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USPON I PAD UNIVERZALNOG

BANKARSTVA

Rezime

Savremena kriza pokreće stare dileme o razdvajanju komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva. Nesumnjive činjenice o uzrocima krize govore u prilog tezi da su zahuktali egzotični poslovi s hartijama od vrednosti bili glavni pokretač finansijskog kraha. Najveće role imale su investicione banke i bile su najvažniji akter na ovom segmentu tržišta, pa se kao moguće rešenje za sprečavanje budućih finansijskih problema nametnulo razdvajanje investicionih i komercijalnih bankarskih poslova. Glavni argument je da se ne sme dozvoliti da novac poreskih obveznika ponovo leči probleme banaka u privatnom vlasništu, probleme prouzrokovane lošim procenama i odlukama ambicioznih i neopreznih menadžera. Rad se u prvom delu fokusira na razvoj univerzalnog bankarstva i na pojašnjenje specifičnih političkih i društvenih okolnosti za nastanak prvog zakona koji reguliše univerzalne banke. Dalje se ukazuje na prednosti i manjkavosti ovog koncepta, da bi se u poslednjem delu sumirali okviri novih oštrih regulatornih propisa i preporuka u ovom segmentu finansijskog tržišta.

Ključne reči: univerzalno bankarstvo, komercijalne banke, investicione banke, sekjuritizacija, regulacija, deregulacija, kriza

JEL: G01, G21, G24, N20

UDK 336.714/.717

originalni naučni

rad

Rad primljen: 24.09.2013.

Odobren za štampu: 22.10.2013.

doc dr Sanja VučkovićFakultet za poslovne studije,

Megatrend univerzitetsvuckovic@megatrend.edu.rs

Prof. dr Vladimir PrvulovićFakultet za medjunarodnu

ekonomiju, Megatrend univerzitetvprvulovic@megatrend.edu.rs

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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF UNIVERSAL BANKING

Summary

The contemporary crisis has reopened the old dilemmas about the separation of commercial and investment banking. Indisputable facts about what caused the crisis speak in favor of the thesis that the frenzied exotic operations with securities were the main trigger of the financial breakdown. The biggest roles were played by investment banks, as the main players in this market segment, hence the potential solution for preventing future financial problems imposed itself in the form of separating investment and commercial banking operations. The major argument is not to allow the taxpayers’ money to once again heel the problems of private banks, problems caused by bad judgments and decisions on the part of ambitious and imprudent managers. In its first part, the paper focuses on the development of universal banking and the clarification of specific political and social circumstances relevant for the adoption of the first law regulating universal banks. The paper moves on to indicate the advantages and disadvantages of this concept, whereas its final section sums up the frameworks of the new stricter regulations and recommendations in this field of the financial market.

Keywords: universal banking, commercial banks, investment banks, securitization, regulation, deregulation, crisis

JEL: G01, G21, G24, N20

UDC 336.714/.717

original scientific paper

Paper received: 24.09.2013

Approved for publishing: 22.10.2013

Sanja Vučković, PhD, Assistant ProfessorGraduate School of Business Studies, Megatrend Universitysvuckovic@megatrend.edu.rs

Prof. Vladimir Prvulović, PhDGraduate School of International Economics, Megatrend Universityvprvulovic@megatrend.edu.rs

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Univerzalno bankarstvo: put do zvezda

Osnovne usluge komercijalnih, tradicionalnih ili klasičnih banaka, vekovima unazad podrazumevaju primanje različitih vrsta depozita od klijenata i izdavanje kredita stanovništvu i privredi u zemlji i inostranstvu. Ovi najstariji bankarski poslovi nazivaju se depozitno-kreditnim. Depoziti se međusobno razlikuju po ročnosti, vrednosti i valuti, što bitno utiče na kamatu koju deponenti dobijaju na uložena sredstva. Novac koji je banci duže na raspolaganju ona vrednuje i nagrađuje više od onog koji joj je ponuđen na kraći period. Takođe, krediti koje banka odobrava svojim klijentima imaju različitu namenu, ročnost, vrednost, pa i kvalitet i, prema tome, nose različitu kamatnu stopu koju banka na njih zaračunava. Pored ovih osnovnih poslova, većina banaka obavlja usluge platnog prometa, izdavanja garancija, poslove u vezi sa finansiranjem nekog spoljnotrgovinskog posla, menjačke poslove, povereničke, kao i mnoge druge. Bez obzira na broj i kvalitet usluga koje pružaju, zajednička karakteristika svih tradicionalnih komercijalnih banaka je u tome da su im depoziti osnovni izvor prihoda, a izdati krediti čine najznačajniju stavku aktive. Naplaćujući višu aktivnu kamatu za izdate kredite i plaćajući nižu (pasivnu) za primljene depozite, banke ostvaruju razliku u ceni koja čini osnovni profit ovih institucija. Takođe, banke prihoduju po osnovu raznih provizija i naplata za ostale svoje usluge.

Nekadašnja uloga banaka vremenom se menja. One postaju vrlo aktivan i u pojedinim zemljama dominantan učesnik na finansijskom tržištu. Koncept komercijalnog bankarstva, naročito u eri industrijalizacije, pruža isuviše mali manevarski prostor za povećane apetite, kako samih bankara tako i njihovih klijenata. Javlja se potreba za dodatnim izvorima sredstava. Spektar njihovih usluga širi se shodno zahtevima klijenata, s jedne, i prirodne težnje banke za sticanjem što višeg profita, s druge strane.

Savremene banke širom sveta danas nude spektar usluga svojim klijentima koji se drastično razlikuje od poslova tradicionalnih banaka. Pored klasičnih bankarskih, obavljaju poslove sa hartijama od vrednosti, daju konsultantske usluge u vezi sa investiranjem

na finansijskom tržištu, pružaju pomoć oko organizovanja emisije hartija od vrednosti, garantuju emisije, otkupljuju ili samo prodaju hartije emitenata. Isto tako, aktivni su učesnici u restrukturiranju preduzeća, promeni vlasničke strukture, preuzimanju ili spajanju. Banke koje se bave isključivo prethodnim nabrojanim poslovima nazivaju se investicione banke. Usko su povezane sa brokersko-dilerskim poslovima i aktivno trguju svim vrstama hartija od vrednosti. Strukturu njihove pasive čine, pored sopstvenog kapitala, pretežno izdate hartije od vrednosti ili pozajmljeni kapital od drugih banaka. Njihovi najznačajniji klijenti su investicioni i penzioni fondovi, hedž fondovi, osiguravajuća društva, brojne korporacije. Veliki doprinos razvoju investicionog bankastva daje međunarodno regulatorno okruženje, okrenuto procesima deregulacije poslednjih decenija, razvoj tehnologije u oblasti širenja informacija, kao i nesumnjiv napredak kompjuterske tehnologije. Zahvaljujući broju i raznolikosti usluga koje nude, mnoge današnje banke dobijaju naziv „finansijski supermarketi“ ili one stop shops što nedvosmisleno opisuje da ponuda na jednom mestu može zadovoljiti apsolutno sve finansijske prohteve. Zahvaljujući ovoj činjenici koja pogoduje kako komitentima tako i bankama, banke sve više razvijaju svoje aktivnosti na finansijskom tržištu afirmišući time koncept univerzalnog bankarstva.

Univerzalne banke su finansijske institucije koje se bave podjednako depozitno-kreditnim poslovima sa stanovništvom i privredom i poslovima sa hartijama od vrednosti. Imaju dominantnu ulogu na finansijskom tržištu zajedno sa ostalim institucionalnim ulagačima. Koncept univerzalne banke ima dugu istoriju i u mnogim razvijenim zemlјama predstavlјa i jedini model poslovanja banaka (Pelaez i Pelaez, 2009). U manjem broju zemalјa, postojala su regulatorna ograničenja za komercijalno i investiciono bankarstvo pod zajedničkim krovom. Zapravo, komercijalni i bankarski poslovi su dugi niz godina bili fizički odvojeni zakonskim aktima i nije postojala mogućnost da ista banka obavlјa obe grupe finansijskih poslova. Da bi se dobio jasniji uvid o tome da li univerzalno bankarstvo treba, mora ili ne sme da opstane u bankarskom sektoru i na koji način mu doprinosi ili šteti, napravićemo

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Universal banking: road to stardom

The basic services of commercial, traditional or classic banks have for centuries referred to the taking of various types of deposits from clients and granting of local and cross-border, retail and corporate loans. These oldest banking operations are known as deposit and lending operations. Deposits differ according to maturity, amount and currency, which considerably determine the interest that the depositors get for their deposited funds. A bank values more and accordingly rewards the money entrusted to it for a longer period of time, as opposed to the money offered for a shorter period. Also, loans granted by a bank to its clients have a different purpose, maturity, value, and quality, thereby entailing different interest rates calculated by the bank. In addition to these basic operations, most banks conduct payment system services, issue guarantees, finance foreign trade, effect foreign exchange operations, trustee operations and many others. Regardless of the number and quality of services they offer, the common characteristic of all traditional, commercial banks is that deposits are their main source of income, whereas granted loans stand as the most important item of assets. By charging higher lending interest rate on granted loans and paying lower (passive) interest rate on received deposits, banks achieve a difference in price which is the main profit of these institutions. Also, banks generate profit in respect of various fees and charges for their other services.

The role banks had in the past has changed over time. They have become a rather active and, in certain countries, predominant player in the financial market. The concept of commercial banking, especially in the industrialization era, offers too narrow a maneuvering space for increasing appetites, both of bankers themselves and of their clients. A need has arisen for additional sources of finance. The range of their services has been expanding in line with the clients’ requests, on the one hand, and with the natural inclination of banks towards the acquisition of the largest possible profit, on the other.

Today, modern banks all over the world offer an array of services to their clients,

drastically different from the operations of traditional banks. Alongside the classic banking operations, they conduct securities-related operations, provide consulting services in respect of financial market investments, provide assistance in organizing securities issuance, guarantees these issuances, purchase or just sell securities on behalf of their issuers. Moreover, they actively participate in restructuring of enterprises, changes in ownership structure, mergers or acquisitions. Banks which are primarily engaged in the above listed operations are called investment banks. They are closely associated to broker-dealer operations and actively trade in all types of securities. The structure of their liabilities, in addition to equity, mostly consists of issued securities or capital borrowed from other banks. Their most important clients are investment and pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and numerous corporations. Largely contributing to the investment banking development is the international regulatory environment, inclined towards the deregulation process in the past decades; the development of information distribution technology, accompanied by the evident progress of computer technologies in general. Thanks to the number and versatility of services they offer, many of the banks today get nicknamed “financial supermarkets” or “one stop shops”, which unambiguously indicates that the offer in a single place absolutely can satisfy all financial needs. Due to this fact, favorable both for clients and for banks, banks have been increasingly developing their financial market activities, thereby promoting the concept of universal banking.

Universal banks are financial institutions equally dealing with deposit and lending operations with retail and corporate clients, and with securities-related operations. They play a dominant role at the financial market alongside the other institutional investors. The concept of a universal bank has had a long history and in many developed countries it is the only banking model (Pelaez and Pelaez, 2009). In a few countries, there have been certain regulatory limitations for commercial and investment banking under the same roof. In fact, for quite a while, commercial and banking operations have been physically separated by

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kratak osvrt na njegov nastanak. Zanimlјivo je da su se u posmatranim sistemima (u SAD i u Evropi) odnosi između komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva potpuno različito formirali i razvijali. Zajedničko im je ipak to što je univerzalno bankarstvo nabujalo kada su želјe banaka za visokim profitima postale važnije od društvenih interesa i stabilnih finansijskih i ekonomskih tokova. Zbog toga je priča o usponu i padu univerzalnog bankarstva neodvojiva od sudbina poznatih poslovnih lјudi i bankara.

