Field Artillery Journal - Jun 1946

7/28/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Jun 1946

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MUST

EDITORSBE

UNHAPPY?

Sad but true, Einar Larssen's cartoon is a crackerjack! He's certainlycaught the frenzied worry and mental turmoil that characterizes each wakefulmoment of your Secretary-Editor and Treasurer's life these days.

Must editors always be unhappy? Perish the thought! Certainly this editorwouldn't be unhappyin fact, Larssen would have to practice up on drawingface-splitting smilesif every member of the Field Artillery Associationwould:

a. Go out and get another member,

b. Buy his books from his Association,

c. Get squarely behind our match venture, and

d. Go out and get another member.


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A Boost fromGeneralDevers


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UNCOMMON

ARTILLERYMEN . . . A column dedicated to the honor

of American soldiers, no longer in theService, who rendered uncommonservice to the Field Artillery.

(See Page 356)

Major General William Josiah Snow,Rtd., stands unchallenged in the view ofmany as the most uncommon artillerymanever to wear the uniform of an Americansoldier. Upon graduation from theMilitary Academy in 1890, General Snowwas commissioned in the Artillery, andfor the next thirty-seven years wasdestined to be a pioneer in thedevelopment and improvement of theartillery arm.

The first artilleryman to graduate fromthe Army War College, General Snow

soon became themotivating

personalitybehind thefounding of theUnited StatesField ArtilleryAssociation; hewrote itsConstitution, and

became the firstEditor of our JOURNAL in 1911.

At the outbreak of World War I,General Snow was recalled from foreignservice and assigned the task ofreorganizing the School of Fire at FortSill. Promoted to Brigadier General inAugust, 1917, he took command of the

156th Field Artillery Brigade at CampJackson, reluctantly yielding thiscommand in February, 1918, to becomethe first Chief of Field Artillery. Hecontinued to hold this position, through aseries of appointments, until hisretirement in December, 1927.

Regrettably, past lessons are sometimesforgotten in the rush of present events. It wasso after World War I and during World WarII. It is so right now. Serious-mindedartillerymen, who realize the folly of"throwing away the book," will still findmany a valuable lesson tucked away inSignposts of Experience,* General Snow'smemoirs of World War I. In addition tovaluable lessons, many will also discover thestrength and character of a truly great anduncomon artillerymanone of the biggestlittle men that ever livedMajor GeneralWilliam J. Snow. In his 78th year, GeneralSnow makes his home in Washington, is ingood health, and takes a keen interest in theswirl of events in the ever-changing present.

*U. S. Field Artillery Association; 317

pp.; illustrated; index; $2.75.

"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 36 JUNE 1946 NO. 6

z Cover: Major General William J . Snow, Rtd. See Uncommon Artillerymen, in thecolumn to the left, and also the Editorials page.

z Frontispiece: A Boost from General Devers.

EDITORIAL MISCELLANY 356

ARTICLESThis Mighty Instrument of Victory ............................................................................ 324Mobile, Armored and Revolving, by J. M. Riboud ................................................... 326Must We Always Learn the Hard Way? by Maj. Gen. John A. Crane, USA............ 329Artillery of the Future? by Maj. Hal D. Steward, Inf. ................................................ 332AGF Guided Missile Battalion, by Lt. Col. J. W. Rawls, CAC ................................. 334Gem Testing for Veterans.......................................................................................... 335Wartime Developments in WD Organization and Development, by Maj. Gen. O. L.

Nelson, Jr.......................................................................................................... 336Reorganization of the War Department and of the Army........................................ 339Landmarks of Military Policy..................................................................................... 344Post-War School System for Army Officers............................................................. 347Due for Foreign Service?........................................................................................... 350Soldiers Like to Sing, by Lt. Col. Fairfax Downey, FA-Res..................................... 351

(Song: Field Artillery Guns, Bugle Arrangement: The Caissons Go Rolling Along )Annapolis, USA, by Lt. Comdr. Henry Y. Sheefer, USNR........................................ 355Perimeters in Paragraphs, by Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd....................................... 365

ARTILLERY NOTESField Artillery Notices ......................................................................................... 334Welcome to the Field Artillery............................................................................ 346Courses of Instruction at the Field Artillery School........................................ 348VII Corps Artillery Battle Experiences.............................................................. 360Who Do You Know at Sill?................................................................................. 373

OTHER FEATURESOf More Than Passing Interest ......................................................................... 331What's Your Artillery IQ?................................................................................... 335Letters to the Editor............................................................................................ 358

BOOKS........................................................................................................................ 376

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONGEditor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN LENNA PEDIGOAssociate Editor Business Manager

Published monthly by The United States Field Artillery Association. Publication office: 3110Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md. Editorial and executive offices: 1218 Connecticut Avenue,Washington 6, D. C. Address all communications to the Washington office. Entered as secondclass matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore, Md. Accepted for mailing at thespecial rate of postage provided in Sec. 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Copyright, 1946, by TheUnited States Field Artillery Association. Subscription rates: $3.00 a year; foreign, $3.50; singlecopies, 35 cents; additional single copies to subscribers, 25 cents. The Field Artillery J ournaldoes not accept paid advertising. It does pay for original articles accepted, but unsolicitedmanuscripts must be accompanied by return postage if they are to be returned.


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This Mighty Instrument of Victory

A speech (slightly condensed) made by Winston

Churchill in Washington on March 9 to the

senior officers of our Armed Services.

Reprinted by courtesy of THE READER'S DIGEST

HE PREVAILING FEATURE OF OUR worktogether in the war was the intimacy of association.

There was a spirit of loyalty, of good will, ofcomradeship which never has been seen in all historybetween Allied Armies, Navies,Air Forces fighting side by side.No one was more the championand embodiment of this unitythan General Eisenhower.

Our effective unity savedscores of thousands of lives,perhaps far more, and abridgedthe course of the struggle. Thatmust be regarded as a preciouspossession which we have in

common and which whenevercircumstances may require Icannot think they will do so inour lifetimewill be available tostrengthen any joint efforts ourgovernments may order in somefuture period.

I have been thinking a greatdeal about the work of the UnitedStates' services. It was a prodigyof organization, of improvisation. There have been manyoccasions when a powerful state has wished to raise greatarmies, and with money and time, and discipline andloyalty, that can be accomplished. Nevertheless, the rateat which the small American Army of only a fewhundred thousand men, not long before the war, created

the mighty force of millions is a wonder in militaryhistory.

Two or three years ago in South Carolina I saw thespectacle of what you may call themass production of divisions. Isaw the creation of this mightyforcethis mighty Army,victorious in every theater againstthe enemy in so short a time andfrom such a very small parentstock. This is an achievementwhich the soldiers of every othercountry will always study withadmiration and with envy.

But that is not even the greatestpart of the story. To create greatarmies is one thing; to lead themand to handle them is another. Itremains to me a mystery as yetunexplained how the very smallstaffs which the United States keptduring the years of peace wereable not only to build up theArmies and Air Force units butalso to find the leaders and vast

staffs capable of handling enormous masses and ofmoving them faster and farther than masses have everbeen moved in war before.

I offer you gentlemen my most earnestcongratulations on the manner in which, when thedanger came, you were not found wanting. I speak not

TFiercely nationalistic, more often

than not, in the rugged proving

ground of the conference table or

public forum, nevertheless men of all

stations in life recognize the living

greatness of Winston Churchill

clairvoyant and articulate champion

of embattled human liberty. Here, he

pays ringing tribute to our Military.

Mindful at all times of the

continuing need for penetrating self-

criticism, it is equally important in

these days when the Services seem to

be "fair game" that all fighting men

hold high their heads in proud and

articulate awareness of the

magnificent record of American

arms.


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entirely as an amateur. I went through five years ofprofessional training at the beginning of my life and Ihave had the good fortune to be in all the wars that GreatBritain has been engaged in in one capacity or anotherduring my lifetime. We now have to choose very

carefully the line of division between the officers andother ranks upon which authority should stand. There isonly one line in my view, and that is professionalattainment. The men have a right to feel that theirofficers know far better than they do how to bring themsafely and victoriously through terrible, difficultdecisions which arise in war.

For my part as far as Great Britain is concerned, I shallalways urge that the tendency in the future should be toprolong the courses of instruction at the colleges, toequip our young officers with special technicalprofessional knowledge. It is quite clear that class orwealth or favor will not be allowed in the modern world

to afford dividing lines. Professional attainment, basedupon prolonged and collective study at colleges, rank byrank, and age by agethose are the title deeds of thecommanders of the future armies.

The United States owes a debt to its Officer Corps. Intime of peace in this country, as in my own, the militaryprofession is very often required to pass a considerablenumber of years in the cool shade. One of Marlborough'sveterans wrote these lines, nearly 250 years ago:

God and the soldier we adoreIn time of danger, not before;The danger passed and all things righted,God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.

