Tribal politics was also apparent during the jihad and the mujahideen government as the

factions showed a tendency to recruit (and rival each other) along tribal lines.

65

This section draws heavily on pages 229-232 in: Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, Curzon Press, Richmond, (1997).

67

• The Zirak Durrani establishment (Barakzai and Popalzai) of the provincial centre were

closer to the traditionalist Mahaz-e-Milli and Jabha-e-Nejat; the Alkozai on the other hand

were linked to Jamiat-e Islami (see Chapter 3).

• The support base of the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was strongest among the

Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes (see Chapter 3).

• The Panjpai tribes were fragmented and split among different factions: the Nurzai

supported the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ittehad-e Islami while the

Ishaqzai were strong in Harakat-e Inqilab and the Alizai were closer to Jamiat-e Islami.

While the factions did show pragmatism in their recruitment as long as the common enemy

was present, the old Zirak Durrani - Ghilzai rivalry over leadership in Kandahar-city re-

emerged after the Soviet forces withdrew from Kandahar. The “Zirak factions” agreed on a

loose alliance against HIG and pushed them to the western border of the city. The

mujahideen government was clearly dominated by the Zirak tribes.

4.1.3 Tribal rivalries and the current Taliban insurgency

There is currently a backlash by the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes who have been left out

squarely from the access to resources and power as the Zirak Durrani hold the sceptre firmly

in their hands (see 4.2 below). In southern Afghanistan, the US military strategy relied heavily

on Zirak Durrani anti-Taliban forces who were subsequently rewarded with the control of key

business sectors, political positions and the security apparatus. The new (and old) Zirak

power holders suggested a simplistic friend and foe schemata that allowed for a

stigmatization of Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes as Taliban and their subsequent marginalization.

Similarly, the jails of southern Afghanistan are filled with Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani whereas

Zirak Durrani tribes often avoid imprisonment because of their connections to the police or

other central power holders (see Box 4 below). The example of the Sarpoza jailbreak below

is telling in this regard. The current Taliban insurgency has been fast in picking up on these

grievances as the basic political problem between the traditional Zirak Durrani establishment

and the Panjpai and Ghilzai “underdogs” remains unresolved.

Box 4: Tribal dimension of police and prisons

The infamous peak of insecurity in Kandahar was probably the widely publicised Sarpoza

jailbreak in June 2008 that allowed over a 1,000 prisoners, some hundreds of them Taliban,

to escape and re-join insurgency fighting forces.66 A less publicised story occurred during the

jailbreak and illustrates the tribal dimension surrounding police and prisons in Kandahar.

During the jailbreak, two prisoners (a Popalzai and Ghilzai) decided to stay and protect the

66

ABC Transcripts (Australia) June 17, 2008

68

prison. When the Afghan security forces arrived several hours later they found that during the

actual jailbreak two prisoners had seized weapons and prevented 120 inmates from fleeing

the prison, holding the others hostage.

The Afghan security forces gave the two hostage takers their respective ‘rewards’. The

Popalzai prisoner, who had been convicted of 15 murders and stealing gas and fuel was

pardoned and even became Commander of the Security of the Police headquarters. The

other hostage taker, a Ghilzai who had been convicted of a relatively minor crime, was thrown

back into jail.

4.2 Political economy of Kandahar-city

While the ideology of the Taliban movement (just as the PDPA) tried to replace the tribal

logic with a new identity, the US-led intervention in 2001 re-established the domination of

Zirak tribes (again mainly Popalzai and Barakzai) through a simplistic friend and foe

schemata that stigmatized Panjpai and Ghilzai tribal leadership collectively as Taliban, and

Zirak Durrani as allies. The prominence of Ghilzai and Panjpai tribesmen among the former

Taliban leadership cannot be denied but this in turn does not mean that the Zirak collectively

opposed the former Taliban or that the Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes wholeheartedly supported

the Taliban. Yet as Zirak Durrani leaders (Popalzai, Barakzai, Alkozai and Achekzai)67 allied

with the US-led intervention into Afghanistan that took down the Taliban, cards were stacked

against other tribes from the beginning. The close relationship between US forces and Zirak

Durrani leaders was fortified in the subsequent join-hunt on “Taliban and Al-Qaeda” terrorists

that allowed Zirak Durrani commanders to become very powerful and act with impunity,

harassing former Taliban (from all tribes) and extorting lootable resources (money, weapons,

cars) from them. In essence they used their ties to the US Coalition Forces to cement their

powerbase, control the economy and the government and increase their wealth and weaken

their rivals.

