The Roman Army in Late Antiquity: Solider and Society

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As long as man has existed conflict, violence and wars have also existed. This over

the passage of time has led to professional armies, during Rome’s dominance of the

Mediterranean world standing armies were used for the first time. This new development by

Rome set the standard that is still reflected in the armies of the modern world. The history of

any armed force, by definition, makes it very easy to get bogged down in statistics; numbers

of men deployed, casualties, supplies, and after action reports. The experience, actions and

history of a single unit or person can often become lost when looking at the bigger picture,

and, when individuals are mentioned in the histories it is almost always an officer. This is

quite understandable; commanders conduct the army at the highest level and have the

ultimate burden of responsibility should the units under their command fail, it only stands to

reason that they should also get the lion’s share of the glory too; after all, commanders win

fame through successful campaigns. The objective of this essay is to move the focus away

from the commanders and the faceless legion and focus instead of the common soldier. It

would be impossible, of course, to single out one individual for the purpose of this essay, nor

would it give the reader a broad enough spectrum into the military society in Late Antiquity.

The essay will first discuss the recruitment of men into the military. This was the first step

into a society that was very different from the one they had know, and, naturally enough

many men were reluctant to join it, the essay will explore the reasons for this; stating that it

was a combination of apathy of the potential recruits and the administration, lack of interest

in the service itself and all that it entailed (such as travel, combat and garrisoning), good

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prospects in civilian life, abuse by officers and in general the declining moral fibre of the

military that drove the army to conscription. Consideration will also be given to the types of

men that joined or fled from military life. Another aspect is the recruitment of Roman citizens

and barbarians; citizen recruitment is fairly simple to deal with, however, the huge influx of

barbarians into to army during this period is a very important point to the essay, were

relevant, the far-reaching ramifications of the barbarian recruitment will be discussed. The

numbers of men recruited and what class of soldier there were will also be discussed, as this

was a factor in the overall society of the army. The essay will then move on actual service

and society of the military. It is important to look at how men socially related to each other,

and, how this directly related to morale, cohesion, and combat effectiveness. It will also be

outlined how the decline of these social relations led to the decline of the military in general

which contributed to the downfall of the Empire. Other factors of the military society and

their effect on the men will also be considered, such as, the collegia, awards, battle standards

and grants of citizenship. Late Antiquity is an interesting era to research when dealing with

the Roman army because on the decline and ultimate defeat of that society. The latter part of

the essay will focus on this factor, first looking at the decline of the standard of command.

This was, perhaps, the most significant decline in the military society; as the essay will show,

many the commanders in Late Antiquity had neither the skill nor inclination to perform their

duties well, and were often more concerned with the extortion of the local civilians and their

own men, than a successful military campaign. When dealing with commanders, the question

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of barbarians and were their loyalties lay will be considered. Next the essay will look at how

this break down in the command structure led to a general lack of discipline, cohesion and

morale throughout the army. This, in turn, led to a complete breakdown of the military

society and the armies’ fighting ability. Finally the essay will consider how and why the

soldiers of Late Antiquity turned on the civilian population they had once been part of. It will

be pointed out, that while many abuses toward civilians were a knock on effect of other

abuses, many too were the work of the troops themselves. Where it is relevant, and possible,

the essay will use Egypt as a reference. This is possible due to the large amount of papyri

found there.

Before getting into the main text of the essay, it is important to recognise the main

source of information on Egypt in Late Antiquity. The papyri found in Egypt give historians,

in many ways, a unique insight into the workings of a Roman province. The dry climate has

preserved many examples for modern historians to study. This mean that the artefacts found

in Egypt, such as papyri, had a better chance of being preserved. It is also important to

remember that, after the fall of Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire ruled in Egypt for many

centuries. This mean that, unlike most of the former Roman Empire, (Europe, for example),

Egypt was quite peaceful in the middle ages, and thus allowed more evidence to survive.

However Roger Bagnall, in his book, Egypt in Late Antiquity, is quick to point out that his

sources of papyri were limited to finds at only a handful of Egyptian cities; namely,

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Oxyrhynchos, Hermopolis, Antinoopolis, Panopolis, Arsinoe and a few others.1 It is clear,

then, when dealing with papyri, that one must understand that while they did not suffer the

“dark ages” as many stone inscriptions in Northern Europe did, the papyri will not answer all

questions about the ancient world; indeed, they may raise more than they answer in some

cases. Bagnall claims that very few cities of Roman (or even Hellenistic) Egypt have been

excavated.2 Compounding this issue are several other problems. Many of the potential

papyri- rich sites have been looted, or, in some cases, rebuilt, and much of the delicate papyri

have been lost forever.3 Bagnall cites the Nile itself as another source of the destruction of

papyri, stating that the Nile’s slow but steady shift east over the past two millennia has, no

doubt, wiped out many villages and towns rich in papyri.4 There is another problem with the

papyri that Bagnall points out: In part, it is to do with the many cultures and races that passed

though Egypt; this is no great surprise when one considers that Egypt was one of the hubs of

trade in the Roman world, the gateway to Africa and the Far East. The result of this is that

papyri of Late Antiquity can be found in many different languages. The most common

language is Greek;5 no great surprise as Egypt had very strong links with the Greek world all

throughout the history of the Roman Empire. Other languages, such as Coptic, Latin, Syriac

and Arabic, were also found quite frequently.6 This creates something of a problem for the

translators, not just in the modern period but also for those in centuries gone by. The fact that

1 Roger Bagnall, Egypt in Late Antiquity. (Princeton 1996.) 5 Hereafter referred to as “Bagnall.” 2 Bagnall, 63 Ibid, 64 Ibid, 6-75 Ibid, 76 Ibid, 7

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there was no universal language in Egypt at the time means that many of the papyri are

poorly edited and translated.7 It seems that, while there are, in relative terms, plenty of papyri

sources, many of them are worthless, when considered as academic historical documents.

Egypt was considered by many to be the jewel in the crown of the Roman Empire,

and the Roman Republic before it. Throughout the life of the Empire, it was one of the richest

provinces, and Rome relied on it for many essentials of its economy, such as grain, pottery

and jewels. Egypt, then, always needed a strong garrison to protect Rome’s interests there. In

the 4th ‘Century AD there were over 20,000 men stationed in Egypt.8 The military was a

constant presence in the lives of the people living in Egypt. It is possible that the population

may have felt more secure with a permanent legion or garrison; however, in their day-to-day

life, it seems that the military could be a source of annoyance (perhaps no surprise

considering that many criminals ended up in the legion9). Soldiers were sometimes billeted in

private homes; while this was, no doubt, the case all throughout the Empire, it most likely

disrupted the household’s life, and was quite unpopular.10 The billeting of troops may have

had some far-reaching effects as well. When the army moved into civilian quarters, the

distinction between military and civilian became blurred; the army lost some of its elitist

boundaries, this may have led to a weakening of the spirit of the army, and a lack of cohesion

7 Ibid, p78 Bagnall, 1749 Ramsay MacMullen, The Legion as a Society, (Yale University, 1984,) From Histoira 33, 441. Hereafter refferd to as “MacMullen, The Legion as a Society.”10 Bagnall, 173

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in general, which, in turn, led to a lower moral.11 This is a point that the essay will return to

later.