Kako se koncept univerzalnog bankarstva razvijao u Americi

Bankarski sistem Sjedinjenih Američkih Država sve do prve polovine XVIII veka funkcioniše u potpunosti bez ideje o formiranju centralne banke. Prve inicijative, po ugledu na Banku Engleske, rađaju se 1791. godina kada se i formira Prva banka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Ona funkcioniše sve do početka XIX veka, kada se ukida odlukom Senata, zahvalјujući velikom broju glasova koje su imale manje federalne države u ovoj instituciji. Sličnu sudbinu doživlјava i Druga banka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, koja postaje meta zapadnih federalnih država i prestaje s radom početkom XIX veka (Rothbard, 2002). Period nakon neuspelih pokušaja formiranja centralne banke karakteriše postojanje oko 7.000 manjih nacionalnih banaka koje izdaju novac. Šarenilo papirnih i kovanih novčanica, od kojih mnoge vremenom gube vrednost na tržištu, konačno prestaje krajem XIX veka kada administracija predsednika Linkolna odlučuje da uvede jedinstven nacionalni novac (greenbacks) koji će izdavati autorizovane nacionalne banke i koji je u to vreme služio prvenstveno za finansiranje tek počelog Građanskog rata. Male banke koje nemaju ekskluzivno pravo štampanja novca takođe nastavlјaju sa radom, ali bez mogućnosti da koriste svoj dotadašnji novac.

Najveću ulogu u smirivanju tržišta posle niza

manjih finansijskih kriza do 1913. godine imaju upravo najveće banke smeštene u Nјujorku koje počinju da posluju kao neformalna zajednica centralnih banaka. Na čelo ovog sistema postavlјen je bankar Džon Morgan (John Morgan). Preteča današnjeg FED-a, ovaj sistem dokazuje da su funkcionisanje i razvoj jedne privrede nemogući bez centralne banke. Jačanje javne i političke svesti o potrebi centralizacije bankarstva na nivou zemlјe dovode i do osnivanja Sistema federalnih rezervi (Federal Reserve System, FED) krajem decembra 1913. godine koji danas posluje kao centralna banka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država.

Grupisanje najvećih, najmoćnijih i najuspešnijih poslovnih banaka ujedno je značilo širenje njihove uloge u finansiranju razvoja najznačajnijih američkih korporacija u oblasti industrije i u ostalim krucijalnim granama. Ovo širenje moći povezuje se sa učešćem banaka i samih bankara u delu vlasništva mnogih vodećih industrijskih giganata. Banke omogućavaju privredi finansiranje na različite načine, kako putem kredita tako i putem izdavanja hartija od vrednosti. Pomažu im oko emisija korporativnih hartija, pokrovitelјstva ili prodaje hartija na tržištu. Dakle, banke i korporacije međusobno postaju vezane neraskidivim poslovnim, a neretko i privatnim kontaktima, a sve u ambijentu procvale privrede početkom XX veka. Dovolјno govori podatak da su J. P. Morgan i House of Morgan (jedna od kompanija J. P. Morgana) kontrolisali najveće sektore privrede Amerike. Imali su čak 126 mesta u upravnim odborima 89 kompanija i kontrolisali su 40% ukupnog industrijskog, finansijskog i trgovinskog kapitala Sjedinjenih Američkih Država što je činilo oko trećine bruto domaćeg proizvoda (Tabarrok, 1998). Krupan bankarski kapital omogućava upravlјanje političkim odlukama, a sami bankari time sebi obezbeđuju još veći uticaj i bogatstvo. Moć najvećeg konkurenta Rokfelera (Rockefeller), jednog od klјučnih lјudi koji su imali uticaj na stvaranje Sistema federalnih rezervi, a i ostalih bankara (naročito njujorških), nije bila ništa manja. Prvobitno vlasnik kompanije Standard Oil (Standard Oil), a kasnije i mnogih drugih u oblasti industrije, Rokfeler kupuje prvu banku koju kroz seriju merdžera uvećava do nivoa jedne od najvećih banaka Amerike. U to vreme

Federal Reserve

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means of legal provisions, leaving no possibility for one and the same bank to conduct both groups of financial operations. In order to acquire a clearer insight into whether universal banking should, must or must not survive in the banking sector, and in which way it facilitates it or damages it, we will briefly go back to its origins. Interestingly enough, in the observed systems (in the USA and in Europe) the relations between commercial and investment banking have had a completely different formation and development process. What they do have in common, however, is the fact that universal banking flourished once the banks’ desires for high profits gained precedence over social interests and stable financial and economic flows. It is exactly why the story of the rise and decline of universal banking is inextricably intertwined with the fates of celebrated businessmen and bankers.

Development of the universal banking concept in America

Until the first half of the 18th century, the banking sector of the United States of America functioned completely bereft of the idea about the formation of a central bank. The first initiatives, modeled after the Bank of England, were born in 1791 when the First Bank of the United States of America was established. It operated until the early 19th century, when it was closed according to the Senate’s decision, owing to the majority votes of the smaller states within this institution. Similar fate befell the Second Bank of the United States of America, which stopped operating in early 19th century after it became the target of the western states (Rothbard, 2002). The period following the unsuccessful attempts to establish a central bank is characterized by the existence of about 7000 smaller national banks issuing money. The motley of banknotes and coins, many of which lost their market value over time, finally ended in late 19th century, when the administration of President Lincoln decided to introduce uniform national money (greenbacks) which was issued by authorized national banks, and at that time primarily used to finance the Civil War that had just broken out. Small banks with no exclusive rights to print money also continued their operations, but without the possibility to use

the money they used until that point.The largest role in pacifying the market after

a series of slighter financial crises up until 1913 was played by no other than the largest banks located in New York, which started operating as an informal union of central banks. The banker John Morgan was appointed head of this system. As a predecessor of today’s Fed, this system proves that proper functioning and development of an economy are impossible without a central bank. The strengthened public and political awareness about the necessity of having centralized banking at the country level led to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) in late December 1913, which today operates as the central bank of the United States of America.

The consolidation of the largest, most powerful and most successful commercial banks at the same time implied their expanded role in financing the development of the most important US corporations in the field of industry and other crucial branches. This expansion of power is associated with the share of banks and bankers themselves in the ownership structure of many leading industrial giants. Banks enable financing of economy in many ways, both by granting loans and by issuing securities. They provide assistance in respect of corporate securities issuing, underwriting or selling at the market. Thus, banks and corporations become mutually connected by unbreakable business, and often private ties, in the environment of the flourishing early 20th century economy. It is sufficient to say that J. P. Morgan and House of Morgan (one of J. P. Morgan’s companies) controlled the largest sectors of the US economy. They had as many as 126 seats in the BoDs of 89 companies, thereby controlling 40% of total industrial, financial and trading capital of the United States of America, which amounted to about one third of GDP (Tabarrok, 1998). Substantial banking capital provides leverage in political decision-making, and bankers thereby acquire additional influence and wealth. The biggest competitor, Rockefeller, one of the key people who impacted the creation of the Federal Reserve System, just like other bankers (especially those in New York), was equally powerful. At first the owner of Standard Oil Company, and later of many other industrial

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ova kompanija finansira izbornu kampanju senatora Mekinlija (McKinley) i kroz njegovu administraciju kasnije vrši ogroman uticaj na političke odluke. Značajniji je, međutim, odnos koji uspostavlјa sa senatorom Oldričem (Nelson Aldrich), prvo politički, a udajom senatorove ćerke za njegovog sina i familijarni. Oldrič je bio i predsednik Nacionalne monetarne komisije (National Monetary Commision), tvorac plana (Aldrich's Plan) koji sa neznatnim izmenama postaje poznati Glas-Stigalov zakon (Glass-Steagall Act). On je i jedan od osnivača Sistema federalnih rezervi. Zapada za oko i činjenica da je Oldričev sin postao predsednik banke sa kojom Rokfeler započinje svoju bankarsku karijeru. A očevo bogatstvo u periodu od trideset godina, koliko je bio senator, raste sa 50.000 na 12 miliona dolara (Tabarrok, 1998).

Međutim, tridesetih godina XX veka, SAD, a i ostali deo sveta, suočavaju se sa do tada najvećom ekonomskom depresijom koju je svet poznavao. Nezaposlenost koja je dostizala preko 30%, pad industrijske proizvodnje od oko 50% i međunarodne trgovine do 60% parametri su koji potpuno srozavaju američku i svetsku privredu. Kriza najpre počinje na berzi, strmoglavim padom cena akcija kotiranih preduzeća, ali vrlo brzo eskalira kroz realni sektor i dovodi do kolapsa. Posle godina procvata, cene akcija su se neprirodno pretvorile u mehur koji je u jednom trenutku eksplodirao ostavlјajući dramatične posledice. Krivci su se tražili na raznim stranama. Veliki broj malih banaka je zatvoren, a njihovi advokati su tvrdili da su oni žrtve velikih banaka koje su svojim aktivnostima sa hartijama od vrednosti zaslužne za stvaranje berzanskog mehura i devastiranje čitave privrede. Drugi su (monetaristi), pak, smatrali da se radilo o običnoj recesiji koja je povremeno stanje svake privrede, a da je kasnije pogrešna politika centralne banke, restriktivno orijentisana, dodatno proširila žarišta. Kejnzijanci su uzrok nalazili u smanjenju tražnje i potrošnje koja nastaje kao posledica gubitka poverenja u finansijski sektor. Smatrali su da je vlada morala da povećava deficit i smanjuje poreze, da bude ekspanzivno orijentisana kako bi tražnja ponovo oživela, što su i predlagali u jeku depresije.

Ubrzo nakon Velike depresije kreatori ekonomske politike pokušavaju raznim predlozima, koji na kraju prerastaju u zakone,

da savladaju zahuktalo finansijsko tržište, naročito u sektoru bankarstva. Tridesetih godina (1933) stupa na snagu poznati Glas-Stigalov zakon koji u potpunosti zabranjuje komercijalnim bankama da se bave poslovima sa hartijama od vrednosti, kao i bilo kakvu međusobnu povezanost ove dve grupe banaka u smislu vlasništva ili upravlјanja (Neal i White, 2012). Poslednji segment posebno pogađa velike banke, kao što je bila J. P. Morgan and Company, s obzirom na činjenicu da su one i formalno imale veliki uticaj na poslovanje mnogih drugih banaka putem direktnog učešća u vlasništvu ili upravlјanju. Najveća zamerka uvođenju novog zakona bila je, skoro svima očigledna, loša namera predlagača da se uništi prvenstveno imperija porodice Morgan. Sve postaje interesantnije ako se ima u vidu da je jedan od kreatora zakona (Glas) bio u bliskim vezama sa senatorom Oldričem koji je preko njega i lobirao za uvođenje pomenutog zakona. Štetu je pretrpela i konkurentska imperija, ali se smatra da je Morganova znatno veća (što je i bio cilј). Posledično, banka J. P. Morgana ostaje čisto komercijalna banka, a jedan deo vlasnika se odvaja i osniva kompaniju Morgan Stanley. Zakon je prilično tesno izglasan u Kongresu, ali mu je u korist išla podrška predsednika Ruzvelta i brojne otkrivene malverzacije velikih banaka. Naime, u isto vreme je u javnost dospela istraga koja se vodila u Morgan grupi, a ticala se neplaćanja poreza prethodnih nekoliko godina, dok je konkurent Rokfeler uspeo da se izvuče zahvalјujući bliskim vezama sa senatorom Oldričem. Takođe, smatralo se da postoji veliki sukob interesa kada komercijalne i investicione banke posluju pod istim krovom i da će u kriznim situacijama doći do moralnog hazarda. Naime, u pokušaju da sebi obezbedi veći profit, banka počinje da trguje hartijama od vrednosti sa svojim klijentima. Zapravo, očekujući promenu cene na tržištu, preko veštih, iskusnih menadžera i bankarskih savetnika, banka može direktno svojim klijentima da proda hartiju za koju veruje da će joj cena opasti. Pomenuti zakon u neizmenjenom obliku ostaje na snazi sve do sedamdesetih godina XX veka kada komercijalne banke sve više vrše pritisak da se on ukine. Razlog je bio taj što je profit komercijalnih banaka drastično opao zahvalјujući praksi da se preduzeća

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companies as well, Rockefeller bought his first bank which, through a series of mergers, he enlarged to the level of one of the biggest banks in the US. At that time, his company financed the electoral campaign of Senator McKinley, and subsequently used his administration to exert enormous pressure on political decisions. Somewhat more important is, however, the relationship he established with Senator Nelson Aldrich, which, although political at first, after the Senator’s daughter married his son, also became personal. Furthermore, Aldrich was the President of the National Monetary Commission, and the creator of the so-called Aldrich’s Plan, which, with slight amendments, grew into the famous Glass-Steagall Act. He was one of the founders of the Federal Reserve System as well. Conspicuously, Aldrich’s son was appointed president of the bank which marked the beginning of Rockefeller’s career in banking. Aldrich’s wealth, during the thirty years he spent as the Senator, accumulated from 50,000 to 12 million dollars (Tabarrok, 1998).

