Low Involvement Processing: Effects of Stimulus Exposure and Repetition

on Implicit Memory, Explicit Memory and Affect

Michelle P. Y. Lee

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Rotman School of Management Univers~ty of Toronto

43 Copyright by Michelle P. Y. Lee (2001)

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Low Involvement Processing: Effects of Stimulus Exposure and Repetition on Implicit Memory, ExpIicit Memory and Affect

Michelle P. Y. Lee Dactor of Philosopher (2001) Rotman School of Management University of Toronto

ABSTRACT

Involvement is widely regarded as an important construct in consumer behaviour. particularty in

terms of its role in moderating effects of advertising exposure on memory and affect. Effects and processes

that characterize the higher end of the low involvement continuum. however, are much better understood in

comparison to lower levels. This dissertation attempts to contribute to an understanding of the latter with

three experiments that examine the effects of stimulus exposure and repetition on memory (experiments 1

and 2). as well as on affect (experiment 3). under conditions of involvement that may be described as 'very

low'.

In the first two experiments, using 3 selective attention procedure, subjects were incidentally

exposed to advertising messages. Evidence that these exposures had an impact on memory was sought

using two types of memory measures - direct and indirect measures. believed to tap explicit and implicit

memory respectively. The results suggest that. despite minimum amounts of attention devoted to

processing the advertising messages, there was implicit memory for the advertised brand names as

evidenced by an increased propensity to respond with those brand names on the indirect measures of brand

name generation (experiment i ) , consideration set formation and choice (experiment 2). A concomitant

finding was poor explicit memory for the same brand names. These results were, however, moderated by

repetition status (1 exposure vs. 3 exposures) of the brand names at exposure.

The third experiment examined. within the context of the mere exposure effect, the effects of

perceptual tluency and conceptual fluency on liking for words encountered under low involvement

conditions. In particular. the proposition that both types of tluency can give rise to the mere exposure effect

was tested. The results support that proposition and also indicate that perceptual and conceptual tluency

operated independentiy in generating the observed effects. Moreover. the effects on recognition bore

similarity to that found for affect. Repetition of the wurds was also found to have a moderating influence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My heartfelt thanks to Carolyn Yoon. for taking a chance with me and for being a friend and a

mentor since the first day. I would like to also thank Fred Feinberg, for the invaluable advice he has

dispensed over the years and for bringing a little (or perhaps not so little) Grazzi to my life. A note of

thanks also goes to Scott Hawkins. whose encouraging words I have always appreciated. and to my fellow

ductoral studentddinner buddies/X-blast rivals. Edward. Seh-Woong and Kwanho, for beins a phone call

away whenever help is needed. I would like to especially thank Andy Mitchell. for his patience and his

guidance and most importantly. for never allowing me to think that I was not up to the task.

To my parents, Irene and Roger. and my parents-in-law, Gloria and Chandra, my deepest gratitude

tor their unwavering love and support and for taking care of me when I was too busy to take care of myself.

And if my cats. Winnie and Tigger. could read thls. thanks to them too, for taking away the blues just

simply by being their puny selves. Last but not least. I am grateful to Mucus for the things he did for me,

which would rival the length of this dissertation, if enumerated.

All of these people have helped make the destination worth the journey.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

I. 1. Introduction

1.2. Low vs. high involvment processing

1.3. Low involvement processing in consumer behaviour

1 .A. Low involvement processing: Effects on memory

1.5. Low involvement processing: Effects on affwt

1.6. Synopses of experiments 1 -3

Chapter 2

2. I . Implicit Memory: A bit of history

2.1.1. Korsakoff

2.1.2. Claparkde

2.1.3. Janet and Freud

2.1.4. Ebbinghaus

2.1.5. W d n g t o n and Weiskrantz

2.2. Explicit vs. Implicit Memory

2.3. Attention and Memory

Chapter 3: Experiment 1

3.1. Design

3.3. Subjects

3.3. Materials and Procedure

3.4. Dependent Measures and Manipulation checks

3.5. Results

3.6. Discussion

Chapter 4: Experiment 2

4.1. Design

4.2. Subjects

4.3. Materials and procedure

4.4. Dependent measures and Manipulation checks

4.5. Results

3.6. Discussion

Chapter 5

5.1. The mere exposure effect

5.2. Theoretical accounts of the mere exposure effect

5.2.1. Non-specific activation hypothesis

5.2.2. Perceptual tluencylAttributional model

5.2.3. Discrepancy-attribution account

5.3. Perceptual vs. conceptual fluency

Chapter 6: Experiment 3

6.1. Objectives of study

6.2. Subjects and Design

6.3. Stimuli

6.4. Dependent measures

6.5. Procedure

6.6. Results

6.6.1. Affect

6.6.2. Recognition

6.7. Discussion

Chapter 7: Conclusion

LIST OF FIGURES

Experiment L: Effect of attention and repetition on indirect memory test

Experiment L: Effect of attention and repetition on direct memory test

Experiment 2: Effect of attention and repetillon on consideration sets

Experiment 2: Effect of attention and repetition on choice

Experiment 2: Effrct ohttention and repletion on cued recall

Experiment 3: Possible relationships between conceptual tluency and perceptual tluency

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual tluency and exposure level on affect when affect task preceded recognition task

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual and conceptual fluency on affect when affect task preceded recognition task

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual tluency and exposure level on recognition when affect task preceded recognition task

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual fluency and conceptual tluency on recognition when affect task preceded recognition task

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual fluency and exposure level on recognition when recognition task preceded affect task

Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual and conceptual fluency on recognition when recognition task preceded affect task

LIST OF TABLES

I . Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual fluency. conceptual fluency and exposure level on affect when affect task preceded recognition task

2. Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual fluency. conceptual fluency and exposure level on recognition when affect task preceded recognition task

3. Experiment 3: Effect of perceptual fluency. conceptual fluency and exposure level on recognition when recognition task preceded affect task

LIST OF APPENDICES

A. Experiment 1 : Critical brand names and slogans

B. Experiment 2: Critical brand names and slogans

C. Experiment 1: Visually-presented text passage

D. Experiment 2: Visually-presented text passage

E. Experiment 3: Homographs. study and test sentences

F. Experiment 3: Instructions to subjects at judgement phase

vli

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Consumers these days are bombarded by a barrage of advertising appeals. With the addition of the

internet to the advertiser's repertoire of media possibilities, consumers are greeted with more ads at every

turn than ever before. One consequence of this deluge of advertising messages is that they nave become so

much a pan of the landscape that a good portion of them are paid little attention or go unnoticed altogether.

One of the earliest papers to discuss the fallout dt' this advenising clutter is Krugman ( 1965).

Krugman made the observation that the psrvdsive and repetitive nature of ridvertislng has made the learning

d a d s akm tcl the learnme of tht: unimportant and nonsensical. More importantly, he noted that "much of the

Impact of trlevisian advertising is in the form of learnin2 wtthout involvement" and went on to suggest that

the mechanism by which persuasion occurs when invotvernent is low is significantly different from when

~nvolvement IS high. These comments proved to be visionary in a sense, for it foretold some of the

arguments that would be put forth by psychologists in accounting for the n w e exposure effect - the finding

that mere repetition of a stimulus enhances liking for it. Moreover, his comments underscored not only the

need to better understand the psychological processes that underlie low involvement learning and

pzrsuston. but to also properly distinguish between low and high involvement.

1.2 Low involvement vs. high involvement processing

How then does low involvement differ from high involvement? Krugman distinguishes bctween the

tho in terms of the degree of personal incohement or the number of thoughts attempting to relate the

stimuli to oneself. Houston and Rothschild ( 1977) defined tnvolvernent in terms of the extensiveness of

processing that occurs, while Petty, Cacioppo rind Schumann ( 1983) characterised involvement according to

which the target message or iswe is personally relevant. Mitchell ( 1983) conceptualized involvement as a

motivational state having two dimensions, intensky and direction. Intensity refers to the arncunt of attention

devoted tu prwesing the stimuli whereas direction refers to where that attention IS focused. which may be

determined by the processing goal of the individual. It was. however, Greenwald and Leavitt ( 1984) who

provided an overarching definition in a levels of involvement Framework that detailed four distinct leveIs of

involvement.

Greenwald and Leavitt ( 1584) named the four levels of invoIvement preanention, focal attentron.

conlprehertsion and ekzbornrion. in order of increasing involvement. The levels of involvement differ with

respect to the amount of anentianal capacity devoted to processing the stimuli and the cancornitant

dwibility of memo1 y lor the stimuIi, with higher levzls of involvement being associated with greater

atttntronal capaclty and durability. The preattention level involves minimal attentional capacity and

processing is consequently limited to the sensory or feature analysis level. At the focal attention level. a

modest amount of attentional capacity is allocated; enough to allow for identification of the stimulus at the

perceptual or semantic level. Yet greater attentional capacity is allocated at the comprehension level. making

i t possible to process at the syntactic level and to have propositional representation of the message in

memory. Finally. at the elaboration level. where the most amount of attentional capacity is required. not

only does one process syntauti;ally. but also attempts to relate message content to existing knowledge.

Consistent with these propositions is the expectation that memory for the stimulus. as measured on

traditional tests of recall or recognition, is better the higher the level of involvement.

1.3 Low involvement in consumer behaviour

Consumer researchers have a much better understanding of the processes that lead to learning and

persuasion when involvement is at least moderately high. With the exception of several papers that probe

cognitive processes that accompany incidental or peripheral processing (e.g. lanisrewski. 1993; Shapiro.

Maclnnis & Heckler. 1996; Obermiller. 1985). much research in marketing is focused on investigating the

effects of having processed stimuli in 3 delibrr~te and directed manner. as one might expert at higher levels

of inwlvement. In addition, the nature of experimental work is such that the experimental context itself

induces a m d r af processing charxter~st~c of ii higher lcvel of involvement than might be expected in a

more realistic setting. Hence. a subject brought into the experimental laboratory and presented with ads as

experimental stimuli may be reasonably expected to devote greater attentional resources to the ads and

process them more carefully thm if Jhe were to encounter the ads. say. while watching television.

Published studies that examine exposure effects at truly low involvement levels. such as at the preattention

or focal attention levels in Greenwald and Leavitt's ( L984) framework, remain few and far between in the

marketing literature.

The study by Petty. Cacioppo and Schumann ( 19831 often comes to mmd when one thinks of low

involvement persuasion, but even subjects in the low involvement condition of that study were permitted to

take as much time as they needed to peruse the advert~sing stimuli with their full attention. It differed From

the high involvement condition only in the amount of personal relevance or consequence the ads had for the

subjects and may as such be better understood as the lower involvement condition and not as one consuming

particularlv low amounts of attentional resources. (See Park & Hastlk ,1994; Sawyer & Howard. 199 1:

Miniard et 31.. 199 1; Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990: lohar, 1995; for similar manipulations of

involvement. \ involvement has also been manipulated by varying the processing goal given to subjects. Low

involvement subjects may be directed to process in such a way that minimizes the amount of elaborative

processing of the stimuli. often by calling their attention to some non-critical aspect of the stimuli (Mitchell.

1883; MacKenzir & Spreng, 1991: Hawkins & Huch. 1992). Others use a cambination of manipdating

personal relevance and varying the processing goal (Sengupta. G d s t e i n & Boninger, 1997; MacInnis &

Park, 199 1) These conditions are still fairly involving and if cast in terms of Greenwald and Leavitt's ( 1984)

framework. correspond most closely to the second highest involvement level. that of comprehension.

This dissertation is concerned with the lower levels of involvement, induced by limiting subjects'

attention to the stimuli. In the sections that follow, effects on memory and affect are discussed in the context

of such low levels of involvement.

1.4 Low involvement processing: Effects on memory

Given the low attention level associated with low involvement processing. what effects on memory

migh: one expect to find? It would not be surprising to find that memory for stimuli that are paid little

attention would be poor. This last stalement should. however, be qualified by the type of memory measure

~nvolved. A large literature has accumulated in cognitive psychology. providing compelIin evidence that

the 'absence of memory' as determined by one type of measure need not be corroborated by results found on

another type of measure. These two broad classes or' measures have come to be known as direct and itidirea

memory measures. tapping explicit and implicit memory respectively. Implicit memory. as opposed to

explicit memory. may be loosely defined as that aspect of our memory that a not associated with awareness

or intentionality. but which exerts an mfluence on our behavtour that is quite beyond our conscious control.

The one important feature that distinguishes indirect from direct memory measures is the lack of reference

to a prior learning episode or exposure phase. Subjects. rather than being told to recollect specific

information from an earlier phase. are merely instructed to complete the measure to the best of their ability.

Often. effort is made to ensure that subjects are unaware of the connection between the indirect measure and

the exposure phase. Hence. while direct measures encompass the traditional recall and recognition tests and

require one to think back to some point in time in order to form a response, indirect measures make no such

reference and incIude tests such as word-stem or word-fragment completion. perceptual identification, and

even general knowledge questions. Enhanced proficiency in completing an indirect measure following

exposure to tmpt stimuli is evidence for i t s cffecra memory. In comparing the two tvpes of measures.

interesting disscciatims have been fnllnd. with \ari:bles having an effect on one type ot measure having no

effect or the opposite eftect on the other (see Roediger & McDermott ( 1993) for crviev~. As well. an

apparent absence of memory for stimulus exposure u measured on a direct test is sometimes refuted by

better than control or above chance level performance on an indirect test. This points to the possibility that

in low involvement processing where attention levels are low and explicit memory poor. implicit memory

may nonetheless be evident on an indirect test.

1.5 Low involvement processing: Effects on affect

The previous section provided a brief discussion of the possible effects of stimulus exposure on

memory under low involvement processing conditions. We move on now to talk about effects on affect, a

discussion that is relevant to the third experiment of thrs dissertation where the dependent measure of

interest is affect.

Studies on the mere exposure effect provide the background Immure tbr assessing the effects of

repeated exposure on affect. of stimuli processed under low involvement conditions. a jonc pioneered

research in this area and the term 'mere exposure' first appeared in his 1968 seminal paper. In it, he

conducted a series of experi ments, presenting nonsense words (experiment 1 ), Chinese ideographs

(experiment 2) and faces (experiment 3) at various repetition levels and showed that liking increased with

the number of exposures. This represents the first evidence that stimuli encountered under low involvement

conditions. in particular at the level of focal attention according to the GreenwaId and Leavitt ( 1984)

framework, can have an effect on affect. An abundance of similar studies foltowed, providing corroborating

evidence for this effect that results from mere exposure to the stimulus. The effect has also been obtained at

the preattention level of involvement. The first among these studies was one conducted by Wilson ( 1979).

Using a dichotic listening procedure, Wilson ( 1979) presented subjects with melodies in one ear while

having them shadow a message played in the other ear. Despite an apparent inability to remember the

melodies on a later recognition test, subjects displayed a preference for these melodies over control ones.

Other studies using visual stimuli presented either subliminally or under incidental exposure conditions.

have found similar results (Kunst-Wilson & Zijonc. 1980; Mandler et al., 1987; laniszewski. 1993;

Burnstein & D'Agostino. 1999,). There IS therefore no tack of evidence of the impact of stimuli encountered

under low involvement conditions.

1.6 Synopses of experiments

In Lynch and SrulI (1982). it was noted that "One of the most imponant lessons of cognitive

psychology is that most of the memory and attentional factors that affect our judgement are simply

unavailable to consciousness . . . It would seem, then. that consumer research must not limit its focus to

conscious decision strategies, but also explore the unconscious and/or involuntary aspects of information

processing." This dissertation in a sense heeds that call by looking at the effects of stimulus exposure that

may not be amenable to conscious introspection or reporting.

The first two experiments of tnis dissertation look at what happens when ads are encountered whilst

one is engaged by some other task or stimuli, such that the ads are outside the focus of one's attention.

[According to Greenwaid and Leavitt's ( 1984) framework. a processing condition like this falls under the

preclttentmn level uf the involvment. I ?h= fwus of attention is manipulated by presenting subjects with two

sources of stimuli at the same time using a selective attention paradigm. One goup of subjects was asked to

perform an attention-demanding text-reading task while brand names were played to them through ear

phones. A second group of subjects was asked to do the reverse: attend to the brand names while ignoring

the text. In both of these groups, approximately one third of subjects received one exposure to the target

brand names, while another third received three exposures. The rest of the subjects were not exposed to the

brand names and represented the control group. Memory for the target brand names was assessed using both

a direct and an indirect measure. The most interesting results pertain to the condition where attention was

directed away from the brand names to the reading task. Despite an inability to report the brand names as

determined on the direct measure, there was nonetheless evidence that the exposure did, in fact, have an

effect on memory. Performance level on the indirect measure for subjects who were exposed to the brand

names three times was significantty higher than for control subjects who were not exposed to the target

brand names at all.

The third experiment reported in this dissenatron is a mere exposure study that examines the possible

causes of the phenomenon. Perceptual tluency has been proposed in the literature as a potential explanation

for the mere exposure effect. This experiment provides further evidence for the viabdity of that hypothesis

as we11 as tests conceptuat fluency as yet acother possible cause. Both perceptual and conceptual fluency

were manipulated in the same experiment, making it p~ssible to examine the relationship between the two in

producing the mere exposure effect. The critical stimuli consisted of homograph words presented in the

context of sentences. In the exposure phase, subjects were required to read these sentences aloud, each of

which were presented but brietly on a computer screen. [Given the short exposure time, the level of

involvement here corresponds most closely to the focal attention level in Greenwald and Leavitt's ( 1984)

framework.] In the judgement phase, subjects were presented with a new set of sentences, with a target word

embedded in each. Each target word was such that it was 1) identical in form and meaning, 2) identical in

form but different in meaning, 3) different in form but having the same meaning, or 3) different in form and

meaning, to a word seen earlier in the exposure phase. For each target word, subjects responded on a

recognition test and an affective preference measure. Results indicate that subjects were more likely to

express preference for those words that were elther identicai in form or meaning to words that they were

previously exposed to. This implicates both perceptual and conceptual fluency as factors driving the mere

exposure effect. Moreover. the results pointed to independent operation of the two sources of fluency.

