Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent

8/6/2019 Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent

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TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS

STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:A PROPOSED HUMAN CAPITAL MODELFOCUSED UPON TALENT

Casey WardynskiDavid S. Lyle

Michael J. Colarusso

April 2009

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily re ect the of cial policy or position of the De- partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose class-i ed information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre-sent of cial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers themto offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in theinterest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is clearedfor public release; distribution is unlimited.

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The Strategic Studies Institute will publish a 6-part OfficerCorps Strategy Series analyzing the development of an officercorps strategy. This monograph, the first in the series, highlightsthe importance of accessing, developing, retaining, and employ-ing talented leaders.

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ISBN 1-58487-384-1

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FOREWORD

Creating and maintaining a highly competent U.S.Army Of cer Corps has always been the cornerstone ofthe nations defense. Colonel Casey Wardynski, MajorDavid S. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J.Colarusso consider Americas continuing commitmentto an all-volunteer military, its global engagement inan era of persistent con ict, and evolving changes in itsdomestic labor market. They argue that the intersectionof these factors demands a comprehensive Of cerCorps strategy recognizing the interdependency of ac-cessing, developing, retaining and employing talent. Intheir view, building a talent-focused strategy aroundthis four-activity human capital model will best posturethe Army to match individual of cer competencies tospeci c competency requirements.

Such a strategy will enable the thoughtful anddeliberate integration of resources, policies, andorganizations to employ the right talent in the right job at the right time. The authors conclude thatwithout such a talent-focused strategy, the Army andits Of cer Corps confront the increasing likelihoodthat they will be unequal to future American nationalsecurity demands.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Director

Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

CASEY WARDYNSKI is Director of the Of ce ofEconomic and Manpower Analysis and an AssociateProfessor of Economics at the United States MilitaryAcademy. In addition to creating the conceptsfor the Americas Army Game and the Armyspre-commissioning retention incentives, Colonel Wardynski has published in the area of military com-pensation policy and manpower. Colonel Wardynskiholds a B.S. from West Point, a Masters in Public Pol-icy from Harvard, and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysis fromthe Rand Graduate School.

DAVID S. LYLE is an Assistant Professor of Economicsand Deputy Director of the Of ce of Economic and

Manpower Analysis at the United States MilitaryAcademy. He has publications in the Journal of PoliticalEconomy, the Journal of Labor Economics, the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Economics of EducationReview, and the American Economic Journal: Applied. Major Lyle holds a B.S. from West Point and a Ph.D.in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.

MICHAEL J. COLARUSSO is a research analyst inthe Of ce of Economic and Manpower Analysis at theUnited States Military Academy. He is a retired U.S.Army lieutenant colonel and has served in a variety ofmilitary positions, to include as an Assistant Professorof History at West Point. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.)

Colarusso holds a B.A. in History from Saint JohnsUniversity and a M.A. in History from the PennsylvaniaState University.


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SUMMARY

Throughout Americas history, U.S. Army of cershave played an integral role in the formulation andexecution of its national security policy. However, theintersection of multiple factors such as technologicaladvancements, globalization, the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, a protracted con ictwaged with an undersized, all-volunteer Army, andthe increased demand in the civilian sector for theskills that junior of cers possess, suggest that futurenational security challenges will be markedly differentfrom those which were met so successfully in the past.

We nd compelling evidence that the U.S. ArmysOf cer Corps will be unequal to future demandsunless substantive management changes are made.Perhaps the most obvious risk indicator is the Armys

persistent and substantial gap in mid-career of cers.Much of this gap stems from low of cer continuationson active duty beyond the initial service obligation,particularly among ROTC scholarship and West Pointof cers. The Army has also radically shifted its sourcesof commission from those that extensively screen, vet,and cull for talent such as ROTC and West Point, tothose with minimal talent lters. For example, Of cerCandidate School accessions have increased froma historical annual average of 10 percent to morethan 40 percent of active duty commissions. At thesame time, promotion rates have skyrocketed so thatvirtually all of cers choosing to remain on active dutycan reasonably expect continued advancement andeventual promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Some senior Army leaders, analysts in think tanks,and others in government believe that the demandsof the Global War on Terror and the Armys modulartransformation combined to create these troubling


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symptoms. However, strong evidence reveals that theroot causes of these problems precede the war and

modularity, and are instead grounded in the Armysfailure to understand and appropriately respond to achanging talent market. In short, the Army has reliedon draft-era practices to manage an all-volunteer Army.More speci cally, the Army has lacked a cohesivestrategy to guide its of cer manpower efforts. Actionstaken to remedy the problems outlined above haveactually reduced the likelihood that the Of cer Corpswill be equal to the challenges that lie ahead.

In this monograph, the authors argue that thosechallenges demand a comprehensive Of cer Corpsstrategy recognizing the interdependency of accessing,developing, retaining, and employing talented people,of cers with high learning and problem solvingaptitudes and whose mental acuity and intellectual

agility allows them to master the diverse competenciesdemanded now and in the future. Such a strategywill position the Army to compete with the civilianmarket for talent. It will translate directly into betterof cer development and retention through increased job satisfaction, and it will move the Army beyondpersonnel management to talent management.

An of cer talent management strategy will alsocreate the institutional agility required to facilitate job matching, allowing the Army to achieve the rightbreadth and depth of of cer competencies to meetevolving requirementsthe right talent in the right job at the right time. To realize this vision, however,the Army must develop a strategy that commitsample resources, incorporates appropriate policy, and

reevaluates existing organizational designs. Failure todo so may result in a U.S. Army unequal to its share ofthe security challenges confronting the United Statesand its allies.


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TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPSSTRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:

A PROPOSED HUMAN CAPITAL MODELFOCUSED UPON TALENT

Introduction.