Civilians had to assist the army on a communal level as well. According to Bagnall,

the local populace often had to provide the army with transport, and local officials were

expected to assist officers in their duties.12 Despite the often uneasy relationship between the

civilian population and the military, in particular when the two required to come together, (as

shown above,) the legion was, in many ways, a society unto itself. The army, it seems, was

somewhat sealed off from civilian life,13 and this was not just the case in Egypt, nor Late

Antiquity, but all throughout the Empire, and in all centuries. With that said, though, it is

worth mentioning that in Egypt, c.346AD,14 there was an even greater distinction between the

spheres of civilian and military society. It was during this time that there was, in some ways,

a move towards what we today might refer to as a “modern” court or justice system. The

appointment of the riparius as a civic official allowed to the military to move away from

police work and enacting law enforcement on a local level.15 Up until that point, the army had

been quite involved in policing Egypt, and not without risk; one soldier writes in the second

century AD; “we are working hard because we are suppressing the uproar and anarchy in the

11 Pat Southern and Karen Ramsey Dixon, The Late Roman Army, (B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1996,) 169. Hereafter referred to as “Southern and Dixon.”12 Bagnall, 17313 MacMullen, The Legion as a Society, 441 14 Bagnall, 17315 Ibid, 173

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city.” That soldier had himself been badly wounded.16 This left the army more time and

resources to administer and govern their own society.

The recruitment for the army in Late Antiquity mainly came from two sources:

citizens of the empire, and so called barbarians.17 This dual resource of recruitment many

have existed for several reasons. Perhaps the simplest reason is that the nature and style of

warfare, and thus the formation and character of the Roman army were changing. The

barbarian fighting style must have been more adapt to this change in the fighting style, it was,

after all, the barbarian hordes that would sack Rome three times in the fifth century.18 The

recruitment of the barbarians could also be seen as a natural progression, in terms of the

recruitment of auxilia throughout the long history of the Empire. Even in the, (long since

passed,) days of the Roman Republic, and from then on, troops were gathered from the

provinces and from allies. These men did not usually serve in the legion, but were, in many

cases, cavalry or secondary fighting men. Another reason why the recruitment of barbarians

may have been more attractive to the Empire was the reluctance of young Roman citizens to

join the army. Many young men who could afford to, it stand to reason that many of these

men would have come from the equestrian class, as they would have been more likely to be

16 Roy W. Davies, Service in the Roman Army, (Edinburgh University Press, 1989,) 175. Hereafter referred to as “Davies.”17 Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, The Later Roman Empire 248-602, Vol. 1 (Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986,) 614. Hereafter referred to as “Jones.”18 R.C. Blockley, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of The Later Roman Empire, (Francis Cairns, 1981,) 109-111. Hereafter referred to as “Blockley.”

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wealthy, illegally paid huge sums of money to gain exemption from military service.19 While

citizens of the Empire were always going to have to do their civic duty and defend the

borders, the barbarians were a ready source of manpower to fill the ranks of the auxilia, if not

the legion, and one which the Empire snapped up. There were also some levels of society

which were not eligible to join the army, namely slaves, and those who were in a profession

that was “disgraceful,” such as slavers, innkeepers and cooks.20 The military clearly wanted

to keep, who they felt to be, undesirable individuals out of the service, to stop them debasing

military values. There were two major exceptions to this in Late Antiquity; Gildo’s rebellion

in 397AD, and Radagaesus’ invasion of Italy in 406AD saw a great call for the enlistment of

slaves.21 In a pinch, the Roman military had no problem selling out its integrity.

The recruitment of men to the military was quite a stringent legal affair. Much of the

recruitment in Egypt, and throughout the Empire, was local22, though it should be noted here

that some historians differ on what exactly “local” means. Le Bohec claims that the term

“local” is often miss-used by historians, and should only be applied to troops who were

stationed in a camp quite near to the town they were from.23 Whether this is correct or not,

one can assume, that, on the largest scale, a historian considers “local” to be the province in

general, and on the smallest the local town or village. In charge of the whole affair was

19 Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army, (Routledge, 2000,) 71. Hereafter referred to as “Le Bohec.”20 Le Bohec, 7321 Jones, 61422 Bagnall, 17723 Le Bohec, 68

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always a high-ranking official, or a high ranking member of society; mostly, this was the

governor of the province in which the recruitment was taking place; but it could also be

another high-ranking man, such as a proconsul.24 The exact numbers of armed personnel

serving in the Roman army in late antiquity is quite difficult to ascertain. This is rather as one

would expect. In this period the Roman Empire was in decline; given the great invasions,

migrations and general turmoil that came with this decline, it is to be expected, with

hindsight, that many of the ancient sources would become scattered and destroyed. None the

less, there are some conflicting figures for the strength of the Roman army in Late Antiquity.

The sixth-century historian, Agathias, claims that earlier emperors could call on a total of

645,000 men;25 clearly, this figure must be treated with caution. Who exactly is Agathias

referring to when he mentions “earlier emperors?” Another sixth-century source is John the

Lydian; he gives a figure of 435,266 men in service during the reign of Diocletian.26 Zosimus,

also a sixth-century historian, gives a figure of 286,000 men for half of the Empire in the year

312 AD.27 Despite the quite high fluctuation in figures, it seems that an estimation of a

standing army of around 500,000 troops is reasonable for the period. This figure can be

roughly divided in two; half going to the legion and half to the auxilia. Therefore, one can

assume that the Empire, during peace-time at least, needed around 18,000 fresh recruits per

year; Le Bohec notes that one must also consider the navy and the garrison of Rome in this

24 Le Bohec, 7025 Agathias, The Histories, 5.13.7. (Walter de Gruyter, 1975) Translated by Joseph D. Frendo, taken from www.googlebook.ie26 John the Lydian, “On the Months” 1.27. Taken from Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, 158. 27 Zosimus, 2.15.1-2. Taken from Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, 160

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figure.28 It stands to reason that, in times of war, or even in times of heightened tensions with

the many barbarian tribes that bordered the Empire recruitment levels would have been

higher. It is also important to consider that troops were not recruited from every province in

every year; some were taxed in lieu of this. (the aurum tironicum as it was known.29)

Some of these new recruits would have been volunteers, mainly those who had little

chance of work in civilian life. However, the military was not a very popular choice for

young men in general. Bagnall writes that many young men, in particular from the rural

areas, were not at all interested in leaving civilian society in favour of the military one.30

MacMullen agrees with him saying: “But there was little inducement to enter the legions for

a young man with any prospects at all in civilian life, whether he belonged to the longer

established citizen ranks or came from more of the remote territories.” 31 One of the most

obvious exceptions to this rule would be the sons of retired soldiers. The Later Roman

Empire did not have a caste system per sae; however, the mentality of the Empire worked in

such a way that the son of a soldier was more likely to join the legion. It also seems to be the

case that the son of a lower-ranking officer, such as a centurion, would have been more likely

to be promoted to his father’s rank, if he chose to join up.32 It seems, at the beginning of this

28 Le Bohec, 7129 Michael Whitby, The Cambridge ancient history. late antiquity: empire and successors, A.D. 425-600 (Cambridge University Press, 2000.) 284. Edited by, Averil Cameron and Michael Whitby. Hereafter refferd to as “Whitby.” Also see Jones 61530 Bagnall, 17531 MacMullen, 44132 Le Bohec, 68.