NDOUBTEDLY the military profession in the greatWestern democracies, which wholeheartedly desire

peace, is one which has required great sacrifices fromthose who devote themselves to it. All around them goesthe busy exciting world of business and politics with allits varieties, but the officers frugally, modestly,industriously, faithfully pursue their professional studiesand duties, very often for long periods at a time, withoutthe public notice. That you should have been able topreserve the art not only of creating mighty armiesalmost at the stroke of a wand, but of leading and guidingthose armies upon a scale incomparably greater thananything that was prepared for or even dreamed of,constitutes a gift made by the Officer Corps of the UnitedStates to their nation in time of trouble, which I earnestlyhope will never be forgotten here. It certainly never willbe forgotten in the Island from which I come. You will , Iam sure, permit me to associate with this amazing featthe name of General Marshall, the creator of thisInstrument of Victory.

LIBYA, 1943

Drawing depicts British gunners moving a 25 pdr. in action in the African desert.

U


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+ +

A skilled engineer, Mr. J . M.Riboud also leaned heavily upon hisbitter and eye-opening combatexperiences against German armor asa reserve officer of French artilleryduring the Battle of France in 1940 indesigning the M.A.R. gun mount. It isshown, above, firing full charge atzero elevation.

Regardless of whether or not theM.A.R. type of gun mount ever finds aplace for itself in our Army, theprinciples of its design will most

certainly be of interest to Americanartillerymen. They will recognize atonce inherent characteristics thatwould have rendered ti most useful inmany situations in World War II.

Due primarily to the fact that thisweapon appeared after the heavywartime armament production

program waswell underway, our

OrdnanceDepartment

was

apparentlylukewarm tothis weaponduring thewar. It is

understood, however, that it will soonbe subjected to appropriateengineering and other types ofservice tests.Editor.

The figures show the various types of gunmounts: the old trail type, the pedestaltype, and the M.A.R. type. Immediately

evident are the fundamental advantages ofthe M.A.R. type, particularly regarding thestability. The distribution of the masses issuch that in all directions of fire, the centerof gravity of the machine is at themaximum horizontal distance from theopposite base line ground support. Suchconditions, combined with the low settingof the gun trunnions, make for a highstability in spite of the small dimensions ofthe carriage and the absence of outriggers.

+

A NewCarriage Ideafor ArtilleryBy J . M. Riboud

The lessons which have beenlearned from this war are helping inpredicting the trend and evolution of

the artillery. All signs point to afurther development of triplepurpose guns having anti-aircraft,anti-tank and field gun capabilities,with a 360 traverse and 90elevation as basic characteristics.

The only type of mount now usedfor this universal gun is of thepedestal design. In mounts of thistype, which are derived from theMarine artillery, the gun is attachedto a pedestal supported by a mobileplatform equipped with outriggers

that are folded for travel and openedup when the gun is emplaced. Everyground gun mount with an all-aroundtraverse, built so far, belongs to thistype: German 88-mm, Bofors 40 mm,U. S. AA 90mm.

Defects, Pedestal Type. Originally,these guns were designed for anti-aircraft use only. As combat data were

+ 326

J. M. Riboud


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1946 MOBILE, ARMORED, AND REVOLVING 327

The prime mover has stopped. The gun is then

emplaced without being disconnected from thetractor. This is done by opening, directly or byremote control, a lock on the limber. The limber

then collapses and the front of the carriage drops

until the ground plates rest on the ground. The

gun is then ready to fire without being

disconnected. When the prime mover starts, it

will lift the front of the carriage andautomatically return it to the emergency

traveling position. (See cuts of limber, below.)

The last shot and the starting of the vehicle need

not be more than two seconds apart.

There are two gunners inside the carriage. The

seats are held by the shield, thus rotating with

the gun while it is traversed. The carriage is

leveled by means of the two front jack legs. The

crank handles of the jack legs are operated by

the men who are inside the carriage. It enables

these men to lower separately each side of the

carriage, or to raise it: thus compensating for

transverse and longitudinal slope. The control

mechanism of the jack legs consists of two

concentric worms and nuts with balls interposed.

No part of the lower carriage interferes with the

l, which is limited only by the ground,

instead of being limited by the platform as is the

case with the pedestal gun mount. For this

reason, the gun can be set very low, which is a

great advantage from the point of view of

stability and camouflaging.

recoi

gathered, it was realized that theiraccuracy, high rate of fire and all-aroundtraverse would provide an excellentweapon against tanks. However,experience in the field has proved thatthe pedestal type of carriage hasfunctional defects:

It is too high.

It is too cumbersome.

It is too difficult to hide.

It requires too long a time to be dugin.

It gives only scant protection to thegunners and is so heavy that anadditional shield cannot be incorporatedwithout making the total weight

prohibitive.

It takes too long a time to be emplacedor returned to traveling position.

Advantages of M.A.R. Taking intoconsideration the above handicaps, theM.A.R. (Mobile, Armored andRevolving) gun mount was designed toovercome them. Like the pedestalmount, the M.A.R. type is an all-purposemount, with a 360 traverse and a 90elevation as fundamental characteristics,

but it is based on a principle entirelydifferent than that of the pedestal type,and it corrects the defects of the latter.Instead of a solid platform supporting the

pedestal at its center, it is made of anopen four-sided frame carriage supporting

a shield through a ball bearing of largediameter. The ordnance rifle andaccessories are carried by the shield; thegunners are seated inside the frame. Thisdisposition has several fundamentaladvantages over the pedestal type:

The gun can be set much lowerbecause there is no part of the carriage tointerfere with the recoil, which is limitedonly by the ground.

Owing to the eccentricity of themasses, the necessary stability in action

The gun carriage lunette is hooked on the

swiveling bracket of the limber (left of top

picture of limber). This bracket is linked with

the drawbar (right of the picture). In

traveling position, this drawbar is rigidly

connected with the limber frame by a lock.

When the lock securing the drawbar on the

limber frame is open, the rear bracket swings

down and the carriage is lowered until it rests

on the ground. It is automatically raised and

returned to its former position by the motion

of the tractor when it starts on the way.


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328 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL J une

The gun is moved by hand by means of

winches mounted within the rear wheels. This

mechanism consists of planetary pinions, a

ratchet preventing the carriage from backing

up and some devices by which the gear may

be shifted from neutral position to working

position and the ratchet direction changed.

On this apparatus the ratio is 4.5 to 1, which

means that four men exert the same force as

18. The device is entirely self-contained, is not

affected by water or mud, and stands outvery little from the wheel.

(overturning moment) is obtainedwithout resorting to outriggers. Thus, thecarriage is smaller, and as a result, thecamouflaging and entrenchment of theweapon are easier to accomplish.

All parts of the mount have a dual roleof structure and protection. As a result,the M.A.R. mount affords a much better

protection with a lighter weight than thecorresponding pedestal mount.

It is more rapidly emplaced and returnedto traveling position, because of the knock-down design of the limber, and it can befired at a moment's notice without beingdisconnected from the tractor.

Last, the gun crew can move it easilyby hand, owing to specially designed

winch attachments mounted in thewheels.

The advantages of the M.A.R. type aredue to no trick of design or smallchanges, but to the fundamentalmodification in the principle of the

mount. This is best illustrated bycomparing the M.A.R., which this writerdesigned and which was built by WardLa-France, Great American Industries,with the conventional pedestal mount,designed and built by the CanadianGovernment for the 6 Pounder H. V.Although never adopted, both mountswere originally ordered by theCanadians and were designed to beequipped with the same gun and have adual anti-tank, anti-aircraft role.

New Principle. The M.A.R. gunmount was originally designed to be

equipped with a Bofors 40mm or a 6Pounder H.V. Following a change in

plans, the mount has been equippedinstead with a 75mm gun supplied by the

National Forge & Ordnance Company,for demonstration purposes. Since this75mm is a field gun and not an anti-aircraft gun, a few modifications had to

be made on the original design,particularly with regard to the sight

apparatus arrangement and the servicingof the mount. However, the fundamentalcharacteristics of the mount haveremained unchanged; and the model,although not equipped with the propergun, serves its purpose, which is todemonstrate a new principle ofconstruction of a universal 360traverse, 80 elevation gun mount.

A Comparison. The M.A.R. istemporarily equipped with a 75mmhaving the same recoil force as the 6Pounder H.V. The difference of weightof both pieces has been taken into

account for the computation of the totalweight. The comparison shown by thefollowing table is considered particularlysignificant.

Gun Mount M.A.R. Canadian-BritishGun 6 Pdr. H.V.

In the traveling position the front of the mount is

supported by the limber. The jack legs are

collapsed and the ground-gripping plates are heldclose under the carriage. The mount is supported

at the rear on the axle by two coil suspension

springs. Two gunners ride in the machine. When

action is imminent, the ground plates are lowered

half way to the ground, so as to leave about 10

inches clearance. The tractor proceeds at low

speed and is ready to stop at a moment's notice.

