field force debriefing artillery officers vietnam.pdf

7/22/2019 field force debriefing artillery officers vietnam.pdf

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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesand their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 20 NOV 1969.Other requests shall be referred to AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development (Army),Washington, DC 20310.

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S E C R E T DEPARTMENTOFTHEARMYOFFICEOFTHE ADJUTANTGENERAL

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S E C R E T DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAMAPO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHGC-DSTS U B J E C T : SeniorOfficerDebriefingReportEGL .D .Kinnard

AssistantChiefo f StaffforForceDevelopmentDepartmento f t h e ArmyWashington,D .C .

1 ,ttacheda r et h r e ecopieso f t h eSeniorOfficerDebriefingReportpreparedbyBGL .D .Kinnard. T h ereportcoverst h e period2 1May1969t o2 0November1 9 6 9duringwhicht i m e BG Kinnardserveda sCommandingG e n e r a l ,I I FieldForceVietnamArtillery.2 .GKinnardi s recommendedasa candidateguestspeakeratappropriateservices c h o o l s .FORTHECOMMANDER:

1Inclas( t r i p ) W~ 'r- ' - " " " ' : '2c y w dH Q ,D A" . ' 'R e g r a d e dunclassi f iedwh e ne p a r a t e d from classifiedinc losure .

S E C R E T


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S E C R E T EPARTMENTFHERM !HEADQUARTERS , III ELDC R C EIETNAMARTILLERY A P OanFrancisco6266

AVFB-FAC 0ovemr.er9 < S UB J E C T : SeniorOfficerDebriefingProgramU ) CommandingGeneralUnitedStatesrmyVietnamATTN : AVHGC -DST APO6375

1 .References:a .R1-26b .SARVReg1- 3

2 .AttacheddebriefingreportisforwardedaBrequiredbyreferencedregulationsandreflectsmyobservationswhilecommandingI IFieldForceVietnamArtilleryfrom 21May1969to20November1969.

1Inclas L.D.KINNARDBrigadierGeneral,US A

Commanding

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iiS E C R E T


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S E C R E T 1 . ( S ) INTRODUCTION:

a .hefollowingobservationsweremadeinlateNovember1969andpertaintoasix monthperiodasCommandingGeneral,I IFieldForceViet-namArtilleryfromMay21 ,1969toNovember20 ,1969. Itmightb eusefulattheoutsettocommentbrieflyontheenemyandfriendlysituation r .theI IFieldForceareaduringthatperiod.b .atureofthewar . A saresultofFuMAFsuccesses,themainforceenemyunitshavemovedintooutlyingareas.tappearsthattheenemy'smajorobjectivesweretoreopenLOC'sandtodisrupttheFWMAFpacificationeffort.istacticswerecharacterizedbystandoffattacksusingmortarsandrockets,sapperreconnaissanceandselectedattacks,andmainforceattacksinstrengthalongtheborder.heenemy'sabilityt oavoidcontactwheneverpossible

continuedtobehisgreatestasset. Ontheotherhand,hisabilityt ochoosethetimeandplaceforbattlewasbeingattrited. Oursuccesseshaveenabledust oaccelerateVietnam!zationofthewar,TerritorialsecurityforceswerebeingcommittedtothesecuritycfthepopulatedareasandARVNunitswerepushingoutt ointerdictenemymovementandtoengagehimintheoutlyingareas. FWMFcontinuedcombatandcombatsupportactivitieswithaviewtowardsacceleratingpacification,improvingthecombateffectivenessofRVNAF,anderodingenemycapabilityinallareas.c .nemyandFriendlyDisposition. DurinpthepaBtBixmonths,the5thVCDivisionhaBmovedfromitsbaseareaBinLongKhanhProvincetothenorthernportionofPhuocLongProvince.he7th

and9thNVADivisionsremaininthenortherntier.ntelligenceindicatesthatthe13tNVADivision,withtworegiments,hasmovedIntoIVCTZ. Sub-regionalforceshavebeenseriouslyattritedandwhiletheyremaininthesamegeneralareashavebeenforcedtodisperseintosquadandplatoonsizegroupsinordertoobtainfoodandtoavoiddetection. TheassumptionoffullresponsibilityforCapitalMilitaryDistrictbyCG,CML,andtheBubequentphasedownofCMAC,permittedtheutilizationofthe199thLIBandthe3dBde82dAbnDivinotherareas.he3dBde82dAbnDivwasInitiallyemployedinsouthernBinhDuongProvinceandlaterreturnedtotheUnitedStates. The199thLIBwasdeployedt otheeasternportionoftheIIICTZtooperatewiththe18th* ARVNDiv. The11thACRmovedfromthesoutheasternportionoftheI I ICTZwhereithadbeencondztinpoperationswiththeRTAVFandthe1stATFLOthenortherntierwhereitispresently0PC0Nofthe1stCavDiv(AM). TheARVNAbnDivwithtwobrigadeshasalsodeployedtothenortherntiertoconductoperationswiththe1stCavDiv(AM).he25thInfDivwiththe3dBde9thInfDiv OPCNcontinuestooperateinthewesternportionofIIICTZ. The1st DivremainsinthecentralTAG]. CMDforcesconsistofonebrigadeof eARVNAbnDiv,ARVNRangers,andRegionalForces.KOK ' iIT69B0561'llobure O W N G R A D E D A T 3Y E A R I N T E R V A L S ;

D E C L A S S I F I E D A F T E R2E A R S .D O D D IR 5200.10S E C R E T


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S E C R E T d ArtilleryDeploymentsandOrganisation . ThepastBixmonthswitnessedtheinitiationandcompletionofthefirsttwophases(KeystoneEagleandKeyBtoneCardinal)oftheoperationwhichprovidestheimpetusforUStroopwithdrawalsfromtheRepublicofVietnam.nitialimpactoftheforcereductionson

IIFieldForceArtillerywastheIOBSof809personnelapaceare-quiringinactlvationofonebattalionof 105mm howitzers,oneartillerygroupheadquarters,andtwoartilleryradardetachments.Additionally,theorganictargetacquisitionbatterywasdrawndowntoastrengthof 30personnel,loBtitstwoMetrosections,andispendingattachmenttotheForceArtilleryHeadquartersandHead-quartersBattery.OBSofonegroupheadquartersnecessitateda realignmentofForceArtilleryassetstoprecludeoverextendingthespanofcontrolofasinglegroup.nderthisrealignmentthethreeheavybattalionswereassignedtoForceArtilleryandthetwolightandfourmedian battalionswereassignedto23dArtilleryGroup.hefor^eartillerystaffwasaugmentedtomeettheaddedadministrativevorkload,principally,thatresultingfromassumptionofresponsibilityforpersonneladministration.heassumptionofcommandandcontroloverthreeheavybattalionsresultedInaddeddemandsontheoperationsf l e c t i o nandrequiredsomeinternalreorganisation.hechartsatTABAdepictIIFieldForceArtilleryorganizationbeforeand aftertheinitialforcereduction.

e .rtilleryAssetsAvailable.uringmoBtoftheperiodofthisreporttherewere816US,RVNAFandF r f M A F artillerypiecesinactionwithinillCTZ.henormalassignmentsanddistributionbyARVNDiifiicnTacticalAreaareshownonthechartatTABB .2. ( C )redibilityofTaigetDetectionMeans

a .urjngtheperiod21Maythrough21November,largescaleenemyactivityhasbeensporadicandin manyareasofIIICTZ,non-existent.hlBreluctancetomassforcesandconductfrequenteve-tmilitaryoperationshasnecessitatedaresultantincreaseintheusecranddependenceupen,targetdetectiondevicestolocateanddlsrup1theenemyandcontinuetodenyhim unlimiteduseofthecorpsa r c - ;conducthisoperations.b .hroughextensiveuseoftargetdetectiondevicessignificantlessonshavebeenlearnedregardingtheiremploymentandcredibility,( 1 )roundSurveillanceRadars(GSR).heuseofGSRhasincreasedsignificantlybyfrequentmovementofthesetst oarea3ofBuspectedenemyactivity.reviously,staticemplacementoftheselongrangepersonneldetectiondevicesenabledtheenemytofixhislocationsandplanhisoperationsoutsidetheirrangeorsectorofscan.hemap

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CONFIDENTIALatTABCdepictstypicalstaticlocationsofAN/TPS-25AradarsinIIICT2.rganicdivisionalasBetsareshowninpreenandthoseoftheforceArtilleryinred.

Duringthepastsixmonths,throughcorrelationofintelligencedata,highlysuspectareasofenemy activitywerelocatedandaGSRmovedtothenearestalliedinstallationorfirebasetofurtheren-hancedetectionofenemymovementsforsubsequentengagementbyartillery,,TACAir,ormaneuverforces.wotypeBofGSR,AN/PPS-5andtheAN/ITS-^,havebeenusedinIIICTZ. Theoffensiveem-ploymenttechniquedescribedabcvohasbeenextremelyeffectiveincounteringenemymovementsbuthasidentifiedseveralproblemareas. Therelativelydelicatenatureoftheequipmentrequireswelltrained personnelnotonlyintheoperationandmaintenanceofthesetbutalsoinproperdisplacementtechniques.ncreasedcrewproficiencyintheseareashasgreatlyreduceddowntime.oin-creaseeffectivenessofthesetinareasthataremaskedfromgroundlevel,AB-216/UsignaltowershavebeenusedtoelevatetheGSR andhaveprovedt ob ewellsuitedforthisparticularrole.

( 2 1ensors.heuseofsensordevices,seismic,acoustic,magneticandinfrared,hasbecoieincreasinglysignificantasameanBof providingtargetinginforaationforartilleryengagement.Althoughthecredibilityofonesensoractivationisextremelylow,theratingincreaseswhensensorsareemployedingroupsutilisingdifferenttypes. Forthemostpart,sensorsc a n i ^ o tdiscernbetweentypesoftargets,however,employingdifferenttypesofsensorsandcorrelatingactivationswithotherintelligencedatahasproducedprofitableresults.f primaryimportanceforartilleryengagement1Banaccuratemeansoflocatingthesensorsandwelltrainedop-era torecapableof identifyingInsignificantactivations, Approx-imately70^ ofthesensorBarea'rdroppedmakingaccuratelocationdifficult. Severaltechniquesh * i v ebeenusedtoaccuratelylocatethedevicessuchasthedroppingofasmokegrenadewiththesensor.Theareaisphotographedimmediatelyafterthedropandthephoto-graphIsthencomparedtoanotherphotographtakeneitherbeforethedropor afterthesmokehasdissipated.secondtechniqueistohoverahelicopteroverthea t . r . a o randuseradartoobtainagridlocation.thertechniquesIncludemapspot'-'npandartilleryfiring.