However, in the 1930s, the USA and the rest of the world faced the biggest economic depression, unprecedented until that point. Unemployment exceeding 30%, drop of industrial production by about 50% and decline in international trade by 60% are the parameters that completely devastated the US and global economy. The crisis first broke out at the stock exchange, with the drastic fall of listed companies’ stock prices, but it quickly escalated in the real sector, and caused a total collapse. Following the years of bloom, the stock prices artificially created a bubble which at one point burst, leaving dramatic consequences behind it. The culprits were sought on various sides. Many small banks were closed, their lawyers claiming that they had been the victims of the leading banks whose securities-related activities were to be blamed for the creation of the stock exchange bubble and devastation of the entire economy. Others (i.e. monetarists), however, believed that it was just a regular recession, as an occasional state of every economy, and that the subsequent central bank’s policy, restrictiveness-oriented, spread the contagion. The Keynesians found the cause in the reduced demand and consumption, resulting from the lost confidence in the financial sector. They

believed that the government should have increased the deficit and reduced the taxes, and that it should have been expansion-oriented in order to revive the demand, as they kept suggesting even at the height of the depression.

Soon after the Great Depression, the economic policy makers offered various proposals, eventually turning into laws, in their attempt to soothe the heated financial market, especially in the banking segment. In the 1930s (1933, to be precise) the famous Glass-Steagall Act came into effect, introducing a complete ban for commercial banks to conduct securities-related activities, and prohibiting any affiliation whatsoever between these two groups of banks in terms of ownership or management (Neal and White, 2012). The latter segment particularly affected large banks, such as J. P. Morgan and Company, given the fact that they formally had a large impact on the business of many other banks due to their direct share in ownership or management. The principal objection to the adoption of the new law was the bad, and obvious to almost everyone, intention of its proponent to destroy, first and foremost, the empire of the Morgan family. The whole thing becomes even more interesting when we bear in mind that one of the creators of the law (i.e. Glass) had close ties with Senator Aldrich, who had lobbied for the adoption of the concerned law. Although the competitive empire suffered the damage as well, it is generally believed that the damage inflicted upon Morgan was considerably higher (as was originally intended). Consequently, the bank of J. P. Morgan remained a pure commercial bank, whereas a group of owners stepped out to establish the company Morgan Stanley. The law was adopted in Congress with a rather tight voting result, but it had in its favour the support of President Roosevelt, and numerous cases of exposed malversation in the operations of large banks. Namely, an investigation led at that time within the Morgan group concerning tax evasion in the several years before got disclosed to the public. Morgan’s competitor, Rockefeller, managed to dodge this bullet thanks to his close ties with Senator Aldrich. Moreover, it was considered that a huge conflict of interests existed when commercial and investment banks did business under the same roof, and

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osamdesetih godina okreću hartijama od vrednosti kao atraktivnijem izvoru finansiranja od dotadašnjeg tradicionalnog kreditiranja putem banaka. Istovremeno, profit investicionih banaka rapidno raste.

Najpre se 1978. godine komercijalnim bankama dopušta prodaja komercijalnih zapisa i osnivanje afilijacije koja ima pravo da do pet procenata ukupnog prihoda ostvari putem pokrovitelјstva, a kasnije se (1988) ta mogućnost proširuje na deset procenata prihoda i to ne samo putem poslova sa komercijalnim zapisima već i sa hipotekarnim i municipalnim obveznicama. Stege sve više popuštaju: dve godine kasnije, komercijalne banke su već mogle da posluju sa korporativnim obveznicama kao i sa akcijama preduzeća. Vremenom dozvola za obavlјanje poslova sa hartijama od vrednosti dostiže čak 25% ukupnih prihoda, da bi 1999. godine pomenuti zakon bio u potpunosti i ukinut Gramm-Leach-Bliley zakonom. Time je i zvanično počela nova era univerzalnog bankarstva u Americi (Casserley i saradnici, 2009).

Univerzalno bankarstvo u Americi u proteklih deceniju i po karakterisalo je izdvajanje velikih finansijskih kuća, kao što su Goldman Sachs, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns i Lehman Brothers koje su vrlo uspešno poslovale sve do finansijske krize 2007. godine. Nakon izbijanja krize doživlјavaju različitu sudbinu. Neke su bankrotirale (Lehman), neke su prodate (Bear, Merrill, AIG), a Morgan Stanley i Goldman Sachs nastavlјaju da posluju kao komercijalne banke. Zajedničko za sve banke je da su zahtevale, a neke i dobile, pomoć od države.

Čime je bilo podstaknuto bujanje univerzalnih banaka u SAD u poslednjih tridesetak godina? Još je administracija predsednika Regana dozvolila liberalnije odnose na finansijskom tržištu. Umesto vladinih programa izdavanja kredita zajmoprimcima s niskim dohotkom, liberalizacija je zapravo značila da se bankama dopušta da se bave popularnim i široko rasprostranjenim poslovima kreditiranja stanovništva. Banke su izdavale pretežno kredite osigurane hipotekom i vremenom cene kuća i stanova počinju da rastu. Banke prikuplјene hipotekarne kredite sortiraju u pulove sličnih karakteristika i na osnovu njih izdaju dužničke hartije od vrednosti i dalјe ih preprodaju na finansijskom tržištu. Ovo su osnovne karakteristike procesa sekjuritizacije neposredno

pre izbijanja poslednje finansijske krize. Da bi se hartije što lakše i skuplјe prodale na finansijskom tržištu, neophodna je bila reputaciona potpora koju pružaju rejting agencije. Naime, najpoznatije rejting agencije rangiraju ovakve instrumente kao hartije veoma visokog kvaliteta i time njihovim izdavaocima omogućavaju veći i brži profit. Nizak rizik hartije dobijaju na osnovu hipoteka koje su im u osnovi, a čija cena u međuvremenu rapidno raste. Naposletku, s padom cena nekretnina čitav proces se piramidalno urušava i ostavlјa posledice kako na finansijsku tako i na realnu oblast ekonomskog života. Sumnjivo poslovanje sa egzotičnim hartijama od vrednosti je na kraju samo Sjedinjene Američke Države kroz program pomoći (Troubled Asset Relief Program, TARP) koštalo oko 400 milijardi dolara. Poslednjih godina vodi se oštra polemika o ponovnom uvođenju formalne barijere između poslovanja komercijalnih i investicionih banaka (Greenspan, 2007).

Nemačka - postojbina univerzalnog bankarstva

Nemačko bankarstvo u svojoj istoriji nikada nije imalo zakonsko razgraničenje komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva. Tamo je koncept univerzalnih banaka oduvek postojao kao jedini oblik bankarskog poslovanja. Kraj XIX veka karakteriše brz razvoj industrije sa zahtevima za velikim kapitalnim investicijama koje su mogle biti obezbeđene jedino putem udruživanja sredstava više pojedinačnih banaka. Udruživanjem kapitala stvara se manji broj većih banaka (Berlin banks) koje su imale dominaciju u finansiranju razvoja privrede, ali bez funkcije centralne banke.

Nemačka centralna banka (Reichsbank) od 1876. godine jedina je imala monopol nad izdavanjem novca, ali je takođe bila zadužena i za kreditiranje privrede na kraći rok putem razgranate mreže svojih banaka. Zahvalјujući brzom razvoju industrije u zemlјi, velike banke su bile fokusirane na finansiranje korporativnih klijenata, dok su štedno kreditne zadruge i kreditne unije poslove sa stanovništvom obavlјale sve do šezdesetih godina XX veka. Banke su imale vlasnički udeo u preduzećima koja su finansirala što se pokazalo kao mudro rešenje u godinama hiperinflacije nakon Prvog svetskog rata. Naime, u kriznom periodu velike inflacije banke su izgubile skoro dve

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that in emergency situations there was potential for moral hazard. Attempting to yield higher profits, a bank starts to trade in securities with its clients. In fact, while expecting the market price to change, through skillful, experienced managers and banking advisors, the bank can directly sell to its clients the securities whose price it believes would fall. The concerned law remained in effect, in the same form, until the 1970s, when commercial banks started to exert increasing pressure for it to be abolished. The reason lay in the fact that the commercial banks’ profit was drastically diminishing due to the practice exercised by enterprises in the 1980s which resorted to securities as a more attractive source of finance compared to traditional bank lending. At the same time, the profit of investment banks was rapidly increasing.

At first, in 1978 commercial banks were permitted to sell commercial papers and to establish affiliations entitled to yield up to 5% of total income by means of securities underwriting, and later on (in 1988) this possibility was expanded to 10% of income, not only by means of operations with commercial papers, but also with mortgage-backed and municipal bonds. The pressures of discipline were getting lighter: two years later, commercial banks were already allowed to trade in corporate bonds and companies’ shares. Over time the license for conducting securities operations reaches 25% of total income, and in 1999 the concerned law was fully abolished and replaced by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This officially marked the beginning of a new era of universal banking in the US (Casserley et al., 2009).

In the past decade and a half universal banking in the US was characterized by large financial companies, like Goldman Sachs, AIG, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, which singled out in the market and operated rather successfully until the 2007 financial crisis. After the outbreak of the crisis, each of them had a different fate. Some went bust (Lehman), some were sold (Bear, Merrill, AIG), whereas Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs continued their business as commercial banks. What all these banks have in common is that they requested to be, and some of them were, bailed out by the state.

What was it that boosted universal banks in

the US to thrive in the past thirty years or so? The administration of President Reagan was the first to allow more liberal relations at the financial market. Replacing the government programs for granting loans to low-income borrowers, liberalization actually implied that banks were allowed to engage in popular and widespread retail lending operations. Banks mostly extended mortgage-backed loans, causing the real estate prices to start growing over time. Banks further sorted their mortgage loans into pools with similar characteristics, based on which they issued debt securities and resold them at the financial market. These are the main features of the securitization process straight before the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. In order to sell securities in the financial market in the easiest possible way and at the best price, it was necessary to have reputational support provided by rating agencies. Namely, the most famous rating agencies ranked these instruments as high-quality securities, thereby enabling bigger and quicker profit to their issuers. Low risk was awarded to securities based on their underlying mortgages, whose prices were, in the meantime, rapidly increasing. Finally, when the real estate prices dropped, the entire process underwent a pyramidal collapse, and had disastrous consequences for both financial and real sectors of the economy. Suspicious transactions with exotic securities ended up costing the United States of America only, through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), about 400 billion dollars. In recent years harsh debates have been led about the potential reintroduction of a formal barrier separating the operations of commercial and investment banks (Greenspan, 2007).

Germany - the cradle of universal bankingIn its history, the German banking has never

had regulatory division of commercial and investment banking. In Germany the concept of universal banks has always been the only form of banking. The end of the 19th century was characterized by a swift development of industry, posing requests for large capital investments that could have been provided only by affiliating funds of several individual banks. Through the association of capital, a smaller number of larger banks (the so-called Berlin banks) were created, which achieved supremacy

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trećine kapitala, a spas su predstavlјale upravo akcije velikih industrijskih preduzeća koje su imale u posedu. Međutim, sledeći udar bankarske krize tridesetih godina ostavio je veće posledice. S obzirom na činjenicu da su poslovale sa visokim leveridžom (dugom), u čijoj je strukturi preovladavao strani kapital, banke su bile jako osetlјive na spolјne uticaje. Tako se kriza austrijskog bankarskog sektora vrlo brzo proširila na Nemačku, usled čega neke banke proglašavaju bankrot dok je veći broj ostalih nacionalizovala država.