6 Pdr. H.V.Traverse 360 360Elevation 80 80Depression 10 10Total Weight 5400 lbs. 6500 lbs.Height 50 traveling65

emplaced50Width (emplaced) 86 125

Pit Area 50 sq. ft. 125 sq. ft.Protectionfront 2

side nonetop with noneTime to emplace 10 seconds 120 secondsTime to put in traveling

position 10 seconds 120 secondsManhandling Traction reducer


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MUST WE ALWAYS LEARN

THE HARD WAY?By Maj. Gen. J ohn A. Crane, USA

One of our most senior and most experienced artillerymen

again raises his clear voice in strong support for an

integrated artillery guidance, at home and abroad.

HAT is everybody's business is

nobody's business!In his memoirs, General Pershing

criticizes the War Department sharplyfor not answering his cables on fieldartillery matters during the period priorto the appointment of our first Chief ofField Artillery. Upon becoming Chief ofField Artillery in February 1918, MajorGeneral William J. Snow found fieldartillery queries from the Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F. in a dozenscattered offices; many were marked"file" and had gone unanswered formonths. However, when Lieutenant

General Peyton C. March, himself aformer field artilleryman, took up thereins in Washington as Chief of Staff hedirected that "The Chief of FieldArtillery will be responsible . . . thatadequate measures are taken to preparethe field artillery for overseas service. . .. All questions pertaining to the FieldArtillery arising in the War Departmentwill be referred to the Chief of FieldArtillery and his decision, given inaccordance with the policy of the Chiefof Staff and subject to review by theChief of Staff, will be final." At last the

Field Artillery had a papa.Worked Well. The system worked so

well in Washington that the Infantry andother branches followed suit. A similarsystem was used in France. A Chief ofArtillery, A.E.F., was provided for inorders from General Pershing'sheadquarters dated February 16, 1918.Major General Ernest Hinds, who had

been functioning in virtually that

capacity for some time, was made Chief,and held that office as long as there wasan A.E.F. He had a large staff, and heran the American artillery in France. Itwas a big job; nearly half the combatsoldiers in the A.E.F. wore red hat cords.General Hinds established a regularcourier service with General Snow inWashington, and the two worked closelyand in harmony.

Thinking Contracts. At the close ofthe last war, large tactical headquarters

passed into history, large tactical unitsmelted away, and our military thinking

showed a tendency to contract; itconcentrated upon the infantry divisionsas though it were all-important. Littlethought was given to corps artillery, andcounter-battery became a lost art. Non-divisional artillery scales andammunition estimates for various typesof situation remained static on the basisof World War I experience tables untilafter the Sicilian Campaign in WorldWar II. With the campaigns in Polandand France, in 1939 and 1940, came ahuge expansion of our armored force."Blitzkrieg" was the password, and

prosaic, conventional field artillery was"streamlined" down and cut to the bone.Field artillery staffs at headquartershigher than army were consideredunnecessary, and general staff sectionsof other special staff sections wereassumed to know all they needed toknow about field artillery, and wereexpected to look after that arm in

addition to their other duties. Once

again, artillery business had becomeeverybody's business.

Unflagging Insistence. We went toAfrica, and put elements of the II Corpsinto the field in Tunisia. There was noartillery section at theater headquartersin Algiers. Brigadier General Chas. E.Hart (then Colonel, and later to becomethe First Army Artillery Officer) wasthen the II Corps Artillery Officer.Fortunately, he enjoyed the completeconfidence of the Corps Commander.Due primarily to General Hart'sunflagging insistence, higher

headquarters finally agreed to includeone battalion of long range guns inaddition to a regiment of 155-mmhowitzers, as corps artillery. That one

battalion of Long Toms proved soinvaluable that it was the only unit tostay in action, with just time to movefrom one sector to another, for over twoyears without relief. Incidentally, aveteran Panzer division from Poland andFrance was driven back from a pointdangerously near the 1st InfantryDivision CP at El Guettar by the guns ofthis battalion.

Hard Pounding. We learned the hardway. We learned that it took artillery,and still more artillery, to counter tanksand enemy artillery. We learned that intough country, or before well-preparedenemy defenses, the commander's planmust often be built up around thecapabilities of his artillery.

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The cry went up for more artillery andfor bigger artillery. From time to timerelief was sought from some of the"bugs" to be found in equipment hastilydesigned and manufactured afterDecember 7, 1941. Ammunition

problemspacking, shipping andsorting of lotswere numerous. Welearned from the enemy; we learnedfrom the British; and we learned a gooddeal by ourselves as we fought.Requests, "beefs," and suggestionsstarted to flow back to Algiers. Much ofthis material was of importance not onlyto the II Corps but also to the UnitedStates Army as a whole. Theorganization of Allied ForceHeadquarters did not provide any seniorofficer with the necessary knowledge offield artillery, plus the necessary time

and office facilities, to cope with allthese matters. History was repeatingitselfartillery problems began toaccumulate in files all over theheadquarters, just as A.E.F. artillerycables had once hung fire in the WarDepartment in World War I.

Big First Step. At the suggestion ofGeneral Hart and myself, the II CorpsCommander, Lieutenant GeneralBradley, suggested to GeneralEisenhower that a U. S. Field ArtillerySection be formed in his headquarters.The suggestion was accepted at once,

and Brigadier General (then Colonel)Carl C. Bank flew over in October 1943to become the first full-time Chief ofField Artillery for the MediterraneanTheater.

Stepping Along. Meanwhile, theopen warfare of the Tunisian andSicilian Campaigns had given way toheavy slogging in Central Italy. Myseasoned 13th Field Artillery Brigadehad provided all the general supportartillery there was in the initialcampaigns; it had expanded, and nowcontrolled directly thirteen battalions,including a Canadian regiment of 5.5-inch guns in support of an Americancorps. By this time I had my secondstar, and to my personaldisappointment, existing Tables ofOrganization precluded my staying onwith my grand old Brigade. To digressmomentarily, I believe very stronglythat a corps artillery commandershould be a major general. Not onlydoes he frequently control in the

neighborhood of 10,000 men, but hemust coordinate and at times rigidlycontrol divisional artilleries, andshould be able to meet divisioncommanders on an equal basis.

When Lieutenant General Devers,

himself a former artilleryman,succeeded General Eisenhower early in1944 as the commander of Americanforces in the Central Mediterranean, Iwas called to AFHQ as ArtilleryOfficer. General Bank succeeded me incommand of the 13th F.A. Brigade.General Devers merely told me to "lookafter the artillery." I had a separate staffsection, and dealt directly withwhomever I desired. Officially, Ireported to the Commander through theChief of Staff, but I used to see GeneralDevers a good deal. He was always

keenly interested in artillery questions.Looking back, it seems to me that the

most important results of thisarrangement concerned the artillery armas a whole, and not our forces in Italyalone. We were the oldest active theaterin the war with Germany, and hadlearned to modify the World Warexperience tables of artillery scales andammunition allowances. Our armoredartillery battalions had convinced us ofthe desirability of six-gun batteries, andwith War Department approval wereorganized the light artillery battalions

of two of our infantry divisions intosix-gun organizations. The use of TDs,tanks and AAA in a ground role wasdeveloped in our theater; countermortarand counterflak programs wereintroduced; forward observer partieswere obtained on the T/O & Es on ourrecommendations, and Air OPs cameinto their own with us.

Sowing Seeds. General Devers hadappointed me to go into these mattersfor him, and he backed me up on themall the way. He sent me as his

representative to Washington, where Idiscussed artillery and ammunitionscales, six-gun batteries and othermatters with General Waldron, Chief ofthe Requirements Section, AGF, andheld a number of other conferenceswith the various people in the PentagonBuilding who were interested inartillery problems. General Marshallreceived me with his usual cordiality,and saw my points at once.

When General Devers took the SixthArmy Group to France, I continued toreceive good support from LieutenantGeneral McNarney, new DeputyTheater Commander in the MTO. As anillustration of the value of centralized

field artillery staff work at a higherheadquarters, we had given the shirtsoff our backs to support the AnvilOperation in Southern France. With theformidable Siegfried Line in our minds,we furnished the Sixth Army Groupevery weapon larger than the 155-mmgun in the entire Theater, and kept onlysix battalions of Long Toms. We didthis on the assurance that we would not

be asked to breach the Gothic Line ofFlorence in the autumn of 1944. FifthArmy was ordered to attack anyway,with such artillery means as we had left

or could borrow from the British EighthArmy. Futa Pass was captured. Patrolscame to the last ridges of theAppennines and looked down onBologna in the Po Valley beyond. Thisaccomplishment fills me withadmiration for our fighting men, but Iam glad that I was able to tend theseeds I sowed in Washington, so thatthe War Department approvedadditional heavy artillery for therenewed offensive in the spring. I

believe that from the Theater'sstandpoint my service in that one

respect justified maintaining a FieldArtillery Section at AFHQ. Someoneshould be looking after the FieldArtillery at each echelon of command.

