Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 19-122-Russia-10-90-NATO-4

CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 19-122-Russia-10-90-NATO-4

President Trump’s travel ban on several Muslim countries is not anti-religious or otherwise prejudiced against Muslims.

“There are attempts to claim that this decision is aimed against a religion, but it is not aimed against a specific religion, this is a temporary decision, it is important to take these points of view into

account,” he continued.Moldova's President Igor Dodon called his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in

Moscow "historic."

BELGRADE 2 Feb – During the afternoon in the Presidency of Serbia an urgent meeting was held of the President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic with the ambassadors of Russia, China and the United States, writes Serbian daily “Blic”. The reason for the meeting, which was attended also by the Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Djuric, is the situation in Kosovo after last night’s round of negotiations in Brussels, writes “Blic”.At the same time, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic has called for an urgent meeting with the Minister of Defense Zoran Djordjevic, it was confirmed for Serbian daily “Vecernje Novosti” in the Cabinet of the Government of Serbia.As the daily writes, after the meeting with Djordjevic, Vucic will meet in Raska at 5 p.m. with political representatives of the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija.Prime Minister Vucic confirmed that he will meet today in Raska with political representatives of the Serbs from the north of Kosovo and Metohija, but he did not want to comment on media reports that there is a danger of attacks by armed Albanians in municipalities with Serbian majority.Vucic said that he will notify the representatives of the Serbs about what was discussed at the meeting in Brussels and how Belgrade looks upon the outcome of the continuation of the Brussels dialogue.“We will give our best to lower tensions and keep peace. And that is the reason why I am going to Raska, where I will meet with mayors who are worried”, said Vucic.When asked to comment on certain media reports that there is danger of armed Albanians storming the north of Kosovo, Vucic said that he does not want to comment on media reports.“Am I worried? Of course I am! Is the situation tense? Yes, but not everything depends on us”, said Vucic and added that Serbia will do everything to preserve peace.Prime Minister of Albania Edi Rama arrived in unannounced visit to Pristina, which, according to analysts, could complicate the situation the day after the negotiations in Brussels.According to Kosovo media, Prime Minister Edi Rama will visit the headquarters of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, and will also meet with the mayor of Pristina Ahmeti Sendo.Asked about today’s visit of the Albanian Prime Minister to Pristina, where he talked with members of the party of Ramus Haradinaj, Vucic said that he does not want to comment on it, but that he can imagine what the reaction would be if he went to visit some extreme Serbian parties in the region.A Brussels meeting of the Belgrade and the Pristina delegations as part of the top-level dialogue between the two sides ended shortly after 11 p.m. Wednesday.The delegations left the EEAS building without making any statements, Tanjug’s correspondent reported.After the talks, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said she was “encouraged by the constructive engagement shown by both sides.”The participants “reconfirmed their full commitment” to continue dialogue, a statement said.There were no comments from the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia.

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 15

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German radio Deutsche Welle in a show in Albanian language reported this morning, citing unnamed sources, that the meeting of the delegations of Belgrade and Pristina last night in Brussels, “completely failed”. On the Serbian side, according to Tanjug, fears are growing that Pristina is not giving up on the idea to attack Serbs in northern Kosovo.

31 Jan Whether it is stocking up on weapons, proposing to redraw borders, or simply a claim like the one made this month by Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic about being ready to send in troops if Serbs in Kosovo are threatened, the Balkans feels once again like a powder keg. It seems that the younger generation in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro does not see war as the answer. Marko Milosavljević, an activist with Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Serbia, has a short but clear message for political leaders: "Do not play with the [slogans] of the 1990s." "We believe that in a democratic society, the ruling party should not be promoted by a war criminal," Milosavljevic told RFE/RL in Belgrade. Young people in Gorazde, "I don't think that anybody would dare to start a war after what happened here," Jamakovic told RFE/RL's Balkan Service. "I even believe that my parents' generation did not want a war but that they were manipulated by their political leaders." "At a time of growing tensions, such as over the referendum in Republika Srpska," Basaskic said of the decision by the ethnic Serb-majority entity of Bosnia to mark statehood day on January 9, a controversial date linked to prewar Serb nationalism, in defiance of the Bosnian Constitutional Court. "Even people formerly engaged in campaigning for peace are spreading hate speech, and are retreating into their ethnic cocoons." "The politicians are responsible for the warmongering, but it is not their children who would be doing the fighting. Personally, I would pick up my suitcase and head for the West," Edin Kanka Cudic, from the Alliance for Social Research and Communication, sounded less optimistic. "In Bosnia, we have the absence of war but no real peace yet. Civil society is very weak. It is not able to stand up to nationalism," Cudic said. "Young people who were born after the Dayton peace agreement [in 1995] could be manipulated to take part in some new conflict. Whoever has any experience of war would leave the country immediately in case of any confrontations."