( 3 ) RedHaie, I , AR ,Sniffer. Thes- : r a t i o ndeviceshavep r o v e : :valuableasintelligencegather!:;'media,however,theyhave. h a dlit'lnpracticalapplicationforartilleryengagementbasedsoleyonInfor-mationtheyprovide.LAR,beingadopplerradardevice,detectsonlymovingtargets. 3ythetimetargetdatasoobtainedcanbeplottedthetargethasp r o ; . movedfromthearea.edHaelaaninfrareddevicewhich ^ i b l eofdetectingandprovidingthegenerallocationofheat : I n gobjectsonthegroundsuchasfiresand

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CONFIDENTIAL vehicleengines.helocationsprovidedareareatypelocationsandareseldompreciseenoughfortargeting.hisdevicecannotdis-criminateaccuratelybetweentargettypesandthusIsbeBtusedtodesignateareaswhichmightwarrantadditional,moredetailedinvest-igation.hesnifferdevicesamplesthelayerof airjustabovethejunglecanopyandiscapableof detectingminutetracesof gasesandairbornecompoundscommontoanimalexcreta.irmovementandthepresenceofwildlifeinthejunglelimittheaccuracyoflocationaswellastheidentityoftargetseolocated.hesethreedevicesprovideanexcellentareadetectioncapabilityandassuchnotonlyindicatethebestareasforGSRsearchandsensoremploymentbutarefrequentlyusedtoconfirmtargetsdetectedbythesemorerefinedmeanB.osingledetectionmeansshouldbeusedasthesolesourceof targetingdatawherealternatetargetingmeansareavailable. greatdealofartilleryammunitionhasbeenwastedinthepaBtengagingpoorlylocatedandilldefinedtargetsdetectedbyonlyonemeans.tTABDisapaperwhichdiscussestherelativecredibilityof availabletargetdetectionmeans.3.C )mploymentofArtillery

a .rtilleryRaids.ommandemphasisonmobilityandaggressiveemploymentof theforceartilleryhasresultedinatenfoldincreaseinheavyartilleryraidsduringtheperiodMaytoNovember1969overemploymentofsuchtacticsduringtheprevioussix months.mploymentofheavyartilleryinthismannerhasprovenparticularlyeffectiveagainstcaves,bunkersandcachesalongenemyroutesofegress,denyingtheenemyvitalsuppliesandshelterenroutet oandfromsanctuaryareas.ccasionallysuchraidsaretargetedagainstenemyforwardstagingareaslocatedbyimprovedtargetdetectionmeans.heextremeaccuracyanddevastatingfirepowerhavehadadecidedpsychologicalimpactonenemymoraleasrevealedbyagentreportsanddetaineeinterrogations.histacticmaintainscontinualpressureontheenenybyeffectivelydenyinghimsaferefugeinareaswhichwerepreviouslyrelativelysecure.

b .obility.obilityisthek eytoeffectiveartillerysupportof maneuverforcesinthecounterinBurgencyenvironment.Suchisevenmorethecaseduringperiodsof lowlevelenemyact-ivitywhenfriendlyactivityischaracterizedbyextensivesmallunitoperationsthroughoutlargeAC'S.oprovideeffectivesupportfortheseunits,forceartilleryassetshavemade109majormovesduringthepastsix months.uchactivity,inadditiontcshortmovesinvolvedinconductingartilleryraids,hassignificantlyincreasedtherequirementforamobileconfigurationwithintheforceartillerysinceMay1969.hechartatTABE depictsthisincreasingtrendingreenandcomparestubemilagewithintheforceartillerywiththatofothermajorI IFieldForcecomma'de.hiscontrast

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CONFIDENTIAL betweenforce artilleryanddivisionartillerymovement1Bexplainedinlargepartby anincraaaingtendencyforamaneuverunit,anditsdirectsupportartillery,toconfineitselftoasingleareaofoper-ations.romamaneuverunitpointofview,thisisquiteimportantatthisstageof thewar.stheenemy,tcincludeVietConginfra-structure,becomesincreasinglydifficulttolocateitisvitallyimportanttoknowanareaof operationsaswellorbetterthantheenemy.neffect,then,theforceartilleryfilledfiresupportgapsandpivoted aroundthedirectsupportbattalionsandthemaneuverunitstheysupport.

c .rtilleryArnnmnltlonExpenditures.uringtheperiodMaytoNovember1969,artillery ammunitionexpendituresincreasedslightlyeventhoughexpenditureswithinIIFieldForceArtillerydroppedduringOctoberinresponsetcacorrespondingdecreaseinenemyact-ivity.hechartatTAB Fcomparesexpendituresoftheforceartilleryandother artillerywiththeforcetoenemyinitiatedincidentsandenemyKIAsinceJanuary1969.fparticularsignif-icanceisthefactthatexpendituresofthedirectsupportartillerybattalionsshowedamarkedincreaseduringOctoberasenemyincidentsdecreased and'friendlysearchanddestroyoperationswereinitiatedtomaintainpressureontheenemyandlocatehisbaseareas.sreflectedonthechartatTAEG ,expendituresbyIIFFORCEVArtilleryunitsagainstacquiredtargetsincreasedsharplyduringthesameperiod,whileconfirmedtargetengagement,whichhadincreasedsteadilysinceMay1969,decreasedproportionately.hevarioustargetcategoriesdepictedaredefinedonthepagebehind thischart.mprovedtargetacquisitionmeans,alreadydiscussed,areresponsiblefortheIncreasedexpendituresagainstacquiredtypetargets.nextensivestudyisinprogresstodevelopspecificguidancewhichwillprovidecommandersabasisforfurtherdevelopingexpendituremanagementpolicywithintheircommands.

d .ounter-SapperDefenseofFireBases.hegreatestcurrentthreattothesecurityofartillery weaponsandammunitionlocatedatfiresupportbasesissapperattack.roperrevetingandbunkeringofweaponsandammunitionprovidesexcellentsurvivabilityagainstattackbysmallarmsandgoodprotectionagainsttheeffectsof mortarandrocketattackunlessadirecthitisscored.heVC/NVAsapper,however,istrainedtoinfiltratebaseca^ tefenBes,oftenunderthecoverof indirectfire,toengageh l g ;" i i u etargetssuchasartillerypiecesandammunitionbunkerswi : hsatchelchargesandrocketpropelledgrenade(RFC)fire.venthebestpreparedlteniajdefensesometimesfailstocompletelyprotectweaponsandammunitionfrothistypeattack.fthemanycounter-sappertacticswhichh a *beendeveloped,theistimportantarethoseaimedatdetecting anddecisivelyengagl"'~ .e sapperbeforeheisabletopenetratethefirebaseperimet = hek ey tosuchdetectionisalertsentinelsCONFIDENTIAL


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CONFIDENTIALandawellplanneddefensivebarrier.onsiderableemphasishasbeen placed onmethodsofpreparingeffectivedefensivebarriersandobstaclestoimpedethesapper.hesetechniquesnavebeenintegratedintounittrainingprogramsandthetrainingandalert-nessofsentinelsisamatterof strongcommandconcernandemphasis.Oneofthemosteffectivetrainingvehicles'jurrentlybeingusedisademonstrationofsappertacticsandtechniquesbyex-VC/NVAsapperKitCarsonScouts.hesedemonstrationsareparticularlyenlighteningandImpressivetoenlistedpersonnelwhoaresubjecttoperimeterandaentineldutysincetheytendtorelatedirectlytothesituationthattheyareobserving}thati s ,asapperinfiltratingwhattheyconsidertobeawellconstructeddefensiveperimeterwireobstaclesimilar rthatwhichtheyguard.hedevastatingfirepowerandaddedpinpointilluminationaffordedbythe40mm"duBterB",quadruple5 0calmachinegunsand xenonsearchlightsoftheautomaticweaponsbattalionhavemorethanonceweighedheavilyinthedefenseof afirebaaeundersapperetteza. Themostimportantsinglefactor,however,indevelopingdefensivetechniquestocountersappertacticshasbeenthepersonalinterestandattentionofcommanders,manyof whom visitedbaseslikelyto)eattackedinordertostudytheproblemfirst-hand,aswellBtoencouragethedefenders.heiranalysisof sappertechniquesandthedefensivetacticsdevelopedtherefromharecontributedsignificantlytoour presentknowledgeanddefensibility.

e . ArtilleryAccidentsandIncidents.neofthemoat per-plexingproblemsfacingartilleryc o m i c a r . d e r sinVietnam i f lthatofbringingthefullcombatpowerof hisweaponstobearonthee n t - m y ,yetselectively avoidinginjuryandpropertydamagetofriendlycivilians,amongwhomtheenemyattemptst oconcealhimself,andinjurytofriendlytroopswhooperateint h esameareaastheenemyinsearchofhislocation.ehavedeterminedthebestf f a t h o d ofaccoapliohlngthisdifficulttasktobeapplicationof surgicalprecisiontoallaspsotsoffiredeliveryandclosestudyoffailureswhichresultinascidentandIncidents.eareconstant-lyseekingnewwaystoimplementandfocusattentiontothestand-ingregulationsanddirectiveswhichprovideforsafeandaccuratedeliveryoffire.etailedanalysisofaccidentandincidentInvest-igationreportsidentifiescausesandprovidesanIndicationofweaknesseswhichrequirecorrectiveactionintheform ofcommandemphasisandconcentratedtrainingprograms.uringtheperiodMaythrough November1969thisheadquarters'accidentandincidentpreventionprogram hassignificantlyreducedbothaccidentsandincidentsandfriendlycasualtiesresultantthereto. AsindicatedonthechartatTABHfiringmishapshavedecreasedby + 5 %andfriendlycasualtiesby8 1$ sinceJune1^69.heseratherdramaticresultsareattributabledirectlyt oourhavingbeenabletoidentifythemostfrequentcauaesofIncidentsandareid^tsandconcentrate

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CONFIDENTIALoncorrectingtheconditionswhichpermittederrorat oo c c u r .o s t .commonwerefiringbatteryerrorsw i i c haccountedf o r 371 ofallfiringincidentsandfiredirectionario. , .u.-^-...rIti s interestingt on o t e ,a tt h i s p o i n t ,t h a tu " >nrnpincidentsharebeenattributedt o a nF D Cr u nb y a graduateox u . . ~in-countryF D Oschoolconductedb yt h eforceartillcr,.iaisonandclearanceerrorswereattributablet oa numberofs e - i n r a t ecausesandaccountedf o r 28^of allfiringincidents, j u et ot h evarietyofcausesinvolvedi nt h i sgenerala r e a ,specificcorrectiveactionortrainingi sdifficultt oprescribe. T h echarta tT A B Idepictsthisbreakoutofincidentcausesandprovides acomparisonofincidentcausesthroughoutUSARVduringt h es a m e period.