4.2.1 Economic sectors and administration

Military power was not the only monopoly of the Zirak tribes in the current government. As

the Taliban were defeated quickly, the ambition to control quickly extended to political and

economic resources. According to local respondents presently the Popalzai, Barakzai and to

a lesser degree the Achekzai political power and key businesses in the licit and illicit

economy (fuel, gasoline, diesel), narcotics (poppy and heroin), development funds,

contracting, and logistics to foreign military (see also chapter 3). Most security providers and

private construction companies are in the hands of Barakzai and Popalzai who are well

67

The fifth Zirak tribe, the Mohammadzai, lost most of its influence as a consequence of the Afghan wars after 1978 and do not play an important role in Kandahar-city anymore. When we speak of Zirak tribes in relation to power, the Mohammadzai are not included.

69

connected to international military forces. The political control allows for the appointment of

administrators where the Zirak Durrani tribes are also dominant (see Chapter 3.1). One of the

benefits of a position in the administration is linked to corruption as shown in box 5 below.

Box 5: “Taxing” of economic transactions

Political positions allow tapping into various legal and especially illegal taxes on economic

transactions ranging from small shops to property sales. For example, on a transaction of

10,000,000 (Da Lak) Afghanis there is a regular tax of 15,000 Afs, but in reality people end

up paying about 300,000 Afs for various administrative places documents and stamps or to a

group of middlemen who deal with the administration on their behalf.

There is a perception among the people that the international presence and the inflow of

massive amounts of resources into this political system has lead to a increasing income and

wealth concentration and inequality that has reached drastic proportions. While many agree

that because of the international presence living standards in general have risen over the last

seven years, the strong wealth concentration in the hands of few creates resentment among

the excluded: the Panjpai and the Ghilzai.

4.2.2 Land grabbing

Both in 1992 and 2001, when regime changes created temporary power vacuums, state land

in and around Kandahar-city was appropriated and distributed by powerful Zirak Durrani

leaders; this process allowed them to increase their personal influence and alter the

demographics of Kandahar-city to increase the power of the tribe.

Loya Wiala, located to the north of the “old town”, is a large area to the north of the city

centre and the melting pot of the city. After the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992

large tracts of the Loya Wiala desert were occupied and subsequently sold by jihadi

commanders. Prominent examples are the late Mullah Naqib (Alkozai) and Amir Lalay

(Popalzai). The Dabaro Manda (Stone’s River) in Loya Wiala was the “land grabbing divide”

between Mullah Naqib and Amir Lalay. The area west of the Dabaro Manda was grabbed

and distributed by Mullah Naqib, including the area from Najeeb Numar to the Tirin Kot bus

station from 1992-1994 the east by Amir Lalay Both of them used the land not only to enrich

themselves, but also to build constituencies and consolidate the status they achieved as

military commanders during the Afghan wars within their respective tribe. Mullah Naqibullah

distributed land mostly among his Alkozai tribe who moved into the city in large numbers and

as a consequence constitute a more important part of the population than before. Amir Lalay

did the same by providing Popalzai sub-commanders who had fought with him in the jihad

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with land plots. These soldiers in turn sold their land to other tribesmen from Shah Wali Kot,

Miya Nishin and Tirin Kot.

This process was repeated in the current government in 2001 in the Loya Wiala area, but

also to the east of the city. Since 2001 different commanders grabbed land in Mullah Naqib’s

name and distributed about 10,000 jeribs (2,000 ha) of land among their fellow tribesmen

from Ghorak, Zhari, and Arghandab. Amir Lalai distributed about 5,000 jeribs (1,000 ha) of

land among 200 Popalzai families from Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, Maruf, Arghistan, Deh

Rawud (Uruzgan), Khakrez and Daman. These beneficiaries were Popalzai who still own

their lands.

The legal property rights of the houses built in Loya Wiala 2 are far from secure as it used to

be government land. Some Kandahari believe that these squats are illegal. People living in

Loya Wiala 2 also fear that if the government becomes strong enough to assert its property

rights there is a high possibility that the state will take the land back. Some claim this leads

some tenants in Loya Wiala 2 to financially or physically support the insurgents in order to

weaken the current government, and ensure they can keep their land.

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Appendix

Table 1: Kandahar Government

Name Tribe Job/Department

Tooryalai Vesa Mohammadzai

Provincial Governor, Tooryalai Wesa, from Kohak Village is a Mohammadzai from Arghandab from the same village as the deputy governor of Arghandab, was a lecturer in the faculty of agriculture.

Ahmad Wali Karzai Popalzai Head of Provincial Council, from Karz Village in Dand.

Matiullah Qatea Achekzai Late Police Chief of Kandahar, Khalqi background, from Khas Uruzgan. Killed on 29 June 2009, allegedly by security contractors.

Momin Suliman Khail (Ali Khail sub tribe) from Laghman

Director of NDS, Khalqi background. Previously head of the NDS in Kunduz. Has a good relationship with Karzai.

Haji Fazal Ahmad Khan

Alkozai Director of Water and Power. Serves as deputy head of the department under the PDPA, mujahideen, and Taliban. Resident of nahiya 6.