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period, that Diocletian enacted a law in 313AD which stated that sons of veteran were

obliged to serve, if physically able. Constantine, in 326AD, relaxed this law somewhat.33 It

would seem, then, that the more willing recruits into the legion must have come from the

urban poor. This is no great surprise. The urban poor had always been a great source of

manpower to the legions, since Marius raised an army of them to fight King Jugurtha of

Numidia in 106BC.34 One can imagine that life in the legion would have been quite an

attractive prospect to many of the Empire’s poor, both urban and rural. The legion offered the

young men an amount of security in their lives; the legion could, for the most part, keep them

fed, and, if they were involved in a successful campaign they could acquire some level of

wealth through looting and war booty. More important than this, though, after twenty-five

years of service a man in the legion was given a lump-sum of money, land-holdings, or

citizenship. 35 Despite this, however, it seems that, in general, many young men of the urban

poor were not at all keen to undertake a stint in the legion. As stated above, there were

c20,000 troop based in Egypt in the fifth century; most of them in key locations such as

Babylon, Memphis and Philai, as well as trouble “hotspots,” such as the desert borders.36 The

garrison population of Egypt was between 0.5-0.8 percent of the total population of the

province. Bagnall writes that this is about the average for the Empire as a whole in Late

Antiquity.37 This meant that, the recruitment needed for a garrison that was relatively small

33 Jones, 61534 Sallust, Jugurthine War 86. Also see, Aullus Gellius, Attic Nights 16.10.10. 35 David Divine, The North-West Frontier of Rome (MacDonald & Co Publishers, 1969,) 15. Hereafter referred to as “Divine.”36 Bagnall, 17437 Ibid, 174

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compared to the total population of Egypt, maybe 2,000 troops per year.38 However, what

was true for the rest of the Empire was true in Egypt; many young men simply did not want

to become part of the legionary society. There can be little doubt that the harsh treatment of

recruits went some way towards this. There was something of a wave of paranoia in the

military that new recruits would go absent without leave at the first chance. The result of this

was that the recruits were intimidated, and treated almost as prisoners, until they were fully

inducted into the army. One example of this from Egypt saw a young fourth-century

conscript and his companions “...placed in prison each night as they were transported

northward along the Nile valley.”39 As a result of this kind of treatment, much of the time the

recruits did as much as they could to get away from the army, while still receiving the

enlistment bonus of thirty solidi;40 “The recruit’s ideal, to be sure, was to keep the cash and

somehow escape the actual service...”41The military, of course, conscripted young men into

the legion, although there is some question as to whether this was the norm, or was only

invoked in times of crisis.42 Whatever the case, there is no doubt that conscription was, at

least at times, in place. It is also most likely that those who were conscripted were, in general,

more likely to desert.

38 Bagnall, 17439 Lee, 8040 Bagnall, 17641 Jones, 616. Also see Bagnall, 17642 A.D. Lee, War in late antiquity : a social history, (Blackwell Publishers, 2007,) 80. Hereafter refferd to as “Lee.”

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All recruits, whether volunteers or conscripts, were subject to certain requirements.

Perhaps the most important were health and fitness. In Egypt these examinations were in

conjunction with a local census called the epikrisis.43 The young men who were eligible for

service were usually between eighteen and twenty-one;44however, this could be extended up

to thirty-five for sons of veterans who had eluded their initial call-up.45 Recruits also had to

be of a certain height; in 367AD this requirement was 5ft 7in.46 There also must have been

other restrictions of weight, eyesight and education. This seems to have been the case, for

there were two main standards of troop in the legion.

There were two main types of troops in the Roman army in the period of Late

Antiquity; the comitatenses and the limitanei,47 although there were several other types,

including scholae, candidate and excubitores.48 This essay will only discuss the first two.

Under the law of Valens, in 375AD, the fitter men were enrolled in the comitatenses and

those who were not as fit went to the limitanei.49 The limitanei troops were stationed at the

frontier regions were as the comitatenses were considered the elite field army.50 It is clear

that, while there was, (and in many ways still is,) a division between the two groups each

needed the other to function fully. The limitanei were the anchor, to hold the front line

43 Le Bohec, 7244 Ibid, 7345 Jones, 61646 Ibid, 61647 Whitby, 28848 Ibid, 29149 Jones, 61750 Lee, 109

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against any barbarian expedition into Roman lands; this seems reasonable, considering the

increased Germanic raids in this period.(cn) As well as combat, their role was also to protect

local community interests, such as keeping communication-lines open, and to be the physical

presence for the Empire’s sphere of influence.51 They made up around two-thirds of the

Eastern Empire’s forces, but only about half of those in the Western Empire.52 The limita-

nei’s popularity and position within the Empire seems to have waxed and waned with each

Emperor, although this may have been true with every aspect of the Empire. None the less,

the limitanei could be used to attack the Emperor, observers sometimes commenting that the

troops were poorly trained and showed a lack of commitment to provincial security.53 This

does beg the question that, if the army of Late Antiquity was being used as a political

weapon, how much did that corruption damage or hinder reforms, recruitment and moral?

And thus, how significant was it in the fall of the Empire? Their position could also depend

on each Emperor’s grasp of strategic situations; Justinian re-established the limitanei in parts

of Africa, to protect the frontiers of newly-conquered provinces,54 while Diocletian gave up

land south of the First Cataract of the Nile, as the cost of keeping troops there was too high.55

If the limitanei were the anvil, then the comitatenses were the hammer. These heavy elite

troops were not designed to hold territory, but were sent to troubled areas to destroy enemy

51 Whitby, 28952 Ibid, 29253 Ibid, 28954 Ibid, 28955 Southern and Dixon, 27

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armies.56 The comitatenses’ use as a mobile force is also evident in the fact that each unit had

five hundred cavalry attached to it, thus giving the army more mobility.57

The recruitment of barbarians into the later Roman army is worth a mention on its

own; about half the troops in the Roman army were auxilia, many of whom were

barbarians.58 While these troops came mainly from Germanic tribes, there were also Atecotti

from Ireland and Scotland, Sarmatians from north of the River Danube, Lazi, Tazani,

Iberians, Armenians and Persians.59 Many, but by no means all, of the barbarians who served

in the Roman army at this time were prisoners of earlier wars with Rome, who had been

allowed to settle on Roman lands in return for service in the army; this system was called

laeti.60 The Emperor Valens seems to have been one of the first to instigate this practice; he

allowed many Goths settle in the Empire in 376AD, no doubt viewing them as a future source

of manpower.61 The settlement and recruitment system was on a surprisingly large scale;

Jones writes that fourteen cities in Northern Italy, and some twenty in Gaul, were subject to

barbarian settlement.62 The recruitment of the barbarians living in the Empire also gave the

Emperors an economy boost. The barbarians, and the provinces in which they settled, were

56 Ibid, 29057 Peter Salway, A History of Roman Britain. (Oxford University Press, 1993) 24258 Ian Haynes, Millitary service and cultural identity in the Auxilia. Taken from “The Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series Number Thirty Four: The Roman Army as a Community.” This work includes papers of a conference held at Birkbeck College, University of London on 11-12 January, 1997. Edited by, Adrian Goldsworthy and Ian Haynes.(Cushing-Malloy, 1999,) 165. Hereafter referred to as “Haynes, Military service and cultural identity in the auxilia.”59 Jones, 61960 Ibid, 62061 Lee, 8062 Jones, 620. Also see Lee, 81