January 31, 2017 Special Dispatch No.6765Russia's Orbit – Moldova's President Dodon Promotes Strategic Partnership With Russia During Visit To Moscow

On January 17, 2017, Moldova's President Igor Dodon called his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow "historic."[1] The former Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) leader Dodon,[2] described as a 'pro-Russian' and 'Euro-skeptic' leader, recently won the presidential elections that took place in Moldova on October 30, and on November 13.[3]During the joint press conference with Putin, Dodon underlined the need for a "strategic partnership" with Russia. Dodon said: "Last year Moldovan citizens cast their votes for the values the President of Moldova will uphold. They opted for maintaining our statehood and neutrality, for reintegration, for settling the Transnistrian issue and preserving our traditional Orthodox Christian values. These three aspects are of fundamental significance and cannot be protected or promoted outside strategic partnership with the Russian Federation."[4] Dodon also stressed that he does not rule out that after the next parliamentary elections in 2018, the parliamentary majority's position would be in favor of revoking Moldova's association agreement with the European Union, adding that it did not bring anything positive to Moldova. Dodon said: "We have lost the Russian market and, strangely enough, our exports to the EU have also fallen. In other words, we have received nothing from signing the agreement. And I cannot rule out that after the next parliamentary election, this will be the position of the parliamentary majority and I will support that position."[5]Dodon also told a TASS news conference that "it is wrong to try to build relations with the European


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Union on anti-Russian rhetoric" and that "it will be wrong to make friends with the West to antagonize the East and the other way around." Concerning NATO, Dodon mentioned that he was opposed to the opening of a NATO office in Moldova's capital Chisinau. He said: "I spoke out against this not only at this stage but also when I was a lawmaker. That's very interesting. They rushed to open this office before I assumed office, realizing that I would block this move... I believe that was a mistake, Moldova is a neutral state."[6]Following are excerpts from an article titled "The Moldovan President Is Becoming Pro-Moldovan Rather Than Pro-Russian," written by prominent Moldovan journalist Dmitry Chubashenko and published by the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.[7] Chubashenko asserted that during his mandate, Dodon "will try to correct the slant towards the West, restore the ruined relationship with Russia and oppose the idea of Moldova's incorporation into Romania."

Dodon 'Asked Not To Call Him Pro-Russian But Pro-Moldovan'"... The electoral process and its result demonstrate yet again how deeply the Moldovan society is split. This geopolitical schism ('for Europe' or 'for Russia') depends on age, geography and ethnic identity. Older people tended to vote for [Igor] Dodon, young people – for [leader of the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), Maia] Sandu. Russian speakers, northern regions, south (Gagauzia, Bulgarian Taraclia), voters from Transnistria and the diaspora in Russia all preferred the 'pro-Russian socialist.' Central regions, Chisinau, and the diaspora in the West, where there are more Moldovans (including those who consider themselves Romanian) were pro-Sandu."The split of the voters into two approximately equal parts during the presidential election has shown that Moldova is not capable of making any clear choice in favor of either the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) without breaking irrevocably into irreconcilable parts that could never be glued together again."It is evident that the winner himself realizes the weakness of his position. During the election campaign, Dodon appeared to be demonstrably pro-Russian, and the voting itself became a 'landmark' referendum in the second round, about to determine the country's geopolitical vector; yet, only three hours after the voting stations were closed, the leader of the socialists asked not to call him 'pro-Russian' but 'pro-Moldovan' and declared that he was ready to be 'president for all people,' including those who had voted for his 'pro-European' rival. And the next day after the elections, the Russian president's press secretary Dmitry Peskov urged everyone to refrain from labeling Dodon and Rumen Radev, who won the Bulgarian presidential election on the same day, as 'pro-Russian' politicians."The losing side has refused to acknowledge the result of the elections and challenged 'the mass fraud' in court. Dodon will have to make great efforts to be recognized as the legitimate president by everyone – the pro-European opposition, the ruling power of the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, and the left-wing opposition, which, like PSRM, is considered pro-Russian."'The New President Of Moldova Will Try To Correct The Slant Towards The West' And 'Restore The Ruined Relationship With Russia'"After the presidential election, the situation in Moldova has not become clearer, but even more entangled. Now, Chisinau has the 'pro-European' power in the person of Plahotniuc and his ruling majority who control 57 members of Parliament, the government, law enforcement agencies, public prosecution office, courts, most TV channels, and large business companies. Prime Minister Pavel Filip has already called Dodon to close the books on the election and 'return to the European reform agenda'. This agenda is based, among other things, on the IMF program that includes an increased retirement age, a rise in utility rates, and re-defining the billion dollars stolen from Moldovan banks in 2014 as national debt. Dodon strongly disagrees with this 'agenda,' but it is unclear how a president in a parliamentary republic, with hostile parliament and government, can oppose it."At the same time, there is strong 'pro-European' opposition in Moldova that accuses 'Plahotniuc's