Throughout its history, military of cers have beenintegral to the formulation and execution of U.S. na-tional security policy. From George Washington, Ulys- ses Grant, and George Marshall to Norman Schwarz-kopf, Colin Powell, and David Petraeus, the UnitedStates has repeatedly called upon its most talentedArmy of cers to execute missions successfully acrossa wide spectrum, from peacetime military engagementto major combat operations. Several factors, however,may make future challenges markedly different from

those met so successfully in the past.First, the United States and its allies are confrontedby an increasing number of actors who are willing touse violence to achieve their ends, unconstrained bythe moral convictions or legal restrictions within whichtraditional military forces operate. The intersectionof several factors has created this ever more dynamicand demanding security environment, including theaccelerating creation and diffusion of technology,urbanization, globalization, resource competition, theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),and the absence of the rule of law in a growing numberof failed states. 1

Moreover, while its current generation of of cershas been able to count upon American economic and

technological preeminence as unrivaled sources ofpower, the U.S. Armys future of cers may be unableto do so. Instead, they will likely be confronted by


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several nations possessing large, relatively youngand well-educated populations, with greater access to

capital and technology drawn from rapidly expandingdomestic economies. Against this backdrop ofcompeting nation-states, Army leaders will also bechallenged by nonstate actors who operate in andaround urban centers, rely upon the safe havensprovided by a growing number of failed states, andadapt technologies to create asymmetric threats. As wehave seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, prevailing againstsuch foes is landpower-intensive. As a result, the U.S.Armys particular competencies are in great demandand will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

Second, the United States and its armed forces arewaging this protracted con ict with an all-volunteermilitary force. Unlike previous wars, there is littlelateral entry of specialized talent via conscription,

nor is there any signi cant popular or political U.S.support for returning to a draft. Americas Army,therefore, must wage war with the volunteer of cers itaccesses and retains. Now more than ever, these menand women must be extremely talented.

Yet, despite the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)entering its 8th year, there is compelling evidence thatthe Army has continued to rely upon legacy of cermanagement practices, practices that were increasinglyoutmoded even before the war began. In fact, thatevidence suggests that the United States has beenassuming signi cant risk in its Army Of cer Corps forover a decade. Consequently, the Army requires anof cer corps strategy to meet the unique challengesoutlined above.


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Symptoms of an Of cer Corps at Risk.

It is important to clarify from the outset that we arenot arguing that the Armys Of cer Corps is unequalto current demands. Rather, we posit that there areincreasing and accelerating signs that its Of cer Corpswill be unequal to future demands unless substantivechanges are made in its management. Perhaps themost serious risk indicator is the Armys persistentand substantial gap in mid-career of cers. Mid-careerof cers are the heart and soul of a professional of cercorps; they lead, coach and mentor junior of cersand they are the feedstock for future general of cers.Consider, for example, the cohort of Army of cerswho were commissioned in 1998, now having served10 years of active duty. As depicted in Figure 1, theArmy still requires about 2,200 of these of cers, but

it has only retained about 1,800. Additionally, for theranks of captain through lieutenant colonel, the Armyis only manned at 80 percent strength. 2

Data are from the Total Army Personnel Data Base as of September

2007 and the Manning Authorization Document as of September2007.

Figure 1. Requirements and Inventory .


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Moreover, continuations on active duty past thecommissioning obligation are lowest among the junior

of cers that the U.S. Army invested the most in. Theseof cers are produced either by the Armys ReserveOf cer Training Corps (ROTC) 4-year universityscholarship program, or through attendance at theUnited States Military Academy (USMA or WestPoint). 3 Figure 2 shows that 4-year ROTC scholarsand West Point graduates continue to 8 years of activeArmy service at the lowest rates. The Army paid forthe undergraduate education of these of cers due totheir demonstrated intelligence, leadership potential,and high aptitudes for learning. Coupled with theeducation and training provided by the Army, thesecharacteristics are in demand everywhere and areaggressively sought by outside employers. As theseof cers have the greatest range of employment options,

they more often exercise those options when theirArmy careers fail to meet their expectations.Low continuation rates and the corresponding

shortage of mid-level career of cers has a cascadingeffect upon of cer management that goes well beyondthe over-production of lieutenants, with furthernegative implications for overall of cer quality.Take, for example, the Armys loss of discretion overpromotion rates. Figure 3 captures the dramatic rise inpromotions to the rank of major and lieutenant colonelover the past decade. In 1997, the Army promotedroughly 60 percent of eligible of cers to the rank oflieutenant colonel and 75 percent of eligible of cersto the rank of major. By 2007, however, the Armypromoted over 90 percent of eligible of cers to the

rank of lieutenant colonel and major. Of note, morethan half of this growth in promotions occurred before the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in


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Competitive Category Primary Zone Promotion Rate by FiscalYear

Data are from the Total Army Personnel Data Base .

Figure 3. Promotion Rates to Major and LieutenantColonel.

To provide opportunities to its most talented enlistedsoldiers, the Army also commissions of cers throughin-service Of cer Candidate School (OCS-IS). Finally,it offers an enlistment option for Of cer Candidate

School (OCS-EO) to individuals who have graduatedfrom college and decide that they want to be anof cer. 4

As shown in Figure 4, West Point graduates com- prise roughly 20 percent of active duty of cer pro-duction (per congressional mandate). Meanwhile, fromthe inception of an all volunteer U.S. military force in1973, through 1998, both OCS sources have historicallycombined to provide another 10 percent. The engineof the commissioned Of cer Corps, however, hasbeen ROTC, which over this same period produced 70


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draft army. At wars end, the majority of them wouldaccompany the conscripts they led back into the civilian

workforce. Today, however, OCS of cers receive aRegular Army commission and are placed upon thepath to mid-career and senior leadership positions. 5

There are several implications of accessing sucha large share of of cers via OCS. First, while it mayseem counterintuitive, OCS-IS is the single mostexpensive source in terms of marginal cost (the changein total cost to the U.S. Army that occurs every timean additional of cer is produced). Unlike the youngperson brought into West Point or ROTC from outsideof the Army, the OCS-IS of cer is recruited fromwithin it. His or her commissioning robs the Non-Commissioned Of cer (NCO) Corps of talent andimmediately creates a hole in the Armys enlisted forcethat must be lled. 6 Increasingly, OCS-IS candidates

are non-commissioned of cers in whom the Army hasinvested years of training and education. SeasonedNCOs cannot be created overnightreplacing eachone entails signi cant training and recruiting costs forthe multiple soldiers which will eventually yield onenew sergeant.