Nakon Drugog svetskog rata prvo su velike banke podelјene na veći broj manjih banaka koje su poslovale kao univerzalne banke, da bi im se pedesetih godina dozvolilo da se ponovo udruže sa pravom osnivanja nacionalnih filijala. U tom periodu banke i dalјe imaju akcije i upravlјačke pozicije u mnogim industrijskim korporacijama. Ovakvi odnosi su podvrgnuti kritici sedamdesetih godina XX veka kada se ograničava vlasničko učešće u nefinansijskim organizacijama na 25%. I ovde se uočava konflikt interesa u poslovanju univerzalnih banaka i narednih godina sve više insistira na smanjenju uticaja koje banke imaju na velika preduzeća. Tako nemačke banke počinju da smanjuju svoje udele u korporacijama, delimično zbog pritiska investitora, a drugim delom zbog zaštite kapitala. Slična situacija se održala i poslednjih godina tako da ni danas banke nemaju znatnije učešće u vlasništvu kompanija, kao ni na upravlјačkim pozicijama u preduzećima.

I ovde je u središtu najnovije finansijske krize aktuelizovano pitanje razdvajanja tradicionalnih od investicionih banaka. Bitna razlika je što u Nemačkoj mali broj najvećih banaka posluje sa stanovništvom, pa im glavni izvor sredstava ne predstavlјaju depoziti građana. Većina se bavi investicionim bankarstvom i kao glavni izvor na strani pasive nalaze se kratkoročne hartije od vrednosti ili pozajmice od drugih banaka.

Univerzalno bankarstvo u Velikoj BritanijiBritansko bankarstvo je oduvek poslovalo sa

vrlo jasnom granicom između tradicionalnih i investicionih banaka, iako nikada nije postojala zakonska regulativa koja je to nalagala. Tek osamdesetih godina XX veka, u procesu izraženije deregulacije, britanske banke počinju poslovanje kao univerzalne finansijske institucije.

Najznačajnija institucija britanskog bankarstva od svog osnivanja 1694. god bila je Banka Engleske. Nјena osnovna uloga bila je pomoć Vladi pri finansiranju i izdavanju novčanica. Ostale banke nisu imale mogućnost da se udružuju u veće finansijske institucije tako da centralna banka ima dominantnu poziciju u finansijskom sistemu Engleske početkom XVIII veka. Pored malih banaka, postojale su specijalizovane trgovinske banke sa sedištem u Londonu koje su prvenstveno bile zadužene za finansiranje trgovine i distribuciju vladinih obveznica. Prvu bankarsku krizu Engleska trpi na samom početku XIX veka kada se ispolјava sva slabost i krhkost malih banaka da prevaziđu novonastalu situaciju. Tada se Banka Engleske po prvi put nalazi u situaciji kreditora u krajnjoj nuždi i pruža pomoć bankama u nevolјi kako bi ostale na tržištu. Posle krize bankama se dozvolјava udruživanje kapitala da bi se većim finansijskim sredstvima lakše oduprele budućim kriznim situacijama. Vlasnici udruženih banaka imaju neograničenu odgovornost što se smatralo garantom sigurnosti da će banka poslovati obazrivije i više voditi računa o novcu svojih deponenata. Ovakva teza ipak se nije potvrdila u praksi - u prvoj sledećoj krizi, pedesetih godina XIX veka, banke su privukle manje kapitala nego što bi to bio slučaj da je odgovornost vlasnika bila ograničena. To je zapravo značilo da investitori nisu bili blagonakloni prema vlasnicima banaka koje su činili lјudi različitih profila i interesovanja. Krajem XIX veka banke dobijaju legitimno pravo da posluju sa ograničenom odgovornošću vlasnika.

Mali broj velikih nacionalnih banaka pretežno okrenutih komercijalnom bankarstvu, ograničene odgovornosti vlasnika, čini sliku vrlo stabilnog bankarskog sektora Engleske početkom XX veka.

Sedamdesetih godina i nešto ranije, engleske banke počinju da šire svoje poslovanje na hartije od vrednosti, izdaju hipotekarne kredite, dugoročne revolving kredite preduzećima i slične poslove. Evidentan je i proces integrisanja velikih banaka koje počinju rad van granica Engleske. Takva situacija ostaje do finansijske krize 2007. godine. Tada neke najznačajnije engleske banke kao što su HSBC, Barclay i Standard Chartered Bank uspevaju same da se izbore sa novonastalom situacijom,

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in financing the economy’s development, yet had no function of a central bank.

Since 1876 the German central bank (Reichsbank) had the monopoly on money issuing, but was also in charge of short-term corporate lending via its extensive branch network. Owing to the rapid development of industry in the country, large banks remained focused on financing corporate clients, whereas savings and credit cooperatives and credit unions conducted retail operations until the 1960s. Banks had their ownership shares in the enterprises they financed, which turned out to be a prudent solution in the years of hyperinflation following the First World War. Namely, during the large inflation crisis banks lost almost two thirds of their capital, seeking salvation in the shares of large industrial enterprises they possessed in their portfolios. However, the next shock imposed by the 1930s banking crisis had somewhat bigger repercussions. Given the fact that they operated with high leverage (debt), in whose structure foreign capital was predominant, banks were extremely sensitive to foreign influences. Thus, the crisis in the Austrian banking sector quickly spilled over to Germany, as a result of which some banks went bankrupt, whereas the majority of others got nationalized by the state.

After the Second World War, large banks were first divided into many smaller banks which operated as universal banks, only to be allowed in the 1950s to re-affiliate with the right to establish national branches. In this period, banks still had shares and management positions in many industrial corporations. Such relations were subject to criticism in the 1970s, when ownership shares in non-financial organizations were limited to 25%. Here,

too, the conflict of interests was observed in universal banks’ operations, which is why in the following years it was increasingly insisted upon the reduction of impact banks have on large enterprises. Thus, the German banks started to reduce their shares in corporations, somewhat due to the pressure on the part of investors, and somewhat due to capital protection. The situation has remained similar until recent years, so that today banks in Germany do not have considerable shares in companies’ ownership structure, nor do they hold managerial positions in enterprises.

In light of the recent financial crisis, the issue of separating traditional and investment banks was current in Germany as well. A significant difference, however, lay in the fact that in Germany a few major banks actually conduct retail operations, which is why their main sources of funds are not retail deposits. Instead, most of them do investment banking, the main sources on the liabilities side being short-term securities and loans from other banks.

Universal banking in Great BritainBanking in Britain has always functioned

with the clear distinction between traditional and investment banks, although there have never been any laws or regulations to prescribe it. It was only in the 1980s, in the process of prominent deregulation, that the British banks started to operate as universal financial institutions.

The most significant institution in the British banking, since its establishment back in 1694, has been the Bank of England. Its main role has been to assist the Government in financing and money issuing. Other banks did not have the possibility to associate into larger financial institutions, so that the central bank occupied the dominant position in the financial system of England in early 18th century. In addition to small banks, there were specialized merchant banks seated in London, which were primarily in charge of trade finance and government bonds distribution. The first banking crisis hit England at the very beginning of the 19th century, when small banks demonstrated all their weakness and fragility in trying to overcome the newly-occurred situation. It was then that the Bank of England for the first time found itself in the

Reichsbank, Berlin, 1903

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dok neke druge, poput RBS, Lloyds i manje banke koje su bile zavisne od njih, dobijaju vladinu finansijsku pomoć kako bi opstale (Casserley i saradnici, 2009).

Univerzalno bankarstvo i svetska kriza

Svetska finansijska kriza direktno se povezuje sa velikim finansijskim konglomeratima čije rizično poslovanje, naročito u sektoru sa hartijama od vrednosti, postaje glavna meta najnovijih mera regulacije. Verovatno najveći kritičar investicionog bankarstva jeste uticajni Pol Krugman, profesor ekonomije i dobitnik Nobelove nagrade. On ukazuje na otuđenost savremenog bankarstva od svojih korena i kritikuje „bankarstvo u senci“ - odbojnost banaka da se bave tradicionalnim kreditno-depozitnim poslovima i njihovu opčinjenost investiranjem i hartijama od vrednosti. On smatra da bankarstvo mora ponovo da bude „dosadno“, što znači da se regulacijom ograniče mogućnosti da banke budu univerzalne (Krugman, 2009).

Jasno je da na talasu prethodne kritike različite države aktuelizuju pitanje opravdanosti koncepta univerzalnog bankarstva. Stručna javnost je prilično podelјena u stavovima, ali je moguće izdvojiti argumente za i protiv univerzalnog bankarstva kao i preporuke za buduću regulaciju ovog koncepta.

Šta je to što zagovornici ideje o (ponovnom) razdvajanju komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva zameraju univerzalnom bankarstvu, a šta stoji kao glavni stub odbrane univerzalnog bankarstva?

Da li banke treba da budu izložene visokom riziku?

Investicione banke u proteklih nekoliko decenija preuzimaju vrlo visoke rizike u poslovima sekjuritizacije, jednim od najvećih izdanaka procesa deregulacije koji preovladava finansijskim tržištem tokom XX i početkom XXI veka. Univerzalne banke nemaju barijere ni u pogledu pribavlјanja niti ulaganja sredstava, pa se dolazi u situaciju da je novac štediša vrlo rizično plasiran. Banke su izdavale sumnjive hipotekarne kredite koji sa strmoglavim padom cena nekretnina u SAD, neposredno pred krizu, nisu bili naplativi. Krajem XX veka

(1998) vrednost derivativnih hartija bila je dva i po puta veća od vrednosti svetskog bruto domaćeg proizvoda, a neposredno pred krizu čak dvadeset puta veća (Blundell-Wignall, 2011). Imajući u vidu da država u većini zemalјa osigurava depozite građana, nameće se zaklјučak da su se investicione banke olako kockale tuđim novcem, računajući na to da će u slučaju da stvari krenu po zlu država morati da pomogne i to novcem poreskih obveznika. Popularizovana je krilatica „preveliki da bi propali“ (too-big-to-fail) koja govori o postojanju velikih i važnih finansijskih institucija, poput nekih investicionih banaka, koje su toliko inkorporirane u mnogim sektorima privrede da bi njihovo bankrotstvo pretilo čitavoj privredi. Ovakav stav dodatno olakšava rizične plasmane jer se smatra da će država kao garant na kraju morati da pripomogne (podstiče se moralni hazard). To se videlo i na poslednjem primeru spasavanja velikih bankarskih sistema, naročito u Americi (TARP), što je i izazvalo najviše gneva u javnosti i kreatore monetarne i finansijske stabilnosti ponovo navelo na put odvajanja banaka i stroge regulacije.

Međutim, treba imati u vidu i sledeće. Poznato je takođe da mnoge hartije od vrednosti nose niži rizik i veću likvidnost u poređenju s kreditima. Likvidnost hartija dozvolјava bankama da u vrlo kratkom roku prepakuju svoj portfolio i tako izbegnu moguće negativne posledice drastičnog smanjenja profita. Uživajući u koristima koje im pruža diversifikacija, banke smanjuju ukupan rizik poslovanja što bi im bilo uskraćeno kada ne bi imale pravo bavlјenja investicionim bankarstvom. Sledstveno, u svojim bilansima mogle bi da drže samo nelikvidne kredite i u slučaju nenaplativosti da pretrpe mnogo veće gubitke. Prethodna analiza, da zaklјučimo, govori o tome da univerzalno bankarstvo može da ima svoje prednosti - uspešnije upravlјanje odnosom između rizika i profita.

Protiv teze o previše rizičnom poslovanju univerzalnih banaka stoji i činjenica da su univerzalne banke zapravo na meti monitoringa (nadglednja) sa dve strane: deponenata i vlasnika hartija od vrednosti. Zbog toga efikasnost njihovog poslovanja mora biti veća. Iskustvo američkog bankarskog sistema pokazalo je da su u periodu Velike depresije propadale

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position of the lender of last resort, providing assistance to problematic banks, so that they could survive at the market. In the aftermath of the crisis, banks were allowed to pool their capital so that their larger financial funds could help them resist future crises more easily. The owners of affiliated banks had unlimited liability which was deemed to be a guarantee of security and certainty that banks would operate more cautiously, taking better care of their depositors’ money. This thesis, however, did not pass the test of practice - in the first following crisis, in the 1850s, banks attracted less capital than it would have been the case had the owners’ liability been limited. This actually meant that investors were not benevolent towards the banks’ owners, including people of various profiles and interests. In late 19th century banks were granted the legitimate right to operate with limited liability of their owners.

A small number of large national banks, mostly oriented towards commercial banking, with limited liability of their owners, account for the extremely stable banking sector of England in early 20th century.