f . ArtilleryUnitEvaluations. T h eC G ,I IFFCRCEVArtillery,institutedacommandandcontrolconcepti n August1 9 6 9whiche s - tablishedt w oevaluationt e a m s ,e a c hheadedbyaseniorstaffofficer,whichextendedcommand andcontrolt obatteryl e v e l .n eteamconductsNo-noticeOperationalReadinessEvaluations( N O R E )offiringbatteriesandt h eotherconductsNo-noticeAdministrativeReadinessEvaluations( N A H E )ofheadquartersbatteriesandservicebatteries. Sincet h eteamvisitsareunannouncedandunitsa r eevaluatedduringconductof normaldutiest h e s eevaluationsaccu-ratelymeasuret h e unit'sproficiencyi nt h eareasevaluatedratherthani t s abilityt opreparef o raninspection. Additionally,n otimei swastedinpreparationf o rt h ev i s i t s .heresultsoft h eevaluationshavealreadycontributedconsiderablyi na numberofareasofconcern.h e N O R E :h a sdetectedweaknessesi nfiringbatteryandfiredirectionprocedures,verifyingweakareasdetectedthroughanalysisoffiringincidentinvestigationreportsandcombatreadinessevaluationsconductedbybattalionandg r o u p .AREresultshavedetectedweaknessesi n automotivemaintenanceandbatteryleveladministration,bothof whichindicatea requirementf o rassistancea n d commandattention. Theseevaluationresultswhenanalyzedandcomparedwithothertrainingindicatorswillb eusedt oupdatetrainingprograxsandservea s anindicatorof areasrequiringcomnandemphasisand/orotaffassistance.heeev a l i r . c l e extensionsofcomnandandcontrolenablecommandersate a c hechelont obetterensurecontinualimprovementoftheiru n i t s 'combatreadiness.A. ( U )rtilleryDongTien

Perhapst h emostimportants i r . f l eprojectinitiatedduringt h epastsixmonthsi st h eartilleryDongT i e n(ForwardTogether)pro-g r a m ,a coordinatedprogramofcombinedU S , R T : ,andFWMAFm u t u a lsupportprojects.h e artilleryD o n g Tienplanwasdevelopedt ocomplementI IFFV'sandI I IC o r p s 'OperationD o n g T i e n .tw a sconceivedthrought h ecorbinedeffortsofC G ,I IFF 1 ;Artillerya n dC O ,I I ICorpsArtillery. combinedUS/ARVKworkingcommitteew a s

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CONFIDENTIALo;o uttveiop thep]n. The purpose1 uw _Dion 1 )y > dfifl< " *hfi rvnfiWii. ,' . ' -r*'1 . --Mn4|< B -.

'UU..1>r uwellas 1 " - _ . j t . r a i i a n1stC4^r,+dRTAYFdlvisicr.. . LII.w^ine a r - 1..uvince.nturn,eachu .theseFreeWorldForceunitewillberequiredtodevelo:

amutuallycoordinatedlistof artillerybattalions. Thebattalionswillthendevelopamutuallycoordinatedlistof artillerybatteriesdowntoARVNplatoonlevelformutualassociation. Associationofartilleryuniteisintendedt o :

1 )mprovecoordinationandmutualunderstandingbetweenARVNandUS/FWMAFartilleryunits.2)mprovefiresupporteffectivenessb y :Combinedplanningandcoordinationoffiresupport.Standardizationoftechniques.Improvingthequalityoftraining.Increaseartilleryfiringcapabilities.Thecombinedplanningcommitteedevelopedthefollowingninemutualsupport projectswhich,whencompleted,willaccomplishtheprogramobjectives:Projectl ixchangeVisitaofBatteryPersonnelProject2;ombinedFireSupportCoordinationCenters(CFSCC)Project3 :roceduresandCoordinationRequirementsfor PlanningCombinedFireSupport

b )c )3)

Project U Project5Project6Project"Project6 Project9

StandardizedOperationalReadinessEvaluationCombinedUnitRefresherTrainingProgramStandardizationofTubeCalibrationProceduresStandardizationofRegistrationPolicyCombined' J s eofMeteorologicalDataCombinedSurveyControlFlan

a .rojectOnerovides- u n d e rtheassociatebattorypunderstanding,augmentexist!areasandobservebatteryopoandNCC'swillvisittheirasof theproblemsconfrontingtwheneverpossible.heacvisofevaluatingtheeffectivene3attarieswillcollocatewhenvlaiteamongbatteryperscnne

exchangevisitsofbatter} -personnelrogramandisaconcepttoimproveBUTF..nga d v i s o r ; . 'programs,discussproblemrationsandtechniques.electedofficersBociateunitst obecomebetterinformedheircounter-partsandrender assistanceitswillalsoprovideanexcellentmeansssoftheothermutualsupportprojects.everpossibletofacilitateexchange

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b .rojectTwoestablishescombinedfiresupportcoordinaticr.centersthroughoutIIICTZ whichwillprovideA f i V N ,USandFreeWorldForceArtillery unitBacentralcontrolfacilityforcoor-dinationof firesupportandexchangeof tacticalinformation.The BOBtimportantlongrangebenefitofthisprojectistheorgan-ization of atrainedfunctioningfiresupportcoordinationfacilityatdistrictlevelwhichwillremainasanassettotheprovincechief long aftertheimmediaterequirementforcombinedcoordinationhaspassed.hroughemploymento f ' thesecenters,provincechiefswillbeabletoconcentratecontrolof theirartilleryassetsandthusmoreefficientlyexercisetheirpoliticalaswellasmilitaryauthority.c .rojectThree,proceduresandcoordinationrequirementsfor

planningcombinedfiresupport,willbedeveloped utilizingtheex -istingCFSCC'sinareaswheretheyhavealreadybeenestablished.Wherethesecentersdonotexist,unittounitcoordinationwillhavetobeaccomplishedinordertodevelopproceduresforcombinedfiresupport.d .tandardisedOperationalReadinessEvaluation(ORE),es-tablishedby ProjectFour,willbeinstrumentalinidentifyingareasof weaknessintrainingprogramsandensurethatstandardgunneryproceduresarebeingfollowed.standardizedOREchecklistwillbedevelopedandobserverswillbeexchangedtoobserveother OREteamsastheyperform theirduties.heOREisa particularlyeffectivedeviceforusewiththeOriental.ycomparingaunit'sperformance

tcanestablishedstandardratherthanthatofanotherunitthethreatof embarrassmentorlossof"face"iseliminated;animportantconsiderationamongVietnamese.

e .ombined unit refreshertraining programs,providedbyProjectFive,willassistinincreasingtheproficiencyof ARVNartillery.tmaybe accomplishedusingeitherof threemethods:1 )mallschoolsatdivisionartilleryorbattalionlevel

togiverefreshertrainingtoselectedindividuals.2)nARVNorOSmobiletrainingteartobetrainedbya combinedinstructorgroup.ncetrained;themobileteamwouldtravelfromunittounit(ARVNtoARVNami l StoU S )givingrefreshertraining.3)n-the-JobrefreshertrainingcanbeconductedbyUSbatteriescollocatedwiththeir associated ARVNbatteries.f .ntilrecently,ARVNartilleryassetswereemployedinapurelyterritorialdefenserolewithlittleornorequirement


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t omoveorrelocatefortacticaloperations.rtillerywa sdeployedbyplatoonstokeynilitaryandpopulationcenters,oftenasapoliticalgesturewhereth eweaponswereincorporatedintoth eareadefense,providingdirectandindirectfiresupportforbothlocaldefensean dmaneuverunitswhichwerelimitedintheiroperationst oth eareadeterminedbytherangeof the weapons.UnitssoemployedquicklydeTelopedase tofstandardcorrectiont oraw gunnerydatabasedonexperienceandthusha dnopracticaluseforcurrentMeteorologicaldata,surreyorevengrequentregis-tration.fteraperiodoftime,firedirectionpersonnelforgothowtocomputedataemployingthesecorrectionsandmobilitytech-niques,beingnolongerimportantt oth emission,wereomittedfromtrainingprograms. Th enewBcbileconceptofartilleryemploymentadoptedbyth eDongTienplanrequiresthesestaticallypositionedunitstomoreinsupportof maneuTerforcesandtodeliver accuratefiresupportunderconditionsdifferentfromthosewhichwerestandardattheirstaticbases.ongforgottenproceduresmustbereieamedandstandardisedinorders oimproveaccuracy andprovideth ecapabilitytomassfireswithotherunits.rojectsSix,Seven,Eight and NineweredesignedfortheBepurposfcS.Theseprojectsdealwiththetechnicalaspectsofartillery andareextremelyimportantt oartilleryunitsinamobileconfig-uration.irst,weaponsmustbecalibratedtoprovidecompensationfo rnonstandardvariationsdu etotubewear.henunitsareconstantlymovinginsupportofmaneuverforcestheymustutiliseregistration,individualpiece,andcurrentmeteorologicalcorrectionsInordertodelivertimely,accuratefires.urveycontrolmustbeestablishedinorderfo rartilleryunitstomasstheirfires.heseprojectswillprovidethebasisfortransitionfromamissionwhichhasbeorientedprimarilytostaticterri-torialdefensetoamobileconfigurationsupportingmaneuverele-ments.Aconsolidatedquarterly progressreportwillbesubmittedforunitsandappropriatemilestoneswillbeestablishedagainstwhich progresscanbemeasured.

TheartilleryDongTien planwasjointlysignedbyCG,IIFFORCEVandCG ,IIICorpson7Nov 69and wasdistributedtothefieldlateinNovember.Acopyofth eplanisattachedatTAB Kforreference.

AcloselyrelatedbutIndependentprojectcompletedinvolvedtrainingCIDGartillerymen.n Julyofthisyear,acombinedARVN,IIFieldforceArtillery andSpecialForcesprogramwasinitiatedtoprovideth einitialdeploymentofCivilianIrregularDefenseGroupartilleryinIIICorpsTacticalZone.wo105mmhowitserplatoonsweredeployed,oneeachattheSpecialForces


17/61

SECRETCampsatThlenNgonandKatum. Thehowitzers,providedb ythe5 t hSpecialForcesGroup,weremannedb yartillerymenfromthe2 . 5 t hARVNDivj.sionuntilCIDOpersonnelwemtrainedandreadyt oa a s \ i r themissionofprovidingtheirowndirectartillerysupport. ; ,bothcamps,thereisaUSliaisonteamt ocfferassistanceanda d v i c ' . - .TheCIDGartillerymenbegantrainingon1September1969attheSpecialForcesCIDGtrainingcampatTrangSup. CIDOpersonnelKatumandThlenNgonwerecarefullyscreenedand70ofthemostqualifiedwereselectedtoattendthetraining.heinstructorteamforthetenweekcoursewasprovidedbythe23dArtilleryGroupandconsistedofthreeofficersandtenenlistedmen. TheplanofinstructionforthecourseisshownonthechartatTABL .On8November19695 6CIDGartillerymenweregraduated. ThegraduatesthenreturnedtoKatumandThienNgon,relievingtheARVNpersonnelandassumingresponsibilityforprovidingtheirownartillerysup-port.heARVNartillerymenarebeingwithdrawninthreephases;one-halfateachcampwereremovedon15November1969.alfoftheremainingpersonnelwillberemovedon15December1969andtheremainderon15January1970. Asecondclasswillbegintrain-ingon1December1969toprovideCIX personnelt omanthehow-itzersatDueHue,TraCuandLocNinhSpecialForcesCampb.ForwardobservertrainingwillbeaddedtothePOTforthisclass.