Second, as the Army increases the number of OCS-IS of cers, it must reach deeper and deeper into itspool of sergeants to create new of cers. As a result, theshare of OCS-IS candidates with a U.S. Armed ForcesQuali cation Test (AFQT) score below Category IIhas increased from 15 percent in 1997 to 35 percentin 2007 (see Figure 5). This is signi cant because theAFQT score is used to determine basic quali cationfor enlistment, and to help predict future academic

and occupational success in the Armed Forces. AFQTscores are not raw scores, but rather percentile scoresindicating how each examinee performed comparedto all others. Thus, someone who receives an AFQT


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score of 65 (the Category II threshold) is in the top 35percentile of all examinees. Therefore, an increasing

share of OCS candidates below Category II meansthat of cers with a reduced likelihood of academicor occupational success are being commissioned ingreater numbers than before.

Year GroupData are from the Total Army Personnel Data Base .

Figure 5. Changes in OCS Demographicsover Time.

At the same time, the U.S. Army has increasinglydrawn senior NCOs into OCS. In 1997, only 15 percentof OCS-IS candidates had more than 10 years of enlistedservice. By 2007 that percentage had tripled to 45percent, and a full quarter of these were Sergeants FirstClass. This increasing reliance on senior NCOs alsobrings OCS into direct competition with the Warrant

Of cer Corps, which has traditionally relied upon theNCO Corps as its feedstock. 7


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Root Causes.

Many of the symptoms of an at-risk Of cerCorps were magni ed by corrective measures thatexacerbated rather than eliminated them. This is because the root causes of the problem were not under-stood. For example, to remedy the shortage of mid-career of cers, the U.S. Army increased its productionof lieutenants (see Figure 1). Rather than addressingthe underlying problem of lower continuationrates, however, over-accessing new of cers actuallymagni ed the problem because the Army hired excesslieutenants who did not have lieutenant jobs waiting forthem. As this continues, it puts pressure on the Armysassignment mechanisms and leads to decreased time inkey and developmental jobs for all junior of cers, whichis likely to increase their frustration levels just as they

complete their initial active duty service obligations.Such examples demonstrate that unless root causes arediscovered and eliminated, the symptoms of an at-riskOf cer Corps are persistent.

Given that most of these symptoms rst surfacedin the mid-1990s, we focused our search for potentialroot causes in the preceding decade. In the 1980s, theU.S. economy was undergoing a fundamental shiftfrom the industrial-age to the information-age. Therewas a dramatic increase in the demand for high-skilled workers who could complement technologicalinnovations. Jobs shifted from factories to of ces, andhigher wages followed workers who could processinformation quickly, manage projects, and solveproblems. High-potential junior of cers who secured

a 4-year scholarship, earned an undergraduate degreethrough ROTC or at West Point, and spent 4 or 5 yearsgaining valuable leadership experience in the U.S.Army were among those in high-demand by the civilian


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sector. Figure 2 shows of cer continuation behaviorthrough 8 years of service sorted by scholarship level.

Also, in response to the demand for higher skilledworkers, federal college grants and student aid morethan doubled, from $7 billion a year in the early 1980sto more than $14 billion a year in the early 2000s. 8 This created alternative sources of funding for high-potential, college-bound students who might haveotherwise turned to the military.

In parallel with these market changes, the Armyunderwent the post-Cold War drawdown of the early-to-mid 1990s, during which its active component Of-cer Corps shrank from 91,000 to 69,000 over 7 years. 9 The Armys focus on rapid force reduction and its peacedividend meant signi cant budgetary cuts relatedto of cer accessions, to include ROTC scholarshipdollars. In an effort to mitigate the impact of reduced

scholarship funding, ROTC moved from a centralizedscholarship award system to a decentralized system.In the centralized system, candidates competed on anational or regional level. If awarded a scholarship,they could attend the university of their choice, toinclude selective and nationally recognized Tier 1and Tier 2 schools. 10 Under the decentralized system,candidates competed for scholarships at speci cROTC host institutions. As a cost avoidance measure,the Army provided low-selectivity (and thus lowercost) institutions with a higher scholarship quota thanhigher-selectivity institutions. 11

Comparatively speaking, the centralized scholar-ship has greater value than the decentralized scholar-ship. Decentralized scholarships limit the U.S. Armys

access to college-bound students because some of theschools that the scholarships are tied to may not bein the choice set of college aspirants. The loss of can-


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must evaluate each new of cer not just for his or herpotential as a lieutenant, but as a colonel or a general as

well. This is why the U.S. Army cannot accept risk inits Of cer Corpsthe consequences are generationalin scope, far reaching and enduring. By accessing andpromoting lower talent today, the Army pays a price inless competent of cer leadership tomorrow, a problemthat takes years to rectify.

Since the U.S. Army cannot possibly know whatspeci c of cer competencies will be demanded 25years from now, the best way for it to mitigate riskis to continuously access and retain talent . Talentgoes beyond attitude or desire, beyond will and skill,beyond tolerance, compassion, values and character.Army of cership demands all of those thingstheyare non-negotiable. Talent, however, adds the criticaldimensions of intelligence, of aptitudes for rapid

learning and adaptation. Talented of cers have powersof reasoning to discern quickly patterns of activitywithin new situations, and can conceive alternativesto address situations for which they have never beenspeci cally trained. Talented of cers leverage theseinnate aptitudes to become expert in the competenciesto which they are drawn. These may range from deeptechnical skills to broad conceptual or intuitive abilities,all of which the Army requires.

