1NC – Dark Night KThe 1AC is a façade – a pseudo-sign image of sociopolitical changeWilliams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has recklessly spawned an aporetic1 existence for minorities. The entrenched ideological complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political, legal, cultural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform : Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality ; a silent conviction that the majority still retains power. The “gift” of equality , procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that remains nervously secure in the hands of the majority. The ostensible empowerment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo- sign image (a hypertext or simulation) of real sociopolitical progress.

This creates a hegemonical, narcissistic reinforcement of power which turns the caseWilliams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343) Reciprocation on your part is impossible. Even if one day you are able to return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your time of need. As the initiators of such a charity, we are always in a position of power, and you are always indebted to us . This is where the notion of egoism or conceit assumes a hegemonic role. By giving to you, a supposed act of generosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you. Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtlely let you know that we have more than you. We have so much more, in fact, that we can afford to give you some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony ! Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the process takes on exactly the form of Derrida’s gift. The majority controls the political, economic, legal, and social arenas ; that is, it is (and always has been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the educational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and, thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minority populations feel better. There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic justice, albeit falsely manufactured. 18 In return for this effort, the majority shows off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a community), forever indebts under- and nonrepresented classes to the generosity of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real chance to attain happiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers

the narcissism of the majority (its representatives have displayed power and have been generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the hegemonical effect of empowering the empowered, relegitimating the privileged , and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged.

Their demand for the ballot is trapped in a web of scheming – the ethic of calculation turns the caseMcGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)

According to Kant, when we emerge as subjects, we do so as beings of radical evil, that is, beings who do good for evil reasons . We help our neighbor for the recognition we gain; we volunteer to help with the school dance in order to spend time with a potential romantic interest; we give money for disaster relief in order to feel comfortable about our level of material comfort; and so on. For Kant, this is the fundamental problem that morality confronts and the most difficult type of evil to extirpate . He explains, “The human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims . He indeed incorporates the moral law into those maxims, together with the law of self-love; since, however, he realizes that the two cannot stand on an equal footing, but one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition , he makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law — whereas it is this latter that, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole incentive.”[12] Though Kant believes that we have the capacity to turn from beings of radical evil to moral beings, we cannot escape a certain originary radical evil that leads us to place our incentives of self-love above the law and that prevents us from adhering to the law for its own sake.[13] Our first inclination always involves the thought of what we will gain from not lying rather than the importance of telling the truth. Even when we do tell the truth, we do so out of prudence or convenience rather than out of duty . This is why Kant contends that most obedience to the moral law is in fact radical evil — obedience for the wrong reasons . The presence of radical evil at the heart of obedience to the law taints this obedience and gives criminality the upper hand over the law. There is always a fundamental imbalance between law and criminality. Criminality is inscribed into the law itself in the form of misdirected obedience, and no law can free itself from its reliance on the evil of such obedience. A consequentialist ethics develops as a compromise with this radical evil at the heart of the law. Consequentialism is an ethics that sees value only in the end — obedience — and it disregards whatever evil means that the subject uses to arrive at that obedience . If people obey the law, the consequentialist thinks, it doesn’t matter why they do so. Those who take up this or some other compromise with radical evil predominate within society, and they constitute the behavioral norm. They obey the law when necessary, but they do so in order to satisfy some incentive of self-love. Theirs is a morality of calculation in which acts have value in terms of the ultimate good that they produce or the interest that they serve. Anyone who obeys the law for its own sake becomes exceptional. Both Batman and the Joker exist outside the calculating morality that predominates among the police, the law-abiding citizens, and the criminal underworld in Gotham. Both have the status of an exception because they adhere to a code that cuts against their incentives for self-love and violates any consequentialist morality or morality concerned solely with results. Though Batman tries to save Gotham and the Joker tries to destroy it, though Batman commits himself to justice and the Joker commits himself to injustice, they share a position that transcends the inadequate and calculated ethics authorized by the law itself. Their differences mask a similar relationship to Kantian morality. Through the parallel between them, Christopher Nolan makes clear the role that evil must play in authentic heroism. It is the Joker, not Batman, who gives the most eloquent account of the ethical position that they occupy together. He sets himself up against the consequentialist and utilitarian ethic that rules Gotham, and he tries to analyze this ethic in order to understand what motivates it. As the Joker sees it, despite their apparent differences, all of the different groups in Gotham indulge in an ethics of what

he calls scheming . That is to say, they act not on the basis of the rightness or wrongness of the act itself but in order to achieve some ultimate object. In doing so, they inherently degrade their acts and deprive them of their basis in freedom. Scheming enslaves one to the object of one’s scheme.

The alternative is to vote negative because the 1AC’s ethics are right - to be the Dark Knight is the only way to create true heroism and substantive change. McGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)

Just as The Dark Knight illustrates the inextricable relation between heroism and evil , it also undermines the idea of the hero who can appear as heroic. From early in the film, Batman proclaims his desire to step aside in order to cede his position to someone who can be heroic without wearing a mask. He sees this possibility in the figure of Harvey Dent. But the film shows that there is no hero without a mask — and, more specifically, without a mask of evil. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “The properly human good, the good elevated above the natural good, the infinite spiritual good, is ultimately the mask of evil.”[20] nWithout the mask of evil, good cannot emerge and remains stuck the calculation of interest; without the mask of evil, good remains scheming. This is precisely what Harvey Dent evinces, despite the promise that Batman sees in him for the perfect form of heroism. Throughout the beginning part of the film, Harvey Dent seems like a figure of pure good. The purity of his goodness allows him to never be nonplused. Even when a mobster tries to shoot him in open court, he calmly grabs the gun from the mobster’s hand and punches the mobster in the face. After the punch, we see Dent’s expression of total equanimity, even in the midst of an attempted assassination. This coolness stems from his absolute certainty that events will ultimately follow according to his plans. The rapidity with which Nolan edits together the threat from the mobster and Dent’s response minimizes the spectator’s sense of danger. The threat against Dent’s life disappears almost before we can experience it as such, which suggests that it lacks a quality of realness, both for Dent and for the spectator. The court scene establishes him as a hero whom one cannot harm. Ironically, the superhero in the film, Batman, shows himself to be vulnerable when he first appears in the film, as dogs bite him through his protective armor. This distinction between Dent and Batman’s

vulnerability explains why the former cannot be an authentic hero. In contrast to Batman, Dent’s heroism does not involve the experience of loss and is based on a repudiation of the very possibility of losing. Bruce Wayne adopted the identity of Batman after the trauma of being dropped in a cave full of bats and the loss of his parents, but no such tra umatic loss animates the heroism of Dent. He is heroic through an immediate identification with the good, which enables him to have a purity that Batman doesn’t have. No rupture and subsequent return animates his commitment to justice. He can publicly avow his heroic actions because he performs them in a pure way, without resorting to the guise of evil. But the falsity of this immediate identification with the good becomes apparent in Dent’s disavowal of loss, which Nolan locates in the tic that marks Dent’s character — his proclivity for flipping a coin to resolve dilemmas. On several occasions, he flips the coin that his father had given him in order to introduce the possibility of loss into his activities. By flipping a coin, one admits that events might not go according to plan, that the other might win, and that loss is an ever-present possibility. Though the coin flip represents an attempt to master loss by rendering it random rather than necessary or constitutive, it nonetheless ipso facto accedes to the fact that one might lose. Dent first flips the coin when he is late to examine a key witness in court, and the coin flip will determine whether he or his assistant Rachel will do the questioning. When Rachel wonders how he could leave something so important to chance, Dent replies, “I make my own luck.” It is just after this that the mobster tries and fails to shoot Dent, further suggesting his invulnerability. Dent wins this and subsequent coin flips in the first part of the film because he uses a loaded coin, a coin with two heads. When it comes to the coin flip, Dent does make his own luck by eliminating the element of chance. The coin that he uses ensures that he will avoid the