InanotherprojectwhichexemplifiesapplicationoftheDongTienprinciple,IICorpsArtilleryherantraininganARVNartillerybatteryinairmobilemovementtechniquesandjungleoperationsInSeptember1969.tBtrainingnowcompleted,thisspecializedunitwillassumethemissionofdirectsupporttothe3dMobileStrikeForce,amissioncurrentlybeingperformedbytheUSJunglebattery,acompositebatterycomprisedofthree105mmhowitzersfrom2dBn,13thArtyandthree1 5 5 n r a howitzersfrom2dBn,12thArty.hetransferof responsibilityfromUStoARVNartilleryis&fourphaseoperationandwillbecompleteinJanuary1970.odate,twotubesof105mm,anFDCandbatteryheadquartersminushavebeeninsertedtotheRuDopSpecialForcesCamp,initiatingthetransferofresponsibilitytotheARVNjunglebattery.dditionalelementswillbephasedintofullserviceinsucceedingMobileStrikeForceoperations.5 .U )aintenance

Isolationof manyfiringunitsandconsequentinaccessatllityofBupportmaintenancefacilitiesp o s e r ,acontinuingproblemtotheartilleryinIIICTZ.heresultantdelaysInobtainingrepairpartsanddifficultyinevacuatingequipmentcoupledwiththegenerallackofsufficientschooltrainedmechanicsandmaintenancesuper-visorsatbothbattalionandbatterylevelcontinuet obeaproblem.Twoprogramsrecentlyinitiatedpromisetosignificantlyreducesome

11SECRET


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S E C R E T ofthesedelays. TheCommandCriticalItemsList(CCIL)providescommandersanopportunitytoover-ridenormalrepairpartssupplychannelst oobtaincriticallyneededpartsandrepresentsoneofthemostsignificantimprovementsdevelopedlatelytoexpeditedeliveryofcoaoatessentialitemst ocustomersinthefield. TMBprogramalscprovidesseniorcommandersadirectlinkwiththe1stLogisticalCommandCommander; contactwhichhasprovidedasecondarybenefitintheformofvitalfeed-backonnormalrepairpartssupplyprocedurefailuresduetomis-understandingormisinformationatunitlevel. Thisfeed-backservestoidentify'suchencumbrancest othesystemandoftenre-sultedinexpertadviceoncorrectivemeasuret obetaken.

Arecentchanget oI IFFD.RCEVArtillerypolicyregardingthe1stLogisticalCommandRepairandReturn(R&R )programforM107andM110self-propelledweaponshassignificantlyImprovedthesupportprovidedbytheprcLTrams.reviously,R&Rserviceswereperformedatthefiringbatterylocation.henewpolicypermitsonehowitzerperbattaliont obetakentotheDirectSupportUnit(DSU)forRiHservice.hischangeallowsmax-imumutilisationof facilitiesandequipmentavailableattheDSU.heweaponcrewaccompaniesitonR f tRandprovidesmanualassistancet omaintenancepersonnel.secondarybenefitoftheprogramisthetrainingwhichthecrewpetswhileassistingDSUpersonnelperformtheR&Rservices.6 .S )utureAspects

A f lVietnamizationofthewarprogressesandfurtherUStroopwithdrawalsaremadetherequirementsforForceArtillerysupportwillremainfortheforseeablefuture.uchcombatsupportser-vicesasheavyartillerymeteorologicaldata,surveycontrolandcargetacquisitionradarsupport,whicharecurrentlyprovidedlargelyb yIIFFORCEVArtilleryinIIICT2,willcontinuetobevitaltothecombinedeffort,Spersonneltrainedinthesespecialtieswillberequiredt otrainARVNspecialistsforevent-ualassumptionofesponsibilityforprovidingcertainofthesesupportcategories.esidualelementswillcontinuetorequireconvoyescortandbasedefensefirepowercurrentlyprovidedbytheartilleryautomaticweaponsbattalion.heseassetB,whichincludethetrackmountedM^2,40mm"duBter",thevehiclemountedquadruple. 5 0calmachinogunandvehiclemounted 23inchXenonsearchlight,willIncreaseinvalueasUScombatstrengthde-creasesandaddedrelianceispiecedontheirfirepower.eneralsupportandreinforcingRrtilleryunitswillhavetorelyontheirownorganicselfdefenseforcesaurrnennedbyRegionaland

1 2S E C R E T


19/61

S E C R E T PopularForceuniteforsecurityaatheywillseldomh ecollocatedwithUSmaneuverelements.

ABARVNartilleryunitBachieveincreasedmobilitytheywillalsofaceanumberofproblemswhichhaveheretoforebeennon-existentoroflittlesignificance. TheArtilleryDongTienprogram,previouslydiscussed,addressesseveraloftheseproblemareas,notablyprovisionof meteorologicalandsurveydatawhichwaspreviouslylittleusedbystaticallypositionedARVNartilleryunits,andstandardizedregistrationpolicy. AnotherareaofconcerrismaintenancesupportofthemoresophisticatedequipmentwhichARVNmustultimatelybecapableofproviding. Communicationsequipment,radarsandmetrostationequipmentrequiretheconstantattentionofhighlytrainedtechnicians,particularlywhenitismovedfrequently. ARVNdoesnotcurrentlyhavethetechnicalmain-tenancebasetosupportauchequipmentbuteventuallywillhavetoassumeresponsibilityforcertainoftheseservicescurrentlyprovidedbyCSassets.

1 3S E C R E T


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21/61

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22/61

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TAB B 16


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h- C O tr h - < U Jw 201- O>N -, 0


24/61

CONFIDENTIAL I.hereas Deen teadilyncreasingntercutn the us ex 'oe-tectu:devicesorargetingyartillery Thisaseenarticular., trieduringeriodsfownemyactivity. As contactwithuenemy ecre-ison,tnemploymentfartillerynontactypemissionssonsequentlyreduced. Inas, othermeansreoughtompicyheirepoweravi..a(,.- . - .withnencreasednterestnheseevices, its important T .O.^cwhat tneredibilityfnedevices, itsccuracy, and iUitabiîuy.: u.eargetorngagementyartillery.

Aredibility analysisfiveargetdetectiondevices (on1..,oensors,edaze,utiindnlfi'er) employeenllT Z, was io.iaucieabyic'iiMMArtillery.II.he twoprimaryroundurveillanceadarspresently employeeniiT ZareaareherS-5no ther-25 Itseneranyhount tliat'.f-st- rad^rightingsakexcellenturrets, .- .owever, theiravueseducedbj tueproblemsfdiscrimination,esignimitationndX ;orieacefoperator. T headardiscriminatesbviousifferencesnargetssbetweeneuici.esndersonnel, nowever, toellneifferenceetweentneovementfanimalsnd the..ovemem.f.ersonnei isiff!suit; orovenhedifferencefreesrrushmovingnhewind. The s emovements naveudiondisualresentati.s of imiîarature. T he secondrrobl?mshedesignimitati fhesets. T her:>-5with ated...aximuman ef00Cmetersas angerrorf Ometersnc aatedasim tnrrorofCmils. A tO C Ometers thisomputeso + 0 X 1 Limeterboxenteredround theeportedridwhereinne targeteuid be ôcated.ihemaximumrrornnei'-25such.argeratneameange. i.'.oranêatef5metersnc tne5mil o e a u widthives ocxt%'Lmetersf5x175meters; w..ichncreases to5 " C 4 2 C..eterstne2 ,CCC metermaximumange.

nOstofheangendzimuthrrormdeportingffalseargetscaneliminatedutilizingruyxperiencedersonnel, lieaudiond visualresentationaneeakedoherobableargetareaseducedaroundheeportedrid. rrS-5peratorsaneducenereao< - C x 5 Cmeterareandhe>3-25peratoraneducehereao 0x1'0meterareaalthoughhenfantryhasaaproblemseepingxperiencedperatorsonne-rd-5et, theyreenerallywellualified. AilfherS-25aetachmentsaveeennountryverixmonthsnd therewsrewelltrained.

III..h'iecondypeofargetdetectionaevicesheamilyfSensor-,consistingofooismic,Acoustic-iagneticndnfraiedoensors. ..ostcOLaiandersonsiderensoractivationssxcellentargets; however,thereare rcoxemareas: sensorsreon-descriptive, u.ereccuracyT AB I) CONFIDENTIAL


25/61

CONFIDENTIAL isdependentontargetsizeandgridlocationi softenerroneous.hecensorscannotteiltriedifferencebetweentypesoftargetsandwillactivatefromvariouscausessuchasanimals,airstrikes,artillery,thunderstorms,anaelectricstormswhenusinghagneticoenscrs.neofthebigbestpro-blemswhenusingSeismic_ > n s o r cistheeffectofvibrationsc a u s ^ - c .o ymovementof treeroots.naddition,somesensorswimibee oneoverlysensitiveuncactivateonalmostanythingandarecalledTakers,hecredibilityofanyonesensorisverylow;howeverthecr'ioiuiiityratingincreasesrapiclywhenthe ensorsareemployedintroapsanduifierenttypesareusedintnes a i a efield,. goodoperatorcanthenweedoutmostofthefalseactivations.i O ta - . . ,activationsarereportedaso e n . - o rTar.ets,necriteria . n u m b e rof-enscrs;numbero fa : t i v a t i o . i a ) ,time. . n cdistancef a c t o r : ,t oaesi&natcatargetrestsw i t ,tneoperatorandtnebuidancehehasreceived.ne censorshavear u t e c .n o t e c t i o . " rtn ra eof1 .feetto3^metersdependingon thetypeof~ensor.hitrange. L . i c r e a s e su i t l i differentactivity,orexample,a SeismicdeviceVila^otcctai ^ a nwalkingat3Cmetersoutw i j . 1producethesamei n i c a t i c : i W i i e nitaatectsagroupofpersonnelat -metersorvaniclemovementatjOOMeters.hustneaccuracyoftargetvocationisdependentontnedistancegroundviurationsextendfromthetarget.nemethodof_ensorp i a c mtnt aisodecreasestargetaccuracy.pproximately C , < - ofthes e ^ . s u r sareairaeiiveredw ; . i c hmakesanaccuratesensorlocationaifiiculttoobtaineveraltechniquesareusedtomoreaccurate].,aocatetheaevicerichasthedroppingofs ; a o k ebrenadewithtnesensorancthenphotographing: : . eareaandsubsequentrestitutionofthexOCati-n. ;econ' ?technique;orODtainingabridi sbyhoverinbahelicopterovert r . es e i 6 o r andobtainingagridbyradar.thertechniquesusedtoxoc^tttnesensor,^nciucemapspottingandthef i r j . . . gofartillery.

