ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

POLITICAL SCIENCE 610

SENIOR PROJECT

Chad Shokrollahzadeh

Comparing Revolutionary Theory: A Critical Analysis of John Foran’s and Theda Skocpol’s Theory of

Revolution.

Department of Political Science

4/07/10

Chad Shokrollahzadeh

Comparing Revolutionary Theory: A Critical Analysis of John Foran’s and Theda Skocpol’s Theory of

Revolution.

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to

maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

____________________________________(NAME PRINTED HERE)

____________________________________(HONOR CODE SIGNATURE)

Approved by:

____________________________ (1st Reader’s Name)

____________________________ (2nd Reader’s Name)

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my parents Mostafa (who really sparked my interest in politics) and Susan

Shokrollahzadeh (who has always encouraged me to follow my dreams) for their moral,

financial, and emotional support. Without them making it this far would not have been possible!

I would also like to thank my advisor Professor Howard Tamashiro, for his patience, guidance,

and assistance throughout the course of this project. Furthermore, I would like to thank all of the

brothers of the Theta Chi Fraternity for their friendship, companionship, and support throughout

these four years of college. Last but not least, I would like to thank God for all that he has

granted me throughout my life and throughout college and for the promises that he has for my

future.

I dedicate this project to the courageous people of Iran, whose struggle for justice and freedom

has yet to be completed and to oppressed people all over the world who still long to have a voice.

Table of Contents

Introduction, Revolutions: The Evolution of a Concept………………………………………….1

Chapter 1: Past Legacies and Current Developments of Revolutionary Theory…………………7

Chapter 2: Criteria For Evaluating Revolutionary Theory……………………………………...46

Chapter 3: The Iranian Revolution and Establishment of the Islamic Republic………………..74

Chapter 4: Implications for Future Revolutionary Theorizing…………………………………109

Conclusion, Foran Plus: A Theory Revisited………………………………………………….133

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………...141

1

Introduction- Revolutions: The Evolution of a Concept

Revolutions have ushered in the age of modernity. From the French Revolution to the

opposition to the era of global capitalism occurring in Mexico and throughout the global South,

individuals have come together to oppose the existing political and social order. However,

certain dynamics go into the making of a successful revolution, which in and of itself is a rare

occurrence. The attempt to understand the dynamics that go into the revolutionary process has

been the aim of scholars since at least the past one hundred years. During this time, there has

been an evolution of thought from the “historicist” account of the early 20th

century to the

“structuralist” analyses of the 1970‟s to an eventual focus on how culture influence the

trajectory of the revolutionary process.

In short, the study of revolution is a continuously evolving field with different

perspectives and biases all attempting to explain how and why individuals can overthrow a

government, usually the most powerful entity in society and replace it with another. Inevitably

the process by which revolutions occur is infinitely complex and involves understanding the

causes state weakness, the means by which the masses are mobilized and how new power elites

consolidate state power. This is no easy task. Indeed this is the essence of why the scholarship

of the revolutionary process lends itself to continuous evolution. With each revolution, new

questions are asked and new perspectives emerge as to how regimes are overthrow and new ones

are established. This has led some scholars to resign themselves to the notion that it is

impossible to understand how revolutions occur in general and that revolutionary transitions can

only be understood from a case to case basis.

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While it is true that revolutions have their own nuances, broad patterns do exist as to how

regimes are overthrown and new ones established. Understanding the workings of these patterns

and how they can be applied to various cases is at the heart of revolutionary theory. The relative

explanatory power between different theories depends upon their ability to explain in broad

terms how revolutions occur and what kinds of changes happen as a result of the revolutionary

process. In other words, a successful revolutionary theory can be applied to various cases that

have their own unique circumstances but that share similar patterns. For example, although the

Chinese and Iranian Revolutions occurred in separate times and both had separate circumstances,

they both shared broad patterns. Both revolutions occurred in exclusive, repressive regimes,

both occurred in times of economic distress and international pressure. Finally, both involved

the formation of multiclass coalitions that advocated the overthrow of the existing regime and its

replacement with a new political and social order.

However, both are different in that the Chinese Revolution involved large scale peasant

revolts, an event that did not occur in Iran. Furthermore, the Chinese Revolution came as a result

of careful planning and execution by a revolutionary mass-mobilizing party. The Iranian

Revolution did not have clear leadership until the later stage of the revolution – after the fall of

the Shah‟s regime. However, one thing remains clear; both revolutions shared broad patterns

behind the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and the overthrow of the regime even if the

means by which this occurred appear strikingly different. Therefore, the ability of one theory

over another to explain the revolutionary process makes it superior or inferior to another theory

of revolutionary transition.

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This is what makes the Iranian Revolution such a valuable case for comparison. The

Iranian Revolution has often been called the “last great social revolution” and for good reason.

The Iranian Revolution was the last political upheaval that resulted in drastic restructuring of the

economic, political, and social structures of a country. For this reason, the Iranian Revolution

plays a very important role for revolutionary scholarship. The ability of any given theory to

explain the Iranian Revolution, along with the revolutions that have occurred in the past signifies

that the theory has great explanatory power - not just for revolutions that have occurred in the

past, but ones that could occur in the future. Since one theory can explain a wide array of

revolutions that have occurred in the past, the ability of a theory to explain revolutions that could

happen in the future should at least be considered. However, even if the theory itself does not

account for all of the revolutions that may occur, it does provide a good starting point for the

very reason that revolutionary theory is constantly evolving with ever-changing world

circumstances.

The theories studied in this project attempt to articulate the causes, processes, and

outcomes of revolution with varying degrees of success. The first theory studied, Theda Skocpol

's States and Social Revolutions attempts to explain revolutions in terms of how inter and intra

elite conflicts along with international military competition and peasant rebellions causes the

overthrow of the regime. Therefore, she takes a “structuralist approach” that emphasizes how the

relationship between different classes in society influences the economic, political and social

system. As Skocpol (1979) puts it her “structural analysis” consists of “the nexes of state/state,

state/economy, and state/class relationships” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 11). As these classes and entities

come into conflict, the regimes in power face a dual threat of peasant rebellions and upper class

resistance. As a result of this conflict, new leaders who previously consisted of “marginal elites”

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emerge and change the political and social arrangements. Furthermore, She argues that states

are part of an international system of competing states which means that governments have an

obligation to build up their coercive apparatus in order to deal with real or imagined international

threats. However, the attempt of states to build their armed forces creates conflicts with the

landed elites because the extraction of resources that this requires is antithetical to their interests.

At the same time, peasant rebellions spring up as a result of the instability that this conflict

creates. The peasantry, which has long standing grievances with the present order finally, has

the opportunity to rebel. In terms of outcomes, Skocpol argues that the principal outcome of

revolutions is the increasing power of the state. This is a result of the revolutionary leadership's

propensity to use state power to accomplish their ends. This power becomes institutionalized

either through a mass mobilizing party state, as what happened in China and Russia or through

the rise of charismatic leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte in France.

In the second theory studied, John Foran argues that revolutions occur as a result of a

personalist, exclusionary regime with a superpower patron facing an economic downturn as a

result of this relationship of dependency. This allows for the excluded classes to form a multi-

class coalition, mobilized by what he calls “cultures of resistance.” After the regime collapses,

new power elites take control and begin a process of great social and political change. The scope

of Foran's theory is much broader than Skocpol's and can be applied to many more cases,

including Iran. For example, Skcopol stresses that peasant rebellions are a necessary

precondition for the overthrow of the old regime. Foran does not deny the importance of these

rebellions in some cases, such as Nicaragua. On the other hand, his theory does not articulate

peasant rebellions as necessary. In Iran for example, the peasantry played little to no role in the

overthrow of the Shah.

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Furthermore, Foran notes that culture plays an important role in the mobilizing of the

masses against the regime. In other words, cultural elements allow for the opposition to find

common ground in their grievances against the regime. A culture of opposition, in other words

emerges because of repressive and exclusive nature of the regime and the economic problems

that these types of regimes tend to face. It seems as if Foran argues that people look to stories,

myths, and their historical circumstances for inspiration. For example, the story of Sandino's

resistance to foreign interference and repression by domestic political elites inspired the

Sandinistas, a movement named after Sandino, to fight against the repression of the Somoza

regime in Nicaragua during the late 1970's. This element of culture, largely ignored by Skocpol

played an important role in the mobilization of the Iranian masses against the repressive regime

of the Shah.

Finally, the theory that best explains the Iranian case will be studied in light of the

changes in world historical circumstances that have occurred since the “last great social

revolution.” Does this theory take into account the changes that have occurred as a result of

globalization? How will mobilization patterns change? What will be the aim of new

revolutionary actors and what will be the result of these new aims? These questions will be

examined in the final chapter of this project.

The method used throughout the course of this project is a comparative analysis of the

Foran and Skocpol theories of revolution using criteria for analysis outlined in the second

chapter. Using these criteria, the explanatory power of the theories will be outlined in light of

the Iranian case presented in the third chapter. The theory that best fits the Iranian case will also

be examined in terms of its explanatory power of revolutions that may occur in the future.

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Therefore, this project does not attempt to construct a new theory. Rather, this project consists of

a comparative analysis of two distinct theories by means of a case study. The results of this

analysis will determine the explanatory power of each individual theory.

The aim of this project, therefore, is to examine how the theory of revolution should

evolve. Should it take Skocpol's “structural” approach or Foran's emphasis on how structural

weaknesses and exclusive regimes give individuals the opportunity to act against the regimes

that oppress them? Structure refers to refers to the recurrent patterned arrangements which seem

to influence or limit the choices and opportunities that individuals possess. From this perspective

Foran and Skocpol seem to view structure differently. Skocpol appears to view structure as

constraining while Foran seems to view structure as influencing the actions taken by individuals.

In any case the perspectives of these two authors will be studied in light of the Iranian

case in order to determine the trajectory that revolutionary theory should go. Should future

scholars take Skocpol‟s focus on “structural” constraints or Foran‟s focus on how structural

conditions are necessary but not sufficient for a revolution? This project will attempt to attempt

to address this issue in terms of how they explain the 1979 Iranian Revolution and revolutions

that may occur in the future.

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Chapter 1- Past Legacies and Current Developments of Revolutionary Theorizing

By definition a revolution consists of “basic transformations of a society‟s state and class

structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from

below” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 4). In its various manifestations, the revolutionary struggle of the

masses against their often oppressive rules has greatly shaken the halls of power from Paris to

Tehran in a violent wave of social transformation. Although exceedingly rare, revolutions have

their place in the modern political lexicon as events of hope, yet unfortunately fail to establish

justice in the countries, empires, and nations that experience them. However, although the

inherent good of the outcomes of any particular revolution are always up for debate, one truism

still remains. Revolutions have and remain a source of curiosity for the academic community, so

much so that an entire literature dedicated to explaining the causal patterns and the outcomes of

revolutions has proliferated over the past century. This literature, often taken from such diverse

fields as history, political science, sociology, and psychology attempts to explain how and why

revolutions occur and the role that revolutionary elites and the masses play in constructing a

post-revolutionary political, economic, and social order.

Jack Goldstone, a student and analyst of revolutions himself, has described these

developments as “generations” of revolutionary theory, each with its own emphasis on different

causal patterns and modes of post-revolutionary institutionalization. According to Goldstone,

the first, second, third, and the emerging fourth generation of revolutionary theory all share

general attributes in terms of their intellectual scope and theoretical disposition. Furthermore,

the development of each subsequent “generation” of revolutionary theory serves as an evaluation

of the apparent shortcomings of the preceding generation of revolutionary theory. According to

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Jack Goldstone an influential revolutionary theorist, these different “generations” of

revolutionary theory fall within specific time frames starting around 1900 with the “first

generation” until the “fourth generation” of the present.

The “first generation” falling around 1900 and 1940 primarily consisted of thinkers such

the psychologists Gustave LeBon and Charles Ellwood, and the sociologist Pitrim A. Sorokin as

well as historian Crane Brinton, author of The Anatomy of Revolution. Although these theorists

developed many notions and insights that still prove useful to those that study revolutions, their

analyses presented many major flaws. According to Goldstone many of these theorists, including

Brinton, attempted to provide an explanation of the various “stages” of the revolutionary process

(Goldstone, 1980, p. 426). Others tried to simply describe the social and demographic changes

that revolutions produced. In addition, the psychological analysis that some of the thinkers

during this period provided appeared ad hoc and weakly specified (Goldstone, 1980, p. 426).

These theories such as LeBon‟s “mob psychology,” Ellwood‟s “breakdown of social

habits” and Sorokin‟s “repression of basic instinctual needs” lacked the broad explanatory power

necessary for analyzing the complex political and social phenomenon of the modern revolution

(Goldstone, 1980, p. 427). In essence, these theories attempted to describe how a revolution

occurred in a particular place and time not why and when revolutionary situations occur.

Therefore, as the 1940‟s came to a close, a new set of thinkers attempted to formulate explicit

theories of the revolutionary process, each coming from a different disciplinary perspective

ranging from cognitive psychology, the structuralist-functionalist theory of sociology and the

pluralist, interest group conflict theory of political science (Goldstone, 1980, p. 427).

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The first class of these theories, the analysis based on cognitive psychology and

frustration-aggression theory, appears in the work of Ted Gurr among others. The root of

revolution to these theorists was a product of the “state of mind of the masses.” They believed

that the masses, because their aspirations could not be realized through present political, social,

and economic arrangements entered a cognitive state of “frustration” and “aggression”

(Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). The sources of frustration varied from the long-term effects of

modernization and urbanization, short-term economic strife, and the closure of political and

economic opportunity to selected economic or ethnic groups (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). In any

case, each perspective agreed with the notion that the emergence of a revolutionary situation

sprang from frustration with the current political-economic arraignments and that the primary

task for revolutionary theory was to uncover why the masses reacted to these arrangements.

The second camp that emerged during this time period was analyses based on

sociological structural-functionalist theory. These theorists viewed societies as systems that

depended on “equilibrium” between the system and its environment. Namely, in any given

society at any given time the “total flow of demands and resources between the system and its

environment, and between the various subsystems-polity, economy, status, and culture (values)-

that make up the social system” must be in balance (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). Thus, any

“disequilibrium” or “dysfunction” in this balance leaves society unstable and prone to revolution.

Changes in the subsystem such as shifting power relations of subsystem elites, and the growth of

new ideologies and religions are cited as examples of instability in this literature (Goldstone,

428). Therefore, the study of what causes this unbalance became the defining factor for this

school of thought during the 1960‟s.

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The third camp of the second generation consisted of analyses of revolutions based on

political science theories such as the interest-group competition theory. Authors such as Samuel

Huntington and Charles Tilly fall into this tradition (Goldstone, 1980, p. 428). These authors

contend that political outcomes are the product of the conflict between competing interest groups

(Goldstone, 1980, p. 429). The conflict between these groups becomes so intense before a

revolution that normal political processes cannot resolve the conflict, leading to the collapse of

the incumbent system entirely. Furthermore, these competing groups must possess the adequate

resources- political, financial or otherwise to establish sovereignty over a political or military

base that will allow them to achieve their goal through violence (Goldstone, 1980, p. 429).

According to these authors, any given series of events can allow for these conditions to arise.

Conditions such as war, economic modernization, and urbanization give rise to new interest

groups and distributions of these resources between the various interest groups, thus leading to

conflict (Goldstone, 1980, p. 429).

The theories of the second generation, although varied in their approach and academic

discipline all shared the same premise that revolution was a two-step process. First, a set of

conditions or patterns must arise that differ from current patterns. Second, a “critical variable” of

some sort (relative depravation, modernization etc.) must rise to a magnitude that will allow for a

revolutionary situation to take place (Goldstone, 1980, p. 431). These two facets of second

generation theory received much criticism during the mid-1970s. This criticism eventually led to

the development of third generation theory with works by Skocpol, Eisenstadt, and others. The

major criticisms of second generation will be given fuller attention when Skocpol‟s theory is

introduced.

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However novel these ideas appeared, many doubts concerning their analytical scope

emerged in the decade or so after they were introduced. The criticism of third generation

revolutionary theory came from scholars who doubted that structural vulnerabilities of regimes

constituted the major reason why revolutionary struggle both appeared in certain countries and

certain times, and why these regimes were powerless to prevent their own downfall.

Furthermore, criticism began to emerge concerning these theories use of a limited number of test

cases. In other words, the revolutionary process in France and Russia had a completely different

character than in countries such as Nicaragua during the Cold War and post-colonial polities

such as Angola during the 1970‟s. Therefore, the conclusions of third generation scholars based

on the study of a limited number of cases did not seem to apply to revolutions during the late 20th

century.

Taking these short-comings into consideration fourth generation scholars began to re-

evaluate the direction that the study of revolutions had taken. What they discovered by studying

newer cases from the 1970‟s and 80‟s shook the foundations of the intellectual tradition of

studying the revolutionary process. For one, the notion that revolutions consisted primarily of

inter and intra elite conflicts and agrarian upheaval became seriously doubted. Observation

demonstrated to fourth generation scholars that revolutions did not emerge simply from elite

struggles for power, structural weaknesses of incumbent regimes, or agrarian conflicts. Rather,

Goldstone asserts that scholars claimed that most revolutions that took place in the 20th

century

had taken on an urban character with multi-class coalitions as the driving force for revolutionary

change (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141).

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Since revolutions seemed to have taken a different character than they did in the past, the

scholarship that studies revolutions also changed, in two major ways. First, some scholars tried

to apply third generation precepts to more recent revolutions such as those that took place in

Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141). Some scholars on the

other hand had taken a different approach. To them, the rule of culture, ideology, contingency,

multiclass coalitions, and conscious action by the participants of revolution became areas of

analysis (Goldstone, 2001, p. 141). No longer did the study of revolutions entail the study of

how elites, peasants, and regimes interacted with each other. In its place, scholars began to study

how cultural and ideological dispositions among the participants in the revolutionary struggle

influenced the onset, course, and conclusion of that struggle.

Furthermore, these scholars examined the different types of revolutions that had taken

place during the 20th

century. Third generation theorists concentrated their focus on so-called

“great revolutions” in which the overthrow of the regime was followed by changes in economic

and social struggles (Goldstone, 2001, p. 143). The 20th

century witnesses revolutions of a

different type such as “political revolutions” that consist of violent regime change, “abortive

revolutions” that consist of a temporary victories by revolutionaries, and rebellions in which

violent struggle is concentrated in a limited area (Goldstone, 2001, p.143). However different

these “revolutionary events” may be they all feature similar characteristics and dynamics that

make them possible, such as the presence of repressive regimes, a world systematic opening, and

the formation multi-class coalitions.

Concurrently, the fourth generation also changed its focus on the role that the

international system played in fostering revolutionary change. Although third generation

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theorists introduced the idea that international military and economic competition affected

regime stability, fourth generation theorists expanded upon this by examining how ideological

influences, international support of incumbent regimes and direct military and diplomatic

intervention can influence popular perceptions of regime legitimacy (Goldstone, 2001, p. 145).

The absence of legitimacy because of international influence has proven to be a powerful driver

in popular mobilization against the regime in power.

Fourth generation theorists also studied how formal and informal networks,

organizations, and identities shape revolutionary mobilization. Therefore, these theorists

contend that the mobilization of the masses does not necessarily occur only through the

formation of organizations such as unions and parties. Rather, informal organizations like the

family and community are crucial in building protest identities. These identities in turn are built

through ideological and cultural frameworks that utilize symbols and beliefs endemic to any

given society. These symbols, stories, and ideas undermine the current regime because they

suggest a more just way of leadership than currently constitutes the norm (Goldstone, 2001, p.

155).

The two theories examined throughout the course of this project exemplify some of the

major dispositions, analytical frameworks, and at times biases of the different generations of

revolutionary theory. The first, Theda Skocpol‟s States and Social Revolutions explores the

relationship between the state, elites, and the peasantry and how a breakdown in these

relationships led to revolutionary upheavel. The second, John Foran‟s Taking Power: On the

Origins of Third World Revolutions studies how the formation of “cultures of opposition” allows

for multi-class coalitions to emerge and overthrow the repressive, personalist regimes that have

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dominated Third World politics. According to Foran, these regimes, either colonial or national

all have similar characteristics and weaknesses that invite popular discontent against them. This

discontent coupled with a tradition of protest and opposition, the “culture of opposition”

eventually leads to demands for “justice” from the incumbent regime. Eventually, the regime

collapses through the efforts of a multi-class coalition whose components have grievances

against the regime.

In the intellectual world of revolutionary theory, few works had the impact or as strong a

reaction as States and Social Revolutions by Theda Skocpol. Skocpol‟s analysis, methods, and

conclusions provided both rave reviews and a backlash of criticism. The main premises that

Skocpol emphasizes, the “autonomy of the state,” how structural weaknesses which lead to state/

society conflicts and peasant insurrections seems to consist of a coalescence of the major trends

that have taken place during the evolution of third generation revolutionary theory. Or as

Goldstone (2001) states Skocpol effectively “capped” the third generation of revolutionary

theory Furthermore, as stated, Skocpol‟s theory sparked much interest and criticism in the

academic community. This interest and criticism sparked interest in the study of revolutions and

led to further developments in revolutionary theory. Thus, Skocpol‟s theory is important not

only because it provides fresh insights to the causal patterns and post-revolutionary consolidation

of regimes, it also ushered in the beginning of a transition to a new era of scholarship, the fourth

generation.

Skocpol, admittedly a student of revolution, offers fresh insight to the causes, processes

and outcomes of revolutions. According to Skocpol, other schools of thought such as the

Marxist school do not have the same historical analysis that she presents in her work. Therefore,

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Skocpol contends that revolutionary theory up until the late 1970‟s when she published her work

seemed woefully inadequate in explanatory power because they lacked a profound depth of

historical scholarship (Skocpol, 1979, pg. 5). Therefore, Skocpol‟s method of “comparative

historical analysis” seemed to her a more logical method of study because it would allow for

different causal patters to be compared and contrasted within their respective historical

circumstances. This in turn would allow for a better understanding of what caused revolutions

within a varying array of complex contexts (Skocpol, 1979, p. 5). For instance, although the

French and Chinese Revolutions occurred in very different places and times, both shared some

similar causal patterns. Therefore, by studying these revolutions historically, one may arrive at a

better sense of how revolutions occur and conclude in various places during various historical

eras.

In addition to her historical scholarship, Skocpol emphasizes the role of how the behavior

of the pre-revolutionary state and its relations with societal elites and the peasantry shape the

revolutionary process. Therefore, Skocpol (1979) contends that class analysis should be coupled

with the ideas of political conflict theorists in order to fully understand “why and exactly how

these overt class conflicts developed during the Revolution [France, Russia, and China]” (p.5). In

essence, although Skocpol provides a fresh perspective on how revolutions should be analyzed

she does not construct an entirely new theory. However, this fresh perspective remains

significant because it calls out the inherent weaknesses of many of the previous theories that

attempt to explain the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions.

However, Skocpol breaks from the second generation in one important regard, her

emphasis on the “non-voluntarist” structural analysis of the revolutionary struggle. According to

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Skocpol, the theorists of the past (i.e. the second generation) emphasize the “social

displacement” (Johnson) or “relative depravation” (Gurr) all emphasize how personal discontent

leads individuals to collectively organize against the old regime through personal choice

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 15). According to this premise, the masses organize through purposive

movements of discontented and disoriented individuals realizing the Marxian notion of

“consciousness”. Skocpol contends that these “voluntarist” analyses of revolutions do not take

into account how structures such as international and intra-national political and economic

institutions influence how individuals behave and interact (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17).

Skocpol contends that revolutions are “born” and not “made” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17).

Therefore, unlike earlier scholars such as Johnson, Gurr, and the Marxists, Skocpol contends that

the groups that oppose the old regime do not do so with the intention of overthrowing that

regime at the outset. Rather, the emergence of ever intensifying political-military struggles

within the state creates the necessary conditions for revolutionary mobilization (Skocpol, 1979,

p. 17). Therefore, Skocpol contends that previous theories viewed societal order as based upon

“the consensus of the majority.” She views this as completely flawed because of the lack of

historical precedent, “no matter what form social revolutions conceivably might take in the

future…the fact is that historically no successful social revolution has ever been made by a mass-

mobilizing, avowedly “revolutionary” movement” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). Thus revolutions

come through conflicts result from “differently situated and motivated groups have become

participants in complex unfolding of multiple conflicts” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). These conflicts,

carefully “limited and shaped by existing socioeconomic and international conditions” act as the

primers of the explosive and volatile mix of political, economic, and social energy unleashed by

revolutionary violence.