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subject to the same conscription as the rest of the Empire. This meant that, in certain years,

the conscription could be bypassed, with the payment of the aurum tironicum. Given the high

numbers of barbarians settling in the Empire at this time, this would have, no doubt,

generated quite a lot of gold for the coffers of Rome. The barbarians, though, had, in general,

a great tradition of military service and warfare, which made their young men very good

fighters, and they seemed more eager than their Roman counterparts to join the army.63 This

was maybe because they were often placed into specialized units within the auxilia, such as

archers from the eastern nations, and cavalry from Gaul and Spain,64 the most common troops

were most likely the Germanic ferderati.65 The standard of living in the army, especially

during peace-time, also helped persuade many barbarians to volunteer for the army. Another

reason may have been the differences in how warfare was viewed in the tribal nations,

compared to the Roman Empire. Many young men in Rome could work as butchers or stone

masons, and see very little or no combat in their whole lives. In the barbarian tribal society,

the situation was not quite the same. The more turbulent life-style meant that, for at least

some parts of the year, all fit men were expected to soldier. This was even truer of the mass

invasions and migrations of Late Antiquity, with the whole tribe moving and fighting as one.

(cn?)This seems more likely, when it is taken into account that the kingdoms that succeeded

the Roman Empire in the West, such as the Frankish or Visigothic, had no standing army.66 It

is clear that, in times of crisis, any available fit men would be brought to arms. The fighting

63 Lee, 8464 Le Bohec, 9765 Whitby, 29066 Whitby, 288

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prowess of the barbarian can also be found in the concessions that the Roman army made to

these men; many barbarian units were allowed to fight with their traditional weapons and

armour; however, they still fought in the Roman fashion, and with discipline. As Divine

writes:

“The auxiliaries tended to use the weapons of their provinces: the curved sword of the Dacians, the

Syrian bow of the Hamians, the sling of the Balearics. The cavalry was drawn primarily from the great horse

tribes, but fought in formation and under discipline.”67

In some cases these barbarian troops would be put under the command of a Roman general; it

seems clear that this would have happened most often in the regions deemed more important,

or more likely to revolt, by the senate and Emperor. The historian Ammianus remarks though

that the Roman officers commanding barbarian troops was becoming less common by the

period of Late Antiquity.68 One could draw many conclusions from this, perhaps stating how

the decline or limited numbers of Roman officers, or indeed Roman citizens, in command of

the barbarians led to a break-down in discipline, morale, and thus fighting ability. This may

not have been the case, however. Jones, citing Ammianus, writes that there is little or no

evidence to suggest that the Germanic troops were not reliable, even when fighting their own

people.69 This only tells of the German peoples, though, a people who, at this time, were not

fully unified, and fought many wars among themselves. There is less information on the

67 Divine, 1568 Jones, 62169 Jones, 621

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many other races that fought in the Roman army at this time. One wonders if they showed the

same loyalty as the Germans. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the Germans, at least,

were quite inclined to join the military, and be loyal to the Roman Empire. Despite this

apparent loyalty, (at least for the Germans) and the good fighting ability of the barbarians,

some Roman traditionalists believed that their influx into the military weakened the army as a

whole.70

While recruitment was often local, service often was not; senior personnel, and even

entire regiments, could be transferred from one end of the Empire to another, depending on

the political climate.71 That is not to say that new recruits would always be shipped to far-off

provinces. There is a least one document stating that, in 508AD, two brothers were serving as

clibanarii in their own home town of Arsinoe.72 That said, troops were often sent to the far-

flung corners of the Empire, and this many have been, at the very least, part of the reason

why many young men had no desire to enter military life. There is evidence to suggest that, at

the very least, some of the troops garrisoning Egypt were barbarians, with many from

northern Europe and beyond. Artefacts found at different sites confirm this; one of the most

striking being an openwork baldric phalerae, which is a buckle on a sword belt, it depicts a

70 Whitby, 29071 Ian Haynes, The Roman Army as a Community, Taken from “The Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series No. 34: The Roman Army as a Community.” This work includes papers of a conference held at Birkbeck College, University of London on 11-12 January, 1997. Edited by, Adrian Goldsworthy and Ian Haynes.(Cushing-Malloy 1999) 7. Hereafter referred to as “Haynes. The Roman Army as a Community.”72 Southern and Dixon, 72

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she-wolf suckling Romulus and Remus. The inscription on the piece is important; it reads;

Leg(ionis) VI Ferr(atae) F(idelis) C(onstantis) Fel(icis).73 While there is no date on the

baldric, it is documented that, at the end of the fourth century the 8th Squadron of Vandals, the

7th Squadron of Samatians, the 4th Cohort of Juthungi, the 1st Squadron of Abasgi, the 1st

Squadron of Franks, the 1st Squadron of Quadi, the 11th Cohort of Alamanni and the 7th

Cohort of Franks were stationed in Egypt.74 In the reign of Diocletian there also may have

been an elite cavalry unit, the equites Dalmatae.75 Some modern historians, though, are keen

to point out that, over time, many of these cohorts and squadrons would have become racially

diluted with the local population.76 The evidence is there that many units were shipped out to

garrison provinces far from their homes, even, if over time, they did gain recruits from the

local areas. These young men, and in particular those who were rural and worked the land,

surely felt a strong bond to their local community.(cn? If possible?) Travel, for both business

and pleasure, was not at all rare throughout the Empire in late antiquity(cn?) It was however,

for the most part, reserved for nobles, equites, and merchants, most of the lower or even

middle-class would make few journeys out of their local areas. It must have been an immense

culture-shock for those young men who did enrol, or for those who could not escape the

service, to be taken perhaps hundreds of miles across the known world. There was good

reason for this dispersal of troops throughout the Empire; many, many times over the history

of the Empire a popular general had convinced his men to proclaim him Emperor and march

73 Southern and Dixon, 10874 Notitia Dignitatum (28, 31 East) taken from the website www.fordham.edu. (Internet medieval source book)75 Southern and Dixon, 1676 Lee, 84

20

on Rome, more often than not leading to a bloody civil war. The so called “Year of the Four

Emperors,” in 69AD,77 stands out as the most striking example of this. These measures did go

some way to stop private armies attacking ones loyal to Rome, but it never fully eradicated

the problem.78 Language surely must have been a problem for newly-trained troops that were

stationed far from home; several languages were commonplace in the Empire, and thus the

legion, with Latin and Greek being the most common.79 It stands to reason that for “basic”

orders, for example, the language of the legion would have been Latin or Greek, depending

on the legion’s location and ethnic majority.80 It is clear, though, that the officers must have

needed to command a good “working knowledge” of other languages, if they were to

converse with the men under their command. This seems more likely when one considers that

bilingualism, and even trilingualism, were quite common in some areas of the Empire,

(Beirut, Alexandria and Marseilles being some examples.81) This, however, does not mean

that it was common across the board; it clearly would not have applied to the majority of

poor, and people living in rural areas. Indeed, MacMullen is keen to point out that “In the

back-country, local dialects persisted for a long time...”82

77 Kenneth Wellesley, The Year of the Four Emperors, (Routledge, 2000,) 178 Southern and Dixon, 1579 Ramsey MacMullen, Provincial Languages in The Roman Empire. From the American Journal of Philology. (1966) 1 Hereafter referred to as “MacMullen 1966.”80 Le Bohec, 72. Also see Haynes, Military Service and Cultural Identity in the Auxilia, 169-17181 MacMullen, (1966) 182 Ibid, 1

21

The Roman army offered a new lifestyle to those recruits who accepted it. They

entered a society that was cut off, for the most part, from the civilian one they had known.