2 Chapter Two

2.1 Implicit memory: A little bit of history

The term implicit memory was coined by Graf and Schacter ( 1985). with reference to the

phenomenon of remembering without awareness. Althcugh implicit memory research has been a hotbed of

research activity only in recent years. the awareness of such unawareness is not a discovery that modem day

scientists can lay proprietary claim to. The idea that memorial traces may manifest itself in words and action

w~thout one having conscious recollection of the acquisition event has been flirted with. speculated upon

and described in excruciating detail by philosophers and scientists before our time. The following provides a

historical perspective and insight into the precursors of implicit memory.

2.1.1 Korsakoff

In two papers published in 1889. Korsakoff provided rich accounts of the implicit memory

phenomenon. which still makes for an intriguing read today. The first of these was translated to English in

1955, while translation of the second Bas only accomplished very recently by Banks and Karam ( 1996). In

the latter, Korsakoff provided rather remarkable accounts of how his patients who. suffering from a

condition now known as Korsakoff s amnesia. exhibited memory disorders that proved fascinating. The

central feature of this syndrome is the inability to recollect new information. in particular events occuning

subsequent to the onset of the disease, which is in sharp contrast to the normal memory they have for events

pre-dating the condition. The extremity of the condition is reflected in the striking absence of memory for

actions that had taken place literally moments sgu. with the result that patients often engage in repetitive

behaviour simply because they have no recollection of ha\ ing done something they had just done. The more

relevant of the observations. in light of our present interest. is the finding that white there is no conscious

memory of recent cbents. memorial traces of them nonetheless persist to intluence behaviour in more subtle

ways. This is best illuminated by the example of one patlent who at each meeting with Korsakoff. guessed

that he was a physician. but stubbornly opposed the suggestion that they had met before. Then there is the

case nf the patient treated with electro-shock. who despite having no recollection of having undergone such

therapy, would guess merely from looking at the case containing the shock apparatus that Korsakoff was

there to administer shocks to him. Interestingly. Korsakoff reported a resurgence of these 'lost' memories as

his patients embarked on the road to recovery, as evidenced by accounts of patients gradually recounting

more and more events that they supposedly had no memory of during their amnesic period.

Korsakoff s thwretica1 account of the phenomenon which we now call implicit memory postulates

firstly that each event lays down a memorial mace and secondly that successful recovery of that tnce

requires the existence of associative connections leading to the target representations. A trace strength

exceeding threshold levels 1s a necessary cond~tion for conscious recollection. This should, however, not be

interpreted as a stmple trace strength theory of memory since conscious remembering is also contingent on

the presence of effective associative networks. such that a strong trace by itself is by no means sufficient for

awareness (Banks, 1996).

About two decades subsequent to Korsakoff s publications. Clap~ede ( 19 I 1, 195 1 ) provided

accounts of amnesic patients with conditions remarkably similar to those reported by Korsakoff. Among

these observations is the anecdotal account of the amnesic woman on whom Claparede tried a little

experiment. He hid a pin between his fingers and pricked her hand with it. As is typical of patients suffering

from Korsakoff s syndrome. the pain was all too quickly forgotten and no impression of it remained just

shortly afterward. Nevertheless. each time Clapartde placed his hand in the vicinity of hers. she would. as a

retlex, withdraw her hand. When the reason for the prompt action was pursued. she nonetheless was not able

to attribute it to s recollection of the preceding pricking occasion, but instead gave responses such as "Isn't

it allowed to w~thdrtrw one's hand'?" and "Perhaps there is a pin hidden in your hand". When questioned

about how she came to fathom such an idea. her replies were that "It is an idea that just came into my head"

and "Somrtimcs pins are hidden in hands" (Parkin, 1993).

Claparede's theoretical explanation of accounts such as the above, like Korsakoff s. appeals to the

existence of associative networks. Mowver. Claparede postulates two associative networks; one connects

representations to each other (peripheral associations). while the other connects representations to the self

(egocentric associations). Implicit expressions of memory are then a case of intact peripheral associations

but severed egocentric associations (Banks. 1996).

2.1.3 Janet and Freud

Janet and Fred were primarily interested in the form of implicit memory manifested in hysterical

amnesia. The condition refers to the absence of conscious memory for a traumatic event, although

impressions ot it nonetheless show through in thoughts and action. Janet concluded from his case studies of

such patients that t w factors were at play. Firstly. in hysterical amnesia. the patient relinquishes control of

voluntary and cimcious activation of memorm and sec.ondly, these same memories may still be evoked

automatically and in an untimely fashion. His proposed explanation appealed to the notion of an "inabiIity to

synthesize memories ir,tr, the personal consciousness" t Janet, 1904). Freud, like Janet. also believed that

hysterical symptoms were an expression of suppressed memories that do not enter the conscious state of

mind and further emphasized the potency of unconscious memories in influencing behaviour (cf. Schacter.

1987;.

2.1.4 Ebbinghaus

Ebbinghaus is well-known for his savings paradigm which neatly demonstrates economies in

learning when one relearns material for a second time (or n' time. for that matter). In the study phase of this

method, one learns material usually in the form of nonsense syllables and this is followed by a test phase

requiring the recall of the learned words. The number of trials. or alternatively. the time taken to master

perfect recall is noted for purpose of comparison when on subsequent occasions. the entire process is

repeated. Savings is measured by the difference in the number of trials or amount of time required to attain

equivalent levels of performance from one learniag occasion to another and the general finding is a positive

difference that occurs independent of whether one is capable of recollec~ing the original learning experience.

In present day terms, the savlnp method qualities 3s a test of ~mplicir memory because explicit recollection

of a prior learning episode is of no concern Ebbinghaus ( 1885. 1964) distinguished between types of

memory: voluntary recollection. which corresponds most closely to explicit memory in modern day

terminology; involuntary recollection, which refers to the spontaneous 'bringing to mind' of previous

experiences. More interestingly, Ebbinghaus conjectured that there may be a third type of memory -

memory that we're not aware of possessing but which nonetheless has an impact on our behaviour.

2.1.5 Warrington and Weiskrantz

Warrington and Weiskranu can rightly be credited for sparking the enthusiasm over implicit

memory among memory researchers by providing the first convincing empirical evidence for yet another

memory type in their work with amnesics. Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) documented startling findings

of dissociation in performance on direct versus indirect tests. Normal and amnesic subjects were

administered two direct tests ( free recall, recognition) and two indirect tests (word fragment identification,

word-stem completion) to assess retention of words presented earlier in a to-be-remembered list. Normal

subjects outperformed amnesic subjects on the direct tests: a result that's hardly surprismg given the very

nature of amnesia. However. it is this outcome in combination with the tinding of statistically equivalent

performance by both groups on the indirect tests that proved to be enlightening. This virtually demolished

the then prevailing view of amnesia as arising from a failure to transfer information from short-term

memory to long-term memory. since the expenmental findings showed that there was indeed retention of the

learned material even if it was only apparent in the implicit memory tests (Roediger, 1990).

2.2 Implicit vs. Explicit Memory

Warrington and Weiskrantz's (19'70) landmark finding generated an impressive may of new

findings. theoretical perspectives. and procedures for investigating Ule relation between implicit and explicit

forms of memory. The distinction bet ween implicit and explicit memory rests on the intent~onality of the act

of remembering. Whereas explicit mcmory is manifested when subjects consider their own past experiences

in order to generate an appropriate response. implicit memory presents itself as a facilitation in performance

as 3 result of prior experience without the conscious intention to draw on past experience. The most often

used measures of explicit memory, referred to 3s direct measures, are that of rxal t and recognition. For

implicit memory, psychologists have developed a large set c~f mdirect measures ranging from word-fragment

completion tests, lexical decision tasks. possible/irnplssible object decision tasks, to general knowledge

questions (see Roediger & McDermort. 1993). The luge set of measures owes, in part, to the fact that

implicit memory, as psychologists have defined it, has become a blanket term for any facilitation in

performance by past experiences without intention to rely on those experiences. Hence, there are potentially

many measures that qualify as tapping implicit memory. In consumer research, generation of brand names in

response to category cues can be deemed an indirect memory measure so long as no reference is made to

any past episodes or events. Of greater practical relevance to marketers are choice and consideration set

measures (where subjects indicate the brands they would choose or consider for choice given a product

category) that can, in the absence of reference to prior encoding conditions, also be considered measures

representing implicit memory.

Many interesting dissociations between implicit and explicit memory performance have been

uncotered in the several decades of implicit memory research, For instance. levels of processing (Craik &

Tulving, 1975) msnipulations have beer, sh~wn to affect performance on duect tests but nct indirect tests

(Jawby & Dallas. 1981; Graf & Mandler, 1984). Changes in presentation format of stimuli. such ~s from

auditory at study to visual at test, h a w been shwn to adversely affect implicit memory performance. whde

having little or no impact on explicit memory performance (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger & Blaxton,

1987). Age differences have also been found to dissociate the two classes of memory measures, with

younger subjects outperforming older subjects on direct tests but not on indirect tests (e.g. Light, Singh &

Capps, 1986; Light, 1987). FinalIy, more evidence of dissociations between implicit and explicit memory

has been reported in cognitive neuroscience, among patients with frontal lobe damage, with observations of

facilitation in performance on indirect tests in the absence of any performance improvements on direct tasks

(for recent reviews see Schacter, Chiu & Ochsner, 1993; Squire, Knowlton & Musen, 1993).

Whereas the evidence for dissociations is clear. the mechanism(s) underlying these dissociations has

been the subject of mtich debate. One tenable hypothesis is that these dissociations are the result of different

reuieval modes. with re&eval on direct measures being intentional while retrieval'on indirect measures

being incidental. Far this to be a plxusible explanation of dissociations. Schacter, Bowen and Booker (1989)

have noted the necessity to hotd all overt conditions (~ncluding test cues) at study and test constant, except

for retrieval instructions given at test. Only then can differences in implicit and explicit memory

performance be attributed to intentionaiity of retrieval. This necessary condition. called the retrieval

inrentionuiiry criteriort. has become a useful rule-of-thumb of sorts. for researchers relying on the

consciousness or intentionality o f retrieval argument as 3n exptanation for observed dissociations.

2.3 Attention and Memory

As discussed in the previous section, variables such as age, levels of processing and presentation

modality have been shown to have very dissimilar effects on direct and indirect memory measures. Yet

another one of these variables is that of attention. With attention. however, conflicting results have been

obtained and inconsistencies have yet to be resolved. Early studies investigating the role of attention in

memory performance demonstrated that dividing attention at study (wherein subjects are required to

perform two concurrent tasks) has no effect on implicit memory performance, while at the same time,

having large adverse effects on explicit memory performance (Parkin & Russo. 1990; Parkin, Reid & Russo.

1990). More recent studies (Woiters & Prinsen. 1997; Mulligan, 1998; Mulligan & Hanrnan, 1996;

Mulligan. 1997). however. have documented results that do not concur with these simple conclusions and

suggest the presence of moderating factors that were previously unaccounted for. One explanation invokes

the Transfer Appropriate Processing (TAP) framework (Morris, Branstbrd & Franks. 1977) and proposes

that the type of processing that takes place at test may reconcile inconsistencies between studies that found

an effect of attention on implicit memory and those that did not.

The principle espoused by the TAP framework. briefly stated, says that performance on a memory

test is enhanced to the extent that the cognitive processes engaged at study are re-engaged at test. The types

of cognitive processes. according to TAP, can be broadly classified into ones that are perceptually-driven

and ones that are conceptually-driven (e.g. Blaxton. 1989). For instance, if the type of processing that occurs

at study is predominantly perceptual (analysis of surface features) as opposed to conceptual (analysis of

meaning), performance on a later memory test will be facilitated insofar as the type of processing engaged in

is also primarily perceptual. The nature of processing that occurs at test is thought to be induced by the

demands of the memory test. Hence, in perceptually-driven memory tests such as word-fragment completion

or degraded stimulus identification. one has to rely on the perceptual attributes of the test cues to generate an

appropriate response. On conceptually-driven rests such ss category exemplar generation or general

knowledge questions. apprupnste responses are only conceptually related to the test cbes, thus cornpeiling

one to engage In more conceptual processing.

Hence. rhc TAP framew~rk ~ffers a poteli~d ex?!anation for the discrepancy in findings. Dividing

attention at study constlains che amount of cor~crptual ?rr)cessing that is possibk and performance on a later

itmceptually-dri ven memory test will be poor as a consequence of the mismatch in processes. Perceptual

processing. on the other hand, is presumed to be less resource-demanding, such that it is affected little, if at

all, by divisions of attention. According to this Iine of reasoning then, a reconciliation of the discrepant

findings reported in the literature may be obtained by appealing to the difference between these studies in

type of memory test administered. And indeed, the evidence that speaks to this issue appears to partially

support the contention: Studies in which perceptually-driven implicit tests are used have found little effect

of attention on memory pertommce (Muiligan & Hartman. 1996; Parkin & Russo, 1990; Szyrnanski &

MacLeod, 1996). The evidence, however. continues to be murky when it comes to conceptually-driven

implicit tests. Both support for (Wood & Cowan, 1995; Mulligan. 1997) and against (Koriat & Feuerstein,

1976; Isingrini. 1995) an effect of attention on memory performance on such tests have been found.

Further attempts at resolving this inconsistency have argued that TAP continues to be a useful

framework in predicting the effects of dividing attention. but that inconsistencies arise as a result of

differing operationalizations that lead to attention being divided to varying degrees in the different studies

(biulligan, 1997). When attention at study is but mildly divided (such as by imposing a concurrent task

that's not too resource-demanding), it is argued that conceptua1 processing is impaired, but not to the extent

that it is altogether absent. Hence in studies employing conceptually-driven impltcit tests and in which

attention is not strongly divided, it is unsurprising to find that implicit memory performance is not different

between full attention and divided attention conditions. Only when attention is strongly divided and

conceptual processing consequently c~mailed do d~fferences become apparent, as Wolters and Prinsen

( 1997) and Mulligan 11997) have shown.

This line of reasoning also implies that in studies of selective attention, wherein subjects are told to

focus on some task whde ignoring concurrently presented stimuli. there ought not to be implicit memory for

the ignored information on a conceptually-driven test. Assuming that the primary task is sufficiently

engaging such that subjects are not able to simuttaneously perform both tasks without performance on the

primary task suffering appreciably. there can be very little conceptual processing of the to-be-ignored

information. What processing goes on will likely be sontined to merely perceptual processing (see Craik.

1983: Cruk & Byrd. 1981). It follows then that the absence of conceptual processing or the little of it that

takes place means that there will be little evidence of memory on a conceptuctll y-driven indirect test.

To summarize, the TAP framework predicts that in divided attention studies where memory

performance is assessed on a conceptually-driven indirect test of memory. an effect of attention will be

observed only when attention is divided sufficiently strongly. In the case of selective attention studies, not

only will there be an effect of attention, but implicit memory for critical information will not be evident

when that information receives nonfocal attention.

A review of the marketing and psychology literatures reveals. however, that support for the second

prediction is equivocal. Of the few published studies that look at selective attention and memory

performance (both explicit and implicit), there are both studies that have found support for the presence of

implicit memuiy (Shapiro, MacInnis & Heckler, 1997; P h m & Vanhuelle, 1997; Eich, 1984) and ones that

provide evidence to the contrary (Wood & Cowan. 1995; Wood. Stadler & Cowan. 1997). Of particular

significance and relevance is the study by Eich ( L384), which presents one of the earliest pieces of evidence

of memory for information that is ignored and one that has generated some controversy as to the robustness

of the findings. I t s importance warrants a more detailed discussion of the experiment conducted and its

read ts.

Eich ( 1984) demonstrated that information presented in a dichotic listening procedure affected

implicit memory despite a c1ea.r absence of recognition for the same information. Subjects were given a task

of shadowing an audio version of an essay played to one ear. while word pairs were played to the other.

Some of these word pairs were such that the first would be compatible with a less Frequently occurring

homophone word rather than the more commonly used possibility. One example would be the word pair tari

-fare, in whichfare instead of fair would be the more likely interpretation given the word taxi. Subjects

were subsequently administered two tests, a recognition test (direct) and a spelling test (indirect). On the

latter of these. when subjects were asked to spell the homophone words. it was found that they were

significantly more likely than a baseline control group to write down the less frequently occurring word

encountered in the listening task than control words not presented. By contrast. recognition of these words

was not above chance level.

That the results reported by Eich 1 1981) were engendered by subjects' switching of attention between

the mended and to-be-ignored channels \vils raised as a posstbility by critics (Wood & Cowan. 1995; Wood,

S tadler & Cowan, 1997). In support of this contention, it has been pointed out that subjects shadowed prose

presented at a rather slow rate (85 words per minute) and that words presented in the to-be-ignored channel

were presented at the rate of one-second per word with a two-second interval between word-pairs. This

makes it likely that subjects had periodically shifted attention to the to-be-ignored channel. Moreover. as

mentioned earlier. to make a convincing argument that dissociations between direct and indirect tests are the

result of differences in the mode of retrieval and not merely to task differences. the retrieval intentionality

criterion (Schacter, Bowers & Bookers, 1989) holds that a11 cues in indirect and direct test conditions should

be held constant except for the instructions given n test. The Eich (1984) study, unfortunately, does not

satisfy this criterion and provides but tenuous testimony to the notion that the attentional resources can

dissociate performance on direct and indirect tests.