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Furthermore, Skocpol argues that revolution occurs in nations that are part of the

“international system of competing states.” These states are in a constant struggle for influence

and because of constant warfare had to continually modernize their armies and economies to

ensure that one nation in particular dominated the international system. Furthermore, because of

these international conflicts leaders from the French Revolution used patriotic appeals to the

masses in order to mobilize the citizen masses (Skocpol, 1979, p. 21). Developments in the

international system of states brought two distinct changes to the domestic order, the attempt by

incumbent elites to “administer industrialization from above” and the harnessing of mass

involvement by revolutionary regimes. Furthermore, states going through or potentially going

through social revolutions do so within a particular context. For example, weaker states tend to

undergo revolutions because international military, economic, and political competition have

invariably undermined state control and existing state authorities in light of the state‟s own

relative structural weaknesses (Skocpol, 1979, p. 23).

Skocpol also contents that revolutions happen within the context of “world time”

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 23). Revolutions do not happen within a historical vacuum. Developments

such as the industrial revolution and Leninist organization all influence how a revolution takes

place. For example, the Russian Revolution influenced how the Chinese Revolution took place

because the development of Leninism as a mass mobilizing framework influenced how the

Chinese revolutionary leadership organized the masses and consolidated the post revolutionary

regime (Skocpol, 1979, p. 24). Therefore, not only does revolution occur within the context of an

international competitive states system it also takes place within a system of intellectual and

economic development which molds the trajectory of the revolutionary struggle within the

international states system.

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Furthermore, Skocpol‟s analysis of revolutions views the state as an autonomous entity in

society. Previous analysts viewed the state as an arena in which struggles of a more

socioeconomic nature take place. To these analysts, the political struggle during a revolution

was merely incidental and that political struggle merely expressed larger and more fundamental

structural strains in the regime (Skocpol, 1979, p. 25). This understanding follows in the

footsteps of the liberal understanding of the state in which denotes state legitimacy as an

embodiment of “fundamentally consensually based legitimate authority” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 25).

When this authority loses its legitimacy through “relative depravation,” “social dislocation,” or

by revolutionary ideology, the state will face a revolution.

Skocpol argues that the state plays an autonomous role in society, that the state does not

exist to serve the interest of any dominant class. Rather, the state, as a manifestation of coercion,

exists for the sole purpose of serving its own interests and increasing its own power for its own

purposes (Skocpol, 1979, p. 27). In essence the state extracts resources from society to build

administrative and coercive institutions. While true that the state operates within a class-divided

society and institutions which includes the participation of non-state actors in the policymaking

arena the basis of the state‟s power is its own coercive apparatus (Skocpol, 1979, p. 29). This

apparatus throughout its daily life can potentially come into conflict with the dominant classes of

society even if these classes‟ interests and the interests of the state are similar vis-à-vis more

subordinate classes (Skocpol, 1979, p. 30).

Beyond autonomy from national class interests, the state also exists in a particular

geopolitical environment. This environment determines what actions a particular state can take

in dealing with its domestic crises. International military conflict sets and changes the priorities

19

of states. For example, a state that undergoes intense military competition from the outside must

take steps (building arsenals, armies etc) that potentially come into conflict with the interests of

the dominant class (Skocpol, 1979, p. 31). State led economic growth in the face of fears of

domination by other states also influences the policies pursued by these states (Skocpol, 1979, p.

31). The extraction of resources to accomplish fundamental economic reforms in light of

international competition will at times hinder the interests of the dominant class (Skocpol, 1979,

p. 31).

These two examples employed by Skocpol demonstrate that “legitimacy” as such does

not rely on the acquiescence of one group or another to the state‟s authority. Rather, legitimacy

relies on the states coercive apparatus and cadres to remain cohesive and confident in the state to

perform its duties (Skocpol, 1979, p. 32). The resources needed to build and maintain this

apparatus and the distribution of these resources play a fundamental role in intra-elite conflicts

which can create political contradictions leading to regime instability and disintegration. The

state, in essence is “Janus faced” with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided

socioeconomic structures and an international system of states” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 32). To

Skocpol, understanding the relationship between these two and the conflicts that states face

within this context prove instrumental in understanding their weaknesses and likelihood of

collapse when faced with challenges from these two spheres.

In order to methodically understand how all of these elements come together in a variety

of contexts, Skocpol utilizes what she calls the “comparative historical” method of analysis. She

claims that this method departs from first generation theorists who provide broad generalizations

of revolutions and later theorists who utilize a multitude of cases and subsume them within much

20

broader categories (Skocpol, 1979, p. 33). For example, historical analysis of the second

generation included structure-functionalist social system categories of Johnson and categories

such as “political violence” utilized by Gurr (Skocpol, 1979, p. 34). However, these theories that

attempt to avoid overly “historicized” descriptions tend to only emphasize one or two aspects

that go into the revolutionary process. For example, Gurr maintains that relative depravation is

the main cause for discontent in any given society and eventual revolution. Isn‟t this true for any

given society? This means that while “relative depravation” does favor other factors over others

it only points out one factor that exists in any given society in the pre-revolutionary struggle

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 34).

Furthermore, this method does not require large amounts of statistical data and cases.

Rather, comparative historical analysis compares the national and international trajectories of

countries undergoing social revolution at different times and explains the causal patterns of

revolutions in light of the analysis of the comparison. In order to effectively use this method,

Skocpol compares the factors that made revolution successful in a variety of contexts (Skocpol,

1979, p. 37). In doing this Skocpol points out that the causal patterns of revolution can be

understood by comparing what does and does not allow for a successful social revolution.

Skocpol has reservations concerning this method of analysis however. First, strategic

guesses have to be made to understand how the various factors operate within each of the cases.

This means that some “contextual features of the historical cases that interact with the causes

being explicitly examined in ways the comparative historical analysis either does not reveal, or

must simply assume to be irrelevant” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 39). Second, this method of analysis

assumes each factor as independent of the other (Skocpol, 1979, p. 39). However, Skocpol gets

21

around this by pointing out how the various factors can overlap and influence each other

especially in the international context. For example, intellectual developments in Russia, in

regards to how the Russian experience led to communist party organization through the

Comintern that help the Chinese Communists in their revolutionary struggle (Skocpol, 1979, p.

39).

Related to her methodology are her choices of cases to study. Skocpol chooses to study

specifically China, Russia, and France because these three countries shared very specific

characteristics during the time in which all three underwent social revolution. First, the state

structures had existed for long periods of time and had not been altered by colonial arrangements

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 40). Second, each of these three nations experienced complete revolutionary

transformation in a long enough period of time in the past to consider that transformation

complete (Skocpol, 1979, p. 40). In addition, despite the differences that these countries faced

prior to revolution all shared other and perhaps more important features. Primarily each of these

countries was a proto-bureaucratic autocracy suddenly faced with competition from more

developed countries (Skocpol, 1979, p. 41). This led to the incapacitation of the central state

machinery of the old regime, widespread peasant rebellions and attempts by mass-mobilizing

political leaderships to consolidate revolutionary state power (Skocpol, 1979, p. 41).

For the sake of brevity only Skocpol‟s analysis of China will be introduced in great

detail, however passing references to Russian and France will be employed to demonstrate how

she employs the historical-comparative analysis to substantiate her claims. China faced different

circumstances than either Russia or France. Unlike the French or Russian nobility the Chinese

gentry wielded considerably more power in the peasant community. Not only did the gentry

22

collect money from land rents but also through the collection of taxes and interest rates on loans.

The gentry in China also had a “preponderant organizational position within peasant

communities” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 148). Peasants did not live in independent villages, but rather in

clusters of villages centered on a marketing community (Skocpol, 1979, p. 149). Since the gentry

essentially ran the social life of the marketing community they were effectively able to co-opt the

peasantry and take a more decisive role in their daily lives (Skocpol, 1979, p. 149). Furthermore,

peasants in China did not live on communal lands, but rather on individual plots ran by

individual families. This kept each individual peasant family in competition for more land and

resources thereby decreasing peasant solidarity. When resistance did emerge, the gentry were

usually the leaders of the rebellions against Imperial authority. Furthermore, orthodox Confucian

elements would often hijack the leadership of peasant movements and change the goals and

direction of these movements (Skocpol, 1979, p. 151). Therefore, the lack of peasant autonomy

made the chances peasant revolt extremely slim in Imperial China.

This did not mean the Chinese gentry were invulnerable to peasant uprisings. The

peasants, the majority of which were small land holders stood to gain if the gentry were pushed

aside (Skocpol, 1979, p. 151). Additionally, the state that had ensured the gentry‟s survival came

into increasing conflict with the gentry. When the Imperial system did collapse in 1911, the

gentry became more vulnerable to outside forces that wanted to undermine their authority

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 152). The rise of social banditry during this period of disorder sowed the

seeds of future conflict because it demonstrated the development of nascent class struggle. The

Chinese Communist party provided cohesion and direction to these outcasts under the aegis of a

revolutionary movement (Skocpol, 1979, p. 153).

23

In terms of outcomes, Skocpol emphasizes the role that political changes brought by the

revolution in all three cases have on the socioeconomic changes wrought by the new regime, the

structure and function of particular states, and how these changes can influence the social order.

In order to accomplish this Skocpol emphasizes the role the revolutionary leadership plays in the

development of the state. The leaders of these revolutions, being “marginal elites” who in one

way or another were involved with the administration of the old regime, understood the value of

the state in creating a stronger and more robust polity nationally and internationally (Skocpol,

1979, p. 170). Therefore, these groups more than any other, felt that changes in the state were

necessary to make this possible (Skocpol, 1979, p. 170).

She also sees ideology as important, although not in the sense that ideology serves as a

blueprint for action. Instead, Skcopol (1979) sees ideology as a force that allows for

revolutionary leaders to build and hold state power by encouraging people from diverse

backgrounds to work together for change (p. 170). Also, ideologies help leaders to encourage

the masses to engage in politico-military struggles against the regime. Finally, the totalitarian

outlook of revolutionary ideology helps justify the actions of revolutionary leaders to use state

power to achieve their ultimate political ends. Constrained by structural conditions, international

restraints, and legacies of the old regime revolutionary ideologies create states far different than

ideologically envisioned (Skocpol, 1979, p. 170).

Unlike Russia and France, the destruction of the Imperial system did not lead to the

emergence of revolutionary elites that mobilized the masses to build new state machinery.

Instead, the warlords that helped bring down the Chin‟g dynasty competed with each other on a

regional basis for more resources (Skocpol, 1979, p. 238). Skocpol (1979) asserts that not only

24

did this drive the peasantry from their land but also increased the “opportunism” and repressive

nature of some segments of the local gentry against the peasantry (p. 241). Although the gentry

faced new pressures related to the breakdown of the Imperial authorities, once the gentry aligned

with the warlords their power increased (Skocpol, 1979, p. 240).

However, this system allowed for the maneuvering of potential revolutionary elements

because of the disorganizing effects of the collapse of Imperial power, namely, the difficulty of

communication between local elites, between local elites and the national government, and the

decrease of Confucian-educated elements which increased the power of the local dominant class

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 241). These three conditions in concert both increased the potential of

revolutionary action because the increased exploitation of the peasantry coupled with the

increasing isolation of the gentry created more opportunities for revolutionary action.

The struggle against the warlords finally came in 1926 when the nationalist Kuomintang

(KMT) and the Communist Party with Soviet insistence joined forces and formed the National

Revolutionary Army (Skocpol, 1979, p. 243). This army financed and trained with Soviet

support had more financial resources and ideological legitimacy than the warlords (Skocpol,

1979, p. 243). Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek leader of the KMT was able to defeat the warlords

that controlled the northern portion of the country thereby nominally reuniting China under a

nationalist government (Skocpol, 1979, p. 241).

The KMT ultimately failed to effectively unite the country and centralize political

authority because it lacked the industrial and political resources to do so. More specifically,

because the KMT based its power on urban support and commercial activity, the KMT could not

and would not take a foothold in the countryside where socioeconomic conditions remained the

25

same as they did before the nationalist takeover (Skocpol, 1979, p. 247). Furthermore, Chiang

Kai Shek‟s authority solely based upon arms and subsidies to local leaders did not have effective

administration of large areas of the country (Skocpol, 1979, p. 248). In other words, Nanking‟s

authority was primarily based upon the old “warlord” style of governance of reliance on local

armed elites, albeit on a “national” scale.

The KMT became considerably weakened because of the military encroachments from

Japan and the inability of the regime to collect revenues and effectively administer a central

government (Skocpol, 1979, p. 250). This, coupled with the KMT‟s retreat from the coastal areas

further decreased the financial resources of the Nationalist government creating political and

economic stagnation (Skocpol, 1979, p. 250). Furthermore, the regimes military base consisted

of a loose collection of armies backed by Chiang‟s personal resources that because of a lack of

central administration could not effectively fight against a foreign invasion or against the better

organized guerrilla force of the Chinese Communist Party (Skocpol, 1979, p. 251).

On the other hand the communists, by reaching out to peasant communities in areas

under little control by the KMT or the warlords, were able to slowly build a revolutionary army

consisting of peasants under the direction of party commissars (Skocpol, 1979, p. 253). This

would take time since the communist party had limited contact with the settled peasantry.

However, the tactic of “communist banditry” in which small groups of communist led bandits

infiltrated peasant communities eventually led to increased contact and mobilization of the

peasant base, eventually leading to the establishment of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931 (Skocpol,

1979, p. 255). Although the KMT successfully defeated the soviet by 1935, the communists

strengthened their presence in the northwest (Skocpol, 1979, p. 255).

26

An opening came with the Japanese invasion in the years leading to the Second World

War. Although Chiang disliked the communists he allowed for them to fight under his nominal

authority under the auspices of the Second United Front (Skocpol, 1979, p. 256). The

Communists, seeing their opportunity to recruit more supporters, began a campaign to entice the

patriotic sentiments of the population and at least more effectively bureaucratize communist

administration. The communists achieved this by employing students as well as higher-level

party cadres and traditional officials to develop socioeconomic policies and plans for

administration through a “vertical hierarchy of departments extending downward from the

regional level” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 258). However, increasing pressures brought by the Japanese

and KMT made mobilization just as, if not more important than administration (Skocpol, 1979,

p. 258).

Therefore, by 1942 the communists began engaging in rural agricultural activities as a

way to further increase solidarity between the peasants and party leaders. Furthermore, “party

rectification” which encouraged the development of the “mass line” provided a method by which

the party could indoctrinate the peasantry with Maoist ideas and translate them into action

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 260). This strategy had a two-fold effect. By creating an autonomous

peasantry as a “class for itself” the communists provided the opportunity for the peasantry to

engage in armed struggle to secure its interests (Skocpol, 1979, p. 260). Second, the formation of

“base areas” by the communists strengthened the ties between the party and the peasantry

through the party‟s productive activities in these areas. Skocpol (1979) contends that this

translated into a “synthesis between the military needs of the Chinese Communists and the

social-revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry” (p. 262). The release of this social-

27

revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry under the leadership of the communists

eventually resulted in the defeat of the demoralized KMT by 1949.

Like France and Russia, the Chinese Revolution created a more centralized government

and a more hierarchical state bureaucracy. No longer could individual power blocs composed of

individuals with private property interests undermine central authority. The state, with its

monopoly of political, financial, and administrative resources created a system by which

authority was relegated from the center, thereby creating a truly united China (Skocpol, 1979, p.

263).

Skocpol (1979) contends that economically speaking, China during the 1940‟s was more

similar to France in the 1780‟s than to Russia during the early 20th

century (p. 264). However,

the direction of China economically seemed to take a more Stalinist approach. Skocpol (1979)

asserts that because the Chinese Revolution happened at the specific historical juncture that it

did, it was able to adopt the program of state led industrial growth coupled with the

collectivization of agriculture witnessed in Soviet Russia (p. 267). In other words, China would

not become an administrative state with peasant smallholders.

However, according to Skocpol‟s analysis, by the 1960‟s the China had developed its

own development strategy suited to China‟s own conditions. Mao, seeing the necessity of

“balanced development,” between industry and agriculture did not use collectivization to funnel

surpluses to industrial growth but to use them to the benefit of the village and community

(Skocpol, 1979, p. 269). To do this, a decentralized scheme of village leaders and party

“brigades” cooperated to formulate strategies that would allow for the village to reach its

productive goals (Skocpol, 1979 p. 270). This is one example of the Chinese Communists have

28

preferred political leadership through grass roots organization rather than the bureaucratic

management of a Soviet-style state. A final contrast to the Soviet Union is the emphasis on

egalitarianism demonstrated by the Chinese Communists. The aim of egalitarian policies such as

the abolition of insignia on uniforms and the attempt to reduce wage differentials is a product of

the Communists attempt to mute inequalities that exist in order to involve as many people as

possible in China‟s national development (Skocpol, 1979, p. 274).

As clearly made evident, Skocpol provides an extensive analysis of China in order to

demonstrate the clearly related causal patterns of revolutions and their various outcomes. In

Skocpol‟s view of this case demonstrates the importance of the breakdown of the state‟s coercive

machinery as a pre-requisite for revolutionary action by the masses in a class-based primarily

agrarian setting. Furthermore, all three conditions demonstrate the importance of state society

relations, especially between the state and the peasantry in shaping the revolutionary struggle.

Finally, Skocpol‟s analysis of the Chinese case demonstrates the importance of historical world

circumstances and international dimensions that create systematic openings for the revolutionary

process. As will be seen, some scholars such as John Foran see this level of analysis as important

yet somewhat incomplete. To Foran, structural conditions seem to answer provide a partial

explanation of the revolutionary process, a point demonstrated through his own extensive

investigation.

John Foran, author of Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions attempts

to understand the causes of revolutions in terms of the cultural, economic, and political factors

that went into them and what exactly a revolution entails. Foran (2005) actually adopts Skocpol‟s

definition of social revolution "rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class

29

structures...accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below,"

because it “represents an advance in linking political and social changes and in identifying the

importance of large-scale participation” (p. 7). Although Foran (2005) acknowledges that

Skcopol does not define how much social and political transformation constitutes a revolution he

still perceives her definition as useful because it allows for a distinction between a true “social”

revolution and a political revolution in which simply change the “alter the outlines of the state”

(p. 8).

Foran also acknowledges the contributions that “structuralist” thinking has on how

revolutions are studied. However, Foran attempts to understand the revolutionary process by

understanding how structural patterns combine with agency and culture to allow for

revolutionary mobilization. The product of this, Foran‟s five inter-related causal factors

exemplify this way of thinking. According to Foran (2005) these factors: 1). dependant

development 2). a repressive, exclusionist personalist state 3). The elaboration of effective and

powerful political cultures of resistance; a revolutionary crisis consisting of 4) an economic

downturn 5) a world-systematic opening must combine “in a given conjucture” to produce a

successful social revolution (p. 18).

Dependant development according to Foran (2005) “is the principle cause of the

grievances of the classes and groups that participate in revolutionary coalitions, as well as the

key to a more nuanced understanding of Third World social structure itself” (p. 19). Therefore,

dependant economic development with all of the issues that generally accompany it make

revolutions possible because of the disruptive effect that it can have in Third World Societies

(Foran, 2005, p. 20). According to Foran (2005), dependent development consists of a complex

30

intermeshing of internal and external dynamics (p. 19). During the phase of dependant

development countries undergo rapid increases in GNP, foreign trade, and industrial growth

(Foran, 2005, p. 19). However, this process can cause inflation, debt, and growing inequality.

This creates grievances among diverse strata of society such as peasants, urban workers, and the

middle class (Foran, 2005, p. 19). Furthermore, such development usually requires a repressive

state to keep order in a society undergoing such rapid disruptive change.

Personalist, exclusionary states more often than accompany dependant development

exclude the lower classes, the burgeoning middle class and economic elites from political

participation. Exclusion serves to make the regime the target of many grievances in society and

encourages the formation of multiple class coalitions that challenge the regime‟s power (Foran,

2005, p. 20). Without representative or electoral bodies to dissipate the grievances caused by

dependant development, those who face the challenges caused by dependant development see no

other option than to remove the dictator imposing it (Foran, 2005, p. 21).

The driving force that allows for the opposition to coalesce and form multi-class

coalitions consists of the opposition‟s “culture of resistance.” This differs from Skocpol‟s notion

of “ideology” because “cultures of resistance” embody cultural idioms, subjective emotions and

historical experiences absent in formally constructed ideologies (Foran, 2005, p. 21). It seems

almost as if “ideology” is entirely constructed by revolutionary leaders for their own purposes

while “cultures of resistance” are products of the experiences of everyday people-experiences

turned into oppositional drivers in the face of economic hardship and an illegitimate non-

incorporative regime. This culture of resistance a product of cultural idioms, myths, and ideas of

“justice” and “democracy” allow for the different classes to mobilize the needed energy to

31

remain a cohesive oppositional force (Foran, 2005, p. 21). Although each class may have its own

separate “culture of resistance” one thing remains clear; cultures of opposition allow for each

class to mobilize and cooperate towards the fulfillment of the common goal, overthrow of the

regime (Foran, 2005, p. 21).

Furthermore, the structural problems caused by dependant development and the

emergence of cultures of resistance are precipitated by an economic downturn, which weakens

the state financially and emboldens the opposition (Foran, 2005, p. 22). This, coupled with a

“world systematic” opening constitutes the “revolutionary crisis.” Foran contends that since

Third World regimes tend to rely on a more powerful core nation for economic and political

support, the regimes of these dictators can face severe hardship when “normal” relations between

the core and periphery are disrupted (Foran, 2005, p. 23). This disruption can take the form of

distraction of the core with other issues, mixed messages sent by the core to Third World

dictators such as the impetus to liberalize while at the same time maintaining stability, or a

divided foreign policy by the core during an insurrection (Foran, 2005, p. 23).

These factors, according to Foran must work together in concert in order for a truly

successful social revolution to take place. The absence of any one of these factors will lead to a

different outcome such as a failed revolution or reversed revolution. The scope of his project,

therefore, is to explain how these factors and especially to what extent these factors played in

creating conditions that allowed for revolutions to occur in the first place (Foran, 2005, p. 24).

In order to understand the causal patterns of social revolutions Foran uses the “historical-

comparative” method employed by Skocpol in order to demonstrate how his “five factor”

approach can be used within a variety of cases.

32

The first “variety of revolution” that Foran studies is what he calls the “great social

revolutions” of Mexico, China, Cuba, and Nicaragua. For the sake of brevity only his analysis of

China and Nicaragua will be introduced. First, China was chosen because the Chinese case

proves instrumental in serving as a framework of comparison with Skocpol‟s analysis. Second,

since Nicaragua consists of both a success and failure analysis of this case proves instrumental in

understanding how revolutions in Foran‟s perspective succeed and fail. These revolutions,

although they possess their own peculiarities all demonstrate broad patterns of similarity. All of

these revolutions took place in countries where dependant development coupled with a

personalist regime created multiclass coalitions of disparate elements mobilized through an

endemic culture of opposition. Revolutionary crisis consisting of an economic downturn and

foreign pressures facilitated the destabilization of the old regime.

Foran‟s analysis of the Chinese Revolution bears remarkable similarity to that of Theda

Skocpol, therefore a full exposition of Foran‟s analysis does not seem necessary at this juncture.

However, one important and interesting divergence that Foran‟s analysis takes consist of his

emphasis on the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party as a mobilizing force within the

Chinese peasant community. Skocpol contends that the successful match of the revolutionary

leadership and the peasantry had “little to do with revolutionary ideology and everything to do

with the peculiarities (as seen from a European perspective) of the Chinese sociopolitical

struggle” (Foran, 2005, p. 52). Mao‟s ability to synthesize Western Marxist and Chinese idioms

created a revolutionary ideology that would appeal to the Chinese masses who by the 1940 began

chanting “down with the old, up with the new.” This ideology, coupled with the nationalist

sentiments created by the struggle against the Japanese helped to further champion the

communists ideology of revolutionary nationalism (Foran, 2005, p. 53).

33

On top of that, Foran (2005) asserts that beyond appeals to nationalist sentiments,

Maoism provided an “equally powerful and long-standing message of social justice which

appealed to the peasant base of his army and the party” (p. 53). Equality, mass participation, and

self reliance (Foran, 2005, p. 53) became the foundation of Mao‟s brand of Marxism-Leninism.

This “skillfully crafted political culture” attracted a mass base from peasants to urban

intellectuals, an attraction implying, at least to Foran, that there was something a little more than

“the peculiarities of China‟s sociopolitical struggle” that contributed to the rise of Maoism as

China‟s most prevalent revolutionary ideology.

The last case of the “great social revolutions,” Nicaragua, more profoundly than the other

cases demonstrates how an exclusionary dictatorship contributes to revolutionary mobilization.