possibility of losing. The coin with two heads is certainly a clever device, but it also stands as the objective correlative for Dent’s lack of authentic heroism. The immediacy of his heroism cannot survive any mediation. Once loss is introduced into Dent’s world, his heroism disappears, and he becomes a figure of criminality. The transformation of Harvey Dent after his disfigurement is so precipitous that it strains credulity. One day he is the pure defender of absolute justice, and the next he is on a homicidal warpath willing to shoot innocent children. One could chalk up this rapid change to sloppy filmmaking on Christopher Nolan’s part, to an eagerness to move too quickly to the film’s concluding moments of tension. But the rapidity of the transformation signifies all the more because it seems so forced and jarring. It allows us to retroactively examine Harvey Dent’s relationship to the law earlier in the film. Dent becomes Two-Face after his injury, but in doing so he merely takes up the identity that police department had adopted for him when he was working for the Internal Affairs division. As an investigator of other officers, Dent earned this nickname by insisting on absolute purity and by targeting any sign of police corruption. Even Gordon, an officer who is not corrupt, complains to Dent of the paralyzing effects on the department of these tactics. On the one hand, an insistence on purity seems to be a

consistently noncalculating ethical position. One can imagine this insistence obstructing the longterm goal of better law enforcement (which is why Gordon objects to it). On the other hand, however, the demand for purity always anticipates its own failure. The pure hero quickly becomes the criminal when an experience of loss disrupts this purity. This first occurs when Gordon is apparently killed at the police commissioner’s funeral. In response to this blatant display of public criminality, Dent abuses a suspect from the shooting and even threatens to kill him, using his trick coin as a device for mental torture. Even though Dent has no intention of actually shooting the

suspect, Batman nonetheless scolds Dent for his methods when he interrupts the private interrogation. This scene offers the first insight into what Dent will become later in the film, but it also shows the implications of his form of heroism. Dent resorts to torture because his form of heroism has no ontological space for loss . When it occurs, his heroism becomes completely derailed. Rachel's death and his own disfigurement introduce traumatic loss into Dent’s existence. Nolan shows the ramifications of this change through the transformation that his coin undergoes during the explosion that kills Rachel. The explosion chars one side of Dent’s two-headed coin (which he had earlier flipped to Rachel as he was taken away to jail), so that it becomes, through being submitted to a traumatic force, a coin with two different sides. The film indicates here how trauma introduces loss into the world and how this introduction of loss removes all subjective certainty. When Dent as Two-Face flips the newly marked coin, the act takes on an entirely new significance. Unlike earlier, he is no longer certain about the result of the flip. He flips to decide whether he will kill the Joker in the hospital room, whether he will kill Detective Wuertz (Ron Dean) in a bar, or whether he will kill Detective Ramirez (Monique Curnen) in an alley. Of the three, only Wuertz ends up dead, but Dent also kills another officer and the criminal boss Maroni, along with some of his men. This rampage ends with Dent holding Gordon’s family hostage and threatening to kill the one whom Gordon holds most dear. Dent becomes a killer in order to inflict his own experience of loss on others: he tells Gordon that he wants to kill what is most precious to him so that Gordon will feel what he felt. Dent can so quickly take up this attitude because his heroism has no place for loss. When it occurs, the heroism becomes completely undone. After Dent’s death, the film ends with Batman accepting responsibility for the killings performed by Dent in order to salvage Dent’s public reputation and thereby sustain the image of the public hero. Gordon and Batman believe that this gesture is necessary for saving the city and keeping its hope for justice alive. When Gordon says, “Gotham needs its true hero,” we see a shot of him turning Dent’s face over, obscuring the burned side and exposing the human side. In death, Dent will begin to wear the mask that he would never wear in life. A mask of heroism will cover his criminality. As the film conceives it, this lie — that purity is possible — represents the sine qua non of social being. Without it, without the idea that one can sustain an ethical position, calculation of interest would have nothing to offset it, and the city would become identified with

criminality. But the real interest of the film’s conclusion lies with Batman and the form of appearance that his heroism takes. It is as if Batman takes responsibility for Dent’s act not to save Dent’s face but to stain his own image irrevocably with evil. He remains the heroic exception, but his status changes radically . In order to guarantee that Dent dies as a hero, Batman must take responsibility for the murders that Dent committed. With this gesture, he truly adopts the mask of evil . In the closing montage sequence, we see the police hunting him down, Gordon smashing the Bat Signal, and finally Batman

driving away into the night on his motorcycle. As this sequence concludes, we hear Gordon’s voiceover say, “He’s the hero Gotham deserves , but not the one it needs right now. And so we’ll hunt him, because he can take it. Because he’s not a hero. He’s a silent guardian, a watchful protector ... a dark knight.” As Gordon pronounces the final word, the film cuts to black from the image of Batman on his motorcycle. The melodrama of this voiceover elevates Batman's heroism, but it does so precisely because he agrees to appear as evil.

This gesture, even more than any of his physical acts of courage, is the gesture of the true hero because it leaves him without any recognition for his heroism. For the hero who appears in the form of evil, heroic exceptionality must be an end in itself without any hope for a greater reward . When the exception takes this form, it loses the danger that adheres to the typical hero. The mask of evil allows the exception to persist without multiplying itself. By adopting this position at the end of the film, Batman reveals that he has taken up the lesson of the Joker and grasped the importance of the break from calculation. Dent, the hero who wants to appear heroic, descends into murderous evil. But Batman, the hero who accepts evil as his form of appearance, sustains the only possible path for heroic exceptionality . In an epoch when the law's inadequacy is evident, the need for the heroic exception becomes ever more pronounced, but the danger of the exception has also never been more apparent. Declarations of exceptionality abound in the contemporary world, and they allow us to see the negative ramifications that follow from the exception, no matter how heroic its intent. Audiences flock to superhero movies in search of a heroic exception that they can embrace, an exception that would work toward justice without simultaneously adding to

injustice in the manner of today’s real world exceptions. In The Dark Knight, Christopher Nolan offers a viable image of heroic exceptionality. As he sees, its form of appearance must be its opposite if it to avoid implicating itself in the injustice that it fights . The lesson for our real world exceptions is thus a difficult one. Rather than being celebrated as the liberator of Iraq and the savoir of U.S. freedom, George W. Bush would have to act behind the scenes to encourage charges being brought against him as a war criminal at the World Court, and then he would have to flee to the streets of The Hague as the authorities pursue him there. In the eyes of the public, true heroes must identify themselves with the evil that we fight.