Wood and Cowan ( t 995. Experiment 3 & 4). in contrast, using a similar dichotic listening procedure

and conceptual1 y-driven memory tests that meet the retrieval intentionality criterion. found little evidence of

implicit memory. Subjects wore headphones through which two different prose passages were played in the

right and left charrnels. The task requmd the shadowing of input from thc right channel while ignoring input

trom the left. At the wnclusion of the listening task direct and indirect tests, each consisting of 14 phrases.

were administered. One phrase from each pair was extracted from the passage played in the ignored channel

and the other was ohtamed from unheard passages from the same book. On the direct test. participants were

asked to choose the phrase in each pair that they had hexd in the irrelevant channel. For the indirect test,

subjects were informed that half of the phrases came from a pubIished story by a well-known author and the

task was to identify whicn phrase of each pair was such. In comparing these results to those obtained from

control p u p s it was clear that both explicit and implicit memay for information presented ir, the to-be-

ignored channeI were absent. However. when the same stimuli were attended to, direct and indirect test

scores were significantly above those of control groups.

One may argue that the nature of the stimuli may have contributed to the failure to find implicit

memory in the ignore condition. It is conceivable that a certain minimal level of semantic processing has to

have occurred at study in order for implicit memory for phrases to be found, a condition that was not

achievable given the little attentional resources devoted to the information. Nevertheless. the finding of no

implicit memory under these conditions is not conclusive evidence that it cannot be found. It remains

possible that with smaller conceptual units. such as simple words or brand names instead of whole phrases.

implicit memory on a conceptually-driven test will be evident even when the critical information is but

minimally processed at exposure. Moreover. multiple repetitions of the information that receives only

nonfocal attention may reveal implicit memory effects.

The purpose of the present study then is to test the above proposition in a marketing relevant context.

We attempt to simulate. in an experimental context, situations of ad encounter commonly experienced by

consumers - situations in which ads are devoted little attention and are consequently minimally processed.

Specifically. we investigate whether advertising slogans that are heard while one is engaged in a resource-

intensive primary task may make the featured brands come to mind more readily on a later brand name

generation task. This allows us to see if there can be implicit memory on a conceptually-driven test when

smaller conceptual units are used and also offers the opportunity to put the predictions of the TAP model to

test. We 311~9 examine of the role of advertising repetition as a potential moderator of the relationship

between memory and attention.

3 Chapter Three: Experiment 1

3.1 Design

The experimental design was a 3 (number of exposures) x 2 (direction of attention) between-group

factorial. The first of these factors involved nor exposing subjects to the brand names (control group) to

establish baselines for comparison, or exposing subjects to one or three exposures (experimental groups).

These three [eveis of the first factor are also referred to elsewhere in this paper as control. no repetition and

repetition. The second factor entailed directing subjects to either focus attention on the brand names or to

Ignore them while attending to some other concurrently presented information.

3.2 Subjects

A total of 188 undergraduate students participated in the experiment for cred~t in an introductory

marketing course at a large northeastern university. The experiment was conducted on dn individual basis,

with each session lasting a half-hour. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions on

a n ~ v s l .

3.3 Materials and Procedure

At the start of the experiment, individuals were seated in front of a computer and asked to read a set

of instructions on tl printed sheet. Those subjects assigned to the attend condition were told that their task

was to listen to audio messages played to them through earphones. while at the same time ignoring text

flashed on the computer screen. As part of the cover story. they were told that the aim was to assess how

comprehension of audio information may be affected by distracting visual stjmuli. For that reason. they

were to keep their eyes on the computer screen whiie paying full attention to what they were hearing

through the earphones. Ti, reinforce the need to focus attention on the audio message, they were told to

expect a later test of comprehension.

Subjects in the ignore condition. on the other hand, read instructions that told them to read the text

presented on the computer screen, as if they were reading a regular print article. except that they were to

read i t out loud. To be sure that subjects understood what was expected of them and as a w m up, they

were, at this point. required to read a short passage of 122 words flashed one word at a time at a pace that

corresponded to that used in the main task. After completing this practice trial. they were then told that they

were required to perform a similar task. but with concurrent audio messages played to them through

earphones. The cover story informed them that the purpose was to assess how comprehension of text

passages may be affected when the environment is a noisy one. As with the attend condition. it was

necessary to provide incentive to focus attention on the text passage and this was accomplished by telling

subjects to expect a later test of comprehension of the text.

After it was clear that subjects understood a11 instructions, the main task of the experiment began. The

experimenter then started a software program called Vortex, used for the purpose of displaying text on the

computer screen. The program parsed text passages and displayed them one word at a time at a

predetermined rate and in a manner that was reactiw to punctuation. This software allowed us precise

control over the rate of presentation and hence the speed of reading. In addition. its sensitivity to

punctuation enabled reading in a more natural manner. The text passage used was a concatenation of two

advertising messages. one for the product Ambien (a sleep medication) and the other tbr the Bose Wave

Radio. taken from print magazines. The passage was 605 words long, presented at the rate of 165 words per

minute. (Please see Appendix C for text passage.) This rate of presentation was chosen based on pretest

results that indicated that it was demanding enough to prevent subjects in the ignore condition from shifting

attention to the audio messages. Subjects in the pretest were presented with the text passage at various

reading speeds with a concurrent audio message played to them through earphones. They were subsequently

probed for awareness of the content of the audio message and explicitly asked if they had at any point

shifted attention to the audio message.

Immediately after clicking on the button that started the Vortex program running, the

experimenter began playing an audio tape containing the critical ad slogans. A total of 16 mock ad slogans

(featuring real brand names) were played. with a 3-second interval between slogans and a 40-second period

of silence at the start df the tape. This period of silence served the same purpose as the practice reading trial

- to ensure that subjects in the ignore condition had warmed up and were comfortably focused an the

reading task before they were presented with the critical ad slogans. Subjects in the no repetition condition

heard 4 critical ad slogans just once and each of the 4 filler slogans were repeated three times for a total of

16 slogans heard. Conversely. subjects in the repetitton condition heard each of the 4 critical ad slogans

three times and the tiller slogans once. again for a toul of 16 slogans heard. The brand names appearing in

the critical d slogans were seiected based on a pretest..' (See Appendix A for the critical brand names and

slogans ilsed. )

Upon completion of the reading/listening task, subjects were administered the dependent measures

contained in a questionnaire booklet. At the end of the session, they were debriefed. thanked for their

participation. and dismissed.

3.4 Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks

In the ignore conditions. in which subjects were required to read the text on the computer screen,

whenever there was a break in continuity of the reading or when words were slupped, a record of it was

made. The experimenter had a printout of the text that was read before her and a highlighter ready, so that as

subjects read the text. errors were noted by a quick highllgnting of the words that were missed. This served

. as an indication of reading fluency with dysfluencies suggesting attentional shifts.

For greater assurance that subjects in the ignore (or nonfocal) and attend (or focal) conditions had

indeed focused attention respectively on reading the text and listening to the audio, subjects were given ten

bur-alternative multiple-choice questions based on the text passage.

One indirect and one direct memory test were contained in the questionnaire booklet. In the case of

the former. the associated instructions were to respond with the first brand name that came to mind for each

of ten product catepnes. Subjects were discouraged from deliberating for too long. For the latter. subjects

were required to recall the brand names that they may have heard in the audio messages and were prompted

rvith ten category cue:. different from those used in the indirect memory test. For each subject. memory for

two of the four critical brand names was assessed on the ind~rect test. and memory for the ather two on the

direct test. Thus the product categories were divided into two sets of two categories each. ~ u c h that each

subject would see one set on the indirect rest and the second set on the direct test. Use of each set on either

the indirect or direct test was counterbalanced across subjects, as was the order of the indirect and direct

measures. In keeping with the retrieval intentionality criterion. the tests were designed such that the indirect

and direct tests were distinguished only by ~nstructions.

The order in which the measures were collected was as follows:

i . Multiple-choice questions

2. Indirect [Direct] measure

3. Filler task

4. Direct [Indirect J measure

5 . Test fcr hyporhesis awareness

6 Demographic information

The filler task was s~mply a wurd search puzzle that took approximately 5 minutes to complete. It

served the purpose of clearing short-term memory as subjects moved from one task to the next. Hypothesu

awareness was tested fur with a series of questions placed near the end of the booklet, followed by some

demographic questions about each pan~cipant.

3.5 Results

Twenty percent of the 188 subjects run were deemed to be either aware of the hypothesis or of the

connection between the indirect task and the exposure phase and were excluded from further analyses. To be

sure that systematic biases were not introduced by doing this, two sets of analyses were run on the critical

dependent measures. one that included these subjects and another that did not. The results of both analyses

were not different on key hypothesis tests, but nonetheless we restrict discussion, in the following sections.

to data obtained from subjects who were not aware of the study hypothesis.

Given that the order of the memory tests was counterbalanced across subjects. we first checked for an

order effect on subjects* probability of responding with the brand names featured in the slogans by

conducting a logistic analysis on data from the experimental groups. The results reveal a null effect of test

order on ather the indlroct or direct memory tests ( X ' S c I. ps > 3). Thus. in subsequent analyses. data were

collapsed across test order.

Manipulation Checks. For assurance that subjects had indeed focused attention on the textlaudio as

instructed. their score (out of a possible ten) dn the multiple-choice questions assessing text comprehension

was subjected to an ANOVA test. There was only a significant main effect of direction of attention

(F( 1,144)= 195.3s. p<.0001) with subjects in the ignore conditions scoring higher (M=7.25) than subjects in

the attend conditions (M=3.25).

For subjects in the ignore conditions who were required to read text, we obtained a measure of their

reading fluency by computing the total number of words that each subject skipped over. This measure was

subjected to an ANOVA to assess if fluency, and hence the likelihood of attentional shifts, might have

differed across repetition levels. The results indicate that subjects in the different repetition conditions

cannot be distinguished on the basis of the number of words missed in the reading task (&, w,,=19.3.

&,Cl,UM1=27S. &onml=2 1.4; F(2.75)= 1.34, p>0.2)).

Indirect Memorv Mesure. For each of the two criticai brand names on the indirect memory test.

wbjects recaved a score of I ~f they generated the cc.rrec t brand name and 0 other wise. Since each subject

was rested fi>r implicit memory for two brand nzmcs. a cpeatcd measures logistic analysis. with time as the

repeated factor. was run on the data.

The analpis revealed a significant main effect of direction of attention (x2( 1)=3.99. pc.05'). with

subjects in the attend conditions being more likely to respond with the critical brand names than subjects in

the ignore conditions. Main effect of repetition was also significant indicating that the likelihood of

responding with those brand names was not equivalent (x2C)=20.08. p<.OI) across groups that received

zero. one or three exposues to the brand names. The time factor was not significant (~'(1)=1.19. p>.Z).

demonstrating that whether a product category was encountered early or later on had no significant effect on

subjects' responses. In addition. none of the interactions involving time was significant (X2s<l. pn.5 ) . Of

greater interest was the fact that the significant main effects are qualified by a significan~ direction of

differences between experimental and control groups across the repetition condition point to the presence of

explicit memory.

For subjects in the attend conditions, there was a steady increase in the proportion of subjects able to

recall the correct brand names as the number of exposures to the brand names increased. Pairwise

comparisons of proportions revealed a significance difference between the attend/control and attendno

repetition conditions (253.92. p=.001). as well as between the attendtcontrol and attendlrepetition

conditions ( 2 - 5 . 6 2 . p=.OOL). There was a marginally significant difference between the attendno repetition

and attendlrepetition conditions ( Z 5 - 1.65. p=. LO).

In the ignore conditions. on the other hand. none of the pairwiw comparisons yielded significant

differences (20--7. ps>.2). Hence. subjects in the different ignore conditions were not differentially able to

recdi the brand names they were exposed to.

3.6 Discussion

That implicit memory for the brand names increased with repetition when attention is focused on the

slogans is an unsurprising one. since the positive relation between priming and repetition in full attention

conditions has been established by previous studies (Greene. 1990; Roediger & Challis. 1992; Krishnan &

Shapiro. 1996). The more interesting results pertain to the ignore conditions. As the analysis above

indicates. there was no evidence of irnpliclt memory when only one exposure to the brand name was

afforded. a result that is consistent with the predictions of the TAP framework. Given that only perceptual

processing is possible under the conditions. there ought not to be evidence of memory for the information on

a later conceptually-driven test. Data yielded by the ignodrepetition condition. however. cast doubt on this

line of reasoning. Subjects in this condition were presumably similarly impaired in terms of abiIity to

process conceptually. but interestingly, displayed implicit memory for the brand names.

Could this owe to the hct that there had been attentional shifts to the audio presentation that went

undetected'? The manipulation checks lend little support to this argument. Subjects in the ignordno

repetition and ignorelrepetition conditions missed a statistically equivalent number of words. yet only the

latter showed implrcit memory for the brand names. This. however, rests on the assumption that attentional

shifts can be detected by breah in the tlow of reading. Glven that we had intentionatly made subjects read at

the fast pace of 165 words per minute, this does not seem to be an unreasonable assumption.

In summary. the results of this first experiment indicate that, contrary to the TAP model, there can be

implicit memory on a conceprualIy-driven task even when there is Iittle conceptual processing at time of

exposure. This dilutes the strength of the conceptual-perceptual distinction as an explanation for implicit-

explicit memory dissociations. The results yielded by this experiment also suggest that advertising

communications can have an effect on our behavior even in situations when they are not attended to or are

ignored. This occurs presumably by virtue of the information contained within these communications being

sufficiently activated (or made more accessible) to levels that facilitate its coming to mind when one is

prompted with the right cues. Two observations are noteworthy. First of all. in the context of the present

experiment, the results seem to indicate that the level of activation afforded to ignored brand names when

the number of exposures is limited to one is insufficient for ~mplicit memory to be observed. Each additional

exposure represents added opponuniry for activation. such that at three exposures. incrementaI activation is

ample for the emergence of implicit memory. Secondly. information has to be available in memory to be

activated or made more accessible. Given that the brand names employed were ones of at least moderate

familiarity to university students, activation remains a viable explanation for the phenomenon. This

experiment says nothing about situations in which coherent memory representations have to be formed for

novel or obscure brand names for which there is little pre-experimental familiarity. There is, however,

evidence in the psychology literature that attention is critical to the formation of memory representations of

novel items. Smith and Oscar-Bennan ( 1990) found priming on a speeded lexical decision task to be

equivalent in both full and divided attention conditions for word stimuli, but not when they were nonsense

words.

The present experiment suffers from several shortcomings, among which is the high proportion of

subjects classified as hypothesis-aware. By omitcmg the data of these subjects horn the lnalyses. one risks

having excluded subjects that may have been systemrtticalIy different from the remaining sample in respects

other than hypothesis awareness. Although our andyse using data from both larger and smaller samples

yield essential1 y the bame results. it docs no1 detract from the fact that ensuring low awareness levels would

have been preferable as well as prudent. Also. the ~rnplici t memory measure employed required subjects to

respond with the tirst brand name that came to mind. While first responses reveal top-of-mind brands. the

practical implications of this are somewhat limited. It remains to be seen if implicit memory for a brand

name would translate to a greater likelihood of tts inclusion in the consideration set and of being selected in

a memory-based choice situation. In addition, the products used in this experiment were of the consumer

packaged goods variety and it is not clear if the effects would generalize to other types of products. One

might expect that more durable products, associated in general with more high involvement type purchases,

would be somewhat immune to the effects found In the first experiment.

4 Chapter Four: Experiment 2

Experiment I demonstrated that brand names presented outside the focus of attention can nonetheless

be made more likely to come to mind with repeated exposures. From a marketing perspective, it would be

interesting to see if this greater accessibiIity of the brand names might actually extend to greater likelihood

of choosing or considering the brands. We therefore use the dependent measures of consideration set and

choice in experiment 2. in place of the fint response measure used in experiment I . We examine to see if the

same pattern of results found in experiment 1 would hold with these other measures. Attitude measures were

also administered to help ascertain if repeated exposures in this context might lead to enhanced attitude.

Experiment two was also conducted with an eye to avoiding the pitfalls discussed in the previous section.

One objective was to lower the level of hypothesis awareness with a modification in procedure. In addition.

brand names of products belonging to the inore durdble variety (watch, camera) were employed to allow a

stronger test of the effects found in Evperiment 1 Attitude measures were also collected in addition to the

dependent measures of choice. consideration set and cued recall.

4.1 Design and Subjects

The experimental design remains similar to that of Experiment I. Hence, thre e factors are involved

- two between subjects factors of direction of attention (attend vs. ignore) and number of exposures to

brand names (zero vs. one vs. three). A totaI of 203 participants were initially recruited by placing an ad in

the university newspaper. Eleven of the 203 recruitees turned out to be older non-university students and

were therefore eliminated from the study sample. All 192 subjects retained in the study were thus university

students who were paid $8 for their putic~pation. The session lasted about 30 minutes and as before. each

session was conducted on an individual basis.