Thesedeviceshaveanoverallgoodcredibilityratingandaresuit-ajielorengabement . ,artilleryprovidedtnatthetargetiser.^gedasrapidlyaspossibleueforeit. . . o v e soutofu.earea,-recxearancecfsensorfieldswilldecreaseu etimeuexSyanuinoreaet h e robibiiityofsuccessfully ngag'Tngthetarget,I/,i e t t e rr . n o w nasdad haze,Infrai t e aisanothertargetdetectiondevicewhichprovidesanindicationcfpossiblee n s i ,activityinanarea.hecredibilityofUlisdevice.iso . i x y fairast . . e r earecriticalproblemsareas;nondiscrimination,inflightreaaouti cinaccurate,detaiieGreadoutisnott i - . . e x y ince t e dn a s t erecordsatemperatureuifference.itwixxpickupxnniuentiiyasapossibletargetailformsofheatOwurces,andcannotuistinauishbetweenthem,orexample,liresuprortbuses,motorsonsampans,exposedwater,burningtreestums ,notrocks,andartilleryroundsuptoan. o a r afterburst,x^riencedersonnelarenecessaryinoruertosanitizeaotspots.nfligntreadingsmayoeootaineuforpossibleuse;however,theaccuracyoftheser .ortedbridswi*lbepoor.heoperatorviewsa /' , ; "screentnaticiartstneterrain.tanoncaaaircraftruna p e o o .of1 o C-2X Knotst . a . ^ratornas3secondsinw ; i c htoidentifyai i o tspotandi i c n t i i , .i twithterrain,- n .hencompareitt oa1:250,-COmapt odt._r._net i . e

CONFIDENTIAL/9


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CONFIDENTIAL gridlocation.Jear.yidentifiableterraini ' ct u i - e si n a yincrc-.it: theaccuracy,butwhenthesefeaturesarel a c k : . .b,anaccurate.ocationisunlikely.

Thevocationofthenotspotcanuedeterminedtoa1GCi . . e t e raccuracywithsufficienttime,butthiscanonlyb edneafterthej - l a n exandsandtheinformationi sstudied,i yt h etimetheunitreceivestheinformationiti tfrom2[- tobhoursoldandi snolongervalidasatargetb yitseif.Thecredibilityofthisdevicet oobtainagoodf.rtilleryt a r g e t ,i spoorandcanbeoostuaedasanintelligenceindicator,t ob ecorreiateawithotnerintelligenceinformation.

V, ThefourthdeviceunderconsiderationisaiAn(aide cokingirborneRadars).trequiresanobjectwithsufficientreflectivity,travelinginexcessef3kmêri . o u r .twillnotric k u ; _personnel,heproblemwitno h A r tisthatitisnondiscriminating,nottl."iy,tuedirectionofmo v e t ontisunknown,itisveaicleorientec,anai so i u , yanintelligenceindicator.tcannotdistinguishbetweentruetarbeU a dfalset-rêtrauchasrapidsonwaterways,treetorsblowingint h twindandotnerair-craftflyingb e lowthemissionaircraftwhicnoperatesat70CCfeet,SLAKooesnotgivejo\i timelyinformation.nflightreadingsarenott i - . e l yenoughtoo eofr n u c nvaiue.fterdetection,ittakes3minutesfortne1:50C,0C0scalefilmtcappearintheviewer.hustnetargethasairady+ ravled150meters.neoperatorthen . a s5 m i n u t c . sl osearc.hefilm,locatuthemovementindicator,transferit ot . . ef i x e . .turb- j tindicatora n - ;thenmapspott n elocationon a 250,COGmap.hoaccuracyoftnisp j . o twillran6efrom100to300meters.ttnispoint,coordinatescanoepassedtothefiring' u n i tinthearea. ytnetimeaunitisreadytoengigethet.rget,whichistravelingat3kmormoreperi . o u r ,itwill: . eatleast500meters,way.feninflightreadouti snotobtainedt h edeiaycanbe3-6 hoursbeforetheinformationisobtainedandt h etargetwillhavedepartedthetargetarea.he directionoftargetmovementcannotb edeterminedunlessarequestismadet omakeasecondpassovertneareaandgetasecondpic*upofthetarget.. o tknowingthedirectioni .whichthetargetismoving,aonekmcircle(oragridsquare;becomestnetarcetarea.Lknasintendedfor huropeantypecombatenvironment,itsonlyvalueinacounterinsurgencyenvironmenti stintitdoessnowmovementiaanareaandisauintelligenceindicator,wnichshouldoecorre-latedwithotherinformation./ I .nifferisadetectiondeviceunsignedtodetecttheintensityandc n a f l g eofthetypeofmatterinthei i r .nertaremanyproblemswithsnifferasiti snondiscriminating,lacksreliabilityandi sanintexii. : . indicator.tcannotdistinguishbetweenh u i n u nactivity,vehicleandgeneratorexhausts,monkeys,waterbuffalo,orthes . u o K efromuurniu^0 tumpsanagrassw l i i c hisprevalentintnedryseason.tisnotreliableastothetimetneactivitytookplace.twillpickuâirstrikesfromtnepreviousday,giveareading- i nnourorsoaftertroopslavemoved

CONFIDENTIAL3LD


27/61

CONFIDENTIALt r . r o u g h anarea,andreportananimalthathasbeendeadfor days,heaircrafthastoworkupwindandcannotmakearerunofanareaasthecuvicewillpickuptheaircraftexhaustotiliintheair.> i n c epartisi.eewillo ocarrieddownwind,andtheSniffer miasionisflowninstripe2GC-3 Cmetersapart,thelocationofthetargethasanaccuracyof200-3CCmeters.however,sincethewinddirectionisnntreported,thewaythetargetgridisdeterminedisbytheoperatorcalling'mark'vnenareadingisobtained.Atthistixethepixotofthecontrolaircraftflyingoverheadmapspotstielocationona 1:50,00map.hecredibilityof Sniffertargetsislowaswellasproviding apoorlocationforanartillerytarget.nifferisanotherdevicethatprovidesinformationthatrequirescorrelationwithotherintelligence data.VII. SummaryofthecevicesdiscussedshoustheGSBsandSensorsprovidegoodartillerytargetdata,owever,notexcellentassomepersonnelbelieve.hisisduetothelimitationoftheequipmentandtherequire-mentforexperiencedoperators.

(hadhaze,S h A j tanaSniffer)providepoorartillerytypetargetsandcanbestbeusedasintelligenceindicators.i - i e l yGSK andSensorreadingsprovidegoodartillerytargetsedHaze,J i 4 h . ,andSnifferareof doubtfulvalueunlesscorrelatedwithotherintelligence means.

CONFIDENTIAL


28/61

>-cr >Q

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29/61

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30/61

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31/61

CONFIDENTIALTARGETCATEGORIESDEFINED

1 .ONFIRMEDTARGETS ;heenemylocationle known,andhiepresencehasb e e r ,determinedbycontactwithfriendlyforcesoractivityB69nb yairorgroundobservers. Thiscategoryincludesmissionsfiredagainsthardtargetssuchasbunkercomplexes.2.CQUIRED TARGETS:nemylocationsbaaeduponSLAB,SPAR'S,RedHazemissions,groundsurveillanceradars,airbornepersonneldetectorsandotherdetectiondevices.argetsinthiscategorymustbebasedupontimelyreactionandadditionallymustmeetallofthefollowingcriteria:

a .etectionbyoneormoreof thesenBorydeviceslisted.b .alidationbyanevaluationofenemypatternofoperations.C Terrainanalysisbycompetenttargetingagencies.

3.OUNTERBATTERYTARGETS:nownorsuspectedlocationsengagedbyfriendlyartilleryimmediatelybefore,duringorimmediatelyafterenemyrocket/mortar/artilleryattacks.k. PREPARATIONTARGETS:andingzones,firesupportbasesandobjectivesorareaswhichreceiveprecautionaryartilleryfirepriort oairassualtorgroundoccupationbyfriendlyforces.hiBcategoryincludesrecon-naissancebyfiremissionsandblockingfires.5 .NTERDICTIONTARGETS:reasorpointswhichtheenemyislikelytouseatsomeunpredictedtime.ireIsdeliveredforthepurposeofdenyingtheunrestricted uB eofanareaorpoint.hiscategoryincludestargetsfiredasaresultofagentreportsthatarenottimelyorlacksufficientreliabilitytofallintheconfirmedcategory.6 .PECIAL PURPOSETARGETS:hosetargetsfiredwhichassistartilleryandmaneuverelementstoimprovethetechnicaleffectivenessoftheiroperations.hiscategoryincludesregistrations,markingmissions,navigationmissions,calibrations,adjustmentof defensiveconcentrationsandIlluminationmissions.7 .THERS:hoBefiredforservicepractice,training,demonstrationr.,andothercategoriesnotincludedabove.8 .RVNSUPPORTTARGETS:issionsandroundsfiredinsupportof A R V . :forceBarereportedinthesevenpreviouscategoriesandalsoextractedfromoveralltotalsandreportedinthiscategory.

rABH 6CONFIDENTIAL


32/61

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES orog26 SdVHSIW


33/61

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34/61

tu c c ^ G J C J o ra ^) 0 3 H;O , H -3 5 '^H rH G 5 JE c 0Jjj tix; o '. : cm S i ' : . 3 r* r* 3 c 3 3^ x; H 5 |

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35/61

HEADQUARTERSIIIELD FORCE VIETNAMAPOanFrancisco 96266II FFORCEV CIRCULARNUMBER25-2

REPUBLICOF VIETNAMRVNAFIII CORPS AND III CTZ7November 1969

ARTILLERYDONG TIEN

("FORWARD TOGETHFR")* PURPOSE: Toefineheonceptandostablishhepoliciesndpro-ceduresoroordinatingallmutualsupportprojectswhichncreasehecapabilitiesndffectivenessfheorr.binedartilleryeamwithinHI CTZ.2. CONCEPT:a. ArtilleryDONGTIENs programequiringlosendontinuous

coordinationofmutualsupportprojectshroughhessociationfdesignatedARVN ArtilleryunitsndUS/FWMAF Artilleryunits. Allprojectsreon-tinuousnnaturendwillrequireperiodiceviewandevision.

b Thelosendontinuousoordinationofartilleryunit3sntendedto:(1)mproveoordinationandmutualunderstandingbetweenARVN andUS/FWMAFrtilleryunits.(2)mproveireupporteffectivenessy:(a)ombinedplanningndoordinationoffireupport.(b)tandardizationofechniques.(c)mprovinghequalityofraining.(3)ncreaseheapabilitiesfARVN Artilleryunitshroughhe

developmentofcombinednheobrainingprograms.3 . POLICY:T A B ? < ?