Details A-plenty. In addition toquestions of major policy, a host ofadministrative and technical matterswere worked up, pressed, and followedthrough in Allied Force Headquarters bymy Section; on a somewhat reducedscale, they duplicated most of theartillery problems which were presentedto AGF in Washington. I think ourorganization proved itself successfully.An Executive Officer, a Colonel withexperience as a brigade executive,coordinated the functioning of:

1. An S-1 who watched Tables ofOrganization in detail and assistedG-1 in personnel planning.

2. An S-2 who studied enemy orderof battle, tactics and technique,

produced a monthly ArtilleryInformation Letter, and effected


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1946 MUST WE ALWAYS LEARN THE HARD WAY? 331

necessary liaison with the artilleryof foreign armies.

3. An S-3 who studiedrecommendations for T/O and Echanges, prepared trainingmemoranda for the Theater

Commander's signature, andproposed, revised and editedtraining literature for publication

by the Field Artillery School underthe Army Ground Forces.

4. An S-4 responsible for keepingrecords and makingrecommendations on ammunitionand equipment, and furtherresponsible for study of proposedchanges in T/O & Es and for studyof technical data on all sorts ofequipment, particularly of new type.

5. An Artillery Air Officer and a

Tank Destroyer Officer who wereable to accomplish importantpioneering staff work in these newfields. (Both organic artillery

planes and TDs were first used incombat under AFHQ). To this

brief functional outline of theSection, I should add my ownenjoyable correspondence with theCommandants of the FieldArtillery School, first MajorGeneral Ward and then MajorGeneral Pennell.

RA Points Way. AFHQ was a

combined headquarters. The U. S. FieldArtillery Section not only gaveimportant aid and counsel to the FrenchArmy which was formed in Africa withAmerican equipment but also receivedexcellent support and help from theBritish Royal Artillery Section,

particularly in the development stage ofthe Section. I have always been anadmirer of the unbroken chain ofcommand which exists in the RoyalArtillery. Artillery with a British corpsis controlled by the corps artilleryofficer; the army artillery officer

coordinates the artillery of the variouscorps. On a theater level, there was aRoyal Artillery Section in AFHQ asearly as May, 1943. The BritishArtillery Officer was made a majorgeneral in December, 1943. The BritishSection was a going concern whenGeneral Bank was appointed on theAmerican side. Integration of theBritish and American subsections was

physically complete during the autumn

and early winter of 1943-44; officers ofthe corresponding rank and duties in thetwo subsections sat face to face atadjoining desks. Files were combined.It was found, in the course of time, thatvery little work was done in common,

and in the long run it proved moreefficient to function in adjoining officesand to confer on matters of mutualinterest. Much of the attention of theRoyal Artillery Section was devoted tomatters of detail pertaining to

personnel. In my opinion, this workcould have been centralized in G-1British to better advantage, and I amperfectly willing to suggest that thesystem of Chiefs of Branch in our WarDepartment was killed by too muchattention to similar matters of non-technical detail. A Chief of Field

Artillery should concern himself withtechnical and tactical artilleryproblems and give only advice onpersonnel policy; he should shunroutine administrative responsibilities.

The Major General, Royal Artillery,had one important advantage over me;he had a Director of Royal Artillery inLondon who was in active charge of thewhole Royal Regimentthat is, of allBritish Artillery. Complaints,suggestions and requests originated byMajor General Harrison, MGR in Italy,did not go to one or two or three dozen

different offices at Whitehall inLondon; they went directly to MajorGeneral Lund, DRA, and they becamehis babies from there on. The RoyalArtillery had a papa.

From time to time, in the face ofdifficulties or delays, I used to thinkhow fortunate General Hinds had been,as an Artillery Chief, A.E.F., withGeneral Snow in Washington to backhim up. In World War I, there was aChief of Field Artillery, a whole-souledadvocate of the arm, with theknowledge, rank and responsibility

required to fight for the field artilleryon the home front.

Let's Not Forget. Faulty and slowthough our steps, we were movingsteadily in the direction of a moresuitable structural organization forartillery guidance and control, it seemsto me, as World War II progressed. Butit was hard going too much of the time.I trust that we won't always have tolearn the hard way.

OF MORE THAN PASSINGINTEREST

Happy Birthday. Four years old on 14May 1946 and approved, in principle, bythe WD for a permanent place in our post-war Regular Establishment, birthdaygreetings and best wishes are extended tothe Women's Army Corps for a job welldone and a challenging future.

Tops All Others. The WD hasannounced that the 3rd Inf Div topped allothers, with 351 days in combat, in World

War II.Unfair to Officers? According to a

press item, Pvt James L. Triplett, father offive boys and five girls, pockets $315.96each month at the pay table. It has beensuggested that "discrimination-minded"

junior officers may wish to have theDoolittle (caste-investigating) Boardreopen its hearings.

Lest We Forget. Final WD casualtytabulations for all theaters in World WarII: battle deaths229,238; total battlecasualties, including wounded, injured,captured and missing948,418.

Doughboy's Rally. An InfantryConference will be held at Fort Benningduring the period 10-22 June. Of morethan passing interest to Artillerymen is thelecture and demonstration time alloted bythe agenda to artilllery and artillery-associated topics.

Headquarters Move. Orders have beenissued to complete the movement by 11June 46 of Hq, First Army from FortBragg, NC, to Governors Island, NY, andof Hq, Second Army from Memphis,Tenn, to Baltimore, Md.

New Regulars. Non-Regular officersselected for commission in the RegularArmy will be notified thereof on 28 June.

Dirty Business. It took more than 600million pounds of soap and otherdetergents to keep our Army clean duringWorld War II.

Signed Up Yet? More than 330,000officers and 370,000 enlisted men have

joined the Organized Reserves.


14/67

ARTILLERY

OF THE FUTURE?By Maj. Hal D. Steward, Inf.

Collaborating fully in the conduct of

the V-2 tests, the Commanding

General, AGF, provided the necessary

launching crews and radar crews from

the 1st AAA Guided Missile Bn.

Commanded by Lt. Coy. George F.

Pindar, CAC, this unit is unique inpersonnel organization. Predominantly

Coast Artillerymen, the roster also

includes field grade officers from the

Field Artillery, Infantry, and Armored

Force, and numerous Field Artillery

officers of company grade. (See article

on page 332.)

The author witnessed the test

firing described herein. Presently

assigned to the War Department

Bureau of Public Relations Major

Steward has a broad background of

PRO combat experience in the

Pacific, extending from New Guinea

to the Philippines. The first PRO inManila, he entered with the 1st

Cavalry Division on the night of 3

Feb 45.

DEAFENING ROAR, SHEETS ofviolent flame and the monstrousrocket bolted into the sky.

It was the first American firing of theGerman self-propelled V-2 bomb. Theevent took place April 16, 1946, at

about two o'clock in the afternoon inthe middle of the New Mexico desert atthe White Sands Ordnance ProvingGrounds.

Before the missile had been in theair five seconds one of its fins fell tothe earth. The gigantic bomb wasshooting through the sky at aninestimable speed. Acting quickly, thetechnician at the radio control boardshut off the bomb's fuel supply after ithad been allowed to burn only 19seconds. The bomb crashed into thedesert, making a crater large enough to

bury a five-room house.

Despite this mechanical failure, thefiring of this German bomb wasreasonably successful, since it

established the fact that AmericanOrdnancemen are capable of firing them.

By research and development theOrdnance Department hopes to increasethe range of this bomb to 5,000 milesand to load its warhead with atomic

explosives. Further speculation is thatthe bomb can be propelled by atomicenergy instead of the present fuels ofalcohol and liquid oxygen. When and ifthis is accomplished the V-2 will have

become the most potent war weapon ofthe atomic era.

Fired by an electrical charge andcontrolled in the air by radio, at presentthe V-2 has a maximum range of about200 miles at a velocity of 2,620 feet persecondabout the speed of a .30 caliber

bullet. The bomb has been known totravel as fast as 3,500 miles an hour.

Used by the Germans in the latterstages of the European war, the V-2 is46.05 feet long and weighs 28,380

pounds when fully loaded and fueled.

General view of the V-2 launching area in the New Mexico desert

332


15/67

1946 ARTILLERY OF THE FUTURE? 333

Unloaded it weighs 8,816 pounds. Thebomb's diameter is 5 feet 4.9 inches. Withits 2,200 pound warhead fully loaded, in its

present stage the V-2 makes a crater ofabout 35 feet in diameter and 18 feet deep.It can be fired vertically and is capable of

reaching an altitude of approximately 100miles.

A crew of some 28 men is needed to setup and fire the V-2. Two men are requiredfor the firing board; five men on

propulsion; seven men on the trailer onwhich the bomb is carried; four men on theelectrical port and 10 men to fuel the bomb.The bomb can be put into position and firedin 90 minutes.

In damage power, the V-2 comparesroughly with the American 4,000 poundaerial bomb. The explosive used in thewarhead is Amotol, the same as the U. S.

Army uses in its explosives.The bomb is built at a cost of

approximately $20,000 and is accurate towithin 200 yards of a designated target.

Great weight caused by the large amountof fuel it must hold gives the present V-2 itsgreatest disadvantage. Until a substitute fuelcan be found to propel the bomb, it will bealmost impossible to increase its range. Ifatomic energy can be used, as is hoped, the

bomb will have an almost unlimited range.