2NC – Overview

OVMuch like the Batman, the affirmative presents us with a choice --- the choice to succumb to their mandate of the ballot --- to reward them with a “win” for presenting an ethical advocacy --- but does this create space for true change? Is this true heroism?

Does voting affirmative change anything? Or will they simply be negative next round and potentially debate this very same affirmative and go for the Politics DA and a couple of util cards as they’ve done in the past

Does stepping into a debate room in the middle of _____ help these people’s lives?

Does handing people some money from the federal government for a few more buses and trains actually break down the system? Does it stop ____ or ____ from causing their oppression or does it stop ____? Yet the 1AC says they stop it all and voting affirmative ends it --- making that decision is not only a flawed way at producing change but is also dangerous

Yet through all of this, it’s not even enough for the affirmative to simply present an ethical advocacy --- rather, they demand the ballot which is a morality of calculation --- it uses ethical challenge they pretend to advocate as a means to win the ballot --- this reduces us to mere pawns on their chessboard and controls the root cause of the 1AC’s harms and destroys the value to lifeDillon 99 (Michael Dillon, University of Lancaster, “Another Justice,” Political Theory, 1999, http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/27/2/155)Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation.

Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation,

logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value— rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may

then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the humanway of being.

Only the alternative solves --- by taking the role of the Dark Knight, voting negative rejects the ethics that we all agree should come first --- but by not taking the credit, the alternative allow the objects of the 1AC to be helped without visibly handing them a gift and without scheming --- only that is truly ethical and means that the heroism of the alternative is a prior question

Power Distribution Extend that the 1AC is a political façade. They put on the mask of heroism, and constantly produce fraudulent reform, which is doomed by the ethic of caclulation. The inherent gift of the 1AC, the gift that they screeched 8 minutes about only seeks to give more power to the powerful elites – that was Williams 2k

And extend that the fact that we can give the gift of the 1AC, only serves to re-entrench the ideology that we have something to spare – so much that we can spare extras the the periphery, those marginalized. The link is the apparent, obvious gift of the 1AC. This only serves to perpetuate who is really in charge – the 1A and the 2A – that was the second piece of Williams 2k

This redistribution of power turns the case and leads to loss of value to life, dehumanization, and mass self-inflicted violenceKhan 94 (Ali Khan, Law Professor 3at Washburn University school of Law, “Lessons from Malcolm X: Freedom by Any Means Necessary,” 38, Howard Law Journal 81, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/howlj38&id=89&type=text&collection=journals)

The second aspect of oppression is a systematic assault on the inherent human dignity of the oppressed.46 Dehumanization of the oppressed and lack of control over basic decisions in life work in tandem and are inseverable attributes of oppression. The oppressors create, defend, and reinforce social assumptions which portray the oppressed as inferior human beings lacking intelligence, virtue, and social skills .47 This attack on the human dignity of the oppressed is made to defend an uneven and unfair distribution of social goods, economic benefits, political power , and constitutional values. ' By alleging the inherent inferiority of the oppressed,49 the oppressors can claim, without guilt, a superior position in the social hierarchy.50 Such an assault on human dignity has a devastating effect on the oppressed. According to Malcolm, the oppressors begin to control the minds of the oppressed ,5" and the oppressed begin to think about themselves just as the oppressors characterize them.52 Consequently, the oppressed internalize self-hatred manifested by hating their skin, hating their caste, hating their language, hating their religion, and indeed hating who they are and what they are.53 This hatred leads the oppressed to turn upon themselves blaming their own kind, and killing their own children, brothers, and sisters ,54 as if it is their own race, their own caste, their own religion, and their own community had trapped them and brought them down.55 Thus, deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation eliminate the dignity of the entire group . 56

And- A loss of value to life outweighs all other impacts – death is preferable to valueless existenceMitchell '05 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 171-217]

Devastation (Verwistung) is the process by which the world becomes a desert Wfiste), a sandy expanse that seemingly extends without end, without landmarks or direction, and is devoid of all life.20 If we follow the dialogue in thinking an ancient Greek notion of "life" as another name for "being," then the lifeless desert is the being-less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is consequently an un-world from which being has withdrawn . The older prisoner makes this connection explicit, "The being of an age of devastation would then consist in the abandonment of being" (GA 77: 213). As we have seen, this is a process that befalls the world, slowly dissolving it of worldliness and rendering it an "unworld" (cf. GA 7: 88, 92f./EP, 104, 107f., etc.). Yet this unworld is not simply the opposite of world; it remains a world, but a world made desert. The desert is not the complete absence of world. Such an absence would not be reached by devastation (Verwisiung), but rather by annihilation (Vernichtung); and for Heidegger, annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation : "Devastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [blofle Vernichtung]. Mere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrary orders and spreads everything that blocks and prevents" (WHD, 11/29-30; tin). Annihilation as a thought of total absence is a thought from metaphysics. It is one with a thinking of pure presence: pure presence, pure absence, and. purely no contact between them. During another lecture course on H6lderlin, this time in 1942 on the hymn "The Ister," Heidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda of America in regards to the "homeland," which is here equated with Europe: "We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate [zu vernichten] Europe, that is, the homeland, and that means: the inception of the Western world. The inceptual is indestructible [unzersto'rbar]" (GA 53: 68/54; tm). America is the agent of technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions of presence and absence that it itself is so expert at dissembling.

America resolves to annihilate and condemns itself to fdilure in so doing, for the origin is "indestructible." We could take this a step further and claim that only because the origin cannot be annihilated is it possible to destroy it. This possibility of destruction is its indestructible character. It can always be further destroyed, but you will never annihilate it. Americanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction of the world ever further into the unworld. America is the agent of a malevolent being. This same reasoning explains why the older man's original conception of evil had to be rethought. Evil is the "devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it" (GA 77: 207), he said, but this annihilation is simply too easy, too much of an "Americanism." The human essence is not annihilated in evil-who could care about that? Instead it is destroyed and devastated by evil. Devastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the un-world. Without limit, the desert of the un-world spreads, ever worsening and incessantly urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. Annihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There would be nothing left to protect and guard, nothing left to concern ourselves with-nothing left to terrorize. Devastation is also irreparable; no salvation can arrive for it. The younger man is able to voice the monstrous conclusion of this thinking of devastation: "Then malevolence, as which devastation occurs [sich ereignet], would indeed remain a -basic characteristic of being itself" (GA 77: 213, 215; em). The older man agrees, "being would be in the ground of its essence malevolent" (GA 77: 215). Being is not evil; it is something much worse; being is malevolent.

And- Dehumanization is the root cause of and outweighs all calculable impactsBerube 97 – [David M., Professor of Communication Studies at University of South Carolina., “NANOTECHNOLOGICAL PROLONGEVITY: The Down Side,” http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm]This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn[s]: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation . For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.

Ethic of Caculation And extend that when the ballot is on the line, people will always put their need for winning this round before this social movement. This is a disingenious engangement with the 1AC that fails to create real change. The moral calculation is always subordinated the supereme maxim of the ethic of calculation which fails to address the problems of the 1AC. This demand for personal benefits before what is morally right is the ethic of calculation, and that turns the case.