However, Foran notes that economically speaking, Nicaragua still demonstrated a model of

dependant development and its associated economic downturn caused by a decline in low world

prices for cotton, sugar, and meat. This caused uncontrollable inflation by 1979 (75%), capital

flight and unemployment reaching 42%. Furthermore, Nicaragua‟s economy consisted of a poor

primarily agrarian structure. High land concentration and nascent industrialization reduced the

percent of the population engaged in agriculture form 80% in 1950 to 44% in 1977 (Foran, 2005,

p. 67). The emergence of a heterogeneous middle class and a modest-sized non-unionized

working class occurred simultaneously with the weakening of the agricultural sector.

Although “dependant development” in Nicaragua is less pronounced than in many other

countries that experienced revolution there can be no denying that external forces have played a

role in the shaping of Nicaraguan political institutions. Thus, dependence in the case of

Nicaragua has been primarily political, with the US supporting and backing the Somoza regime

34

for political and strategic purposes (Foran, 2005, p. 67). Therefore, the element of dependency

still remains in the Nicaraguan case even if that dependency takes on a political form.

Furthermore, although some claim that Nicaragua‟s economy could be considered to

stagnant during the Somoza regime to really consist of any sort of “development” there is strong

evidence to the contrary. During the 1960‟s and 70‟s the Nicaraguan economy experienced very

high levels of growth, especially in the 60‟s when growth averaged 6.7% per year (Foran, 2005,

p. 66). At the same time, exports rose 11.5% per year along with light industries such as cement

and food processing (Foran, 2005, p. 66). Therefore, Foran contents that the Nicaraguan

economy did grow during this time, a growth dependant on the United States and its support of

the Somoza dynasty.

The three Somozas that controlled the government from 1933 to 1979 used fraudulent

elections and sheer terror to solidify their rule. The family essentially controlled 25% of all

agriculture and amassed a fortune of over $500 million (Foran, 2005, p. 68). In order to stay in

power, Somoza relied on highly unprofessional National Guard consisting of 7,500 mostly poor

conscripts led by corrupt officers (Foran, 2005, p. 68). The repressive apparatus of the National

Guard was held together by US military and economic aid which from 1967 to 1975 amounted to

$1.8 and $17.3 million per year respectively (Foran, 2005, p. 68).

Sandinismo, “consisting of petty-bourgeois nationalism, tinged with utopian socialist and

spiritualist ideology” (Foran, 2005, p. 69), became the culture of resistance that united people of

various ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. In the 1960‟s the ideology of the movement

incorporated diverse elements combining nationalism, liberation theology along with ideas of

35

social justice and democratic liberalism (Foran, 2005, p. 69). This diverse mix of various beliefs

appealed to the various groups that were involved in the struggle against the Somoza regime.

Furthermore, the ideas of liberation theology provided the glue that held together the

opposition because it emphasized the struggle for “the good” as understood by its adherents.

Support of one‟s fellow man became the central idea of liberation theology a Biblical

interpretation that stresses the social justice aspects of Christ‟s teachings, a support manifested

through the struggle against the Somoza regime (Foran, 2005, p. 70). This radical interpretation

of the teaching of the gospels led many of adherents of this radical theology to support the FSLN

(Foran, 2005, p. 70).

The collapse of sugar, beef, and coffee prices (Nicaragua‟s main exports) during the

1970‟s increased inflation 9.7% between 1971 and 1976 (Foran, 2005, p. 72). By 1979 inflation

went completely out of control while at the same time an IMF austerity program led to sharp

devaluation. The insurrection led to further inflation and capital flight, decreasing exports and a

plummeting GDP. In essence, the greed of the regime coupled with the disruption caused by the

insurrection allowed for the crisis to deepen.

The Somoza regime, falling under more pressure from the Carter Administration after the

assassination of La Prensa editor Perdro Chamorro became increasingly isolated when

Nicaragua‟s elites pulled their support (Foran, 2005, p. 72). With the support of other Latin

American nations, and the weakness of the Somoza regime, the FSLN (Sandinista Front of

National Liberation) was able to increase its power as an alternative to the Somoza regime. The

Carter administration, unable or unwilling to intervene in the situation because of other more

pressing international issues such as the revolution in Iran created the world-systematic opening

36

for the FSLN (Foran, 2005, p. 72). The diverse social group composed of peasants to students

was finally able to depose the Somoza regime by July 1979.

Unlike Skocpol, Foran does not explicitly analyze the specific changes brought about by

both China and Nicaragua. Instead, Foran simply notes that a social revolution is successful

when it stays in power long enough to effectively create social change. However, Foran does

analyze movements that have taken power yet have ultimately failed to considerably change

sociopolitical and economic institutions. Rather, the regimes that took power in what he calls

“reversed revolutions” either had the changes reversed either through internal fragmentation

followed by external interventions such as happened in Bolivia, Chile and Grenada or through

slower reversals that ended with electoral defeat i.e. Nicaragua (Foran, 2005, p. 152). Although

these reversed revolutions share similar causal patterns to successful social revolutions they

failed to consolidate for a variety of reasons (Foran, 2005, p. 153).

In Bolivia, a country plagued by dependant development, a backwards feudal like

agricultural system and a new dynamic tin industry remained one of the poorest nations in Latin

America by the time the MNR (National Revolution Movement) took power in 1952. Although

the largest sector of Bolivia‟s economy, agriculture only produced a third of its GDP its tin

industry which comprised 3% of the labor force contributed 25% (Foran, 2005, p. 154). The

disproportionate share of the tin industry in Bolivia‟s GDP gave capital and labor

disproportionate political power as the national oligarchy and radical opposition respectively

(Foran, 2005, p. 154). During this time of development between 1946 and 1952 a military

government with a sham democratic mandate backed by a US supported government ran the

country (Foran, 2005, p. 155). Behind this state, the oligarchic power of the tin elite which used

37

the state to crush unrest. Although not technically personalist, the regime was so repressive and

alienated so many groups that it was at least functionally personalist (Foran, 2005, p. 156).

Bolivia‟s defeat in the Chaco war of the 1930‟s delegitimized the military and also

brought peasants into contact with radical urban workers through service in army during the

conflict (Foran, 2005, p. 157). By the 1950‟s the MNR became more liberal and appealing to the

middle class with its democratic ideals and to workers and peasants with its calls for social

justice and an end to the unpaid labor system forced upon the peasantry (Foran, 2005, p. 156).

The MNR built a wide social base because it could indentify with each class‟ unique culture of

opposition (Foran, 2005, p. 157).

The economic crisis came with the collapse of the tin industry which during World War

II had undergone considerable growth in Bolivia. The main reason for the collapse consisted of a

halt in production due to the oligarchs‟ perception that Bolivia was not receiving a fair price on

the world market for its tin. The tin oligarchs stopped production, thus halting exports which

alienated the US (Foran, 2005, p. 157). This exacerbated the internal economic downturn by

March 1952. Unemployment along with an increasing cost of living brought pressures to a

boiling-point (Foran, 2005, p. 157). The MNR finally came to power when the government

annulled the results of the election which it finally agreed to. The MNR fought the government‟s

largely leaderless army until the government collapsed on April 11th 1951.

Immediately following the MNR‟s victory, the new government took on new reforms

such as nationalization of the tin industry, land reform, universal suffrage, an increase of

worker‟s rights, and the neutralization of the army. Although the government owned about 80%

of the tin industry it pledged that it was not anti-US or pro-Soviet (Foran, 2005, p. 171). At the

38

same time, peasants began land seizures which allowed for 28% percent of rural families to own

land by 1960. However, the new regime would not last after 1964 when US structural

adjustments (such as the reduction of government spending and wages) on the Bolivian economy

as a condition for a $25 million loan caused the broad coalition that supported the MNR to

fragment and lead to a coup due to the economic problems that structural adjustment caused

(Foran, 173).

What led up to the coup was a series of economic problems caused by the exodus of

foreign skilled technicians and foreign capital which led to a balance of payments deficit and

inflation. This put pressure on all social classes including peasants and the elite. Furthermore, the

MNR‟s decision to take US loans to weather the crisis put more pressure on the regime because

of the conditionalities of wage reduction and deregulation that accompanied foreign capital. As a

result of the economic downturn, popular support of the MNR collapsed (Foran, 2005, p. 172).

The president moved further to the right and abolished workers control and made the mines

military zones of occupation and began to govern the country in a more closed bureaucratic

fashion (Foran, 2005, p. 173). The president brought the army back to full strength and named

General Hugo Barrientos as his vice president. Eventually General Barrientos led a coup in 1964

that resulted in his five year dictatorship that effectively reversed the social revolution of the

MNR (Foran, 2005, p. 174).

The other type of revolutionary failure, collapse of the social revolution by gradual

electoral defeat is exemplified by the Nicaraguan case. After the armed struggle which brought

the FSLN to power in 1979, the new government took immediate measures to improve the

economy by investing in basic need such as education and healthcare while at the same time

39

nationalizing 40% of Nicaragua‟s economy (Foran, 2005, p . 190). This exemplified a “middle

path” between socialism and capitalism meant to ensure that the revolutionary coalition of

peasants, workers, and the middle class remained united (Foran, 2005, p. 190). Thus, the FSLN

was able to create a state controlled economy without expropriating foreign capital or alienating

the middle class, instead the FSLN simply took over Somoza‟s share in the economy (Foran,

2005, p . 190).

Although a recession throughout Latin America weakened many of its economies, the

Nicaraguan economy actually grew 22.5 percent during the period between 1979 and 1983. The

policies of land reform and a literacy campaign helped make the FSLN very popular (Foran,

2005, p. 191). The National Guard was replaced with veterans from the revolution and popular

militias putting the FSLN in control of the military and police. However despite its popularity,

the regime had its detractors in the elite and the Catholic Church (Foran, 2005, p. 191).

The world systematic opening that allowed for the formation of the opposition under the

aegis of the contras came with the election of Ronald Reagan in the US. Unlike Carter, Reagan

perceived the FSLN as a threat to regional stability because of its appeal to other countries in

Latin America. In Reagan‟s view the spread of the mixed economy and democratic polity model

of the Sandinistas would undermine the US‟ control in that region and Third World in general

(Foran, 2005, p . 191). Furthermore, Reagan viewed the FSLN as a possible Moscow aligned

movement that would ultimately attempt to spread “communism” throughout the region.

In order to weaken the Sandinistas the US secretly mined Nicaragua‟s harbors and

created the contras out of remnants of Somoza‟s National Guard through CIA training (Foran,

2005, p. 192). The Sandinistas despite heavy US support for the contras eventually proved

40

victorious on the battlefield, although with heavy costs. After a ceasefire in March 1988 the

contras continued its attacks which led to the deaths of 30,000 Nicaraguans. Unrelenting, the US

leaked a fraudulent document “Operation Pegasus” which outlined phony plans for a US planned

invasion of Nicaragua (Foran, 2005, p. 192).

In response, the Sandinistas moved to establish a representative democracy in order to

through the opposition off balance. The pro-US candidate eventually backed out of the race

because he claimed that free elections could not be held (Foran, 2005, p. 193). Although the

elections proved to be free and fair the United States condemned them as a “Soviet-style sham”

(Foran, 2005, p. 193). The one thing that brought the FSLN down was its economic weakness.

Nicaragua, plagued with shortages of goods, inflation, indebtedness and a large deficit

from the contra war and partially a result of the FSLN‟s redistributive policies and land reform

decreased the popularity of the regime. Furthermore, US economic aggression in the form of a

trade embargo and a decrease in Soviet aid after 1985 forced the Sandinistas to take “austerity

measures” such as the reduction of spending and wages to help stabilize the economy (Foran,

2005, p. 195). As a result, of this economic weakness many believed that reconciliation with the

US was the only way that the economy would improve (Foran, 2005, p. 195). The victory of the

UNO (National Opposition Union) in the February 1990 elections demonstrated that the

electorate perceived reconciliation as a possibility only if the Sandinistas were out of power. This

rational choice by the electorate under these premises meant that although the Sandinistas

instituted many reforms, they could not last after the feverish years of the 1980‟s. Therefore,

although the democratic legacy of the FSLN‟s revolution exists to this day, its social legacy does

not.

41

Foran concludes that not only do personalist, exclusionary regimes predispose a nation to

undergo revolutionary struggle but also open democratic polities. The problems of holding

together the revolutionary coalition that brought about the revolution in the first place, outside

intervention, and the economic problems associated with economic redistribution and land

reform contribute to the instability that open democratic polities face. This implies that

authoritarian regimes, such as the ones that emerged in the wake of the Russian and Chinese

revolutions are somewhat shielded from these weaknesses because of the isolated nature and the

use of repression by revolutionary leaders in order to hold the system together (Foran, 2005, p .

204). Foran suggests that this does not mean that open democratic polities should never be

pursued by revolutionary elites (Foran, 2005, p. 204). Rather, the context of the Cold War and

its associated struggle against the Left in the Third World ushered in a more aggressive military,

economic, foreign policy by the United States against regimes deemed antithetical to US regional

interests (Foran, 2005, p . 203). Thus by playing on the weaknesses of the new regimes

especially the legacy of dependant development, the United States successfully undermined the

social project of those regimes.

Finally, unlike Skocpol, Foran discusses in great detail how he envisions the future of the

revolutionary struggle. According to Foran, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent

process of globalization that has taken place have considerably changed how the revolutionary

struggle will take place. Foran asserts that globalization has increased global disparities in wealth

that have not existed for over 200 years, disparities that reduce the legitimacy of the system by

those disaffected groups such as the peasantry and urban workers, while acting as a driver for

mass mobilization (Foran, 2005, p. 262). Furthermore, the increase in communication and the

weakness of the state have also changed how revolutionaries view the state in terms of the

42

desirability of power to affect social change (Foran, 2005, p . 263). According to Foran,

revolutionaries don‟t view the state as something to eventually control. Thus, revolutions that

have occurred in China and Nicaragua will become rarer events. Rather, today‟s revolutionary

sees the opening of democratic space for the “free discussion of political, economic, and cultural

alternatives to globalization” ( Foran, 2005, p. 264).

Thus, movements such as the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in Mexico

will more likely pursue the opening of democratic space within their respective countries that

will allow for disenfranchised groups to have representation. The aim, therefore, is not power in

the classic sense but empowerment of the masses against a regime that consistently ignores its

voice (Foran, 2005, p . 272). The masses which consist of a diverse group with various interests

and differing backgrounds are held together with their own separate ideas of how to make their

situation better, the pursuit of justice in its various forms (Foran, 2005, p. 275). The opening of

democratic space along will ensure that each group will have a stake in the political and

economic process, something rare in today‟s world. To Foran the Zapatista movement embodies

the revolution of the future that will take place in countries all over the world. The revolutions of

the future, in other words, will take on a more globalized and more democratic form, a

manifestation of the human pursuit of justice in the face of the global reality.

John Foran and Theda Skocpol both demonstrate very unique and interesting ideas on

how to study the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolution. The question remains, which

one of these theories constitutes a more complete analysis of the revolutionary struggle? For

instance, do conflicts among the elite along with world systematic openings and agrarian

upheavals act as the main drivers of revolution, as Skocpol contends? Or do structural constraints

43

coupled with “cultures of opposition” against a personalist, repressive regime in a favorable

world environment fuel the revolutionary struggle as Foran argues? The next chapter will serve

to answer these questions by providing an understanding of what factors should be taken into

consideration when studying the revolutionary process.

44

Table 1-1: A Comparison of Skocpol‟s and Foran‟s Analysis of the Causes, Processes and

Outcomes of Revolutions.

Causes Processes Outcomes

Foran Personalist Regimes

that exclude the

majority of society

from the political and

economic process

accompanied by an

economic downturn as

a result of dependant

development.

Economic downturn

and personalist nature

of the regime lead to

the articulation of

“cultures of resistance”

which promote the

formation of multi-

class coalitions against

the state.

Successful social

revolutions remain in

power long enough to

produce “social

change.” New regimes

can also break down

from electoral defeat or

coalition breakdown.

Skocpol Agrarian-Bureaucratic

states that face military

competition from

abroad. This leads these

regimes to extract

resources in order to

finance the build-up of

the coercive apparatus

of the state. This

creates animosity

amongst the landed

elites leading conflicts

between the state and

elites.

Peasant revolts and

revolts of the elites

against the state occur.

This weakens the state

and eventually causes it

to collapse. Leadership

emerges from

“marginal elites.”

Marginal elites

institutionalize a more

powerful state and

increasingly rationalize

authority through

modern bureaucracies

through mass

mobilizing parties or

charismatic

authoritarian

dictatorships.

45

References

Foran, J. (2005). Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. Cambridge:

University of Cambridge Press.

Goldstone, J. (1980) Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation. World Politics 32, 425-453.

Goldstone, J. (2001). Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. Annual Review of

Political Science, 4 139-187.

Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

46

Chapter 2- Criteria for Evaluating Revolutionary Theory

Revolutionary theory, the product of the scholar‟s analysis, prejudices, and dispositions

inevitably contains different foci from theory to theory. This poses the question, “how does a

student of revolutionary theory evaluate the works of others?” This chapter will attempt to

address this question by laying out an analytical framework of how revolutions should be

studied. Therefore, this chapter will not constitute an entirely new theory in and of itself. Rather,

this chapter will borrow the perspectives of authors and scholars with their own points of view in

order to formulate criteria of evaluation. These criteria will allow for a further understanding of

how the revolutionary process functions. Furthermore, these criteria will be used to evaluate the

explanatory power of both the Foran and Skocpol theories. What do these theories focus on, and

how does that affect their ability to explain the complex phenomenon of revolution? This chapter

will provide criteria of evaluation in order to effectively answer this question.

At the heart of how scholars perceive the revolutionary process is the role of ideology

and structural conditions and how these conditions lead to the overthrow of the old order and the

consolidation of the new regime. Consequently a debate has arisen over which kinds of structural

conditions lead to the overthrow of the old order and to what extent these structural weaknesses

of the old order play in allowing for a revolutionary situation to take place. Adding to an already

complex mix, there is also a debate as to the role that structure and ideology play throughout the

course of the revolution. For example, what role do structural conditions of any given country

play in starting the revolutionary process in a “planned” versus “spontaneous” revolution?

Furthermore, an investigation in the role that culture plays in shaping the opposition to the

regime in power will help in the understanding of how the masses are organized to fight against a

regime that seems unjust and insensitive to the cultural sensibilities of those that its rules. Thus,

47

the notion that “revolutions do not occur in a cultural vacuum” will serve as another focal point

by which the theories of both Foran and Skocpol will be analyzed in the third chapter. Finally,

the role that revolutionary leadership, the weakness of the incumbent‟s armed forces, and

international world-historical openings will also serve as criteria by which these revolutionary

theories will be analyzed. Do both theories adequately take these factors into account, or are

there shortcomings to these theories‟ analyses of these factors that undermine the ability of these

theories to fully present the root causes and the potential paths that revolutions can take? The aim

of this chapter will be to address these questions.

The first question to be addressed relates to the role that structural conditions play in the

creation of the revolutionary energy needed to mobilize the masses to revolt. Both Foran and

Skocpol throughout the course of their analyses contend that structural weaknesses and

shortcomings of the regime play a pivotal role in its overthrow. The first shortcoming, and

perhaps most influential, is the nature of the regime itself. In other words, the relationship

between the state and society, the economy, and other states seems largely connected with the

nature of the regime itself. Skocpol contends that the “authoritarian bureaucratizing, agrarian

regimes” are most vulnerable to overthrow. Foran, on the other hand, asserts that personalist,

repressive regimes that exclude the majority of the population from the political process are most

vulnerable. Other terms, used throughout this chapter, “sultanistic” or praetorian regimes, also

describe highly personalist, exclusionary and repressive regimes. A sultanistic regime is a regime

characterized by personalistic rule and patrimonial ruler-client relationships (Chehabi and Linz,

1998, p. 7). Rulers in these types of systems exercise unlimited power and are unencumbered by

rules or commitment to a value system (Chehabi and Linz, 1998, p. 7). The government

apparatus, largely chosen by the ruler completely submits to the ruler‟s whims. What

48

characterizes all sultanistic regimes is the lack of legal-rational legitimization and ideological

justification (Chehabi and Linz, 1998, p. 7). Thus the vulnerability of these regimes lies in the

fact that the highly exclusionary nature of these regimes isolates many that may have grievances

with the system as a whole without any real political process or legal foundation for dealing with

these grievances. Without a true medium by which to have these grievances dealt with the

discontented and repressed masses will eventually overthrow the unpopular government that

controls their daily existence.

Furthermore, the blurring of the line between regime and state that occurs in a sultanistic

regime makes the bureaucracy even if it does exist more tied to the person of the dictator and

therefore less autonomous and professional. The sultanistic dictator attempts to keep the military

leadership divided amongst itself and loyal to the regime through patronage. This loyalty,

however, unintentionally encourages the growth of opposition – because the military remains

loyal to the regime. For this reason, the moderate opposition must join forces with the radicals

who have the organizational or coercive advantage (Snyder, 1998, p. 58). In other words, the

moderates could not bring political change within the system because the coercive apparatus was

incapable of acting against the dictator especially since the moderate opposition tends not to have

independent organizational or coercive capacities. For example, as Foran points out the National

Guard of Somoza‟s Nicaragua was highly corrupt and co-opted by the regime. Therefore,

potential opponents to the regime within the ranks of the military did not exist because they

became part of Somoza‟s ruling clique. Therefore, since the FSLN had the coercive and

organizational resources to take on the National Guard, it was able to build a multi-class

coalition consisting of intellectuals, students, as well as more “moderate” elements such as the

business community and politicians (Dix, 1984 p. 438).

49

Furthermore, the military of a highly personalist regime usually consists of large numbers

of conscripts (Parsa, 2000, p. 11). As a consequence, when the coercive forces become

challenged by the opposition, the army will fracture and lose its repressive capacity (Parsa, 2000,

p. 11). When the lower ranks of the military join the opposition the army will either declare

neutrality or even cooperate with the opposition to allow for a transfer of power (Parsa, 23). One

final weakness of the personalist, repressive regime is its dependence on a “superpower patron”

for military, economic, or even political support. This also contributes to the success of the

maximalist opposition because it allows the ruler to “detach his repressive state apparatus from

its social base and dispense with domestic coalition building (Snyder, 1998, p. 58).” This

dependence also incites the nationalist sentiments of the maximalist opposition because this

extreme relationship of dependence creates a “crisis of sovereignty” in that society does perceive

the regime as representative of the interests of domestic society, but rather the interests of an

alien superpower. Thus dependence on a foreign superpower can “provide revolutionaries with

the advantage of laying legitimate claim to protecting national interests (Weede and Muller,

54).”

Dependence is one way in which states; especially Third World states enter the

international system. Dependence, according to Foran, sets the stage for mass discontent with of

the regime because of the economic problems that dependence on a foreign power can create.

These problems, according to Foran come in the form of growing inequality, inflation, debt, and

overburdened housing infrastructure among many other social problems (Foran, 2005, p. 19).

These problems impact broad segments of society from workers, to the middle class, peasants,

and others. These grievances can and do become political especially if the state becomes heavily

involved with the economy – people will blame the state for their economic problems if the state

50

is seen as the sole actor running the show. Skocpol, on the other hand, emphasizes the military

nature of international competition for power and influence and how the state can become

weakened in the face of growing international pressure. This competition takes the form of wars

or even through the regime‟s own threat perception of the states around them. Since nations

exists in an international system of states, a system which at its very foundation consists of

nations attempting to exert their influence on the world stage, regimes are compelled to pool the

resources of society in order to develop the coercive capacities to function in this competitive

system. However, in the attempt to do so, the state can open the stage for class conflict because

of the disruptive nature of resource extraction. Therefore, Skocpol perceives international

competition as weakening elites which in turn makes them less resistant to class-based revolts

from below. Thus, it is clear that both theorists view international influence as important in the

making of a revolutionary crisis, even if their perception of the type of influence is different.

Besides the resentment caused by perceived domination by a powerful superpower-

sultanistic regimes inflame religious opposition because of the weak civil society that these types

of regimes permit. In other words, religious institutions remain one of the few truly independent

institutions that have a presence in society (Chehabi and Linz, 1998, p. 42). This is especially

true if the regime is unwilling or is unsuccessful in co-opting the religious establishment. Since

the social base of these regimes is so narrow, religious institutions may fall outside of the

umbrella of the state. In other words, the state may adopt policies that negatively affect the

religious establishment for the sake of increasing the power of the state. Unpopular taxes on the

clergy, the withdraw of financial support, the oppression of clergy members that speak out

against the state are just a few actions taken by sultanisitic regimes against the religious

hierarchy. Furthermore, the unrestrained and decadent lifestyles of those in power also breed

51

resentment among the masses. Religion plays a role in directing this resentment into an

organizational force. The religious sentiments of the opposition consist of a “religious ethic of

the disprivileged [sic] which… teaches that the unequal distribution of goods is caused by the

sinfulness and illegality of the privileged, and sooner or later God‟s wrath will overtake them

(Chehabi and Linz, 1998, p. 42).” This sense of morality that the clergy can produce is very

powerful indeed, especially when it is directed against a highly unpopular regime. The clergy

helps to destroy the raison d‟être of the regime by destroying it moral, and in essence, its

political legitimacy.