The use of aircraft in war may beoutmoded if the V-2 can be propelled by

atomic energy and carry an atomicwarhead. This will make it possible forthousands of these bombs to be sent over adesignated target by radio control andmaintain an even greater accuracy than isnow possible by aircraft.

With such a bomb, it is not unlikely thatthe mission of ground troops would be thatof occupation.

Unquestionably, the other major worldpowers are also busy trying to develop theV-2. Once fully developed to presentexpectations the V-2 would in all

probability be the most dangerous war

weapon the world has ever seen.The V-2 can be used tactically as well asstrategically, according to Major Herbert L.Karsh, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, who is in directcharge of the firing of the V-2 in presentexperiments. This being the case, the degreeto which it may render obsolete our currentartillery concepts necessarily lies hidden inthe challenging field of futuredevelopments.

German Monowagon places V-2 in position for firing at White Sands,

New Mexico


16/67

AGFGuided

MissileBattalionBy

Lt. Col. J .W.Rawls, CAC

N OCTOBER of 1944 Army GroundForces made Battery C, 69th AAA

Gun Bn, available to the Ordnance

Department for test firing of guidedmissiles at Camp Irwin, California,under the ORDCIT (OrdnanceDepartment California Institute ofTechnology) project.

When it became necessary to reducethe number of antiaircraft artillery unitsin Army Ground Forces, the 69th AAAGun battalion (less Battery C) wasinactivated. Battery C was moved toWhite Sands Proving Ground at LasCruces, New Mexico, in February of1945 and continued participation in the

ORDCIT project. This battery wassurplus to AGF Troop Basis but was notinactivated due to the importanceattached to its work by the CommandingGeneral, Army Ground Forces.

After V-E Day, when redeployment tothe Pacific was under consideration, itwas planned that one of the redeployed

AAA Gun Bns would be used forparticipation in guided missile projects.

After V-J Day, the troop basis for ArmyGround Forces was drastically reduced andno provision was made for a battalion towork on guided missiles. As Battery C69th AAA Gun Bn was surplus to thetroop basis, its inactivation was imminent.

A plan to create a guided missilebattalion from the overhead allotmentavailable to Army Ground Forces was thenadopted. This plan included thediscontinuance of the Antiaircraft TrainingCenters at Fort Bliss and Camp Stewart.

The plan also included certain manpowersavings from other sources and a total of621 spaces in the troop basis was found.

The name of the battalion was then thesubject of conjecture. It was finallyconcluded that, rather than select someunusual "fancy" name, it would be betterto consider guided missiles just anothertype of artillery and in keeping with

present designations for AAA Gun,AAA Automatic Weapons, etc., Bns, thedesignation "AAA Guided Missile Bn"was selected.

Just prior to activation of the Bn, ArmyGround Forces received permission toparticipate in a guided missile programbeing conducted by Johns HopkinsUniversity for the U. S. Navy.

Another AAA Gun Battery, Btry C,517th AAA Gun Bn, which was surplusto the Army Ground Forces troop basis,was working with the OrdnanceDepartment on "Little David," a 36-inchmortar. This battery was also inimminent danger of inactivation. This

battery was considered an excellentsource of personnel for the Guided

Missile Bn due to the possibility oflaunching a missible by firing it from amajor caliber gun.

On 3 October 1945 orders were issuedby Headquarters Army Ground Forcesfor the activation of the 1st AAA GuidedMissile Bn with personnel drawn fromBattery C, 69th AAA Gun Bn, Btry C,517th AAA Gun Bn and certain otherAAA units concurrently inactivated.

The purpose in organizing a guidedmissile unit in Army Ground Forces wasto have a nucleus of personnel,intimately familiar with ground-launched guided missiles, which could

be used as cadres for future ground-to-air, ground-to-ground and ground-to-seaguided missile artillery units when the

weapons were produced.The mission assigned the battalion

included the furnishing of assistance todevelopment agencies and, mostimportant, to recommend doctrine fortactical employment of ground-launchedguided missiles.

The activation of this unit received thepersonal attention of the CommandingGeneral, Army Ground Forces. He wasenthusiastic over its activities anddirected that its personnel includeadequate representation from FieldArtillery, Infantry and the Armored

Force. Accordingly, a major from eachof these three Arms was authorized and,in addition, 2 captains and 3 lieutenantsof Field Artillery.

Recently, the officer authorization forthe Bn was changed so that the Batterygrade officers would be branchimmaterial. This permits the selection ofofficers based upon individualqualification rather than upon branch.

A history of the 110th FA Bn, 29th

Inf Div, is being prepared. Anyone

wishing to be on the mailing list for

notice when orders are taken should

write: Capt. Wm. A. Beehler. The

Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, Maryland.

Former officers of the 110th FA

(Regiment and Battalion) of the

Maryland National Guard are forming

an "Alumni Association" of officers.

Eligible are all former officers (peace

or war) of the Regiment, its successorunits, and all enlisted men who served

in the 110th and became officers of

other units. Duesnone: purpose

one annual dinner in Baltimore to

maintain friendships and to lead moral

support to the new 110th to be formed

in the National Guard. If eligible, send

in your name to Col. R. L. Slingluff,

Jr., Mercantile Bldg., Baltimore 2, Md.

334

I

Away she goes!


17/67

GEM TESTING FORVETERANS

Finding that thousands of G.I.'s arenow trying to discover whether the"gems" they purchased so blithely inforeign lands are genuine or

otherwise, the registered jewelers ofthe American Gem Society have cometo their aid with a simple plan bywhich they will waive their usual $5fee for gem testing and provideveterans with authentic andunimpeachable identification of theirgem stones without charge. Whilemany of the gem stones purchased inEurope, China, India, Japan, andthroughout the Pacific Islands have

proved to be genuine and worth atleast the money spent on them, therehave also been a number of cases of

misrepresentation. For example, mostof the "cat's eyes" purchased in theSolomons turn out to be ordinaryseashells; many "rubies" have turnedout to be topaz, and the so-called"oriental sapphires" when tested have

been found to be synthetics.

To obtain free gem identification,service men and women already incivilian life need only presentdischarge or terminal leave papers toany registered jeweler of the AmericanGem Society. Those still in uniformneed only present themselves.

A limit of three stones to a veteranhas been set by the Society and a timelimit of February 15 to July 1, 1946has been set.

The American Gem Society is theonly professional society in the

jewelry industry which, for theprotection of the buying public,registers those jewelers who meet itsstandards of knowledge and integrity.It is a non-profit organizationgoverned by members of the jewelrytrade itself.

To avail himself of this free gemtesting service the veteran is advisedto look for the emblem "RegisteredJewelerAmerican Gem Society"usually displayed in a rectangulardesign on the jeweler's window, orwrite to the American Gem Society,541 South Alexandria Avenue, LosAngeles 5, California, forinformation as to the nearest jewelerin his locality.

QUESTIONS

1. The angle which subtends one yard at 1000 yards is called a: (a) Gradient, (b) Minute, (c) Offset,(d) Mil.

2. Your guns are on your left. The angle T is 400 mils. The plane of fire is passing through the target

for deflection. You see a round land to the left of the OT line. You should sense that round as (a)

Over, (b) Short, (c) Doubtful, (d) Lost.3. The four pieces of a battery have the following calibration data. Which piece should be the base

piece? (1) 2 ft/sec, (2) + 1 ft/sec, (3) + 3 ft/sec, (4) + 5 ft/sec.4. When the gunner sets offright 50, what happens on the panoramic sight? (a) Deflection increases,

line of sight moves left; (b) deflection increases, line of sight moves right; (c) deflection decreases,

line of sight moves left; (d) deflection decreases, line of sight moves right.5. A line connecting the base piece and the base point is known as: (a) an orienting line, (b) a

directional traverse, (c) the line of impact, (d) a base line.6. The width in yards covered effectively by a 105mm howitzer shell burst is: (a) 15 yards, (b) 60

yards, (c) 80 yards, (d) 50 yards.7. What is a simple but effective field telephone expedient for getting your telephone message through

when the telephone local battery is dead?8. What is the function of the repeating coils with which the switchboard is equipped?9. What is meant by "integrated communications"?