In 1970s and somewhat before that, the British banks started to expand their operations to include securities, mortgage loans, long-term revolving loans to corporates, etc. What is also evident is the process of integration of large banks, starting to expand their business outside the borders of England. This lasted until the 2007 financial crisis. Then, some of the major English banks, like HSBC, Barclay and Standard Chartered Bank, managed to struggle with the new situation on their own, whereas some others, like RBS, Lloyds and smaller banks depending on them, had to be bailed out by the government in order to survive (Casserley et al., 2009).

Universal banking and the global crisis

The global financial crisis is directly associated with large financial conglomerates whose risky business, especially in dealing with securities, became the major target of the latest regulation measures. Probably the harshest critic of investment banking is the influential Paul Krugman, professor of economics and winner of the Nobel Prize. He underlines the alienation of modern banking from its roots, and criticizes “shadow banking” - reluctance of banks to conduct traditional lending and deposit operations, accompanied by their fascination with investment and securities. He believes that banking has to go back to being “boring”, implying that regulation has to limit the possibilities of banks to be universal (Krugman, 2009).

Clearly, fuelled by the above criticism, various countries have focused on the issue of justifiability of the universal banking concept. Opinions in the professional public have been rather divided, but it is possible to list the arguments for and against universal banking, along with the recommendations for the future regulation of this concept.

Why do those advocating the (repeated) division of commercial and investment banking disapprove of universal banking, and what is it that stands as the main pillar of defense of universal banking?

Should banks be exposed to high risk?In the past several decades investment banks

have been taking really high risks in the process of securitization, one of the main outcomes of deregulation, prevailing at the financial market throughout the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century. Universal banks have no barriers in terms of acquiring or investing funds, which results with depositors’ money being placed at huge risk. Banks issued dubious mortgage loans, which, after the drastic fall of real estate prices in the US, became non-performing. In late 1990s (in 1998, to be precise) the value of derivatives was two and a half times higher than the value of global GDP, and right before the crisis broke out, it was twenty times higher (Blundell-Wignall, 2011). Bearing in mind that in most countries

Bank of England

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upravo male banke (njih oko 9.000) koje nisu imale svoje afilijacije čija je osnovna delatnost poslovanje sa hartijama od vrednosti (tj. koje se nisu bavile investicionim bankarstvom). Isto tako, kriza krajem osamdesetih u kojoj stradaju prvenstveno štedno-kreditna udruženja (njih preko 700), koja su bila usko specijalizovana i nisu se bavila poslovima investicionog bankarstva, suzbija tvrdnju da je univerzalno bankarstvo kao takvo a priori generator najnovije finansijske krize. Veliki bankarski sistemi pružaju klijentima „uslugu po meri“ (tailor-made service) i imaju mogućnost da ih, zahvalјujući ekonomiji obima, servisiraju po znatno nižim troškovima nego što bi to činile manje specijalizovane banke.

Bez obzira na činjenicu da li je univerzalno bankarstvo najveći krivac za aktuelnu krizu ili samo jedan od faktora u nesrećnom spletu okolnosti, ne bi trebalo zanemariti i koristi koje proističu iz ovakvog koncepta i, uopšte, iz inovacija na finansijskom tržištu. Regulatori ne bi smeli da u potpunosti suzbiju podsticaje za razvoj finansijskih inovacija i da preteranom i prestrogom regulacijom suzbiju interes banaka da se bave osnovnim i srodnim bankarskim poslovima. Treba naći pravu meru između sprečavanja „kockarskog“ ponašanja banaka, s jedne strane, i nesputane slobode tržišta, s druge strane.

Da li univerzalne banke doprinose privrednom rastu?

Istorijski pregled razvoja bankarskog sektora na najznačajnijim finansijskim tržištima pokazuje da su banke imale veliku ulogu u njihovom privrednom razvoju. Banke postaju glavni finansijeri najvećih korporacija, naročito u periodu industrijalizacije. Mobilizacija i efikasna alokacija finansijskih sredstava po definiciji pripada upravo intermedijatorima kao što su banke. Shodno različitoj genezi i strukturi bankarstva u Evropi i SAD, ova uloga dolazi više ili manje do izražaja u različitim zemlјama.

Veliki broj radova i istraživanja ukazuje na blisku vezu univerzalnog bankarstva, naročito njegovog investicionog dela, i privrednog rasta. Samo velike banke (ili sindikalizovane manje banke) u mogućnosti su da podrže zahteve za velikim iznosom finansijskih sredstava koji je potreban korporacijama za kapitalne investicije. Na primer, u periodu snažnog industrijskog

razvoja SAD (početak XX veka) izražena bankarska koncentracija (tj. mala konkurencija između banaka) zapravo je doprinela rastu i nije, što bi se na prvi pogled pomislilo, usporila razvoj nauštrb bankarskih profita (Mitchener i Wheelock, 2013). Svojom reputacijom i poverenjem koje uživaju u javnosti, velike banke imaju mogućnost da bez većih napora uvedu i podstaknu trgovinu novim instrumentima (Schilbach, 2013). Univerzalne banke omogućavaju nastanak i širenje finansijskih inovacija inicijalno za institucionalne klijente, ali ovi finansijski instrumenti vrlo brzo postaju popularni kod ostalih učesnika na finansijskom tržištu i tako doprinose razvoju čitavog društva. Treba izdvojiti instrumente zaštite (hedžinga) na deviznom tržištu kao finansijsku inovaciju namenjenu multinacionalnim kompanijama koja biva brzo i lako prihvaćena od strane ostalih učesnika. Poslovanje nemačkih banaka krajem XIX i početkom XX veka bilo je pretežno orijentisano na privredna preduzeća sa kojima se stvara vrlo blizak odnos i međusobno poverenje. Posledično, smanjuju se troškovi pribavlјanja informacija o preduzećima i na taj način se osvetlјava put nepoverlјivoj štednji da se lakše mobiliše.

Banke su u situaciji da temelјno sagledaju poslovanje preduzeća, da odaberu bolјe i lošije investicije i da sa tim informacijama mnogo jednostavnije privuku kapital. U Engleskoj je struktura finansijskog sistema bila više okrenuta poslovima sa hartijama od vrednosti i nije postojala tako bliska veza sa preduzećima kao što je bio slučaj u Nemačkoj. Posvećenost nemačkih banaka korporativnom sektoru u velikoj meri objašnjava mnogo brži rast industrijske proizvodnje u ovoj zemlјi pre Prvog svetskog rata. Komparativna analiza sa američkim finansijskim sistemom takođe potvrđuje veću posvećenost industrijskom razvoju i ukazuje na manje sistemske probleme finansijskog sektora u Nemačkoj. Za razliku od bankocentričnog nemačkog, američki finansijski sistem je više okrenut tržištu hartija od vrednosti, prvenstveno akcijama koje su uglavnom bile u posedu stanovništva. Ovo predstavlјa razlog više u prilog činjenici da je nemački finansijski sistem kroz smanjenje informacione asimetrije i preko veće korporativne kontrole u preduzećima omogućavao efikasniju alokaciju sredstava. Razvijeno američko tržište hartija od vrednosti je, s druge strane, afirmisalo veći nivo

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the government insures retail deposits, the only conclusion is that investment banks carelessly gambled with other people’s money, counting on it that, in case things go wrong, the government would have to intervene, using the tax payers’ money. The catchphrase “too-big-to-fail” has been popularized, referring to the existence of large and important financial institutions, like some investment banks, which have gotten so deeply incorporated into many sectors of economy that their bankruptcy would threaten to bring down the entire economy. Such an attitude additionally facilitates risky placements, because it is considered that the government, as a guarantor, would eventually have to intervene (thereby instigating moral hazard). This was to be seen in the latest example of bailing out the large banking systems, especially in the US (TARP), which has caused a lot of anger in the public, and brought the monetary and financial stability policy makers back to the path of dividing banks and introducing strict regulation.

However, the following also has to be taken into account. It is well known that many securities entail lower risks and higher liquidity compared to loans. Liquidity of securities enables banks to repackage their portfolio within a rather short period of time, thereby avoiding potential adverse effects of a drastic profit reduction. Enjoying the benefits of diversification, banks reduce their overall business risk, which would have been denied to them were they not entitled to do investment banking. Consequently, in their balance sheets they could only hold illiquid loans, suffering from much higher losses in case these loans become non-performing. The above analysis, to conclude, confirms that universal banking may have its advantages - i.e. a more successful management of the correlation between risk and profit.

What also speaks against the thesis on too risky operations of universal banks is the fact that universal banks are, in effect, subjected to monitoring (supervision) from two sides: depositors and securities owners. Therefore, the efficiency of their operations has to be higher. The experience of the US banking system has shown that in the period of Great Depression the first to go bust were small banks (about 9000 of them) which had no affiliations of their own

whose basic activity was trading in securities (i.e. banks which did no investment banking). Likewise, the late 1980s crisis which primarily hit savings and lending associations (over 700 of them), which were highly specialized and conducted no investment banking operations, disputes the claim that universal banking as such is a priori the generator of the recent financial crisis. Large banking systems provide tailor-made services to their clients, and thanks to the economy of scales, they are in the position to service them at the considerably lower costs compared to some less specialized banks.

Regardless of the fact whether universal banking is to be blamed for the current crisis or has just been one of the factors in an unfortunate turn of events, the benefits arising from this concept, and generally from financial market innovations, should not be neglected. The regulators should not entirely curb the incentives for financial innovations development, and should not let too strict a regulation discourage the banks’ interest in dealing with basic and associated banking operations. The true balance needs to be established between preventing the “gambling-like” behavior of banks, on the one hand, and the unrestrained freedom of the market, on the other.

Do universal banks contribute to economic growth?

A historical review of the banking sector’s development in the major financial markets has shown that banks played a huge role in their economic development. Banks became the main financiers of the largest corporations, especially in the industrialization period. Raising and efficient allocation of financial resources by definition belongs to no other than to intermediaries like banks. In line with the different genesis and structure of banking in Europe and in the USA, this role has been more or less prominent in various countries.

Many papers and studies indicate that there is a close connection between universal banking, in particular its investment segment, and economic growth. Only large banks (or smaller, syndicated banks) are able to support the requirements for huge amounts of financial funds, which corporations need for the purpose

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diversifikacije kao osnove za smanjenje rizika ulaganja (Levine, 1997).

U aktuelnoj svetskoj krizi istraživanje Dojče banke (Deutsche Bank) ukazuje da su najveći gubitak pretrpele visoko specijalizovane banke, bilo da su se bavile samo investicionim ili samo komercijalnim bankarstvom, a da su univerzalne banke imale manje finansijske probleme od njih. I dalјe se konsoliduju, ali su pretrplјene štete i gubici prvenstveno rezultat loše poslovne politike menadžmenta i loših odluka (Schilbach, 2013). U drugom istraživanju, u osnovi je potvrđena prethodna hipoteza, s tim što su loše odluke menadžmenta pripisane državnom vlasništvu u propalim nemačkim bankama (Dietrich i Vollmer, 2012). U sklopu teze o doprinosu razvoju zemlјe, zanimlјivi su rezultati istraživanja koje empirijski dokazuje da su univerzalne banke od 1989. do 2012. godine finansirale projekte rizičnijih i ujedno znatno produktivnijih korporacija od onih koje su finansirale komercijalne banke. Takođe, postoje dokazi o većoj efikasnosti poslovanja univerzalnih banaka i njihovom izraženom uticaju na disperziju prihoda u SAD (Neuhann i Saidi, 2013).

Prethodni argumenti još jednom ukazuju na pozitivne strane univerzalnog bankarstva, ukazivanjem na vezu između finansijskog razvoja i privrednog rasta i razvoja. To što je neka banka razvijena ili uklјučena u korporativne tokove ili u investiranje u hartije od vrednosti, ne znači unapred da je taj finansijski sistem loš i sklon izbijanju finansijske krize. Finansijski sistem, iako jedan od najvažnijih i najznačajnijih sistema u državi, ipak predstavlјa samo (jedan) segment razvoja ukupne privrede.

Treba imati u vidu specifičnosti malih zemalјa, pošto određena pravila koja važe u velikim državama ne važe za manje privrede. Tako se ukazuje na činjenicu da je za male privrede važno da zadrže manje tradicionalne banke, pošto će se u njima pre i lakše ispostaviti da su veće banke „prevelike da bi propale“ i da su izražena pretnja finansijskoj stabilnosti (Vallascas i Keasey, 2012).