This has been the case for most regular armies throughout history, but the Roman army, more

than most, lived in its own society.83 Despite this fact, the Roman military was in almost

constant contact with civilians. Many permanent or semi-permanent camps attracted a whole

host of civilians to sell their wares, even in harsh landscapes.84 The two groups were

“mutually useful and symbiotic.”85 On occasion though friendships could cross military-

civilian lines, to what extent depended on a range of factors: language, ethnic makeup,

localized guerrilla warfare or a history of recent conquest.86 That said as the period of Late

Antiquity went on, the military began to act more aggressively towards the civilian

population. This military society that the recruits entered could, by its very nature, be a hard

one, and was subject to great corruption. It is quite difficult to gauge just how much of

closeness was felt between the men of the legion; MacMullen points out that “...inscriptions

offer little help. They record only moments when units acted as such both during service and

afterwards.”87 Young men who are snatched from civilian life and thrust together in

potentially dangerous situations have no choice but to make friends quickly; that is common

in armies all throughout history. The training they underwent changed their mindset, in most

83 Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War 100BC-200AD, (Oxford University Press, 1998,) 252. Taken from the website, www.books.google.ie/books. Hence after referred to as “Goldsworthy.” Also see MacMullen The Legion as a Society, 44184 Goldsworthy, 25285 MacMullen, 44586 Haynes, “The Roman Army as a Community.” 1187 MacMullen, 442

22

cases; ideas of how to behave in the military society were formed during this time.88 From the

moment they entered the military they marched, paraded and undertook ceremonies with their

unit;89 this went a great way toward unit cohesion. It also conditioned them into having good

social relationships with their peers, which no doubt made adjustment to military life much

easier. Living space was very cramped when the men were in standing camps; with only nine

square meters per man and even less in marching camps.90 The troops referred to those

whom they liked, (in most cases, these were the men they lived with,) as contubernales which

means “tent-mate,”91 with eight men to a tent.92 This, though, was far more than just a word;

it was an idea and a philosophy. Indeed, one gets the sense that it was almost a rite of passage

to be called contubernales by one’s fellow soldiers. The soldiers who considered themselves

to be contubernales lived and died beside each other; their bonds saw them eat, work, march

and fight together.93

Another term used by soldiers was commilito, or “fellow soldier;” this term was often

favoured by officers why wished to flatter the men.94 Some groups of men formed unofficial

groups within the army, called collegia, these groups practiced rituals to different Roman

Gods,95this means that the troops identified with their Gods through the legion. Perhaps more

88 Goldsworthy, 24989 Ibid, 25590 MacMullen, 44491 The Vindolanda Tablets, Taken from the website, www.vindolanda.csad.ox.ac.uk. Tablet 331.92 Goldsworthy, 25793 MacMullen, 44394 Ibid, 44395 Haynes, “The Roman Army as a Community.” 6. Also see, Goldsworthy, 256

23

importantly than this, the collegia gave a solider some sense of security in his life; the

collegia provided members with aid, in particularly for funeral benefits in the event of their

death.96 The collegia also had some more practical benefits. The collegians often broke down

the normal divisions within the army; at least one collegia, CIL VIII 2553, had optiones,

valetudinarii, pequarii, a libraries and discentes capsariorum in its ranks.97 This was very

important for a soldier wishing to network; much of the advancement and promotion in the

Roman army was through benefactor and patronage, networking was vital to this process, the

collegians gave aspiring soldiers the opportunity to do this.98 There were other official sub

divisions within the legion; the auxilia and cohorts were organized out of the tribes or regions

from which they came.99 This system would have been very beneficial to unit cohesion and

the military society in general. It seems the bonds men formed in their time in the army did

not end when they left the service; many left their worldly goods to their contubernales, or

the legion they had served in.100 Men are more likely to bond with each other if they have

something in common; this can be as simple as being of the same tribe, or from the same

region. In the earlier periods of Roman history there were some cases of whole regiments

raised en masse from one area, and so soldiers would have found themselves serving

alongside and under men of similar cultural backgrounds.101 In Late Antiquity, though, the

huge influx of barbarians into the army meant these divisions became racially diluted; one

96 MacMullen, 44397 Haynes, “The Roman Army as a Community.” 1098 The Vindolanda Tablets, Taken from the website www.vindolanda.csad.ox.ac.uk. Tablet 250. Also see Haynes, “Military Service and Cultural Identity in the Auxilia.” 16799 MacMullen, 445100 Goldsworthy, 256101 Haynes, “Military Service and Cultural Identity in the Auxilia.” 166

24

small unit is recorded as having “...one African, one Norican, two Britons, one Raetian, three

Spaniards and twelve Gauls.102This is just one example of the huge racial dilution of the

Roman army. This dilution reduced the cohesion of the army and thus its combat

effectiveness; men are quite unwilling to fight and die with people they have no social

connection with.

When the mechanics of the military society did work it brought men together in a

very meaningful way. The best known, official, sub-society within the legion was the

century; it was also most likely the most important to the men, as it was the smallest, and

therefore the most intimate, and they had a “...strong feeling of identity and belonging.”103

This was a place where the men could call home away from home. The century was not just a

social group, though; the social connections formed in that society turned the group into an

efficient fighting machine. The men proudly displayed their cohort’s number on their shields,

not only for display purpose, but also to maintain contact with their contubernales, should the

battle-line degenerate into a mêlée.104 The shield seems to have being a very important

element of the soldier’s kit; not only did it have obvious combat value, it was, in many ways,

his cohort’s signature, it showed others that he was part of that unit and all its

accomplishments. It was a symbol of his belonging to something that was greater than

himself, the military society. If Tacitus is to be believed, then the only men who volunteered 102 Ibid, 166103 MacMullen, 446104 Ibid, 446

25

for the army were those who had failed completely in civilian life;105 this may be even truer of

Late Antiquity; given the lack of willing volunteers in that period, those who did join up must

have had no other option and no prospects in civilian life. The shield, though, was not the

only symbol that the soldiers used, the sword and sword-belt were also very important; they,

perhaps more than anything else, identified a man as a soldier; showed that he was a

representative of imperial power, and had an elevated position in provincial society.106 The

fact that so many belts and swords were lavishly decorated is evidence as to how important

they were.107 Indeed, symbols were an integral part of the military society, and were very

important to the men on a personal level. Commanders often awarded troops who had shown

bravery in battle, this was a great honour, and men fought hard for these awards, called

dona108 in Latin. Men often went to great lengths on the battlefield, taking great risks, and

even entering into single combat to gain such rewards.109 They were worn by the men with

pride; in battle it was usual for men to advance with all their honorific symbols showing.110