36/61

II FFOKCEV CIRCULAR 525-2a.RVN and US/FWMAF Artilleryunitsmustakeeveryopportunitycoccoidinateandcloselycooperatewithheirounterpartsoaccomplisheachmutualsupportproject.b.RVN and US/FWMAF Artiller/Commanderswillstriveoac-complishhemutualupportprojectshroughhestablishmentofmutualassociationofArtilleryunits.c.herogramofmutualupportprojectsArtilleryDONG TIFN)shouldbeorientedohettainmentofncreasingheeffectivenessoffiresupport, developingnewcapabilitiesandclosecoordinationofallARVNandUS/FWMAFArtilleryunits.

4. PROCEDURES:a.rtilleryDONG TrFN areasandassociatedunitsarehownnAppendixA .b .rtillery DONG TIEN mutualupportprojectsarehownnAppendixB .c.RVNandUS/FWMAF ArtilleryunitswillestablishanAssociateBatteryProgramandarrangeorxchangevisitsfpersonnelorollo-cationofunitswhenappropriate. Emphasiswillbeplacedonheollowing

areasofinterest:11)iringBattery(2)torageandHandlingofAmmunition(3 )ommunications(4 )aintenanced.ncreaseartilleryfireupporteffectivenesshroughheaccomplishmentofheollowingobjectives:(!) Ineachmutuallyagreedocation, specifiedARVNndUS/FWMAF

ArtilleryunitswillormCombinedFireSupportCoordination(enters.

3o


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I IFORCEVIRCULAR 525-2(2)pecifiedunitswillestablishprocedure!andcoordinationrequire-

mentorplanningcombinedireupport.(3)tandardizeandconductoperationalreadinessevaluationsorallfiringunits.(4)evelopapolicyorregistrations.(5)tandardisealibrationproceduresanddevelop planorh eannual

calibrationofartillerypieces.(6)stablish programorcombinedunitrefresherrainingnspeci-

fiedsubjects.e. Increaseireupportcapabilitieshroughheaccomplishmentof

theollowingobjectives:(1)tilizationofmeteorologicaldata.(2 )stablishsurveycontroloallartillerypositionswithinIICorps

area.5 . REPORTS: Aconsolidatedquarterlyprogresseport(formatprovid-edseparately)onhetatusofArtilleryON G TIENmutualsupportpro-jectswillbeubmittedby:

a.RVNDivisionArtilleryunitsandI ICorpsArtilleryBattalionstoI ICorpsArtilleryHeadquarters.b.rtilleryGroup, Div'sionArtillery, FWMAFArtilleryandSeparate

BrigadeArtilleryhroughu irrespectiveheadquartersoIFVHeadquarters,ATTN: Artillery.c.eniorAdvisorARVNDivisionArtilleryoSeniorAdvisorIICorps

Artillery.1stquarterlyreportwillbedueatendof2dquarterY 1970ndarriveatrespectiveheadquartersnotaterhanh e0thdayofhemonthafterheend

3/


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II FFORCEV CIRCULAR 525-2ofhequarter.6 . ItshouldbeecognizedhatARVN and US/FWMAFArtillerycommand-erseachretainheirullcommandreaponaibilitiea. ThedesiredresultoftheArtillery D O N GIEN Planaomaximizeheapabilitiesandeffective-nessofartillerysupportavailablenII CTZ throughhecoordinatedeffortsofARVNand US/FWMAFArtilleryunits.

JULIANJ. EWELLLieutenantGeneral, U SA CommandingGeneralIIFFORCEV

-TVUAPD OCAORILieutenantGeneral, ARVNCommandingGeneralIII CorpsandE CTZ

2AppendicesA.rtilleryDONGTIENAreasandAssociatedUnits.B .rtilleryDONG TIENMutualSupportProjects.DISTRIBUTION:20CG, IIFFV, APO9626620 CG, I!FFVArty, APO9626620CO, IIICorpsArty, BienHoa8CG, 1stCavDivAM),APO964908CG, 1stInfDiv,APO963458CG, 25thnfDiv, APO962254CG, 199thLIB, APO962794CO, 3dBde, 9tbnfDiv, APO963718CO, 23dArtyGp: APO962898CG, RTAVF, APO965308CMDR, 1stATF, AFPO

3-A


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ArtilleryDONG TIENAreasandAssociatedUnitsARVN Units5thARVN DivArty5thARVN DivArty18thARVNDivArty18thARVN DivArty25thARVNDivArty25thARVNDivArty1 1 1 Corps Arty Bns(32d, 35th, 38th, 46thBns)

US/FWMAF Unit1stCav DivArtyAM)1stIniDivArty2/40thArty1stFidRegtRTAVF DivArty2/4thArty25th InfDivArty23dArtyGpIIFFVArty Bns

ProvinceBinh LongPhoucongBinhDuongLongKhanhBinh TuyPhoucuyBienHoaLongAnHauNghiaTayNinh

\ppondix A to T A U K 35


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Mutual Support Project

i. ExchangeVisitsfBatteryPersonnelAaeociateBatteryProgram).2.ombinedFireSupportCoordinationCenterCFSCC).3.roceduresandCoordinationRequirementsorlanningCombinedFire Support.4.tandardizedOperationalReadinessEvaluation.5.ombined L'nit etreaher 1rainingProgram.6 .tandardizationofTubeCalibrationProcedures.7 .tandardizationofRegistrationPolicy.8 .ombinedJseofMeteoroJogicalData,9.ombinedSurveyControllan.

Appi'iici


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Project1 :xchangeVisitsofbattervPersonnel(Associatebattery-FrogEoaJ1 .heiriniaryobjectiveoftheAssociateBatteryProgramistoconductexchangevisitsofbatterypersonnelinordertoimprovemutualunderstand-ing,augmentexistingadvisoryprograms,discussprcblernareasandobserveDatteryoperationsandtechniques.2 .' h eintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a .stablishassociatebattalionlist.b .stablishassociatebatterylist.c .onductexchangevisitsofbatterypersonnelbetweenA i t V I JArtilleryandU S / F / f l - i A FArtilleryunits,

3 .nitiationdateforthisexchangeisJanuary1970.U . CoordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinappendixAoftheArtilleryLUNGTIEKPlan.his;rejectv f i i l

- : iementeddowntoARVNArtilleryplatoonlevelanamonitoredbysucceed-i r . gr.eadquarters.henpossiblebatterieswillcollocateatliresupportt - . . > : forsnortperiodstofacilitateexchangevisitsofbatterypersonnel5 .uidanceforeachlevelofcommand;

a.llCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtilleryAdvisor,I IF T ' V artillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.( a )stablish : ,associateunitlistforArtilleryGroup,DivisionAr-

t i - i l e r y ,DivisionArtilleryAdvisor,FWMAFArtillery,SeparateBrigadeAr-t i .ierylevel.

( b )rovidebasicguidancetoartilleryunitsundertheircommand.(2)xecutionPhase.onitorAssociateBatteryProgramandresolve

;robi'.msinunitassociation,( 3 )valuationPhase.( a )stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbe

measured,( b )eviewandanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsubmittedby Artillery sup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryAdvi-sor,r V . i . A FArtilleryn . ,. - parateBrigadeArcillery.

3 5 -


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eae: .-'t\rtioryii dL,)\.rogressfartillery.' i.f:acinwirt.erj. ,r;,.:.r tJL,J v .i uriCi : . , ( J < > oi." c;.an,;s in ;.ro,-Ta:r. to Ci, lii Cor. ; an.: ., .al'Uiv . : at.:onwithieldunits,{' ' i itiatepproved changes inherogramsequired,-. rti cry inup, divisionArtillery,Divisi nArtistry-' .; :. ...irynd.rparaferigade-irtiilery.

,:.UJ la.iiu.'.i; : hajt; Establishiaisonwit:.;. ociateattalionist. ;;oci ;' u,.

U/ ^Accaijvii.ase. ..orutor tt;essociate battery rcpra. i:.,Li.byrieattalionsndesolveroblemsnnitssociation,(3) Evaluationhase. Evaluateheffectivenessfnessociateat

i'-ryrO;Ta:' tocaievetsrirnarybjectivendeconr.end :rove.-.ent..o.rtillerybattalion, Artillerybattaliondvisor,(1; v...iii.uu'lanjiin.;hase. Establishiaisonnu -evc - iX : ai .s..:.uaiteryi:;townoArtillerylatoonevel.(') wi'.cut..:,aase. supervise tnes.oci.-ite batteryTOt'.ra.(') r.y-..ua" ionnase. Evaluate theffectivenessf thes.ocia'n.atu>ryrr ra-r.ochieve its prir-arynjeetiv-aml re,. .CI.J . -r'v .:. a..i'tii_;(.-ry.-atterv, rti iery_atoor.(1) 1. n.1 :b'lMu;;,- : Phase.(a,- ...;;t- i .i.: . iiaisonwithssociate mattery,{tj A:ra,;t exc.nnhgevisitsfatteryersonnel,(i) xt-ci;tior,hase. Conductxchange visitsl batteryer .- ..

i . ' . ' i .:.a.,in ti.e .iowirn;reas:(; :::.'attery[i -'.. rapendan ,.irn;fA:a.uuni tion;.'j Co' .:cati ensl ;.a:e.)T n nast;. Evaluate tneiTtctivcr;.chieve its ri::iaryc.-jpct.ve: .u ; a . u 36


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Project: CabinedFireSupportCoordinationCenters ( C FGCC )1. T herimaryobjectivefhisrojectsostablishF S C C ' shrcuj:nautillT Z.t .neintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a .odesignatemutuallyagreeduponlocationsol' CFSCC'sandassigna riorityofestablishment.

b .electunitsresponsibletodevelopplansandestablishandoperate i ' w C C ' s .

c .mplementapprovedplans.j ,ntensivecoordinationisrequiredandwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedin Appendix AoftheArtilleryL O N G - TIENPlan.hisprogramwillbeimplementedat ArtilleryBattalionlevelandsupervisedbythenexthigherheadquarters.U . Guidanceforeachlevelofcommand:

a.llCorpsartillery,IIICorpsArtilleryAdvisor,I IFFVArtillery.(1)ombinedPlanninghase.(a)electnitsesponsibleorstablishingF S CC ' snddenoterequiredompletionate.

Province nitsResponsibleofflBieLigiDateT ay.inh 5thInfDivArtyct96 9 iiaughia5thnfDivArtyec96 9 binhong/27thArtyeb97C Longhanh/AJCthArtyan9 70 Fhouc uystFidRegtB A bienH oa /8thArtyB A binhuong3dArty peb970 LongAn /UthArtyul9 6 9 (b)rovideasicuidanceoallnitsnhestablishmentfheGF S C C .