10. What characteristic of FM radio receivers lends itself to the prevention of jamming?11. The maximum range of the 155mm gun M2 on carriage M1 is approximately (a) 20,000 yards. (b)

24,000 yards (c) 26,000 yards. (d) 28,000 yards.12. The HE projectile M1 for the 105mm howitzer M2A1 weighs 33 lbs. It contains how much TNT

filler? (a) 3 lbs, (b) 5 lbs, (c) 10 lbs, (d) 12 lbs.13. The 105mm howitzer M2A1 on carriage M2 weighs approximately (a) 1 tons, (b) 2 tons, (c) 3

tons, (d) 4 tons.14. Can the standard ammunition of the 105mm howitzer M3 be used in the 105mm howitzer M2A17

(a) No, (b) yes.15. The projectile of the recoilless rifles is different from the projectile of our standard artillery

weapons. The difference is: (a) color, (b) longer fuze, (c) pre-engraved rotating band, (d) spin vanes

on the boat tail.16. The cyclic rate of fire of the U. S. Carbine, Caliber .30, M2, is: (a) 550 rounds per minute, (b) 650

rounds per minute, (c) 750 rounds per minute, (d) 850 rounds per minute.17. In any artillery weapon firing separate loading ammunition, obturation takes place at: (a) forcing

cone, (b) centering slope, (c) main bore, (d) gas check seat.18. The HE projectile for the 8-inch howitzer M2 weighs approximately: (a) 100 pounds, (b) 150

pounds, (c) 200 pounds, (d) 250 pounds.19. The maximum range of the present standard 4.5-inch rockets M16 and M20 is approximately: (a)

3000 yards, (b) 5000 yards, (c) 7000 yards, (d) 9000 yards.20. A 75mm pack howitzer is transported by pack mule in: (a) 5 loads, (b) 6 loads, (c) 7 loads, (d) 8

loads.

ANSWERS: 1. (d); 2. (b); 3. (4); 4. (c); 5. (d); 6. (d); 7. use the receiver alternately as transmitter andreceiver; 8. permits simplexing or phantoming to secure additional channels of wire communication; 9. asystem which will permit communication between individuals by wire, radio or a combination of both; 10.FM radio receivers will accept only the stronger of two mutually interfering signals; 11. (c); 12. (b); 13. (b);14. (b); 15. (c); 16. (c); 17. (d); 18. (c); 19. (b); 20. (c).

335


18/67

The Shape and Way of

Our Future MilitaryEstablishment

Wartime Developments in War Department

Organization and Administration

Digested from an article by MAJOR GENERAL OTTO L. NELSON,

JR. Republished by courtesy of THE MILITARY REVIEW

There follows hereinafter aseries of articles that it is hopedwill help to clarify, for JOURNALreaders, certain vitally importantaspects of the pattern of our post-war Army. The lead-off article byGeneral Nelson provides usefulbackground information. An expertin administrative procedures andstaff organization, General Nelsonhas just written a splendid book,National Security and the GeneralStaff,*which will be reviewed in anearly issue of THE FIELDARTILLERY JOURNAL.Editor

*The Infantry Journal Press, 601 pp.;

illustrated; index; $5.00.

N TERMS of organizational changeand administrative developments, the

war did to the War Department about whatone would expectshook it up andchanged it to a point where it is scarcelyrecognizable to its intimates of pre-wardays.

Wartime demands for prompt action

and the compelling necessity for thecoordination of global military operationsforced fundamental changes in theorganizational structure andadministrative procedures of the WarDepartment. It was not that the oldorganization could not assimilateincreased numbers, for it could have doneso with little change. There were manyorganizational forms and departmental

procedures which had demonstrated theirmerit over a long period of years andwhich were capable of serving wartimeneeds. Alterations in the pre-war

organizational structure had to come tofacilitate rapid action, to improvecoordination, and, above all, to make themost of that fleeting factor, time, whenthere was so much to be done and so littletime available in which to do it.ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT AND

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

One of the most significant changesinduced by war needs was theestablishment of the Joint and CombinedChiefs of Staff and their supportingagencies in December 1941. The JointChiefs of Staff provided the medium toresolve the top military and related

political and economic problems of theUnited States. Designed primarily to

bring the Army and Navy chiefstogether, they also facilitated thetransaction of business between themilitary and the other executivedepartments of the government in thosefields closely related to the war effort.By admitting the military representatives

of the Allied governments, the JointChiefs of Staff transform themselves intothe Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The essential elements of the JointChiefs of Staff organization are:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consistingof the Chief of Staff to the Commander

in Chief of the Army and Navy, the Chiefof Staff of the U. S. Army, the Chief of

Naval Operations, and the CommandingGeneral of the Army Air Forces. Formalmeetings are usually held weekly. Anagenda is prepared for these meetingsand well-documented and thoroughly

prepared papers reduce randomdiscussion and pave the way for promptaction.

2. The Joint Chiefs of StaffSecretariat, with an officer of the Armyand an officer of the Navy as secretaryand deputy secretary, and an

administrative staff consisting of Army,Navy, and civilian personnel. The officeis well integrated, and no distinction inmade in assignment of jobs because of

branch of service.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff committees.Each committee operates under a charterapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff andconsists of Army and Navy officers, whoin many instances also have importantassignments in a related activity in theWar and Navy Departments. As a rule,there is a committee for each specific fieldor area in which the Joint Chiefs of Staffare interested. Thus, there are committeeson logistics, administration, transportation,

production, and strategy, to name a few.

The organization of the CombinedChiefs of Staff follows the same patternas that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Theonly difference is the addition ofrepresentatives of the Allied Nationsto each element of the Joint Chiefs of

I

336


19/67

1946 WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 337

Staff organization. Thus, when therepresentatives of the Allied Nations areadded, the Joint AdministrativeCommittee becomes the CombinedAdministrative Committee. The Joint andCombined Chiefs of Staff organizational

arrangement makes it possible forquestions to be considered first on astrictly national basis and then on anAllied basis and has the merit of using thesame representatives from the Army and

Navy to serve in a dual capacity.

Perhaps the most significantcontribution of the Joint and CombinedChiefs of Staff organization is that it has

provided top-level planning for theentire war effort. The various Joint andCombined Chiefs of Staff committeesare excellent planning agencies, and theentire organization has been designed to

emphasize the planning function. Theorganization is such that there is no

possibility for the planning committeesto become operating agencies. After thedecision has been made by the Joint orCombined Chiefs of Staff, the executionor implementation of an approved planor directive becomes a responsibility ofthe War or Navy Department or of anoverseas commander. This inability tooperate has contributed greatly to theexcellence and single-purposeness of the

planning function.

An important characteristic of the

Joint and Combined Chiefs of Stafforganization is to be found in thecombination of the committees. This can

best be explained by an example. Forinstance, the Army members of the JointLogistics Committees are, by design, thekey logistics officers in the WarDepartment. The head of the LogisticsGroup in the Operations Division of theWar Department General Staff, the headof the Plans and Operations Division inthe Army Service Forces, and the keyofficer on logistical planning in theArmy Air Forces, with their counterparts

in the Navy Department, make up theJoint Logistics Committee. It is thus

possible for them, when the need arisesfor a subcommittee, to staff it withofficers who are working on this

problem in their jobs in the War or NavyDepartment. Thus, the opportunity is

provided for a vast amount ofpreliminary work to be done within theWar and Navy Departments, in order toobtain first of all a complete treatment of

the problem along comparatively narrowlines. The Army Service Forcesrepresentative can be relied upon todevelop his side of the problem; theArmy Air Forces representative, the airside; and the representative from the

operations division of the WarDepartment General Staff will stress theoperational or strategical aspect. Thesame kind of treatment occurs in the

Navy Department. Then the Armyrepresentatives determine the Army

position while the same process isoccurring in the Navy Department toestablish the Navy view. In anappropriate subcommittee, or in the JointLogistics Committee, the air, ground,sea, and supply views of the problem are

put together. The opportunity is presentto resolve at the lowest practicable level

differences which might exist in thevarious viewpoints. By informalmethods the working members canascertain the views of their respectivesuperiors. At this level difficulties can besurmounted and disagreements resolvedwith comparative ease. This is in sharpcontrast to the difficulty experienced inreconciling diverse views when eachseparate opinion is processed throughthe various echelons to the highest level,and the attempt then made to secureagreement after a firm position has beentaken by the interested parties.

When a Joint Chiefs of Staffcommittee completes its work on a

project, a report in the form of a formalpaper is made to the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. The subject then becomes a properquestion for decision by the Joint Chiefsof Staff, and the paper is placed on theagenda of a formal meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and theCombined Chiefs of Staff organizationhas facilitated greatly the transaction ofinterdepartmental business of a militarynature among the various executivedepartments of the United States

Government. Likewise, the machineryhas facilitated the handling of complexmilitary questions involving the Allied

Nations.

THE WAR DEPARTMENTREORGANIZATION OF 1942

The War Department reorganizationof March 1942 was no less importantthan the establishment of the Joint andCombined Chiefs of Staff organization.