4.2 Materials and Procedure

In an effort to reduce the likelihood of hypothes~s awareness, subjects were first informed that they

were about to participate in two unrelated research studies, Study A and Study B. each of which lasts about

15 minutes. The instructions for Study A were essentialIy identical to that for Experiment I. That is, subjects

were told to either focus all attention on reading text or listening to audio messages as both were

simultaneously delivered. Essentidly the same text for reading was used. with the exception that words that

Experiment I subjects had particular problem with were replaced or removed. to allow for smoother

reading. The resulting text was only slightly shorter with a total word count of 586 words. (Please see

Appendix D for text passage.) The audio stimuli. in similar fashion, contained mock slogans featuring actual

brand names, atthough an entirely different set of slogans and brand names were used in this second

experiment. There were. however, only two criticaI brand names instead of four, employed (see Appendix B

for critical brand names and slogans used).' In the repetition conditions, to avoid drawing particular

attention to the repeated brand names, thereby leading subjects, particularly those in the attend conditions, to

be hypothesis aware, we repeated the two other tiller brand names in addition ro the two critical brand

names. Upon completion of the reading/Iistening task. subjects proceeded to answer the same multiple-

choice questions that tested comprehension of the text passage. To reinforce efforts to minimize awareness.

subjects were given a 5-minute filler task cons~sting of open-ended questions of no consequence to the study

As soon as subjects completed Study A, they were presented with Study B containing six tasks.

Introductory comments informed subjects that the study was done in collaboration with a marketing research

firm, as part of an ongoing effort to find out about consumers' preferences in various product categories. In

Task 1, subjects were presented with twelve different product categories and asked that they list the brands

that they would consider purchasing as if they were actually about to make purchases in each category. In

Task 2. they were then asked to pick one brand from amongst the brands listed for each category. the one

they would actually buy. To see if there might be an effect of task order, a different version of the tasks

administered to half the subjects, required them to first name the brand they would buy before listing other

brands that were considered. For Task 3. subjects rated fifteen different brands on two attitude scales

mchored by very bad/very good and dislike very mrtcldfike very much. In Task 4, they were presented with

seven different advertising slogans that they were again to rate on similarly anchored scales. For Task 5.

subjects were asked to think back to Study A and to try to recall the brand names that they heard. Fifteen

different product category names, of which only one corresponded to the critical brand. were provided as

cues. The final task consisted of quest:ons that probed possible awareness of the hypothesis or af the relation

between the exposure phase and the considenticn set and chorce measures. It also checked for suspicions

that the cover story was redly a rust: t t ~ drsguise ;he relation between the two supposedly separate studies.

4.3 Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks

Two critical brands belonging to two diKerent product categories were included in this experiment.

For any subject. one of these product categories would appear on the consideration set, choice and attitude

measures while the other would appear on the explicit memory measure, with counterbalancing done across

subjects.

On the consideration set and choice tasks, we were interested to see if there might be an increased

propensity tbr subjects to respond with the brand names that they were exposed to, even under nonfocal

attention conditims. We dso wanted to investigate if exposure to the brand names might have affected their

attltude towards the brands: hence the brand attitude measure. If subjects exposed to the critical brands are

indeed more Iibcly ct; include those brands in their consideratinn sets, there may be two possible underlying

reasons - that exposure had increased rrccessibi li ty of those brands and/or that subjects' attitudes towards

the brands had been enhanced.

Among the slogans that subjects rated in Task 3 was one that they were exposed to earlier. Given we

were interested in their evaluation of the slogan rather than the brands per se in this particular task, the brand

names that were originally associated with the slogan was replaced with fictitious names judged to be

neutral in terns of any connotations. The purpose of this measure was to assess the relation between

evaluation of the slogan (as opposed to the bnnd) and the exposure level.

The other manipulation checks used in this experiment were the same ones used in Experiment 1,

consisting of the measure of reading fluency and the multiple-choice test of comprehension of the text

passage.

4.4 Results

Of the 192 study participants. approximately 69 were classified as hypothesis aware. This level is

lower than that of the previous experiment, demonstrating some success in our attempt to minimize

awareness. The discussion that follows is based on data that exclude these subjects. As in Experiment 1. our

analyses revealed that including them did not change the substantive results.

Mani~ulation Checks. As before. subjects r e c e i d 3 score out of ten on the multiple-choice test for

comprehension of the text passage. If subjects had directed their attention to the audiohisual stimuli as

instructed, ignore subjects (told to ignore the acdic) ought to outperform attend subjects on th~s test. Indeed.

there was a significant main effect of direction of attention (F(1,174)=110.37, p<.000L, MUa=3.85,

Mi,,=6-74) on the test score.

The number of words that subjects in the ignore condition missed when reading the text passage was

taken as a measure of reading fluency. This was subjected to an ANOVA. the results of which indicated the

absence of a difference in fluency levels across the number of exposures conditions (F(2.95)= 1.84, p>. 17).

De-pendent Measures. The data were subjected to a logistic analysis, Recall that some subjects

received the choice task first while others received the consideration set task first. We therefore first

determined that task order did not have a significant effect on any of the dependent measures and collapsed

the data across task order for all subsequent analyses. Also, since two brands were used, we checked to see

if responses r n l g l ~ ~ hake been different for the two brands. Again, neither the main effect nor the interactions

were found to be .>ignificant.

Considerntion set. The main et'tects uf d~rect~on c.4 attention and number of exposures on the

li kzli hood ot mcluding critical brands in one's consideration sets were both bignificant at the .05 p-level

( ;('( I !=5.86. x'(z)= 14-16, respectively; x e Figure 3 ,L The direction of attention effect shows that subjects

who attended w the brand names were more likely to respond with the critical brand names than subjects

who ignored them. Also, subjects who had three exposures to the brind names were more likely to include

those brands in their consideration sets than the subjects who had one exposure; and the latter group were, in

turn, more likely to do so than the control group.

------*-*-*---------------.-----*---------

Insert Figure 3 about here.

Planned pairwise comparisons show that subjects In the attendno repetition and attendrepetition

conditions were significantly more likely to include critical brand names in their consideration sets than

atrend/control subjects (Z=-2.95, p=.002; Z=-2.00, p=.02; respectively), but the attend/repetition and

attend/no repetition groups were not signiticantty different from each other subjects (E-0.86. p=. 19). When

attention was directed away from the brand names, the proportion of subjects who had those brand names in

their consideration sets was significantly higher in the ignorehepetition than in the ignore/control conditions

(Z=- 1.78, p=.04). However, the comparison between the ignorefno repetition and ignorefcontrol conditions

yielded a marginally significant difference (Z=- 1.42, p=.O8). A final compilrison between the ignoreho

repetition and ignore/repetition conditions indicates that the two groups are not different from each other

(Z=-0.4 1. p.34).

Choice. The choice data were similarly submitted to a logistic analysis (see Figure 4 for results).

There was a significant main effect of repetition (~?2)=8.7?. pc.01). reflecting the higher proportion of

subjects who chose the critical brands as the number of exposures increased. The main effect of direction of

mention was marginally significant (x2( 1)=?.63. PC. LO).

Of greater interest. how ier. are the planned comparisons. Within the attend condition, the proportion

ot subjects responding w~th the critical brands hcreased with repetition. Pairwise campaiisons show rz

significant difference between attendkontrol and atteadho repetition (2-2.02, p=.02). as well as between

attendfconuol and attendJrepetihon (Z-2.29, p=.O! J conditions. Attendho repetition and attendrepetition

were, however, not significantly different from each other (Z-0.20, p=.42). A different pattern emerges for

the ignore conditrons. .4 comparison of the control and no repetition conditions shows that there is no

significant difference in choice probability (Z--0.10, p=.46), but a similar comparison between the no

repetition and repetition conditions revealed a significant difference (Z-1.79, p=.04). The difference

between the ignorekontrol and ignorehepetition conditions was sxgnificant as well (Z- 1.8 1. p=.04).

Cited Recall. As can be seen in Figure 5, on the explicit measure of category-cued recall. there were

significant main effects of attention (x2( 1 )=67.00. pc.01) and number of exposures (x2(2)=i 32.22, pc00 1 ).

Planned comparisons show a steady increase in the proportion of subjects who correctly recalled the

brand (see Figure 5) . when they attended to the brand names (Zsc-3.00. pse.005, for ali pairwise

comparisons). When they ignored the brand names, repetition led to recall rates that were significantly

greater than in the control (Z-3.04. p=.OO!) and no repetition (25-2.86, p = . W ) conditions. Recall rates in

the ignorekontrol and ignordno repetition conditions were equivalent at zero.

Other Measures. The two attitude subscales for brand (a=.87) and for slogan (e.90) were averaged

to give a single score for brand attitude and a single score for slogan attitude, ANOVAs were conducted on

the brmd attitude and slogan attitude data, to assess the effects, if any, of the number of exposures and

direction of attention on affective evaluation. Null effects were found for both attitude measures (Fscl).

An additional measure. that of consideration set size, obtained simply by counting the number of

dternativr brands subjects listed for the critical product categories. was similarly submitted to an ANOVA

test. The expertmental manipulations of number of exposures and direction of attention were again found to

have no effect on set stze (Fsc 1 ). The only s~gniticant effect that emerged was that of brand with the watch

category having, on average. a significantly larger consideration set size than the camera category (M =2.33

and M =3.02 . respectively; F= 19.53. p<.OOI ).

4.5 Discussion

To summarize. the objectives of Experiment 2 were to Iend credence to the findings of Experiment 1

and to see if similar effects may be detected with the more ecologicalIy valid measures of consideration set

and choice. The results in this experiment are consistent with findings in Experiment 1 and show that

subjects' pmbabihty of choosing a particular brand can be increased by simply ~ncreasing the accessibility

of the brand name through repetition priming. Although this increase is reliable with just one exposure when

the brand name is given focal attention. the effect of prior exposure is much weaker when the brand name is

minimally processed. In fact. in the ignore condition. no increase was observed with a single exposure but a

significant increase was found with three exposures. The pattern of results for choice is thus consistent with

those found for the indirect measure in Experiment I .

Slightly different results were obtained for the consideration set measure. The point of difference lies

in the ignordno repetirion condition in relation to the ignordcontrol and ignore/repctition conditions. As cm

be seen in Figure 4. there was an increase in probabitity of inclusim with just one exposure. beyond which

t h e was no appreciable increase. The consideration set measure IS, 3f course quite different from the

choice measure or the indirect memory test employed in Experiment 1. in that it allows for multiple

responses to a single product cue. We propose that even with a single exposure. the brand names were made

more accessible. This increase in accessibility may not be sufficient to be detected when one is given the

opportunity to generate but one brand name, by allowing the generation of multiple brand names. the chance

of detecting the effect of a single prior exposure is increased. Although we find in this experiment that the

probability of including the critical brand name in a multiple brand consideration set did in fact increase

with a single exposure. that iccrew attained but marginal significance. This is in contrast to what was

found by Shapiro. Maclnnis and Heckler (1997). In their study, a single exposure to a product presented in

peripheral vision increased the likelihood of its consideration for choice.

There are a number of signitkant differences between the two studies that may have contributed to

the different findings. Whereas target items were presented auditorially in this study. they were presented

v~sually in Shapiro et al.'s study. There may be fundamental differences between the two modalities that

allow preconscious processing of stimuli to occur more readily in the visual presentation mode than in the

auditory presentation mode. In addition. the dependent measure in Shapiro et al.'s study involved the

forming of consideration sets for ad-hoc categories ("food one would buy before p ing parachute-jumping")

whereas consideration sets were for established product categories in the present study. Subjects are likely to

have pre-existing preference and knowledge structures associated with these product categories, which may

dilute the effects of experimental manipulations. making it harder to detect potential effects.

Another finding of interest is the equivalence in brand attitudes across conditions. Had brand attitudes

been affected by the experimental manipulations. such as if brand attitudes had become more favorable with

the number of exposures. there would have existed a compelling alternative explanation for the effects found

in this experiment. In those conditions where repetition increased the probability of including the critical

brands in one's consideration set or of choosing those brands, the fact that attitudes were statistically

equivalent across conditions leaves increased accessi bi ti t y of the brand names. rather than favorabili ty of

attitudes toward those brands, as the primary underlying factor [see Nedungltdi (1990) for similar findings].

To further examlne the relation between brand attitude and choice as well as considerat~on set

~nclusion. we correlated the relevant measures in each of the SIX conditions. Specitically. subjects' affect

ratlngs were correlated with their choice and considerdtwn set responses (which were coded as I when they

responded with the target brand and G otherwise.) Interestingly. the only significant correlations were found

in the control conditions. For the attendfcontroi condition, brand attitude was significantly correlated with

choice (e.35. p . 0 3 ) and for the ignorekontrol condition. the correlations between brand attitude and

choice (e.30. p=.061 and between brand attitude and consideration set inclusion (e.30. p.06) were

marginally significant. These results suggest that without any exposure to brand-related information,

~ndividuals are likely to include a brand in their consrderauon set based primarily on attitudes. With minimal

Levels of processing of brands, the influence of any a priori act~tudes towards the brands does not appear to

increase. evidenced by the lack of correlation between brand attitude and consideration set inclusion or

choice in both the attend and ignore situations.

A frequent concern in implicit memory studies is the question of whether perform,ance on implicit

memory measures might have been contaminated by explicit memory strategies. That is. might subjects

have relied on intentional retrieval. and hence explicit memory. in responding on the implicit memory

measures'? There are three sources of evidence in Experiment 2 that suggest that this is not the case. First of

all, we correlated the recall measure with the choice and consideration set measures for the different

conditions in which expIicit memory was evident (i.e. attendno repetition. attendrepetition,

ignorelrepetition). None of the correlations turned out to be significant (ps>.3). Secondly. we had excluded

from the analyses subjects who saw through the cover story and expressed awareness of the relation between

the priming phase and the test phase. Hence. the remaining subjects were unlikely to have intentionally

recollected and responded with what was heard when completing the consideration set and choice tasks.

Finally. we note the following dissociation: Subjects in the ignoreho repetition condition. despite being

unable to recall the brand names that they heard (see Figure 5). were nonetheless as equally likely to

consider the brand for choice, as subjects in the ignorelrepetition condition. The latter subjects. on the other

hand, showed signiticant explicit memory for the brand names.

That explicit memory would be found in the ignoreIrapetition condition is somewhat unexpected. The

manipulation check on reading fluency certainly did not indicate attention shifting to be a potential

explanation. I t seems plausible. particularly given the use of familiar brand names. that repeated exposure

heightened xttvation to such levels that perm~tted conscious detection of their occurrence. Such an

explanation is in agreement with the atrenuator model of attention proposed by Treisman ( 1960, that will be

further elaborated on in the general discussion section.

Could subjects have momentarily switched artention to the unattended channel, heard the brand

names. but before coming around to responding on the explicit memory measures had forgotten what was

heard? This is an important question from a theoretical standpoint. but it is nevertheless still interesting to

know. particularly in an applied context, that previous encounters that have faded from conscrousness can

influence our behavior in ways that we are not aware of.

A final nbjrction may be made with repard to the assumption that shifts in attention can be detected

by breaks in the tlow of reading. The uggestion may be made to increase reading speed. so as to get a more

sensitive measure of attentional shifts As discussed earlier, subjects were made to read at the rather fast

pace of 165 wpm. a rue determined in n pretest to be comfortable enough not to undermine efficiency. It has

to be borne in mmd that excessive breaks in reading caused by reading speeds that are hard to keep up with,

may itself be the cause of attentional shifts and not merely the symptom. Hence, the issue of an optimal

reading speed remains a methodological challenge.

5 Chapter Five

The focus of experiments 1 and 2 was on the effects of repetition on memory for brand names when

these brand names were encountered under low involvement conditions. Memory for brand or product

information is, of course, but one factor influencing consumer buying behaviour. Affect or attitude toward a

brand is an important input to choice, and is a factor that's of immense interest to marketers. The focus of

this dissertation, beginning with this chapter. shifts to affective judgements of stimuli initially processed

under conditions of low involvement. As in the previous two experiments, the effect of repetition as a

critical moderating variable. is examined. The literature in the mere exposure effect, which is concerned

with the relat~onship between repetition and affect. provides the backdrop for discussing the third

experiment of thls dissertation. The following section provides an overview of the mere exposure effect.

5.1 The mere exposure effect

The term ntrre exposure effect was coined by Zajonc ( 1968). in reference to the phenomenon of

enhanced liking for stimuli to which one had been repeatedly exposed. That the phenomenon so intrigued

researchers 1s reflected in the more than 150 published studies investigating the mert exposure effect.

following Zajonc's initial

publication. The wide-ranging contexts within which it has been examined. fiom explaining food preference

(e.g Pliner. Crandall) to explaining liking for various stimufi in nonhuman mammals (Hill, 1978)- also attest

to its far-reaching impact.

The mere exposure effect has certainly received extensive empirical support. Within mainstream

social and cognitive psychology, the mere exposure effect has been found with viuious types of presentatron

stimuli - meaningful words (Grush. 1476. Whirtlesea. 1993). geometric shapes (Mandler. Nakarnura &

Van Zandt. 1987; Bumstein & D'Agustino. 1992). melodies (Wilson. 1979; Obemlller. 1985) -as well as

using various clic~tatiort measureb - forced-choice preference judgment (Seamon, McKenna & Binder.

1998; Mandter et al., 1987: Wilson. 1979: K~nst-Wilson & Zajonc. 1980). like-disiike rating scale

t Bornstem 4r D'Agost~no. 1992). multiple bipoh adjecile scales (Okrmiller. 1985; Jmiszewski, 1993).