(c)utualgreementnocationfsiteor F S C C .(2)xecutionhase. MonitorstablishmentndperationfF S C C ' s .(3)valuation> . . .ji.

37


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( a )stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbemeasured.( b )eviewandanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsuumittedbyArtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryAd-visor,FWMAFArtilleryandSeparateBrigadeArtillery.(c)G,IIFFVArtillery andCO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebriefedeachquarteronprogressofArtilleryDUNGTIEN.riefingwillberotatedbetweenthetwoheadquarters,(d)ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,IIFFV

aftercoordination withfieldunits.( e )nitiateapprovedchangesintheprogramasrequired.b .rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtillery Advisor,FWKAFArtillery,SeparateBrigadeArtillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.( a )ecommend ARVNandUSartillerybattalionstoberesponsibleforestablishingandoperatingCFSCC.attalionsrecommendedshouldbelocatedneartheprovincecapitolandhavearelativelystaticposture.( b )ecommendsiteforCFSCC.ConsideruseofexistingTOC),( c )stablishliaisonwiththeProvinceSeniorAdvisor,( 2 )xecutionPhaseuperviseplanning,establishmentandoperatimCFSCC.( 3 )valuationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessofthisprojecttoachieveheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovementsc .rtillery Battalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase.( a )evelopplansforestablishmentofCFSCC.( b )evelopacombinedSOPforoperationofCFSCC,( 2 )xecutionPhase.(a) EstablishandperateF S C C .lb) Publish ombinedOP .(3)valuationhase. Evaluateheffectivenessfheroject tochievetherimarybjectivendecommendmprovements.

c i


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Project3 :roceduresandCoordinationRequirementsforPlanningCombinedFireSupport1 .heprimaryobjectiveoftheproceduresandcoordinationrequirementsforplanningcombinedfiresupportprojectistodevelopproceduresbetweenARVMandUS/FWMAFartilleryunitsfortheplanningandcoordinationofcombinedfiresupport,2 .heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a.stablishmentofinitialliaisonwithARVNartilleryandUS/FWMAFartillery.

b.RVNartillery andUS/FWMAF"artillerydevelopproceduresforplanningcombinedfiresupport,(1)nittounitcoordinationwillbeaccomplishedinthoseareas

forwhichaCP3CChasnotbeenestablished.( 2 )oordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheCFSCC'sinthoseareasforwhichonehasbeenestablished,

3 .nitiationdateforthisprojectisJanuary1970.U . Liaisonwillbeeffectedthroughtheartilleryadvisoratdivisionartilleryand/orbattalionartillerylevel.hisprojectmaybeimplementedatdivisionartilleryand/orbattalionartillerylevel,5 .uidanceforeachlevelofcommand:

a.llCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtilleryadvisor,IIFFVArtillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.rovidebasicguidancetounits,(2)'ExecutionPhase.onitorproceduresandmonitorcoordinationestablished.( 3 )valuationPhase.( a )stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbe

measured.( b )eviewandanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsubmittedby ArtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,Division Artillery

Advisor,FWMAFArtilleryandSeparateBrigadeArtillery,(c)G,IIFFVArtilleryandCO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebriefedeacnquarteronprogressofArtilleryDONG T I E N ' .riefingwillberotated

betweenthetwoh e . v :narters.

$1


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(d)ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,IIFFVaftercoordinationwithfieldunite.(e)nitiateapprovedchangesintheprogramasrequired.b .rtillery Group,Division Artillery,DivisionArtillery Advisor,

FWMAF Artillery,SeparateBrigadeArtillery.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase.(a)stablishliaisonwithassociatedunit,( b )evelopproceduresandcoordinationforplanningcombinedfiresupport.(2 ) a r e rationhasf l .(a)onductcombinedfiresupportplanningwhenappropriateatthislevel.(b)rovidebasicguidanceandsupervisiontobattalionsonpro-ceduresandcoordinationforplanningcombinedfiresupport,(3)valuationPhaaavaluatetheeffectivenessoftheproceduresandcoordinationrequirementsforplanningcombinedfiresupportprojecttoach-ieveitsprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.c .rtillery Battalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor,( 1 )ombined,PlapnjngP f l f l8e.(a)stablishliaisonwithassociatedunit.(b)evelopproceduresandcoordinationforplanningcombinedfiresupporti(2)xecutionPhase.onductcombinedfiresupportplanning.(3)valuationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessoftheprocedure-andcoordinationrequirementsforplanningcombinedfiresupportprojer

toachieveitsprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.

0


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j-roject4 :tandardizedOperationalReadinessEvaluation(ORE)1 ,heprimaryobjectiveofthestandardizedOperationalReadinessEvaiua-tionprojectistoprovidestandardizedevaluationforARVM/USArtilleryunitswhichwillidentifyareasof weaknessintrainingprogramsanaen-surestandardginnery proceduresarebeingfollowed,2 ,heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:a.headoptionandpublicationofastandardizedoperationalreadinessevaluationchecklist.

b .naninvitationalbasis,theexohangeof ARVNandUSobserversonu k r .Teams(l05mmand155mmunits).

c .eamsconduct.ORE'3,3,nitiationdateforthisprojectis February1970.U , CoordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinAppendix Aofthe ArtilleryDONG TIENPlan.hisprojectwillbeimplementedatArtilleryGroup,Division Artillery,DivisionArtilleryAdvisor,andSeparateBrigadeArtillerylevel.5 .uidanceforeachlevelofcommandJ

a.ilCorps Artillery,IIICorpsArtilleryAdvisor,IIFFVArtillery.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase.rovidebasicguidancetounits.( 2 )xecutionPhase.onitorprogressofproject.(3 ) Evaluation J a a a ( a ) .stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbemeasured,(b)eviewandanalyzetheconsolidated quarterly progressreportsubmittedby ArtilleryGroup,Division Artillery,DivisionArtilleryAd-

visor,FWMAFArtilleryandSeparateBrigadeArtillery,(c)G,IIFFVArtilleryandCO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebriefedeachquarteronprogressof ArtilleryDONG TIEN.riefing willberotated

betweentnetwoheadquarters,(d)ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,I IFFVafter

coordinationwithfieldunits.

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( e )nitiateapprovedchangesintneprogramasrequired.b .rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryadvisor,an.SeparateBrigadeArtillery.( 1( a ( b( 2( a( b

(105mm( c( 3 ,- -- _._.OREprojecttoachievetheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.c .rtilleryBattalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor.

Non-applicable.

CombinedPlanningPhase.Establishliaisonwithassociatedunit.DevelopastandardizedOKEchecklist.ExecutionPhase.PublishastandardizedOKEcnecklist.ArrangefortheexchangeofARVNandUSobserversonhi. ' . - ; a m sand155mmunits).UnitswillconductORE's. EvaluationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessofthestandardized

y^


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Project5:ombinedUnithefresherTrainingProgram1 heprimaryobjectiveofthisprojectistoestablishandconductaunitrefreshertrainingprogram.2.heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a .utualselectionofsubjectsforcombinedunitrefreshertraining.b .electionof methodofconductingtraining.c .evelopmentofaprogramofinstruction,d.ombinedArtViN/US/FVMAFobservationofclassesandtraining,

3 .nitiationdateforthistrainingisFebruary1970.li. CoordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinAppendix AoftheArtillery DOKGTIENPlan, Threeapproachesforconductingcombinedunitrefreshertrainingarthrough:

a.hedevelopmentofasmallscnooltogiverefreshertrainingtoalimitednumberofk eypersonnelorspecialists.heclasseswouldbescheduledandconductedasneeded.b .hecombinedtrainingofmobiletrainingteams. combinedinstruc-

torgroupwouldtrainamobiletrainingteamwhichwouldtravelfromoneunittoanother.itherUSorARVNmobiletrainingteamscouldbetrained.Themobiletrainingteamswouldgivjinstructiontoonlytheirunits.c . USbatteryconductingonthejobtrainingwithanARVNbatterywhe1 " .batteriesarecollocated.

Methodsaandbabovecouldbeestablishedat ArtilleryGroup,DivisionArtilleryorBattalionArtillerylevel.upervisionandmonitoringwouldbeattar nexthigherlevel.5 .uidancefore a c r .levelofcommand:

a. IllCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtilleryAdvisor, IF r ' YArtillery.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase,(a)utualagreementonunitrefreshertrainingprogram.(b)rovidebasicguidancetounits.( 2 )xecutionPbj> j .onitorunitrefreshertrainingprogram.( 3 )valuation : . a r . e.


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(a)stablishppropriatemilestonesgainstwhichrogressanemeasured.(b)ev iewandanalyzeheonsolidateduarter1yrogresseportsubmittedyArtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryAd- visor,W M A FArtilleryandSeparaterigadeArtillery.(c)G ,IFVArtilleryandO,IICorpsArtillerywilleriefedeachuarternrogressfArtillery O N G I E N , Briefingwilleotatedbetweenhewoeadquarters.(d)ecommendhangesnrogramoG , IIICorpsndG , IIFV afteroordinationwithieldunits.(e)nitiatepprovedhangesnherogramasequired.b.rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryAdvisor,

F W M A FArtillery,SeparaterigadeArtillery.(1) Coflbjned,U&BPlMf a f t f l f l(a)utualelectionofubjects.(b)utualelectionfmethodsfraining.(a)uperviseevelopmentfrogramfnstruction.(b)uperviseronduct training.(3) EvaluationPhase. Evaluateffectivenessfraininghroughobservation,nd/orxamination.c.rtilleryBattalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor.(1 )cBbined, lM B iagBaa*(a)utualselectionofsubjects.(b)utualselectionofmethodsofconductingtraining.(c)evelopmentofaprogramofinstruction.(2)sflfiuiigp haaa(a)stablishtrainingschool(ifapplicable).( b )stablishcombinedmobiletraininginstructorgroup(ifapplicable).

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( c )onductrefreshertraining.(3)valuationPhase.( a )oraacombinedinspectionteamtoobservetraining,( b )valuatetheeffectivenessofthisprojecttoacnieveits

p r i. a r ybjectiveandrecommendimprovements.

if

_


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Project6;tandardizationof TubeCalibrationProcedures.1 .hepriaar>'objectiveofthisprojectistostandardizecalibrationproceduresanddevelopaplantocalibratealltubesannually,2.heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a.ublishanddisseminateadocumentexplainingthenecessityofcalibration.b.evelopplanforconductingcalibrationsannually.c.xecutecalibrationplan.