The U.S. Army should access of cer candidates whopossess these aptitudes rather than hoping to impartor discover them later. Accessing talent is like miningdiamonds rather than coal. While both have value,diamonds are multifaceted and enduring. They can bere ned and polished to increase their value, which can

then be used to recapitalize the future Of cer Corps.Operating from the basis of inherited practices,however, the Army has not focused upon that future.


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As a result, the demands of the present have crowdedout strategic planning to ensure its Of cer Corps

is equal to future challenges. In its 2007 review ofof cer accessions, for example, the U.S. GovernmentAccountability Of ce (GAO) faulted the U.S. Army forits lack of an integrated and centralized approach todrawing new of cers into its ranks:

The Armys traditional approach has been to rely rst onits ROTC and academy programs and then compensate

for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCSaccessions. . . . [The] Armys three accession programsare decentralized and do not formally coordinate withone another, making it dif cult for the Army, using itstraditional approach, to effectively manage risks andallocate resources across programs in an integrated,strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan fordetermining overall annual accession goals, managingrisks, and allocating resources, the Armys ability to meet

its future mission requirements and to transform to moredeployable, modular units is uncertain. 13

As we have seen, the lack of a coherent of ceraccessions strategy certainly impairs the Armysability to create and sustain an Of cer Corps equalto future requirements. Accessions, however, is justone of four interdependent activities that we believeare critical to delivering effective Army leadership.These activities also include developing, retaining,and employing of cer talent. Therefore, we argue thatthe Army requires more than just the of cer accessionsstrategy called for by the GAO report. Rather, itrequires a comprehensive Of cer Corps strategy thatboth accounts for and leverages the interdependence

between these four central activities.


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Such an approach would afford the Army greaterdepth of of cer competencies. It avoids the need for all

of cers to be multiskilled, which may be unrealistic, asfew individuals can become experts in multiple elds.Efforts to engender this type of all encompassingcompetency normally yield skill sets an inch deepand a mile widethe old maxim, Jack of all trades,master of none, applies here. By allowing each of certo specialize in his or her areas of expertise, however,and by building an institutional capacity to employtheir talents at the right place and time, the Army stillachieves a multiskilled capability but with much greaterdepth of competency. Thus, the object of the ArmysOf cer Corps strategy should be a distribution of talent,some with deep, speci c, and varied skills, others withbroad general skills, and a talent management systemthat can employ this diverse talent ef ciently.

Effective talent management reinforces andlinks of cer development, retention, and accessionsprograms. For example, assigning of cers to positionsleveraging their innate and acquired competencies candirectly improve of cer career satisfaction and success,which in turn can extend the service of high-potentialleaders and also attract additional talent. Therefore,an effective Of cer Corps strategy recognizes theinterdependency of accessing, developing, retaining,and employing of cer talent. It acknowledges theneed for institutional adaptability to foster and bene tfrom deeper of cer competencies. Lastly, it createsan environment in which talent attributes evolve andgrow over time.

Figure 6 is a graphic depiction of our proposed

of cer human capital model that supports such anof cer corps strategy focused on talent. As eachcohort of new of cers progresses from the junior


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ranks toward senior leadership roles, they will arriveprepared for those roles only if the Army understands

and leverages the linkages between the criticalactivities of accessing, developing, retaining, andemploying talent. Properly executed, each of theseactivities is mutually reinforcing and will ensure thatfrom lieutenants to four-star generals, the U.S. Armypossesses not just the right number of of cers, butalso the right distribution of those of cers. It willalso ensure that collectively, the Of cer Corps has thebreadth and depth of competencies both demanded bythe present and anticipated for the future.

Figure 6. Proposed Army Of cer Human CapitalModel.

Our proposed human capital model focuses uponof cer talent for an army that must be adaptable tochanging internal and external labor markets, and in


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the context of an all volunteer force. Before consideringeach of the models components in greater detail,

however, we rst provide a theoretical frameworkfor leavening of cer talent through the process ofscreening, vetting, and culling.

Screening, Vetting, and Culling for Talent.

Screening takes place at the start of the of ceraccessions process and entails the evaluation of of cercandidates against accepted measures of aptitude. TheArmy must put signi cant energy into screening since itmust later devote resources to developing, employing,and retaining all those who gain entry to the Of cerCorps. Screening is perhaps the highest value activityof the accessions process as it determines both the levelat which of cer development can begin and the pace

at which it can proceed. Effective screening requires asuitable (in both quantity and quality) pool of applicantsfrom which to draw talent, as well as appropriatescreening standards. Without standards, screening haslittle meaning. Similarly, without a suitable applicantsupply, screening becomes a rubber stamp. By way ofexample in Figure 7A, a notional organization employsscreening to draw a relatively more talented pool ofapplicants into its ranks, shifting organizational talentfrom an average 1 (without screening) to an average2 (with screening). Note that even the upper tail ofthe distribution may shift to the right because as thereputation of the organization improves, it can attractincreasing levels of talent.


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Figure 7. Screening, Vetting, and Culling for Talent.

Vetting is the means by which the Armysprecommissioning organizations validate the delity

of talent assessments made during the initial screeningprocess. Once enrolled in ROTC, West Point, or OCS,these organizations can evaluate candidate perfor-mance and potential under circumstances more closelyapproximating those in which candidates will serve asof cers. Vetting also provides the rst real insight intoeach employees potential for retention, development,and advancement. As shown in Figure 7B, this allowsorganizations to reorder their appraisal of employeetalent. In the context of precommissioning sources,vetting allows the Army to establish an accurate orderof merit listing for its potential of cers.