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criminal regime' of 'discrediting' the pro-European way..."The new president will have to maneuver between the 'pro-European' authorities, 'pro-European' opposition, and left-wing opposition. In order to carry his initiatives into practice, he has to cooperate with Plahotniuc, but he may be accused of being in cahoots with the oligarch, especially since Plahotniuc will not give in on important matters – and the most important matter for him is keeping control over Moldova."If Dodon starts complaining that he would like to do something but is being sabotaged by Plahotniuc, he will play the role of a purely ornamental, fit-for-nothing president, repeating the fate of his predecessor, Nicolae Timofti. Any misstep made by Dodon will be exploited by the 'pro-Europeans', as well as by the left-wing Our Party, headed by Renato Usatii (mayor of Balti, second largest city in Moldova), and the Party of Communists, headed by ex-president Vladimir Voronin."The external environment, too, could hardly be called favorable for Dodon. The U.S., the EU, and both neighbors of Moldova – Ukraine and Romania – have expressed confidence that the country will continue on its old 'pro-European' course even with the new president; some politicians in Kiev, very displeased by Dodon's declaration that Crimea is de facto Russian, even threatened him with 'a Chisinau Maidan' and reminded him of Viktor Yanukovych's fate. Dodon will have to restore normal relations with Russia taking into account threats of this kind."Dodon asserts that the presidential election is only an interim stage; new parliamentary elections will follow. As scheduled, the parliamentary elections in Moldova should take place in late 2018. Dodon promises to bring about early elections, but Plahotniuc will oppose this, since he wants to change the electoral system and, if he opts for an early election, it will be according to his own rules. Currently, the Moldovan parliament is elected on a proportional basis by party lists. Plahotniuc proposes electing half of the MPs in single-mandate constituencies."The new president of Moldova will try to correct the slant towards the West, restore the ruined relationship with Russia and oppose the idea of Moldova's incorporation into Romania. But on the whole, these elections have not solved the issue of dismantling the oligarchic system still controlled by Plahotniuc; nor do they signify a radical change in the foreign policy of Moldova. At least until the parliamentary elections, scheduled or early, Moldova will continue to be shaken by internal struggle between various political groups, including those in the top echelons of power, and all the talks about changing the foreign policy direction will remain no more than pre-election rhetoric."Appendix I - Joint News Conference With President Of Moldova Igor Dodon, Kremlin.ru, January 17, 2017Putin: 'Moldova's Mutually Beneficial Ties With Russia Deteriorated Due To Attempts To Boost The Republic's Rapprochement With The EU'Putin: "Our talks with the Moldovan President were held in a constructive and I would also say friendly atmosphere. They were concrete and covered issues of mutual interest."We have discussed the entire range of bilateral issues first in a narrow format and then in the presence of the heads of Russian ministries and agencies. We have outlined the goals and tasks for the further development of Russian-Moldovan cooperation."We also held a detailed discussion of regional issues. I welcome our partners' intention to further develop bilateral relations. I would like to say that Moldova is an important partner of Russia in the post-Soviet space. Russia has always stood firmly for maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic and its non-aligned and neutral status."This year Russia and Moldova will mark 25 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Mr. President and I have agreed that we will celebrate this event."Our talks focused on the development of mutual trade. Unfortunately, our bilateral trade has decreased by more than 50 percent in the past few years, largely due to objective factors such as fluctuating prices of raw materials. Also, we must say that Moldova's mutually beneficial ties with


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Russia deteriorated due to attempts to boost the republic's rapprochement with the European Union. As a result, Moldovan goods have almost lost their traditional place in Russia and have not gained a foothold in other markets. On the contrary, statistics show that Moldova's trade with the EU countries has declined."The bilateral intergovernmental commission is now working to remedy this situation. During a recent meeting, it has adopted a joint action plan for 2016–2017, which includes practical steps to bolster mutual investments and trade, including in industry, high technologies and agriculture."Incidentally, Russia is not opposed to Moldova developing relations with its partners anywhere, including Europe, as we pointed out at the talks with the Moldovan President. However, we would like this joint work to proceed in a coordinated manner, so as not to damage what we have created but to help us move forward, improving our economies, the social sector and the quality of life for our people."The energy sector is a key aspect of Russian-Moldovan economic cooperation. Russia regularly provides Moldova with oil and gas and completely meets the country's demand for natural gas. After the talks, we instructed experts to draft proposals on addressing issues in this area. Russia and Moldova have substantial experience of inter-regional cooperation. Sixty-seven Russian regions maintain contacts with their Moldovan partners. Moscow, St Petersburg, Belgorod and Bryansk regions lead the way in this respect. Russian regions are also actively expanding their ties with Gagauzia. We have agreed to take action for expanding bilateral cooperation in humanitarian areas."Naturally, we discussed the Transnistria peace settlement in great detail. Some improvements in the negotiating process that manifested themselves in 2016 will certainly help enhance trust between the parties to the conflict. It is necessary to search for a mutually acceptable state legislative model for resolving the conflict on the basis of generally recognized norms of international law. As before, Russia is ready to continue acting as mediator and to guarantee compliance with agreements that may be reached by the parties. During our talks, we devoted attention to Eurasian integration processes. As the incumbent CIS president, Russia praises the desire of the President of Moldova to expand Moldova's involvement in the work of CIS organizations..."Dodon: 'The Citizens Of Moldova Will Feel That We Have Resumed Our Friendly Strategic Relations'Dodon: "Today is a historic day for Moldovan-Russian relations. Unfortunately, the past seven years were not the best period in our relations, which date back hundreds of years. As we know, strategic partnership with the Russian Federation has disappeared from the majority of government documents and strategies of the Republic of Moldova."This is the first visit by a Moldovan President in the past nine years. Until now, Moldovan leaders did not come to Russia but made official visits to Brussels."Last year Moldovan citizens cast their votes for the values the President of Moldova will uphold. They opted for maintaining our statehood and neutrality, for reintegration, for settling the Transnistrian issue and preserving our traditional Orthodox Christian values. These three aspects are of fundamental significance and cannot be protected or promoted outside strategic partnership with the Russian Federation."I would like the citizens of Russia to know clearly without any doubt that the majority of Moldovans want to be friends with Russia, regardless of what some politicians may claim. We are set for strategic partnership with Russia, and I am convinced that we will turn a new page in our bilateral relations today, the goal we have discussed in detail during my visit."Of course, we discussed very many issues that have accumulated over the past years. One of them concerns trade. We understand that it will be difficult to resolve all problems in our bilateral trade while retaining the free trade agreements we have with other countries, including the EU, but we have agreed to move towards this goal.