WhiIe the robustness of the mere exposure effect is seldom in dispute, the reasons for its mxrrence

and theoretical accounts put forth have been the topic of fervent discussions and scrutiny. One of the most

Important aspects of the mere exposure effect that these theories have had to account for, is what's been

called the nonconscious mere exposure effect, the finding that repeated stimuli are better liked despite

subjects having no recollection of having encountered them. In Kunst-Wilson and Zrrjonc's (1980) study,

for instance. subjects were briefly exposed ( 1 ms) to target items at study. At test. they chose target items

signiticantly more often than distractor ones in a forced choice preference task, but picked out target items at

no better than chance level on a recognition task. An early theory proposed by Zajonc (1980, 1984) to

account for this tinding, one that has generated considerable controversy and debate. suggests that affective

and cognitive responses are the product of two separate and independent systems. Affective processing may

proceed independently of cognitive processing and may also precede it. thereby giving rise to the observed

independence between the two. Skeptics were quick to point out that the absence of recognition is not a

sufticisnt condition to establish the absence of cognition (Lazarus. 1982; Gordon & Holyoak. 1983). Rather,

affective responses may be mediated by cognitive activity in the form of perceptual registration (Lazarus.

1982). even when recognition is no better than chance.

The latter represents the cognitive mediation approach. an instance of which is the uncertainty

reduction model (Sawyer, 198 1). It posits that each exposure offers the opportunity for learning and a

reduction in uncertainty about the stimuIus is a direct consequence of this learning. Because a stimulus

about which there is less uncertainty is less likely to be associated with aversive tension. affective response

to the stimulus becomes more positive with repeated exposures. This explains the uncertainty reduction

model in general terms. More precise explications of the mechanism that Ieads from familiarity to liking are

contained in theories such as wo-factor theory (Berlyne, 1970). response cornperition (Harrison, 1968) and

optirrtul arousal (Crandall. 1970). the most prominent being the first of these. Two-factor theory asserts that

affect becomes more positive as one [ e m s about the stimulus and becomes more familiar with it with

repeated exposures, but that this enhancement occurs only up to a certain point. beyond which tedium or

boredum sets In. When this comes about. a decline in affect becomes evident with additional exposures.

Tu.0 factor theory hres fairly weli for the most pan. in accounting for tindings in the mere exposure

literature. Brxnstein ( 1989). in his rneta-analysis and review of the literature. noted that 'Qverall. a two-

factor learning-satiation model of exposure effects seems best supponed by this review." Nonetheless, the

rheury does have its difficulties in explaining some findings. the most significant of which is that stronger

mere exposure effects are obtained with sub1 iminal rather than supraliminal stimuli (Bornstein &

D'Agostino. 1992). Since the theory proposes that affect varies with subjective famdiarity, this finding

cannot be readily accommodated.

Today, the independence vs. cognitive-mediation debate has come to an impasse and newer theories

have in recent years gained favour at the expense or these earlier ones. They are the non-specific activation

hypothesis. the perceptual fluency/attributional model and the discrepancy-attribution account, each of

which is discussed in the following section. Although the experiment that will be described in the next

chapter docs not provide a critical test of the competing accounts, a discussion of these accounts is intended

to provide background understanding of the mere exposure effect in terms of recent theoretical

developments.

5.2 Theoretical accounts of the Mere Exposure Effect

5.2.1 Non-specific Activation Hypothesis

Mandler et al. (1987) argue that two things can happen when a stimulus is encountered - there can

be activation of the stimulus* representation in memory and there can be elaboration on the item involving

more conscious or effonful processes. The first of these results in the greater accessibility of the stimulus in

memory and is context-free. unlike elaboration. which involves integrating the stimulus with the context. In

studies demonstrating the mere exposure effect for stimuli that are not recognized. the target stimuli are

typically presented very briefly for but a fraction of a second (e.g. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc. 1980). In such a

situation. Mandler et al. ( 1987) argue. there is activation of the target stimuli in memory with each

subsequent presentation even though elaboration is not passible. When later presented with a target. for

which there is an activated representation. and a distractor, for which there is none. the greater activation

biases subjects to select the target as the preferred stimulus. Because successful recognition is reliant on

having integrated. to some extent. the stimulus with the context at time of exposure. the very brief

presentations afforded at exposure ensured that recognition performance would be poor.

The more imponant pan of Mandler et al.'s ( 1987) account. however. is the claim that this bias in

response due to activation is not peculiar to affective or preference judgments. The account predicts that

when asked to make judgments on any other relevant dimension. subjects' responses will favour the target

in a similar fashion. This was indeed what was found in an experiment in which different groups of subjects

were asked to select from a pair of stimuli. the preferred stimulus. the brighter stimulus, the darker stimulus

or the stimulus that had been presented in an earlier exposure phase. Recognition performance was

unsurprisingly poor with target items selected 49.62 of the time; on the other hand. target items were

preferred over distractor ones at 59.2% of the time. were chosen as brighter 60% of the time and chosen as

darker 60.8% of the time.

That mere exposure effects can be found not just with affective judgments lessens the viability of

Zajonc's ( 1980.1984) independent hypothesis. Zajonc had accorded affect a special status. by arguing for a

reparate affective system that generates affective ruponses. unmediated by cognitive processes. If mere

exposure effectr can be found with other types of judgrcenls. then certainly. it %odd not be reasonable to

postulate that a scpante system is responsible for each type of response.

Mandler cr at ( 1987) refer to the sort of activatmn that occurs as nonspecific activxion because it h s

the potential to intluence judgment about any relevant Fmpeny or dimension of the stimulus. Hence. it is not

simply n response bias. but rather iorolves the subject attempting to relate the activation to a relevant

dimension of the stimulus. The authors point out that one would not expect to find similar effects with

dimensions such as odor or a t e because they are irrelevant. but this raises the question of what relevance

entails and if it is possible to specify a priori the dimensions that are considered relevant and ones that are

not. a question not dealt with in any detail by the nonspecific activation account. Moreover. this issue of

relevance. not being the focus of the paper. was not subject to testing in the experiment reported. The

dimensions of liking. brightness and darkness used in the experiment were all deemed to be relevant

dimensions. The nonspecific activation account also does not provide the conceptual link between the

simple activation of a stimulus* representation in memory and its effect on judgment. The reason for that

cause and effect is not clearly argued. Finally, the only attempt at replicating the experiment reported to

date. by Searnon, McKenna and Binder ( 1998). proved unsuccessful. Prior exposure was found to affect

responses an preference judgment. but not on judgments of brightness or darkness.

5.2.2 Perceptual Fluency/Attributional Model

The Perceptual FluencylAttributional Model of the mere exposure effect was proposed by Bornstein

and D'Agostino ( 1994) and motivated by the observation that subliminal stimuli tended to produce mere

exposure effects that were about twice as large as that for supraliminal stimuli (Bornstein, 1989). It therefore

attempts to explain two interesting aspects of the mere exposure effect. The first is what most currently

viable accounts have concerned themselves with, and that is that mere exposure effect can be found even for

stimuli that are not recognized. The second is the larger effect found for stimuli that are not recognized. in

comparison to clearly-recognised stimuli.

The model draws on Jacoby and Kelley's ( 1987) notion of perceptual tluency. which briefly defined.

is the ease of processing or encoding [he perceptual features of a stimulus. Perceptual fluency arises most

often as the result of repeated exposures to a stimulus - a previously encountered stimulus becomes easier to

process on subsequent encounters. This fluency in processing is experienced as a feeling state. which the

subject relies on in making an affective response to the stimulus. In fact. as Jaccoby and his colleagues have

argued (Jacoby. Kelley & Dywan. 1989). this misattribution of perceptual fluency is not peculiar ro affective

judgments. but has been found to occur on a variety of other judgment task that the subject is faced with.

For instance. in what has become known as the false fame experiment, in the absence of recognition for

previously presented names. subjects were signlticantly more likely to mistakenly call previously seen

names famous, compared to new names (Jacoby, Woloshyn & Keiley, 1989). In another study, subjects

were presented with sentences in a noisy background and were given the task of judging the loudness of the

noise (Jacoby. Allan. Collins & Larwill, 1988). Some of these sentences had been presented prior to the task

and were more fluently processed. As a cmsequence of a misattribution of this fluency, subjects judged the

noise to be less loud when the sentences were old rather than new.

Repeated exposure is not the only means by which perceptual fluency may be engendered.

Whittlesea. Jacoby and Girard (1990. Experiment I ) showed that by subtly manipulating the level of

masking of stimuli (20% vs. JOB) such that some words were easier to process than others unbeknownst to

subjects, the more fluently perceived words were more likely to be called 'old' in a recognition test. Similar

manipulations led subjects to judge with greater probability that fluently processed words were presented for

twice as iong (Whittlesea. 1993~.

Regardless of the manner in which perceptual tluency is created, the reason i t affects these various

judgmenrs has to do with subjects, being unaware of the source of the fluency, seelung the most

parsimonious explanation for the experienced feeling state. Since this perceptual fluency is experienced at

the same time the judgment task is presented, subjects misattribute the fluency to their evaluation of the

stimuli on the dimension concerned.

Bornstein and D'Agostino go a step beyond this explanation of the mere exposure effect by arguing

that a correcting mechanism is in place, that alIows one to discount the initial interpretation of the fluency.

This discounting occurs when subjects are aware of having been exposed to stimuli in an earlier phase that

might be at least partially responsible for the experienced tluency. They are therefore likely to discount the

fluency and report lower affective ratmgs than would otherwise be the case. This expiains the finding of

larger mere exposure effects for subIirninaI rather than supralrminal stimuli. No discounting process occurs

with the former because subjects are typically not cognizant of having been previously exposed to the

sr~muli. The key. however. is not in the subliminality of the stimuli, but rather the lack of awareness of the

relarronsh~p between the exposure phase and the affective judgment phase. and subliminal exposure is

merely one way of achieving it.

Comparing the nonspecific activation account and the perceptual fluency/attributional model. it is

apparent that the two are very similar and may be two sides of the same coin. The consequence of activation

in memory is greater accessibility and hence quicker processing (Collins & Loftus. 1975; Anderson. 1983).

Greater processing speed is also implied by greater ease of processing and perceptual fluency, in fact. is

often indexed by reaction time (e.g. Whittlesea. 1993). The perceptual fluencylattributional model, unlike

the nonspecific activation account . is more explicit about the process that leads from stimulus encounter to

affective judgment. Perceptuai fluency has also been the subject of numerous experiments (Reber,

Winkielman & Schwan. 1998; Whittlesea, 1993; Anand & Sternthal, 199 1 ) an3 has stood up well to

empirical testing. The discounting component of the perceptual fluency/attributional model. on the other

hand. awaits funher testing. There has not been much evidence either in support or against it, beyond the

experiments conducted by Bornstein and D' Agostino ( 1994). While the discounting argument is plausible, a

subtle distinction can possibly be made between an argument that says there is an initial misattribution of

fluency !o l i k i q . folIowed by a correction of that interpretation and one that says there is a smaller

likelihood of misattributing the tluency to begin with. when one is aware of other potentla1 sources of that

fluency. Future studies would have to make a distinction between the discounting argument and alternative

expianations like this one.

5.2.3 Discrepancy-Attribution Account

The Discrepancy- Attribution explanation was praposed by Whittfesea and Will lams i 1998) not so

much to account for the mere exposure effect. but rarher to explicate the circumstances under which feelings

of familiarity arise. Nevertheless, the account is based on the notion of processing fluency and as the authors

themselves have argued. the feeling of familiarity is but one of many possible feeling states (inciuding

feelings of pleasantness or liking) that may be aroused by processing fluency. As such the concepts

proposed in their arguments are equally relevant to an account of the mere exposure effect.

The feeling of familiarity is the subjective feeling of having encountered something before. The

prevailing view is that is arises because one experiences fluent processing and attributes the fluency to an

encounter in the past rwhittlesea. 1993; Jacoby & Girard. 1990; Lindsay & Kelley, L996). Whittlesea and

Will~arns argue that it is not processing tluency per sz that is responsible for these feelings of familiarity.

After 311. there are a multitude of stimuli that one can tluentty process. such as the familiar faces of one's

friends. the objects In one's home, ctc. Yet the feeling of familiarity does not always accompany all

occasions of tluent processing. Rather ir is experienced only when the fluency is unexpected or surprising

given a particular context.

The discrepancy-attribution model th~refore makes two important assertions. First, the feeling of

familiarity is the product of a compuison process between experienced fluency and expectation. It arises

when there is a mismatch between outcome and expectation. The second assertion follows from this and

says that. unlike that advocated in other theories, fluency need not be enhanced to produce the effect.

Rather. fluency need only be greater or less than the context leads one to expect. This in turn leads us to the

question of how these expectations come about. Whittlesea and Williams ( 1998) alluded to a general

background experience of an item. but provided no specifics as to how this background experience is

derived. or what it translates to in psychological!y meaningful terms. One conjecture might be that the

background experience of an item is the avenge fluency or activation level over the caurse of one's lifetime

experience with the item.

The discrepancy-attribution model is resonably applicable as an explanation of the mere exposure

rfkct. Under appropriate situational constraints provided by the stimuli. context and task. t1uenc.y may be

attributed to a feeling of pleasantness or liking; surprising tluency. that is. This. in fact. offers an

explanation. alternative to the perceptual tluency/atuibutional model. for why subliminal mere exposure

studies yield stronger effects compared to supralirninal ones. Subjects exposed to supraliminal stimuli are

less likely to be surprised when fluency is later experienced, since there is reason to suspect that the prior

exposures would exert an effect on fluency and expectations may be influenced accordingly. This

hypothesis that the mere exposure effect is the result af unexpected fluency, while a simple variant of

Whittlesea and William's ( 1998) hypothesis with respect to the feeling of familiarity, has as yet not been the

subject of any published study. Whether or not it will stand up to empirical testing remains to be seen.

5.3 Perceptual Fluency vs. Conceptual Fluency

The three accounts of the mere exposure effect discussed in the previous section are not too markedly

different from each other and, ;n fact. they all seem to share the theme of perceptual fluency The notion of

perceptual tluency is an intuitively appealing one and one that has received support in the literature. Much

less often ascribed to and examined is conceptual fluency. Conceptual fluency. like perceptual fluency,

refers to the case of processing a stimulus except with respect to the semantic properties or meaning of the

stimulus.

There has been but one experiment published to date that investigates the mere exposure effect in the

context of conceptual fluency. Whittlesea (1993) had subjects read a series of sentences, presented in such a

way that each sentence. except for its last word, was presented on one screen. followed by the last word that

completes it. on the next screen. The sentences were constructed such that the sentence stems were either

more (predictive context) or less (neutral context) predictive of the last word that would appear.

For example. in the predictive condition. the following might be presented on the fint screen

'The mother gently rocked her . . ." folIowed by the target word

"baby" on the next screen.

In the neutral conditlon, a sentence and a target word such as the following might have appeared

instead:

'The boy in the classroom could not . . ."

"draw"

This predicuveness of context represented [he ~~nceptuai tluency rnanipulat~on. In the predictive

context condition. the meaning of the sentence stems constrained the possible words that could appear next

and this presumably led to greater ease in processing the meaning of the word when it did appear. Subjects

were asked to indicate if target words. the last words of the sentences, were pleasant or neutral. Results

showed a significantly higher probability of judging target words to be pleasant when presented in a

predictive context. compared to a neutral context.

However. the mere exposure effect as has been defined, is the more favourable affective response to

stimuli as a result of unrehforced repeated exposures. One may argue that subjects in the predictive

condition were able to anticipate the target word and confirmation of that expectancy, on presentation of the

tarp: word. may be reinforcing in itself. thereby leading to greater lilung for the target word. Hence. it may

be the reinforcing effects of the predictive condition. rather than conceptual tluency per se. that may be

driving the mere exposure effect.

6 Chapter Six: Experiment 3

6.1 Objectives of Study

The objectives of the present study are four-fold:

1. We test the hypothesis that conceptual tluency can give rise to the mere exposure effect, in a way

that avoids the confounding effects of reinforcement discussed earlier.

2. We manipulate perceptual and conceptual tluency within the same experiment. thereby allowing

us to examine the relationship between the two. Four possible scenarios are depicted in the

graphs of Figure 6.

In the first instance, shown in Figure 6a, we find that perceptual fluency but not conceptual

fluency exerts an effect on affective judgments. Perceptual fluency effects have been effectively

demonstrated in the literature. whereas conceptual fluency has as yet, not received extensive

support, making this scenario a possible one. Alternatively. we might find that perceptual and

conceptual fluency operate independently to produce the mere exposure effect. This is shown in

the gaph of Figure 6b. where the effects are independent and additive. Figures 6c and 6d depict

scenarios where perceptual and conceptual fluency interact. In the former. the affect is at its

highest level when both perceptual and conceptual fluency are high. In the latter. only one of

conceptual or perceptual tluency needs to be high, in order for affect to be enhanced. There are

no additional gains from having both high conceptual and high perceptual fluency.

3. We also examine the effects ot'ctjnceptu~l and perceptual tluency on recognition. Jacoby and

dthers (Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan. 1989, Jacoby. Woloshyn & KeIley. 1989; Whittiesea, 1993;

Whittlesea & W~lliams. 1998) have argued that tluency when prccesslng a stimulus can give rise

to a feel~ng of familiarity and hence affect familiarity judgements. Since recognition performance

is widely thought of as being reliant on two component processes, famil~arity and recollection

(Mandler, L980), fluency may exert its effects on recognition performance by influencing

familiarity. In such a case, we may observe that both recognition and affect are affected by

conceptual and perceptual fluency in a paralie1 fashion.