Culling draws upon the reordering accomplishedby vetting. Through culling, organizations can rewardand advance high-performing, high-talent candidates

and of cers and retrain or release those with lower-performance or potential. Early culling of low-potentialcandidates and of cers can reduce retraining costs,


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focus talent development efforts, and raise the averagelevel of talent within an organization. However,

extensive culling can indicate inadequate screening,raise accession requirements, and increase costs. Asillustrated in Figure 7C, culling seeks to shorten thelower tail of an organizations talent distribution andthereby raise average talent levels above those achievedwith screening at 2, to some higher average, 3.

From the board room to the gridiron, screening,vetting and culling are fundamental to the developmentof high-performance teams. For example, in the case ofprofessional American football, bench building beginswith a draft. Teams seek to acquire those playerswho have distinguished themselves in performancedimensions associated with success in the pros. Toaccount for the variance in player talent across collegesof different size, within different conferences, and with

schedules of varying dif culty, professional recruitersfocus upon drafting players with superior standing innational rankings. In this way, teams begin the workof bench building with exceptional feedstock. Thosethat fail to draft exceptional talent face an uphill battleto create a competitive bench.

During pre-season, coaches reassess the talent ofthe players who made it into their programs. Theyalso hone player talents, array them from rst string tobench warmers, and meld them into a high-performingcohesive unit. Development and vetting occurcontinuously and in parallel so that teams can cut theirweak players and focus upon the development andemployment of their strongest players. By the timeregular season play begins, the process of screening,

vetting, and culling yields a team with a much highertalent average than its initial pre-season bench.


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Just as changing requirements force professionalfootball teams to constantly reevaluate a players talent

throughout his career, so too must the U.S. Armycontinually vet and cull talent throughout an of cerscareer to ensure that the Army keeps pace with evolvingtalent requirements. In fact, the Armys of cer humancapital model, which necessarily precludes signi cantlateral entry, makes proper screening, vetting, andculling imperative. While a football team can sign afree agent or trade with another team for talent, theArmy can only employ the talent that it has accessed,developed, and retained. Consequently, it must seekways to screen, vet, and cull talent throughout itsof cer human capital model.

Accessing Talent .

Although bringing in high quality accessions isimportant to any organization, the limited lateralentry in the U.S. Armys of cer labor model makesaccessions particularly important. To provide theUnited States with an of cer corps of high-performing,adaptive leaders who possess deep competencies inleadership, decisionmaking, risk management, foreigncultures, engineering, and the like, the Army mustscreen, vet, and cull for talent as part of its of ceraccessions process. It can draw talent from its enlistedranks, from the nonmilitary pool of young Americanswho are college bound, or from those who recentlygraduated from college.

As discussed earlier, while commissioning soldiersfrom the ranks provides a path for drawing high-

potential talent into the Of cer Corps, it also depletesthe pool of talent from which the Army builds itsbench of NCOs and Warrant Of cers. To put this in


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perspective, the Of cer Corps is 20 percent the size ofthe enlisted force, and yet signi cantly larger than the

existing pool of college-educated enlistees.16

However,the population of college bound or college graduatecivilians from which the Army can compete for of cercandidates is far larger. In fact, the entire activecomponent Of cer Corps currently represents lessthan 5 percent of the stock of recent male graduatesfrom college. Additionally, this pool best embodies therapid learning, development, and adaptive skills theArmy seeks in its of cers. Lastly, the tiered ranking ofAmericas universities provides a valuable screening,vetting, and culling function.

Maximizing the acquisition of these desired skillsand aptitudes, however, requires that the Armydeliberately establish and closely monitor appropriatescreening, vetting and culling mechanisms. It can

thereby narrow the range of of cer candidate talentaround a higher average and avoid the developmentalcosts associated with unsuitable candidates prior tocommissioning.

Unfortunately, the Armys current approach toaccessing of cers, which was arrived at by inchesrather than through the development of an overarchingstrategy, does not screen, vet, and cull in ways thatsystematically leaven the quality of the Of cer Corps.For example, across and within commissioning sources,screening, vetting, and culling occurs against widelydisparate standards, with the primary objective ofachieving quantitative accession goals. This approachengenders substantial variation in terms of the qualityof of cer talent entering the Army. In turn, this quality

variation places a burden on both the Generatingand Operating Forces in terms of compensatorydevelopmental costs and retraining. 17 To the extent


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that an army tolerates such variance in of cer candidatetalent, it must incur either high levels of attrition in

training among lower performing candidates (thetail of the talent distribution) or reduce leaderdevelopment goals and retard the development of itshigher potential candidates.

The relatively recent reduction of active componentOCS from 14 weeks in 2006 to 12 weeks in 2007 may bean example of such a reduction in leader developmentgoals. While it is too early to draw any nalconclusions, the near-term cost savings provided byOCS course compression may eventually be eclipsedby much higher post-commissioning developmentaland employment costs. In other words, this exampleshows how strain in the Operating Force to meet thedemands of the GWOT can quickly transfer to theGenerating Force. As the Generating Force modi es

standards, the Operating Force is apt to experiencefurther stress from lower-talent of cers.However, an accessions program executed within

the framework of our of cer human capital modelshould present the U.S. Army with a positive sum gamein terms of talent acquisition. For leaders accustomedto allocating talent within and across units under theircontrol, this can be a foreign concept. 18 A senior Armyleader recently recounted his experience with creatingtest units using a disproportionate mix of high-performance soldiers. He supervised a particularlycon dent battalion commander who asserted hecould dominate every engagement during a NationalTraining Center (NTC) rotation if permitted to createan ideal unit of hand-picked soldiers and of cers. 19

The battalion commander was correcthis idealunit dominated the NTCs resident Opposing Force(OPFOR) in every engagement. Notwithstanding


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brings in new of cers with the requisite dimensionsof talent, it can then focus its developmental efforts

upon continuing education, training, experience, andtenure.Differentiating between education and training

is critical. While both are important for of cers,adaptability is more closely linked with education.Education teaches of cers how to think. Well-educatedof cers do not need a play book when introduced tounfamiliar situations. They can quickly assess theenvironment and make decisions that lead to desiredoutcomes. By comparison, competence is more closelylinked with training. Training teaches of cers what to thinkhow to respond to familiar or anticipatedsituations. Training can take place in either speci cor general skill areas. Speci c training is unique tothe profession of arms, such as throwing a grenade.