Economically, sultanistic and praetorian systems are especially vulnerable because they

tend to politicize grievances that are otherwise nonpolitical. These states tend to be “hyperactive”

in that they “intervene extensively in capital allocation and accumulation…limiting the market‟s

operation (Parsa, 2000, p. 13).” In addition to extensive planning, these states often control vast

amounts of economic resources which make these states large economic forces (Parsa, 2000, p.

13). These states render themselves vulnerable to attack because it becomes easy to blame the

regime for mismanagement and economic hardship when the regime, in contrast to impersonal

market forces, controls the majority of a nation‟s economic resources (Parsa, 2000, p. 14). The

failure to “deliver the goods” economically speaking leads to greater frustration and resentment

among those who perceive that the government is hoarding all of society‟s resources and leaving

them out in the cold, especially “small” capitalists that compose the majority of the capitalist

class in Third World economies (Parsa, 2000, p. 19). That is, state accumulation policies can

undermine other groups especially if those groups were once economically influential. For

example, merchants that once had economic prowess could suffer if the regime preferentially

treats large capitalists with loans and subsidies (Parsa, 2000, p. 19). Alienation of these smaller

52

groups decreases the social base of the regime, making its claim to legitimate political power all

the more tenuous.

Although economic weakness does not necessarily drive the revolutionary struggle as

suggested by Gurr, economic hardship can “increase the likelihood of opposition to a regime”

especially “when that regime is seen as an obstacle to continued economic mobility (Kamrava,

1992, p. 17).” Therefore, economic policies that serve to increase the wealth of the regime at the

expense of the rest of society can deepen the cleavages caused by a breakdown in the already

frail political system that characterizes a praetorian system. These types of policies, because they

create the levels of discontent that they do, will expedite the formation of broad based coalitions

of different classes and groups against the regime. Although these groups may have different

interests, perceptions and backgrounds they all share one thing in common being excluded from

the political and economic process. The common enemy, the regime, acts as glue keeping these

groups united and cohesive against an exclusionary, unjust, and unpopular regime.

Furthermore, economic difficulties before a regime transition affect large portions of the

population, imposing new costs and generating distributional conflicts (Parsa, 2000, p. 23). In

other words, “economic crisis, such as those that struck the developing world in recent decades,

affect not only the preference of different social actors among a given set of policies, but also

their preferences among different institutional arrangements and their capacity to maintain or

change those institutions (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995, p. 7)”. Poor economic performance

reduces the loyalty that some social actors have to the regime because economic difficulty

reduces the resources the regime has to sustain its bases of support, no matter how narrow those

bases may be (Haggard and Kauffman, 1995, p. 29). Therefore, poor economic performance

53

hinders the ability of the regime to widen its base and opens up the possibility for disenchanted

groups to blame their own poor economic situation on the exclusionary nature of the regime

(Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995, p. 31). This makes sense considering that in an exclusionary

regime the economy comes under the control of the dictator and his patronage circle. Those

outside the circle suffer, while those on the inside benefit – this creates opposition to the regime

and a desire to create a system that will allow for once excluded groups to benefit.

For this reason, Foran is correct in asserting that an economic downturn is a necessary

condition for the coalescence of a broad-based coalition against the regime. Since the personalist

state has a monopoly on the economic resources of a country, it is easy to blame the regime for

the economic problems that the country faces during an economic downturn. Skocpol, on the

other hand, argues that the economic roots of revolution lie in the fact that the state extracts

economic resources to build its coercive apparatus in the face of growing military competition

from other states either in the form of wars or threats of wars. However, this is not always the

case. The state may extract resources for a multitude of reasons. For example, the Somozas

extracted resources to increase the personal wealth of the Somoza family and ensure the loyalty

of its clients.

The hardship and alienation of the praetorian regime, which may not overtly cause a

revolution itself, creates the conditions by which revolutionary mobilization occurs. The

grievances and hardship experienced by the masses must be given a voice if successful

revolutionary mobilization is to occur (Kamarava, 1992, p. 17). This means that the values and

ideological justifications of the regime in power must be delegitimized while new ones should be

created (Kamrava, 1992, p. 17). Thus, the proliferation of intellectual activity in the time leading

54

up to the revolution is especially important because it gives voice and meaning to a set of

grievances felt by the masses. Therefore, the intellectual plays an important role in revolutionary

mobilization and leadership because in a society where speaking one‟s mind can be considered

“revolutionary” the very fact that the willingness exists to criticize the regime further

delegitimizes the regime while at the same time creating “alternative values and conceptual

frameworks” to the regime in power (Kamrava, 1992, p. 18). Skocpol contends that leadership

emerges from the ranks of “marginal elites” whose accomplishments and merit do not reflect

their position in society.

These “marginal elites” have an interest in a new order because they see opportunities for

advancement after the consolidation of new political and social arrangements. Foran seems to

have less to say about the role and nature of revolutionary leaders per se. Foran does

acknowledge that multi-class coalitions are pivotal in the overthrow of the regime and that the

breakdown of these coalitions leads to the collapse of the regime after it takes power, as he

demonstrates through the Nicaraguan and Bolivian case. However, these coalitions have also

broken down in the wake of successful social revolutions in which new political elites were able

to hold on to power. Therefore, Foran does not explain how the breakdown of these coalitions

does not necessarily mean a reversal of the revolution.

Furthermore, the lack of political modernization on the part of the regime contributes to

its instability. The demand for greater political participation, if not met, can increase the

likelihood of political instability (Kamrava, 1992, p. 25). In repressive regimes, the lack of

political participation among various discontented groups creates an increasingly antagonistic

relationship between the regime in power and the state and society (Kamrava, 1992, p. 25).

55

Thus, the lack of any normative means of expression and competition within the political process

and the exclusion of politically aware and repressed groups along with functional weaknesses

inherent in these regimes creates a system marked by a “growing proclivity toward revolutionary

eruption (Kamrava, 1992, p. 25).”

However, apart from the apparent structural conditions that lead to revolutionary

circumstances is concerted effort on the part of revolutionary leaders to bring down the regime in

power (Kamrava, 1992 p. 26). The willingness and efforts of these leaders coupled with the

situational possibilities for mobilization of the masses lie at the heart of revolutionary mass

mobilization (Kamrava, 1992, p. 26). However, the formation of these groups varies from

revolution to revolution. For example, the emergence of some revolutionaries occurs before the

state experiences considerable structural difficulties. During other times, revolutionary groups

appear only after considerable state deterioration has already taken place (Kamrava, 1992, p. 26).

Herein lays the difference between a “spontaneous” and “planned” revolution. During a

“planned” revolution such as occurred in China, a clearly defined revolutionary cadre appears, a

cadre bent on facilitating the rapid destruction of the powers that be (Kamrava, 1992, p. 27). On

the other hand, during a “spontaneous” revolution such as the Nicaraguan Revolution

revolutionary leaders appear after considerable state atrophy has begun. In other words, the

group that leads the revolutionary struggle depends on the revolutionary circumstance itself.

Many groups with various interests and ideas become involved in the revolutionary struggle

against the regime. However, only one group will ultimately become powerful enough to become

the “leaders” of the revolution.

56

Do Skocpol and Foran adequately differentiate “spontaneous” versus “planned”

revolutions? It can be asserted that they both do, however, both have different perspectives on

how revolutionary mobilization occurs. In Skocpol‟s view, revolutionary conflicts happen

because of class-based revolutions below. These can either occur with considerable planning

and organization, as her analysis of the Chinese Revolution demonstrates or more spontaneously,

as in the French Revolution, through revolts between the landed elites and the state and the

peasantry and the landed elites after the state has considerably weakened. Foran, seems to

emphasize the importance of the spontaneous formation of multi-class coalitions in the time

preceding the collapse of the regime. However, he does acknowledge that in some cases, notably

China, considerable planning by revolutionary elites.

However, once facet of a “planned” revolution that Skocpol ignores in the concept that

revolutionary leaders can initiate structural change. As noted, Skocpol acknowledges that

revolutions are not “made” but emerge out of uncontrollable structural conditions. However, the

considerable planning by the Chinese Communist Party and the time that it took to build working

relationships with the peasantry serves as a testimony to the power that human initiative plays in

the emergence of a revolutionary circumstance. As previously mentioned, Skocpol even

mentioned that the Chinese peasantry lack the autonomy necessary to provide any real resistance

to the KMT. However, once the Communists were able to mobilize the peasants through and

form a base in the countryside an effective resistance to Chiang Kai Shek could be mounted.

Therefore, human agency on the party of the Communist Party meant that they could alter the

structures around them. By organizing the communists were able to overcome the structural

constraints, their isolation and lack of autonomy, that kept the peasantry from rebelling against

the regime.

57

Furthermore, the question remains as to how leaders emerge throughout the course of a

spontaneous revolution. The answer lies within the nature of the spontaneous revolution itself.

Spontaneous revolutions often occur when the coercive powers of the state decline

simultaneously with an increase of polarization among various segments of society (Kamrava,

1992, p. 32). This polarization leads to the emergence of two disorganized and crude camps of

political supporters of the regime and political opponents (Kamrava, 1992, p. 32). Furthermore,

this dichotomy of supporters and opponents plays a hand at politicizing traditionally non-

political groups (Kamrava, 1992, p. 32). Revolution will often occur when the opposition creates

more political momentum than the regime in power for the very reason that the regime is

unwilling or unable to sanction popular political participation (Kamrava, 1992, p. 32). Without

an outlet for expressing grievances and feeling left out of the political process, oppositional

groups will rally around their leaders who exploit the opportunities created by an increasingly

reactive, weak, and illegitimate regime. This contrasts a “planned” revolution during which

revolutionary leaders create situational opportunities, through guerilla organization and military

conflict with the regime, that arise as the revolution progresses (Kamrava, 1992, p. 33).

This is not to say that revolutionary leaders during a spontaneous revolution play any less

of a role than leaders of a “planned” revolution. However, the role that they play comes much

later during the revolutionary process. Revolutionary leaders during a “spontaneous” revolution

“call the shots” only after they know without doubt that they are the ones leading the masses on

the street. Revolutionary leaders are able to ensure their position during a revolution because a

number of different factors including their organizational and verbal skills, the cultural

communicability of their ideas, and the effectiveness in exploiting the opportunities presented by

the regime‟s collapse (Kamrava, 1992, p. 33). For the most part, leadership during these types of

58

revolutions comes through already existing social organizations which facilitate strong links

between the masses and the leaders themselves.

Communication of revolutionary ideas during a spontaneous revolution reflects the

informality of the leadership itself – leaders are not chosen by a party or other organization.

Rather, leaders during a spontaneous revolution without any formally delegated authoritative

powers spring up. These leaders, perhaps out of combination of drive, magnetism,

communications skills, or creativity appeal to the participants of the struggle against the regime

and help direct the action against the regime on the street. During a “planned” revolution

revolutionary ideals are transmitted from party organizations and a cadre of hierarchically

defined revolutionary elites to the masses – usually within the context of a guerilla struggle.

Thus, “planned” revolutions take on a more “military” nature as China and Cuba demonstrate.

During these two revolutions, guerillas played a pivotal role in using armed struggle as a vehicle

for creating a revolutionary situation. Leaders during a spontaneous revolution take advantage

of an already destabilized situation and mobilize the masses. However, they can only accomplish

this if they have the organization and financial resources to do so, resources that are available to

a limited number of groups.

One example of such a group is the religious leaders who have used the organizational

resources at their disposal to mobilize the masses. Religious leaders in exclusionary regimes tend

to become politicized because the regime itself depends more upon external sources of support

rather than the clergy (Parsa, 2000, p. 130). In other words these regimes tend to ignore the

clergy or, as Iran demonstrate, initiates policies that undermine the clergy‟s position of authority.

As a result, the clergy‟s influence in the political and social matters of the state becomes

59

reduced. This serves as a catalyst for the politicization of the clergy because the clergy that once

had influence in the affairs of the state longer plays that role. The exclusion of the clergy, in

other words, compels the clergy towards supporting other groups that have also been excluded

from the political process such as the poor and segments of the traditional elites (Parsa, 2000, p.

130).

The radicalized clergy can play an important role in the mobilization of the masses as

conflict between the regime and it opponents intensifies. This allows for the clergy to form

coalitions with various groups while simultaneously using the organizational resources of the

church to allow for this coalition to coalesce. The continuation of the politicization of the clergy

facilitates the development of radical ideologies among the lower ranks of the clergy, ideologies

that call for dramatic shifts in the political and social order. The emergence of these ideologies

can be tied to the fact that the clergy, like students and intellectuals, are involved with the

“production, dissemination, and continuity of the moral and ideological basis of the social order

(Parsa, 2000, p. 130).”

This is especially true in polities in which religion espouses an eschatological versus a

cyclical view of history. According to Goldstone (1991), “in eschatological thinking, history

moves to a particular point in time, a time of judgment and destruction, from which a new,

superior order will emerge.” This makes its claim on how the revolutionary potential of certain

religious traditions because it allows for revolutionary leaders to “describe the revolutionary

struggle and the task of reconstruction” in terms that are culturally available (Goldstone, 1991, p.

436). For example, Christianity, Islam, and even Marxism all describe some sort of “end” and

employ the use of eschatological imagery. Liberation theology in the Nicaraguan case is an

60

interesting example of how the eschatological views of Marxism and Christianity were fused.

Both Christianity and Marxism teach that history will arrive at some point at an “end” and that a

superior order will inevitably emerge. In the case of Nicaragua, the Christian ideals justice and

equality were combined with the Marxian notions of class struggle to provide an answer to how

the present order should be restructured to promote justice and equality in the face of exclusion,

corruption and repression.

Furthermore, religion plays an important role in developing societies where “political

opposition is often expressed through religious ideology and organization” (Billings and Scott,

1994, p. 182) these societies are “especially prone to legitimacy deficits” (Billings and Scott,

1994, p. 182). When the clergy faces an exclusionary or even openly hostile regime, it will

begin to doubt and eventually denounce the regime as illegitimate while at the same time

actively supporting and engaging in the overthrow of that regime. In essence, the clergy has the

communicational capacity, the organizational capacity, and, in exclusionary regimes, the

autonomy to engage in collective action.

The involvement of the Nicaraguan clergy in the struggle against the Somoza regime

during the 1970‟s fits this pattern. Although small in numbers the clergy played a pivotal role in

the opposition of the government (Parsa, 2000, p. 146). Although the majority of the clergy

supported the moderate opposition, a small segment supported the Sandinistas and advocated a

social revolution. As clerical politics began to radicalize during much of the 1960‟s, the clergy

began to organize “Ecclesiastical Base Communities” or CEBs among the more marginalized

urban and rural poor of Nicaragua (Parsa, 2000, p. 146). These CEB‟s combined Bible study

with a strong undercurrent of criticism of the existing social reality (Parsa, 2000, p. 147).

61

However, because the clergy remained small in number they lacked the ability to mobilize on a

truly national scale.

The clergy did play a very important role in the grassroots mobilization of marginalized

groups at the local level (Parsa, 2000, p. 147). Local organization and mobilization would prove

pivotal when larger scale national conflicts developed (Parsa, 2000, p. 147). The earthquake of

1972 that devastated the country provided this opportunity. The government, which took control

of the relief effort from the church, was accused by members of the clergy as misappropriating

and even stealing relief funds (Parsa, 2000, p. 148). Furthermore, the church began to criticize

the legitimacy of the regime itself. In a 1974 pastoral letter, seven bishops including the

archbishop of Managua stated that “while the Church had an obligation to promote political duty

it was not obliged to support political power (Parsa, 2000, p. 152).” Furthermore, the church

became a meeting ground for journalists who could not publish their writing freely and a place

where opponents of the regime could meet and organize collectively against the regime (Parsa,

2000, p. 152). However, when the struggle against Somoza turned violent in the months leading

to the revolution the clergy played a smaller role in the struggle against the regime (Parsa, 2000,

p. 153). Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan case demonstrates how the resources and relative

immunity of the clergy from severe repression plays an important role in the mobilization of the

masses.

Furthermore, the denunciation of the ruling elite has a powerful effect in reducing the

social support of the regime (Parsa, 2000, p. 131). This occurs because the clergy occupies a

“social space” safe from the repressive apparatus of the regime, and indeed proves almost

indispensible when they possess their own independent infrastructure and resources (Parsa, 2000,

62

p. 131). Thus the opening of mosques and churches to the opposition facilitates the use of the

independent resources and relatively immune public space. Therefore, even if the clergy do not

take an active role in initiating the mobilization process, the very fact that segments of the clergy

allow for the use of public religious space means that the opposition can more effectively

coalesce than they would in the absence of this space (Parsa, 2000, p. 133).

Foran seems to emphasize the importance in this type of leadership in the Nicaraguan

case. Liberation theology and its emphasis on social justice proved to be a powerful tool in the

mobilization of the masses against the regime. However, what Foran leaves out is the

importance of the organizational capacity and independence of the Church from state co-option

and repression. The church was not successful simply because it could articulate a “culture of

opposition.” Rather, the church was successful because it could foster this culture while at the

same time organizing the masses against the regime.

Skocpol seems to emphasize organization more than Foran does, however this

organization occurred under the auspices of a mass mobilizing-revolutionary party- the Chinese

Communist Party. She notes that the party was able to mobilize the Chinese peasantry because it

could organize base communities in the countryside while articulating a formal ideology that

stressed the importance of the “mass line” and the cohesion created by the party. This type of

leadership seems to be more hierarchical, more rigid than the type of leadership exhibited by the

Nicaraguan example. Therefore, it seems that Skocpol emphasizes the importance of political

parties and formal political ideologies in the mobilization of the masses against a regime.

However, as Foran demonstrates, the type of leadership exhibited by formal political parties does

present itself throughout the course of the revolutionary struggle. The masses can be organized,

63

therefore, through pre-existing institutions that have become hostile to the regime, institutions

that while not avowedly political per se, have taken a political stance due to the perceived unjust

and exclusive nature of the regime.

In addition to the structural and organizational attributes of the revolutionary struggle,

ideology plays an important role in mass mobilization. Ideology, by definition consists of “self-

conscious rationales and programs for political action (Goldstone, 1991, p. 406).” Ideologies,

however, do not fully or sufficiently explain the actions taken by individuals during the

revolution- ideologies in other words are highly fluid and take on many different forms during

the revolution (Goldstone, 1991, p. 406). Furthermore, during the revolution, many different

groups have many different ideologies. Therefore, attempting to understand or predict

revolutionary outcomes by proceeding from a single revolutionary ideology will yield

insufficient results (Goldstone, 1991, p. 407). For this reason, it is important to understand how

ideologies change and shift during the stages of the revolutionary conflict. The breakdown of the

state, the revolutionary struggle and state reconstruction, and the stabilization of authority all

involve different contenders (Goldstone, 1991, p. 407). The breakdown of the state involves the

conflict between the state and masses. The state attempts to maintain control and keep the

initiative in the face of growing this growing discontent.

Ideology during a “spontaneous” revolution plays a different role than it does during a

“planned” revolution. Planned revolutions depend more upon on deliberate revolutionary

mobilization of the masses. Ideology during a “planned” revolution allows for effective

leadership of the masses during the protracted struggle that often defines a “planned” revolution.

Spontaneous revolutions are largely non-ideological during the embryonic stage. Revolutionary

64

ideologies emerge only when the clear leaders of the revolution finally emerge (Kamrava, 1992,

p. 36). For the most part, the ideologies during a “spontaneous” revolution do not entail a

detailed roadmap of future courses of action. Instead, dogmatic slogans rejecting the present

without any real plans for the future become the ideology of the crowd (Kamrava, 1992, p. 36).

Only after the regime is overthrown and the leaders finally are able to seize power do the

ideological orientations of the leaders become truly apparent. However, these orientations often

shift due to strategic, organizational, and diplomatic considerations (Kamrava, 1992, p. 36).

However, ideology within this context takes on a non-specified very vague form

(Kamrava, 1992, p. 37). The formation of “coalitions” a product of the coalescence of different

classes with different interests makes this a necessity. This is especially true during a

“spontaneous” revolution when the success of the revolution depends more upon the

mobilization of the masses against the regime. In “planned” revolutions the leadership knows

what it wants and will adopt an ideology suited to achieving their objective of overthrowing the

regime and establishing an alternative frame of reference to the regime (Kamrava, 1992, p. 36).

Therefore, the emergence of avowedly revolutionary ideology only appears after the emergence

of revolutionary leadership during a spontaneous revolution (Kamrava, 1992, p. 35).

Revolutionary leaders more often than not emerge after the overthrow of the regime which once

provided the rallying point by which the opposition coalesced into a broad-based revolutionary

coalition.

Furthermore, because spontaneous revolutions start out non-ideologically, the most

important factor that facilitates mass-mobilization is the coalition between the middle and lower

classes. The middle class, often un-incorporated into the political as well as the economic

65

system already mentioned, of most praetorian regimes that rule Third World countries have little

to gain from supporting the present regime and often see it as a source of grief and anguish

(Kamrava, 1992, p. 37). Once the middle class unites with other groups such as the proletariat

and the peasantry (two groups with little to lose) the numerical superiority of the opposition

increases compared to that of the supporters of the regime (Kamrava, 1992, p. 37). This, coupled

with the economic and social power of the middle class becomes a threat to the existing political

order, which will face greater instability due to the increasing opposition of these groups.

Therefore, the emergence of leaders in post-revolutionary states after a spontaneous

revolution has to do with the situational opportunities, personalities, and characteristics of the

revolutionary leadership itself (Kamrava, 1992, p. 61). Leaders became leaders because of the

access to the political and organizations that they could use to communicate with their respective

audiences (Kamrava, 1992, p. 69). Needless to say, those groups that did not have access to

equally strong organizations could not assume political leadership because of the inability to

communicate their ideas to a larger audience. Furthermore, once the revolutionary leadership

becomes established, the opposition to these new leaders becomes more repressed once the

newly emerged leaders take more of a role in institutionalizing the new regime (Kamrava, 1992,

p. 71). The repression of intellectuals, the banning of political parties and the terrorizing of

opponents all constitute manifestations of the new leadership‟s attempt to further consolidate

their power and solidify the institutions keeping them in power (Kamrava, 1992, p. 71).

Foran acknowledges that ideology during the early phases of the revolution does retain a

general character. These ideologies consist of general themes such as “justice” and “equality”

not specific blueprints of action. Foran contends that this type of ideology allows for the

66

coalition that formed against the regime to remain cohesive. However, as noted, Foran fails

explain how the new elites that emerge out the revolution are able to institutionalize their new

regime in the face of opposition. The use of force by new elites to secure their position of

superiority often occurs after the revolution has taken place – something that Foran does not

point out. Skocpol on the other hand acknowledges that new elites will often use force to crush

the opposition. For example, she points out that the Soviet Communist Party used unprecedented

repression to crush the opposition from wealthier peasants (kulaks) that were perceived as a

threat to the new Soviet state in the “name of urban interests” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 172).

Finally, cultural grievances also play a role in the discontent of the masses before a

revolution actually takes place. Many Third World nations undergoing rapid development

encounter ideas, values, cultures, and beliefs different than those experienced in the past. These

different values can come into conflict with each other and can form clusters of “different

cultures” which can come into conflict with each other (Kamrava, 1992, p. 43). Furthermore,

citizens of Third World countries disillusioned with themselves and the changes occurring

around them will tend to vent their anger on the political system, especially if normal means of

competition are absent (Kamrava, 1992, p. 41). For this very reason, intellectuals and students

seem to be the ones that are prone to political opposition than many other groups (Kamrava,

1992, p. 44). They are the ones that examine prevailing social values – and are “aware of the

conflict between the values to be adopted.”

However, students, intellectuals, and the working class all play a pivotal role in the

downfall of the regime. No one group or strata of society can effectively cause the collapse of a

regime through its own efforts. Rather, it is through the coalition of various groups with different

67

interests, ideologies, and interests that create the necessary mobilization to change the present

order. This mobilization can only occur when favorable circumstances present themselves,

especially within a highly-repressive context (Parsa, 2000, p. 21). These favorable conditions

present themselves when the state becomes especially vulnerable due to external pressure,

schisms within the state, and when the state is subject to extensive external pressure (Parsa,

2000, p. 21). In the face of all of these vulnerabilities the state may resort to repression to crush

the opposition. However, repression usually has the opposite effect than the regime anticipated.