The purpose of the reorganization wasto effect necessary decentralization andto reduce greatly the number ofindividuals reporting directly to theChief of Staff. Pursuant to ExecutiveOrder No. 9082, Circular No. 59 was

published on 2 March 1942. Since thenthis terse circular of ten pages hassupplied the guiding principles and

basic organization under which the WarDepartment has functioned. Authority toact upon matters relating to the trainingof the ground combat armsinfantry,cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery,tank destroyer, and armored forcewasdelegated by the Chief of Staff to theCommanding General of the ArmyGround Forces. To the CommandingGeneral of the Army Air Forces wasdelegated the responsibility to procure

and maintain equipment peculiar to theAAF and to provide AAF units properlyorganized, trained, and equipped forcombat operations. The CommandingGeneral of the Services of Supply (nowthe Army Service Forces) was given themission of providing services andsupplies to meet military requirements,except those peculiar to the AAF. Underthe Commanding General of theServices of Supply were grouped thesupply servicesordnance,quartermaster, engineers, medical,signal, and chemical warfare; and the

administrative bureausfinance,adjutant general, chaplain, and judgeadvocate general. Certain fieldcommands, such as corps areas [nowservice commands], ports ofembarkation, and other miscellaneousactivities, were placed in the Services ofSupply. Thus the number of individualsdirectly responsible to the Chief of Staffwas reduced sharply. The commandinggenerals of the three major commands,the commanders of overseas theaters,and the assistant chiefs who head thefive War Department General Staff

divisions report direct. By this reductionin the span of control of the Chief ofStaff, the reorganization permitted theChief of Staff to concentrate on the

broad aspects of planning anddeveloping the military program and toguide the strategic conduct of war. TheWar Department General Staffdeveloped and coordinated policy; theoverseas commanders and thecommanding generals


20/67


of the three major commands in theUnited States carried out policies andstrategic directives under very widegrants of authority.

Such was the urgency for speedyaction that the reorganization

intentionally over-emphasizeddecentralization and the delegation ofauthority to subsidiary echelons. It was

possible to solve many questions atlower organizational levels, and thetransaction of War Department andArmy business was greatly expedited.Because of the degree ofdecentralization, there had to be somesacrifice in the degree of coordination to

be obtained.

With the establishment of the ArmyGround Forces, Army Air Forces, andArmy Service Forces in March 1942, the

War Department General Staff divisionswere freed from the strain of pressingday-to-day operations and were ableonce again to return to their planningand coordinating activities.

To coordinate military operations, thereorganization included theestablishment in the War DepartmentGeneral Staff of an Operations Division,which replaced the War Plans Division.Here was placed the responsibility totransmit and to coordinate all theinstructions and directives for theconduct of military operations which

were sent to the various overseastheaters and to the defense commands inthe United States. The OperationsDivision became the central agency inthe War Department through which allinstructions to overseas theaters had to

be channeled. By monitoring allincoming and outgoing messages fromand to theaters, the Operations Divisionmade certain that a theater request didnot go unanswered and that conflictinginstructions were corrected. In thestrategy and policy group of theOperations Division there was

established the required staff assistanceto prepare the necessary strategicaldirectives for the Chief of Staff.

STAFF SUPERVISION

Staff supervision by the WarDepartment General Staff has always

been subject to varying interpretation.The planning role of the staff has always

been accepted, but there has always beena disposition to question the extent of itssupervisory role. With the establishmentof the three major commands in theUnited States, and with the prominenceof the overseas theaters, the tendency

has been for the War DepartmentGeneral Staff to respect the commandprerogatives of the commanderconcerned and to accept the philosophythat commanders will comply with WarDepartment directives. Where specialconditions have arisen, and where it hasappeared likely that the commanderconcerned might have difficulty inimplementing a directive, WarDepartment General Staff supervisionhas been extended to the point necessaryto obtain a close check on performance.

Early in the war it became necessary

to initiate staff supervision to make surethat troop units going overseas wereadequately trained and equipped. TheDeputy Chief of Staff was given theresponsibility of personally approvingthe clearance of every unit prior tooverseas shipment. It was thereforenecessary to establish a system ofsupervisory controls in which theInspector General played a mostimportant part. The system required thata status report, describing the conditionsof the unit, be submitted by thecommanding general of the major

command responsible for the training ofthe unit. This report listed: the pertinentinformation concerning the unit, such asthe efficiency rating of the unitcommander; a summary of the trainingthat had been given; the percentagequalifications of the unit in the weaponswhich had to be fired; a statement thatthe training required by mobilizationregulations had been completed; and astatement that all required equipmentwas on hand or that it would befurnished on a certain date. Thesereports were excellent, but because they

were made by the commander who wasresponsible for the training, it wasconsidered desirable to obtain thecomments of a disinterested agency. Forthis reason, it was required that anofficer of the Inspector General'sDepartment spend several days with theunit in order to make a detailedinspection, on the basis of which anindependent report was submitted. The

report indicated all deficiencies whichhad been observed in the unit and endedwith a statement that the unit was or wasnot qualified for overseas shipment. Thestatus report which was submitted by theresponsible major command and the

report of the Inspector General werethen considered at the same time, andtogether they furnished the informationnecessary to make a decision to approvethe shipment of the unit overseas.

The wartime shortage of manpowerwas responsible for the establishment ofanother General Staff agency whose

primary duty was staff supervision. Inorder to exploit all opportunities to saveon manpower, the War DepartmentManpower Board was established inWashington with field sections invarious parts of the United States. The

board reports directly to the Chief ofStaff, and is given free rein in makingmanpower surveys to ascertain where

personnel savings can be made. Aftersurveying a number of the same type ofinstallations throughout the UnitedStates, the War Department ManpowerBoard sets up a yardstick which it usesas the basis for personnel manning in agiven type of installation. It then appliesthat yardstick and submitsrecommendations on personneleconomics which, in its opinion, can bemade.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

It would be wrong to assume that theWar Department has no unsolved

problems in organization andadministration and that all agenciesoperate at optimum efficiency. Only inwartime was it possible for substantialchange to occur, and this factemphasizes what might be termed thedifficult role of the innovator in publicadministration.

While wartime changes were alwayseasy to make, the fact remains thatchange was the rule and the status quothe exception. The principal officers inthe War Department not only werewilling to try new methods but alsoinspired subordinates with a zeal toeffect improvement. It is to be hopedthat the advantages of that condition will

become so apparent that it will beas itwas not beforecontinued in peacetime.


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GENERAL

N LINE with the reduction of theArmy from a peak strength of more

than 8,000,000 to 1,550,000 the WarDepartment has announced a majorreorganization of the War Departmentand of the Army, effective at 12:01 a.m.,June 11, 1946. Acting on therecommendation of the Secretary ofWar, the President issued an executiveorder on 13 May authorizing theSecretary of War to reassign the

functions theretofore assigned to theArmy Service Forces. This order, takenin connection with existing laws andexecutive orders, makes possible a majorreorganization of the Army and of theWar Department.

The present organization of the WarDepartment was designed for theconduct of a global war and servedadmirably during hostilities. However,the transition from war to peace and thereduction in size and scope of activitiesof the Army make advisable a majorreorganization which will not only save

money and personnel but also minimizeduplication of effort and provide moreclear-cut command channels.

Careful Study. The reorganization ofthe War Department and of the Armycomes as a result of studies initiated bythe department soon after thetermination of hostilities with Japan. Thenew organization is not intended as amodel for the formation of a unifieddepartment of armed services which isthe subject of pending legislation.However, in the event such legislation isenacted, the War Departmentorganization, with minor adjustments,can remain substantially unaltered,except for the transfer of the Army AirForces to an independent status withinthe new department.

Most of the changes effected werethose recommended by a WarDepartment Board, originally headed bythe late Lieutenant General AlexanderM. Patch, and later under the presidency

of Lieutenant General W. H. Simpson,former commander of the Ninth Army.The Board made a thorough study of theWar Department operations during theWar and incorporated in its findings theconclusions reached from lessonslearned during hostilities.

The War Department has alreadyinitiated action to make effective within30 days the reorganization of the WarDepartment and of the Army.Instructions have been sent to all major

commands directing the necessary stepsto begin the reorganization. A WarDepartment circular is being issuedgiving detailed information on thechanges to be effected.

Principles Developed. The followingprinciples were developed during thecourse of the studies and hearingsconducted, and were incorporated intothe reorganization:

A simple and flexible organization,with clear-cut command channels, isneeded to satisfy the requirements of

economy and efficiency.The top organization of the War

Department must be capable of carryingout the orders of the Chief of Staffquickly and effectively and must havethe means and the authority tosupervise and direct the execution ofsuch orders.

The structure of the staff organizationmust be as simple as possible with aminimum of individuals reportingdirectly to the Chief of Staff or hisdeputy.

Of great importance is the provision of

adequate means for (1) the conduct ofthe best possible research anddevelopment program, (2) intelligenceand counter-intelligence activities and(3) elimination of duplication in allactivities.

The necessary degree of efficiencyand vitality can be attained only throughthe aggressive application of the

principle of decentralization. No

function should be performed at the stafflevel of the War Department which can

be decentralized to the major commands,the Army areas or the services withoutloss of adequate control of operations bythe staff.

REORGANIZATION OFTHE WAR DEPARTMENT

AND OF THE ARMY There must be a single continuouscommand channel from top to bottom ofthe War Department.

Direct contact and mutualarrangements, within approved policies,

between major commands, staffdivisions and technical andadministrative services are desirable andare encouraged.