Da li je jedan od motiva bankarskog ulaganja u preduzeća povećanje privrednog rasta? Nasuprot prethodnom razmatranju, ima stavova da bi bilo naivno bankarskom razvoju pripisivati bilo kakve zasluge za privredni razvoj. Ako do toga i dođe, to je samo slučajna

posledica sebičnog ponašanja banaka. Ako se ima u vidu rani razvoj američkog bankarskog sistema, naročito kroz poslovanje J. P. Morgana i Rokfelera, uviđa se ogroman uticaj koji banke vrše na kompanije, kako direktno tako i preko političkog lobiranja. Podatak o 126 direktorskih pozicija u 89 kompanija koji su J. P. Morgan i njegova banka imali, jasno ukazuje na veliku moć koju uživa mala grupa lјudi. Savremenici ovih događanja ukazuju na svemoć grupe oligarha koji kroje i prekrajaju zakone i propise po svojoj meri. Već je napomenuto da i čuveni Glas-Stigalov zakon više nastaje kao posledica privatnih previranja nego nužnog javnog interesa. Kroz svoje političko-rodbinske veze, Rokfeler lobira za ovaj zakon (iako će i njegova banka trpeti posledice) s cilјem da uništi svog konkurenta, o čemu je već bilo reči. Dakle, lični motivi, osvetolјubivost, lјubomora, gramzivost, pohlepa i nezasitost nekada su mnogo veći pokretači reformi i zakona nego bilo koji društveno opravdani faktori.

Da li su univerzalne banke u konfliktu interesa s klijentima?

U konceptu univerzalnog bankarstva konflikt interesa nastaje po definiciji jer je veoma teško razgraničiti poslovanje banke u interesu klijenta od interesa same banke. Poslujući sa hartijama od vrednosti, s jedne, i depozitima, s druge strane, univerzalne banke mogu da dođu u sukob interesa. Hartije od vrednosti, čiji su pokrovitelјi, banke prodaju svojim klijentima (deponentima) i time mogu da se, umesto na istoj, nađu na suprotnim pozicijama u transakciji. Naime, kao pokrovitelјi emisije, banke imaju interes da postignu što veću cenu kako bi pobolјšale reputaciju i povećale profit kao posrednici u emisiji hartija. S druge strane, imaju deponente u čijem bi interesu trebalo hartiju kupiti po što povolјnijoj ceni. Dakle, univerzalne banke se nalaze u situaciji da biraju između interesa dve grupe svojih klijenata (Ber i saradnici, 2001). Često u tom procesu prevare svoje komitente kojima prodaju hartije za koje očekuju pad cene. Ova praksa je, sem u Americi, evidentna bila sedamdesetih godina u Nemačkoj i to u nekoliko oblika. Najnovijom finansijskom regulativom sve veći značaj pridaje se baš ovom pitanju. Opisani konflikt interesa je jedan od glavnih uzroka finansijskih

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of capital investments. For instance, in the period of strong industrial development in the US (in early 20th century), prominent banking concentration (i.e. low competition among banks) actually facilitated growth instead of, as might have been expected, slowing it down for the sake of banking profits (Mitchener and Wheelock, 2013). Thanks to their reputation and the confidence of the public that they enjoy, large banks are in the position to easily introduce and boost trading in new instruments (Schilbach, 2013). Universal banks enable the creation and expansion of financial innovations, initially for institutional clients, but these financial instruments soon become popular with other financial market participants as well, thereby contributing to the progress of the society overall. Worth mentioning are the hedging instruments at the FX market, which were originally a financial innovation targeted at multinational companies, soon, however, accepted by other market participants, too. The operations conducted by the German banks in late 19th and early 20th century were mostly oriented towards commercial enterprises, with which they established a rather close relationship based on mutual trust. Consequently, the costs of procuring information about the enterprises are reduced, distrust is eliminated, and the road paved for easier savings mobilization.

Banks are in the position to closely examine the business of enterprises, to distinguish between better and worse investments, and use this information to attract capital in a much simpler way. In England the financial system’s structure was more securities-oriented, and there was no such close relation with enterprises as was the case in Germany. The dedication of the German banks to the corporate sector to a great extent explains the incomparably quicker growth of industrial production in this country prior to the First World War. The comparative analysis with the US financial system also corroborates higher dedication to industrial development, at the same time pinpointing some slight systemic problems in the German financial sector. As opposed to the bank-centric financial system in Germany, the US financial system was somewhat more oriented towards the securities market, predominantly shares owned by retail clients (households). This is an

additional argument in favor of the fact that the German financial system, through the reduction of information asymmetry and increased corporate control in enterprises, enabled a more efficient allocation of funds. The developed US securities market, on the other hand, promoted a higher level of diversification as the basis for mitigated investment risk (Levine, 1997).

In light of the current global crisis, the research by Deutsche Bank indicates that the biggest loss was suffered by highly specialized banks, whether they engaged only in investment or only in commercial banking, as opposed to universal banks which faced slighter financial problems. They are still consolidating, but the suffered damage and losses are mostly the result of bad business policy of their management and their poor judgment (Schilbach, 2013). Another research basically confirms the above hypothesis, the only difference being that the bad decisions of the management are ascribed to the state ownership in bankrupt German banks (Dietrich and Vollmer, 2012). As part of the thesis on contributing to a country’s progress, it might be interesting to mention the results of a research empirically proving that, between 1989 and 2012, universal banks financed the projects of riskier and, at the same time, more productive corporations, compared to those financed by commercial banks. Also, there has been evidence of higher business efficiency of universal banks and their prominent impact on the dispersion of income in the US (Neuhann and Saidi, 2013).

The above arguments reiterate the positive aspects of universal banking, by indicating the correlation between financial development and economic growth and progress. A fact that a bank is developed or involved in corporate flows or securities-based investments, does not necessarily mean that the concerned financial system is bad overall, or prone to financial crises. The financial system, though one of the major and most significant systems in a country, still represents just one segment of the entire economy’s development.

The specificities of small countries have to be taken into account, given that certain rules that apply in large countries does not apply to small economies. Thus, the fact is that for small economies it is important to keep less traditional

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problema poslednjih godina i to zahvalјujući potpuno različitoj kulturi investiranja koje imaju tradicionalne i investicione banke. Prve su konzervativnije i imaju veću odbojnost prema riziku, dok su ove druge okrenute špekulativnim i rizičnijim transakcijama.

Oni koji smatraju da nema konflikta interesa između banaka i investitora (deponenata) najčešće se pozivaju na reputaciju univerzalnih banaka. Loše savetovanje investitora brzo bi se pročulo i to nije u interesu nijedne strane. Gubitak reputacije je najveća kazna na finansijskom tržištu. Osetlјivi i lako ranjivi, investitori bi na informaciju o pogrešnom poslovnom savetu povukli svoja sredstva i premestili ih na bezbednije i pouzdanije mesto. Dakle, sukob interesa u dugom roku je nemoguć.

Da li univerzalne banke podstiču moralni hazard?

Moralni hazard podrazumeva preuzimanje prevelikog rizika i društveno neodgovorno ponašanje učesnika na finansijskom tržištu potkreplјeno ulјulјkavanjem u osećaj bezbednosti da neko čuva leđa ako stvari krenu po zlu. Univerzalno bankarstvo se u stručnoj literaturi neizbežno povezuje sa moralnim hazardom. To je posledica činjenice da se rizična ulaganja investicionih banaka finansiraju (delom) iz osiguranih depozita koje garantuje država, a garancije pruža i centralna banka kao kreditor u krajnjoj istanci. Značaj činjenice da su gubici dobrim delom zaštićeni, omogućava rasterećenje i konfor u investiranju, što po pravilu rezultira ulaganjem u visoko rizične projekte. I zaista, u viševekovnoj istoriji bankarskog sistema postoji puno primera pomoći države u kriznim situacijama. Veliki broj radova ukazuje na transmisiju moralnog hazarda iz oblasti bankarstva na realne privredne sektore, najviše zahvalјujući činjenici da se univerzalne banke nalaze u strukturi vlasništva preduzeća (Boyd, 1999).

Protivnici prethodnog stava smatraju da moralni hazard ne mora biti u direktnoj vezi sa univerzalnim bankarstvom. Više smisla ima vezivati ga za velike banke koje posluju pod okrilјem da su „prevelike da bi propale“ (too-big-to-fail) ili sa čisto komercijalnim bankama koje izvorno posluju uz državno osigurane depozite. Upravo na ovu činjenicu ukazano je

u američkom slučaju nakon Velike depresije tridesetih godina prošlog veka. Tada je, naime, država nametnula bankama obavezne rezerve, što je, uz državno osiguranje depozita, zapravo imalo suprotan efekat zamišlјenom - umesto da se smanji moralni hazard banaka, one su osetile da je finansijski sistem zaštićeniji i da mogu da se upuste u rizičnije poslove nego do tada (Mitchener i Richardson, 2013). I u ovom primeru se pokazuje da regulacija, i kada je dobro zamišlјena i motivisana, može da ima neželјene efekte.

Neizvesna budućnost: regulativa i preporuke

Novi zakon u SADNakon brojnih parcijalnih mera za spasavanje

finansijskog sistema, predloga, saveta i pravilnika, Sjedinjene Američke Države u julu 2010. godine, delom na osnovu Vokerovih pravila (Paul Volcker, američki ekonomista i bivši predsednik Fed-a, a od 2009. godine u savetodavnom telu predsednika Baraka Obame), koja se tiču bankarskog trgovanja, donose zakon o finansijskoj reformi (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) kojim se u potpunosti reguliše čitav finansijski sistem. Pored banaka, osiguravajućih kuća i penzionih fondova, zakon reguliše i rejting agencije kao i druge segmente finansijskog sistema. Najznačajnija promena u smeru rigoroznije kontrole banaka je Vokerovo pravilo o ograničavanju špekulativnih transakcija koje su identifikovane kao glavni uzročnici finansijske krize i potom recesije. Naime, komercijalne banke mogu se baviti trgovinom hartija od vrednosti u svoje ime, kao i ulaganjem u hedž fondove i ostale privatne fondove samo do 3% sopstvenog kapitala (proprietary trading, trgovina hartijama od vrednosti koju banka obavlja u svoje ime i za račun sticanja sopstvenog profita). Izvorno, Voker je predložio niz strožih ograničenja, ali nisu svi predlozi i pretočeni u zakon. Tako je pravilo prvobitno sugerisalo potpunu zabranu ulaganja komercijalnih banaka u investicione poslove u svoje ime, ali se ipak, pod političkim pritiscima i pritiscima raznih interesnih grupa - modifikovalo.

U pogledu odvajanja investicionog i komercijalnog bankarstva, novi zakon se poredi sa Glas-Stigalovim zakonom iz 1933. godine. Dok je na snazi bio stari zakon, dešavale su

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banks, because in these economies it might more easily turn out that major banks are “too-big-to-fail”, and that they pose a considerable threat to financial stability (Vallascas and Keasey, 2012).

Is facilitating economic growth one of the motives for banks’ corporate investments? As opposed to the above considerations, there are some opinions stating that it would be naive to ascribe any credits for economic growth to the development of banking. Even if it does happen, it is simply a random consequence of the selfish behavior of banks. If we bear in mind the early development of the US banking system, especially through the businesses of J. P. Morgan and Rockefeller, we become aware of the enormous impact banks exert on companies, both directly and indirectly by means of political lobbying. The information about 126 managerial seats in 89 companies which J. P. Morgan and his bank occupied, clearly indicates the huge power concentrated in the hands of a few. The contemporaries of these events try to draw attention to the almightiness of a group of oligarchs, tailoring the laws and regulations to suit themselves. It was already mentioned that even the famous Glass-Steagall Act was more a result of the private turmoil than of the necessary public interest. By means of his political and family ties, Rockefeller lobbied in favor of this law (although his bank was to suffer the consequences, too) with the intention of destroying his competitor, as was already explained. In other words, personal motives, revengefulness, jealousy, cupidity, greed, and insatiability were once much bigger drivers of reforms and laws than any socially justified factors.

Are universal banks in a conflict of interests with the clients?