Instead of decreasing resistance to the regime, increased repressive measures more often than not

strengthen the organized opposition among various classes (Parsa, 2000, p. 22).

These organized masses have more potential to engage in collective action than the

unorganized (Parsa, 2000, p. 22). Furthermore, the organizations that the masses form create

more opportunities for communication networks that facilitate the coordination and transmission

of instructions and tactics of large numbers of people (Parsa, 2000, p. 22). However, the

organization of the masses occurs most fruitfully and indeed most exclusively in organizations

that are independent of the state – not co-opted or repressed by the state “such organizations

must be independent of the structures they attack. For this reason, those alternative channels of

mobilization that are not restricted by government repression may have a decisive impact on the

outcome of the conflicts (Parsa, 2000, p. 22).” The independence of these institutions from the

control, manipulation, or repression of the state means that they can successfully conduct

mobilization against the state because they have the organizational capacity to do so.

Furthermore, the disruptions caused by these broad-based organizations can contribute to

economic difficulties and weaknesses faced by the regime by interrupting services, production,

68

and distribution of goods and services especially in an urban economy (Parsa, 2000, p. 23).

Therefore, actions such as strikes and walk-outs by various segments of the working and middle-

classes can contribute to the greater destabilization of the regime. This destabilization takes the

form of the mobilization of un-mobilized groups and a decrease in state revenues caused by the

cessation of economic activity (Parsa, 2000, p. 23). Further dissatisfaction caused by the

increasing instability will also contribute to the defection of key elements of the polity such as

the armed forces and the bureaucracy itself (Parsa, 2000, p. 23).

However, this mobilization does not take place simply because of the structural

weaknesses of the regime. Skocpol states that ideologies exist within structural constraints, i.e

that social structures determine which ideologies emerge throughout the revolutionary struggle.

Further, she asserts that ideologies play an important role in the cohesion of the revolutionary

leadership and its control and influence of the masses. Foran notes that ideologies are one

component of a “culture of resistance” that can combine formally articulated ideologies along

with broader cultural idioms. Despite the differences in how the concept of ideology is

constructed, there can be no doubt that ideology plays a determining factor in how the coalition

will form and stay together throughout the course of the revolution. That is, whether or not the

social conflicts that arise will change the social structure largely depends upon the challengers

that ultimately seize power (Parsa, 2000, p. 24). For example, if moderates with ties to old elites

are the ones that eventually assume the role of revolutionary leaders the outcome will most likely

consist of a transformation of the political process without any subsequent changes in the social

structure (Parsa, 2000, p. 24). However, the absence or oppression of moderate leaders provides

the political opportunity for radical leadership to emerge and to shape the revolution. When this

69

occurs, the radical leadership, once it assumes power, will not only change the political system

but also re-arrange society‟s structures (Parsa, 2000, p. 24).

However, radicals are usually less successful than the moderate leadership because they

lack few allies in the regime forcing the radicals underground to escape repression and relegating

them to seek allies elsewhere such as the working class (Parsa, 2000, p. 24). However, this may

prove detrimental to their cause if radical, class-based; working class activism alienates the more

moderate opposition of the privileged social classes making coalition forming all but impossible

(Parsa, 2000, p. 24). However, the severe repression of the moderate opposition that occurs in a

repressive, exclusionary regime usually forces the moderates to align themselves with the radical

opposition (Parsa, 2000, p. 25). Therefore, severe repression does more to undermine the regime

because it alienates its moderate opponents who would otherwise depend on the state to block

radical action. Repression radicalizes the opposition against the regime and further encourages

the opposition to unite against the regime despite the differences that the individual groups

within the opposition may have. For this reason, the fact that Foran points out the repressive

nature of the regime is especially important. As noted repression encourages the cohesion and

radicalization of the opposition because it points out that the regime is unwilling to compromise

with groups that has decided to exclude from the political processes. This encourages those

excluded groups to come together and oppose the regime.

Almost intertwined with the concept of ideology, culture plays an important role in the

process of revolutionary mobilization. Understanding the role of culture in the revolutionary

process is important because culture helps one understand how it “shapes the capacities from

which strategies of action are constructed (Swidler, 1986, p. 277).” Culture acts as a “toolkit”

70

because actors attempting to mobilize the masses can select different pieces at different times

(Swilder, 1986, p. 277). In other words, people will come to value ends (revolutionary ends for

instance) to which their “cultural equipment” is well suited (Swilder, 1986, p. 277). Perhaps the

emergence of what Foran coins “cultures of resistance” in pre-revolutionary polities embodies

the products of this “toolkit.” The various cultural idioms that combine to create this “culture of

resistance,” in other words, simply manifest the creation of a mass-mobilizing phenomenon from

pre-existing cultural forms- albeit for the purpose of social transformation.

Therfore, culture acts as a “toolkit” for action, but a toolkit for whom? This is where the

role of revolutionary leaders comes in. The “action” taken by the revolutionary leaders and the

masses has a lot to do with how the leadership frames the world around them – how they

construct meaning to the actions that they are taking. By definition a frame is an “interpretative

schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuation and

encoding objects, situations, events, and experiences, and sequences of actions within one‟s

present or past environment (Tarrow, 1994, p. 122).” For example, the Catholic Church in

Nicaragua used the social teachings of the Gospels to provide meaning to the masses‟ struggle

against the economically and politically unjust Somoza regime. Thus “framing” by

revolutionary leadership is essential in mobilizing the masses because it means that leaders are

“inscribing grievances in overall frames that identify and injustice, attribute the responsibility for

it to others and propose solutions to it (Tarrow, 1994, p. 123).”

However, revolutionary leaders must compete with other movements, media agents, and

the state for cultural superiority (Tarrow, 1994, p. 123). Furthermore, movements that adapts to

well to their societies cultures lose their “force of opposition” and may alienate more militant

71

supporters (Tarrow, 1994, p. 123). Finally, the participants in a movement may have their own

reading of events that may be different from their leaders (Tarrow, 1994, p. 123). Therefore,

successful leadership understands how to employ the right cultural symbols at the right time in

order to gain both widespread support and keep its revolutionary edge. Thus, the process of

“framing” can be seen as a balancing act. Revolutionary leaders must have an understanding of

how they can build a consensus around their own stated goals and objectives while

simultaneously using the cultural symbols that they have chosen to inspire the masses to take

action.

As we have seen, the study of revolutionary theory involves an understanding of the

complex interplay of various elements and causal patterns that lead to the collapse of the regime

in power and the institutionalization of post-revolutionary authority. As history demonstrates,

and as theory articulates, the collapse of regimes largely depends upon the structural weaknesses

of the regime itself within a specific international context. Both Skocpol and Foran clearly point

this out. However, theory should also focus upon how the various groups in society with

disparate interests come together to overthrow the regime in power. The formation of broad-

based coalitions occurs through pre-existing autonomous institutions in society which provide

both formal and informal leadership to the masses. This leadership, when it possesses the

organizational resources as well as significant institutional autonomy shapes the post-

revolutionary policy because it has the resources that other groups simply did not have.

Furthermore, the ability of the leaderships to employ cultural symbols to motivate the

masses to action can not be underestimated. The ability of leaders to use cultural symbols to give

meaning to the masses actions against the regime while at the same time accomplishing the goals

72

of the leadership is no easy task. Thus, leaders must have a nuanced understanding of how they

can effectively articulate the struggle against the regime while competing with other groups at

the same time. The next chapter will attempt to address how the collapse of the Pahlavi regime

actually occurred and why the Islamic leadership with its organizational resources and ability to

use Iranian cultural elements could effectively usher in a new political and social order.

Furthermore, the explanatory power of the Foran and Skocpol theories will be revealed in the

light of the Iranian experience.

73

References

Billings, D & Scott, S. (1994). Religion and Political Legitimation. Annual Review of Sociology,

20, 173-201

Chehabi, H.E., & Linz, J.L. (1998). A Theory of Sultanism 1: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule. In

Chehabi, H.E., & Linz, J. (Eds.), Sultanistic Regimes (pp. 3-26). Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press.

Dix, R. (1982). Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail. Polity, 16, 423-446

Goldstone, J. (1991). Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution. Theory and

Society, 20, 405-453.

Haggard, S., & Kaufmann, R. (1995). The Political Economy of Regime Transitions. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.

Kamrava, M. (1992). Revolutionary Politics. Wesport: Praeger.

Parsa, M. (2000). States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, R. (1998). Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist

Perspectives. In Chehabi, H.E., & Linz, J. (Eds.), Sultanistic Regimes (pp. 49-85)

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Swilder, A. (1986). Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological Review,

51, 273-286.

Weede, E, & Mueller, E (2000). Rebellion, Violence, and Revolution: A Rational Choice

Perspective. Journal of Peace Research, 1, 43-59.

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Chapter 3- The Iranian Revolution and the Establishment of the Islamic Republic

The revolutionary upheaval that occurred Iran from 1977 to 1979 greatly shook the

political and social arrangements that had existed in the country since at least the reign of Reza

Shah during the early 20th

century. The revolution which effectively destroyed 2,500 years of a

monarchical tradition stemming back to Cyrus the Great seems to have been the product of a

struggle against a system that had outlived its usefulness. The days of a despotic king

legitimized through divine mandate had become a bitter memory and the legacy of a former era;

Iran had entered a new age. A focus on the dynamics that led to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty

and ushered in the “Islamic Republic” will be examined in this chapter.

However, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 did not happen

overnight. In fact, certain social and political forces were necessary in order for the clergy under

the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini to grasp the reins of power and consolidate

their leadership over the revolution. In other words, Imam Khomeini did not represent the only

faction that competed for power in the days following the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty. The

question remains, why and how could the clergy eventually assume political leadership in the

face of this competition? What kinds of resources did the clergy possess that other groups such

as the liberal-nationalists, Marxists, and others did not?

Another question posed by this chapter concerns the ability of the various theories

discussed in the first chapter to effectively explain the causes, processes, and outcomes of the

Iranian revolution. Whether John Foran and Theda Skocpol can sufficiently call to attention the

various dynamics that led to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of a theocratic

republic will, by implication serve as its own criticism of two distinct schools of revolutionary

75

theory that currently exist; the third and fourth generation. The question that stems from this

criticism is: “can the current school of revolutionary theory sufficiently explain revolutions that

have occurred in “Third World” countries such as Iran, or does revolutionary theory deserve an

intellectual re-evaluation and new direction? Although Theda Skocpol and John Foran have

different views in terms of the causal patterns and outcomes of revolutions, both rely on the same

methodology of the “historical-comparative” perspective.

Theda Skocpol concentrated on only three cases, while John Foran focuses on a larger

number of cases including ones which consist of “Third World” revolutionary change during the

20th

century. Taking this into consideration, can the number of cases involved in the creation of

an overarching “theory” of revolutionary have an effect on its explanatory power? In other

words, does the focus on a small number of cases assist in the creation of a more detailed

analysis of how revolutions occur or does a more general analysis of a broader spectrum of cases

allow for a more comprehensive and therefore more complete theory of revolutionary change?

The focus on the Iranian revolution throughout this chapter should in many ways point out the

inherent strengths and weaknesses of each author‟s scope of analysis.

The roots of the Iranian Revolution lie deep in the Iranian political landscape of the 20th

century. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the reign of Reza Shah from 1921 until his

forced abdication in 1941. These two eras brought Iran into a more “modern,” “western,” and

“secular” age. Reza Shah, the shah of Iran during this era attempted to accomplish these three

goals by expanding state power (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 72). The expansion of the state power

under the shah decreased the power of the Majles or parliament, because, according to one

British minister, the Shah created an “atmosphere of uncertainty and fear. The Cabinet is afraid

76

of the Majles; the Majles is afraid of the army; and all are afraid of the Shah.” This atmosphere

of uncertainty and fear allowed for the Shah to take unprecedented steps to increase his power

because it allowed him to staff the bureaucracy with sycophants that would follow his orders.

Throughout the 1930‟s the Shah increased state intervention in the economy by taking over the

banking, telecommunications, and basic consumer goods (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 77).

Simultaneously, Reza Shah reached the arm of the state deeper and deeper into society.

Conscription of the peasantry into the army proved to be one of the most valuable tools in the

shah‟s arsenal for “modernizing” Iran. Conscription in the army forced the peasantry to learn

Persian and interact with other ethnic groups (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 77). This type of policy was

meant to turn tribesmen into citizens and usher in a new age of nationalism. At the same time, he

standardized weights and measures, introduced standard time, and adopted a new calendar. All

of these reforms were meant to “instill in the citizenry a felling of uniformity and common

allegiance to himself and his state” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 83).

Furthermore, Reza Shah also tried to exert state control over religious institutions such as

the seminaries. For the first time, the state began to decide who could and could not teach

religion (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 85). Reza Shah also mandated the teaching of religion classes in

public schools while banning curriculum that even suggested religious skepticism, which he

deemed analogous to “materialism” which meant “communism” and communism, was the

ultimate enemy of the Shah‟s autocratic rule. Other reforms, such as the adoption of a modern

legal code greatly weakened traditional courts and the Shari‟a legal system and changed the legal

registration system from the clergy to local notary publics (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 88). Capital

punishment became restricted to murder, treason, and armed rebellion while at the same time,

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long-term imprisonment replaced corporal punishment for less serious offenses (Abrahamian,

2008, p. 88).

The regime was not without its detractors, especially among the ranks of the clergy and

the intelligentsia. The conflict with the clerics eventually came in 1935 after a series of

controversial reforms including prohibiting teachers to wear the veil, the abolishment of holy

celebrations such as Muharram, and the opening of the Mashed shrine to foreign tourists

(Abrahamian, 2008, p. 94). These reforms, among others, led to a revolt by the clergy in Mashed

which was eventually crushed. Although this could be interpreted as a nascent opposition

movement by the clergy, most of the religious ranks remained silent while the Shah continued

his secularizing reforms (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 95).

Most of the opposition from the intelligentsia came from the ranks of the younger

intellectuals, influenced by the European left during the early 1930‟s. They viewed the Shah as

an “oriental despot” that selfishly exploited the nation for his own purposes (Abrahamian, 2008,

p. 96). Most importantly, however, the intelligentsia viewed the Shah as a puppet of the British

government-especially after he agreed to a mere four percent increase in oil royalties until the

year 1993! This opposition would come into the open after the abdication of the Shah and the

coming of the “nationalist interregnum” following the forced abdication of the Shah in 1941.

The Pahlavi state, still intact after the fall of Reza Shah, came under the leadership of his

son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1941. The new Shah attempted to increase his democratic

credentials by promising to uphold the fundamental laws of the constitution and rule not reign as

a constitutional monarch (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 99). During this period, between 1941 and the

coup against Mossadegh in 1953, power shifted away from the Shah to the landowning elites.

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Although the shah remained in control of the army, these elites controlled the patronage system

and the bureaucracy. These notables dominated the Majlis through political parties or “fraksiun”.

These leaders of these parties steered legislation and dominated the committees that steered this

legislation. They also chose cabinet ministers and premiers and could withdraw their vote of

confidence at any point (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 105). The notables also dominated the electoral

boards that counted the votes for the Majlis election, and thus dominated the electoral outcome

based on the interests of the landed elites (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 107).

The early opposition to the domination by the notables came in the form of the socialist

Tudeh (masses) party. The party elected delegates to the Majlis and was able to pressure the

government into decreeing the first comprehensive labor law in the Middle East, which included

an eight hour day and the abolition of child labor (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 110). The Tudeh party

also drew support from the salaried middle classes as well as intellectual “fellow travelers” such

as playwrights and historians. Division among party ranks occurred in the wake of Soviet

demands for oil concessions and the Azeri uprising in 1945-46. The uprising occurred following

the Second World War during which the Azeri ethnic minority, with Soviet support, attempted to

break away from Iran and establish its own Azeri republic in the North West Iran. These two

events divided the “nationalists” who opposed oil concessions to the Soviets and Azeri autonomy

and the “leftists” who supported both (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 112). The government itself

attacked the Tudeh party by accusing it of aiding the Azeri “secessionists” and issued arrest

warrants for its leaders. The final blow came in the wake of an assassination attempt against the

Shah after which he declared martial law, outlawed the Tudeh party, and arrested/exiled its

leaders.

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The Tudeh party, falling from national prominence, added some very important ideas to

the Iranian political lexicon. For the first time, the ideas of mass mobilization and class identity

became well known and embraced. Furthermore, ideas such as responsibility of the state to tend

to the needs of the people became reinforced and that both men and women deserve equal rights.

Most importantly, however, was the party‟s call for the nationalization of Iran‟s oil, an issue that

would serve as the rallying point of the nationalist opposition during the late 1940‟s and early

1950‟s which culminated with the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh.

Mossadegh became prime minister during a time of intense political and social

stratification and division. During this point the major landed upper class and bureaucracy still

controlled the political and economic life of the country (Parsa, 38). The state controlled the

small, yet growing industrial sector (Parsa, 1989, p. 38). Harsh labor exploitation and indirect

taxes on mass consumption items put a strain on the working classes. Furthermore, state polices

encouraging the importation of cheap goods from the West, which endangered the livelihood of

the merchant class (the bazaaris) (Parsa, 1989, p. 39).

These social conflicts came to the forefront with Iran‟s nationalization of the oil industry

in the early 1950‟s. Seeing the British royalties as unfair, Mossadegh moved to nationalize the

oil while at the same time providing compensation for Britain‟s losses. Although Britain

contested the decision, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and courts in both Italy and Japan

contended that the issue was between Iran and Britain (Parsa, 1989, p. 41). Eventually,

Mossadegh refused to back down and did not accept Britain‟s offer for oil compensation (Zabih,

1982, p. 101). In fact, this was demonstrative of Mossadegh‟s position. Throughout the course

of his premiership, Mossadegh sought a course of nonalignment with the Western powers by

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“seeking support and and even protection from distant third powers” (Zabih, 1982, p. 102). For

this reason, Mossadegh sought the assistance of the United States during the oil crisis. The

United States, while originally neutral, eventually backed Great Britain and refused to buy

Iranian oil or provide technical assistance until the conflict was resolved (Parsa, 1989, p. 42).

However, since the United States began to back Britain, Iran could have decided to “fall back on

another of its traditional foreign policy doctrines, namely, cultivating the support of a powerful

northern neighbor to attenuate, if not neutralize, Anglo-American pressure” (Zabih, 1982, p.

103). Mossadegh did not follow this course but instead tried to convince the Eisenhower

Administration to support the prime minister during the oil crisis. At the same time, decreasing

oil revenues almost bankrupted the Mossadegh government while at the same time increasing

prices for consumer goods. The nationalist economic policies adopted by the prime minister

helped to ease the burden and benefitted many of his supporters including the bazaaris, along

with white and blue collar workers.

Domestically, Mossadegh sought to curb the power of the Shah and restore the 1906

constitution. The issue that exemplified the conflict between the Shah and Mossadegh was the

control of the military. Mossadegh argued that the Prime Minister had supreme authority over

the military, a role that the Shah had taken (Zabih, 1982, p. 100). The constitutional struggle over

control of the military led Mossadegh to dismiss top army commanders and enjoy “full power

over the army (Zabih, 1982, p. 106). Furthermore, Mossadegh also came into conflict over the

Shah over his land reform policies which he opposed on the grounds that these reforms would

lead to discontent in the countryside and make maintaining order more difficult (Zabih, 1982, p.

107). Although the Shah finally granted the government the power over royal estates, the Majlis

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refused to support the Mossadegh government and instead became highly critical of

Mossadegh‟s policies including his foreign and oil policies (Zabih, 1982, p. 108).

Thus, Mossadegh‟s support in the Majlis began to greatly diminish by mid-June of 1953.

Communist agitators, the pro-Shah clergy and other opponents began to support the Majlis in

their campaign to get rid of Mossadegh. In response, Mossadegh moved to dissolve the

government by holding a referendum which supported the dissolution of the legislative body.

Mossadegh felt that Majlis had to be dissolved because of its recalcitrant nature and because it

served as a “sanctuary of vigorous opposition deputies” (Zabih, 1982, p. 109). The opposition,

led by General Zahedi (who would eventually become prime minister) went underground and

tried to convince the Shah not to issue the necessary decree that would effectively dissolve the

legislative body and instead to dismiss Mossadegh and place General Zahedi in power. The

Shah, reluctant at first to acquiesce to this decision finally relented hoping that the dismissal of

Mossadegh would destroy the loyalty of the armed forces to the prime minister.

Colonel Nassiri, chief of the Imperial Guards personally delivered the decree dismissing

Mossadegh on August 15, 1953. However, Mossadegh instructed the army chief of staff General

Riyadi to disarm the Imperial Guard, an order that he followed. Sensing the ouster had failed,

the Shah fled to an unknown destination. What followed was a storm of pro-government

demonstrations and a decree by Mossadegh dissolving the Majlis. Mossadegh ordered the

Tehran garrison quell the protests an order that the army obeyed. The opposition, seeing that the

army remained loyal attempted to make the dismissal of Mossadegh public by storming a radio

station and broadcasting a message by General Zahedi as the new prime minister (Zabih, 1982, p.

120). At this juncture, the army became increasingly loyal to the Shah and refused to disperse the

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crowds that had gathered in his support (Zabih, 1982, p. 121). The opposition elements of the

military along with their civilian supporters eventually attacked Mossadegh‟s personal residence

– in response Mossadegh stepped down and General Zahedi became Prime Minister (Zabih,

1982, p. 123).

The second coup (with US assistance) was successful in restoring power to the Shah.

Severe repression followed during which the Shah systematically eliminated his opponents,

especially among the ranks of the Tudeh party. The National Front, the coalition of workers and

bazaaris that Mossadegh had constructed and led fell apart after Mossadegh was ousted from

power. Meanwhile, the US got control of 40% of Iran‟s oil and provided millions of dollars in

military aid to the Shah. In addition, the US trained the SAVAK or secret police that would assist

the Shah in crushing any opposition. The nationalization crisis put the Shah back in power while

at the same time relegating Iran as a patron state of the US.

With the end of the Mossadegh premiership Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was able to

increase and consolidate his power. The opposition, divided and without adequate

communication or organizational capacities could not stand up to the increasingly repressive

regime (Parsa, 1989, p. 51). Therefore, the Shah could embark on his reforms, under the title of

the “White Revolution” which included land reform, nationalization of forests and pastures,

profit sharing in industry, the enfranchisement of women, and the establishment of a literacy

corps (Parsa, 1989, p. 50). The landlords, traditional politicians and the religious establishment

opposed these reforms and rebelled in 1963. These rebellions were quickly crushed by the

Shah‟s army. This effectively destroyed the landed upper class as an independent social class and

which “transferred their sociopolitical power to the state” (Katouzian, 1998, p. 188). The clergy,

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which also opposed the White Revolution revolted alongside the traditional landed upper class.

However, their rebellion was also short-lived. Nonetheless, the 1963 uprising allowed for

Khomeini to rise to national political prominence even after being exiled for his involvement in

the protests against the Shah (Katouzian, 1998, p. 188). Even so, after the repression of 1963 the

Shah tightened the vice on the political and economic life of the country – especially since rises

in oil revenues allowed the Shah to both finance his reforms and maintain his independence from

the domestic economy (Katouzian, 1998, p. 188).

The US, because of these reforms, perceived the Shah‟s regime as progressive and saw

Iran as a Western ally. Furthermore, Iran‟s economic growth during this period made the country

more strategically important to the United States which meant that the US would support the

Shah with military aid. By 1974 this military aid would shoot up to $3.91 billion (Parsa, 1989, p.

51). The United States also sent military personnel to help train the Iranian armed forces in the

use of this sophisticated military equipment (Parsa, 1989, p. 52). The military, along with the

SAVAK and the expropriation of oil revenues became one of the pillars that the Shah relied upon

to increase his personal power and independence from domestic interests. Military elites had a

multitude of special privileges and powers including the power to expropriate private property

whenever it served their purposes (Katouzian, 1998, p. 195). Furthermore, each province had a

military commander appointed by the Shah which had more power than the civilian governor.

Furthermore, the gendarmerie units under the command of the general had a tight grip on

provincial affairs by relying on intimidation and coercion to accomplish their goals (Katouzian,

1998, p. 195).