The ethic of calculation always outweighsFrazer 06 (Michael L. Frazer, PhD, “The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength,” http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/The%20Compassion%20of%20Zarathustra.pdf)

Perhaps we should turn our attention from the subject of compassion to its object. Nietzsche does ask whether such an emotion is good, not only for those who feel it, but also “for those who suffer [den Leidenen]” (FW IV:338, p. 269). His answer here, too, is that compassion is of no value ; “if one does good merely out of compassion [Mitleid ], it is oneself one really does good to, and not the other ” (WM 368, p. 199). To be sure, one’s painful sympathy may be soothed, but the object of this sympathy has been shamed by the condescension charity implies, and, even more importantly, been deprived of the opportunity to build real strength from his own efforts to overcome his suffering. Indeed, the potential value of suffering as a challenge to be met head-on, a spur to greatness, and a test of one’s mettle is a central theme in Nietzsche’s ethics. “It almost determines the order of rank,” he repeatedly insists, “how profoundly human beings can suffer” (JGB IX:270, p. 410). “ To those of my disciples who have any concern for me,” Nietzsche therefore reasons, “I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities . . . I have no compassion [Mitleid] for them , because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not” (WM 910, p. 481).

This ethic of calculation kills value to life, perpetuates dehumanization, and creates endless genocide – this turns the case – only the alternative can access the harms of the 1ACDillon 99 (Michael Dillon, University of Lancaster, “Another Justice,” Political Theory, 1999, http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/27/2/155)

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable , however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to evaluation but also , of course, to devaluation . Devaluation, logically , can extend to the point of counting as nothing . Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust . However liberating and emancipating systems of value— rights—may claim to be, for example , they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the humanway of being.

Cross apply Mitchell 7 and Berube 97. Dehumanization and value to life outweigh.

This mix of the competition for wins and losses via the ballot with emancipatory strategies destroys productive dialogue and risks breaking down coalitions necessary to create community-wide change. Also, the demand for the ballot always demands the ethic of calculation which destroys your movement Martin Osborn (Former Missouri Debater, NDT and CEDA top speaker and semifinalist, and darling of the debate community) August 2008 “towson” http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2008-August/075583.html

The idea that debate isn't at some point competitive is pretty strange to me. A large part of why debate rounds become intense, awkward, and loud is because nobody wants to lose. I have always taken solace in the competitive aspects of this activity and honestly find it intriguing that aside from a select few, I consider myself on good terms with almost everybody I ever debated. Greenstein and somebody else posted that they like the idea of having a throwdown and then drinking afterwards with their opponent. I like that idea, too, and I don't even drink. After round 7 at the NDT I was angrier than I had probably ever been about a debate round. I felt genuinely betrayed by Towson and seriously questioned my decision to apologize to them. I figured out

long before CEDA semis that debaters like to win and did things that helped them to win and suddenly my attempt to mend fences seemed almost inappropriate given the competitive environment (despite being advised to do so by the team's coach, some onlookers, and maybe a tiny bit by my conscience although I did feel that what I said at CEDA was 100% misinterpreted by anybody who I'd need to apologize to). A public statement would have been SO much better in preempting the "ozzy is racist" argument in the event we debated again but that wasn't even a part of my motivation (although it was my initial plan, Russell convinced me that the political appearance of such a post would probably overwhelm any meaningful content or goal). On the other hand, my private conversation was unverifiable and largely secret because I didn't care if other people knew about it. Did Towson read that extra part of the 1AC to preempt my deployment of "BTW judges I said I'm sorry so I'm not racist" or were they trying to convince the judges that what I had "said" at CEDA was so egregious I should lose this debate, too? Was it planned to include the person in the audience in cx or was he just watching his team? I can think of a lot of competitive reasons why Towson would have waited until we debated to reveal their opinion of my apology. The likelihood that this was just a public service announcement seemed and seems pretty low but I can't claim to know exactly why they'd choose to

start the debate there. For me, listening to a passionate diatribe about how much of a white supremacist I am would have been a lot different after the CEDA debate, after the CEDA tournament , before the NDT, or after my apology. I feel that I would have had more of an opportunity to have a true conversation unconstrained by time limits and my desire to not kiss my NDT and debate career goodbye so I could rectify a situation I consider incidental. Instead I found out during the 1AC when I was pre-flowing, and thinking about the 2NR, and wondering which aff I'd break if I lost, and whether Julian would vote for T, and … Above and beyond the commitment to their goals that I'm sure Towson always displays in round, there was something else at work during that debate round and to pretend there aren't strategic elements to Towson's decision to wait would require a level of naivety I am not comfortable granting to anybody whose intelligence I respect. The reason depersonalization was introduced in debate (as I understand) was so people would be forced to debate the merits of U.S. engagement with communist China back before even Ben Warner was born. I don't know if total depersonalization is the best model for debate but it certainly removes the option of turning your opponent into a true, real-life enemy based on something they said (including all those somethings you think they said). Discussing deeply personal beliefs and tendencies as a means to tackle difficult structural issues is one thing – legitimizing ad hominem attacks as a means of keeping hostility-based arguments afloat is quite another. While

there may be some shock value to forcing people into this conversation during a debate round , it certainly doesn't seem to generate much positive social change in the way of creating relationships between people who misunderstand each other . I can't speak for anybody else but my single attempt to make peace with one of the many debaters who looked at me like I sold out my ethnicity by going for topicality worked out about as poorly as I can reasonably envision (but maybe only because I have never seen my own ass). From this experience springs my conclusion that if somebody genuinely wants to address racism and other systemic problems within and with the debate community, a debate round might not be the best place . The conversation cannot and will not revolve solely around the non-competitive goal of one or both teams. Far more likely is that the team who loses feels like they have been swindled and an honest discussion never actually takes place . I've come pretty close to making this post a lot of times, although it almost never is written out with this amount of restraint. It angers me that Adam Jackson-5, Deven, and others behave as if Towson (and their supporters) have been "face to face" on the issue instead of relying on "rumors" regarding racism in debate when I feel like I attempted the former in response to the latter and basically got burned. If transparency is important to this conversation, it seemed pretty irresponsible of me to not make this post at some point..

Their plea for change through winning the ballot not only fails to inculcate communal response but also re-entrenches the very evil they criticize - rejecting the notion that one creates change through the ballot is our only hope Atchison and Panetta 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. I f each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem , because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem . There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community chang e, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate . When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best

environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

Alternative The Alternative is to vote negative to be the dark night – adopting the face of negation as a façade. This is the only way to create change and give Derrida’s gift – the gift of invisibility. At the end of the beautiful production of the dark night, Bruce Wayne adopts the façade of a villain in order to adopt the true rule of heroism. Zizek speaks, “The properly human good, the good elevated above the natural good, the infinite spiritual good, is ultimately the mask of evil.”[20] Without the mask of evil, good cannot emerge and remains stuck the calculation of interest; without the mask of evil, good remains scheming. This speaks to the ability of the mask of evil to be able to resist the calculation of calculation. In the film, Batman was looking for a new face for the hero of Gotham. His first pick was Harvey Dent. Harvey Dent adopted the methodology of pure heroism. Inevitably, when pure heroism experiences loss, they can’t cope, because the ideology of the pure hero leaves no ontological space for loss. This inevitably dooms their project. Vote negative to give the Affirmative the façade of evil, this is the only way they can cope with loss, give the gift of the 1AC while remaining incognito through the negative ballot, and be the dark night. This solves all our offense.