These symbols would have shown that, not only had the man who wore them been accepted

into his centuries’ society, but he was among the best of them; it reflected well on the man

and on the unit as a whole. This in turn gave the man increased self-respect and confidence,

which had a knock-on effect throughout his whole unit. Vegetius claims that the desire to be

105 Goldsworthy, 252106 Haynes, Military Service and Cultural Identity in the Auxilia, 167107 Haynes, The Roman Army as a Community 10108 Goldsworthy, 253109 Ibid, 253110 MacMullen 447-449

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granted these rewards also helped keep the men in line during a campaign.111 Whole units

could be granted honours, as well as individuals; these usually came in the form of names or

new battle standards.112 The battle standard was held in very high regard by the auxilia; many

of their standards had themes from their own country of origin, which no doubt, improved

their identity with their unit. The auxilia were also sometimes rewarded in other ways; these

rewards could include a grant of citizenship.113 The importance of these symbols also had

another effect; it improved the men’s appetite for combat, by introducing a level of rivalry

between units.114 This would have also gone some way to improve the social relations in

smaller groups such as the centuries; it gave the troops something extra to pull together for. It

would be wrong to go so far as to say it gave men a common foe; they were all part of the

Roman army, after all, and, if nothing else, it united them in their desire to “beat” other units.

Good commanders, it seems, often played on this fact; during rousing speeches they would

remind the troops of what their units had achieved before they were in service.115 If he was

good enough, the commander could mould his men to his way of thinking in regards to how a

solider should act.116 Troops, in general, would also fight harder when a commander they

respected was looking, and thus earn his praise, and perhaps a reward.117 Although well out of

111 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, 3.26. From the work Readings in Late Antiquity: A Source Book, By Michael Mass, (Routledge, 2000,) 93112 Goldsworthy, 254113 Ibid, 255114 MacMullen, 450115 Ibid, 450116 Goldsworthy, 252117 Goldsworthy, 258

27

the time-frame of this essay, Caesar often found this to be true;118 it can be safely assumed

that this was the case throughout the history of Rome.

The morale of the later Roman army is a very important issue to address when

discussing the military as a society, and when looking at the downfall of that society. The

Roman army was, for several hundred years, the elite in Europe, if not the world. In Late

Antiquity, though, the Romany army was no longer the elite; it was been overtaken by the

barbarian peoples and the desert-dwellers. Hand in hand with the physical and tactical decline

of the army went the decline in the morale of the troops; indeed, the two are inseparable.

Soldiers who are relatively happy will, in general, have higher morale; this improves their

loyalty, discipline, fighting ability and their will to win, all of which could be summed up

with the catch-all: esprit de corps. Morale is a hard factor to gauge. It may be easy to see

when an individual’s morale is low; however, when looking at this factor spread out over a

unit of men numbering in the thousands, to say nothing of a standing army of hundreds of

thousands, it becomes far more difficult. Other factors, such as cultural psyche and tradition,

as well as group-dynamics, come into play, as well as psychology and sociology. This is

further exacerbated by the fact that these young men have been, in many cases, exposed to

the stresses of combat. A good example of this comes from the First World War: the German 118 Gaius Julius Caesar, “The Gallic Wars” 3.14 Translated by W. A. McDevitte and

W. S. Bohn. From the

website, www. classics.mit.edu

28

High Command were frustrated by their attempts to gauge the morale of the British

Expeditionary Force. The British often sang songs about their desire to return home the

Germans saw this as a decline in British morale. This was not however, the case; British

morale remained relatively high during the war; the singing was simpley a means of

entertainment for the troops.119 That said it is quite difficult to compare the morale of soldiers

form the First World War to Roman soldiers from Late Antiquity; indeed, it is difficult not to

use terms such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. One must remember that these terms did

not exist in late antiquity; indeed, much of the thought process that the modern world has

about combat did not exist. Combat today is a very different affair from that of that era.

While modern armies are very well trained, it is a rather simpler affair to kill someone with a

rifle with a sword; an astute student could be effective with a rifle in a few hours, whereas

combat with a sword takes a much longer time to master. This prolonged training not only

conditioned the body, but also the mind for combat; aggression was a characteristic praised in

young men in the Roman Empire. War was not the plague upon humanity that it has now

become; it was a path a young man could use to gain wealth and glory, as well as doing his

duty for the good of the Empire. That is not to say the men did not suffer, and feel the effects

of prolonged combat; they were human, after all. Like modern armies, those of the later

Roman Empire fought some gruelling engagements, with the Battle of Adrianople, in

378AD,120 being perhaps the worst of the late Empire. Historians and scholars agree that

119 David Englander, Mutinies and Military Morale, From The Oxford Illustrated History of The First World War, Edited by Hugh Strachan. ( Oxford Universty Press, 1998,)196120 Southern and Dixon, 170

29

defeats like this did lead to a general “war weariness”121 throughout the Empire, not just in

military society, but also in the civilian one; though studies in the twentieth century have

shown that the a dip in the morale of civilians will lead to a dip in morale of soldiers.(cn) In

Late Antiquity the Empire was under constant attack from all sides, it should not be taken

that there were constant large battles on all fronts; it was more of a case that, on any given

day, Roman troops somewhere would have contact with hostile forces. How much combat a

solder of the Empire saw depended, in general, on where he was stationed. It stands to reason

that troops on the Rhine and Danube would have seen more action then those in Italy; of

course, these troops could be put on the line in times of crisis. Some troops, it seems, finished

dealing with one border raid just in time to be sent to another one.122 This, in turn, led to a

general decline in morale of these exhausted men. There were many other, much more

specific, reasons, though, for the decline of the morale of the army. One of the most visible

effects of this was the way the army bonded, or lack thereof. The influx of the barbarian

troops into the army had a big effect on the cohesion of the men, and thus affected the combat

effectiveness of the army in general. As shown above, military society was a very sensitive

and complex entity, where men shared a level of interaction that was not readily found in

civilian life. Ramsey MacMullen states that unit cohesion goes beyond banners, symbols and

military regalia; these things on their own are not enough; a man must place high value on his

121 Ibid, 176122 Procopius of Caesarea, The Secret History. (University of Michigan Press, 1961) section 24. Taken from the website www.fordham.edu (internet medieval sourcebook) hence after referred to as “Procopius.” (not full ref!!)

30

fellows, and the society he serves in, for him to be an effective solider.123 There was, it seems,

in the Roman army-much as in modern armies-a need by men “not to let the side down;” it

was truly a case of serve in the army for your country, but fight for the man next to you.