4. We administer both affect and recognitron measures for each stimulus item. The use of multiple

measures allows us to observe if fluency can simultaneously influence affect and recognition or

if tluency attributed to one will not be available to influence the other. Moreoever, taking both

measures allows us to analyse the relationship between affect and recognition using measures of

association. If both affect and recognition are based on the same processes, a positive association

should be obtained.

6.2 Subjects and Design

Subjects were 51 undergraduate commerce students. who participated in the study for extra credit.

The design is a 1 (perceptual fluency: high vs. low) x 2 (conceptual fluency: high vs. low) x 1. (number of

exposures: 1 vs. 5) x 2 (order of dependent measures: affect first vs. recognition first). The first 3 of these

factors are within-subject factors, whereas the last is a between-subjects factor.

According to Bornstein's ( 1989) review. the effects of exposure on affect tend to peak between 10-20

presentations. In order to provide a clear assessment of the potential effects of fluency, it was necessary to

avoid this downturn in affect. Moreover. since natural words were used in this experiment. in contrast to the

meaningless stimuli (nonsense words. photographs. polygons, etc.) employed in the majority of the studies

reviewed by Bornstein. the likelihood that an earlier downturn might occur led to a decision to set the

number of exposures conservatively to one and five.

6.3 Stimuli

The stimuli were meaningful words sharing the common characteristic of being a homogr~ph.

Homographs are words that have two or more possible meanings. An example would be the word RIGHT,

which presented in the absence of a context. could mean the opposite of LEFT. or it could mean CORRECT.

48 homographs were selected according ro the following criteria: ( 1) they had to be between three and seven

letters long (2) hey had to have synonyms that were also between three and seven letters long. All 48

homographs were presented in the exposure or study phase, each presented either once or five times.

In order to constrain the meaning of the homographs, they were presented in the context of sentences.

The sentences were between six and ten words long and the homographs always appeared as the last word of

these sentences. For example. a subject might see the sentence. 'There are prizes for guesses that are right."

A subset of these sentences was drawn from Masson and MacLeocl(1992).

In the judgment phase. subjects again saw 48 sentences between six and ten words long with target

words at the end of sentences. The target words were either ( I ) one of the homograph words seen at

exposure (2) a synonym of one of the homograph words seen at exposure (3) one of the homograph words

seen at exposure bur with a different meaning :mplicd. c,r (4) a new word unrelated to any of the homqraph

words seen earlier.

Fur example. if the following sentence w s presented at study:

"His inheritance made him very rich."

One of the following four sentences was presented at judgment:

I. "He won the lottery and became rich."

2. "He won the lottery and became wealthy."

3 . 'The chocolate cake was very rich."

4. 'The chocolate cake was very tasty."

The first of these sentences represents the high conceptual fluencylhigh perceptual fluency condition.

since the target word has the same meaning and looks the same as the homograph word presented at study.

The second sentence represents the high conceptual fluencynow perceptual fluency case because the target

word is a synonym of the word seen at study. In the third sentence. the target word is the same word as that

at study. although a different meaning 1s implied by the context and represents the low conceptual

tlucncy/h~gh perceptual tluency condition. Finally. a target word unrelated to that seen at study is presented

in the lasr sentence and we therefore have a low conceptual tluency/low perceptual fluency. Which of the

four sentences was presented was randomly determined by the computer program. (Please see Appendix E

for the entire set of sentences used in the study.)

6.4 Dependent Measures

Aher each sentence is presented, subjects made two judgments about the target word. Approximately

half the subjects first responded to an affective judgment task. They were asked to indicate if they found the

word to be 'pleasant' or 'neutral'. This was followed by a recognition test that required them to respond

'old' or 'newb to each target word. The order of the two tasks was reversed for the rest of the subjects.

A variety of measures has been used with success to elicit the mere exposure effect (cf. Bornstein.

1989). The decision to use a pleasandneutral task here was in keeping with WhittIesea (1993). Also. a

choice between 'pleasant' and 'neutral' was deemed more appropriate than one between 'pleasant' and

'unpleasant' because. although the iattcr would present no problems in the case of words for which there is

high fluency ( we predict that subjects would misat?ri b ~ t e the tluency to pleasantness and hence respond

'pleasant'r, In the case of ~ o r d s for which there is low fluency or an absence of fluency. subjects may find

neither of -pleasantg or 'unpleajant' to be appropriate responses. A 'pleasant/ne~tral' judgement would

therefore be more congruent w~th high and low fluency. Moreover. an effort was made to avoid using words

that may be connotati-dy negative, which could overwhelm any positive effects of fluency and limit our

c h x e s of finding signiticant etfects. 'fhc use of such words also make a pleasantheutral judgement task

suitable.

6.5 Procedure

The entire study was administered on computer and each individually-run session lasted about thirty

minutes. On entering the lab. subjects were seated in front of a computer. They were told that the study

consisted of several tasks. that separate instructions precede each task and to follow instructions closely.

On the first task, which was the exposure phase of the experiment, subjects were informed that

sentences would appear on the computer screen, one at a time. Their task was to read each sentence aloud as

i t appeared. They were warned that the sentences would appear only briefly and they were to therefore focus

their attention on the centre of the screen where the sentences would appear. Each sentence was on-screen

for exactly 2.5 seconds, with a 1-second lapse, during which a '-' appeared on the screen, between

sentences. These sentences were the 48 sentences containing ~e homographs discussed in the previous

section. Half of these were presented just once, while the other haIf was repeated five times. The distribution

of the repeated sentences was randomly determined by the computer program.

The second task was a filler task intended to clear short-term memory. Subjects were given fairly

engaging math problems to solve for five minutes. These were presented on the computer screen. one

question at a time, and subjects input their answers using the keyboard. They were led to believe that their

math ability would be correlated with their performance in other parts of the study. Given that the critical

stimuli were words. math problems. involving only numbers. were chosen as the filler task to avoid possible

interference effects that might occur with a task that had words in it.

The third task was the critical phase where the dependent measures were administered. Subjects were

once again presented with sentences that appeared for 2.5 seconds each. The instructions given to them were

that they would once again be presented with sentences just as in the earlier part of the experiment. and they

were to read them aloud like before. This time around. however, after each sentence was read, the last word

of the sentence would remain on the screen. For the affective judgement task, the words 'pleasant' and

'neutral' appeared below the target word. Subjects were instructed to assess how pleasant they found the

word to be. If there was a pleasantness to the word, they were to indicate their choice by pressing the key

corresponding to the 'pleasant* option. Otherwise, they were to mdicate 'neutral'. The recognition task was

similar to the affect judgment task, except subjects chose between 'old* and 'new'. based on whether they

believed the same word [identical in meaning or form) had appeared earlier in any of the sentences

presented in the exposure phase. (See Appendix F for instructions.) The affect judgment and recognition

tasks were presented one after the other for each target word. Although both tasks were self-paced, with

each target word remaining on-screen until the two responses were made. subjects were advised not to

deliberate too long on each word before making their choice. Also. in order to ascertain that subjects had

understood the instructions correctly and to allow them to familiarise themselves with !he task. five

sentences that were not part of the set of 38 were presented for practice.

The final task of the experiment consisted of questions relating to the subject's demographic protile.

This concluded the experiment and subjects were debriefed and prompted for hypothesis awareness. They

were specifically asked to describe what they thought the experiment investigated. None of the subjects

related anything that hinted at hypothesis awareness.

6.6 Results

For each subject. the proportions of 'pleasant' responses for the affect task and 'old' responses for the

recognition task in each of the conditions were calculated and these proportions represent the data analysed.

Note that since we are looking at the probability of judging a word to be 'old', we are examining effects on

subjective recoption rather than recognrtion accuracy.

In terms of the results that might be expected, in view of scenarios depicted in Figure 6, we might

tind that perceptual fluency alone drives the mere exposure effect. In such a case. there should be a

significant morn effect of perceptual fluency or an interaction between perceptual tluency and exposure

Ievel. in the absence of effects involving conceptual fluency. Alternatively, should perceptual fluency and

conceptual tlurncy contribute independently to the phenomenon. the analyses should reveal effects

involving conceptual and perceptual fluency. but no interactions between the two. Two other scenarios

predict a significant perceptual fluency by conceptual fluency interaction - one in which the effect from

both sources of fluency combined is greater than can be expected from either alone. and the other in which

tluency from either source is sufficient to establish high affect levels, and no fwther gain is achieved with

tluency contributed by both sources. Post-hoc contrasts would help distinguish the latter czse tiom the

former.

Most studies in mere exposure use multiple exposures to generate the mere exposure effect, although

some have found effects with just a s~ngle presentation (e.2. Oberrniller, 1985; Whittlesea, 1993). We may

tind in the present case that multiple exposures are needed for effects of perceptual andfor conceptual

tluency to be observed. in which case tluency by exposure level interaction(s) can be expected. The

interactions also allow us to observe if the impact of perceptual and conceptua1 tluency on affect may differ

across the two exposure levels.

As 3 first step. the presence of an order effect is checked for. Results from a four-way ANOVA

performed on the affect data revealed a significant effect of conceptual tluency (F( 1 A 15)=5.09. p<.05). a

significant perceptual fluency x exposure level interaction effect (F(1,415)=4.35. pe.05). a significant order

effect (F( 1.4 15 ~=25.79. p<.0001) and a marginally significstnt effect of exposure level (F( 1.4 15)=3.54.

p<. 1). The rrcngnrtion d m were similarly analysed and yielded rather similar results. The following efTects

were significant: main effect of conceptual fluency (F( 1.4 l5)= 16.27, pc.000 1). main effect of perceptuai

tluency (FI 1.3L5)=202.57, p 4 0 0 1 ) , perceptual fluency x exposure level interaction effect (F(I.415)=16.01.

p<.0001) and main effect of exposure level (F(1.4 15)=41.32, p<.000 I). There was also a marginally

significant main effect for order of dependent measures (F( 1,4 15)=2.87, p<. 1).

Given the effects found for order, as well as for ease of interpretation of the results. both affect and

recognition data were further analysed by way of three-way ANOVAs for each level of order. There were

therefore four separate ANOVAs performed. the results for which are reported below.

6.6.1 Affect

When the affect measure preceded the recognition measure. analysis of the affect data yielded a

significant main effect of conceptual fluency (F( 1.3!5)=4.34. px.05). Subjects were more likely to call

target words 'pleasant* (&*=0.42. &ow,=0.36). when the target word had the same meaning as a word

presented in the exposure phase. This is therefore evidence that conceptual fluency can drive the mere

exposure effect. There was also a marginally significant effect of repetition (F(1.2 15)=3.08, p<. 1). with the

five exposure condition leading to a slightly higher likelihood of choosing 'pleasant' compared to the one

exposure condition (&,=0.42. &,,=0.36). The effect is. however. qualified by a significant perceptual

fluency by exposure level interaction (F( 1.215)=4.15, pc.05). The means for the various conditions are

presented In Table 1.

A closer look at the perceptual fluency by exposure level interaction with simple main effects tests

revealed a significant difference between high and low perceptual tluency within the five exposures

condition 1 & , @ ~ ~ ~ ~ = 0 . 4 7 . &0wpkxp=0.37. t=2.15. p<.OSj. but not within the one exposure condition (&,&,

l,xp=0.35. ~l,,w,1..p=0.36. t=0.63. p>.5). Hence high perceptual fluency had a greater impact on affect only

when the target words were repeated five times. Within the high perceptual fluency condition. five

exposures resulted in a significantly higher mean compared to one exposure (&ghpkp=0-47+ bP. 1,p=0.35. t=?.JO. p<.05). but within the low perceptual fluency condition. no such difference was found

~,,kxp=0.27. &1,p=0.38. 14 .2 1. pz.5). In other words. when perceptual fluency was low. repeated

exposure made little difference. (Please see Figure 7.)

Insert Figure 7 about here.

One ofthe ubjectives of this study was :o find out what the relationship between conceptual and

perceptual tluency might be in generating the mere exposure effect. The perceptud fluency x conceptual

fluency intermion was not significant. suggesting thatthe two have independent influences (Please see

Figure 8.) Further analyses in the form of separate two-way ANOVAs within each level of exposure were

conducted for a closer look at the relation. At five exposures. there were significant main effects of

conceptual fluency (F ( 1,107)=5.40, pc.05) and perceptual fluency (F( 1,107)=5.40, p<.05) and a non-

significant interaction effect. which again points to independence between perceptual and conceptual

fluency. At one exposure, however. none of the main or interaction effects was significant (Fsc0.5, ps>.4).

Insert Figure 8 about here. -------------"-------------------_------*-

Interestingly. when the affect measure was administered after the recognition measure, a three-way

ANOVA of the affect data did not result in any significant effects (Fx1.3. ps>.20). The same analyses

discussed above, including the simple main effects tests (tscl.4, ps>.l) and the two-way ANOVAs for each

level of exposure (Fsc1.7. ps>. 1). similarly failed to ttirn up any significant effects.

6.6.2 Recognition

When the affect measure preceded the recognit,on measure. a three-way ANOVA for recognition

yielded four significant effects. These included n significan~ main effect of perceptual fluency

(F( 1.2 L5)- 106.727. p 4 0 0 I ). with means in the high pcrxptual tluency condition higher than in the low

perceptual tluency condition (&,0p=0.50. &,,=0.19). a main effect of conceptual fluency (F( 1.2 Is)= 1 1.53.

pc.001), with the means in the high conceptual fluency condition again higher (&, , eO. JO. &,,=0.29).

There was also significant main effect of exposure level (F(1.215)=3?.22, p<.0001). Words presented five

times were more likely to be recognized than words presented just once (&,,=0.43, &,xp=0.26). The last

significant effect was for the perceptual fluency x exposure level interaction (F( 1.2 l5)=8.19. p 4 0 5 ) . Please

see Table 2 for the relevant means. With the exception of the perceptual fluency main effect. the effects

found here are the same as those found for affect.

Simple main eftkc ts tests were agaiil conducted on the perceptual tluency by exposure level

conditions and results indicate that when target words were presented five tlmes, the high atd low

perceptual fiuency conditions were significantly different h m each other (l(hlghpkxp=~.6% &owpkxp~.?3.

t=8. LO. pc.Wl).The same was true when target words were presented once (&,plcxp=0.37. sOwp ,,,=O. 14. t=5.67. pc.0001). There was also a significant difference between the five and one exposure

conditions when perceptual fluency was high (Gap Lxp=0.63. &,,,,~,~,~~=0-37, t=5.33. pc.000 1). When

perceptual fluency was low. the difference was smaller, but nonetheless still significant (Xl,,,zenp=0.23,

The hnal analysis is a two-way .ANOVA for each level of exposure. At one exposure, there was rt

main effect of conceptual fluency (F( 1.99)=4.15. Pe.05). a main effect of perceptual fluency

(F( 1.99)=23.78. p<.000 1 ) and a non-significant interaction effect. At five exposures. however. the main

cffec t of conceptual fluency was not significant (F( 1.99)= 1.68. p>. 1). although the main effect of perceptual

fluency was (F(l.99)=84.54, p<.0001). The perceptual by conceptual fluency interaction was again not

significant. (Please see Figure 12.) This absence of an interaction was consistently found in all of the

analyses performed.

Insert Figwe 12 about here.

The results thus far show that the independent variables exert very simiIu effects on both recognition

and affect. the exception being the case where the recognition measure came first and no effects of fluency

or repetition on affect were found. This suggests that both j~dgements may be based on similar processes.

We examine this by analyzing the relationship betweea affect and recognition. The phi coefficient was

computed for each order condition. based on frequencies in 3 2 x 2 [affeit(pleasanr/neutral) by recognition

(old/new)J conrmgency table. and the significance ~f the ~ssaciation was rested using a zL lest. It was found

that when the at'fect measure came t'irst. therz was a significant positive association between affect and

recognition (xL( 1 .N= l3U)=2O.? 1. pc.000:. i =. 1 3). When the recognition measure came tirst. there was o

smaller but still significant positive association found ( X 2 ( I.N=lX8)=8.18. p<.M)5, 4 =.O8). Correlation

analyses were also run for each order condition, using the proportion of 'old' responses and the proportion

of 'pleasant' responses for each subject. When the affect measure came first. there was it significant positive

correlation between affect and recognition (r=.22, p<.OO I). When the recognition measure came first. the

correlation was not signrficant (r=.09. p>.l).

While most of these results indicate a positive relationship between affect and recognition. the results

should be interpreted with caution since the estimate of phi is small but made significant by a large number

of observations. Hence, although the results from analyses of variance show similar effects on both affect

and recognition. measures of association were not as strong as might be expected if both judgements were

made on the basts of tluency.

6.7 Discussion

1 begin first with a discussion of the results for affect. With respect to perceptual fluency. the

experiment replicates previous studies in showing that the fluency experienced in processing the perceptual

features of stimuli as the result of previous encounter can lead to the mere exposure effect. This effect of

perceptual fluency. however, was found when the stimuli were presented five times but not when presented

just once. It therefore appears that it takes several exposures for fluency to be sufficiently enhanced to

produce the mere exposure exposure effect. at lest in the case of meaningful words. This is in contrast to

Obermiller ( 1985) where the mere exposure effect was obtained with a single exposure. The difference in

findings may owe in part to the different target stimuli used. Melodies were used in Obermiller ( 1985) and

perhaps because melodies rue defined by their perceptual properties. perceptual tluency becomes a more

potent factor in influencing affect. Also. as the simple main effects tests showed, when perceptual fluency

was low. liking was not enhanced through repeated exposures. Repetition only had an effect with high

perceptual tluency words.