The alternative is invisible – the apparent lack of the appearance of the gift solves all our offenseWilliams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the

University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)Much of the distinction between law and justice has implications for the gift (of equality) and the (im)possibility of justice as equality: “T he gift is precisely, and this is what it has in common with justice, something which cannot be reappropriated” (Derrida, 1997, p. 18). 11 Once a gift is given, if any gratitude is extended in return, the gift becomes circumscribed in a “moment of reappropriation ” (Derrida, 1997, p. 18). Ultimately, as soon as the giver knows that he or she has given something, the gift is nullified. The giver congratulates him- or herself, and the economy of gratitude, of reappropriation, commences. Once the offering has been acknowledged as a gift by the giver or receiver it is destroyed. Thus, for a gift to truly be a gift, it must not even appear as such. Although it is inherently paradoxical, this is the only condition under which a gift can be given (Derrida, 1991).

To embrace the position of the dark night is a better methodology for generating community wide awareness and avoids the road to fascism turning their ethics. McGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)The film begins with Batman’s grasp of the problem, as it depicts his attempt to relinquish his exceptional status and to allow the legal order to operate on its own. In order to do this, a different form of heroism is required, and the quest that constitutes The Dark Knight is Batman’s attempt to find the proper public face for heroism . He is drawn to Harvey Dent (Aaron Eckhart) because Dent seems to embody the possibility of a heroism that would be consistent with public law and that could consequently function without the need for disguise. After the death of Rachel Dawes (Maggie Gyllenhaal) and Dent’s own serious facial burn transforms him from a defender of the law into the criminal figure Two-Face, Batman sees the impossibility of doing away with the hero’s mask. Dent, the would-be hero without a mask, quickly becomes a criminal himself when he experiences traumatic loss. This turn of events reveals that the hero must remain an exception, but it also shows that the heroism of the hero must pass itself off as its opposite . Just as the truth that Leonard (Guy Pearce) discovers at the end of Nolan’s Memento (2000) is a constitutive lie, the conclusion of The Dark Knight illustrates that the true form of appearance of heroism is evil . The film concludes with Batman

voluntarily taking responsibility for the murders that Dent/Two-Face committed. By doing so, Batman allows Dent to die as a hero in the public mind, but he also — and more importantly — changes the public perception of his own exceptional status. When he agrees to appear as a criminal at the end of the film, Batman avows simultaneously the need for the heroic exception and the need for this exception to appear as criminality. If the heroic exception is not to multiply itself in a way that threatens any possibility for justice, then its appearance must become indistinguishable from criminality. The heroic gesture, as The Dark Knight conceives it, does not consist in any of the particular crime-fighting or life-saving activities that Batman performs throughout the film. It lies rather in his embrace of the appearance of criminality that concludes the film. Gordon’s voiceover panegyric to Batman that punctuates the film affirms that this is the truly heroic act. This act privileges and necessitates its own misrecognition : it is only through misrecognition that one sees it correctly. If the people of Gotham were to see through Batman’s form of appearance and recognition his real heroism, the heroism would be instantly lost. As the film portrays it, the form of appearance of authentic heroism must be that of evil. Only in this way does the heroic exceptionality that the superhero embodies avoid placing us on the road to fascist rule.

2NC – Exceptionalism KThe mandate to vote affirmative as an endorsement of their call for change creates an exception in your decision, positioning an affirmative ballot as the epistomological heroic choice – this ideological “infinite obligation” to vote affirmative is limitless exceptionality that justifies mass genocide and endless warfare McGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009,

http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)

Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben sees the great danger inherent in the exception. It leads not just to abuses of civil rights but to large-scale horrors like the Holocaust , which functions as a major point of reference for Agamben’s thought. Exceptionality, for Agamben, launches a legal civil war and thereby plays the key role in the transition from democracy to fascist authoritarianism . The declaration of the state of exception attempts “to produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule , and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible .”[10] The problem is that the exceptional time never comes to an end, and the disappearance of the distinction between an emergency and everyday life pushes the society toward a state of civil war that the very exception itself was supposed to quell . Rather than acting as a temporary stopgap for a society on the brink of self-annihilation, the state of exception actually pushes the society further down the path to this annihilation by undermining the distinction between law and criminality and thereby helping to foster a Hobbesian war of all against all, in which every act of sovereign power becomes justified in the name of order. The Dark Knight begins with a focus on the problem engendered by the state of exception embodied by Batman. He is a figure outside the law on whom the law relies to respond to the most recalcitrant criminal elements in Gotham. But Batman’s very success at fighting crime outside the law has, when the film opens, spawned numerous imitators — vigilantes who dress like Batman and spend their nights fighting crime. The result is an increased degree of lawlessness and insecurity in the city. Through these copycat vigilantes, the film begins by making clear the danger of the sanctioned exception that exists outside the law. Once one embraces the exception, the need for exceptionality will constantly expand insofar as the exception augments the very problem that it is created to fight against. The fake Batmen question Batman directly on the monopoly he attempts to hold on exceptionality. After Batman rescues them from their botched effort to interrupt a drug deal, he warns them against this type of activity: One says, “What gives you the right? What’s the difference between you and me?” Batman responds, “I’m

not wearing hockey pads.” While amusing, this quip is actually wholly inadequate as an argument. Batman has no inherent right to guard exceptionality for himself, and as long as he occupies this position, others will be drawn to it. And a self-multiplying exceptionality portends the destruction of the social order. The state of exception justifies any type of action — any encroachment on civil liberties — in order to realize the justice that ordinary law is incapable of realizing. The Dark Knight explicitly links the heroic exception embodied by Batman with the violation of civil liberties associated with the official declaration of a state of emergency (in the current War on Terror, for instance). Batman acts exceptionally not just by wearing a mask and breaking a few traffic laws but by creating a system of surveillance that completely erases the idea of private space within Gotham. When Batman commissions his technical designer Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) to create a device that will allow him to map the location of everyone within the entire city of Gotham, Fox balks at the violation of civil liberties that this entails. He agrees to help to catch the Joker (Heath Ledger) but promises to resign immediately afterward. As Fox changes from fully supporting Batman and his exceptionality, his outrage signifies that Batman has crossed a line beyond heroic exceptionality where one can no longer differentiate the heroic masked man from the criminals that he pursues. But in order to apprehend the Joker and disrupt his criminal plans, the film makes clear that Batman must cross this line. It places him