Some level of unit cohesion was natural for men who spent a lot of time together, and even

more likely when under the stresses of combat; the smaller the body of men, the higher the

level of cohesion seems to be the general rule.124 The high numbers of barbarians entering the

Roman army in Late Antiquity upset this cohesion somewhat. As stated above, the barbarians

made fine soldiers, both for the Romans and for their own people, they were however not

Roman. The distinction between Roman and barbarian was, at this time, blurring;125 the racial

difference was still very much there though. Though the military did try to keep Romans and

non-Romans separate, interaction did happen,126 and (as stated above) many units were

mixed, depending on many factors such as demand for troops and a unit’s location over a

period of time. Where units are mixed there was, it seems, a detrimental effect to the unit and

the army as a whole.127 It should be noted, though, that some scholars believe that the decline

of the Roman army was more to do with barbarian lack of standardization in training and

discipline than racial diversity.128 None the less, there is evidence that others (such as

MacMullen) are correct. He cites a work by a Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, written

after the Second World War; Men Against Fire. The point that Marshall makes in the extract

123 MacMullen, 447124 Ibid, 449125 Southren and Dixon, 169126 Ibid, 169127 Ibid, 169128 Southern and Dion, 169

31

is that soldiers, in general, fear losing the respect of the men they know and respect more than

their lives.129 The opposite of this is also true; if a soldier was in combat with men whom he

did not know, had no respect for, or had no social identity with he was less effective in

combat, and more likely to flee from the face of the enemy. As MacMullen puts it, this factor

determined whether men would fight or run.130 Another, if less obvious, effect on cohesion

was the marked increase of troops being billeted in civilian dwellings. The billeting was more

cost-effective, of that there is little doubt; but it cost the army in other ways. The distinction

between soldier and civilian was broken down; this led to general weakening of the unity of

the army. Even more important than this, though, when billeted the army would have been

spread out over a wide area of the city. The men would not have been in as close contact as

they would have been if they were in camp; this led to a breakdown of relations between

men, and, perhaps more importantly, officers.131 The troops billeted were so troublesome to

civilians that at least one group, living in Thebaid, Egypt built a hostel specifically to house

the soldiers.132

Military leadership in Late Antiquity was in general decline, at all levels. Good

leadership was paramount in battle, as it was often the only thing between a victory and a

rout. However, it was just as important to have good leadership in peace-time. In peace-time

129 Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, Men Against Fire. (New York, 1947) Taken from Ramsay MacMullen, “The Legion as a Society.” 130 MacMullen, 449131 Southern and Dixon, 169132 Whitby, 489

32

an army can easily find itself with little to do; idle men can become restless, and restless men

(who are armed) can become dangerous. A good officer can command how men behave on

an individual level, and thus on a group level.133 The Roman army in Late Antiquity still

could be an effective fighting-force, true, it has lost some of its best men by this stage, none-

the-less it was still a force to be feared, when led properly. Southern and Dixon claim the

men serving were “...as courageous and potentially effective as their counterparts had been in

the preceding centuries of Rome’s history.”134 The Roman army did not forget how to fight;

but it was not being led as well as it once had been. A leader must inspire his troops to face

battle; often being right there with them is enough; the great Republican general Gaius Julius

Caesar was famous for this. The officers of Late Antiquity seemed to lack the back-bone of

their forefathers; Ammianus makes reference to some officers showing cowardice in battle.135

Most commanders, it seems, were more interested in financial gain than being effective

leaders.136 The wages awarded to officers by the government in this period was “paltry,”

according to Southern and Dixon. Indeed, given the long history of corruption, on all levels,

both civilian and military, one gets the feeling that the government almost expected

133 Goldsworthy, 248134 Southern and Dixon, 174135 Ammianus 24.3.1-2 History of Rome, Vol. III. William Heinemann Ltd,

London, U.K. 1952. Translated by,

John C. Rolfe. Edited by, T.E. Page, E. Apps, W. H. D Rouse,L. A. Post and E. H. Warmington

.

136 Southren and Dixon, 175

33

commanders to supplement their wages by extortion and war booty. Most of the officers went

at this task with gusto. Not only did they steal from civilians, but also, in some cases, from

the men in their charge. The historian Libanius paints a bleak picture for troops on the

receiving end of this corruption;

“Then there is what they [the commanders] can get from the regimental ration returns: here they can

keep the dead alive and themselves draw rations in the dead man’s name... the gold that should properly stay in

the hands of the men... finds its way into those of the commander. As a result the fight man is pauperized, his

morale lowered, as he wears his scraps of boots and his ghost of a uniform. And quite often the contribution he

makes is from his belly, so that they lead into action starving bodies.”137

This corruption by the commanders had far-reaching ramifications for the troops of the

army, civilians, and thus the Empire at large. It had a huge impact on morale in the army;

troops need their commanders do be better than they are, not only on the battle-field but in

every aspect of life, only that way can they respect and be willing to kill and die for him.

However, commanders can only be put on a pedestal when they earn the respect of the men;

something as simple as knowing a man’s first name can be enough to endear a commander to

his men.138 No man could respect a commander that was stealing from him so openly; this

meant that he was less likely to follow orders, and less likely to fully commit to combat.

When this is the case right across the Empire, it is clear that combat-effectiveness was greatly

reduced. The corruption of the officers in turn corrupted the enlisted men; their needs were 137 Libanius, Selected Orations. 31.2. Taken from Southern and Dixon, 175.138 MacMullen, 449

34

not being catered for by the systems in place, so the troops used their own corruptions to do

so. This does not mean, though, that all Roman soldiers were good men, that were forced into

this situation by their commanders; many, no doubt, would have turned to corruption of their

own accord. The corruption of the officers set off a chain of events, that not only reduced the

armies’ effectiveness, but also created a sense of loathing between the civilian and military

societies.139

The corruption of the army in Late Antiquity led to a general lack of discipline, which

further degraded the military society, and its morale. Any large bodies of men (and. in

particular those who are armed) will be undisciplined. It is, in a way, only natural, and to be

expected; these men will have been trained to be aggressive. This has been present all

throughout human history; the era of the Roman Empire was no different, with many cases of

ill-disciplined troops,140 which led to conflict with civilians. Even if troops were fairly well

behaved, a large group of soldiers in one place are going to have a significant effect on

civilians and on local settlements. Michael Whitby backs up this point:

“... since a sizeable body of soldiers, young men trained to be combative, will seldom be popular with members

of the civilian society with which it has to interact, whether in Aldershot or Edessa. The military ethos would

encourage contempt for the non-fighters, whose main function, from a military perspective, was to feed, water,

house and generally support the more important activities of the military.141

139 Southern and Dixon, 175140 Ibid, 170141 Whitby, 486

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As stated above, the most likely time for ill-discipline was went the army was at rest; it was

then the role of the officers to maintain that discipline. This discipline had been, for centuries,

Rome’s strongest ally in war. Rome’s armies often faced much larger forces, but could rely

on their steadfast discipline to win the day; it was the hallmark of the legions. In Late

Antiquity however, there was a distinct lack of discipline, both on the battle-field and off,

(though the two go hand in hand). The root cause of this, along with poor officers, was a

general lack of training across the board. For example, before the disastrous battle of

Adrianople, in 378AD, the magister militum Sebastianus only had the time, resources or

inclination to train a mere 2,000 of his troops, two thirds of which were wiped out in the

battle.142 The Roman army had been defeated before -not very often- but it had known hard

times in the past. In those hard times, though, there was always a core of veteran troops ready

to replace the ones that had been lost, thus keeping the standard of Roman fighting men

high.143 This however was not the case in this period; as written above, young Roman men

were not keen on joining the army. Military service was so hated that many potential recruits

attempted to evade service by committing self-mutilation.144 Barbarians joined in larger

numbers but, while brave fighters, did not fit into the military system as well as Roman

citizens; many of them served under leaders of their own culture and were not subject to the

same disciplinary standards as Roman citizen troops.145 Although it should be noted that