This type of training is not readily transferrable tothe civilian sector. In contrast, general training suchas language training has direct application outside ofthe Army. In short, the development of of cers mustentail a combination of continuing education, speci c,and general training to maintain and increase requisitetalent levels.

While education and training provide developmentin a theoretical construct, experience and tenureprovide development through direct application.The U.S. Army is well-regarded for its ability toimpart leadership, management, and administrativeskills. Most of these are acquired through hands-onexperience in day-to-day assignments. For example,a platoon leader assignment provides experiences

in multiple dimensions of leadership. In addition,compared to peacetime platoon leadership, wartimeleadership accelerates a lieutenants opportunities to


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directly apply his or her education and training.Tenure has important implications for the depth

of experiential development and suitability for futureassignments. The Armys current assignments modelenvisions of cers with many talents rooted in variedexperiences from platoon leader to battalion adjutant(S1) to battalion logistician (S4). Given relatively rigidtime constraints at each rank, this model prioritizesbreadth over depth in skills. At the other extreme,lieutenants with lengthy-tenured platoon leader timewill not have had as many experiences in staff positions.Those with greater tenure as platoon leaders are likelyto have nely-honed direct leadership skills that willserve them well in company command. They will not,however, have had as much experience in the supplyand personnel aspects of company command.

Clearly, there is a trade-off between breadth and

depth of experience, but the Army must avoid runningto a corner solution by declaring that everyone shouldbe either a generalist or a specialist. Rather, it shouldseek a distribution of talent, with some of the generalistvariety, some of the specialist variety, and some fallingbetween the two. This should not be confused withthe Armys current of cer career eld model, whichfocuses almost exclusively upon expertise gained ingraduate programs and organized for relative ease ofmanagement. We argue that the Army should seek adistribution of talent between and within career elds.

Unfortunately, a great deal of of cer developmentunfolds without regard for its need or applicationbecause the U.S. Army has not clearly articulated itsenduring or emerging requirements in engineering,

marketing, cultural geography, enterprise management, decision sciences, social sciences, behavioral sci-ences, business transformation, environmental science,and a host of other elds in which of cers continue to


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build deep competencies. As a result, the Army exertslittle direct or indirect in uence upon the development

of noncombat-related of cer competencies. A case inpoint is the growing number of mid-career of cers whowill soon undertake graduate degree study under theauspices of the precommissioning graduate schoolfor service incentive program. In so doing, they willdevelop deep competencies with little considerationor awareness of which ones the Army may actuallyrequire.

Retaining Talent.

While continuing developmental opportunitiesensure that U.S. Army of cers possess the requisitetalent for success at all levels, this can only take placeif these of cers remain in service. As discussed earlier

and illustrated by Figure 2, the Armys most dif cultretention challenge appears among high-potential,seasoned junior of cers. Having completed their initialservice obligation, these of cers serve at will. Thosenot drawn from the enlisted ranks are typically young,and many have yet to marry and form a household.Consequently, they draw relatively little bene t fromthe Armys generous family health and quality oflife programs. Similarly, they lack longevity, whichremoves the loss of potential retirement bene ts as abarrier to exit. Instead, most talented young of cers areconfronted by rising opportunity costs, disincentivesto continued service.

In part, this is due to signi cant changes in the labormarket over the past few decades. When todays senior

Army of cers were completing their undergraduateeducations, manufacturing workers earned relativelyhigh wages in relatively low-skill occupations. More-


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over, these workers aspired to jobs characterized byemployment stability over an entire career. Today, the

situation is much different. Low-skill workers confrontlow wages and reduced job security. In contrast, high-skill, information workers seek lifetime employabilityrather than lifetime employment. They secure thisemployability by applying their talents to projectsthat develop their skills. Using social networkingwebsites, online discussion groups, and their masteryof information search strategies, information workersidentify new employment opportunities and gainunprecedented job mobility. Given their comparablyhigh productivity, these workers garner relatively highwages in elds characterized by continuous learning.They then leverage this learning to enhance theiremployability and avoid skill obsolescence.

Another contributing factor to an of cers rising

opportunity costs is the increasing degree to whichknowledge creation and technological-change drivecommerce and accelerate skill depreciation. Followingcommissioning, most of cers serve 7 years or longerbefore reaching positions in the U.S. Army where theycan put their undergraduate degrees into practice. Bythe time of cers with competencies in elds such asinformation technology reach their 7th year of service,many of their specialized competencies will haveatrophied through disuse or depreciation due to thecreation of new specialized knowledge. By contrast, junior of cers civilian peers immediately put theirexpertise to use in industry, and progress in buildingtheir networks and marketable competencies. Thus,at the completion of their service obligations, junior

of cers face a decision to continue in the military andrisk the further deterioration of their outside option, orto transfer to the civilian sector while they still have achance to keep pace with their peers.


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The allure of the civilian sector is even furtherenhanced by market forces, which place a premium

on high-potential junior of cers who have leadershipexperience. Firms seek talented workers with leader-ship experience and exceptional potential for rapidlearning and innovation. Of course, junior of cers area readily identi ed source of such talent by virtue oftheir developmental experiences. Moreover, within thisgroup, young of cers who complete a ROTC or WestPoint scholarship program are attractive to industry byvirtue of their selection for these merit-based programs.Their completion of these challenging programs marksthem as among the very highest-potential employees,a low-to-no risk hiring proposition. Because the labormarket values them so highly, these of cers respond tocompetitive outside offers in signi cant numbers whentheir expectations of military service go unful lled.