Abdullah Achekzai Head of the Department of Transportation. Was a refugee in Pakistan in jihad and returned in the current government. Resident of nahiya 10 or 11.

Shokrani Alkozai Head of Anti-Narcotics Department, resident of nahiya 7. Not affiliated with any faction.

Abdul Wahab Amraz

Achekzai Director of Water supply. Lives in Kandahar old city (nahiya 1-4). He was affiliated with the PDPA/Khalq faction.

Haji Said Jan Achekzai

Director of Social Affairs, Labour, Martyrs and Disabled. He is known to be a hard worker. He is from Spin Boldak and was Takhtapul district governor in the past.

Abdul Qayum Pukhla

Popalzai Director of Public Health. He is from Tirin Kot. During the PDPA and mujahideen he studied, during Taliban he became head of the Mansel Bagh Military Hospital.

Haji Abdullah Popalzai Director of Hajj and Religious Affairs. Resident of Dand. He is not affiliated with any faction, but has good relations with AWK.

72

Name Tribe Job/Department

Haji Matiullah Achekzai Director Finance Department

Mohammad Azim Khan

Mohammadzai Director of Refugees and Repatriation. He is from Tirin Kot and resident of nahiya 9. He has a jihadi background and good relations with the Karzais.

Rahimi Sahib Barakzai Director of Economy Department. He has a jihadi background and is resident of nahiya 4. Good ties with Gul Agha Sherzai.

Haji Matiullah Achekzai Head of Central Statistics Office. Resident of nahiya 10 or 11. He was living in Pakistan from jihad on and came back in this government.

Sardar Hamidullah Mohammadzai Head of State Case Department. Resident of nahiya 2. In the past he was non-aligned. Now he is head of the Mohammadzai tribe in Kandahar.

Ghulam Hazrat Alkozai Head of Fire Department. Resident of nahiya 4. Non-aligned.

Sadozai Popalzai Head of Natural Disaster. Resident of nahiya 8, non-aligned.

Najibullah Ahmadi Popalzai

Director of Education Department. Resident of nahiya 6. He did not finish the 12th grade, and imposed on the department by Ahmad Wali Karzai. The department was forced to fake his certificate.

Abdul Majid Khan Achekzai Head of Kuchi Department. He is from Khas Uruzgan. He was non-aligned in the past governments.

Abdul Baqi Rayat Mohammadzai Head of Tribal Affairs Department. Resident of nahiya 8. Non-aligned in past governments.

Abdul Wahid Alizai Director of City Court. Resident of Naw Zad, during Zaher Shah he already worked in the court and is non-aligned.

Akil Shah Nurzai Director of Law. From Spin Boldak, he has a jihadi background.

73

Name Tribe Job/Department

Abdul Latif Ashna Tokhi Director of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Resident of Shar-e Naw (nahiya 1). Good qualification.

Rana Tarin Tarin Director of Women’s Affairs. She was a housewife in the past.

Haji Mohammad Baresi

Barets

Head of Afghan Red Crescent, he is from Shorabak district, Kandahar Province. He was a mujahed, but not clear with which faction. Entertains good relations with the Karzais.

Eng. Abdul Hai Nyamati

unknown Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. He is from Farah and was a mujahed. He was Farah's Provincial Governor in the early years of the Karzai Government.

General Mohammad Yusef Khan

Suliman Khail (Ali Khail sub tribe) from Laghman

Head of Military Court. Khalqi background.

Abdul Majid Khan Babai

Tokhi

Information, Culture, Youth and Tourism Department. Resident of Kandahar-city, member of a traditional elite family. Has good relationship with Karzais. Non-aligned in past government, spent most of his life abroad.

Mohammadullah Khan

Ahmadzai Head of Traffic Department. Worked in the same department under Taliban, but not as head.

Abdel Mohammad Dari speaker Head of Public Works Department.

Mohammad Zaher Khan

Zazai from Paktia Head of Customs Department.

Haji Sardar Mohammad

Kakar Cadastre. Resident of nahiya 3, with a jihadi background.