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"Of course, there is the issue of our migrants. Almost 500,000 Moldovan citizens officially work in the Russian Federation, several tens of thousands are in Moldova and cannot enter Russia due to various administrative violations. This issue was among those discussed. We hope that in the very near future a solution for our citizens can be found."Transnistria is another very important issue. Transnistria is a part of the Republic of Moldova. For the first time in the past nine years, I paid a visit to the left bank, Transnistria. Earlier this year, also for the first time in the past nine years, there was a meeting between the leaders of the right and left bank. This produced a concrete result: the Joint Control Commission started working."I do hope that with the active involvement of our strategic partners from the Russian Federation, we will make progress in solving the problems that our people face on both banks of the Dniester. We learned our lessons from the mistakes of the early 2000s when it comes to the Transnistria issue and I am certain that we will not repeat those mistakes again and will move forward."Therefore, Mr. President, our citizens have great expectations and I am sure they are justified. I hope that from now on, the citizens of Moldova will feel that we have resumed our friendly strategic relations."Putin: 'We Welcome The Courage Showed By The Newly Elected President Igor Dodon, Who Travelled To Transnistria'Question: "Mr. Putin, I have a question for you. A lot of things are happening in Moldova for the first time now. We had a nationwide presidential election for the first time. Also for the first time since 2008, as someone mentioned today, we had a meeting at this level here in the Kremlin. And a meeting of the two leaders, the newly elected president and the Transnistrian leader took place on the right bank, in the town of Bendery, also for the first time. Reasonable political forces in Moldova now understand that improving the protracted situation in the Transnistrian region is impossible without the active participation of Russia. In your view, what might happen and how, and what could drive this process? Perhaps, the revival of the 'Kozak plan' [Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova], or some other road map? Thank you."Putin: "First of all, I want to say that we welcome the courage showed by the newly elected President Igor Dodon, who travelled to Transnistria, because it is definitely a demonstration of the desire to restore not only relations, but also the country's territorial integrity. It is also a clear manifestation of respect for the people who live in Transnistria. I think that this will create proper conditions for the start of constructive and serious talks on the Transnistrian settlement."You know, in 2003, we came as close as ever to reaching a final settlement to this issue. Unfortunately, the Moldovan authorities abruptly changed their mind then, and the plan drafted by all the parties to this process fell through. I hope very much that we will return to this issue not in words but in deeds, and find a compromise solution taking into account the interests of all the people who live in that region. If such a compromise is found – and it can be found only among Moldova and Transnistria – we will definitely act as guarantors of the fulfillment of all agreements that are made."Putin: Concerning The Association Agreement Between Moldova and the EU, 'There Are Certain Risks For Us, Similar To The Risks That We Faced After A Similar Document Was Signed Between Ukraine And The EU'Question: "I have a question for both of you. I will continue the theme of the many firsts today – not only the first visit or the first high-level talks. As we know, the Russian-Moldovan Intergovernmental Commission met recently for the first time in four years. Based on the results of today's talks, do you think it will be possible to move toward restoring intensive cooperation? Will it be possible to restore economic cooperation between Russia and Moldova? For example, will Russia open its market to Moldova? And if so, when can it happen?"Putin: "I think we will eventually get there. We must proceed from realities, though, including the reality of Moldovan politics. We know the competence of the Moldovan Government, the competence


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of the President. Some issues are not within the President's competence according to the country's constitution. But we will work with the Government and with the President, we are ready for it. I already mentioned this in my opening remarks."Much will depend on how Moldova will build its relations with the European Union, I mean the association agreement between Moldova and the European Union that has been signed and entered into force. There are certain risks for us, similar to the risks that we faced after a similar document was signed between Ukraine and the European Union. We said so openly and quite convincingly, I believe. We always said so to our partners in the CIS countries, and to our European partners. Much can and should be done in the trilateral format, of course, if our European friends and our partners (Moldova, I mean) are willing to do so. Many plants in Moldova have reopened already, and their products are being delivered to the Russian market."We agreed that a number of plants will be further inspected by relevant Russian agencies, and I do not rule out, actually I am almost certain that the number of companies allowed to supply products to the Russian market will increase."The same applies to labor migration issues. Mr. Dodon has raised this issue today in a variety of formats. Well, what can I say? Moldova is certainly less of a threat in terms of undesirable migrants infiltrating Russia than other areas, bearing in mind a number of factors that the President of Moldova just mentioned. We will think about how to resolve this problem, considering that many Moldovans are really economically dependent on working in Russia. We understand this and are willing to help them. I think a solution will be found."Dodon: "Regarding the resumption of full-scale economic cooperation, I will say this. Of course, we would like it here and now but we understand that Moscow was not built in a day. We understand that what was destroyed over years cannot be restored overnight. We are pragmatists and we understand that there is an association agreement with the European Union. By the way, I have repeatedly come out against signing the agreement. I believe that the agreement has done Moldova no good. We have lost the Russian market and, strangely enough, our exports to the EU have also fallen. In other words, we have received nothing from signing the agreement. And I cannot rule out that after the next parliamentary election, this will be the position of the parliamentary majority and I will support that position. There is the Socialist Party and I hope they will get a parliamentary majority and the agreement will be repealed."Regarding cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union, it is very important. Mr. Putin has spoken about this. In the morning I had a meeting with the leadership of the Eurasian Economic Commission. Today I put forward an initiative to sign a framework memorandum on cooperation with the EAEU. We agreed to begin consultations within the next few weeks and sign this memorandum in the next few months. It is not at odds with the agreements that Moldova has signed at this point with other partners, but it is the first step toward rapprochement."I asked Mr. Putin to consider the possibility of Moldova getting observer status in the Eurasian Economic Commission. I believe this is a good step for us to see what needs to be done and how, as well as to gather information from both sides. Insofar as trade and economic ties are concerned, I believe we are at the beginning of our path. At this stage, enterprises from Transnistria, Gagauzia, and dozens of companies from the rest of Moldova are already supplying their goods to the Russian market. I hope that in the next several weeks (we have discussed this) the list will be expanded for our manufacturers to return to the Russian market."However, the full-scale opening of the market should, of course, be considered also within the framework of the agreements that Moldova has signed with other participants. In early February I will visit Brussels and naturally we will talk about this with our EU partners, citing figures. Two years have passed and so far, there have been no results either in the economy or in other sectors. We will have to decide what to do next."