In view of these labor market conditions, theU.S. Army faces a signi cant junior of cer retentionchallenge as seen in Figures 1 and 2. Absentpurposeful action, low active duty continuation ratesfor its highest potential junior of cers can unhinge itsefforts to build a high-performing Of cer Corps. Asdescribed above, excessive loss of junior of cers hasreduced the Armys discretion over the timing andrate at which it promotes the junior of cers it retains(recall Figure 3). This loss of promotion discretionis all the more problematic given that the remainingpopulation increasingly embodies those of cers forwhich there was little screening. Excessive loss of junior of cer talent also reduces the Armys scope todistribute high-potential junior of cers across the force.

Confronted with a shrinking pool of seasoned juniorleaders, the Army must triage requirements by rstlling positions that present an immediate operational


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requirement. Of course, this approach places currentrequirements ahead of future interests, as Operating

Force billets are lled at the expense of the GeneratingForce. Degrading the Generating Forces ability tobring new talent into the Army creates a downwardspiral that further reduces its capacity to weather thestrain of current and future demands. Moreover,excessive loss of talent has caused the Army toincreasingly rely upon accessions sources such as OCS-EO. As discussed earlier, shorter duration accessionsprograms entail very little development, vetting, orscreening, and in the case of OCS-EO, produce of cerswith the shortest continuation rates. This too worksagainst efforts to slow losses of high potential leaders;in the fullness of time, new cohorts of high-potentialleaders will face outsized demands upon their skillsas a growing number of their peers and leaders are

unable to perform at required competency levels. Thisprospect, as well as the stresses of a long war, maypush the Of cer Corps to its leadership tipping point.Beyond the tipping point, retention of talented of cerswill collapse, robbing the Army of the leadershiprequired to maintain full-spectrum dominance againstits adversaries, completely depleting its bench of talentfor the future, and requiring perhaps a generation torestore.

At least in the area of junior of cer retention, theU.S. Army seems to have developed a positive sumentrepreneurial solution. Beginning in 2006, it beganoffering continuation incentives to its high-potentialof cers prior to commissioning. Speci cally, ROTCand West Point cadets can agree to incur 3 additional

years of obligated active duty service in return for theircareer branch of choice (infantry, armor, intelligence,etc.), their station of choice, or a guaranteed option toobtain a fully-funded graduate degree at a school and


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in the discipline of their choosing. The intent of these precommissioning incentives is to increase retention of

those high potential of cers that confront the highestopportunity cost and who have exhibited the lowestcontinuation rates. In this way, the Army avoids theunnecessary expense of offering post-commissioning retention incentives to of cers who are most likely tocontinue on active duty without an incentive.

To date, precommissioning retention incentiveshave garnered much higher returns on investmentthan the broad-based incentives typically offered to junior of cers nearing the completion of their activeduty service obligations. In fact, high participation inthe rst 3 years of this program has provided the Armywith approximately 15,000 additional man-years ofobligated service and is projected to raise Army-wide8-year continuation rates from the historical level of 41

percent to 65 percent.20

By offering incentives that alignoccupation, assignment, and advanced educationalopportunities with the desires of individual of cers,the Army has taken a critical rst step toward linkingof cer accessions, development, employment, andretention.

Employing Talent.

Although accessions are a pivotal component,employment of of cer talent against competencyrequirements must be the objective of an integratedOf cer Corps Strategy. Even if an army could access,retain, and develop the best talent in the world,without ef cient employment practices, many of the

talent gains would be lost. Furthermore, by employingtalent appropriately, accessing, developing, andretaining talent becomes easierit becomes a virtuouscycle. To achieve effective and ef cient employment,


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the U.S. Army requires the capability to track relevantinformation on talent competencies and a management

system that matches talent to requirements. As isthe challenge for many large employers, the Armyoften accesses, retains, and develops of cers withspecialized competencies that are largely invisible tothe enterprise. This talent is neither well-documentedin personnel databases nor organized within any sortof talent management system.

Legacy of cer management systems re ect practicesinherited from the draft and industrial eras. They arelargely designed to facilitate personnel accountingconcerned with balancing personnel assets againstunit requirements as one would balance assets andliabilities in an accounting ledger. These practicesimplicitly value individual of cers as interchangeableparts within their branch and rank strata. As such,

they accommodated the needs of industrial and draftera personnel managers. However, these systems donot collect, organize or present the types of informationnecessary to manage talent. The Army must seek waysto move beyond personnel accounting and into talentmanagement.

As opposed to accounting, talent managementfocuses on of cer development and employment. Itrequires new capacities that can identify of cer talentand match it with competency requirements. A rststep towards talent management is to develop aplatform where of cers can communicate their talents.This platform should capture and document of cercompetencies such as professional certi cations,membership in social, educational, professional or

international networks, publications, specializedknowledge of an operating area or community ofinterest, project experience, and language skills, as


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personal identi ers, dependency data, and promotionand military quali cation data, as well as assignment

data by unit, location, position, and duration. Theledgers also include source of commission data andeducation data, such as degrees earned and the degreegranting institutions. This is largely the limit of theirinformation.