Table 2: Business and civil society associations

Name of Business/Civil Society Association

Position Name Tribe

Head Haji Abdel Khaliq Kakar

Member Haji Zabet Mohammad Wali Alkozai

Member Haji Abdul Hadi Kakar

Member Haji Ghulam Rasul Nurzai

Fre

sh

Fru

it

Member Haji Joma Gul Alkozai

74

Name of Business/Civil Society Association

Position Name Tribe

Head Haji Ayatullah unknown

Member Haji Neamatullah Nurzai

Member Haji Atiqullah Alkozai

Member Haji Abdul Wahed Nurzai

Member Mustafa Shia T

exti

le

Member Haji Wakil Ahmad Nurzai

Head Haji Hayatullah Nurzai

Member Haji Mir Wais Popalzai

Member Haji Khaysta Khan Barakzai

Member Haji Shafiq Popalzai

Gaso

lin

e

Member Haji Akhtar Mohammad Tokhi

Head Haji Abdullah Achekzai

Member Haji Jad Mohammad Nurzai

Member Haji Mohammad Shah Achekzai

Member Haji Nasrullah Barakzai

Dry

Fru

its

Member Haji Wazir Achekzai

Head Mohammad Qasim Popalzai

Member Haji Musa Jan Barakzai

Member Abdur Raziq Achekzai

Member Haji Mira Jan Alkozai

Member Haji Saleh Mohammad Kakar

Car

Dea

lers

Member Haji Rahmad Nurzai

Head Haji Atiqullah (Azizi Bank) Alizai

Member Haji Pacha Kakar

Member Haki Khan Aka Ishaqzai

Member Lala Piari Hindu Mo

ney

E

xc

ha

ng

e

Member Haji Ekmatullah Nurzai

Head Haji Mohammad Rafiq Popalzai

Member Haji Nasrullah Alizai

Member Mohammad Musa Achekzai Construction Material

Member Haji Khan Mohammad Alkozai

Women's Association Head Amena Tarak Barakzai

Jeweler's Association Head Sayed Ismael Shia

Butcher's Association Head Mohammad Nabi Suliman Khail

Tailor's association Head Sayed Mohammad Daud Sayed

Hotels Head Sabur Khan Tajik

Gas sellers' association Head Haji Sadat Mohammad Achekzai

Truck drivers association Head Haji Nasrullah Achekzai

Teacher's association Head Haji Mohammad Hashim Tarin

Wood sellers association Head Haji Abdullah Nurzai

Athlete's association Head Ustad Ahmadullah Gul Alay unknown

Baker's association Head Amanullah Nurzai

Doctor's association Head Dr. Payinda Mohammad Arghandawi

Suliman Khail

Writers and poets association

Head Mohammad Yar Mohammadzai

Disabled Organisation Head Khayro Khan Alkozai

75

Table 3: Important Businessmen of Kandahar

Name Tribe District Background

Haji Qayum Jan Achekzai Panjwayi

Lives in nahiya 5. He has a market in Spin Boldak. In the past he was involved in livestock sales. Now he deals in many things and imports from Pakistan, China, Japan, and India. No political affiliation.

Haji Bahawudin Achekzai Spin Boldak He deals different things from fertilizer, agricultural machinery, transportation etc.

Haji Abdullah Achekzai Spin Boldak Lives in nahiya 5. His father used to export dried fruit to Pakistan but was imprisoned by the PDPA and disappeared. He is in the same business.

Haji Abdul Jabar Achekzai unknown Animal sales, switched to dried fruits business. Now he imports steel form Almaty.

Ali Khan Alizai from Mullah Alam

His father was a businessman who imported rice from Pakistan.

Haji Atiqullah Alizai Helmand Owner of Azizi Bank of Kandahar. Was in real estate before. No political affiliation. Used to be close to Esmatullah Alizai, former CoP of Kandahar.

Haji Nanay Alkozai nahiya 5 He used to export scrap metal to Pakistan, and now he imports steel from Almaty.

Haji Abdullah Barakzai Kandahar Forefathers were also businessmen. No political affiliations. Known as a charitable person.

Haji Talib Kakar nahiya 4

Poor guy in the past who owned a flower shop. Switched to the fertilizer business and started importing from Pakistan and now he is very wealthy. No political affiliations.

Haji Pacha Kakar nahiya 4 No political affiliations. Imports, cooking fat, flour, rice. Considered a big business man of Kandahar.

Haji Khodai Dat Nurzai Farah Lives in nahiya 9. Dried fruits in the past, now cement from Pakistan. No political affiliation.

Haji Neamatullah Nurzai nahiya 5 Vegetable and fruit trade, import and export from Pakistan.

Haji Hayatullah Nurzai Spin Boldak Lives in nahiya 9. Does petrol, gas and diesel and fruit business.

Haji Abdul Satar Nurzai Spin Boldak Lives in nahiya 6.Vegetable and fruits import/export.

Zulmay Popalzai Daman Lives in nahiya 5. His father used to export dried fruit to Pakistan. He himself also imports cement from Pakistan.

Mohammad Zaher

Popalzai From Daman Dried fruits. No political affiliation.

Tor Mohammad Qasim

Popalzai nahiya 1 Involved in car and motorbike dealings. Imports from China and Japan. No political affiliation. Now also imports gas, petrol, and diesel.

Haji Agha Mohammad

Popalzai nahiya 3 Import of cooking fat. No political affiliation.

Haji Ayatullah unknown Panjwayi Lives in nahiya 9. Clothes.