Within the universal banking concept, a conflict of interests by definition occurs because it is very difficult to make a distinction between the operations conducted by a bank in its client’s interest and the bank’s own interests. Dealing with securities, on the one hand, and deposits, on the other, universal banks may face a conflict of interests. Securities, underwritten by banks themselves, are later sold by them to their clients (depositors), which may put them, instead of on the same, on the opposing sides of a transaction.

Namely, as underwriters, banks have it in their interest to achieve the highest possible price in order to improve the reputation and increase the profit as intermediaries in the securities issue. On the other hand, banks have depositors in whose interest it would be to purchase securities at the most favorable price. Thus, universal banks get into the position where they have to choose between the interests of two groups of their clients (Ber et al., 2001). Often in this process they trick their clients by selling securities whose price is expected to fall. Apart from the US, this practice was evident in Germany in the 1970s, when it took several forms. The latest financial regulations address this very issue as increasingly important. The described conflict of interests has been one of the major causes of financial problems in recent years, owing to the utterly different investment culture practiced by traditional and investment banks. The former are more conservative and have higher risk aversion, whereas the latter are oriented towards speculative and riskier transactions.

Those who believe that there is no conflict of interests between banks and investors (depositors) most often refer to the reputation of universal banks. The rumors of a bad piece of advice offered to an investor would spread all too quickly, and that is certainly not in the interest of either parties. Loss of reputation is a death sentence in the financial market. Sensitive and vulnerable, investors would, at the mention of poor business advice, withdraw their funds and transfer them into a safer and more reliable place. Therefore, a conflict of interests, in the long run, is practically impossible.

Do universal banks instigate moral hazard?Moral hazard implies that financial market

participants have undertaken excessive risk, and that they have been acting in a socially irresponsible way, lulling themselves into a false sense of security by believing that someone is there to watch their back if things go wrong. Universal banking is in literature inevitably associated with moral hazard. This is due to the fact that risky investments of investment banks are (partially) financed by insured deposits guaranteed by the state, although the guarantees are also provided by the central bank as the lender of last resort. The importance

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se parcijalne, ali ne i globalne turbulencije na finansijskom tržištu. Krajem osamdesetih godina kriza na berzanskom tržištu nije pogodila komercijalne banke, kao što bankarska kriza početkom devedesetih nije pogodila tržište hartija od vrednosti. To govori u prilog tezi da razdvajanje dva vida bankarskog poslovanja donosi diversifikaciju na globalnom finansijskom tržištu i umanjuje rizik finansijske krize. Razlog više za razdvajanje leži i u činjenici da su u poslednjoj krizi integrisane banke inficirale jedna drugu i prenele zarazu u svetske okvire.

Nije zgoreg osvrnuti se i na političke uticaje i pritiske pri uvođenju bilo kakvih novina i zakona od strane regulatornih vlasti na finansijskom tržištu. U univerzalnom bankarstvu to poprima ozbilјnije implikacije jer su u ovom slučaju udruženi interesi skoro svih učesnika: komercijalnih i investicionih banaka, penzionih fondova, osiguravajućih društava, investicionih fondova. Razdvojeni interesi i institucije ipak nemaju tako veliku pregovaračku snagu, a imaju manje finansijskih mogućnosti i motiva za lobiranjem i političkim pritiscima.

Međutim, najnoviji zakon u SAD nailazi na brojne kritike. Smatra se da će američke banke biti u inferiornijem položaju u odnosu na konkurentske inostrane banke koje nemaju takvu vrstu ograničenja, što može da dovede do nelojalne konkurencije. Nil i Vajt ukazuju na oprez pri analizi aktuelne regulacije u SAD i ukazuju na moguće posledice koje se sada ne mogu sagledati. Moguće je, prema njihovim rečima, da neke nove finansijske inovacije zaobiđu stroži regulatorni okvir i iniciraju neku novu krizu, krizu čija se obeležja sada ne mogu zamisliti (Neal i White, 2012).

Napori u Evropskoj unijiU Evropskoj uniji kriza je donela prelazak

iz labavije u sveobuhvatniju, precizniju i čvršću institucionalnu regulaciju. Naime, prethodna regulacija sprovođena je u okviru Odbora supervizora evopskog bankarstva (Committee of European Banking Supervisors), osnovanog 2004. godine, i imala je za cilj efikasniju primenu direktiva u oblasti bankarstva. Od 2011. godine nadležnosti pomenutog odbora preuzima Uprava za evropsko bankarstvo (European Banking Authority, EBA), koja, pored izrade regulatornih rešenja i promovisanja harmonizacije različitih

nacionalnih zakonodavstava u oblasti bankarstva, ima i moć da zabrani finansijske aktivnosti koje prete da ugroze finansijsku stabilnost u EU. Sredinom oktobra 2013. godine doneta je odluka o osnivanju Jedinstvenog mehanizma za superviziju (Single Supervisory Mechanism) do kraja 2014. godine, koji se u zvaničnim krugovima EU tumači kao prvi korak ka evropskoj bankarskoj uniji. Pod krovom Evropske centralne banke i EBA, Jedinstveni mehanizam za superviziju treba da se izgradi kao unifikovani sistem supervizije banaka evrozone (članstvo nije obavezno za zemlje EU izvan evrozone). Time se finansijska supervizija poverava centralnoj banci, što je velika promena u konceptu i praksi finansijske regulacije EU. Sistemski važne banke (utvrđeni su kriterijumi za razvrstavanje banaka) nadgledaće neposredno ECB a ostale, manje banke, nacionalne centralne banke. Planira se formiranje interventnog fonda za spasavanje velikih i sistemski važnih banaka, ukoliko su u budućnosti javi potreba za ovim vidom intervencije. Nedostatak ove inicijative je što druge finansijske institucije, osim banaka, neće biti pokrivene novih mehanizmom.

Nova regulativa u Velikoj BritanijiU septembru 2011. nastaje predlog reforme

bankarskog sektora Velike Britanije (Vickers Report). Najvažnija promena tiče se pojma ograđivanja ili izdvajanja (ring fence, odvajanje - ne i fizičko - dela imovine ili poslova kompanije ili banke u posebnu celinu koja posluje pod zajedničkim krovom i istim imenom sa ostalim sektorima matične kuće), koji najavlјuje potpuno novu eru u poslovanju britanskih banaka. Naime, tradicionalni bankarski poslovi sa stanovništvom i malim preduzećima biće potpuno izdvojeni iz osnovne bankarske delatnosti, bilo da je reč o komercijalnoj ili investicionoj banci. Finansijska podvojenost podrazumeva da odvojene celine ne mogu međusobno jedna drugoj pozajmlјivati sredstva ako ne ispune propisane kapitalne zahteve, ali mogu i dalјe koristiti prednosti ekonomije obima u pogledu infrastrukture. Namera je da se izvorni bankarski poslovi sa stanovništvom i malim preduzećima udalјe od „kazino“ investicionog poslovanja i korporativnog sektora. Time bi se smanjio ukupan sistemski rizik finansijskog tržišta i povećala stabilnost

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of the fact that losses are largely protected relieves investors of the burden, enabling them comfortable investing, which as a rule results in investments in high-risk projects. And indeed, in the several centuries’ long history of the banking system there have been numerous examples of government bail-outs in the times of crisis. A large number of papers elaborate on the transmission of moral hazard from banking into the real economy, primarily thanks to the fact that universal banks are part of the companies’ ownership structure (Boyd, 1999).

The opponents of the above opinion believe that moral hazard does not necessarily have to be directly linked to universal banking. It makes much more sense to associate it with large banks operating under the stamp of being “too-big-to-fail”, or with purely commercial banks conducting traditional operations with state-insured deposits. This was the very fact pinpointed in the US case following the 1930s Great Depression. At that time, namely, the state imposed required reserves on banks, which, alongside deposits insured by the state, actually backfired - instead of reducing the moral hazard of banks, it made banks feel that the financial system was better protected, allowing them to enter even riskier operations than until that point (Mitchener and Richardson, 2013). This serves as another example of how regulation, even when well-outlined and properly motivated, can still have undesired effects.

Uncertain future: regulations and recommendations

New law in the USAAfter many partial measures for the financial

system’s rescuing, proposals, suggestions and rulebooks, in July 2010 the United States of America, somewhat based on the so-called Volcker Rule (Paul Volcker, American economist and former Chairman of the Fed, and since 2009 Chairman of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama), referring to banking operations, adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, completely regulating the entire financial system. In addition to banks, insurance companies and pension funds, the law also regulates rating

agencies, and other segments of the financial system. The most noteworthy change towards a more rigorous control of banks is the Volcker Rule concerning the limitation of speculative transactions, which were identified as the main cause of the financial crisis and the subsequent recession. Commercial banks can engage in securities trading on their own behalf, and by investing into hedge funds and other private funds up to 3% of their equity (the so-called proprietary trading, i.e. securities trading that a bank conducts in its own name and for the purpose of acquiring its own profit). Originally, Volcker suggested a series of stricter limitations, but not all of his proposals were actually converted into the law. Thus, his rule initially suggested a complete prohibition of commercial banks engaging in investment operations in their own name, but, under political pressure and the pressure of various other stakeholders, it was eventually modified.

In terms of the division between investment and commercial banks, the new law has been compared with the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. While the old law was in force, turbulences did occur in the financial market, but only at the regional, and not at the global level. In late 1980s, the crisis at the stock exchange market did not hit commercial banks, just like the banking crisis in early 1990s did not hit the securities market. This speaks in favor of the thesis that the separation of these two modes of banking brings diversification at the global financial market and reduces the risk of a financial crisis. Additional reason for such separation lies in the fact that during the latest financial crisis integrated banks infected each other, spreading the contagion on the global scale.

It would not be amiss to briefly comment on political influences and pressures when any innovations and laws are getting introduced by the financial market’s regulatory authorities. In universal banking this has more serious implications, due to the joined interests of almost all stakeholders: commercial and investment banks, pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds. Separate interests and institutions do not possess such a huge negotiating power, at the same time having lesser financial possibilities and fewer motives for lobbying and exerting political pressures.

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čitavog finansijskog sistema. Na ovaj način će investiciono poslovanje biti vidlјivije i transparentnije, tako da će regulatorima i ostalim učesnicima na tržištu biti lakše da utvrde i reše probleme ovog sektora bez uzurpiranja odvojene celine. Ova reforma će po svemu sudeći biti uklјučena u buduće regulatorne akte s obzirom na činjenicu da ima potpunu podršku britanske vlade. Efekti će biti nadgledani do kraja 2015. godine, a potpuna primena kod banaka do kraja 2019. godine.

Kao svaka reforma i ova nailazi na niz kritika i sugestija. Zanimlјiv je stav gospodina Pola Vokera koji u intervju za londonski The Telegraph iznosi sumnju u fukcionalnost ovog sistema. Naziva ga „brodom za lepo vreme“ jer smatra da ovaj sistem neće funkcionisati ako stvari krenu nizbrdo i da njime ne mogu da se zaštite poreski obveznici u potpunosti. Uslovi fukcionisanja izdvojenih britanskih banaka nisu sasvim jasni i precizni jer postoji prirodna težnja da u kritičnim situacijama izdvojene celine hrle svojoj matici (Volcker, 2013). Smatra se, takođe, da postoji veliki manipulativni prostor koji se bankama ostavlјa u procesu razdvajanja, zatim se postavlјa pitanje adekvatnosti i nivoa kapitala koji se zahteva, i koji bi izdvojeni sektor morao da ostvari. Ne treba zanemariti ni velike fiksne troškove potrebne za instalaciju nove informacione platforme u izdvojenom delu. Takođe, vrlo je teško ostvariti opisano izdvajanje bankarskih poslova jer postoje zajednički poslovi trgovine derivatima ili svopovima sa veoma dugim rokom dospeća koje nije lako ni jednostrano odvojiti, tako da će biti potrebno organizovati ekipe stručnjaka koji mogu takve rizike proceniti ili pomoći oko upravlјanja i zaštite od njih. Ne treba zanemariti ni povećane troškove radne snage koji bi se pojavili odvajanjem delova banaka.