142 Southern and Dixon, 170143 Southern and Dixon, 170144 Whitby, 489145 Southren and Dixon, 173

36

Whitby points out that recruitment of veterans sons often did go smoothly.146 Compounded by

this there was a lack of interest in the officer corps to ensure that the men who did join up

were fully trained or equipped. This would not have given the fresh units much confidence in

battle; a man plucked from civilian life, given a spear and some very basic training is far

more likely to flee battle or surrender. This lack of training, apathetic commanders, lack of

equipment and general frustration often manifested its self into violence and attacks on the

civilian population, indeed some civilian communities became more fearful of their own

soldiers then the enemies.147 In this way the soldiers could make up for the loss of income and

equipment they suffered due to the commander’s corruptions. Some of the officers were so

caught up in their own scramble for loot that many troops had a free hand to act as they

wished; Propcopius writes:

“but any of the soldiers who so wished were allowed to neglect their duties; mean while there was only an

insignificant garrison on the walls, and even this received very little attention. For those who chanced from day

to day to be assigned to guard duty were freely permitted to sleep, since no one was put in command of them

who might possibly take some notice of such an act: nor did any officers consent to go the rounds of the

fortifications ... and inspect the guard to see what they were doing...”148

The army could also be a problem for civilians when it was on the march or on campaign. If

the supply train was unable to get food and supplies to the men then they often went and took

what civilians had a sword point. This most readily happened if a garrison was besieged by

146 Whitby, 489147 Southern and Dixon, 171148 Procopius, 7.20.2. Taken from Southern and Dixon, 172

37

an enemy army; when Roma was besieged in 546AD the commander, Bessas, took grain

from the civilian populace to feed his troops.149 While this may seem like cruelty Bessas most

likely had little choice; he needed the army to hold together and hungry men are far less

likely to do that. As well as that the troops mist likely would have just stolen the grain from

the civilians of their own accord, this would have no doubt led to bloodshed. Another striking

example of this was during the reign of the Emperor Anastasius I; during his wars against the

Persians the city of Edessa became an important base for the army. The commander of the

army, no doubt fearful of a Persian counterattack, demanded that each household supply ten

pounds of iron for last minute repairs to the defences and that bread must be provided for

soldiers.150 While again these measures seem harsh there is an element of “for the greater

good” at play. The troops were there to defend the city and province in case of attack, all

would have know that the civilian population most likely would have been killed or sold into

slavery if the city had been taken by the Persians. That is not to say that the soldiers had the

civilians best interests at heart, there are plenty of cases of robbery, violence, rape,

drunkenness and murder at Edessa while the army was there from 502-505AD.151 There were

undoubtedly some cases of violence against civilians in Egypt, but to what extent is quite

difficult to ascertain; there is quite a broad spectrum of thought, with Ramsey MacMullen at

one end stating that violence was quite common and Paul Swarney at the other saying that

149 Whitby, 488150 Ibid, 491151 Whitby, 491

38

Roman Egypt was relatively peaceable.152 Whatever the level of frequency of violence in

Egypt, it did happen. Zosimus writes on one such event;

“...but while the Egyptians marched quietly through the cities and bought what they needed at a fair price, the

barbarians proceeded in disarray and behaved selfishly in the markets. ...while the barbarians began to be

arrogant. And when one of the traders in the market-place asked payment for the goods he had sold, the

barbarian used his sword on him.”153

It is clear then that, Egypt, like the rest of the Empire suffered from the decline of the military

society.

In conclusion, it is clear that, the military was a society unto itself and was, for the

most part, isolated from that of the civilian world. The military and the men who served in it

had different needs to civilians; the men relied, almost completely, on the government to

equip, clothe, pay, feed and house them. As well as this other men, the officers, held a lot of

power over them, they could be the difference whether a soldier received his wages or his

ration of food, and, above all this the officer could be the deciding factor whether a man

became a veteran or was a casualty. These were the basic needs and wants of the soldiers of

the Roman army. When these needs were met the military society functioned quite well, even

in the later years of the Empire; when the men’s basic needs were been attended to they could

focus on the finer point of soldiering and form good social connections with their peers, this

152 Roger S. Bagnall, Later Roman Egypt: Society, Religion, Economy and Administration, (TJ Internalional, 2003,) Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists, 26. Atlanta, 1989. 202-203.153 Zosimus, (4.31.1) Taken from Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, 174

39

in turn improved their fighting ability. It was at this stage, when the whole system was

working well, that the rewards of battle standards and citizenship came into their own; these

could push individuals, and even entire units, to great feats on the battle-field, and keep them

disciplined in peace-time. That said it is clear from the evidence that, for the most part, the

military society was not functioning to the best of its abilities in Late Antiquity. The troops

basic needs were not being met, mainly due to corrupt officers, but also due to the

government’s general apathy towards the army, which the central administration now view as

expensive, corrupt and unsuccessful. Despite the obvious (with hindsight) fact that the

military was only unsuccessful because of government apathy and corruption. It is because of

this that, most young Roman men had no interest in joining the military, especially those who

had any prospects in civilian life. Why would a young man give up a life of work, home and

family, to live in a dangerous and corrupt society? That is not to say civilian life was perfect,

but for many it must have seemed like the better option. The government’s policy of

conscription only served to inspire even more resentment towards the military, although it

did, no doubt, keep numbers of recruits, relatively, high in Late Antiquity. These negative

factors in the army had a massive impact on the men who served; morale, cohesion,

discipline and fighting ability all declined a fact which, no doubt, contributed to the fall of the

Empire. Another, more visible, result of this was the army’s attitude towards civilians. All

soldiers had been civilians at one stage or another, and many would have had family in

civilian life, yet, during the later Roman Empire the troops turned on the civilians they were

40

charged with protecting. This can be directly linked back to the poor quality of officers; when

discipline breaks down on the highest level it has a ripple effect down through the ranks of

any army. Late Antiquity was, in general, a more aggressive and harsher world then the

modern one, there was no police force and the efficiency of judicial systems varied from

place to place; theft and murder was quite common place, more so in urban centres, and some

soldiers were involved in this, all throughout Rome’s history. However, the extortion and

corruption in the army in this era meant more and more men were prepared to extort civilians

to make up for their own short falls, or simply because they could get away with it. This

created a deep sense of loathing between the two parties and increased general

disillusionment throughout the Empire. Underling and compounding all these issues were the

barbarians. These men were fine fighters and eager to join the Roman army, however, too

many were accepted and two fast. In a short period of time the face of the Roman army

changed, and the structures were not in place to deal with it. This essay has considered both

arguments for and against the barbarian’s effectiveness in the army, and, while they did make

good fighters, they were not really suited to serve in a standing army. The barbarians created

massive segregation within the army which lead to a decline of cohesion, social relations and

thus fighting ability and increased conflict with civilians. It may be true to say that the later

Roman army could not have functioned without the barbarian recruits, however, when they

did enrol, they came in such numbers and so quickly that the sprit, discipline, ideals of the

army; so much so that the core foundations of the military were rocked, and thus the systems

41

in place broke down, this when coupled with all the army’s other problems, doomed the army

and the Empire to ultimate defeat.

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