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However, the military establishment, because it had to answer directly to the Shah, had

little to no autonomy and could not make decisions without the Shah‟s approval. In fact, the

Shah would often make decisions about what equipment to purchase without consulting his own

commanders. As a consequence the commanders never knew what equipment was being

purchased and for what purpose (Katouzian, 1998, p. 196). Furthermore, the Shah had such a

grip on the leadership of the military that he had the power to appoint officers above the rank of

major and constantly “reshuffled the top commanders to ensure they could not form power bases

or enduring alliances” (Zabih, 1988, p. 5). He also used his own personal secret police, the

Imperial Organization, to make sure that military leaders could not make alliances against him

(Zabih, 1988, p. 5). The Shah also relied on a large number of conscripts that formed the bulk of

the enlisted personnel; these conscripts would eventually turn against the Shah in the final days

of the regime in favor of the opposition led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shi‟a cleric that had risen

to political prominence.

Economically, the United States under the Nixon administration helped to promote

economic interests in Iran by establishing the Iran Joint Commission headed by US Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger and Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Houshang Ansari

(Parsa, 1989, p. 52). This commission hoped to “intensify economic cooperation and

consultation of economic policies” (Parsa, 1989, p. 52). The commission agreed to a $12 billion

construction project that would include the development of eight nuclear power plants, 100,000

apartments and other joint ventures that would produce fertilizer, processed food, and farm

machinery (Parsa, 1989, p. 53). The Nixon administration, ignoring the apparent human rights

abuses conducted by the Shah, stated that the “United States government considered these

matters to be internal affairs of a sovereign government and that Iran had made great progress in

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the area of human rights” (Parsa, 1989, p. 53). The Shah also depended heavily on oil revenues

to finance his reforms. When oil prices were high and production kept up with demand the

economy grew at an alarming rate, 9-10 percent during the 1960‟s (Arjomand, 1988, p. 110).

However, state intervention and accumulation during the 1970‟s served the interests of

only a few, including the royal family, upper-level government officials and bureaucrats

including the heads of the army and those engaged in large-scale industry (Parsa, 1989, p. 54).

This alienated and affected broad segments of society which gained their opportunity for attack

when the decline of oil revenues during the mid-1970‟s reduced government revenues (Parsa,

1989, p. 54). At the same time, the Shah‟s liberalization policies gave the opposition just enough

room to mobilize for collective action (Parsa, 55).

In light of the growing opposition, the Shah decided to enact political reforms. This

culminated with the premiership of Ja‟far Sharif-Emami. Sharif-Emami declared his government

“the government of national reconciliation” and promised to establish communication with

opposition groups. Other promises that his government made included establishing appropriate

conditions for free elections, reducing taxes for the poor and middle class, and reconciling

government programs with national and religious traditions (Parsa, 1989, p. 55).

At the same time, the economic “miracle” of the White Revolution came to a screeching

halt by the mid to late 1970‟s. Although the GNP went up by 42 percent between 1974 and 1975,

severe bottlenecks and shortages of skilled labor along with a lack of adequate infrastructure led

to the end of economic growth (Arjomand, 1988, p. 110). Since the Shah controlled the

economy, the hardship caused by this economic stagnation was ultimately blamed on him

(Arjomand, 1988, p. 111)! This further deepened animosity towards the Shah and created an

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atmosphere in which many different groups such as the new middle classes, and the bureaucrats

of the oil industry began to distrust his leadership (Arjomand, 1988, p. 112). Divided and kept

under close surveillance of the SAVAK the middle class had no other choice but to join forces

with the clergy who had the organizational resources needed for real political action (Arjomand,

1988, p. 113).

As opposition to the Shah continued to mount in the face of these reforms, the Shah

decided to appoint a law-and-order administration under General Azhari. Although the use of

force by this government lessened the number of strikes, the regime still faced many challenges

from insubordination in the army and the continuance of oil strikes which greatly decreased state

revenues (Parsa, 1989, p. 58). In light of these problems, the Shah appointed Shahpour Bakhtiar

as a reformist prime minister. Bakhtiar promised to act independently of the Shah “the Shah will

reign, and [Bakhtiar will rule] (Parsa, 1989, p. 58)”, and went on to free many leftist political

prisoners and announced that Iran would no longer sell oil to South Africa or Israel nor would

Iran act as the gendarmerie of the Middle East (Parsa, 1989, p. 58). The opposition rejected

Bakhitar‟s compromise with the monarch. Meanwhile the United States declared that the Shah

had to leave in January 1979 because he “could no longer have a role in the political future of

Iran” (Parsa, 1989, p. 58).

In addition, the departure of the Shah in January 1979 caused the armed forces to finally

collapse. The army, long accountable to the Shah could not operate effectively without his

direction primarily because he made all of the decisions concerning how the army was to

operate. Between November 1978 and January 1979, enlisted men and officers began to side

with the opposition. Some even went so far as to establish a “Revolution and Liberation Army”

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to encourage the defection of both commissioned and enlisted personnel (Parsa, 1989, p. 242).

During this time clashes between defecting military units and those loyal to the regime became

the norm. However, as time went on, defections increased as well as popular resistance to loyal

remnants of the armed forces. The final stand of the monarchist military came with the clash

between the Shah‟s “Immortal Guard” and protesting Air Force cadets on February 10th

1979.

Military units sent to assist the Immortals were eventually stopped by groups of people who

attacked the roads and bridges leading into Tehran (Parsa, 1989, p. 245). These reinforcements

eventually laid down their arms and declared their solidarity with the people (Parsa, 1989, p.

245).

As the regime weakened and collapsed while the opposition got stronger, the clergy

began to step up as the undisputed leaders of the revolution. The question remains, how could the

clergy, a traditionally non-political force in Iran take lead of the Iranian revolution while other

groups fell to the wayside? Furthermore, what does the outcome say about Iranian culture and its

influence in the political process? Scholars, including Misagh Parsa and Samir Arjomand

contend that a multitude of groups opposed the Shah including students, intellectuals, and

segments of the working and middle-classes. Furthermore, the reason why the clergy could grip

power so easily was because the clergy, unlike other groups had the support and could

effectively mobilize more segments of the population. According to Parsa (1989) “the success of

the new actors and challengers depended on their ability to mobilize resources, form coalitions,

consolidate opposition forces and classes, and disrupt the social structure” (p. 249).

In the days following the collapse of the regime, the clergy seemed to have the strongest

hold on the resources necessary for revolutionary mobilization. The clerically dominated

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Revolutionary Council, formed by Khomeini himself, not only appointed a new provisional

government it also purged the ad hoc revolutionary committees that sprang up after the fall of the

Shah. However, the council chose a nationalist liberal, Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister.

Therefore, it seems as if the clergy under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini began to

influence Iranian politics even if they did not have complete control of the government in

February 1979.

However, this would eventually change during the summer of 1979. Khomeini, in an

important speech in June, declared that Iran would be an “Islamic republic” and that the

intellectuals and others that should not “oppose the ulama who endowed the nation with a God-

given power” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 137). The clergy, in other words capitalized on the sense of

unity produced by the fall of the Shah in order to “launch its bid for political domination”

(Arjomand, 1988, p. 138). In order to accomplish this, Khomeini began a systematic clampdown

on the press, the National Democratic Party, the Fedayeen, and the Tudeh party. These groups,

which represented the intellectuals and the professional middle classes were labeled “lackeys of

the West” while the journalists of the press were accused of trying to “drown the people in

corruption and prostitution in the name of freedom” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 138) Khomeini also

used the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals to curb “counterrevolutionary activities” in both the

economic and political realms. At the same time Khomeini hand-picked a group of mullahs that

would make up the Assembly of Constitutional Experts for the purpose of drafting a “100

percent Islamic constitution” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 138).

The final nail in the coffin for the liberals came with the hostage crisis. Khomeini

capitalized on the anti-American sentiment created by the taking of the hostages by directly

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taking over the government via the clerically dominated Revolutionary Council. The Iranian

Hostage Crisis radicalized the revolution and gave Khomeini the opportunity to capitalize on the

anti-Western, anti-imperialist, sentiment created when the United States admitted the Shah for

medical treatment. Thus, by December of 1979 Khomeini and the clergy were able to pass a

constitution that made Khomeini the “de jure ruler of Iran on behalf of the Hidden Imam”

(Arjomand, 1988, p. 139). Khomeini also masterfully took advantage of the situation provided

by the hostage crisis by turning this crisis into a struggle of God against the satanic West. In this

light, most other political groups, including the Tudeh party, began to support the Islamic

government in order “not to jeapordize the ongoing anti-imperialist struggle and the political line

of the Imam” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 139).

The final defeat of the moderate, secularizing liberals came with the ouster of President

Bani-Sadr in 1981. At first Khomeini backed the president so that the so that the new

government could run the country and improve the economy (Arjomand, 1988, p. 142).

However, the clerics still had control of the education system which allowed for a “cultural

revolution” beginning in April which began a massive desecularization campaign in the

government and society (Arjomand, 1988, p. 143). Thus, the clergy was able to tighten its grip

on power to the point where the Islamic Republican Party began to control the government. This

would eventually lead to the ouster of Bani-Sadr by the Majlis (dominated by pro-Islamic forces)

and the eventual takeover of the government by the Islamic clergy (Arjomand, 1988, p. 146).

Furthermore, the clergy under Khomeini also had better organizational capacities than

many other of the groups that opposed the Shah, including the liberals that dominated the

political process immediately after the fall of the Shah. Khomeini was able to oust these figures

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from the government because these other groups did not possess the organizational power of the

mosque network, which was under the ultimate control of the clergy, a network “which had been

an important base of their mobilization against the monarchy” (Parsa, 1989, p. 251). Second, the

divisions among the opposition groups along with the establishment of a Revolutionary Guard

under the auspices of the “Khomeinists” allowed for the survival of the clergy as the nation‟s

dominant political force (Parsa, 1989, p. 251). This domination, manifested in the adoption of the

1979 constitution that instituted Veliyat-e-Faqih or rule of the jurists ensured that the clergy

would have complete oversight over Iranian political and social life.

However, the consolidation of the clergy over national politics did not occur without

considerable post-revolutionary conflicts. These conflicts in the form of autonomy movements,

resistance from the peasantry, the universities, the workers, the bazaaris, and even among the

clergy itself are manifestations of the nature of the revolution itself. The revolutionary struggle

was a possibility because of the coalescing of many different classes and groups with many

different interests for one common goal- the overthrow of the Shah‟s regime. Once the regime

fell, the coalition fell apart because the different interests that these groups had finally came to

the fore.

For example, the students who long opposed the Shah actually received encouragement

from the clergy for their struggle against his regime (Parsa, 1989, p. 266). However, once the

Shah fell and the students began to take more radical, leftist political positions the government

reacted by labeling the universities as “bastions of communists” and took violent measures to

crush student political activity (Parsa, 1989, p. 267). Government repression finally culminated

with the closure of the universities in April, 1980 for a period of two years, after which only

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students who could prove that they had no affiliation or alignment with Eastern or Western

ideologies could enroll (Parsa, 1989, p. 267). This violent action of the regime against its

opponents included the bazaaris who proved to be some of the closest allies to the clergy during

the revolution. After the Islamic regime adopted controversial policies against the bazaar

including rationing and anti-profiteering legislation which adversely affected them

economically- the bazaaris began to openly criticize the regime and align themselves with the

liberal president Bani-Sadr (Parsa, 1989, p. 281). After the president‟s ouster, the Islamic

Republican Party (IRP) increased its repression of the bazaar merchants who supported the

liberals or had liberal sympathies (Parsa, 1989, p. 282).

The conflicts between the students, the bazaaris, and the government demonstrate how

the lack of organizational capacity and resources can significantly weaken the power of one

group in the post-revolutionary political process. At least for the baazaris- economic division, the

loss of the mosque mobilization network, and increasing repression from the religiously

dominated government greatly weakened their capacity for collective action in the pursuit of

their interests. This proved that access to networks and insulation from government repression is

pivotal in the pursuit of political power and influence.

Furthermore, the success of the clergy and the failure of other groups to mobilize the

majority of the population may have something to do with the cultural communicability of the

clergy‟s message. In other words, the clergy acted as political entrepreneurs in that they

effectively employed cultural symbols and practices into their message that gave meaning to the

actors involved in the revolutionary process. These cultural symbols, long present in Iranian

society only became revolutionary symbols because of the ability of the clergy to effectively use

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them in order to accomplish their goals, and because the structural conditions were right for

radical action to take place.

Throughout the course of the Iranian Revolution, the symbols that seemed to have the

most powerful mobilization capacity came from Shiite symbols. Religion, especially Shiite Islam

has played a pivotal role in defining how Iranian‟s perceive authority and the legitimacy of

authority. From the Islamic perspective, man‟s role is not to make the law but to conform to the

law provided by God (Allah) and the prophet Mohammad (Behnam, 1986, p. 51). Therefore, the

state according to Islamic faith is the “handmaiden of religion” (Behnam, 1986, p. 52). In Islam

there exist two sects, Shia and Sunni both of which have differing views on how religious

authority and temporal authority should interact. In Iran, the Shia branch of the faith

predominates and is characterized by a hierarchical clergy with a strong tradition of political

influence.

The prevalence of this sect in the religious life of Iran cannot be understated, especially in

terms of how Mohammed‟s successors are perceived. According Shiites, Mohammed‟s

successors, drawn from his bloodline, not only protect the Islamic community but also the

“legitimate ecclesiastical and temporal ruler” (Behnam, 1986, p. 58). Furthermore, this type of

authority was elitist in that it was both hereditary and divinely inspired. The Imam, chosen by

Allah from the ranks of Mohammed‟s bloodline was regarded as “the ultimate authority, the

source of truth, and the only beings worthy of obedience” (Behnam, 1986, p. 59).

The imamate, or the successors of Muhammad, had very strong influence on the Iranian

monarchy. After the last Imam went into occultation, or hiding until “a time that Allah wills it”

the mujtahids (religious scholars) were to represent this “Hidden Imam” or Mahdi until his

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return. Thus, Iranian monarchs had to link themselves with the religious order to appear

legitimate. Therefore, the mujtahids “delegated certain of their temporal prerogatives to the

political authority in order to protect the theocratic social order and religious interests in society”

(Behnam, 1986, p. 60). This relationship between the mujtahids on the one hand and the secular

political authority of the Shah on the other was to serve as the best possible form of government

until the return of the Mahdi. In other words, no government absent from the rule of the Mahdi

could possibly be perfect. However, dual monarch/mujtahid rule would serve as the legitimate

authority absent the direct rule of the Mahdi (Behnam, 1986, p. 60).

Furthermore, Shiism also has a great influence on how the people view themselves and

the political process. Shiism is not just a national religious expression but can also be regarded as

the national religious identity of the Iranian nation (Behnam, 1986, p. 62). This is why the

erosion of Iranian traditions in the face of Western influence became such an important theme

during the revolution. Since the Iranian people identify with their religion as a national religious

identity any attack against that identity will meet hostility from the majority of the population,

especially in a country such as Iran that has faced numerous foreign incursions throughout its

history. The Shah began to embody the interference of the West and thus became a target of

resistance. This resistance was born of a culture that has a strong sense of justice and injustice

emanating from its rich religious tradition that helped to establish the political norms of a nation.

This political predisposition towards justice is articulated through the Shia myth of the

martyrdom of Imam Hossein in 680 A.D. According to Shiite tradition, Hossein was attacked

and killed by the hated Yazid and his soldiers while on his way to receive the caliphate (Behnam,

1986, p. 78). Every year the martyrdom of Hussein is remembered during the month of

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Muharram on the Islamic calendar. During this period, the faithful engage in ceremonies

commemorating the death of Hossein. These ceremonies reach their apogee during the tenth day

of the month, known as Ashura, in which the death of Hossein is reenacted (Behnam, 1986, p.

78). The public responds with a great outpouring of emotion characterized by self-flagellation

and mourning (Behnam, 1986, p. 78). These ceremonies thus have very strong implications on

“who should make and carry out decisions regarding public policy and the common good

(Behnam, 1986, p. 79).” In other words, the conflict between the “good” Hossein and the “evil”

Yazid became a powerful symbol that has permeated Iranian politics. The public mourning of a

leader killed long ago serves as a reminder to the masses that the fight against injustice remains

as pertinent now as it did in 680. Politically this historical and cultural event has very strong

influence on the political psyche of Iran. When the regimes that rule Iran are perceived as unjust

the myth of Hossein seems to be an inspiration to the masses to resist that unjust regime.

Therefore, the cultural idiom of the martyrdom of Hossein has very strong mobilizing potential.

This struggle for justice became a dominant theme in Iranian religious discourse in the

decade leading up to the revolution itself. In 1963 during one of the first major uprisings against

the Shah, the image of Hossein became a symbol of national unity and the fight for social justice.

In a sermon given by Sayyed Taleghani the very words of Hossein were used as revolutionary

message which stated that: “if there is an oppressive sultan breaking God‟s promises, committing

sin among the people, disregarding God‟s orders and action against God‟s messenger, it is the

duty of everyone who is aware of these to stand against him to try to change him either with

advice, or if this is not possible, with power” (Behnam, 1986, p. 80). Thus, the invocation of

Shiite cultural symbols in the political discourse of Iran became extremely important during the

last years of the Shah.

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Besides the emergence of a more radicalized clergy in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, Iranian

intellectuals such as Ali Shariati became extremely influential in the radicalization of Shiite

political thought. The emergence of figures such as Shariati solved a pervasive dilemma within

the better educated Iranian middle-class and students between rational and secular thought on the

one hand and the adherence to religious beliefs on the other. Shiariati bridged this gap by

emphasizing the revolutionary message of Shiism, of calling out the more radical dimensions of

Iranian religious tradition (Salehi, 1988, p. 126). The radicalization of Shiite thought became

known as “Red” Shiism or “Alavite” Shiism. This differed from the religious views of the

established clergy on a number of important dimensions especially concerning the place of Islam

in political discourse and the importance of martyrdom. According to the “red” Shiites adhering

to Shiariati‟s view, the clergy was too pacifist and too closely tied to the regime. The true

message of Shiite faith according to the adherents of this radical sect of Shiites is manifested by

the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. To the “Red Shiites” Shia Islam “is the religion of martyrdom,

of revolution, and of a resistance to oppression” (Salehi, 1988, p. 124).

How should the masses resist, especially in a country in which even mild criticism of the

regime could lead to execution? Shiariati and the segments of the radical clergy contended that

sacrificing oneself just as Hussein did would guarantee success in accomplishing the

“revolutionary dreams” of the masses. Therefore, martyrdom became justified as a means by

which revolutionary goals could be accomplished. Khomeini sums this up quite effectively

when he stated from his Paris headquarters “blood wins over the sword” (Salehi, 1988, p. 125).

The blood of the martyrs of the revolution would not be spilled in vain according to this outlook-

for even with a great loss of life, great things could be accomplished if individuals are willing to

make enough sacrifices, including one‟s life. This line of thinking became dangerous for the

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regime because it meant that individuals were willing to take the initiative to overthrow the

existing order without regards to their own lives. This meant that the army, even if it remained

intact which of course it didn‟t in the Iranian case, would be less effective in suppressing a

revolutionary movement whose rank and file have already come to the conclusion that they were

as good as dead.

What does this strong cultural resonance in the Iranian Revolution say about the

revolution itself and its implications for revolutionary theory? Put more succinctly, “what was

revolutionary about the Iranian Revolution?” This question, posed by Eric Selbin, a pre-eminent

scholar of revolutionary transitions, implies that the Iranian Revolution was not just

revolutionary in the sense that it led to significant social and political change in one country. In

addition to this fact the Iranian Revolution had very strong implications for the academic world

as well. The roles of culture, ideology, and human agency during the course of the revolution

itself has shaped how revolutions are perceived by those that study them and has led to the

proliferation of a new generation of scholars that study how various factors shape how

revolutionary actors are able to mobilize and change the present order.

The first factor that seemed more powerful during the Iranian Revolution than many

others in the past was the role of human agency during the revolutionary process. Before the

Iranian Revolution and subsequent Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, roughly from the mid to late

1970‟s, the social sciences became less “social-” that is, less “people focused.” As pointed out in

the first chapter, scholarship during this period became more “stucturalist” in nature. Instead of

focusing on the actions of individuals and how their individual decisions and desires made

revolutions possible, the sturcutralists focused on impersonal institutions and groups of people

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and how the interactions of these institutions over time created the conditions in which

revolutions take place. Even Theda Skocpol herself had to recognize the importance of human

agency throughout the course of the Iranian Revolution by noting that “if ever there had been a

revolution deliberately „made‟ by a mass-based social movement…the Iranian

Revolution…surely is it” (Skocpol, 1982, p. 267). Skocpol goes on to say that:

By the end of 1978 all sectors of urban Iranian society were coalescing under the rubric of Shia

Islam and were following the direction of a senior Shi‟a cleric, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,

in uncompromising opposition to the Shah and all who remained connected to him (Skocpol,

1982, p. 267).

Therefore, even Skocpol acknowledged the power of purposeful resistance of planning, and the

ability of purposeful resistance to an apparently unassailable regime. The resistance in the

streets brought forth by Iranian urban society served to undermine the monarchy, and replace it

with a new political and social order. Ideology, in other words played an important role in the

order that was to take shape. The establishment of a republic that ruled through Sharia law

manifested this power of ideology during the Iranian Revolution.

Skocpol‟s analysis of the Iranian case points out that ideology played an important role

throughout the course of the revolution. However, Skocpol does not point out that many different

groups have different versions of the society that they wanted to create and thus had different

goals. As Selbin puts it - ideology was a major battleground in the political struggle (Selbin,

2009, p. 40). In other words, there was a marked absence of a “monolithic all encompassing

ideology throughout the course of the revolution”. However, by capitalizing on the popularity of

Ali Shariati‟s ideas of Shia involvement in the revolutionary process, Khomeini was able to

construct an ideology that focused on the “poor and the downtrodden” and the pursuit of

“freedom, independence, and justice” within an Islamic society. In other words, Khomeini

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effectively married the egalitarian principles of the left, the liberal principles of the nationalists

while at the same time employing the Islamic rhetoric and symbolism so powerful within Iranian

society.

Taking the complexities of the Iranian case into consideration, one question remains.

Which of the two theories discussed in the first chapter, best explain the causes, processes, and

outcomes of the Iranian Revolution? Does, Skocpol‟s primarily “structural” analysis or does

Foran‟s focus on both “structural” conditions and his emphasis on culture and agency have more

explanatory power? The differences and similarities between these two theories will both

account for their explanatory power, especially when considering how one interprets which

“structural” conditions are important and the role that revolutionary leadership and ideology play

in the revolutionary process.

As noted, both theories emphasize how structural weaknesses affect the stability of a

regime and how likely a regime will remain in power in the face of growing opposition. The

structural weaknesses that Skocpol emphasizes are the weakening of state organizations due to

international military competition along with an increase of peasant insurrections against the land

holding peasantry. In addition to these “weaknesses” she also contends that “agrarian

bueracratizing states” are most vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow. According to Skocpol

(1979) these states were not “fully bureaucratic” and that these states could not “reorganize local

agrarian socio-economic relationships” (p. 48). Skocpol contends that these weaknesses within

a certain historical juncture will facilitate rapid social and political change.

As far as outcomes go, Skocpol emphasizes the increase in state power that usually

follows a revolution. She attributed this to what she calls “marginal elites,” members in society

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who often involve themselves in the bureaucracy of the old regime. Once these marginal elites

take power through social revolution, they will embark upon revolutionary projects under the

aegis of the new regime because they view state power as instrumental in accomplishing their

revolutionary objectives. Furthermore, Skocpol contends that the ideology plays no role in

determining how revolutionary elites will go about accomplishing their objectives. Rather,

ideologies are simply constructions of revolutionary elites that serve to mobilize the masses.

Ideology in her view serves only to justify the leadership position of the revolutionary leaders

themselves and the subsequent increases of state power that will follow their ascent.

Like Skocpol, Foran also emphasizes “structural” conditions and how they influence the

emergence of revolutionary circumstances. The primary similarities between the two theories are

the attention that both place on international influence during revolutions and regime type.

However, the type of international pressure and regime differ in Foran‟s analysis. Foran seems

to emphasize the economic rather than military pressure placed on regimes from the outside.

According to Foran (2005), this type of pressure presents itself in the form of what he coins

“dependant development” or, “a country‟s historical insertion into the world economy on

dependent terms vis-à-vis core powers significantly shapes its social structure” (p. 19). These

countries may experience exceptional economic growth, but at the cost of alienating certain

groups. Furthermore, the economies of countries undergoing a process of dependent

development face certain economic vulnerabilities such as inflation, growing inequality, and debt

which can weaken the support of many of the social classes already excluded from economic

life.