fully on the terrain of contemporary politics and in the company of conservative political figures. The logic of the War on Terror waged by President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney derives entirely from the idea that they rule in a state of emergency where the normal rule of law will be insufficient for safeguarding the U.S. populace. One must thus carve out an exceptional position outside the law . One of the ramifications of this idea is the legitimization of torture as a normal practice during the interrogation of anyone suspected of having a link with a terrorist organization. But the other ramification touches directly on the actions of Batman in The Dark Knight. The War on Terror, as conceived by Bush and Cheney, is being fought with increased surveillance more than with additional weapons. The nature of the emergency calls for exceptional measures of surveillance, including eavesdropping on telephone calls, spying on emails, and using satellites to track movements, all without court authorization. When Batman uses the device that Fox builds for him, the film's hero elevates himself to an exception in the Bush and Cheney sense of the term. This is one of the points of resonance that led conservative writer Andrew Klavan to link Batman and Bush. But there is nonetheless a fundamental distinction between the two figures and between Batman’s relation to exceptionality and that displayed by Bush. One might assume that the difference lies in Batman’s readiness to abandon the system of total surveillance after he catches the Joker and the emergency ends. Batman arranges for the system to self-destruct after Lucius Fox has finished using it, and as he walks away from the exploding system, Fox smiles to himself, cheered by Batman’s ethical commitment to abandoning the power Batman had amassed for himself. This image does certainly seem to contrast with the image of the system of surveillance established during the War on Terror, which increases rather than self-destructs as the September 11th attacks move further and further into history. Neither President Bush nor his successor will call an end to the War on Terror or revoke all of the aspects of the Patriot Act. But Klavan can nonetheless see a parallel between Batman’s restoration of full civil rights and Bush’s intention to do so after the emergency ends. The difference between Bush’s version of the state of exception and Batman’s — between the conservative and the leftist — does not ultimately reside in the fact that it is temporary for Batman and permanent for Bush. Both figures view it as temporary, but what separates Batman is the attitude that he takes toward this violation of the law: he accepts that his willingness to embrace this type of exceptionality constitutes him as a criminal. Because he views it as a criminal act, Batman is quick to eliminate it. But this is precisely what Bush would be loath to accept and why he views the War on Terror as a quasi-eternal struggle.

2NC – LinkNew Impact - The result of the plan is scapegoating and transference of violenceDelgado 03 (Richard Delgado, Professor of Law at Pitt, Texas Law Review, November 2003)

By the same token, Brown v. Board of Education n109 ended official school segregation for African-American children at precisely the time when Congress was ordering Operation Wetback, under which 1.3 million Mexicans and Mexican Americans, many of them lawful U.S. citizens, were deported . n110 In 1913, California's Alien Land Law made it illegal for aliens ineligible for citizenship to lease land for more than three years , a measure that proved devastating for Japanese farmers. n111 A few years later, Congress eased immigration quotas for Mexican farmworkers. n112 Today, Indian tribes have been winning a series of breakthroughs , establishing the right to sponsor casino gambling and proving mismanagement in federal trust accounts, all at the very time California has been enacting a series of anti-Latino ballot measures . n113 The checkerboard of racial history, with progress for one group coupled with retrenchment for another, features innumerable similar examples. What does the author make of all this? It is a product, he says, of the psychological phenomena of transference and displacement, which occur when feelings toward one person are refocused on another, who is defenseless or more exploitable .n114 He also invokes the idea of scapegoating, n115 in which members of powerful groups discharge frustration on nonmembers who are not the cause of that frustration but who are safer to attack.

**No personal connection** Their reductionist focus on transportation failsArrigo 2k (Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology,

professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, “The Philosophy of the Gift and the Psychology of Advocacy: Critical Reflections on Forensic Mental Health Intervention,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2000, pgs. 215-242)There is one last feature of Nietzsche’s theoretical speculations on giftgiving warranting some attention. This point, raised by Gary Shapiro,35 invites a consideration of Nietzsche’s philosophy of masks. As Shapiro describes, gift-giving risks undermining the masks . . . that are necessary for our protection. In giving a gift one undertakes the hermeneutical project of discovering what is appropriate to the true character of the recipient. If I fail to interpret him properly, he will feel that some violence or degradation has been done . . . . 36 Nietzsche’s philosophy of masks is of considerable importance, particularly when comparing the congruence between what the intervener gives and what the recipient wants or needs. Indeed, if I fail to recognize, connect with, and respond to the individual on this most fundamental of levels, the receiver of the assistance is certain to feel that an injustice has occurred. This is significant in the context of advocacy where the assigner’s gift must be entirely congruent with the recipient’s desire. A failure to understand this dynamic only furthers the (purported ) injustice against which the giver assumes his/her unique role as (mental health) advocate.

**No personal connection** Re-appropriates hegemonic dominationArrigo 2k (Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology,

professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, “The Philosophy of the Gift and the Psychology of Advocacy: Critical Reflections on Forensic Mental Health Intervention,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2000, pgs. 215-242)Proponents of mental health treatment regard the treater as helping the person who is sick or in need. One’s ailment is relieved or, ideally, cured. Intervening in the lives of persons with psychiatric disorders is understood as the gift of reparation; of repairing, remedying, or correcting illness or disease. In such cases as these, the gift of treatment promises the elimination of the patient’s sufferin g. Thus, the first assumption is that treatment is a gift . A second, and more problematic, assumption is that the giver knows what the recipient desires to receive. In other words, the intervener understands what unique treatment is in the best interest of the receiver . This assumption is similarly untenable within the context of advocacy. Indeed, does the advocate fully know , beyond any self- interest or personal experience, what the patient wants , needs, or desires ? A third assumption is that the recipient of

treatment, receiving the gift of reparation, wants the award or, more startling, would want it , if the individual truly knew what was in her or his best interest.

The object of the sympathy of the 1AC has been forever weakened by the condescension charity of the gift of the advocacy.Frazer 06 (Michael L. Frazer, PhD, “The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength,” http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/The%20Compassion%20of%20Zarathustra.pdf)

Perhaps we should turn our attention from the subject of compassion to its object. Nietzsche does ask whether such an emotion is good, not only for those who feel it, but also “for those who suffer [den Leidenen]” (FW IV:338, p. 269). His answer here, too, is that compassion is of no value; “if one does good merely out of compassion [Mitleid], it is oneself one really does good to, and not the other” (WM 368, p. 199). To be sure, one’s painful sympathy may be soothed, but the object of this sympathy has been shamed by the condescension charity implies , and, even more importantly, been deprived of the opportunity to build real strength from his own efforts to overcome his suffering. Indeed, the potential value of suffering as a challenge to be met head-on, a spur to greatness, and a test of one’s mettle is a central theme in Nietzsche’s ethics. “It almost determines the order of rank,” he repeatedly insists, “how profoundly human beings can suffer” (JGB IX:270, p. 410). “To those of my disciples who have any concern for me,” Nietzsche therefore reasons, “I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities . . . I have no compassion [Mitleid] for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not” (WM 910, p. 481).