SECRETARY OF WAR'S OFFICE

Under the reorganization the duties ofthe Secretary of War, the UnderSecretary and the Assistant Secretariesare in general as at present prescribed.As evidence of the emphasis that the

War Department places on theimportance of scientific research anddevelopment, this important activity,for the present at least, will be underthe personal direction and control of theSecretary of War. (See Chart.) Inconnection with the civilian aspects ofthis problem the Secretary will beassisted by an Advisory Board ofleading scientists, technicians andindustrialists to assure necessarycontacts with civilian organizationsengaged in research and developmentactivities. On the military side, there

will be a research and developmentdivision on the General Staff level,directly under the Chief of Staff, butoperating in close coordination with theOffice of the Secretary of War. Theapplication of scientific advances tomilitary equipment, training andoperations will be the subject ofcontinuous study and experimentationthroughout the Army.

The Under Secretary of War ischarged with direction and supervisionof War Department procurementactivities and industrial mobilization and

demobilization. He is also charged withthe supervision of clemency for military

prisoners and certain other mattersrelated to military justice, claims andother activities.

The Assistant Secretary of War isresponsible for administration andsupervision of civil affairs, militarygovernment and relations with the StateDepartment and other governmental

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agencies thereon, and for performingsuch other duties as may be assigned bythe Secretary of War.

The Assistant Secretary of War for Airretains responsibilities similar to those at

present assigned.

CHIEF OF STAFF

Few changes are made in the duties ofthe Chief of Staff but the order redefineshis duties, responsibilities and authority.The Chief of Staff is the principalmilitary adviser to the President and tothe Secretary of War on the conduct ofwar and the principal military adviserand executive to the Secretary of War onthe conduct of the activities of themilitary establishment. The Chief ofStaff has command of the operatingforces comprising the Army Air Forces,

the Army Ground Forces, the ArmyAreas, the Organized Reserves, theNational Guard when in federal service,

and such overseas departments, taskforces, base commands, defensecommands and other commands as theSecretary of War may find necessary fornational security, and the related supplyand service establishments of the Army,

and is responsible to the Secretary ofWar for their use in war and for plansand preparations for their readiness inwar. He is also charged with thecoordination and direction of efforts ofthe War Department and General Staffto this end.

The new organization places the Chiefof Public Information directly under theChief of Staff. He will continue tocoordinate the work of the PublicRelations Division, the Legislative andLiaison Division and the Informationand Education Division. The functions

of these agencies will remainsubstantially the same as at present.

The organization of the offices ofthe Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefwill be the same as at present exceptthat provision is made for a smallAdvisory Group to the Chief of Staffto consist of such personnel as he may

determine.GENERAL STAFF DIVISIONS

Each of the General Staff Divisionswill be headed by a director insteadof an Assistant Chief of Staff. Whilemost of these divisions in general willhave similar functions to those of the

present organization the authorityand responsibilities of the heads ofthe divisions are strengthened andincreased. Each director will have theauthority to plan, direct andsupervise the execution of operations

within his sphere of action. Each isgiven authority to issue

ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT


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1946 REORGANIZATION OF WAR DEPARTMENT AND ARMY 341

orders in the name of the Secretary ofWar and the Chief of Staff.

The Director of Personnel andAdministration replaces the AssistantChief of Staff for Personnel (G-1) in the

present organization. He will be the

personnel manager of the WarDepartment and adviser and assistant tothe Chief of Staff for all matters relatingto personnel as individuals. He will havethe over-all War Departmentresponsibility for the procurement andallocation of personnel in bulk to themajor commands and for thedemobilization of individuals. He willsupervise and coordinate the activitieswithin his field of responsibility of theadministrative servicesThe AdjutantGeneral's Department, The JudgeAdvocate General's Department (except

with respect to court-martial and certainlegal matters for which The JudgeAdvocate General will report directly tothe Secretary of War or the UnderSecretary of War), the Corps ofChaplains, the Office of the ProvostMarshal General and the SpecialServices Divisionand of all existingtemporary boards and committees now

performing personnel functions. Thedirector will limit his activities to

personnel and administrative matters ofa War Department or Army-wide levelof importance decentralizing authority

and responsibility in all other matters toappropriate major commands andtechnical and administrative services.

The Director of Intelligence willreplace the Assistant Chief of Staff forMilitary Intelligence (G-2) in the presentorganization. He will be the adviser andassistant of the Chief of Staff for all WarDepartment matters relating to militaryintelligence and counterintelligence ofthe Army. He is to be responsible formeeting intelligence requirements whichare common to major commands and totechnical and administrative services.

However, all major commanders willoperate their own intelligence agenciesin the field of their primaryresponsibility. The Director ofIntelligence has the over-all WarDepartment responsibility for thecollection, evaluation and disseminationof intelligence. He will represent theWar Department with all governmentagencies on all matters concerningintelligence. He will supervise the

Military Intelligence Service and theArmy Security Agency and Army

participation in propaganda andpsychological warfare.

The Director of Organization andTraining will replace the Assistant Chief

of Staff for Organization and Training(G-3) in the present organization. Hisduties will be much the same as those at

present assigned to this division andinclude studies of the organization of theWar Department and the Army,mobilization and demobilization of theArmy, prescribing training objectives,establishing general training policies ofthe Army School system, coordinatingand inspecting training activities andinstallations and the use of troops indomestic emergencies and civilceremonies.

The Director of Service, Supply andProcurement will replace the presentAssistant Chief of Staff for Supply (G-4). The functions now prescribed forCommanding General, Army ServiceForces, in connection with service,supply and procurement, and thefunctions of the Assistant Chief of Staff,G-4, and Logistics Groups, OperationsDivision, will be assigned to the Directorof Service, Supply and Procurement.The director, in connection withappropriate joint and combined agencies,will develop logistical plans for the

Army. He will furnish logisticalplanning guidance to other WarDepartment agencies and the majorcommands. With respect to procurementand related matters the director willreport to the Under Secretary of War andon all military matters will report to theChief of Staff. The director willsupervise and coordinate the service,supply and procurement activities of theCorps of Engineers (except with respectto civil functions for which the Chief ofEngineers will report directly to theSecretary of War), the Medical

Department, Signal Corps, OrdnanceDepartment, Quartermaster Corps,Transportation Corps, FinanceDepartment and Chemical WarfareService. Other activities of theseservices will be under the supervisionand coordination of appropriate Generaland Special Staff divisions. The Directorof Service, Supply and Procurement willutilize the major commands and thetechnical services as his operating

agencies in discharging the functions forwhich he is responsible.

The Director of Plans and Operationswill supersede the Assistant Chief ofStaff for Operations in the presentorganization. He will be responsible for

the formulation and development ofstrategic and operations plans, includingspecial plans, and for assisting the Chiefof Staff in the strategic direction of theArmy forces.

In the reorganization the Researchand Development Division, which willconcern itself primarily with themilitary aspects of scientific advances,

becomes a division of the GeneralStaff. It replaces the NewDevelopments Division of the presentorganization. The director of the newdivision will be the adviser and

assistant of the Secretary of War andthe Chief of Staff for War Departmentresearch and development. He will beresponsible for the initiation, allocationand coordination of new or improvedweapons, devices and techniques andfor provision for mobilization ofscientific, technical and industrialefforts essential to the research anddevelopment program of thedepartment. He will cooperate closelywith the Advisory Board of theSecretary of War in connection withthese activities.

SPECIAL STAFF DIVISIONS

Special activities which because oftheir scope should report directly to theDeputy Chief of Staff will be underappropriate War Department SpecialStaff Divisions.

The National Guard Bureau, theExecutive for Reserve and R.O.T.C.Affairs, The Inspector General, theBudget Division and Budget Officer forthe War Department, the Civil AffairsDivision, the Historical Division and theWar Department Manpower Board are

retained as divisions of the Special Staff,with duties and functions, for the most

part, as at present prescribed.

The duties and functions of theTechnical and Administrative Servicesof the War Department will remaingenerally as now prescribed; theiractivities will be supervised andcoordinated by appropriate heads ofGeneral and Special Staff Divisions,each in his field of responsibility.


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The Commanding General. Army Ground Forces, and six army commanders. Left to right: Generals Devers. Hodges,Stilwell, and Wainwright; and Lieutenant Generals Simpson, Griswold, and Walker.

ARMY GROUND FORCES

The Commanding General, ArmyGround Forces, commands the sixarmies within the Continental UnitedStates and individuals and units assigned

to the Army Ground Forces. He willadminister and direct operations andtraining of the armies, and willdetermine organization, composition,equipment and training of assignedunits. He will also determinerequirements in personnel, equipmentand funds for the forces under hiscommand. Schools and replacementfacilities for ground forces will beoperated under his direction. He willsupervise and inspect training of units,other than air, of the R.O.T.C., NationalGuard and Organized Reserves.

General Jacob L. Devers, ArmyGround Forces Commander, will soonmove his headquarters from Washingtonto Fort Monroe, Virginia.

ARMY AREAS

The Commanding General of each ofthe Armies will command all units,

posts, camps, stations and installationswithin his Army Area, except exemptedinstallations and stations, and exceptunits, posts, camps, stations orinstallations commanded by

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Jun 1946