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As far as regimes go, Foran‟s characterization of the regime most vulnerable to collapse

differs from Skocpol‟s. Foran contends that “personalist, and repressive” regimes are most

vulnerable to collapse. This differs from Skocpol‟s analysis because Foran does not mention

either implicitly or explicitly that these types of regimes lack a certain level of

“bureaucratization.” Simply, the regime archetype that Foran signals as especially vulnerable

seems to be that of a “sultanistic” or “neo-patrimonial” type. These regimes are characterized by

high levels of repression, patronage, and a considerable lack of constitutional legitimization of

authority. Instead, authority is based upon the ability of the leader to effectively court a group of

clients while at the same time repressing groups outside of his circle of patronage. In addition,

these types of rulers often depend on foreign support and thus neglect to form coalitions and ties

with various groups at home. The regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi clearly demonstrated this

behavior.

This type of leader differs from the “imperial” archetype articulated by Skocpol because

these (patrimonial) leaders cannot act “autonomously” either domestically or internationally. No

matter how powerful these rulers may seem in terms of their personal wealth or military might

they remain dependent upon a “superpower” sponsor and upon the support of their clients.

Furthermore, these types of regimes may have power in agrarian sociopolitical arrangements, as

demonstrated by the reign of Reza Shah. As history demonstrates, Reza Shah effectively

ushered in a new era of rural life by settling the vast numbers of nomads and ushering in a new

“Iranian” identity. This legacy of rural involvement continued with his son Mohammad Reza

Pahlavi through the “White Revolution” in which the government was able to take more control

of rural life. In fact, a European anthropologist during the time once noted “One is amazed at the

high level of centralization achieved within the last decade…Land is contracted for cash by the

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government; fruits get sprayed, crops fertilized... populations controlled – all by the intervention

of the government” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 133). Therefore, the nature of the Shah‟s regime

seems a little different than Skocpol‟s criteria for a vulnerable regime. It seems as if the Shah,

unlike other monarchs of “imperial” states could extend the reach of the state into more rural

areas. Therefore, rural elites and the peasantry lacked the autonomy that Skocpol perceives as

necessary in facilitating conflicts between the rural elites and the peasants.

Finally, John Foran‟s theory can be distinguished from Theda Skocpol‟s in that John

Foran emphasizes the role that culture, ideology, and multi-class coalitions play in the

revolutionary process. According to Foran, the opposition articulates its attacks on the regime

through what he calls “cultures of resistance.” These cultures are constructed from the stories,

historical events, and myths prevalent throughout society. These cultures of resistance facilitate

the formation of multiclass coalitions, because these cultures incorporate cultural elements that

each of these groups can relate to – the fight for justice and opposition to a tyrannical and

illegitimate government. This underscores the importance that Foran places on the formation of

multi-class coalitions during the revolutionary process. From China to Nicaragua, Foran notes

that the formation of coalitions of different groups with different interests and dispositions

occurs for the accomplishment of one goal, the overthrow of the regime.

For this reason, Foran can for the most part account for the “spontaneous” nature of the

Iranian Revolution. The emergence of clerical leadership did not occur until after the Shah‟s

regime had considerably weakened and collapsed. Furthermore, because the clergy could appeal

to different groups with various interests through vague notions of “justice” and “freedom,” it

encouraged the formation of class-based coalitions against the regime. However, one aspect of a

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spontaneous revolution that Foran does not pay adequate attention to is the organizational

superiority of one group allows them to become the eventual leaders of the revolution. As the

Iranian case demonstrates, the clergy became the leaders of the revolution because had the

organizational autonomy and resources that could foster the emergence multi-class coalitions

that could mount an effective resistance against the Shah.

Skocpol‟s analysis of revolutions is slightly more problematic when it comes to

explaining the spontaneous nature of the Iranian case. In her assessment of revolutions,

coalitions of different social classes do not form in order to oppose the regime. Rather it seems

as if the revolts of different classes happen on separate planes. For example, the peasantry and

the upper classes do not revolt for the same reasons nor are they in cooperation with each other.

They do not for a “coalition” in other words, yet their resistance to the regime occurs

simultaneously. This did not occur in Iran. The various classes of society cooperated with each

other to fight one common enemy - the Shah.

Furthermore, in terms of outcomes, Foran has much less to say than Theda Skocpol. As

noted in chapter one, Foran discusses outcomes in terms of revolutionary failure rather than how

the revolutionaries institutionalize their power. Instead, Foran simply labels a revolution as

“successful” if the revolutionaries could institute “social change,” even if the new regime

eventually falls from power, as it did in Nicaragua. However, Foran does point out how the

disintegration of the revolutionary coalition may be a factor in determining whether or not the

new regime can keep power and fully institutionalize. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas fell from

power because of an electoral loss. In Bolivia, the MNR fell from power because it failed to

fully control the coercive apparatus of the state, the army. In both cases, the disintegration of the

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coalition that brought the regime into power proved the crucial factor in determining whether or

not the new regime could last.

This suggests that revolutionary regimes are vulnerable either because of electoral defeats

through the democratic institutions that they created or from an army that they failed to control.

Therefore, revolutionaries can either institutionalize their power either through force or through

peaceful, democratic means which he notes tend to be more vulnerable to external and internal

pressure. This is why many revolutions end up taking an authoritarian turn. The fragmentation

of the revolutionary coalition and international pressure from other nations either military or

economic compels the revolutionaries to use force to impose their program of social change and

to hold onto power.

After examining these two theories and their emphases, it seems that the Foran theory

best explains the Iranian case for a number of reasons. First, Foran‟s emphasis on “personalistic”

dictatorships as most vulnerable seems more in tune with the type of regime which ruled Iran

under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Skocpol‟s “imperial” bureaucratizing-agrarian state may

describe the regime his father, Reza Shah. However, even during this time Reza Shah was able

to exert more control over the countryside and impact the socio-economic arrangements of the

peasantry and landed upper classes. Furthermore, both regimes depended upon a complex system

of patronage and alliances with some elites while keeping others isolated from the political

process.

The use of fear and of pitting opponents, especially in the army, against each other is

typical of the political process that occurs in a personalist regime. Although Skocpol points out

that the power of the KMT in China was vested in the person of Chiang Kai Shek, who created

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patronage networks and excluded those not within these networks from the political process.

This is well and good, but Skocpol does not mention how dependence of US military and

financial aid kept the regime in power before the revolution and how the eventual cut off of this

aid after the Second World War led to the demise of the regime. In other words, Skocpol did not

mention how dependence on a foreign superpower made the KMT regime weaker in the long run

because it depended upon support from the outside and not on domestic coalition building, an

activity that the Communists have engaged in since the 1930‟s! The dependence of the Shah on

military and economic aid from the US made the Shah‟s own personal material wealth increase

at the expense of forfeiting his political power. Since the Shah felt that he didn‟t need broad

based support to stay in power, he relied on foreign and domestic patronage networks to

essentially finance the military, economic, and political activities of the regime at the expense of

alienating other groups.

Furthermore, Skocpol‟s assertion that peasant rebellions are a necessary condition for

regime collapse seems questionable in light of the Iranian case. In Iran, the revolution happened

in the cities with little to no peasant involvement. In fact, the only “peasants” involved were

those displaced and forced into urban shantytowns because of the Shah‟s land reform policy!

Perhaps in some cases, for example, China peasant rebellion was necessary for the collapse of

the regime. However, stating that peasant rebellions always have to happen severely limits the

scope of one‟s theory. John Foran simply states that a multi-class coalition is necessary for the

opposition to effectively undermine the regime. This coalition may consist of peasants, such as it

did in Nicaragua, or it may not – as the Iranian case demonstrates. This opens up Foran‟s theory

to explain or to take into account a more varying array of cases. The root of this broadening of

Foran‟s theoretical lens being that Foran has studied a multitude of cases and not just a few.

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Finally, the emphasis that Foran places on culture as a mobilizing tool better explains

how the revolutionary opposition forms than Theda Skocpol‟s description of how “marginal

elites” construct ideologies that help bring together the opposition. It is clear that in the Iranian

case, culture played a more pivotal role in revolutionary mobilization than any formally

articulated ideology from a political party or any other organization. Shiism and its notions of

justice and independence drawn from the tradition of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein in the

struggle for justice proved pivotal in the mobilization of the masses. This tradition used by

political entrepreneurs such as Ayatollah Khomeini created unity among the various classes

because it did not articulate a formal ideology but rather vague notions of justice and

independence that all groups could relate to. This powerful message, along with the independent

mosque network allowed for the clergy to become the dominant force in Iranian politics towards

the end of the revolution. Therefore, the clergy because of its influence and vast amount of

organizational resources eventually ran the country because the radical clergy had the desire to

form an Islamic Republic and political and organizational means to do so.

The fact that the clergy became the eventual leaders of the revolution points out one

major flaw in Foran‟s theory. He does not focus on political and organizational resources, such

as mosques, in the consolidation of power, and how the loss of those resources can affect the

new regime‟s control of the state. In other words, he does not mention how the opposition uses

these resources to mobilize against the regime and how control of these resources facilitates the

transfer of power to those that control them. In Iran groups such as the students, baazaris, and

workers used the mosque resource to mobilize. However, once the Shah was overthrown these

groups lost control of this resource because ultimately the clergy had gained control of it. Since

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the clergy controlled the mosques, they controlled the organizational resources which ultimately

led them to control the state.

What are the implications for revolutionary theory in light of the explanatory power of

John Foran‟s theory of the Iranian case? What are some improvements that could be made in his

theory and how can it explain revolutions that may happen in the future? In other words, does

John Foran‟s theory account for the changes that have happened in world historical

circumstances since the Iranian Revolution? After all, most scholars agree that the Iranian

Revolution was one of the last “great social revolutions” that have occurred in history. Is the era

of revolution over? If not, can John Foran‟s theory account for how revolutions may happen in

the future? These questions will be examined in the last chapter.

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Table 3-1 A Comparison of John Foran‟s and Theda Skocpol‟s theory of revolution in light of

the Iranian case

1 Foran does not explicitly indicate that the breakdown of the military is a necessary condition for new elites to take

power. However, the new elites hold on power becomes more vulnerable to overthrow if the military is not fully

controlled by these new elites. For example, the MNR in Bolivia and the FSLN in Nicaragua fell from power

partially because elements from the old regime‟s armed forces were not under full control of the new government.

Iran Foran Skocpol

Economic downturn as a

precondition for revolution

Yes Yes

Absence of Agrarian-

Bueraucratic State

Yes No

Absence of peasant rebellions Yes No

Role of Culture in mobilizing

the opposition

Yes No

Superior of organizational

resources leads to the

consolidation of power by new

elites.

No Yes

Breakdown of the military

necessary for taking power

No1 Yes

Formation of multi-class

coalition against the regime as

a precursor to regime

breakdown

Yes No

Absence of international

military competition as a

necessary precondition for

revolution

Yes No

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References

Abrahamian, E. (2008). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arjomand, S. (1988). The Turban for The Crown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Behnam, M. (1986). Cultural Foundations of Iranian Politics. Salt Lake City: University of Utah

Press.

Foran, J. (2005). Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Katouzian, H. (1998). The Pahlavi Regime in Iran. In Chehabi, H.E., & Linz, J. (Eds.),

Sultanistic Regimes (pp.182-206) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Parsa, M. (1989). Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New Brunswick: Rutgers University

Press.

Salehi, M. (1988). Insurgency Through Culture and Religion. Westport: Praeger.

Selbin, E, 2009. What Was Revolutionary about the Iranian Revolution? Comparative Studies of

South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 20, 33-46.

Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skcopol, T 1982. Rentier State and Shi‟a Islam in the Iranian Revolution. Theory and Society,

11, 265-283.

Zabih, S. 1982. The Mossadegh Era. Chicago: Lake View Press.

Zabih, S. 1988. The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. London: Routledge.

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Chapter 4- Implications for Future Revolutionary Theorizing

As revealed in the previous chapter, the theory of John Foran best reveals the causes

processes and outcomes of the Iranian Revolution. However, the question remains as to whether

or not John Foran‟s theory can explain the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions that

could occur in the future. Some revolutionary theorists such as Nikki Keddie (1995), a scholar

on the Iranian case, assert that “predicting many individual events multiplies the difficulties of

predicting long-lasting revolutions and their outcome (p. 22).” However, she also asserts that the

only way that observers can understand revolution is to study it after it actually occurred “once

they [individual events] have occurred, however, it is possible to eliminate all the roads not taken

and to study the forces behind what actually occurred (Keddie, 1995, p. 22).” In other words, any

attempt that scholars take to formulate a theory about the revolutionary process will eventually

will come up short because revolutions can only be understood from a case to case basis.

Revolutions, according to this viewpoint, have a life of their own, and to try to understand how a

revolution may occur in the future based upon the occurrences that happened in the past simply

does not hold water in the real world.

Indeed, Foran notes from the beginning that revolutions are “rare events.” In fact the

whole scope of his theory attempts to determine why revolutions are so rare and why they are

often reversed. Furthermore, Foran acknowledges that successful revolutions are so rare because

the events that lead up to the overthrow of the regime and the consolidation of power by

revolutionary elites must follow a definite pattern. For this reason, Foran‟s extensive historical

scholarship and comparative study seems most fruitful. By understanding the patterns that led to

the overthrow of regimes in places as diverse as China and Iran, Foran is able to construct a

theory that looks beyond the apparent “complexities” and “differences” between the various

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cases and instead looks at broader patterns. For example, when he mentions “international

factors” he does not state that a specific “international factor” such as a war leads to the

occurrence or a non occurrence of a revolution. Rather, international factors that lead to the

outbreak of a revolution can be as diverse as a war (such as occurred in China) or interference of

the superpower in the affairs of a Third World patron state, as the Nicaraguan and Iranian cases

demonstrate. This allows for the theory to explain a variety of cases because it takes into account

the complexity that each case presents within the context of a broad pattern of occurrences. For

this reason, besides its explanatory power in the Iranian case, Foran‟s theory is superior to that of

Theda Skocpol‟s.

Skocpol‟s theory seems too narrowly based on a few individual cases to explain how

revolutions have occurred in countries other than those mentioned by the theory itself. The

broad nature of Foran‟s theory takes into account the variations between one case and another.

For instance, “economic downturn,” and “international factors” for example vary but both play a

pivotal role in the coalescene of multi-class coalitions. Furthermore, he also takes into

consideration the role that culture, specifically cultural symbols and myths play in providing

meaning to the actions that individuals take and how they view the political and social system

that they live under. These perceptions of justice seem absent in the thought and theory of Theda

Skocpol. Foran (2005) notes explicitly that “large-scale structures shape, yet do not determine,

events made by humans, who everywhere have brought creativity, imagination, and courage to

the historical table” (p. 34). Skocpol‟s structural determinism seems inadequate in explaining

how the perceptions and goals of the actors involved in a revolutionary transformation can shape

the world around them! Structures in other worlds, are human institutions and can therefore be

changed by humans acting through their conceived notions of what kinds of arrangements are

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just and which ones are unjust. The establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, for example,

seems to have been the outcome of the search for justice in place of an autocratic system

insensitive to the needs of the people and the Islamic faith.

Beyond the scope of analysis of revolutions that have actually occurred, can Foran‟s

theory explain or predict revolutions that can potentially occur in the future? Interestingly

enough, Foran dedicates considerable amount of effort in his theory to address this question.

This is especially relevant considering the amount of scholarship dedicated to the premise that

the era of revolutions is over in this era of globalization and the post- Cold War march of

democracy around the globe. As the casual observer of geopolitics will grasp, however, the end

of the Cold War and the globalization of goods, services, people, and, indeed, - ideas does not

mean that the struggle of marginalized peoples against regimes that refuse to hear their voice is

over. The process of globalization, catapulted by the adoption of “neoliberal” policies of once

protectionist governments around the world and the proliferation of mass transportation and

communication may actually have done more to change how potential revolutions may occur

rather than negating their existence.

Foran asserts that the process of globalization will contribute to political and social

instability because of the growing inequality and financial hardship caused by globalization in

regards to the Third World economy. Foran asserts that “the impact of globalization seems clear

enough, and suggests that dependant development will remain an all-too-relevant concept for

assessing the prospects for revolution in the near and medium-term future (Foran, 262).” In

other words, globalization has increased the levels of interference that more affluent countries

exercise in the economies of developing countries. The opening of global markets for trade for

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example has its unforeseen consequences, such as growing inequality and the financial hardship

that can occur when nations undergo rapid, “dependent development.”

Furthermore, another phenomenon associated with the globalized economy manifests

itself in the form of increased activity by non-state financial and economic actors such as the

IMF, World Bank, and multinational corporations. These organizations, more explicitly

transnationals, “develop ever greater capacities to escape the regulation of states, control the

distribution profits along commodity chains, and depress the wages of workers” (Foran, 2005, p.

263). Global organizations such as the WTO that favor multinational corporations over states in

trade disputes add to the already declining role of the state in its economic affairs. For these

reasons some scholars contend that the state can no longer play as active a role as it once did in

its economic affairs.

Foran contends that while the state is weaker, relatively speaking, than it used to be this

weakness does not need to occur. The state in other words, can increase its influence in the

economic life of the countries that they govern and reverse the paths of dependency and

economic influence that multinational corporations and international financial entities such as the

IMF have in the economies of Third World nations. The state therefore has not completely

disappeared as a force in society. Rather, the state has become less of a “prize to be won” and

more of a force that can be used to accomplish political and economic goals. In other words,

although the state may be perceived as useful to potential revolutionaries as a means to

accomplish their goals, the acquisition of state power is not an end. Rather, revolutionary

movements of the future will perhaps perceive: “that creating democratic spaces for the free

discussion of political, economic, and cultural alternatives to globalization is a more suitable

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goal for revolutionaries than direct seizure of state power, and that linking the national liberation

struggle to both local needs and global concerns might be the most effective… coalition building

project for deep social transformation” (Foran, 2005, p. 264).

Furthermore, Foran notes that globalization and the changes in the attitudes that

revolutionaries may take will also have an effect on the future of coalition building and

revolutionary leadership. He uses the Zapatistas as an example of how leadership and the types

of coalitions built will change. The Zapatistas, according to Foran (2005) “have offered some

radically new ways of doing politics to the revolutionaries of the future” (p. 270). One of the

principles of Zapatismo, “madar obedeciendo” (“to rule, obeying”) implies that the revolutionary

leadership must serve the needs of the community and not vice versa. Another principle adopted

by the Zapatistas “para todos todo, nada para nosotros” or (“for everyone, everything, nothing

for ourselves”) and finally “walking at a slower pace” signifies that the acquisition of power

should not be the aim of the movement.

What does this mean? According to Foran, how will these types of attitudes shape the

revolutionary discourse of the future? Foran asserts that this type of attitude will encourage the

opening of “free and democratic space for political struggle.” In other words, unlike the

revolutions that occurred in the past in which one group dominated the political discourse after

the fall of the regime, the revolutionaries of the future will encourage discourse between all

groups and that the future of revolutions will take on a more open and democratic form. Gone

are the days in which the violent overthrow of a regime leads to the consolidation of a new,

sometimes even more repressive regime. The revolutionaries of the future, according to Foran,

will more likely try to shape the system, to make it more democratic. According to Foran,

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revolutions such as the Iranian Revolution in which new political actors take power and construct

an authoritarian state are history. Instead revolutionaries will try to shape and mold the system

in order to make it more inclusive and democratic.

Organizationally, Foran (2005) asserts that this type of political action will take place

from what he calls “meshworks or self-organizing, non-hierarchical, and heterogeneous

networks” (p. 272). These networks, which often adopt non-violent practices, consensus

decision-making and fluid leadership, have met success at the local level. However, at a national

and global scale, these meshworks will be difficult to maintain because of the need to encompass

different groups around the world with different interests. This will inevitably lead, Foran (2005)

contends, to conflicts among the ranks of the movement, “producing leadership burnout and

membership drop out” (p. 272). Foran contends that “these issues must be worked out” for the

revolutions of the future to succeed.

However, this type of organization has proven extremely problematic, as the recent

demonstrations against the Iranian regime demonstrate. The movement against the regime

consists of “demonstrations organized by ad hoc means and with conflicting aims” (Erdbrink,

2009, p. 1). The movement, which is a “broad but loosely connected alliance that includes

clerics, politicians, disgruntled middle- class families and young people” is like, as one protester

put it “a body without a head” (Erdbrink, 2009, p.3). The lack of leadership and loose

organization are the two major weaknesses that the opposition faces. Therefore, Foran‟s theory

should include an assessment that the role of leadership and cohesive organization play in

making these new types of revolutions successful. The involvement of many groups to create a

more democratic and inclusive system seem ideal, however if clear leadership and cohesive

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organization do no emerge the success of this movements, and similar movements can be called

into question.

However, Foran is correct in asserting that future revolutionaries must recognize that

there are levels of struggle from the local, grassroots level to global conflict. Increasing use of

communications technology by the opposition may allow for the “linking” of these levels (Foran,

2005, p. 273). In other words, increasing use of communications such as the internet, cellular

communications, fax machines, and other types of technology “represent tools for the education

and communication among social forces from below to foster meshworks” (Foran, 2005, p. 273),

the use of these tools will have to be carefully considered by future revolutionary leaders in order

to create a cohesive and effective political movement.

Finally, Foran addresses the future of what he earlier called, “political cultures of

opposition.” These political cultures will remain as relevant as ever in the globalized economy.

The injustices created by globalization will release the creative energies of those who oppose

these injustices. This is not a new idea, the pursuit of justice has always been a theme

surrounding the creation of a coherent opposition against a ruling regime. However, Foran

asserts that in the future, revolutionary leaders must foster a love of justice in order for

revolutions to have a better outcome. Foran asserts that leaders must not capitalize on the anger

that individuals feel against the regime, but the feeling of love that they feel for those who are

oppressed along with them – a love that will “compel them to do extraordinary things” (Foran,

2005, p. 274). Whether this is just semantics or wishful thinking is unclear, but Foran‟s notion

that individuals should be motivated out of the feelings of love that they feel for each other is

nonetheless interesting and explains his optimistic disposition towards the future of revolutionary

change.

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Does John Foran‟s assessment hold weight? Does globalization create the economic

problems that he cites as one of the major causes of opposition to a regime? Furthermore, does

Foran take into account that some “cultures of opposition” contain very undemocratic elements?

For example, it is widely recognized that the emergence of non-state armed groups such as the

Taliban use terror and coercion to accomplish their political objectives. These groups, motivated

by seemingly authoritarian and religiously inspired ideologies attempt to overthrow existing

regimes, such as the fragile Pakistani government, and establish theocratic regimes in their place.

Foran only mentions these groups in passing. Even when he does, he contends that these groups

are not revolutionary. He fails to explain why, especially considering the radical ideologies and

extreme methods that they use to undermine the existing order. Perhaps this observation or

assertion by Foran is a product of his activist, idealistic background. After all, he does paint a

positive picture of the Zapitistas and of the protesters in Seattle during the third summit of the

World Trade Organization in 2000.

It is interesting to note, that Foran does take a critical stance on the foreign policy and

domestic policy adopted by the United States following September 11.th

He even goes as far as to

say that the Attorney General under George Bush, John Ashcroft, used the Patriot Act to

construct a police state (Foran, 2005, p. 266)! The war on terrorism and the Iraq War are thus

extensions of domestic politics. Foran (2005) contends that by militarizing domestic society

through the Patriot Act, the Bush Administration was able to conduct an “ideological and frontal

assault on the global justice movement… in the name of a chimerical pursuit of global economic,

political, and moral paramountacy [sic]” (p. 266). This type of policy will still create world

systematic openings for revolutionary struggle because, according to Foran (2005),

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“hegemony… even the thinly concealed (and hotly denied) imperial version of Bush and his

team – requires a measure of consent” (p. 267)

The resistance to this hegemony by the Iraqi people goes to show that resistance to US

hegemony will continue, and that in a world where the US tries to assert its dominance,

individuals can still make a difference. The justice movement will survive, and movements from

Mexico to Seattle will continue. Foran, therefore, paints a highly optimistic view to the point

where it seems almost biased. While it is true that resistance to US hegemony will continue, that

resistance will always take the form of the pursuit of “justice” in the sense of the pursuit of the

deepening of democratic ideals and distributive economic policies. There is also a dark side to

this resistance, militant Islam, which continues to assert itself as a powerful and mobilizing force

around the world. To ignore the power of this ideology and to not say that militant Islamic

movements are indeed revolutionary is to ignore the shape that the revolutionary struggle may

take in the future. In other words, the revolutions of the future may take a more democratic turn

than they have in the past. On the other hand, the specter of Islamic radicalism still looms and

threatens to dominate the political discourse of numerous polities around the world, as the

popularity of figures such as Osama bin Laden, the founding leader of Al-Qaeda, a global

terrorist network goes to show.