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Putin: 'Moldova Is Hostage To Our Relations With Other Countries'Question: "I have a question for Mr. Putin. Labor migration is a key concern in Moldovan society. Do today's talks provide any hope for resolving this issue? What specific steps is Russia prepared to make in order to positively resolve the migration issue?"Putin: "I have just mentioned this. I can only repeat what I said earlier. About half a million people from Moldova work in Russia. We don't have any major issues with the people who come to work in Russia from Moldova. About 50,000 Moldovans can't enter the territory of Russia because they violated certain laws. There will not be a positive outcome for those who have committed felonies. For all others, we will seek a solution. I repeat: I am confident that we will find one."We need to build such relations with a wide range of our partners. This does not apply to Moldova, because if we make certain decisions with regard to Moldova, we will have to make decisions with respect to other countries. In this sense, Moldova is hostage to our relations with other countries, but I repeat: we have no problem with Moldova and Moldovans of all ethnicities who come to Russia. I am referring to a variety of favorable factors. We need to do more work on this issue."We agreed that we will create a corresponding Security Council committee in Russia, and effectively it has already been created upon my instruction. In the course of today's talks, the Deputy Interior Minister reported to us their plans for the near future. I just don't want to get ahead of events, but I want to assure you that we will find a solution."

[1] Tass.com, January 17, 2017.[2]After the leader of SPRM, Igor Dodon, was elected as the President of Moldova, the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the SPRM was held on December 18. During the congress, Zinaida Greceanii was elected as the new President of the Socialist Party of Moldova.[3] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6696, Russia's Orbit - Part III - The New Pro-Russian President Of Moldova, November 29, 2016.[4] Kremlin.ru, January 17, 2017.[5] Kremlin.ru, January 17, 2017.[6] Tass.com, January 17, 2017[7] Ng.ru, November 28, 2017.

Georgia to Skip NATO Summit as Russia Flexes Military Muscle in South Caucasus On January 26, Viktor Dolidze, Georgia’s state minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, declared that his country will “probably” not participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) upcoming May summit at the new Headquarters, in Brussels (iPress.ge, January 26). Dolidze’s vague clarification raised eyebrows among those in Georgia’s opposition who support Georgian membership in NATO. “This is not an expansion summit. […] It is a small-scale, getting-to-know-you, a so-called Trump-NATO summit,” the Minister claimed, while asserting that Georgia will still be a topic discussed by the Alliance. If Georgia does in fact sit out the summit, it would represent a significant decrease in the level of its involvement in top NATO meetings. Georgia took an active part in the 2016 Warsaw Summit by virtue of the NATO-Georgia Commission, despite the fact that the session did not deliberate NATO enlargement. The opposition party United National Movement’s Nika Rurua decried the potential move as “open hostility toward the country’s and nation’s fundamental interests” (Tzona.org, January 27). Rurua also stressed that Georgia is missing a vital opportunity to establish a working relationship with the new United States administration under President Donald Trump. The opposition party Free Democrats called on Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili to convene a Security Council meeting in order to


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secure Georgia’s place at the summit. The Council’s secretary, Vano Machavariani, concurred that “Georgia is very importantly involved in European, specifically, Black Sea security” and needs to be “actively represented in the agenda [of the summit]” (Resonancedaily.com, January 28). He further suggested that President Margvelashvili intends to visit Brussels regardless of the ruling party Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia’s (GDDG) consent. But the functional role Margvelashvili holds is marginal relative to that of other members of the executive branch: his executive powers are limited by the Georgian constitution. Moreover, his political influence on the government diminished since he separated from GDDG in early 2014. GDDG’s silent retreat from attending the NATO summit comes at a time when Russia continues to flex its military muscle in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Other areas of the South Caucasus bordering Georgia are also a matter of increasing concern for Tbilisi. On January 25, 1,500 Russian “peacekeeping” personnel deployed near Tskhinvali began exercises at the “Dzartseni” outpost (Accent.com, January 25). The troops practiced attacks with advanced unmanned aircraft, using other materiel and fire weapons. On January 20, 100 “anti-terror” troops and 10 units of assets stationed at the Russian Southern Military District base in Abkhazia conducted training to counter “illegal armed formations” (Apsnypress.info, January 20). On January 26, the de facto Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia carried out a radio communications exercise with organs of military command (Apsnypress.info, January 26). In addition, for the second time within a month, 600 Russian military scouts commenced exercises at the Kamkhut training center near Gyumri, Armenia, close to Georgia’s southern border (Vestnik Kavkaza, January 24). Former Georgian minister of defense David Tevzadze recently emphasized the dangers stemming from Russia’s intensified coordination of its outreach between the military bases in annexed Crimea, occupied South Ossetia and in Armenia (see EDM, December 12, 2106). In a conversation with the author, Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer, pointing to Russia’s recent weapons sales to both Azerbaijan and Armenia, underscored the current high risk of reigniting the Karabakh conflict (Author’s interview, December 14, 2016). On January 27, Armenia’s Minister of Defense Vigen Sargsyan confirmed that part of the weapons acquired by means of a new $200 million loan from the Russian Federation have already been transported to Armenia (Aysor.am, January 27). In April 2016, Russia supplied Azerbaijan, whose military is already substantially better armed, with TOS-1 multiple-rocket-launcher systems, which effectively outweigh the relatively limited impact of the Russian Iskander missiles that were delivered to Armenia last year (Moscow-baku.ru, November 27, 2016). Felgenhauer stressed that Russia’s involvement in a rekindled war over Karabakh would be inevitable. By implication, this would cause Russia to increase pressure on Georgia to provide a transportation corridor for its assets. This could lead to the deployment of Russian troops in Georgia. Felgenhauer’s assessment resonates with recent statements by other Russian security experts. Alexei Fenenko believes that with Trump in the White House, the situation in the region could worsen. Pointing to alleged US oil and natural gas interests, Fenenko claims that “instead of supporting Ukraine, we can get from the new administration efforts to break through to Central Asia, as was the case under the younger [George W.] Bush, and attempts to strengthen positions in the South Caucasus, including activating Georgian and Karabakh directions” (Vestnik Kavkaza, January 25). Such assertions appear to preventively justify Russia’s possible military action in the South Caucasus. Georgian military expert Irakli Aladashvili underlines that it is in Georgia’s utmost interest to


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participate, by way of more active cooperation with NATO, in “protecting the strategic balance in the Black Sea basin—which is a very serious topic, as today this balance is being disrupted.” (Resonancedaily.com, January 28). Aladashvili refers to Russia’s “significant strengthening of its fleet in the Black Sea, and its military potential in the annexed Crimea and occupied Abkhazia.” Citing these Russian threats, Aladashvili warns that “It is very important that Georgia participate in all activities that bring it closer to NATO, Europe, and especially in those that concern cooperation within the Black Sea basin framework.” And yet, Georgia is also sitting out NATO’s February 1–10, Sea Shield drills, in which eight countries and 2,800 personnel participate (Qha.com.ua, February 1). Despite growing threats from Russia’s ongoing multi-focal military build-up in the region, Georgia’s ruling party seems to belittle the fact that it will be absent from the NATO deliberations in Brussels. The new US administration appears to be seeking to reestablish a balance of power with Russia as well as gain its cooperation in fighting terrorism and the so-called Islamic State (IS) (Geonews.ge, January 28). In this environment, it should still be possible for Tbilisi to reaffirm its commitment to NATO as well as deepen its military partnership with Washington. For example, Georgia could offer the US its support in the fight against the IS and initiate a higher level of military cooperation in Georgia than was pursued under the Barack Obama administration. However, despite Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili’s avowals after Trump’s inauguration that Georgia “was and remains” America’s “reliable and staunch ally” (Civil Georgia, January 24), this notable reluctance to interact directly with NATO and the US point to the contrary. Thus far, GDDG has voiced no intention to seek any meetings with the Trump administration. --Devi Dumbadze

Moscow’s Double Game in Afghanistan With multiple global crises competing for urgent public attention, it is not surprising that Western media and governments have failed to keep pace with Russia’s double game in Afghanistan. But in fact, Russian actions there provide a revealing “tutorial” on Moscow’s real approach to the issues presented by terrorism (see EDM, January 17). On one hand, Moscow is trumpeting its desire to lead an international coalition with the United States against terrorism to legitimate its intervention in Syria and deflect attention from its aggression in Ukraine. But on the other hand, it is, according to all accounts, simultaneously upgrading contacts with the Taliban (Thekabultimes.gov.af, January 31). For example in late December 2016, Russia, Pakistan and China jointly discussed how to prevent the Islamic State (IS) threat they see in Afghanistan—where conditions have been deteriorating for some time in their eyes (Valdaiclub.com, August 15, 2016)—from spreading into Central Asia (Sputnik News, December 29, 2016). Predictably, the exclusion of Afghan officials at these trilateral talks regarding Afghanistan infuriated the government in Kabul (Al Jazeera, December 27, 2016). In particular, the representatives of Russia, Pakistan and China jointly agreed to pursue a “flexible approach to remove certain figures [i.e. of the Taliban] from sanctions lists as part of efforts to foster a peaceful dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban movement,” according to Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova (1tvnews.af, December 27, 2016). Russia’s motives here may look opaque, but in reality they are not as mysterious as they seem. For all the talk of a global anti-terrorist coalition, it is clear that for Russia there are “useful” and “not so useful” terrorists. The Islamic State in Afghanistan clearly is not useful, except insofar as it furnishes motives for expanding Russian military presence in Central Asia. But the Taliban, which is evidently much less dangerous to Moscow, becomes useful because support for it continues to weaken the Afghan state, thus ensuring that Russia will always have a voice there. Indeed, the Russian ambassador to the tripartite conference