2NC – AlternativeEven if they win their offense, that just supercharges why the alt solves --- rejecting the affirmative is akin to Batman’s sacrifice --- it’s a choice to not be the hero but to allow the affirmative to lose the debate and die the hero --- a martyr who gave up the ballot for their ethics --- a true hero --- that’s a better method for generating community wide awareness and change and avoids the road to fascism turning their ethicsMcGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)The film begins with Batman’s grasp of the problem, as it depicts his attempt to relinquish his exceptional status and to allow the legal order to operate on its own. In order to do this, a different form of heroism is required, and the quest that constitutes The Dark Knight is Batman’s attempt to find the proper public face for heroism . He is drawn to Harvey Dent (Aaron Eckhart) because Dent seems to embody the possibility of a heroism that would be consistent with public law and that could consequently function without the need for disguise. After the death of Rachel Dawes (Maggie Gyllenhaal) and Dent’s own serious facial burn transforms him from a defender of the law into the criminal figure Two-Face, Batman sees the impossibility of doing away with the hero’s mask. Dent, the would-be hero without a mask, quickly becomes a criminal himself when he experiences traumatic loss. This turn of events reveals that the hero must remain an exception, but it also shows that the heroism of the hero must pass itself off as its opposite . Just as the truth that Leonard (Guy Pearce) discovers at the end of Nolan’s Memento (2000) is a constitutive lie, the conclusion of The Dark Knight illustrates that the true form of appearance of heroism is evil . The film concludes with Batman voluntarily taking responsibility for the murders that Dent/Two-Face committed. By doing so, Batman allows Dent to die as a hero in the public mind, but he also — and more importantly — changes the public perception of his own exceptional status. When he agrees to appear as a criminal at the end of the film, Batman avows simultaneously the need for the heroic exception and the need for this exception to appear as criminality. If the heroic exception is not to multiply itself in a way that threatens any possibility for justice, then its appearance must become indistinguishable from criminality. The heroic gesture, as The Dark Knight conceives it, does not consist in any of the particular crime-fighting or life-saving activities that Batman performs throughout the film. It lies rather in his embrace of the appearance of criminality that concludes the film. Gordon’s voiceover panegyric to Batman that punctuates the film affirms that this is the truly heroic act. This act privileges and necessitates its own misrecognition : it is only through misrecognition that one sees it correctly. If the people of Gotham were to see through Batman’s form of appearance and recognition his real heroism, the heroism would be instantly lost. As the film portrays it, the form of appearance of authentic heroism must be that of evil. Only in this way does the heroic exceptionality that the superhero embodies avoid placing us on the road to fascist rule.

2NC – A2 alt links tooThe alternative is invisible – the apparent lack of the appearance of the gift solves all our offenseWilliams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the

University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)Much of the distinction between law and justice has implications for the gift (of equality) and the (im)possibility of justice as equality: “The gift is precisely, and this is what it has in common with justice, something which cannot be reappropriated” (Derrida, 1997, p. 18). 11 Once a gift is given, if any gratitude is extended in return, the gift becomes circumscribed in a “moment of reappropriation ” (Derrida, 1997, p. 18). Ultimately, as soon as the giver knows that he or she has given something, the gift is nullified. The giver congratulates him- or herself, and the economy of gratitude, of reappropriation, commences. Once the offering has been acknowledged as a gift by the giver or receiver it is destroyed. Thus, for a gift to truly be a gift, it must not even appear as such. Although it is inherently paradoxical, this is the only condition under which a gift can be given (Derrida, 1991).

2NC – A2 aff is genuineThis is another façade – an ingenuine psuedo-sign meant to mask the ethic of calculation which always outweighsFrazer 06 (Michael L. Frazer, PhD, “The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength,” http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/The%20Compassion%20of%20Zarathustra.pdf)

Perhaps we should turn our attention from the subject of compassion to its object. Nietzsche does ask whether such an emotion is good, not only for those who feel it, but also “for those who suffer [den Leidenen]” (FW IV:338, p. 269). His answer here, too, is that compassion is of no value ; “if one does good merely out of compassion [Mitleid], it is oneself one really does good to, and not the other ” (WM 368, p. 199). To be sure, one’s painful sympathy may be soothed, but the object of this sympathy has been shamed by the condescension charity implies, and, even more importantly, been deprived of the opportunity to build real strength from his own efforts to overcome his suffering. Indeed, the potential value of suffering as a challenge to be met head-on, a spur to greatness, and a test of one’s mettle is a central theme in Nietzsche’s ethics. “It almost determines the order of rank,” he repeatedly insists, “how profoundly human beings can suffer” (JGB IX:270, p. 410). “ To those of my disciples who have any concern for me,” Nietzsche therefore reasons, “I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities . . . I have no compassion [Mitleid] for them , because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not” (WM 910, p. 481).

Their lack of consciously examining their advocacy doesn’t mean there’s no link --- rather, it supercharges our egoism arguments and means their epistemology is bankruptArrigo 2k (Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, “The Philosophy of the Gift and the Psychology of Advocacy: Critical Reflections on Forensic Mental Health Intervention,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2000, pgs. 215-242)The psychological egoist questions the possibility of acting altruistically; that is, of acting purely with regard for the interests of another. That is to ask, can our actions at times be motivated purely by a concern for the welfare of others without some manifestation of primary self-interest in our actions? Though questions of self-interest factored significantly into the classical era of philosophical speculation, the establishment of egoism as psychologically predetermined and, consequently, inescapable received its first detailed and philosophically animated treatment in the work of Thomas Hobbes.10 Hobbes’s theory rests on one core assumption: human beings, when acting voluntarily, will be egoistically motivated. In other words, all human actions are rooted in self-interest, and the very possibility of being motivated otherwise is forbidden by the structure of our fundamental psychological make-up. Hobbes’s conceptualizations on the self are artfully depicted in passages from his work, On Human Nature (1650), in which he defines both “charity” and “pity.” These ideas are particularly important for our purposes. Indeed, they anticipate future developments in the logic of the gift and the motivational aspects of advocacy. With regard to the former, Hobbes deconstructs the prevalent sentiment of neighborly love, finding “charity” to be a veiled form of egoism. As he describes it: There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity.11 Actions motivated by a concern for others are those which Hobbes refers to as “charity.” To this, we might also add “altruism,” “assistance,” “intervention,” and, to that effect, “advocacy.” For Hobbes, charity is nothing more than one taking some delight in one’s own power. The charitable man is demonstrating to himself, and to the world, that he is more capable than others. He can not only take care of himself, he has enough left over for others who are not so able as he. He is really just showing off his own superiority.12 There is another important aspect of the charitable person, relevant more specifically to the psychological underpinnings of such selfinterested displays of benevolence. This is the notion of conscious selfinterest versus self-interest that motivates from behind or, in Freud’s topology, underneath the level of conscious awareness.13 This point will become clearer when we discuss self-interest in the context of a Lacanian psychoanalytic critique. For now, we note that even Hobbes recognized that persons motivated by self-interest might

not be consciously aware that their seemingly selfless acts were, in fact, blemished by concerns for the self. What is more characteristic of such behavior in terms of human psychology is that we consciously regard our actions as altruistic; an interpretation most beneficial to our psychic life. In other words, we want to believe that our actions are unselfish and, consequently, we interpret them in such a fashion. In fact, following psychological egoists, this interpretation obtains only superficially; that is, we delude ourselves absent a careful investigation of the unconscious dynamics that give rise to the logic of charitable, altruistic, intervening behavior.

2NC - A2 Ballot Key1. Voting against them is not a condemnation of their projectMoulton, professor of communication and coach t Redlands, 66 (Eugene, The Dynamics of Debate, p. 5)

The awarding of a formal decision is an essential part of interscholastic and intercollegiate debate. The decision represents a judge’s evaluation of the completed contest and does not imply condemnation of the losing team. Judges are usually exdebaters, or coaches who have been well trained in contest debate. In addition to this training, the judge has several guidelines to help him in making a valid decision in the major areas of debate: analysis, reasoning and evidence, refutatory effectiveness, organization of argument, and delivery. The importance of each area upon the final decision is decided by the judge. Some critics give major importance to analysis, while others may stress reasoning and evidence.