As a result, organizational capacities to adapt areimpaired. For example, the U.S. Army has been calledupon to assume broad responsibility for reconstructionoperations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans.Efforts to adapt to these new missions have generatedconsiderable demand for of cers who are professionallycerti ed to guide structural, hydraulic, geological,transportation, power distribution, and otherengineering projects. While the Army carries hundredsof engineer of cers on its ledgers, many of them lack

the speci c competencies required to conceive, plan,or execute reconstruction projects. Conversely, manyengineer of cers do possess these competencies,but as they stem from developmental experiencesoutside of those recorded within the current personnelinformation set, the Army does not know who orwhere they are in time of need. As a result, the ArmyChief of Engineers is now seeking to identify engineerof cers who have competencies beyond those normallyexpected of combat engineers in operational units.Absent a competency or talent management system,the Armys Corps of Engineers cannot effectivelyidentify or employ of cer talent in a timely mannerto speed Army adaptation to reconstruction missions.While considerable engineering talent resides with the

Armys inventory of engineer of cers, this talent ishidden from view by legacy assignment managementsystems.


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The situation confronting the Corps of Engineersis not unique within the Army. It is repeated every

day, across interagency working groups, major staffs,within Army agencies, and throughout deployedcommands. Moreover, this situation is not speci c tothe Army. Rather, as market trends have shifted laborfrom industrial to service sector applications, industryhas found increasing need for systems to managetalent. Today, global rms such as IBM are lessconcerned with producing tangible products and moreconcerned with producing knowledge-based solutionsaligned with customer requirements. To produce thesesolutions, rms must be able to mobilize appropriateemployee talents around requirements that can ariseat any place and time. These requirements can surfacequickly and can embody challenges that demand newapproaches, access to extensive social networks, or

cultural dexterity.By comparison, the U.S. Armys capacity to matchof cer talents to emerging challenges is antiquated.Its legacy personnel management tools were designedto align faces and spaces rather than talents andcompetency requirements. Today, the Army cannotfully employ talent it expends great resources toaccess, retain, and develop, nor does it articulateits talent requirements to of cers so that they canstructure their development in consonance with Armyneeds. Consequently, in addition to expanding itscapacity to access, retain, and develop talent, the Armymust greatly expand its capacity to employ the talentembodied by its Of cer Corps. Absent this capacity,the Of cer Corps' adaptability and effectiveness will

be far less than the sum of its parts.


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Summary.

More than ever before, the U.S. Army requires anOf cer Corps strategy that recognizes and leveragesthe interdependence between accessing, developing,retaining, and employing talent. Beyond attainmentof the right number of of cers at each career level,the Army increasingly needs talented of cers, thosewith pronounced aptitudes for learning and problemsolving, and whose mental acuity and intellectualagility allows them to master the diverse competenciesdemanded by the times. The Armys of cer humancapital model, which necessarily limits lateral entryat middle and senior levels, makes screening, vetting,and culling for such talent critical.

So, too, the U.S. Army must develop the institutional adaptability to employ the right talent in the right

job at the right time. In so doing, it will nally movebeyond assignment management to a genuine talentmanagement system. We believe that such a system,based upon the principles articulated in this mono-graph, must be the centerpiece of an Of cer Strategy it is the single best way to eliminate the problemswhich have challenged the Armys Of cer Corps forthe last decade, while simultaneously posturing itfor future success. A talent management system willposition the Army to compete with the civilian marketfor of cer talent. It will translate directly into betterof cer development and retention through increased job satisfaction. Talent management will also facilitate job matching, which will allow the Army to achievethe right breadth and depth of of cer competencies to

meet evolving requirements. The Army must commitample resources, develop appropriate policy, andreevaluate existing organizational designs to this end.


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would form the nucleus of a peacetime professional Army andthose (such as some ROTC and all OCS graduates) brought induring rapid wartime expansion of the Army via a military draft.In previous post-con ict force reductions, Regular Army of cerswere retained on active duty while non-RA of cers were subjectto involuntary force reductions. The Army gradually abandonedthis practice after the Vietnam War in favor of retaining of cersbased solely upon performance and potential rather than uponsource or circumstances of commission. Accordingly, todaythe RA designation applies to all active component of cers,regardless of commissioning source.

6. NCOs are sergeants. Similar to those found increasinglyin professional armies, the U.S. Armys NCO Corps consistsof seasoned enlisted soldiers with increasing levels of rank,responsibility and authority. While subordinate to commissionedof cers and not commissioned themselves, they are invaluableto the leadership of troop formations. Their direct leadership ofsoldiers and their focus upon building and sustaining individualpro ciencies allows commissioned of cers to focus uponcollective training, as well as the organizational and strategiclevels of leadership. Importantly, NCOs are critical not just to thedevelopment of soldiers but to the development of junior of cersas well, with whom they team in the effective leadership offormations. Any improvements to an armys of cer corps gainedat the expense of its NCO corps will likely have a deleteriouseffect upon that army.

7. In the U.S. Army, Warrant Of cer (WO) is a 5-grade group-ing falling between enlisted soldiers and commissioned of cers.In some professional armies, warrant of cers are effectively seniorNCOs with long military experience. In the U.S. Army, however,they are essentially of cers with technical expertise in highlyspecialized disciplines. Increasingly, they are expected to possessthe same intellectual and leadership potential as commissionedof cers, but in specialties not requiring the academic backgroundfor a commission.

8. College Board, Trends in College Pricing, Washington, DC:2007.


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17. The Army de nes the Operating Force as forcesthat the Army maintains for combatant commanders to usein contingencies, whereas the Generating Force consists ofall institutional or support elements that organize, train, andequip forces maintained for combatant commanders to use incontingencies. Frank Camm et al., What the Army Needs to Knowto Align its Operational and Institutional Activities, Santa Monica,CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, pp. 11-16.

18. Zero sum games are where payoffs to all players equalzero for every con guration of their strategies. A positive sumgame in this regard is where all players bene t, the sum of whichis greater than zero.

19. The National Training Center (NTC), located at Fort Irwin,CA, is one of the U.S. Armys premier force-on-force trainingareas, referred to as Combat Training Centers.

20. Statistics on the precommissioning incentive programs arefrom the Of ce of Economic and Manpower Analysis, West Point,

NY.

Documents

Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent