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***** AUTHOR ACCEPTED VERSION *****
Interdependence Theory and Related Theories
Harry T. Reis
The University of Rochester
and
Ximena B. Arriaga
Purdue University Direct correspondence to: Harry T. Reis, Ph.D. Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 Voice: (585) 275-8697 Fax: (585) 273-1100 E-mail: [email protected] Draft, March 18, 2013
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Analogous to contemporary physics – where the relations between particles are as meaningful as the particles themselves – in interdependence theory, between-person relations are as meaningful as the individuals themselves.” – Caryl Rusbult and Paul Van Lange (2008, pp. 2049-2050).
Sandor and Ellis work on the sales force of a large medical supply company. They
must decide whether to cooperate or compete with each other as they pursue customers.
Shannon and Pat having been dating for about 2 months. As their relationship develops, they
each consider whether to deepen their commitment or preserve their independence. Eamon
and Kyoko, proud parents of a newborn baby girl, must allocate responsibility for middle-of-
the-night feedings. Who will get up and who will sleep? Players and owners from a
professional sports league are engaged in negotiations for a new contract to cover the coming
season. The season will take place only if they come to an agreement, yet each side feels that
the other is not negotiating in good faith. Melissa and Patrick are considering a divorce.
Melissa is employed in a high-paying job whereas Patrick has been a stay-at-home dad and
has few prospects for finding a good job. Does each person persist in trying to save the
marriage or give up? Three college friends agree to form a start-up Internet business upon
graduating. It will take several years of long hours and living on the cheap to determine
whether the company will be profitable, but it can succeed only if all of them persevere and
forgo more secure alternative jobs. Do they remain committed or take the first opportunity to
cash out? A patient resists a much-needed treatment plan, prompting his physician to suggest
less effective alternatives that will elicit greater adherence. How will the physician and
patient negotiate a treatment plan that will help the patient while avoiding wasted effort on
the part of the physician?
Each of these examples describes an interdependence dilemma: The outcomes that
each person will receive depend not only on what both of them do but also on the structure of
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the situation they face. Interdependence Theory was first proposed by Thibaut and Kelley
(1959) to help explain how people represent and consider situations of interdependence with
respect to choosing among potential courses of action. The theory also considers how
cognition and emotion reflect people’s analysis of these interdependent situations, as well as
the role of individual differences in people’s response to various situational contingencies.
Most importantly, Interdependence Theory is unique among social-psychological theories in
addressing questions about how interacting people influence each other’s preferences,
motives, and actions. Interdependence Theory is therefore one of social psychology’s most
far-reaching and comprehensive theoretical statements. It is also arguably the field’s most
social theory.
We see Interdependence Theory as a quintessentially social psychological theory
because its analysis of situations examines their interpersonal and interactional components.
Whereas social psychology has justifiably championed itself as the science of situations
(Ross & Nisbett, 1991), to a large extent it has emphasized the impersonal features of
situations. In life, however, the distinctive properties of situations often (and perhaps more
often than not) reflect their interpersonal aspects: Who one is with, and who affects or is
affected by one’s behavior (Kelley, 2000; Reis, 2008; Reis & Holmes, 2012). In fact, the
social dimension of situations was the driving interest of many of the field’s earliest thinkers,
such as Ross (1908), Lewin (1943), and Allport (1960), leading Kelley to assert that “(t)he
proper study of social psychology is the study of interaction and its immediate determinants
and consequences” (2000, p. 11). Interdependence Theory therefore has great potential to
refocus the field’s attention on what is truly social about situations and in turn elucidate how
situations influence social behavior. Such a refocus seems to us likely to enhance the
explanatory power of social psychology.
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Thorngate (1975) opined that because no theory could be simultaneously general,
accurate, and simple (in the sense of parsimonious), all theories must sacrifice one of these.
In the case of Interdependence Theory, the odd factor out is simplicity. Interdependence
Theory is based on a highly abstract analysis of the interpersonal dimensions of situations,
and, as might be expected, is every bit as complex as the multifaceted interpersonal world
that it seeks to represent. Indeed, novices to the theory are sometimes astounded by the
complexity of the constructs needed to represent judgments that ordinary people make easily.
Interdependence Theory postulates are often portrayed through the tool of payoff matrices,
borrowed from early game theorists such as Luce and Raiffa (1957). Although these matrices
provide a degree of logical precision that is essential to a deep understanding of the theory,
they sometimes deter casual readers from appreciating the clarity and richness of its analysis
and predictions. In this chapter, we therefore eschew matrix representations in favor of a
verbal analysis of the theory’s main concepts, assumptions, and goals.
Consistent with the theme of this volume, our chapter does not directly review
Interdependence Theory. Readers interested in a more forthright account of the theory might
consult any of several excellent sources. Interdependence Theory was first proposed by John
Thibaut and Harold Kelley in their seminal volume, The Social Psychology of Groups
(1959). That volume reflected the authors’ goal of capturing Kurt Lewin’s idea, which had
not been fleshed out in field theory, that interdependence was “the essence of a group”
(Lewin, 1948, p. 84). The theory was later revised by Kelley and Thibaut (1978) and then
applied to dyadic relationships by Kelley (1979). More recently, Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reis,
Rusbult, and Van Lange (2003) used Interdependence Theory concepts to describe and
analyze 20 of the most common interpersonal situations. Excellent reviews can be found in
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Rusbult and Arriaga (1997), Rusbult and Van Lange (1996), and Van Lange and Rusbult
(2012).
By focusing on Interdependence Theory, we limit our discussion to those theories that
use or derive from the theoretical framework first articulated by Thibaut and Kelley (1959).
We have little doubt that this theory offers the field’s most prototypic, best articulated, and
most influential theory of interdependence processes. Our discussion is based both on their
original work and its subsequent elaborations, as well as on other theoretical models that
build directly on this approach. Of course, many other social-psychological theories describe
ways in which people are influenced by the presence or behavior of others, which are surely
examples of, literally, “interdependence.” However, not all theories about the influence of
others make use of specific Interdependence Theory processes or mechanisms, so we focus
our analysis on Interdependence Theory itself and models that most directly reflect that
framework.
This chapter begins by reviewing certain key meta-theoretical assumptions that define
Interdependence Theory. These assumptions should help readers comprehend the basic
principles behind Interdependence Theory’s analysis of interaction and interdependence, as
well as its place within the family of social psychological theories. We next discuss key
structural features of Interdependence Theory as well as its explanatory and predictive value,
followed by a review of several of the theory’s more noteworthy advantages and
disadvantages, an accounting that is admittedly selective and to some extent biased by our
own perspective. We hope that readers will come away from this chapter with an
appreciation for the unique contribution that Interdependence Theory offers to theorizing in
social and personality psychology.
The Meta-Theoretical Framework of Interdependence Theory
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Interdependence theory begins with two key assumptions. The first assumption is that
the most important features of situations are found in their interpersonal core. This emphasis,
which derives from Lewin’s (1943) account of the E term in his famous formulation, B=f(P,
E), namely that behavior is a function of the person and the environment, is consistent with
widespread recognition of the centrality of social relations to human activity and well-being
(Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). It also converges with contemporary interest in the
adaptive significance of interpersonal activity and connections in human evolution (Buss &
Kenrick, 1998; see also Keelaar, this volume).
The second assumption is that the fundamental ground for an analysis of social
situations is the study of social interactions, which are best understood by considering
people’s interdependence with respect to outcomes – namely the nature and extent to which
co-acting individuals or groups are dependent on each other in order to attain desired
outcomes. This assumption follows from the functional analysis inherent in Thibaut and
Kelley’s (1959) original work: that groups exist to help people solve problems more
effectively than they could do alone. In other words, because “socially significant behavior
will not be repeated unless it is reinforced, rewarded in some way” (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959,
p. 5), analysis of the manner in which groups go about solving problems taking into account
the facts of their interdependence represents a useful way to comprehend social behavior.
This is accomplished by examining the abstract properties of outcome interdependence in the
various situations that groups (or, more typically, dyads) encounter.
A marked difference between this approach and many other social-psychological
theories is evident in these assumptions. Whereas other theories often begin in the mind of
the individual, with his or her needs, goals, or mental representations, Interdependence
Theory starts with the objective situation itself – how two or more individuals (or two
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groups) are linked interdependently with respect to possible actions and desired outcomes.
Thus interpersonal interactions, rather than individuals, become the fundamental units of
analysis. This origin has considerable implications for the way in which motives, cognitive
processes, and individual differences are conceptualized, as discussed below.
Interdependence theory characterizes interpersonal situations according to six
properties that define patterns of interdependence, each of which has clear implications for
the choices interacting individuals make: the degree to which individuals’ interests
correspond or conflict; the extent to which outcomes depend on one’s own actions or the
actions of others; whether co-actors have mutual or asymmetric power over each other’s
outcomes; whether the task requires coordination or exchange to produce a desired result;
whether the situation involves interaction over time; and whether or not substantial
uncertainty exists about the likely result of particular actions. These properties can be
combined to portray common or prototypical situations, akin to a periodic table of situations
(Kelley et al., 2003). Novel-seeming situations may not be experienced as completely novel
if a person has had past experience with comparable situations in the same category. Certain
of these patterns correspond to the distinctive norms of social exchange that are proposed by
some theorists to define prototypical categories of social relations (e.g., Bugental, 2000;
Clark & Mills, 2012; Fiske, 1992).
It is conceivable that future analyses will identify different dimensions for describing
situations, an eventuality that most interdependence theorists would welcome. To be
consistent with the theory’s conceptual perspective, these alternatives should be derived from
the objective properties of situations and have logical and discernible implications for
interaction.
What Does Interdependence Theory Mean by Self-Interest?
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Interdependence theory was first proposed during the heyday of reinforcement
theories. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) were clearly influenced by these theories, as well as by
Homans’s (1950) attempt to describe social exchange processes in reinforcement terms.
Thus, as mentioned above, Interdependence Theory assumes that people seek rewarding,
non-costly solutions to the choices they encounter in social interaction. This principle has led
some observers to erroneously conclude that the primary drive behind Interdependence
Theory is outcome maximization or, in the extreme case, that it sanctions selfishness (e.g.,
Wallach & Wallach, 1983). To so conclude seriously mistakes the theory’s fundamental
tenets.
As Rusbult and Van Lange (1996) explain, the “self-interest” to which
Interdependence Theory refers is not immediate and narrow but rather long-term and broad.
Because the ability of situations to provide rewards and costs depends on the degree to which
important needs, values, and goals are fulfilled, broader considerations come into play.
These broader considerations address the complexity and diversity of human needs, values,
and goals, and therefore may include, for example, contributing to the well-being of another
person, delaying gratification to further a long-term goal, following socially appropriate rules
of conduct, or acting in a manner that is consistent with personal moral standards. Any of
these can (and often do) run counter to immediate self-interest, although of course they
benefit the self in the long run. It is in this latter sense that Interdependence Theory
conceptualizes self-interest (see Deutsch and Strack, this volume, for additional discussion).
In fact, Interdependence Theory is unique among motivational approaches in clearly
specifying a process by which broader considerations alter more immediate (or automatic)
self-interest. To wit, the theory distinguishes the given situation – the direct and immediate
outcomes that would accrue, were individuals to ignore the consequences of their actions
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over time or for others – from the effective situation – a reconceptualized set of outcomes that
takes into account the immediate or long-term impact of one’s actions on the self and others.
Just how individuals transition from the given to the effective matrix, a process
known as transformation of motivation, is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Rusbult
& Van Lange, 1996, for a thorough account). It is important to recognize, however, that this
transformation – this taking into account of temporal and interpersonal considerations –
points to another assumption of Interdependence Theory: That people recognize the nature of
their interdependence with others and the impact that their behavioral choices may have for
the well-being of others. For example, a husband may choose to spend his free time running
errands for his wife rather than watching a football game, knowing that by lessening her
burden, she will be happier and more committed to their relationship, which likely benefits
both of them over time. Even strangers consider the interpersonal effects of their behavior
(e.g., by helping strangers in an emergency or by enacting mundane helpful behaviors such
as opening the door for others) and exhibit stable individual differences in how they approach
interdependent situations (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). The self-interest
of Interdependence Theory, in other words, is a broader form of self-interest that takes
metacognition and temporal factors into account.
By referring to metacognition, we mean that before deciding how to act, people must
infer how interaction partners perceive the situation and are likely to feel about each of the
possible alternatives that one might pursue. Although not grounded in Interdependence
Theory, Kenny’s (1994) Social Relations Model provides conceptual and analytic tools for
examining these cognitions in some detail – for example, in distinguishing self-perception
from meta-perception (understanding how others see oneself), and in distinguishing
dispositional attributes from relationship-specific attributes (i.e., how generally likeable a
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person is versus how much one relationship partner likes the other, over and above general
likeability). In its interest in metacognition, Interdependence Theory overlaps to some extent
with work on intersubjectivity: shared meaning systems constructed by interacting parties
during their interaction (Ickes & Gonzalez, 1994).
A related misconception is that by describing rewards and costs associated with
situations, Interdependence Theory assumes that people make rational choices among
available behavioral alternatives (see Trafimow, this volume, for a discussion of rationality in
social psychological theories). The logic of the transformation process, explained in the
previous paragraph, indicates otherwise. The properties of the given situation may indicate
what a “rational” actor should do (i.e., considering only oneself) but people often transform
those options (i.e., considering oneself in relation to others) for idiosyncratic, non-obvious,
perhaps even dysfunctional reasons. In other words, transformations of motivation may be
based on any of the many “non-rational” or construal processes that have been documented
in social-psychological research (e.g., self-esteem maintenance, increased competitiveness of
groups relative to dyads). In fact, a key insight of the interdependence approach is that an
individual’s deviation from behavioral options strongly suggested by the given situation
provides unambiguous evidence of the operation of personal motivational factors. For
example, a spiteful response to an ordinary question suggests something about the
responder’s motives or circumstances, precisely because the more common and situationally
appropriate neutral answer would be associated with better outcomes (e.g., avoiding
unnecessary conflict)1.
The Analysis of Situations Begins with Their Objective Properties
A key and somewhat misunderstood assumption of Interdependence Theory is its
insistence that the analysis of situations begin with the objective properties of those
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situations. On its face, this assumption seems to contradict social psychology’s traditional
adherence to the principle of construal, namely that causal analysis should focus on the
personal and subjective meaning of situations to the individuals involved (e.g., Ross &
Nisbett, 1991; see also Kashima, this volume). To be sure, construals are an important part of
Interdependence Theory. Nevertheless, Interdependence Theory conceptualizes construals as
the product of the individual’s mental processing (i.e., transformational activity) of the
situation as it actually exists – in other words, “what the individual makes of the situation.”
To properly understand situation construals, therefore, theoretical analysis must begin with
the objective properties of those situations, to which individuals respond.
Consider the following example. The theory of psychological reactance stipulates that
when people’s behavioral freedom is threatened, they will take steps to reassert that freedom,
either behaviorally or psychologically (Brehm, 1966). This might be investigated by having
an experimenter tell subjects that they must carry out some action in an experiment, in
contrast to being given a choice to do the same thing. Interdependence Theory characterizes
this scenario as a situation in which participants have the option of protesting against or
acceding to a domineering experimenter. The analysis thus starts with the situation as it is
objectively defined – that there exists an authority figure who has some degree of power over
the subject’s outcomes (perhaps their experimental credits). The subject must then respond to
that situation by choosing whether to rebel or to submit, a choice that depends on whether he
or she construes the experimenter’s demand as a threat to be resisted or alternatively as a
danger that requires acquiescence. This construal, in turn, is likely to derive from something
in the individual’s mind – perhaps a personality predisposition or a momentary feeling.
Rather than illustrating “the power of the situation,” then, as scenarios such as this one is
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commonly labeled, Interdependence Theory sees this example as demonstrating “the power
of what the person makes of the situation” (Kelley et al., 2003, p. 7).
This is not an arcane distinction. Social psychological research often attributes
causality to the properties of a particular situation – indeed, some characterize the field’s
raison d’etre in this way (Kashima, this volume). But if one views construals as the key
causal agent, how are we to distinguish the objective properties that led to a certain construal
from the motives, attitudes, and dispositions that shape individual interpretations (Reis,
2008)? Interdependence theory proposes that we begin causal analysis one step back from the
individual’s construal, by instead defining the situation according to its objective properties.
Of course, outside of the carefully controlled conditions of the experimental laboratory, it
may not always be possible to do so accurately – among several reasons, independent
observers may not always be aware of all relevant contingencies in a particular interaction.
Nevertheless, by explicitly separating situation and construal, a less ambiguous causal
analysis is made possible. (For a more detailed discussion, see Reis and Holmes, 2012).
Murray and Holmes’s Risk Regulation Model (Murray & Holmes, 2009, 2011)
follows directly from this analysis. Committed relationships, they argue, are fraught with
risk: By committing, partners sacrifice autonomy and make themselves vulnerable to
exploitation and harm. The inherent risk of commitment can be mitigated by motivated
reinterpretation that not only minimizes the potential threaten of such situations but also even
increases – through confidence in the relationship – one’s trust and commitment (Murray &
Holmes, 2009). By distinguishing the situation (dependence) from the construal, it becomes
possible to clearly identify the underlying motivational process.
Rusbult’s model of commitment processes (Rusbult, Agnew, & Arriaga, 2012) relies
on a similar analysis. When confronted with the same conflicts of interest, highly committed
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partners differ markedly from their less committed counterparts in what they make of the
situation. Highly committed partners are more likely to construe the situation as an
opportunity to support the relationship rather than as a threat to its continuance; thus they are
more likely to respond to a partner’s destructive behavior by inhibiting the urge to retaliate
and responding constructively instead, more likely to sacrifice preferred activities to appease
a partner, and less likely to escalate negative conflict behaviors. Committed partners thus
reconstrue threatening situations in a manner that bolsters rather than hinders their
relationship.
The emphasis on distinguishing situations from construals is also evident in
interpersonal-process models that differentiate partner behaviors from the perception of those
behaviors. For example, Reis and Clark’s (2013) model of responsiveness posits that
perceptions of a partner’s responsiveness reflect the joint (and empirically separable)
influence of person factors (e.g., needs, goals, and individual differences) and the partner’s
actual behavior. In this model, as in the risk regulation model, the partner’s behavior
provides a potentially ambiguous stimulus, which the perceiver transforms according to the
motives that are momentarily most accessible. The conceptual benefits of distinguishing the
objective properties of situations from construals are discussed further below.
How are Individual Differences Conceptualized?
Individual differences are commonly represented in terms of the consistent patterns
of behavior that a person displays across situations – for example, tendencies to worry or to
be socially outgoing in diverse circumstances. Interdependence theory takes a different
approach, building on the idea of affordance – that situations provide opportunities for the
impact of person factors to be revealed in behavior. The analysis starts with the given
situation – as discussed above, an objective description of what sorts of behavior are possible
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in that situation. Person factors – the various traits, motives, values, preferences, beliefs,
feelings about a particular other, and other attributes that differentiate one person from
another – then determine the individual’s perception of and response to those objective
properties (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). In this way of theorizing, then, person factors are
considered to be nested within situations: situations afford but individuals choose.
Although this conceptualization differs from the traditional view that defines
personality in terms of cross-situational consistency, it is consistent with other models that
similarly point to situation-based variability as the essence of personality. For example,
Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) cognitive-affective processing systems (CAPS) model proposes
that situations activate distinctive patterns of cognition and affect that in turn lead to
behavior. These patterns constitute behavioral “signatures”: predictable patterns of response
to critical features of situations. Consistency in personality is thereby not defined cross-
situationally but rather by “distinctive and stable patterns of situation-behavior relations”
(Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002, p. 50) – in other words, as a series of if X exists,
then response Y is more likely contingencies. These distinctive patterns can be identified by
examining the degree to which within-person variability in behavior is captured by the
properties of situations (Fleeson & Noftle, 2008).
Interdependence Theory takes the idea of affordance considerably further than the
CAPS model does in theorizing that the range of person factors that can be revealed in a
particular situation is limited by the properties of that situation. In the language of
affordance, a given situation affords only certain responses and not others. This is because it
is logically implausible to infer the operation of a person factor when the situation compels a
particular behavior or when a situation does not permit it to occur. For example, most people
would not attribute Rafael’s sad mood to a gloomy personality if they knew that his
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grandmother had just died, nor would they infer altruistic intent from Rachel’s kindly act if
they were aware that she stood to gain a great deal from that act.
The logic of affordance in Interdependence Theory further assumes that behavioral
choices reflect a person’s preference among the various possibilities afforded by a particular
situation. Most situations afford multiple behavioral opportunities: An interpersonal
challenge is an opportunity to be defiant or back down; a friend in need is an occasion to
assist, exploit, or ignore; and a job that needs to be done is a chance to divide labor, delegate,
or do it oneself. By considering the various logically relevant alternatives in particular
situations, perceivers can deduce the dispositions, motives, or goals that may have shaped the
individual’s choice.
Another way to describe this process is to say that person factors represent tendencies
to psychologically transform situations by emphasizing certain of their afforded possibilities
over others. For instance, in the job that needs to be done example, a self-reliant person
would be someone who turns this somewhat ambiguous situation into a more individualistic
one by attaching particular value to the opportunity to go it alone. (Holmes, 2002, referred to
these tendencies as valuation rules; see also Van Lange et al.’s, 1997, theorizing about social
value orientations.) On the other hand, a person who prizes egalitarianism might instead turn
the situation into a more cooperative one. (The analysis of transformational activity borrows
from the Lewinian [1943] concept of restructuring the field.) It can also be seen from this
example that ambiguous situations – sometimes called weak situations (Snyder & Ickes,
1985) – are better able to reveal the impact of person factors than are so-called strong
situations, in which behavior is normatively mandated by the requirements of the situation.
For example, an officer who confronts an ambiguous situation in which a suspect reaches in
his coat pocket will make a split-second decision about whether the suspect is reaching for a
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gun or something else, a decision that reveals the impact of the officer’s personal beliefs or
stereotypes precisely because the situation is ambiguous. (See Reis and Holmes, 2012, for
additional discussion of situational ambiguity.)
In this light, Interdependence Theory’s stance in the longstanding person-situation
debate is readily apparent: Individual differences are inextricably intertwined with situations.
The impact of persons can only be understood as figure against the ground of situations.
Although this may not be news – in 2006, David Funder proclaimed, "Nowadays, everybody
is an interactionist" (Funder, 2006, p. 22) – we would argue that Interdependence Theory
goes further than other interactionist (Person x Situation) theories in proposing a particular,
theoretically integrated functional form of how person factors and situation factors interact
(Cervone, Caldwell, and Mayer, this volume, review approaches to person x situation
interactions). This conceptualization has provided a springboard for many specific programs
of research, as well as for the detailed analyses of 20 prototypical situations and their
characteristic person factors found in the Atlas of Interpersonal Situations (Kelley et al.,
2003).
Structural Features of Interdependence Theory
There are several key structural features of Interdependence Theory, each with
implications for the type of data needed to test relevant hypotheses. Because dyadic
interaction (actual or implied) involves two individuals, Interdependence Theory structurally
models the responses and experiences of both individuals by using an outcome matrix to
represent their behavioral options (Kelley, 1991). A conceptually similar structural model is
the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), which is used to control for dependencies
in dyadic research, a statistical necessity when interdependence exists, and to quantify the
influence of each partner to an interaction or relationship (Kenny, 1996; Kenny &
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Ledermann, 2010). Therefore, in both approaches the most relevant data are obtained from
two interaction (or relationship) partners, although a single individual’s data may also be
useful if they adequately capture the real or implied influence of others. Group research has
likewise made use of outcome matrices to model interdependence that also can be captured
by generalizing APIM analyses to group intergroup contexts (e.g., an ingroup-outgroup
interdependence model; Kenny & Kashy, in press).
The APIM specifies that in a dyad, each partners’ actions can be affected by their
own attributes or prior behavior, their partner’s attributes or behavior, or a combination of the
two. As Wickham and Knee (2012) explain, different combinations of these three types of
effects (described by Kenny and Ledermann, 2010) correspond to different patterns of
outcome interdependence. For example, actor effects with no partner effects in the APIM
would correspond to bilateral actor control in Interdependence Theory, whereas equal actor
and partner effects would correspond to mutual joint control. If partner effects vary from one
partner to the other (e.g., if husbands influence wives more than wives influence husbands)
then control is asymmetric. Wickham and Knee show how the matrix representations of
Interdependence Theory may be used to calculate different patterns of influence in the APIM
(Kenny & Ledermann, 2010). Thus, insofar as the influence of situations on outcomes is
concerned, APIM and Interdependence Theory provide conceptually analogous
representations of the ways in which partners influence each other’s outcomes.
Structurally, Interdependence Theory goes beyond the description of such influence.
The assumptions described earlier in this chapter are indicative of a fundamental structural
distinction in Interdependence Theory, differentiating among: (a) situational features as
reflected in the given situation; (b) in-the-moment, motivational and cognitive transformation
processes guided by person factors that are activated in the given situation, as described
17
earlier (e.g., general personality attributes, specific tendencies with the current partner, and
immediate motives or valuation rules); and (c) overt behavior.
Research has demonstrated the validity of conceptualizing the given situation as a
structural factor separate from the person factors that shape interpretations of a situation. For
example, Yovetich and Rusbult (1994) found that with limited time to respond, people tend
to follow the self-focused, immediate preferences suggested by the given situation, rather
than the transformed (effective situation) preferences that take into account the impact of
one’s actions on others. They concluded that given preferences do indeed exist, and straying
from them requires mental elaboration that is not feasible in a limited response window.
Finkel and Campbell (2001) took another approach, reasoning that transformational activity
is more cognitively demanding than self-focused reactions. They demonstrated that
participants who were depleted of cognitive resources were less likely to consider other-
oriented responses.
These studies show that interaction is not directly caused by the given situation, nor is
it invariant across situations, guided solely by person factors; rather, when people are able
and motivated to consider their interaction goals, behavior strays from the given situation to
incorporate social or interpersonal factors. Transformational activity is particularly likely to
tax cognitive resources when a task is novel, as it was in these studies. Many social
interactions are not novel, of course. They occur in ongoing relationships or in situations that
are comparable to past experiences, so that certain responses are likely to be well-learned and
perhaps even habitual. In such situations, responses can become automated, presenting little
or no cognitive demand, and yet they still reflect the transformational processes that occurred
when the responses were originally formed (Arriaga, 2013; cf. Fazio, 1990). As Rusbult and
Van Lange (1996) and Murray and Holmes (2011) theorize, with repeated, ongoing
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interaction, transformations, once deliberate, can become habitual and automatic (see also
Deutsch and Strack, this volume).
The opening paragraph of this chapter described several situations that appear to
involve deliberate transformations. But the same examples could easily provoke automatic
responses that reflect past transformational activity. When Shannon and Pat consider whether
to deepen their commitment, each may respond automatically, in ways that reflect past
experiences in situations of vulnerability; Pat, an anxiously attached person, may be eager to
deepen their commitment whereas Shannon, an avoidantly attached person, may reflexively
withdraw. The new parents, Eamon and Kyoko, may have automated responses to middle-of-
the-night feedings that are based on their prior experiences negotiating other conflicts of
interest. And the physician and patient may be reminded of interactions with other patients
and other providers, respectively, during which they formed attitudes that are activated
automatically and that direct their response in the current interaction.
Other Structural Considerations in Interdependence Theory
Assessments that conceptually differentiate the given situation from transformational
activity often combine varied levels of analysis. The given situation defines an immediate
pattern of interdependence shaped by physical characteristics (e.g., an individual’s physical
capabilities or disabilities, spatial arrangements), universal person characteristics (i.e.,
meeting basic needs and avoiding aversive experiences, such as getting food or sleep,
satiating the need for connection with others, avoiding pain), or the nature of the task (e.g., a
task can only be accomplished successfully if people coordinate their movements). The
transformational activity that mediates between a given situation and behavior is similarly
shaped by factors that reside at different levels of analysis, such as physical (e.g., biological
temperament, limitations in self-regulatory strength, excessive stress), psychological (e.g.,
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past experiences, individual cognitive and affective tendencies), and socio/cultural
characteristics (e.g., socially or culturally-specific norms, influence of network members or
peers, religious mores). As such, Interdependence Theory provides breadth by integrating
factors residing at different levels of analysis that are often kept separate in social-
psychological theories (De Houwer & Moors, this volume).
Another key structural feature of Interdependence Theory is the clear distinction it
makes between satisfaction and dependence. Satisfaction reflects comparison of current
outcomes with expectations based on prior experiences (known as the comparison level, or
CL). Dependence, or the willingness to remain in a relationship or group, reveals comparison
of current outcomes with the least satisfying alternative perceived to be available (known as
the CL-alt). This important distinction led Rusbult to propose the Investment Model of
Commitment (see Rusbult et al., 2012, for a review). Lay persons and clinicians alike had
commonly assumed that relationship stability depended on satisfaction, despite the fact that
many unhappy relationships persist, and many happy relationships end. As a direct legacy of
her training in Interdependence Theory, Rusbult recognized that dependence (needing a
particular relationship to attain desired outcomes) is distinct from whether or not one is
satisfied with a relationship. Thus, she theorized that people may stay in unhappy
relationships for structural reasons, in particular a lack of alternatives (e.g., having no way of
earning a living except relying on a partner) and high investments (e.g., having put too much
into a relationship that would be lost if the relationship ended). This proposition that has
provided valuable insights into many practical problems, such as why women stay in abusive
relationships (Rusbult & Martz, 1995), why businesses often exploit workers who have few
options (Rusbult, Insko, Lin, & Smith, 1990), and why individuals persist in costly business
relationships (the sunken cost effect; Rusbult & Farrell, 1983).
20
A further structural consideration is that because, as described above, situations vary
in the specific responses that they afford, situations also vary in their degree of
informativeness about persons. Thus, certain situations are considered diagnostic about other
persons, because they are particularly likely to reveal their personal valuation rules (Holmes
& Rempel, 1989). For example, Rusbult’s analysis of accommodative dilemmas (Rusbult,
Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991) highlights responses to conflict-of-interest
situations, as do Murray and Holmes’s (2009) analysis of trust and commitment and
Simpson’s (2007) description of relationship strain tests. Conflicts of interest are diagnostic
of relational valuation rules because they reveal whether partners are inclined to prioritize the
other person (or the relationship). The same may be said of groups. For example, as their
outcomes become increasingly noncorrespondent, interacting groups become more
competitive than interacting individuals, presumably because group members anticipate more
self-interest in the other group than shared interest; Schopler et al., 2001).
Yet another structural consideration underlying the predictions of Interdependence
Theory is that many relevant processes unfold over time and involve different levels of
awareness. Suppose one hypothesized that perceiving (and reporting on) a partner’s selfish
behavior is negatively correlated with relationship satisfaction. This rather obvious claim,
which might be substantiated straightforwardly in a one-time survey, may mask a more
nuanced process that unfolds over time. Murray and colleagues (Murray, Holmes, & Pinkus,
2010) found that when newlyweds were exposed to more high-risk situations (e.g., conflicts
of interest involving high unilateral dependence), four years later they exhibited more
negative implicit attitudes but not more negative explicit reports of satisfaction or love. These
results suggest that the impact of situations may not be immediately apparent, may take time
to develop, and may operate, at least initially, beyond one’s awareness.
21
Temporal considerations may also be evident in partners’ adaptations to their
interaction experiences. Consider the temporal impact of interaction processes on personality
change (Kelley, 1983). For example, individuals who must interact repeatedly in inherently
competitive situations, facing only competitive response options over time, may develop
automatic tendencies in similar future situations. In Interdependence Theory terms, it is not
repeated experiences with a particular situation per se that influences individual differences,
but rather repeated experiences with a specific configuration of abstract features of situations.
A final example of an adaptation process that unfolds over time occurs when the
affect generated by specific interactions directs situation selection in future interactions
(Kelley et al., 2003). Interactions that cause strong affect do not go unnoticed. They are
encoded adaptively, so that similar situations can be elicited or avoided in the future. For
example, individuals whose interaction history has led them to develop an avoidant
attachment style steer clear of interactions that suggest intimacy, whereas individuals who
have developed an anxious attachment style shun potentially threatening interactions.
In sum, Interdependence Theory encapsulates processes that occur at levels of
analysis that vary in specificity and that link together over time. Indeed, Interdependence
Theory provides impressive explanatory breadth precisely because it accounts for many
important phenomena over extended time.
Explanatory and Predictive Value of Interdependence Theory
Epistemologists sometimes describe a trade-off between explanatory breadth and
predictive power, such that some theories explain much yet offer little in the way of specific
predictions, while other theories offer the opposite. Interdependence Theory is clearly and
intentionally a theory that emphasizes explanatory breadth; after all, its concepts and analytic
framework are well suited to explaining most any phenomenon that depends on social
22
interaction and interpersonal influence. To our knowledge, no “critical tests” of
Interdependence Theory have been conducted or published, and it is difficult to imagine an
empirical study that would disconfirm the theory. Such a study would have to show that
people do not repeat rewarding interactions, that they do not attend to the influence of others
on their outcomes nor their impact on others, or that the objective properties of social
situations have no impact on behavior. These are, of course, unlikely.
Nevertheless, Interdependence Theory suggests that the above-mentioned trade-off
between explanatory breadth and predictive power is a misleading dichotomy. In addition to
its explanatory breadth, Interdependence Theory has clear predictive power in at least two
important senses. First, in using the language of payoff matrices and transformations of
motivation, it offers predictions about the behaviors people will choose. In particular
instances these values may be difficult to ascertain, but this is a measurement problem, not an
absence of predictive power. Second, and more generatively, by virtue of its comprehensive,
multi-level conceptualization, Interdependence Theory points to constructs and principles
that would not have been imagined from narrower theoretical approaches, opening the door
to novel theoretical insights.
Nowhere is this influence more evident than in the impact of Interdependence Theory
on the study of interpersonal processes. In the close relationships literature, analyses of
dyadic data have become synonymous with adopting an Interdependence Theory framework
(Wickham & Knee, 2012)2. But the claim that people influence each other – although
profound and not always adopted in study designs – alone does not yield specific insights
about the causes and consequences of interaction. Interdependence Theory’s application to
dyadic relationships highlights more specific, testable propositions, including (but not limited
to) the manner in which people: solve interpersonal problems concerning their relative
23
influence across diverse types of interactions (e.g., in professional or romantic couples, or
among peers); infer traits and motives about others who can affect a person’s outcomes;
establish habitual or automated patterns of interaction in couples over time; develop
relationship-specific attitudes that may operate beyond awareness; form stable expectations
about relationships (i.e., the CL) and the next-best alternative relationship (i.e., CL-alt), and
compare these comparison standards to current outcomes; and clarify the relational
grounding of personality. (Arriaga, 2013, explains how these topics fit into an integrated
model of couple interaction.) Research on each of these topics utilizes constructs not
currently available in other theoretical approaches.
Research on group processes also has been influenced by Interdependence Theory.
For example, as mentioned above, the discontinuity effect indicates that two interacting
groups are more likely to compete in a mixed-motive situation than are two interacting
individuals confronting an identical situation (Schopler et al., 2001). Interdependence Theory
describes specific situational features that intensify or dampen the competitive orientation
that groups adopt – that is, their tendency to transform a given situation from one that allows
for cooperation into one that seems to necessitate competition. In this way, many of the
processes that characterize dyads also characterize groups3. For example, just as dyads may
increase their closeness by becoming more interdependent, so too do highly interdependent
groups have a stronger group identity (i.e., greater entitativity) than groups in which
members are relatively more independent (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 2006).
By identifying necessary constructs, an explanatory theory like Interdependence
Theory gains predictive power. To illustrate this principle, we discuss the example of how
individuals draw meaning from interpersonal interactions. Reinforcement theories suggest
that if an interaction is rewarding, it will be repeated. But the evaluation process is not that
24
simple. Interactions are evaluated on (at least) two levels, namely in terms of their direct and
symbolic outcomes (Kelley, 1979). Whereas direct outcomes are exactly what they suggest –
how something feels in the moment without being modified by higher-order inferential
processes – symbolic outcomes rely on attributional activity to detect broader implications of
a partner’s actions. An act of kindness may yield an immediate positive outcome, but it
becomes an even more positive experience when it comes from a person who typically is
rude to others; knowing that one is the unique recipient of the other’s kind behavior suggests
that he or she has invoked a relationship-enhancing transformation specific to oneself, which
in turn increases the symbolic value dervied from the interaction. Actions that convey
personalized meaning are evaluated differently than actions that are generalized to others
(e.g., speed-daters appreciate being liked uniquely more than being liked by others who like
everyone; Eastwick, Finkel, Mochon, & Ariely, 2007). It is in this sense that person factors
become socially situated, as mentioned above (Semin, this volume). Similarly, small acts of
compassion, like making a partner’s favorite meal when he/she is having a bad day, not only
provide immediate positive outcomes for the partner (i.e., eating a favorite meal) but also
have symbolic value in conveying the underlying sense of caring that led to extra effort on
behalf of the partner.
This analysis of symbolic meaning suggests a prediction that is unique to
Interdependence Theory: Varying the situation (strong vs. weak, as described above, or in
terms of specific features, such as making it personally costly to benefit a partner) will vary
how much diagnostic information the situation conveys about another person’s motives and,
thus, how much symbolic value might to be gained from an interaction. Programs of research
on trust and perceived partner responsiveness – constructs that have been enormously
25
influential in the literature on interpersonal relations (e.g., Holmes & Rempel, 1989; see Reis
& Clark, 2013; Simpson, 2007, for reviews) – have been profoundly influenced by this idea.
This chapter has described several phenomena that in all likelihood would not have
been examined, and various specific predictions that would not have been offered, without
the general theoretical framework provided by Interdependence Theory. They illustrate ideas
that have been enormously generative. Rusbult and Van Lange (2008) discuss additional
predictions that are uniquely derived from Interdependence Theory, such as predictions about
the interpersonal nature of goal pursuits and regulatory fit (Righetti, Finkenauer, & Rusbult,
2011), and the importance of maintaining error-free channels of communication in mixed-
motive situations, as commonly occur in negotiations between parties whose interests are not
aligned (Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerker, 2004).
Advantages and Disadvantages of Interdependence Theory
In our account of Interdependence Theory, we have already noted several compelling
advantages. In this section, we review these advantages in a more integrated fashion, fittingly
enough, because we see Interdependence Theory as a remarkably integrative theory. This
quality is evident both as meta-theory and in the theory’s particulars. Meta-theoretically,
Interdependence Theory and its off-shoots adopt elements from several theoretical traditions
that seemingly involve inconsistent or contradictory philosophical assumptions. One is
structuralism: Interaction processes can be understood in terms of specific structural
components. A second is functionalism: Interactions reflect responses that “make sense” or
provide what is perceived to be the most beneficial (or least aversive) experience (see also
Tetlock, this volume). A third is behaviorism: Interaction involves observable behavior, and
much of what creates a rewarding or aversive experience follows from what can be observed.
A fourth is the social-cognitive tradition: The mental states of each interaction partner –
26
mental states with developmental and experiential origins – figure prominently in
interpreting interpersonal situations and responding to them. A fifth is the Gestalt tradition:
The influence of situations is best understood in terms of “what the person makes of the
situation,” rather than as objective attributes that operate uniformly across persons.
At the level of particulars, most interdependence theorists would probably agree that
the focus on interaction best differentiates Interdependence Theory from other social-
psychological theories. To be sure, social interaction is prominent in many existing theories.
Most of them, however, tend to focus either on the contributions of individuals to interaction
or on interaction processes per se. Interdependence theory, in contrast, forces theorists to
fully integrate these levels of analysis: It is at once a theory of how human needs and goals
create the situations in which people interact, of how situations facilitate certain patterns of
interaction while discouraging others, and of how individual differences are shaped by the
interactional possibilities that situations afford. Interdependence theory is furthermore a
deeply social theory: The situations it studies concern the manner in which people coordinate
their actions with the actions of others. By representing these situations in abstract terms, the
theory allows an analysis of social interaction with considerable generalizability.