2. Losing is not an indictment of their stance- it is an essential part of argumentative training Moulton, prof of comm. and Redlands coach, 66 (Gender Edited) (Eugene, The Dynamics of Debate, p. 10)

Winning and losing are important in debating, as in any form of advocacy. Unquestionably not all decisions go the way the individual wishes, but this does not minimize the importance of the decision. It is essential to learn how to win and how to face defeat without losing confidence and a sense of purpose. The debater often takes extended trips, sometimes covering several thousand miles during one academic year. The obligations and pressures of these trips, and the competition of debate contests, call for tact and consideration. Scarcely any other college subject or activity affords this kind of training. Moreover, for the debater to have practiced relentlessly for many weeks only to find the he [or she] is still behind other debaters is a distinct shock. He [or she] must then swallow his [or her] disappointment and learn to begin again.

3. Insert the 2 alt cards from the 2NC o/v under this under this

4. The ballot links to all our offense i.e. the ethic of calculation, the visible gift, narcissistic hegemonical power distribution – only that alternative solves

5. Cross apply that only losing this debate round with a neg ballot and adopting the mask of negation is the only way produce true heroism and avoid the ethic of calculation.

2nc – A2 kritik can’t solve – aff pre-req The mandate to vote affirmative as an endorsement of their call for change creates an exception in your decision, positioning an affirmative ballot as the heroic choice --- this “infinite obligation” to vote affirmative is limitless exceptionality that justifies mass genocide and endless warfare --- only voting neg solvesMcGowan 09 (Todd McGowan, Associate Professor, film theory, University of Vermont, PhD, Ohio State University, studies the intersection of Hegel, psychoanalysis, and existentialism and cinema, “The Exceptional Darkness of The Dark Knight,” Jump Cut, No. 51, Spring 2009, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/darkKnightKant/text.html)Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben sees the great danger inherent in the exception . It leads not just to abuses of civil rights but to large-scale horrors like the Holocaust, which functions as a major point of reference for Agamben’s thought. Exceptionality, for Agamben,

launches a legal civil war and thereby plays the key role in the transition from democracy to fascist authoritarianism. The declaration of

the state of exception attempts “to produce a situation in which the emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction

between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible.”[10] The problem is that the exceptional time never comes to an end, and the disappearance of the distinction between an emergency and everyday life pushes the society toward a state of civil war that the very exception itself was supposed to quell. Rather than acting as a temporary stopgap for a society on the brink of self-annihilation, the state of

exception actually pushes the society further down the path to this annihilation by undermining the distinction between law and criminality and thereby helping to foster a Hobbesian war of all against all, in which every act of sovereign power becomes justified in the name of order. The Dark Knight begins with a focus on the problem engendered by the state of exception embodied by Batman. He is a figure outside the law on whom the law relies to respond to the most recalcitrant criminal elements in Gotham. But Batman’s very success at fighting crime outside the law has, when the film opens, spawned numerous imitators — vigilantes who dress like Batman and spend their nights fighting crime. The result is an increased degree of lawlessness and insecurity in the city. Through these copycat vigilantes, the film begins by making clear the danger of the sanctioned exception that exists outside the law. Once one embraces the exception, the need for exceptionality will constantly expand insofar as the exception augments the very problem that it is created to fight against. The fake Batmen question Batman directly on the monopoly he attempts to hold on exceptionality. After Batman rescues them from their botched effort to interrupt a drug deal, he warns them against this type of activity: One says, “What gives you the right? What’s the difference between you and me?” Batman responds, “I’m not wearing hockey pads.” While amusing, this quip is actually wholly inadequate as an argument. Batman has no inherent right to guard exceptionality for himself, and as long as he

occupies this position, others will be drawn to it. And a self-multiplying exceptionality portends the destruction of the social order. The state of exception justifies any type of action — any encroachment on civil liberties — in order to realize the justice that ordinary law is incapable of realizing. The Dark Knight explicitly links the heroic exception embodied by Batman with the violation of civil liberties associated with the official declaration of a state of emergency (in the current War on Terror, for instance). Batman acts exceptionally not just by wearing a mask and breaking a few traffic laws but by creating a system of surveillance that completely erases the idea of private space within Gotham. When Batman commissions his technical designer Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) to create a device that will allow him to map the location of everyone within the entire city of Gotham, Fox balks at the violation of civil liberties that this entails. He agrees to help to catch the Joker (Heath Ledger) but promises to resign immediately afterward. As Fox changes from fully supporting Batman and his exceptionality, his outrage signifies that Batman has crossed a line beyond heroic exceptionality where one can no longer differentiate the heroic masked man from the criminals that he pursues. But in order to apprehend the Joker and disrupt his criminal plans, the film makes clear that Batman must cross this line. It places him fully on the terrain of contemporary politics and in the company of conservative political figures. The logic of the War on Terror waged by President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney derives entirely from the idea that they rule in a state of emergency where the normal rule of law will be insufficient for safeguarding the U.S. populace. One must thus carve out an exceptional position outside the law. One of the ramifications of this idea is the legitimization of torture as a normal practice during the interrogation of anyone suspected of having a link with a terrorist organization. But the other ramification touches directly on the actions of Batman in The Dark Knight. The War on Terror, as conceived by Bush and Cheney, is being fought with increased surveillance more than with additional weapons. The nature of the emergency calls for exceptional measures of surveillance, including eavesdropping on telephone calls, spying on emails, and using satellites to track movements, all without court authorization. When Batman uses the device that Fox builds for him, the film's hero elevates himself to an exception in the Bush and Cheney sense of the term. This is one of the points of resonance that led conservative writer Andrew Klavan to link Batman and Bush. But there is nonetheless a fundamental distinction between the two figures and between Batman’s relation to exceptionality and that displayed by Bush. One might assume that the difference lies in Batman’s readiness to abandon the system of total surveillance after he catches the Joker and the emergency ends. Batman arranges for the system to self-destruct after Lucius Fox has finished using it, and as he walks away from the exploding system, Fox smiles to himself, cheered by Batman’s ethical commitment to abandoning the power Batman had amassed for himself. This image does certainly seem to contrast with the image of the system of surveillance established during the War on Terror, which increases rather than self-destructs as the September 11th attacks move further and further into history. Neither President Bush nor his successor will call an end to the War on Terror or revoke all of the aspects of the Patriot Act. But Klavan can nonetheless see a parallel between Batman’s restoration of full civil rights and Bush’s intention to do so after the emergency ends. The difference between Bush’s version of the state of

exception and Batman’s — between the conservative and the leftist — does not ultimately reside in the fact that it is temporary for Batman and permanent for Bush. Both figures view it as temporary, but what separates Batman is the attitude that he takes toward this violation of the law: he accepts that his willingness to embrace this type of exceptionality constitutes him as a criminal. Because he views it as a criminal act, Batman is quick to eliminate it. But this is precisely what Bush would be loath to accept and why he views the War on Terror as a quasi-eternal struggle.Overview