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with China and Pakistan, Zamir Kabulov, admitted that Moscow has no peace plan for Afghanistan (Afghanistantimes.af, December 31, 2016). Moscow’s flirtations with the Taliban have multiple objectives: they are a tool for Russia to retain a voice in Afghanistan, to deflect the Islamic State from Central Asia, as well as to draw nearer to Pakistan—which itself would be the sponsor of any anti-government movement in Afghanistan for its own reasons. In addition, Moscow apparently still believes the residual Western forces in Afghanistan pose some sort of threat to Russia. Kabulov has even charged that the United States is purportedly seeking permanent military bases there (Afghanistantimes.af, December 31, 2016). As a result, Moscow’s support for the Taliban is predicated on the latter’s willingness to allow the preservation of a Russian role in Afghanistan. Alternatively, the Kremlin can use the continued existence of the Taliban to invoke a hypothetical terrorist threat to Central Asia, thus justifying its enduring military presence there as well. On the other hand, Russia characterizes the Islamic State in Afghanistan as a bad terrorist group, presumably because it could actually threaten Central Asia and thus force Russia to make good on its claims that it is the gendarme of Central Asia. As such, Moscow’s argument that it is a fit partner for an anti-IS or other anti-terrorist coalition proves to be groundless when one looks closely at Russian activities in Afghanistan. Indeed, Moscow’s utterly cynical and utilitarian approach to deciding who is a terrorist and with whom it must or must not collaborate is of long standing. In 2007, Russia’s ambassador to Israel, Andrei Demidov, called on Israel to open a dialogue with Hamas. But when asked about Russia’s refusal to talk with the Islamist Chechen insurgency, he stated that the Chechen problem is an internal Russian issue: “We decide how to settle the problem.” Moreover, in complete defiance of the facts, he claimed that Moscow had in fact already settled Chechnya by peaceful means and created a government, a legislature and a judicial system there. He even recommended that Israel learn from Russia’s actions in the Chechen republic (Jerusalem Post, February 16, 2007). Ambassador Demidov’s hypocritical statement highlights the true realpolitik calculations behind Russian policy. It also reveals Moscow’s implicit belief that Israel is not truly a sovereign state while Russia is: so while Russia’s sovereignty is inviolable and not open to any outside input, it can command Israel to negotiate with terrorist groups that seek its destruction. Not surprisingly, back in 2010, Israel replied that Hamas is no different than the Chechen militant groups in the North Caucasus. “Just as Israel unconditionally supported Russia in her struggle against Chechen terror [sic], we expect equal treatment in our struggle against Hamas,” the Israeli foreign ministry declared (Haaretz, May 12, 2010). Moscow’s double game regarding various terrorist organizations—whether they are in Syria, Israel or Afghanistan—is, indeed, nothing new. And any government seeking to build an anti-terrorist partnership with Russia should remember the old Latin phrase caveat emptor (buyer beware) and take appropriate precautions before it buys the same dead horse for the second or even third time.--Stephen Blank

Regards Cees***

Nato withdrawal after 13 years leaves Afghan army and police in charge of security- 28 Dec 2014“Our Afghan partners can and will take the fight from here,” said General John F Campbell,


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the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at a ceremony in the capital.

Afghan government ‘has lost territory to the insurgency’BY BILL ROGGIO | February 1, 2017 |

Chart created by SIGAR, based on data from USFOR-A.

The Afghan government “has lost territory to the insurgency” and “district control continues to decline,” the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said in its most recent quarterly report to United States Congress. An estimated 15 percent of Afghanistan’s districts have slipped from the government’s control over that time period.The picture is more bleak than what the Obama administration and top military commanders have let on when looked at from a longer distance. According to SIGAR, the Afghan government controls or influences just 52 percent of the nation’s districts today compared to 72 percent in Nov. 2015.“SIGAR’s analysis of the most recent data provided by US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) suggests that the security situation in Afghanistan has not improved this quarter,” the watchdog group noted in its most recent assessment of the country. “The numbers of the Afghan security forces are decreasing, while both casualties and the number of districts under insurgent control or influence are increasing.”“[T]he ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] has not yet been capable of securing all of Afghanistan and has lost territory to the insurgency,” since the last reporting period. The Afghan government has lost control of more than six percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts since SIGAR issued its last report, on Oct. 30.According to SIGAR, the insurgency, which is overwhelmingly made up of the Taliban, now controls nine districts and influences another 32, while 133 districts are “contested.” USFOR-A defines contested districts as “having ‘negligible meaningful impact from insurgents,’ contending that neither the insurgency nor the Afghan government maintains significant control over these areas.”


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The names of the Taliban controlled and influenced districts, as well as those that are contested, were not disclosed by USFOR-A or SIGAR. However, according to SIGAR:The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence.“Less strategic importance”The US military justified the loss of territory by claiming the Afghan government’s “new Sustainable Security Strategy” calls for abandoning districts that are “not important.”“USFOR-A attributes the loss of government control or influence over territory to the ANDSF’s strategic approach to security prioritization, identifying the most important areas that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat, and focusing less on areas with less strategic importance,” SIGAR reported. “Under its new Sustainable Security Strategy, the ANDSF targets ‘disrupt’ districts for clearance operations when the opportunity arises, but will give first priority to protecting ‘hold’ and ‘fight’ districts under its control.”This strategy neglects the fact that the Taliban views rural districts or those “with less strategic importance” as critical to its insurgency. The Taliban uses theses districts to raise funds, recruit and train fighters, and launch attacks on population centers. Additionally, Taliban allies such as al Qaeda run training camps and operate bases in areas under Taliban control. This strategy was explained by Mullah Aminullah Yousuf, the Taliban’s shadow governor for Uruzgan, in April 2016.The Taliban has utilized its control of the rural districts to directly threaten major population centers. Last year, the Taliban was able to threaten five of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. The government lost control of Kunduz for more than a week last fall.US military underestimates Taliban control and contested districtsFDD’s Long War Journal has maintained that the US military’s assessment of the state of play in Afghanistan’s districts is flawed. Our study estimates the Taliban controls 42 Afghan districts and contests (or influences) another 55. [Note, USFOR-A’s definition of “influence” matches that of our definition of “contested.” The term “influenced/contested” will be used for clarity to describe these districts. LWJ does not assess districts that are defined by USFOR-A as “contested,” which means neither the Taliban or Afghan government hold sway.]The number of Taliban controlled and influenced/contested districts has risen from 70 in October 2015 to 97 this month.Districts under Taliban command are typically being administered by the group, or the group controls the district center. Additionally, districts where the district center frequently changes hands are considered Taliban-controlled. In influenced/contested districts, the Taliban dominates all of the areas of a district except the administrative center.A map created by LWJ [below] lists the districts thought to be controlled [black] or influenced/contested [red] by the Taliban. LWJ believes that the Taliban controls and contests more districts displayed on the map above, however the districts listed on the map are ones that can be confirmed via independent sources such as Taliban claims, US and Afghan government reports, and news reports. For instance, the Taliban has traditionally held significant sway in many districts in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, however the status of these districts cannot be properly assessed based on open source information.Without USFOR-A’s list of Taliban controlled or influenced/contested districts, it is difficult to compare the discrepancies between the US military and LWJ‘s assessments. However, USFOR-A did provide information on one province which reveals that the military is providing a best-case scenario of the situation on the ground.USFOR-A claims, according to SIGAR, that “The region with the most districts under insurgent