U EU glavi još jedan regulatorni tok odvija se u skladu sa preporukama formulisanim u tzv. Bazelskim standardama. Bankarskom poslovanju se nameću stroži zahtevi za kapitalom, likvidnošću i leveridžom putem Bazel III standarda čija je implementacija u toku. Povećanje zahteva za kapitalom i regulacija

njegove adekvatnosti, kao i ostala ograničenja, uvedena su u cilјu smanjenja moralnog hazarda menadžera velikih banaka.

Umesto predloženog skoro potpunog podvajanja komercijalnog i investicionog bankarstva, postoje predlozi da se uvede stroga supervizija investicionih banaka, jer bi svaka podela mogla da donese više štete nego koristi finansijskom sistemu. Bazelski standardi su zapravo alternativa podvajanju jer svojim strogim kriterijumima i zahtevima za kapitalom, koji raste u skladu sa preuzetim rizikom u aktivi banke, predstavlјaju regulaciju upravo investicione (kritične) grane bankarskog poslovanja, ali bez potrebe za formalnim razdvajanjem.

U poređenju sa uvođenjem Glas-Stigalevog zakona 1933. godine, kada je iznos kapitala kod investicionih banaka drastično opao, a ekonomski rast ipak nastavlјen, efekti najnovijeg regulatornog procesa biće vidlјivi tek posle izvesnog vremena. Da li će uticati na smanjenje transakcija na tržištu kapitala, poskupeti kapital, povećati ili smanjiti finansijsku stabilnost i ekonomski rast - ostaje da se vidi u budućnosti. Potrebno je izvesno vreme kako bi se predložene mere i izglasani zakoni implementirali i još više vremena kako bi se efektuirali i pokazali svoje dobre i loše strane. Već sada ima oštrih kritičara ove regulative i smatra se da će ona dovesti samo do oseke kapitala i manje raspoloživog novca za investiranje preduzeća (Allen i saradnici, 2013).

Teško je odrediti pravu istinu i jednog krivca za poslednju finansijsku krizu i pored dramatičnih ekonomskih posledica. Bio je to splet okolnosti i dešavanja koji su u interakciji doveli do razornih događaja. Za početak će stradati univerzalne banke, delimično i zbog toga što javnost želi da se nešto radikalno promeni, da izgleda kako se problemi rešavaju u korenu. Pri tome, previđa da su u krizi uvek lјudi, a ne sistemi, glavni krivci. Budućnost će pokazati da li će teški okovi u nogama finansijskog sistema moći da preduprede izbijanje narednih kriza i da li će stati na put sebičnoj i gramzivoj strani lјudske prirode ili su zakoni i regulativa i ovom prilikom pokucali na pogrešna vrata.

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Nevertheless, the latest law in the US has been met with a lot of criticism. It is generally believed that the US banks will be inferior to their competitive foreign banks, operating under no such limitations, which might lead to unfair competition. Neal and White (2012) call for a cautious analysis of the current US regulations, highlighting potential consequences that cannot be seen at the moment. According to them, it is possible for some latest financial innovations to find a loophole even in this stricter regulatory framework, initiating some new crisis, whose characteristics are beyond our imagination for now (Neal and White, 2012).

Efforts in the European UnionIn the European Union the crisis has brought

a shift from a more relaxed into a comprehensive, precise and stricter institutional regulation. Namely, the regulations used to be under the jurisdiction of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, established in 2004, and were aimed at a more efficient implementation of EU directives in the field of banking. In 2011 the jurisdictions of the concerned Committee were taken over by the European Banking Authority (EBA), which, in addition to preparing regulatory solutions and promoting the harmonization of various national legislations in the field of banking, also has the power to ban financial activities threatening to jeopardize financial stability in the EU. In mid-October 2013 a decision was passed on the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism by the end of 2014, which has in the official EU circles been interpreted as the first step towards the European Banking Union. Under the auspices of the European Central Bank and the EBA, the Single Supervisory Mechanism should be built as a unified supervisory system for the Euro zone banks (membership is not mandatory for

the non-Euro zone EU countries). Thereby is financial supervision entrusted to the central bank, which is a huge change in the concept and practice of the EU financial regulation. Systemically important banks (according to the defined criteria for banks classification) will be directly supervised by the ECB, and the other, smaller banks will be supervised by the national central banks. It has been planned to form an intervention fund for the saving of large and systemically important banks, if a need arises in the future for this kind of intervention. A drawback of this initiative, however, is that financial institutions other than banks will not be covered by the new mechanism.

New regulations in Great BritainIn September 2011 appeared the draft reform

of the banking sector of Great Britain (the so-called Vickers Report). The most substantial change was expressed by the term ring-fencing (to ring-fence, to separate - not physically - a section of assets or operations of a company or bank, into an isolated whole, functioning under the same roof and under the same name as other segments of the parent company), announcing a completely new banking era for the UK banks. Namely, traditional banking operations with retail clients and SMEs were to be completely separated from the basic banking activities, regardless of the fact whether it was the case of a commercial or an investment bank. Financial separation implies that the separated sections cannot lend funds one to another if they fail to meet the prescribed capital requirements, but they can still use the benefit of the economy of scale in terms of infrastructure. The intention was for traditional banking operations in the retail and SMEs segments to be kept away from “casino” investment operations and the corporate sector. This would mitigate the overall systemic risk of the financial market and increase the stability of the entire financial system. Moreover, thereby would investment banking become more visible and transparent, making it easier for regulators and other market participants to detect and solve this sector’s problems without usurping the separate sections. In all likelihood, this reform will be integrated into the future regulatory by-laws, given the fact that it enjoys the full support

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Literatura / References

1. Allen, Bill, Chan, Ka Kei, Milne, Alistair and Thomas, Steve, „Basel III: Is the cure worse than the disease?“, International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, Vol. 25, 2013, 159-166.

2. Barber, Lionel, The fall of universal banks, The Economist, Internet, http://www.economist.com/news/21566439-exit-rock-star-bosses-fall-universal-bank, 03/07/2013.

3. Ber, Hedva, Yafeh, Yishay and Yosha, Oved, „Conflict of interest in universal banking: Bank lending, stock underwriting, and fund management“, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 47, 2001, 215-241.

4. Blundell-Wignall, Adrian, „On the Necessity of Separating Investment and Commercial Banking“, Intereconomics 2011, Hamburg, Germany, Vol. 6, 2011, 299-312.

5. Boyd, H John, „Expansion of commercial banking powers... or, universal banking is the cart, not the horse“, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 23, 1999, 660-684.

6. Cabral, Ricardo, „A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis“, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 37, 2013, 101-117.

7. Casserley, Dominic, Harle, Philipp and Macdonald, James, „Should commercial and investment banking be separated?“, McKinsey & Company Report, London, 2009.

8. Dietrich, Diemo and Vollmer, Uwe, „Are universal banks bad for financial stability? Germany during the world financial crisis“, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 52, 2012, 123-134.

9. Greenspan, Alan, The Age of Turbulence, Penguin Press New York, 2007.

10. Heffernan, Shelagh, Modern Banking, John Wiley and Sons, 2005.

11. Krugman, Paul, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008, W. W. Norton and Company New York, 2009.

12. Levin, Ross, „Financial Development and Economic Growth“, Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, Vol. 2, 1997, 717-718.

13. Mitchener, James, Kris and Richardson, Gary, Does “Skin in the Game” Reduce Risk Taking? Leverage, Liability and the Long-Run Consequences of New Deal Banking Reforms“, Explorations in Economic

History, rad prihvaćen za objavlјivanje, Internet, www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.kobson.nb.rs:2048/science/article/pii/S001449831300017X? np=y, 04/07/2013.

14. Mitchener, Kris James and Wheelock, David, „Does the structure of banking markets affect economic growth? Evidence from U. S. state banking markets“, Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 50, 2013, 161-178.

15. Neal, Larry and White, N. Eugene, „The Glass-Steagall Actin historical perspective“, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 52, 2012, 104-113.

16. Neuhann, Daniel and Saidi, Farzad, The Rise of the Universal Bank: Financial Architecture and Firm Volatility in the United States, http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/pdfs/Seminars/123f-saidi.pdf, 03/07/2013.

17. Pavlović, Vladan i Ljumović, Isidora, „Finansijska regulativa u SAD kao pokretač krize“, Računovodstvo, 53, 5-6/2009.

18. Pelaez, M. Carlos and Pelaez, A. Carlos, Financial Regulation after Global Recession, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

19. Rothbard, Murray, A History of Money and Banking in the United States, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2002.

20. Schilbach, Jan, Universal banks: Optimal for clients and financial stability, Deutsche bank research, Internet, http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_ENPROD/PROD0000000000296976.pdf, 03/07/2013.

21. Tabarrok, Alexander, „The Separation of Commercial and Investment banking: The Morgans vs. The Rockefellers“, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 1998, 1-18.

22. Vallascas, Francesco i Keasey, Kevin, „Bank resilience to systemic shocks and the stability of banking systems: Small is beautiful“, Journal of International Money and Finance, 31, 2012, 1745-1776.

23. Volcker, Paul, Ring-fencing banks is not enough, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9561624/Paul-Volcker-ring-fencing-banks-is-not-enough.html, 03/07/2013.

24. Walter, Ingo, „Universal banking and financial architecture“, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 53, 2013, 114-122.

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of the UK Government. The effects are to be monitored by the end of 2015, and the full implementation in banks is expected by the end of 2019.

Just like every other reform, this one, too, has been met with a series of objections and remarks. Particularly interesting is the position of Paul Volcker, who, in his interview for London’s The Telegraph, expressed his doubts in the functionality of this system. He said that it would only work in “fair weather” conditions, but not when the weather was foul, adding that it would not be able to fully protect the tax payers. The conditions of ring-fenced UK banks’ functioning are not completely clear and precise, because there is a natural inclination of isolated units in critical situations to flock back to their parent (Volcker, 2013). Moreover, it is believed that there is a huge space for manipulation left to banks in the ring-fencing process, which is accompanied by the issue of capital adequacy and required level of capital that the ring-fenced divisions must achieve. What should not be neglected either are the enormous fixed costs of installing new IT platforms in the ring-fenced divisions. Furthermore, it would be rather difficult to actually achieve the intended separation of banking operations, due to some common operations of trading with extremely long maturity derivatives or swaps, which would hardly be easy to separate just like that. Instead, this would require the organization of special teams of experts, competent for assessing or managing these risks, and providing protection against them. What also has to be taken into account are the higher costs of labour force, generated by the ring-fencing of certain banks’ divisions.

In the EU another regulatory flow has been implemented in line with the recommendations formulated by the so-called Basle standards. The Basle III standards, currently being implemented, have imposed higher capital, liquidity and leverage requirements to banks. The increased capital requirements and regulation of capital adequacy, along with other restrictions, have been introduced in order to curb the moral hazard of large banks’ managers.

Instead of the proposed, nearly complete

division of commercial and investment banking, there have been some proposals for the introduction of a strict supervision of investment banks, because any division could bring more damage than benefits to the financial system. The Basle standards are actually an alternative to this separation, given that their rigid criteria and capital requirements, increasing in line with the bank’s risk weighted assets, regulate the investment (critical) banking segments, eliminating the need for formal division.

In comparison with the implementation of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, when the amount of investment banks’ capital drastically declined, despite the continued economic growth, the effects of the latest regulatory process will only be visible after a certain period of time. Whether it will cause a decline in capital market transactions, whether capital will become more expensive, whether financial stability and economic growth will go up or down - it remains to be seen in the future. Some time is required for the proposed measures and adopted laws to be implemented, and even more time for them to become effective and demonstrate their advantages and disadvantages. Even now, however, there are some harsh critics of these regulations, believing that they would only cause an outflow of capital, leaving less available money for companies’ investment activities (Allen et al., 2013).

It is difficult to fathom the true state of affairs, and point a finger at a single culprit for the recent financial crisis, even with such dramatic economic consequences. It was an unfortunate turn of events and developments whose interaction led to some devastating consequences. For a start, universal banks will go under, partly because the public wants to see some radical changes, making it believe that the problems are being solved by addressing their root causes. All the while, we overlook that in a crisis, people, not systems, are always to be blamed. The future will show whether these heavy chains bounding the financial system will be able to prevent some other potential crises from happening, and whether they will put a stop to the selfish and greedy side of the human nature, or whether laws and regulations are, once again, barking up the wrong tree.