3.nitiationdateforthisprojectisJanuary1970.U . Coordination r f . l lbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinAppondix Aofthe ArtilleryDONG TIENPlan.nordertoeffi-cientlyusetheassistanceofordnance,allAKVNunitswhichcannotbein-corporatedintoaUSunit'scalibrationschedule,willbescheduledforcalibrationinaseparate3Cdayschedule.hisschedulewillbepreparedbytheassociateunit,coordinatedthroughIIFFVArtillery,whointurnwillcoordinatetheuseofordnanceassistancewithinIIICTZ.5.uidanceforeachlevelofcommand:

a.llCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtillery Advisor,IIFFVArtillery.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase.rovidebasicguidancetounits.(2)jBffllSiflB frflafl.(a)ublishanddisseminateadocumentexplainingnecessityofcalibration.(b)onitorplanestablished.(c)oordinateuseofrequiredordnanceassistance.(3)valuationPhase.(a)stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbe

me;sured.{'.)eviewand analyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsuamittedby ArtilleryGroup,Division Artillery,DivisionArtillery Ad-

visor,FWMAFArtillery andSeparataBrigadeArtillery,

tjlfi


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(c)G,IIFFVArtilleryandCO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebriefedeachquarteron progressof ArtilleryDONGTIEN.riefingwillberotatedbetweenthetwoheadquarters.( d )ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,IIFFVaftercoordinationwithfieldunits.( e )nitiateapprovedchangesintheprogramasrequired.b.rtillery Group,DivisionArtillery,Division ArtilleryAdvisor,RTAVFArtillery,SeparateBrigadeArtillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanning Phase.(a)stablishcoordinationwithasaociatedunitanddevelopaplantoincorporatethecalibrationof ARVN artilleryunitsintotheUS

calibrationschedule.RVNunitswillbecalibratedannually.(b)evelopaseparatecalibrationschedule,usingnomorethana3Cdayperiod,tocalibrateallARVNartilleryunitswhichcannotbeincorporatedintotheUSunit'scalibrationschedule.( 2 )E x e c u t i o n , P h a a s .(a)mplementhealibrationplan.(b)oordinateeparatealibrationchedulewithIFVArtilleryforrdnanceassistance,(3)valuationPhase. Evaluateheffectivenessfherojecto

achieveherimaryobjectivendecommendmprovements,c.rtilleryBattalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor.(1)dmbinedPlannlaghase. Non-applicable.(2)xecutionPhase.(a)idnhemplementationofheprogram.(b)rovidenputsequiredynextigherheadquarters.(3)valuationPhasa. Evaluateusefcalibrationdata.

/7


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Pro.jgctlistandardizationof heeistrationPolicy1 .heprimaryobjectiveofthisprojectistoestablishastandardizedpolicyforconductingregistrations.2 .heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a.ublishanddisseminateapaperexplainingthenecessityforcon-ductingregistrationsandwhentheyshouldbeconducted.b .evelopaprocedureofcheckstoensurethattheregistrationpoli-

cyisbeingfollowedbyallunits.3 .nitiationdateforthisprojectisDecember1969.4 . .oordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinAppendix AoftheArtilleryDNGTIENPlan.hisprojectwillbeimplementedatIIICorpsArtillery,IIICorpsartillery Advisor,IIFFVArtillerylevel.5 .uidanceforeachlevelofcommand;

a .llCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtillery Advisor, IFFV Artillery.(1)ombined,PlanningPhase.evelopapaperexplainingthenecessity

forconductingregistrationsandwhentheyshouldbeconducted.(2)xecutionPhqsa.ublishanddisseminateapaperexplainingthenecessityforconductingregistrationsandwhentheyshouldbeconducted(3)valuationPhase.( a )stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogresscanbe

measured.(b)eviewandanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressrepo:tsubmittedby ArtilleryGroup,Division Artillery,DivisionArtilleryAdvisor,FWMAFArtilleryandSeparateBrigadeArtillery,(c)G,IIFFVArtilleryandCO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebriefedeachquarteronprogressofArtilleryDNGTIEN.riefingwillberotated

betweenthetwoheadquarters(d)ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,II r .

coordinationwithfieldunits.. .t-.Initiatepprovedhanges inherogramsequired.

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b.rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryAdvisor,FWMAFArtilleryandSeparateBrigadeArtillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.rovidebasicguidancetounits.(2)xecutionPhase.upervisetheimplementationoftheregistrationpolicyestablishedbyhigherheadquarters.(3)valuationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessofthisprojecttoachievetheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.c .rtilleryBattalion,ArtilleryBattalion Advisor.(1)ombinedPlanningPhase.evelopasystemofcheckstoensuretheregistrationpolicyisbeingfollowed by allbatteriesundertheircommand.(2)xecution Phase.( a )mplementtheregistrationpolicyestablishedbyhigherheadquarters,( b )hecktoensuretheregistrationpolicyisbeingfollowedbyallbatteriesundertheircommand.(3)valuation Phase.valuatetheeffectivenessofthisprojecttoechievetheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.

V?


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Project8:ombinedUseofMeteorologicalData1 .hepriiuaryobjectiveofthisprojectistoprovidemeteorologicaldataandassistancetoAHVKindevelopingthecapabilitytoproduceme-teorologicaldata.2 .heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a.isseminatetoA x i V Martilleryunitstneadvantagesofusingmeteors.logicaldata.b .isseminatemeteorologicalmessagestoallartilleryunitsinillc .rainAhVNpersonneltooperatemeteorologicalstations,

3.nitiationdateforthistrainingisDecember1969.A.hisprojectwillbeaccomplisheddowntobattalionlevel,5 . luidanceforeachlevelofcommand:

a.llCorpsArtillery,IIICorps rtiileryAdvisor, IFFVartillery,( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.( a )evelopapaperexplainingtneadvantagesofusingmeteorological

data,(b)evelopaplantodisseminatemeteorologicaldatatoallartil-

lery unitswithinIIICTZ.(c)evelopplanslorestabli thinga7dayprogramofinstructiont oteachselectedAHVNpersonneltheproceduresrequiredtoproduceavisual

typemeteorologicalmessage.( 2 )xecution? h a g e . (ayublishanadisseminatetoA K V 7 . 'artilleryunitsapaperontneadvantagesol' using meteorologicaldata.( b )isseminatemeteorologicaldatatoailartilleryunitswitninini : z .

Conductavisualtypemeteorologicalschool.{a) PlacementofselectedA . . . ' . ,personnelwitndo meteorological

stationstoreceiveonthejobtraining.


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( 3 )valuationPhase.( a )stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogressc a nbe

measured.( b )eview anaanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsubmittedby ArtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionnrtiileryAd-visor,FWMAFArtillery andSeparateBrigadeArtillery.( c )G,IIFFV ArtilleryandGO,IIICorpsArtillerywillbebrieiedeachquarteronprogressofArtil.eryDONGTIEN.riefingwillberotatedbetweenthetwoheadquarters,( d )ecommendchangesinprogramtoCG,IIICorpsandCG,IIFFVaftercoordinationwithfieldunits.( e )nitiateapprovedchangesintheprogramasrecuired.b .rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,Divisionartillery ndvisor,andSeparateBrigadeArtillery.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.rovidebasicguidancetounits.(2)xecutionPhase.(a)isseminatemeteorologicaldatatoartilleryunitswithinthevalidmeteorologicalareaofcoverage.( b )onductonthejobtrainingforselectedAhVNpersonnel.(3)valuationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessoftheprojecttoacnievetheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.c .rtilleryBattalions,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor.( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.on-applicable.(2)xecutionPhase.( a )eteorologicalsectionsdisseminatedatatoartilleryunitswithinthevalidmeteorologicalareaofcoverage.( b )onductenthejobtrainingforseltctedA h V i ;personnel.(3)valuationPhase.valuatetheeffectivenessofthisprojecttoachievetheprimaryobjectiveandrecommendimprovements.

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Prelect9;ombinedSurveyControlPlan1 heprimaryobjectiveof thecombinedSurveyControlPlanistoextendsurveycontroltoallartilleryunitsinIIICorpsTacticalZonethroughacombinedARVN,USandFWMAFeffort,2 .heintermediateobjectivesofthisprojectare:

a.ocateandidentifyexistingsurveycontrolpointswithinDivisionTacticalAreasandAreasofOperation.b.evelopaplantoextendsurveycontroltoartilleryunitsthrough-outIIICTZ.c .xecutesurveyplan.d.rainAhVNsurveyteamsbyonthejobtraining.

3 .stablishmentofsurveycontrolthroughoutIIICTZwillbeacontinuouscombinedeffort,U , CoordinationwillbeeffectedthroughtheassociatedunitprogramasoutlinedinAppendixAoftheArtilleryDONGTIENPlan.hisprojectwillbeaccomplisheddowntoBattalionlevel.5 .uidanceforeachlevelofcommand,

a.llCorpsArtillery,IIICorpsArtilleryAdvisor,IIFFVArtillery,( 1 )ombinedPlanningPhase.(a)evelopaplantoextendsurveycontroltoartilleryunitsthrough-outtheIIICTZ.(b)rovidebasicguidancetounitsforimplementationof thesurvey

plan.(2)xecutionPhase.onitorexecutionofsurveyplan,(3)valuationhase.(a)stablishappropriatemilestonesagainstwhichprogressc a r .bemeasured.(b)eviewandanalyzetheconsolidatedquarterlyprogressreportsubmittedbyartilleryGroup,Division Artillery,DivisionrtilleryAdvisor,FWMAFArtillery andSeparateBrigadeArtillery,

S3.


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(c)G ,I EPVArtilleryandO, III Corpsnrtilleryvri.lleriefedeachuarternprogressfArtillery O l i G I E N . Briefingwill beotatedbetweenhewoeadquarters.(d)ecommendhangesnrogramo , III Corp s andG , II'r'Vafteroordinationwithieldunits.(e)nitiatepprovedhangesnherogramasequired.b.rtilleryGroup,DivisionArtillery,DivisionArtilleryadvisor,F/lft i ArtilleryndSeparaterigadeArtillery,(1)ombinedlanningPhase. LocatenddentifyexistingSurveyControl PointswithinDivisionTacticalAreasndreasfOperation.(2)xecutionhase.(a) Execute surveylan,(0)rain R V Nurveyeamshroughnheobraining.(3)valuationhase. Evaluateheffectivenessfhisrogramoac"ieve the primarybjectivendecommend improvements.c.rtillerybattalion,ArtilleryBattalionAdvisor,(1)ombinedlanninghase. Non-applicable.(2)xecutionhase. Assistarenteadquartersasequired.(J) Evaluationhase. Non-applicable.

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/h i.ivouf43 NEPORI TITLE

Mll r OfficerDebriefing Report: Ik i L, D . KinnardDfsCRPTivFNOTESTypefeportandnclusivedntes)S eMgr OfficerDebriefing Report,, 21 May 1969 to 20NovemberlOhO

5 AUTHOHISifirsfnme, .niddle initial, lastnnme)

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5U ' ( - " " I .MENTARY NOTE5

N A13 ABSTRACT

12 SCONS' ITANY AC . f VI

0ACSF0K, D A, Washington, D.C. 2CJi1 (J

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field force debriefing artillery officers vietnam.pdf