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control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence.”While this geographic area is poorly defined, LWJ estimates that 24 districts are controlled (12) or influenced/contested (12) in the four provinces mentioned (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul). This means that the Taliban, based on USFOR-A’s estimate, controls or influences/contests only 17 districts through the remaining 30 provinces. However the Taliban is known to control or influence/contest multiple districts in the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, Badghis, Faryan, Sar-i-Pul, Takhar, Jawzjan, Kapisa, Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, Paktia, Paktika, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Ghor, Farah, and Herat.Top military commanders have downplayed the Taliban’s gains over the past year. General John Nicholson, the commander of NATO’s Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan, characterized the fact that 30 percent of the Afghan population is controlled or contested by the Taliban as a “positive” development, as the Taliban is primarily operating in the rural areas of Afghanistan. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, US commander in Afghanistan downplays Taliban control of 10 percent of population.]Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

Regards Cees***Trump’s travel ban doesn’t target Muslims, he has ‘sovereign right’ to impose it – Emirati FM

Without doubt, countries have the sovereign right to make decisions to ensure their sovereignty. The US president used this sovereign right,” the UAE’s top diplomat said.“There are attempts to claim that this decision is aimed against a religion, but it is not aimed against a specific religion, this is a temporary decision, it is important to take these points of view into account,” he continued.

Meanwhile, a group of UN experts also sharply criticized Trump’s travel ban, saying that it violates international law and could lead to refugees being tortured if sent home.

C: So whom do we consider the religion expert??

01 Jan 2017, Speaking at a conference with his Russian counterpart, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates maintained that President Trump’s travel ban on several Muslim countries is not anti-religious or otherwise prejudiced against Muslims.According to Emirati FM Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, President Donald Trump’s order to bar individuals from certain Muslim countries from the US is a “sovereign decision”that would be a mistake to interpret as anti-Muslim.Without doubt, countries have the sovereign right to make decisions to ensure their sovereignty. The US president used this sovereign right,” the UAE’s top diplomat said.“There are attempts to claim that this decision is aimed against a religion, but it is not aimed against a specific religion, this is a temporary decision, it is important to take these points of view into account,” he continued.“Some of these countries that were on this list are countries that face structural problems,” he noted, stressing “these countries should try to solve these issues... and these circumstances before trying to solve this issue with the United States”The Emirati FM was speaking at a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei


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Lavrov. The UAE is one of America’s primary allies in the Gulf region. It is also involved in the Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign in Yemen, and the fight against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL).Another major US ally in the region, Saudi Arabia, did not take any official position on the travel ban. However, its national airline, Saudi Airlines, controlled by the Saudi royal family, issued a statement saying that citizens from the seven countries affected by the ban "will not be permitted to travel with Saudi Airlines. Citizens with diplomatic visas or who work for international organizations and hold valid visas are an exception," as reported by CNN.Meanwhile, a group of UN experts also sharply criticized Trump’s travel ban, saying that it violates international law and could lead to refugees being tortured if sent home. The experts also urged the Trump administration to protect people fleeing persecution and stick to the principle of non-discrimination based on race, nationality or religion in a joint statement. Recent US policy on immigration also risks people being returned, without proper individual assessments and asylum procedures, to places in which they risk being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in direct contravention of international humanitarian and human rights laws,” the statement says.On Friday, President Trump chose to block citizens from seven Muslim countries from entering the United States for a period of 90 days to prevent “radical Islamic terrorists” from carrying out attacks on American soil. The countries included in the ban are Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.Another of Trump’s executive orders puts a 120 day ban on all refugee admissions.Sheikh Abdullah also welcomed the idea of creating safe zones in Syria if they were temporary, served only humanitarian purposes, and were established under international supervision. The FM said he would like to hear more ideas from Washington on the matter.For his part, FM Lavrov said that Russia could support the idea, but only with the agreement of the Syrian government and close cooperation with it. The FM pointed out that Washington’s initiative is markedly different from that which has been proposed by other Western partners.“There have been ideas of creating some areas where an alternative Syrian government could sit, and use those areas for regime change,” Lavrov said.


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Documents

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 19-122-Russia-10-90-NATO-4