Another advantage of Interdependence Theory is the clear distinction it makes
between the objective environment and the person’s construal of that environment (see also
Kashima, this volume). Many theories conflate these two, or at least fail to specify how one
relates to the other. In contrast, Interdependence Theory is explicit about the process of
transforming situational contingencies into goal-directed action. This is another point in
which the theory’s deeply social nature can be seen: Goals are defined broadly rather than
individualistically, encompassing, when it is suitable to do so, actions that take into account
the likely responses of others. For example, Rusbult’s model of behavioral affirmation
27
(sometimes called the “Michelangelo Phenomenon;” Rusbult, Finkel, & Kumashiro, 2009)
describes how partner support contributes to, and non-support hinders, people’s progress in
attaining personal goals. By incorporating thinking about the actual or anticipated response
of others, Interdependence Theory is one of the few social-psychological theories to
explicitly incorporate metacognition (Epley, 2008).
A somewhat more general advantage is the role that Interdependence Theory may
play in social psychology’s elusive quest for a taxonomy of situations, akin to the periodic
table in chemistry or the Big 5 in personality theory. Much has been written about the field’s
lack of a taxonomy of situations, despite numerous efforts to provide one (see Reis &
Holmes, 2012, for a review). Most such endeavors have proceeded bottom-up, from lay
accounts of social activity. Interdependence Theory in contrast takes a top-down approach,
beginning with an abstract analysis of properties likely to influence patterns of
interdependence and then generating the most plausible prototypes (Kelley et al., 2003). If
these efforts bear fruit, it will be possible to theorize more systematically about the varieties
of human social interaction.
Like any theory, Interdependence Theory has shortcomings. Prominent among them
is the inherent ambiguity of specifying in any given case the values of relevant variables. For
example, although the theory requires analysts to determine the objective properties of the
given situation, the fact that observers will have experience with such situations may
ambiguate distinctions between its objective properties and common construals (which
reflect person-factors, not situational features).
Similarly, because many different transformation rules can produce the same
outcome, it may prove difficult to identify the particular transformation that a person is using,
as well as the underlying motive (i.e., person-factor or social norm) for that transformation.
28
Such ambiguity suggests an emphasis on explanatory breadth rather than predictive power,
but in our view that conclusion should not be taken too far. Real life interactions are messy,
often simultaneously involving multiple motives and circumstances that can be deductively
ambiguous. In a highly structured lab study, it may be feasible to identify behavioral options
that are not mediated through the transformation process. In fact, stranger interactions in
novel settings are often guided more by situational factors than by broader considerations;
the absence of a history together and an expectation of future interaction typically renders
specific person factors relatively immaterial. In contrast, interaction with relationship
partners reflects current, past, or anticipated social considerations, making the given situation
less prominent and current person factors more prominent (Arriaga, 2013). Different dyads
may react to the same situation in different ways because of their own unique history and
their habitual interactions. Moreover, the same person may react differently to the same
situation with a different partner. The given situation thus becomes more difficult to identify.
Another limitation is that Interdependence Theory has little to say a priori about
which of the person factors afforded in a particular situation are most likely to be influential
in transforming interpersonal situations. Most anything that can affect an individual’s
interpretation of and response to an interdependent situation in pursuit of outcomes can serve
as a person factor: traits, attitudes, values, habits, preferences, feelings, defenses, roles, even
momentary goals. Although this degree of inclusiveness follows from the theory’s
explanatory aims, it highlights a weakness insofar as Interdependence Theory might serve as
a model of individual differences or of their origins or functional significance.
A final shortcoming is that, despite this theory being highly generative of research,
few studies directly test propositions of Interdependence Theory. Indeed, evidence for the
theory’s propositions often draws on existing research conducted for other purposes (see, for
29
example, the analysis of prototypical situations in Kelley et al., 2003). To some, this may
suggest that Interdependence Theory is more of a general framework and descriptive
language than a specific theory, a conclusion with which we do not concur, as discussed
earlier. A rather different explanation is that newcomers may be daunted by the complexity
of the theory, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. We find this circumstance
somewhat ironic, given people’s “intuitive ability to recognize situations in their own lives
without any formal training in interdependence analysis and moreover, usually without the
ability to articulate the abstract properties that underlie such recognition” (Kelley et al., 2003,
p. 7). It is to be hoped that this shortcoming will soon become irrelevant.
Conclusion
Since its first appearance in 1959, Interdependence Theory has had a somewhat
mixed experience in the history of social psychological theories. Never one of the field’s
most popular theories, over time it has not only endured but grown in scope and influence.
This influence can be seen in research and theory, particularly in the related theoretical
models, mentioned throughout this chapter, born from Thibaut and Kelley’s formulations.
This growth and influence likely reflects the theory’s quintessentially social nature, as we
have elaborated above. Many important psychological phenomena occur in a social context
that directs, moderates, and frames important processes. To scholars looking for social
explanations of these behavior, we encourage them, rather than searching for new theories or
explanatory concepts, to capitalize on the breadth and depth that an interdependence analysis
already offers. Its roots in past theoretical traditions, utility for understanding crucially
important interpersonal processes, and promise for framing novel research questions make
Interdependence Theory an exceptional and satisfying theory.
30
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Footnotes
1 Readers may be interested to learn that this sort of analysis led Kelley to propose his
ANOVA model of attribution theory as a sidelight to his work on Interdependence Theory.
That is, observers infer causality by considering which of the plausible causes of a behavior
covary with its occurrence.
2 In fact, Ellen Berscheid once pointed out to one of us that although Thibaut and Kelley’s
initial work (1959) was entitled The Social Psychology of Groups, most of the examples in
that marvelously generative book concerned close dyadic relationships.
3 This may follow from Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) thorough training in the Lewinian
tradition. Lewin wrote that "marriage is a group situation, and, as such, shows the general
characteristics of group life," explaining that marital interaction follows the general
properties of "the relation between an individual and his group" (1948, p. 84), but the group
in this instance is very small, is central to the person's values, desires, and goals, and is
characterized by "the least social distance" (1948, p. 88) between its members.