The experiment also shows that conceptual fluency. like perceptual fluency, can underlie the mere

exposure effect. something that as yet has not been extensively demonstrated in the literature. Words that

had the same meaning as ones presented earlier were more likely to be found pleasant.

The data were also submitted to two-way ANOVAs within each level of exposure. The results

reinforce earlier conclusions in showing that effects of fluency were evident only at exposure level of Eve.

There were main effects of conceptual and perceptual fluency, but no interaction effect. A significant

interaction between the two was also absent when a three-way ANOVA was performed. Given these resulrs.

it sppem that conceptual and perceptual fluency represent independent bases for responding. The

independent and additive nature of the two sources of fluency conforms most closely to the relationship

depicted in Figure 6b.

Interestingly, the results discussed above hold only when the affect measure preceded the recognition

measure. No mere exposure effects were found in any of the conditions hen the recognition measure came

first. It thus appears that the order of dependent measures administered is crucially imponant or that fluency

effects are sens~tive co temporal delays. This finding is not puticulariy weIl-explained by the three accounts

of the mere exposure effect discussed. The oniy prec~ndition that the non-specific activation account

rpecifies for the finding of the mere expoaure effect is that the dimension being judged be a relevant one and

therefore makes no predictions with respect to temporal delays or intervening measures. The perceptual

tluencylmisatuibution model says that the effects of mere exposure are mitigated when the subject becomes

aware of the relationship between the exposure phase and the judgment task and consequently discounts the

experienced fluency. It may be argued that having the recognition measure inserted between presentation of

the stimuli and the affect task makes this relationship saiient to the subject- That is, since the very nature of

the recognition task makes explicit the role of the exposure phase, this awareness carries over to the affect

task. making it more likely that the fluency wili be discounted. However, this would make a more

compelling argument had the measures been administered in a blocked fashion, with the recognition task for

a11 of the words preceding the affect task for the same set of words. Recall that in the present experiment. the

measures were administered back to back for each word. Since the recognition and affect measures

alternated for the entire judgment phase. subjects in rhe recognition first condition should have been no

more likely to be privy to the potential effects of the exposures on their affect judgment than subjects in the

affect first condition. Finally, the element of surprising or unexpected fluency is central to the discrepancy-

attribution account. It may be argued perhaps that having the recognition task before the affect measure

leads subjects to attribute unexpected fluency to having seen the word earlier. Consequently. when it comes

to the affect measure, the fluency is already accounted for and no longer attributed to liking. This. however.

implies that an order effect ought to be found for recognition as well. The analyses found no evidence for

this.

We suggest that there may be a general unwillingness to attribute fluency to multiple causes. along

the lines of the notion of misguided parsinlony, or the unwillingness to ascribe the same consequence to

multiple causes (cf Nisbett & Ross, 1980: Whittlesea, 1993). According to this principle. a subject

experiencing fluency when processing a stimulus will unlikely think that the fluency is due to hidher liking

tbr the stimulus and to having encountered it before. at the same time. Instead, helshe might attribute it to

the aspect of the stimulus made salient by the first measure administered. Fluency will be attributed to any

measures that follow with a lesser likelihood. This explains why tluency had an effect on affect only when

the affect judpmrnt came before the recognition judgement. This brings us to the question of why tluency

had an effect on recognition irrespective of the order of measures. Recognition differs from affect. in that

there is an element of correctness to recognition performance. Subjects may be less willing to risk being

wrong by ignoring feelings of familiarity engendered by flilency and hence more consistently rely on

tluency in making judgements.

The results for subjective recognition were much more robust and consistently suong effects were

found regardIess of whether the recognition test preceded or folIowed the affect task. Except for the main

effect of perceptual fluency, the anaIysis of variance procedure yielded effects remarkably similar to that

found for affect. ~ k s u r e s of associatim rho* pos~tive hut weak dependence between affect and

recognition within trials. This. together with the analyses of variance results, suggests that affect and

recognition are dependent on only partly similar processes. Wile subjects may have relied on fluency to

some extent in making both affect and recognition judgements. alternative bases for responding may have

been avaihble to them. In the case of recognttion, for instance, subjects may have been reliant on

recollection or z directed search of memory rather than familiarity in making judgements (Mandler, 1980).

As an aside. it should be noted that hits are represented by the means in the h ~ g h conceptualhigh

perceptual tluency cells. The means in all other cells represent false alarm rates. bevine in mind that

subjects were required to respond 'yes' only when the word in question corresponded both in meaning and

form. to one seen in the exposure phase. Hit rates ranged between 31% and 67, while false a l m rates

ranged between 10% and 65%. (Please see Tables 1.2 and 3 for these numbers). It would seem that

recognition performance was rather poor. considering some words were repeated five times. This should not

be particularly surprising given the short exposure times for each sentence, the fairly large set of sentences

presented and the fact that subjects were asked to recognize words that could have had appeared in any part

of the sentences seen at exposure. Given that each sentence was six to nine words long, this makes for a

luge number of words to attempt to match target words to.

The fairly high rates of false alarm in the high perceptuaUlow conceptual and low perceptualhigh

conceptual tluency conditions are reminiscent of studies in false memory, or memory for items or events

that did not occur or occurred differently (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Underwood, 1965; Anisfeld &

Knapp. 1968). Underwood ( 1965), for instance. found that on a recognition task where subjects were to

indicate i f a word had been previously presented in a list, they were likely to falsely recognize words that

wele asswiatixiy dated to prev~ously presented words. This result is often interpreted in terms of a

sprtxding activatton model of memory (Andersen & Bower, 1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975) where activation

of targets words at exposure spread to other related words in memory. Since words in the high

perceptuaVlow conceptual and low perceptuaVhiph conceptual fluency conditions were related to previously

presented target words. the high false alum rates may be similarly explained.

This study was conducted with the main objective of testing the proposition that both conceptual and

perceptual fluency can be antecedents of the mere exposure effect. The experiment was therefore not

designed to provide strong tests of competing accounts. but nonetheless does shed light on aspects of the

accounts that may or may not be supported. First of ali, it is clear that fluency effects are not limited to

perceptual fluency and the perceptual fluencytattributional model would therefore do well to include

conceptual fluency as another basis for the mere exposure effect. The same is true of the nonspecific

activation account. the key points of which are very much couched in terms of activation of the perceptual

features of the stimulus in memory. The discrepancy-attnbution account is the only one of the three that

explains the mere exposure effect in the braader sense of processing fluency. None of the accounts offers a

ready explanation fnr the order effect found. in pivticula~ !hat the mere exposure effect was evident onIy

when the affect measure preceded the recognition measure but not when it was preceded by the recognition

measure. The accounts, 3s they have been developed chcis far, are focused on relating fluency or activation to

affect and do not address moderating influences such as those that have to do with the measures themselves.

Hence. as mentioned earlier, the order effect found here isn't adequately explained and suggests the need to

extend the accounts to provide more definitive answers to the following questions: Can fluency experienced

when processing an item be attributed to multiple causes and hence detected on muItiple measures

completed by the same person? If not, wou1d fluency be attributed to the first measure administered, or

wuuld fluency be attributed to just one measure but with the first measure enjoying no particular advantage?

This leads to the next question of whether fluency is more likely to be attributed to certain properties of the

stimulus or experimental context than others. From a marketing perspective. these questions are important

because attempts at creating the son of fluency that might potentially lead to enhanced liking would be for

nought if that fluency is attributed to something else instead.

The number of exposures examined in this study was limited to one and five and there was sorne

indication that the effect af repetition on affect differs for perceptual fluency and conceptual. Over a larger

number of exposures. this difference may become more readily apparent. Numerous studies have shown that

affect takes a downturn or plateaus after sorne number of repetitions. the likely resuit of boredom setting

~ n t Stanp 8 O'ConneII. 1974: Zajonc et a1.. 1972; Crafidall. Montgomery & Rees. 1973; Kail & Freeman.

1973). Conceptual and perceptual fluency may perhaps differ ~4 th respect to when that apex or plateau is

reached. the increment in affect with each exposure. or perhaps the maximum affect attained. Results from

an investigation into these issues would have interesting implications for advertising execution. Most ad

repetitions within a given campaign are of the exact repetition. or high conceptual fluency-high perceptual

fluency. son. The additive nature of conceptual and perceptual fluency found here implies that the use of

exact repetition has the advantage of leading to the highest affect level, compared to repetitions that involve

conceptual or perceptual variations. Over a iarger range of exposure levels, we may be able to observe

perhaps that exact repetition generates an affect-repetitions curve that reaches its apex much sooner than say

repetitions that are perceptual variatlom around the same conceptual theme. Given the large number of

exposures typical of advertising campaigns. an execution strategy that avoids or delays that downrum in

affect would be of value.

7 Chapter Seven

What is common to a11 three experiments reported in this dissertation is the low involvement nature

of processing at time of initial exposure to stimulus. Experiments 1 and 2 presented target brand names to

subjects as they were engaged in some other task. such that it was possible to devote but minimal resources

to the processing of the brand names. Experiment 3 differs in that target words were presented in focal

attention, but nonetheless, these words were embedded in sentences that were presented fairly rapidly.

hampering attempts to extensively process or elaborate on the stimuli. The levels of involvement

investigated here. though lower than that typical of most consumer behaviour studies, does bear similarity in

reality to many ad encounters. and allows us to better understand behaviour in a wider range of contexts.

In experiments one and two. it was found that even with low attentional resources devoted to

processing the brand names, subjects who received multiple exposures were more likely to generate the

brand names on implicit memory tests. This despite subjects having little explicit memory for the brand

names. These results underscore the need to incorporate memory measures beyond the traditional

recognition and recall tests so often used in investigations of consumer memory. To the extent that there is

over-reliance on measures of the direct sort, we may be missing out on pieces of the puzzle in our attempts

to understand consumer memory. Moreover, it auggests a re-thinking of bays of evaluating admtising

effectiveness to include indirect measures. A case In point is the skepticism that has surfaced of late

regarding the effectiveness of web advertising. The point has been made that click-throughs are at a dismal

rate of 0.5% and that it is much too easy to ignore ads that one encounters while browsing the web. While

this may indeed be true, the conclusion need not necessruily be that such ads are ineffective if there is in fact

implicit memory for brand information that may have an influence on one's purchasing behaviour. Future

studies should perhaps also look to see if implicit and explicit memory may be differentially relied upon in

different types of purchase occasions. Implicit memory may play a bigger role in the case of a consumer

making a purchase of low monetary value and little import, who may make a choice from among brands that

readily come to mind. .4 consumer purchasing a bigger ticket item. on the other hand, may be more reliant

on retrieving from memory brands that hdshe had previouly seen an ad for, heard abu t from friends and

family. or perhaps purchased before.

In experiment three, it was tound rhat liking h r test words increased after multiple exposures to

words that were similar in meaning or form w the test words. This implicates perceptual and conceptual

tluency as causes of the enhanced affect. The prevailing view that tluency underlies the mere exposure

effect, unlike earlier theories that appealed to independent affective and cognitrve systems (Zajonc, 1980) or

to reduction in uncertainty with repeated exposures (Sawyer, 1981). has the advantage that it makes attempts

to increase liking more actionable, from a marketing standpoint. Beyoud simply using repetition,

practitioners can look to other means of creating the sort of tluency that leads to enhanced affect (e.g.

Whittlesea. 1993). In addition, since fluency may be attributed to dimensions other than affect, there may be

situations in which it would be advantageous to have fluency attributed to some aspect of the brand other

than affect. For instance. a brand that enjoys a high level of liking among consumers may benefit from

fluency that's attributed to the brand's prestige or other similar beliefs about the brand. At the same time. the

marketer may want to avoid having effects of fiuency accrue to competitive products that may have

packaging. advertising or brand names that are similar perceptually or conceptually to hidher managed

brand. Thus. there are certain benefits to understanding ( I ) the various means of generating fluency as well

as (2 ) the conditions that may lead one to attribute tluency to a particular dimension or aspect of a brand and

not another.

The results of the three experiments are consistent in showing that stimuli encountered under low

involvement conditions can affect us memorially and affectively. Nonetheless, one aspect of the findings

appears to be contradictory and that is that repetition had no effect on liking for target brands in experiment

two. while it influenced affect judgment in experiment 3. The stimuli and the dependent measures used were

very different, which may have contributed to the difference found. Rating scales were used in experiment

two whereas a forced choice pleasantness judgment task was used in experiment three. Reat brand names

were used in experiment two whereas words were used in experiment three. In the latter case. it is possible

that the use of real brand names that are familiar to subjects meant that they had well-formed. pre-existing

attitudes towards the brand names prior to participating in the study. The three additional exposures

provided in the lab would be but three among many other exposures encountered in the real world and are

hence unlikely to change liking towards the brand. Wtth words. on the other hand. people are less likely to

bring with them well-formed attitudes. allowing tluency to be more readily attributed to their affective

reaction to the words.

In terms of theory development. accountirtg fur implicit memory effects and for the mere exposure

effect has progressed dong rather independent paths. If as Seamon et al. ( 1995) and others have suggested.

the mere exposure effect is in fact just a mantfestation of implicit memory, then there is a need to further test

that proposition. If the results should support that contention. findings in both implicit memory and mere

exposure should be explicitly accounted for within a unified framework. Further findings that may need to

be accounted for within that framework come from studies investigating the truth effect (Hasher, Goldstein

& Toppino, 1977), which refers to the greater likelihood of j udging a statement to be true following repeated

exposures. A recent study by Reber and Schwan (1999) showed that statements were judged to be true with

greater likelihood when they were presented in a colour on a computer screen that made them highly visible,

implicating perceptual fluency as the likely cause of the tntth effect. There, therefore, appears to be a

confluence of evidence pointing to fluency as the antecedent for a variety of phenomena that need to be

accounted for by a generalized model of information processing.

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ENDNOTES

1. A variety of overlapping d~stinctions (e-g., unawarehware. unconscious/conscious. automaticlconuolled) have been used in the psychology literature to capture the distinction between implicit and explicit memory. Because of the prominence of their use in memory research. we repeatedly refer to implicit and explicit memory in drawing conceptual distinctions between them. The terms indirect and direct tests are used throughout our paper. to refer to measures that have been demonstrated in the literature to tap implicit vs. explicit memory, respectively.

2. The pretest that was conducted required subjects to respond with the Arst brand name that came to mind given each of 33 product category cues. To avoid potential floor and ceiling effects. brand names were selected from categories for which there were no dominant responses and for which the number uf brand names generated was not exceedingly large.

3. A separate pretest was conducted to identify product categories and brand names that would be suitable for inclusion in Expe~iment 2.

FIGURE 1

EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECT OF AlTENTlON AND REPETITION ON INDIRECT MEMORY TEST

V --

control no repetition repetition

+ attend + ignore

FIGURE 2

EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECT OF AlTENTlON AND REPETITION ON DIRECT MEMORY TEST

control no repetition repetition

+ ignore

EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF ATTENTION AND REPETITION ON CONSIDERATION SETS

+attend -t- ignore '

control no repetition repetition - -- -----

FIGURE 4

EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF ATTENTION AND REPETITION ON CHOICE

- attend - ignore

0 I control no repetition repetition

--- -

FIGURE 5

EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF ATTENTION AND REPETITION ON CUED RECALL

attend

, -C- ignore

control no repetition repetition

FIGURE 6

EXPERIMENT 3: POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND PERCEPTUAL FLUENCY

affect I

affect

low hhh conceptual fluency

high

-------------- low

low high conceptual fluency

low high conceptual fluency

low high conceptual fluency

----. low perceptual fluency - high perceptual fluency

FIGURE 7

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON AFFECT WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

Low perceptual fluency High perceptual fluency

-+ 1 exposure . . -, - - 5 exposures

FIGURE 8

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY ON AFFECT WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

--- - -

Low perceptual fluency High perceptual fluency

- - -c - - High conceptual fluency + Low conceptual fluency

FIGURE 9

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON RECOGNITION WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

Low perceptual fluency High perceptual fluency -----

1 exposure -. -s - - 5 exposures

FIGURE 10

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY ON RECOGNITION WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

Low perceptual fluency High perceptual fluency - -- * -- --- - - -+ . . High conceptual fluency +Low conceptual fluency

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON RECOGNITION WHEN RECOGNITION TASK PRECEDED AFFECT TASK

I Low perceptual fluency High perceptual fluency -

+ 1 exposure - . -.- - . 5 exposures I

FIGURE 12

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY ON RECOGNITION WHEN RECOGNITION TASK PRECEDED AFFECT TASK

-6 0.58 / 0-52 t I

. * -

+-625 d-c' i i

Low peceptual fluency High perceptual fluency

- - - + - . High conceptual fluency -m- Low conceptual fI uency

TABLE 1

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERECEPTUAL FLUENCY, CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON AFFECT WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

Probability judged pleasant

High perceptual fluency Low perceptual fluency

No. of exposures High conceptual Low conceptual High conceptual Low conceptual fluency fluency fluency fluency

TABLE 2

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERECEPTUAL FLUENCY, CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON RECOGNITION WHEN AFFECT TASK PRECEDED RECOGNITION TASK

Probability judged old ---- ---- High perceptual Low perceptual

No. of exposures High conceptual Low conceptual High conceptual Low conceptual

1 0 . 4 1 0 . 3 3 0.18 0.10

TABLE 3

EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF PERECEPTUAL FLUENCY, CONCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND EXPOSURE LEVEL ON RECOGNITION WHEN RECOGNITION TASK PRECEDED AFFECT TASK

-- Probabrlity judged old

--- High perceptuai Low perceptual

No. of exposures High conceptual Low ~onceptunl High conceptual Low conceptual

I 0 . 4 9 0.33 0 . 2 4 0 .13

EXPERIMENT 1: CRITICAL BRAND NAMES AND SLOGANS

"HEAD & SHOULDERS. The prescription for healthy hzir."

"V.ASELNE ~ T E N S I V E CARE. Give yoLr skin the drink ~t needs."

"DENTYNE. Because i t 's cool to be fresh."

"Wake up to the arornatlc wonder of NESCAFE."

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENT 2: CRlTlCAL BRAND NAMES AND SLOGANS

'TIMEX watches. For function that does not compromise style "

'Take your best plctures with a CANON camera."

EXPERIMENT 1 : VISUALLY-PRESENTED TEXT PASSAGE

Advertising message 1 : Art: you one of the millions of people who are caught in the vicious cycle of not getting the sleep you so desperately need? And does it seem like no matter what you try, you can1 find reliet? It's time to wake up and smell the coffee. Because there is something you can do. See your doctor. You11 learn what things to stop doing. and what things to start doing, if you want to get back to sleeping more like the way you were used to. In some situations, your doctor may prescribe a sleep medication that you can use on a short-term basis when you have trouble sleeping. One of these sleep medications is called Ambien. It, along with appropriate lifestyle changes. may help you get back to your normal sleep pattern and routine. Ambien will usually put you to sleep quickly. You can rake it and not have to wait hours for it to work. Generally, in about twenty minutes, you11 fall asleep. Ambien is effective. It may help you get back to a natural way of sleeping. Also, Ambien leaves your system quickly, so you're less Iikely to be tired the next day and more likely to feel rested and refreshed in the morning. Your doctor will make you aware that you should only take Ambien when you can devote a full 7 to 8 hours of sleep. You should not engage in activities requiring complete alertness, such as driving a car. until you know how you react to the medicine. The doctor may also alert you to some side effects that may be associated with Ambien: drowsiness. dizziness. light- headsdness, and difficulty with coordination. Some people may also experience confusion. memory problems. and change in behaviour. Sleep medicines may cause dependence. especially when these medicines are used daily for longer than o few weeks or at high doses. So. if you're having a sleep problem. you may not have to live with it anymore. See your doctor, and find out whether Ambien may be appropriate for you. Isnl it time for you tci go to sleep? Sleep. It doesnl have :o be a dream.

-4dvrrtising message 2: Tabletop radios are popular for thelr convenience and small size. But their sound quality [eaves much to be desired. No one really expects high-fidelity sound from a radio. Until now. Bose presents the Wave radio. It's the one radio acclaimed by leading audio critics. Because it3 the one radio that delivers big, rich, lifelike stereo sound plus a small. convenient size. We think the Wave radio is the best-sounding radio you can buy. And audio cr~tics agree. Business Week named the Wave radio a "Best New Product of 1994". Popular Science gave it a prestigious "Best of What's New" award. The key is our patented acoustic waveguide speaker technology. Just as a tlute strengthens a breath of air to fill an entire concert hall. the waveguide produces room-tilling sound from a small enclosure. This technology and performance is available in no other radio. Youll touch a button and hear your favourite music come alive in rich stereo sound. Youll hear every note the way it's meant to be heard. The Wave radio fits almost anywhere. So you can listen in your bedroom, living room. kitchen, or any room. Operate the radio from across the room with the credit card- sized remote control. Set six AM and six FM stations, and switch between them at the touch of a button. The Wave radio is available for three hundred and forty-nine directly from Bose, the most respected ndme in socnd. Bose. Better sound through research.

APPENDIX D

EXPERIMENT 2: VISUALLY-PRESENTED TEXT PASSAGE

Advertising message I : Are you one of the millions of people who are caught in the vicious cycle of not getting the sleep you so desperately need? And does it seem like no matter what you try, you can\ find relief? It's time to wake up and smell the coffee. Because there is something you can do. See your doctor. Youll learn what things to stop doing. and what things to start doing. if you want to get back to sleeping more like the way you were used to. In some situations, your doctor may prescribe a sleep medication that you can use on a short-term basis when you have trouble sleeping. One of these sleep medications is called Ambien. It. along with appropriate lifestyle changes. may help you get back to your normal sleep pattern and routine. Ambien will usually put you to sleep quickly. You can take it and not have to wait hours for it to work. Generally, in about twenty minutes. youll hll asleep. Ambien is effec:ive It may help you get back tu a natural way of sleeping. Also. Ambien leaves your system quickiy. so you're less likely to be tired the next day and more ltkely to feel resred and refreshed in the mornlng. Your doctor will make you aware that you should only take Ambien when you can devote a full 7 to S hours of sleep. You should not engage in activities requiring complete alertness. such as drivmg a car. until you k n o ~ how you react to the medicine. The doctor may 3150 alert you to some side effects that may be associated with Ambien: drowsiness, dizziness. light- hcadedness, and difficulty with coordination. Some people may also experience confusion. memory problems. and change in behaviour. Sleep medicines may cause dependence, especially when these medicines are used daily for longer than a few weeks or at high doses. So, if you're having a sleep problem. you may not have to live with it anymore. See your doctor. and find out whether Ambien may be appropriate for you. Isnt it time for you to go to sleep? Sleep. It doesni have to be a dream.

Advertising message 2: Tabletop radios are popular for their convenience and small size. But their sound quality leaves much to be desired. No one realiy expects high-fidelity sound from a radio. Until now. Bose presents the Wave radio. It's the one radio acclaimed by leading audio critics. Because it's the one radio that delivers big. rich. stereo sound plus a small. convenient size. We think the Wave radio is the best-sounding radio you can buy. And audio critics agree. Business Week named the Wave radio a "Best New Product of 1994". Popular Science gave it a prestigious "Best of What's Ned' award. The key is our patented speaker technology. which produces room-filling sound from a small mclosure. This technology and performance is available in no other radio. Youll touch a button and hear yow favourte music come alive in rich stereo sound. Youll hear every note the way it's meant to be heard. The Wave radio fits almost anywhere. So you cm listen in your bedroom. living roam, kitchen. or any room. Operate the radio from across the room with the credit card- sized remoie control. Set six AM and six FM stations, and switch between them at the touch of a button. The Wave radio is avaihble for three hundred and forty-nine directly from Bose. the most respected name in sound. Bose. Better sound through research.

APPENDIX E

EXPERIMENT 3: HOMOGRAPHS, STUDY AND TEST SENTENCES

The second column contains sentences seen in the exposure phase. In the judgment phase. subjects saw one

of the four sentences in each cell of column 3. The b u r tluency conditions - ( 1) high conceptualhigh

perceptual. (2) high conceptuaVlow perceptual. (3) low concrptuaUhigh perceptud. (4) low conceptuaUlow

perceptual - are represented by the first. second. bird and fourth sentences in each cell. respectively.

Homograph I Study Sentence bear I The summer humidity can be hard to

beat The song had a lively beat.

bold

1 bright. 1

He behaved in a manner that was bold.

bright

I t -- I broad i The athlete had shoulders that were broad. I I

1

I I I

He was out to make a quick buck.

I

His excellent grades proved he was

correct / There are prizes for guesses that arc

1 I correct.

I ! 1 He was impatient and easy to cross.

Test Sentence 1. The pain was too much to bear. 2. The pain was too much to endure. 3. While camping he saw a bear. 3. While camping he saw a wolf. I . The audience moved to the music's beat. 2. The audience moved to the music's tempo. 3. The record he set was hard to beat. 4. The record he set was hard to break. 1. She spoke her mind and was bold. 2. She spoke her mind and was daring. 3. The text was printed in bold. 4. - The text was printed in italics 1. The gifted boy was extremely bright. 2. The gifted boy was extremely smart. 3. The sun's rays made the room bright. 4. The sun's rays made the room warm. I . The pathway to the house is very broad. 2. The pathway to the house is very wide. 3. The essay outline was much too broad. 4. The essay outline was much too vague. I . The panhandler was given a buck. 2. The panhandler was given a dollar. 3. The male of some animals is a buck. 4. The male of some animals is a bull. 1. To keep warm he wore a coat. 2. To keep warm he wore a jacket. 3. The wall was given a new paint coat. 4. The wall was given a new paint colour. 1. All answers to the questions were correct. 2. All answers to the questions were right. 3. The document had errors he had to correct. 3. The document had errors he had to delete. 1. His son's bad behaviour made him cross. 2. His son's bad behaviour made him angry. 3. The street was difficult to cross. 4. The street was difficult to ha te .

Loud noises caused the baby to cry.

cue The actor waited for the director's cue.

decline I Interest in the arts is on the decline.

dirty Walking in the mud makes your shoes dirty.

I

draw ] A re-match is necessary if there: a draw.

I

dull i The audience yawned because the talk 1 was dull.

i -- duty I Some goods are subject :o customs duty.

empty I All the shopping left her wallet empty.

fair The cheat was accused of not playing fair.

.4 race car goes very fast.

- project finally czme to a tinish.

i tbo t I Every month he hdd rent to foot.

goal / Becoming a good doctor was his life's

I

1. The touching m o w made her cry. 2. The touching movie made her weep. 3. The Tories adopted a new party cry. 4. The Tories adopted a new party slogan. 1. The coach gave the player a cue. 2. The coach gave the player a signal. 3. The hustler grabbed his cue. 4. The hustler grabbed his rum. 1. The town experienced a population decline. 2. The town experienced a population decrease. 3. The invitation was one she could not decline. 3. The invitation was one she could not refuse. 1. The homeless man's clothing was dirty. 2. The homeless man's clothing was filthy. 3. The con man was up to tricks that were dirty. 4. The con man was up to tricks that were illegal. 1. The competition ended in a draw. 2. The competition endea in a tie. 3. She took classes to learn to draw. 4. - She took classes to learn to sing. 1. The students skipped classes that were dull. * - . The students skipped classes that were boring. 3. The knife's useless because its edge is dull. 4. The knife's useless because its edge is chipped. 1. The purcnase price included import duty. 7 -. The purchase price included import tax. 3. To stand g~md all night was his duty. 4. To stand guard a11 night was his job. 1. After he moved out the apartment was empty. 2. After he moved out the apartment was vacant. 3. He often makes promises that are empty. 4. He often makes promises that are broken. L. A judge should strive to be fair. 2. .4 judge should strive to be just. 3. He took pony rides at the fair. 4. He took pony rides at the zoo. 1. The boxer's reflexes were fast. 2. The boxer's reflexes were quick. 3. His religion requires him to frequently fast. 4. His religion requires hin; to frequently pray. 1. The mokie was thrilling from start to finish. 7,. The movie was thrilhng from start to end. 3. The cabioets had a lacquered finish. 4. The cabinets had a lacouered surface. - -

L-- i

1. The spendthrift had many bills to foot. 9 -. The spendthrift had many bills to pay. 3- He yelped when someone stepped on his foot. 4. He yelped when someone stepped on his toe. 1. They worked hard to achieve the project's god. 2 - They worked hard to achieve the project's aim. 3. Their team finally scored its first goal. 4. Their team finally scored its first point.

kid t lobby

L-- 1 match

I modest

1 novel

pick I pile

The condition of his illness was grave. 1 1. The decision pondered was one that was grave. I 1 i: The decision pondered was one that was serious. He took his secret to the gave.

4. He took his secret to the police. She was very active as a kid. 1. In the stroller sat a cute kid.

In the stroller sat a cute child. He was not one with whom to kid. He was not one with whom to argue.

She eats only meat that's lean. I 1. Months of dieting made him look lean. ! 1. Months of dieting made him look thin. 1 1 3. He's a friend on whom one can lean. I

1 2. The hotel had an impressive foyer. I The reception desk is in the lobby.

I 3. The bill was one activists planned to lobby. I

4. He's a friend on whom one can count. 1. The hotel had an impressive lobby.

The burgh quietly picked the lock.

I 1. The man talking to himself could be crazy. 1

4 The bill was one activists planned to protest. 1. The door was secured with a lock. 2. The door was secured with a bolt.

The death of his family drove him mad.

1 3. The rude service he received got him mad. I

I 3. The cargo ships went through a lock. 4. The cargo ships wer~t through a tunnel. I 1. The man tdking to himself could be mad. 1

I 3- He earns an income that is modest. I

Fans cheered wildly at the soccer match.

He is well-liked for being modest.

4. The rude service he rece~ved pot him upset. 1. The sports channel sh~wed an exciting tennis match. 2. The sports channel showed an exciting tennis game. 3. The smoker lit his cigarette with a match. 4. The smoker lit his cigarette with a lighter. I . He is accomplished but also modest. 2. He is accomplished but also humble.

1 3. She was engrossed in reading the novel. I

She's in the habit of being neat.

i-ier design is one that's novei.

1 -- ! 4. She was engrossed in reading the book. He was rvotded because he behaved odd. ( 1. The man's habits were rather odd. 1

4. He earns an income that is meager. 1. He kept his desk cIean and neat. 7 - I He kept his desk dean and tidy. 3. His ideas are always rather neat. 4. His ideas are always raher nifty. 1. The company rewards ideas that are novel.

1 2. The mn's habits were rather strange. !

! 2. The company rew;uds ideas that are new.

1 3. One and three are numbers that ard odd. I She couldnl decide which dress to pick.

The book was hidden in the pile.

4. One and three are numbers that are prime. 1. There were many alternatives ftom which to pick. 7 b e There were many alternatives from which to choose. 3. He strummed the guitar with his pick. 4. He strummed the guitar with his finper. I The cards where put neatly in a pile.

The cards were put neatly in a stack. The carpet had a thick pile.

4. The carpet had a thick padding. I

i 1 I -. He served drinks from a jug. She bought an antique water pitcher. I !- He served drinks from a pitcher.

1 1 I f . He trained hard to be a baseball pitcher. I

/ 3: The secretary had many letters to mail. The colonel holds a high military post.

I Post The documents were sent by post.

pupil

raise.

4. He trained hard to be a baseball catcher. 1. The secretary had many letters to post.

I

, raise I The weights were ones he could easily His arms ached too much to lift. His boss gave him a raise.

He was cited as a model pupil.

4. Part of the eye is called the ins. 1. His arms ached too much to raise.

4. The colonel holds a high military rank. 1. He is his teacher's favourite pupil. 2. He is his teacher's favourite student. 3. Part of the eye is called the pupil.

4. His boss gave him a lecture.

1 2. He won the lottery and became wealthy. / 3. The chocolate cake was very rich.

1 rear I

I

I 1 rich

Some passengers prefer seats in the rear. His car was hit in the His car was hit in tht back.

spot

I ! Some fishes are difficult to rear.

His inheritance made him very rich.

j 1

1

stick

I

4. Some fishes are diff~ult to catch. 1. He won the lottery and became rich. I I

4. The chocolate cake was very tasty. I

/ store

t m e d 1 The cat in the burning house was saved. 1. The drowning woman was miraculously saved.

1 4. He beat the snake with a twig. To rent a movie he went to the video / 1. Sofas can be bought at a furniture store. I

' 2. The drowning womn was miraculously rescued. 3. He squandered the money he had saved. 4. He squandered the money he had won.

Mount Everest is a difficui t The wall took much stamina to scaIe. scale. The wall took much stamina to climb.

He choked on a fish scale. He choked on a fish bone.

Being tall he was easy to spot. The camouflaged lizard was hard to spot. The camouflaged lizard was hard to find. The Bahamas is a popular vacation spot. The Bahamas is a popular vacation place.

I I store. 1 2. Sofas can be bought at a furnitwe shop. 1

He used glue so the papers would stick. I. He licked the stamp to make it stick.

i 2. She went to the ai+n in a cab. 3 The plane waited its turn to m i .

- I 4. The plane waird its tun to land.

2. He licked the stamp to make it adhere. 1 3. He beat the snake with-a stick.

tail I He lost the man he was to tail.

3. The toys were bulky and hard to store. 4. The toys were bulky and hard to carry. k ! 1 2. 1. The The elusive elusive spy spy proved proved hard hard to to tail. follow.

i 1 I i 3. I

The Siamese cat has a slender tail. 1 i 4. The Siamese cat has a slecder body.

L

laxi He was late so he nailed a taxi. I 1. She went to the airpart in a taxi.

APPENDIX F

EXPERIMENT 3: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS AT JUDGEMENT PHASE

Just before the judgement task began, subjects read the following instructions on-screen:

"Now for the next task. you will again be presented with sentences like the ones you just saw.

First, you are to read the sentence aloud and then indicate if you find the last word in the sentence

to be pleasmt or neutral. Two keys on the keyboard have been marked with a blue and a red

sticker. If the word is pleasant to you. then press the red key. If the word is neutral to you, then

press the blue key.

Atier you have classified the word as pleasant or neutral, you are to indicate if the word had been

presented to you in task 1 earlier in this experiment. If you remember having seen the word.

respond old by pressing the red key. If you do not think the word was presented earlier, respond

new by pressing the blue key ."

[The order of these ~nstructions were reversed for subjcc~s in the recognition-first condition.]

The experimenter then supplemented these on-screen ~nstructions by telling subjects the following:

1. that although the task was self-paced, they should respond quickly rather than deliberate for too

long before responding;

2 . that they should base their pleasantness judgement on their overall liking for or feeling toward the

word;

3. that they should respond 'old' on the recognition test only if the exact same word, with the same

meaning and spelling, had been seen earlier.