Is Foran‟s analysis correct? Does the process of globalization lead to greater inequality

and dependency as Foran suggests? Or does globalization and the inevitable opening of world

markets actually, contribute to economic growth, democratization, and political stability? This

conflict between the proponents and opponents of globalization has raged with ever greater fury

in the post-Cold War world. However, one thing is true, the impact of globalization cannot be

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denied, the opening of world markets and the increase in communication and movement of

people has generated significant socioeconomic changes throughout the world, especially in

Third World countries.

The question remains, what exactly is globalization anyway? Foran defines it with a set

of criteria namely: the breakdown of the US controlled Bretton Woods system, a “galloping

wave” of technological advancement, new forms of media and communication that allow for

financial transactions to take place instantaneously, as well as creating new needs and wants,

reduced costs of moving goods and people, new forms of flexible production, and elaborate

global commodity chains, constantly growing wage labor force, more diverse exploited and

divided in the past, further shaped by hyper-urbanization and migration, the loss of many states

over the control of fiscal policy to international organizations such as the World Trade

Organization, the rise of ecological threats such as global warming and the imminent advent of

“peak oil” production (Foran, 2005, p. 261). Furthermore, culture coming to the forefront in

unpredictable ways as processes of both homogenization and resistance speed up. This

assessment seems to indicate that globalization is a potentially disruptive force, something that

will inevitably create political instability.

This assessment seems plausible, considering that many scholars, opponents and

apologists alike view globalization in primarily economic and technological terms (Kellner,

2002, p. 285). Globalization, by definition, involves both capitalist markets and sets of social

relations and flows of commodities, capital, technology, ideas, forms of culture, and people

across national boundaries via a global networked society (Kellner, 2002, p. 287). The growth of

technology especially computerized technology presupposes this transformation because it

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allows for the free movement of goods, information, and peoples across national boundaries.

Thus Foran is correct in assessing the impact that technological change and scientific

breakthroughs have on the development of global capital networks – “known as

technocapitalism.” Thus, an understanding of globalization ultimately depends upon the

understanding that technology has fundamentally restructured capitalism in some way as to

encourage its global reach. Technology, in other words, has made this restructuring possible and

thus has created “a new society and economy that breaks with the previous mode of social

organization” (Kellner, 2002, p. 289).

Furthermore, this growth in technology, scientific knowledge, computerization and

automation of labor has generated “novel forms of societal organization, forms of culture and

everyday life, conflicts, and modes of struggle” (Kellner, 2002, p. 290). This has deep

implications for the global political economy: “the emergent postindustrial form of

technocapitalism is characterized by a decline of the state and the increased power of the market,

accompanied by the growing power of the globalized transnational corporations and government

bodies and the declining power of the nation- state and its institutions – which remain, however,

extremely important players in the global economy” (Kellner, 2002, p. 290). Therefore, Foran‟s

assessment of the impact that globalization has on the global political economy seems to be

nuanced even if he sees this process in a largely negative light. Globalization, therefore, has

demonstrated its impact on the role of the nation-state – “undermining it as well as creating new

opportunities for the use of the nation state in response to the changes brought upon by

globalization” (Kellener, 2002, p. 290).

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Foran‟s assessment that this new political economy impacts revolutionary movements is

obvious. On the one hand Foran states that while globalization decreases the control that states

have over their own financial affairs, globalization also increases the exploitive nature of

capitalism and deprives marginalized peoples around the world a voice. On the other hand,

globalization creates new opportunities because it creates new mobilizing patterns of a

transnational nature and creates new cultures of resistance along with a greater desire to open

democratic space. The desire to open democratic space is important to Foran because it suggests

that revolutions in the globalized context may have better outcomes than revolutions in previous

epochs - for the reason that the state is not seen as a “prize to be won” but as a mechanism by

which different groups can articulate their needs, desires, and wants in open democratic spaces

via collective action.

However, the destructive effects of globalization should not be ignored. The proliferation

of the Al-Qaeda network shows that globalization “divides the world as it unifies, that it

produces enemies as it incorporates participants” (Kellner, 2002, p. 290). The events of

September 11th

demonstrate how the enemies of globalization and of the West can use the same

technologies that facilitate globalization in an attempt to cause its destruction. While Foran is

correct in assessing that globalization has divided the world into “haves” and “have-nots,” his

optimism concerning what people will actually do in the face of this growing inequality is, at

times, misplaced. While it is true that globalization can create “democratic spaces” and

resistance, it all depends on whether or not the people involved with the resistance to

globalization value the opening of democratic space as a tool of resistance to the negative effects

of globalization.

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Thus, globalization can be seen as contradictory because it creates the opportunity for

democracy while, at the same time, making its implementation problematic. The problematic

nature of democratic governance also has to do with the dichotomy of globalization itself,

globalization from above versus globalization from below. “Globalization from above” refers to

the proliferation of the capitalist state and corporate financial power around the world. This type

of globalization creates many problems because some of the policies that have been a product of

globalization have “intensified exploitation of labor, environmental devastation, growing

divisions among the social classes, and the undermining of democracy” (Kellner, 2002, p. 297).

Globalization, therefore, is not bad in and of itself. However, the policies that make

globalization possible in the past have created a legacy of marginalization, exploitation, and

disenfranchisement that have created resistance from below.

What is the nature of this resistance? As already stated some groups such as Al-Qaeda

have created terrorist networks that undermine globalization while at the same time while using

destructive methods and adhering to non-democratic ideologies. However, Foran is correct in

his assessment that globalization can allow for positive forces of resistance to the problems that

it creates. The anti-globalization movement for global justice, like Al-Qaeda and other terrorist

groups, uses the technology created by globalization to assist in its destruction – albeit for

different reasons. The global anti-globalization movement itself “was increasingly global, was

linking together diverse movements into global solidarity networks, and was using the Internet

and instruments of globalization to advance its struggles” (Kellner, 2002, p. 297).

These new types of global solidarity networks consist of the new coalition of the anti-

globalization struggle – coalitions of movements, ideas, and individuals all “advocating common

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values and visions…and referring to itself in positive terms, like the global justice movement.”

Multi-class coalitions have become multi-movement coalitions in the age of globalization.

Different movements of individuals from around the world have begun to come together to fight

one common enemy (the negative effects of globalization) for the same reason (justice). Political

action, therefore, has some of the same characteristics as it did in the past – groups with disparate

interests and ideas coming together for the same purpose and with the same values.

How does the pursuit of “justice” and of “equality” manifest itself in this new globalized

order? In other words, how does Foran‟s notion of “cultures of resistance” manifest itself in the

global struggle against globalization and its associated deficiencies? Foran asserts that

technology and the proliferation of “meshworks” will allow for different groups to come together

to promote justice and the opening of democratic space around the world. Foran suggests that

the movements in Mexico by the EZLN and the protests in Seattle demonstrate that opposition

exists against the supposed injustices of globalization – these groups; can articulate these goals to

each other via technology such as the internet and mobile telecommunications. Furthermore, as

mentioned, these groups don‟t necessarily attempt to “overthrow” the nation-state. Rather, they

try to reform it, to make the state more sensitive to the needs of those below by fostering the

formation of coalitions that will promote the emergence of a more democratic order. However,

this organizational component does not sufficiently account for the cultural elements that mold

and shape how individuals view themselves and their community in the era of globalization.

However, Foran does note the importance that culture plays in the mobilization of the indigenous

masses under the banner of the EZLN. By invoking the native heritage and past legacies of

resistance to authoritarian rule, Subcomandante Marcos the leader of the EZLN successfully

provided a voice to the people of Chiapas and a cultural rallying point. This points out a

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departure from the traditional Latin American resistance movements inspired by the ideals of

Che Guevara. These movements “produced terrible repression on the part of the military

governments [that fought against them]. Activists put too much faith in the possibility of

transformation and scarcely imagined the horrific brutality of these regimes” (Rubin, 2002, p. 7).

Furthermore, these movements employed “hierarchical authority structures to build mass

movements focused on economic issues” (Rubin, 2002, p. 9).

However, the shift has changed in the new “Marcos” style of resistance. In fact, culture

and civil society have become major foci of the Zapatista movement and similar movements in

Latin America: “at times these movements focus exclusively on issues of culture and civil

society…It may be that such cultural efforts will in the long run produce both large networks and

new groups of citizens, which together will promote reforms through democratic politics.” The

Zapatistas demonstrate an “intertwined emphasis on the Chiapas economy, Mayan cultre, and

new imaginings of democratic politics” (Rubin, 2002, p.9). The formation of large coalitions of

different groups of citizens strays away from the old- Che Guevara style of militant guerilla

struggle. Culture, in other words will play a vital role in the future of revolutionary mobilization

in the future because the focus on culture by revolutionary leadership will help give meaning to

the struggle for democracy. Cultural forms and idioms will inspire people to take action against

injustice and deprivation.

On the other side of the coin, radical Islamists have also used culture as a mobilizing

force. Osama bin Laden, one of the founding members of the Al-Qaeda terror network, can be

considered a “civilizational revolutionary” (Snyder, 2003, p. 328). Bin Laden, unlike many other

revolutionaries, does not aim to simply establish national institutions that reflect his radical

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ideologies, but regional ones. That is, Bin Laden aims for simultaneous revolutions throughout

the region against moderate Arab regimes as opposed to a single revolution in a single country.

This is possible, furthermore, because of the “civilizational” nature of Islam itself. The Islamic

concept of the ummah or community of believers transcends ethnicities and national boundaries

and implies a connection between the members of this community (Lambert, 2005, p.104).

Furthermore, this type of connection not only fosters “the fellowship of association” but also a

“political notion embodying patriotism and nationalism” (Lambert, 2005, p. 105).

The proliferation of modern authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, such as the Saudi

monarchy and the secular leaders of Egypt has bred opposition from those who favor governance

based on Shari „a law. This dialectic lies between the source and legitimacy of authority in these

countries. In effect, these regimes rely upon the charisma of the leader and a coercive police

apparatus to hold power. According to the “proponents of and Islamic polity” the ruler “was not

to be obeyed because of his own personhood; his legitimacy was based only on the virtue of

holding his position through the law of Allah and the prophet. Thus from this perspective:

The ruler‟s right to obedience was derived from his own personal observance of

that law and from no other thing. Hence, if he departed from the law, as secularized

Islamic government inherently did, he no longer was entitled to obedience

and his orders were no longer to be obeyed (Lambert, 2005, p. 111).

Thus, struggle between secularization on the one hand and Islam on the other creates a situation

in which these two ideas come into open conflict, a conflict that is the legacy of European

colonialism in the wake of the First and Second World Wars (Lambert, 2005, p. 111). Thus the

spread of secular ideas from the West as a product of Western interference and control left its

mark and created hostility within the Islamic world.

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Furthermore, the process of globalization has actually assisted Bin Laden in articulating

his ideology and promoting it to the Arab masses. Globalization in the Middle East has

introduced a number of cultural changes; market rationality, equality against patriarchy and

secularism that Bin Laden perceives as threats. The process of globalization has allowed Bin

Laden to target the animosity towards these changes to the outside, and specifically to the United

States. Thus, Bin Laden‟s use of terrorism against the United States, for example September

11,th

can be perceived as a way to externalize a regional problem in order to weaken the

moderate Arab regimes that have US support and radicalize the opposition even more.

Therefore, Bin Laden can be considered a revolutionary because he “sought political

power (Afghanistan), has acquired some organization capacity to gain it (in training thousands of

fighters), and has promoted a populist regional ideology (in Islamism)” (Snyder, 2003, p. 329).

Furthermore his goals against the United States and the moderate Arab regimes of the Middle

East can be considered revolutionary as well. Originally, Bin Laden simply advocated the

withdrawal of American forces from Saudi soil. However, by the mid-1990‟s his objectives

became more radical, namely, the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and the establishment of an

Islamic state.

However, this type of governance in bin Laden‟s view does not only encompass one

state, but the entire region of the Middle East. The problem, however, was that bin Laden

seriously underestimated the resiliency of these regimes to keep power even in the face of weak

institutions, the emergence of new challengers (bin Laden), dependence on an outside power, and

limited economic resources (Snyder, 2003, p. 330). So what does bin Laden do? He externalizes

the conflict – the regional conflict was to have a global solution, an attack on the United States.

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Thus, September 11th

was not just an attack simply to create terror and inflict American

casualties. Rather, bin Laden wanted to incite a conflict with the United States in order to divide

the Muslim world and further weaken the legitimacy of the US supported regimes. A war with

the United States would hopefully radicalize the opposition to the United States just as the

Iranian Hostage Crisis caused the Iranian Revolution to take a more radical turn. Just how was

this to happen? An attack on the Islamic world would “refocus the moderate Islamists‟ energies

on gaining political power and following the lead of the radicals, for they [the moderates] would

become alienated from their governments‟ alliance with the United States in a war against other

Muslims” (Snyder, 2003, p. 334).

Why attack the United States specifically? What is it about the United States presence in

the Middle East that could potentially create hostility if a war would occur in the Islamic world

under the aegis of the United States? In the Middle East, the United States “has become

perceived…as a kind of “imperial power” ” (Snyder, 2003, p. 335) and a hostile one at that.

Since the United States is the only power that has extensive influence in the Middle East Al-

Qaeda and similar groups have singled out the United States as a threat to be contended with.

The US support of unpopular “client regimes” in the Middle East through military support is the

most powerful example of how the United States has created animosity towards the regimes that

receive that support and the United States itself. US support of Israel has also become a rallying

point of these movements against the United States. The apparent support of the Israeli state has

created animosity within the Muslim, animosity that groups such as Al-Qaeda have exploited to

recruit new members.

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Economically, many Middle Eastern countries depend on oil revenues as a main source

of income. Regionally and domestically, the international oil market has created inequality

within countries and among countries. Oil has created some of the richest countries in the region

and world for that matter (Saudi Arabia) and some of the poorest (Yemen). In addition, oil has

hindered democratic development in many of these countries because the authoritarian regimes

that control them “buy off” potential political competitors. Meanwhile, the surge of oil money

meant that these regimes did not have to build long-lasting institutions that would lead to

effective state-building through the extraction of resources. Furthermore since political

participation does not exist a major future economic downturn can cause many to advocate

alternative paths to state-building because the state will have a decreased ability to “buy off” and

co-opt potential competitors. Bin Laden‟s idea of jihad against the United States serves as the

means by which these groups will attempt to build their vision of a just state and society.

Finally, “Militant Islamists hate the United States primarily for its secularism” (Snyder,

2003, p. 341). Given the imperial relationship that the United States has with the Middle East,

this is especially problematic. Globalization is not just a transfer of people, goods and services

but of ideas and culture. The corruption of these Muslim countries is a product of the West‟s

growing influence – especially on the secular regimes that rule these countries. Globalization of

“the American Creed [sic] strikes at the core of their [Muslim] identity” (Snyder, 2003, p. 342)

and creates feelings of animosity towards the United States for its liberal and secular ideas. Since

the United States is perceived as an imperial power that threatens Muslim culture, the democratic

ideals of the West will be met with similar hostility. Therefore, radical Islamic groups will

attempt to construct a political and social system that reflects their notions of what they should

look like in a “true” Muslim country uninfluenced by “Western” ideals of liberal democratic

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governance. Thus, resistance to these ideas takes a non-democratic form because the

proliferation of these ideas is perceived as a threat to the radical Islamists view of what “pure

Islam” actually is. Insecurity has breed hatred and resistance to perceived cultural, political, and

economic domination by the United States.

Thus, the rise of globalization and the weakening of the state does not mean that the era

of revolutions is over. Rather, many of the same weaknesses that regimes faced before their

collapse will allow for challenges to globalization. In other words, economic crisis, the brittle

and unresponsive nature of international political actors, and the cultural grievances against

modernity will help weaken the legitimacy of the globalized world order. Therefore, the idea that

the end of the Cold War and the spread of “democracy” around the world has ended the era of

revolutions is a false pretense circulated among some observers. In other words, the conditions

that led to conflict in the past still exist today, albeit in a different form.

Economically speaking, the globalization of capitalism has reduced many of the buffers

such as subsistence agriculture and closed national economies in the global south that have

shielded people from economic downturns (Webb, 2006, p. 79). Thus, although globalization

does not directly cause economic crises, if they did occur they would affect larger amounts of

people than they would have in the past. Furthermore, if the crisis hits the global poor and lower

middle classes, such as it did in Iran, “revolutionary discontent surges up in a crisis from those

who think the system itself has not delivered for them.”

However, economic crisis does not always translate into revolution, especially if the

regime in any given country can weather the storm. This means that the regimes that have made

this globalization possible, have also fashioned the tools for its destruction. In many countries,

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the “logic of efficiency” and technocratic governance have eclipsed democratic governance as

the norm. In Mexico, for example the neoliberal reforms that took place in the 1980‟s and

1990‟s did not reflect the interests of broad segments of society. Rather, “democracy for them

did not mean an adjustment of policies to popular will. It meant getting enough people to see the

foreordained correctness of the neoliberal vision, and putting together the short-term coalitions

needed to ram reforms through” (Webb, 2006, p. 81).

Furthermore, “global structures back up neoliberally inclined national governments that

have produced the 20:80 society over the past couple decades” (Webb, 2006, p.81) What does

this mean? It means that the growing inequality created by neoliberal reforms is supported by

global structures such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, global actors that would matter if a

global economic downturn should play out. In other words, “they underpin a common elite

identity and lock in the unresponsiveness of those elites to popular discontent” (Webb, 2006,

p.83). This “elite identity” is created because these institutions share the goals of encouraging

free trade and corporate globalization through technocratic regimes. However, these regimes

have often proven to be unrepresentative and undemocratic which often creates hostility against

them.

Furthermore, as these transnational financial institutions such as the WTO develop, they

will have a more visible impact on ordinary people, and will “start seeking legitimacy by

bypassing the national governments that created them” (Webb, 2006, p. 83). This will cause the

focus and the scale of these movements on the “political reality most responsible for that

discontent and most able to do something about it” (Webb, 2006, p. 84). Therefore, these

movements will take on a more transnational scale for the same reason that they are combating

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transnational financial and economic institutions. In addition, since these institutions are

unresponsive to the needs and desires of ordinary people and do not facilitate their participation

these insertions are in essence exclusive. The unresponsiveness and exclusive nature of these

institutions will create hostility within civil society and opposition to these institutions and their

influence in national economic affairs.

The process of globalization, therefore, does not signal the end of revolutions but

revolutions as we have understood them in the past. The resistance against globalization will

take on an international character. Coalitions will be formed between movements and different

actors all across the world. Transnational instead of national organs will be the major political

targets of these movements as these transnational entities continue to grow in power and

influence. Finally, the “economic downturn” as mentioned by Foran will take on an international

instead of a national direction in the age of globalization. As the world economy becomes more

integrated an economic downturn will affect more people and create discontent on a larger scale.

Culturally speaking, globalization will create cultural conflicts across the world as secular ideas

make their way into nations in places such as the Middle East. Groups uneasy with these

changes will use cultural symbols from their past in order to foster a culture of resistance against

these changes, a resistance that could turn violent as the emergence of the Al Qaeda terrorist

network demonstrates.

Foran was correct in arguing that the era of revolution is not over, and his focus on how

globalization will change how revolutions occur bears much intellectual fruit. The ability of

Foran to effectively explain how social revolutions such as the Iranian Revolution and his artful

postulations of how revolutions could happen in the future makes his theory versatile and a

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strong indicator of how scholars can effectively study revolutions in the future. However, that is

not to say that Foran‟s theory is perfect. No theory ever is. However, revolutionary theory is

continuously evolving with scholars building upon the conclusions of other scholars to improve

the understanding of the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions. Foran provides such a

theory – a theory that has proven to be a good starting point for scholarship to come.

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References

Erdbrink, T. (2009). Fissured over goals test strength of Iran‟s opposition. The Washington Post.

Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2009/11/14/AR2009111402682.html

Foran, J. (2005). Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions: Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Keddie, N. (1995). Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood? In N. K.

Keddie (Ed.) Debating Revolutions (pp. 3-27). New York: New York University Press.

Kellner, D. (2002). Theorizing Globalization. Sociological Theory, 55 (3), 285-305

Lambert, S. (2005, April). The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct. Retrieved March 16,

2010, from http://www.dia.mil/college/pubs/pdf/5674.pdf

Rubin, J. (2002). From Che to Marcos [Electronic version]. Dissent Magazine, Summer 2002.

Retrieved March 14, 2010, from http://www.dissentmagazine.org/issue/?issue=51

Snyder, R. (2003). Hating America: bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary. The Review of

Politics, 65 (4), 325-349

Webb, A. (2006) The Calm Before the Storm? International Political Science Review, 27, 73-92

133

Conclusion – Foran Plus: A Theory Revisited

Revolutionary theory has a special place in political science –it studies how rare and

extraordinary circumstances rather than the normal and mundane events that happen in regimes

around the world. For this very reason, revolutionary theory will remain a fascinating and widely

studied field in the future. However, although the survival of the theoretical project remains

certain, the intellectual trajectory that this project may travel remains less clear. The weaknesses

of past theories have taught some valuable lessons that political scientists, sociologists, and

others have taken into consideration when formulating new theories. For instance, the emphasis

on “critical variables” in second generation revolutionary theory proved inadequate in explaining

the revolutionary process. In response, theorists such as Theda Skocpol constructed new theories,

with new lines of thinking that emphasized the role of structure and its influence and constraint

of human action.

It soon became apparent, however, that this theory had some major flaws – including the

absence of culture as a mobilizing force. Instead, this theory focused on societal arrangements as

the primary reason for why individuals behave a certain way. In response, scholars began to

formulate their own theories that made room for culture as well as human agency, as important

in the formation of the opposition. Theories such as John Foran‟s exemplify this development.

Foran notes that structural weaknesses contribute to the formation of the revolutionary

opposition. However, that opposition can only become cohesive through other means. This is

the role that culture plays the in formation and cohesiveness of the revolutionary opposition.

Culture gives meaning to why individuals take action, why they oppose the “structures” that are

unjust and oppress them. Culture helps individuals articulate the grievances that they have and

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inspires them to take action. Furthermore, like many other fourth generation scholars, Foran

emphasizes the formation of multi-class coalitions. Surely, mass revolts will remain class based

– but within a framework of cooperation and coalition building not simply conflict. Many earlier

scholars, Skocpol being one of them, emphasize class conflict as carrying out the revolutionary

struggle. However, as many revolutions in the 20th

century have demonstrated, this is not always

the case. In countries such as Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Iran multi-class coalitions formed through

the one common interest of overthrowing the regime. Furthermore, the breakdown of the

coalitions that brought new political actors to power led to the breakdown of the regime in two

instances, Nicaragua and Bolivia. However, Iran and China are exceptions because the new

political actors were able to consolidate their power through force and take control of the

coercive apparatus of the state – the armed forces.

These sorts of elements played themselves out in the Iranian case. A personalist

dictatorship experiencing an economic downturn as a result of dependant development created

opportunity for the coalescence of multi-class coalitions through “cultures of opposition”

constructed through the past experiences and culture of the Iranian people. However, Foran‟s

theory is not without its weaknesses. First, he does not account for how one group, the clergy,

was able to win out over other groups such as the middle classes and intellectuals that also

participated in the struggle against the Shah. Second, he does not account for how cultural

elements mobilize the masses. Culture by itself does not become revolution just because certain

circumstances allow for or promote the revolutionary or political potential of these cultural

elements. Rather, it is the role of revolutionary leadership, which acts as political entrepreneurs

to make these elements revolutionary, to use their organizational resources to make their

ideology appeal to the majority of the people.

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As the Iranian case demonstrates, the clergy came to power because it had superior

organizational resources and could articulate an ideology that appealed to the majority of the

population. On the one hand, it could use moralistic themes to appeal to some groups, the more

religious traditional middle class and lower classes as a way to contest the Westernizing policies

of the Shah. At the same time, the revolutionary ideology of the clergy reflected an appeal to

social justice and the independence of Iran from foreign interference. For this reason, the clergy

began to have an appeal to the middle classes and students who had great animosity towards the

Shah who they saw as making Iran an American client state. Furthermore, because these groups

lacked the organizational resources of the clergy – they had little choice but to come under their

influence and leadership. This is especially true since the clergy articulated a broad ideology of

“justice” and “independence” that could appeal to many groups. Therefore, the clergy did not

articulate the need for an Islamic Republic until the collapse of the regime and until they knew

that they had suppressed their competitors (nationalists, liberals, leftists etc) after the fall of the

regime.

Furthermore, Foran attempts to explain the future of the revolutionary process in the era

of globalization. According to Foran, social revolutions that may occur in the future will have a

more democratic nature. These future revolutions, in other words, will attempt to open

democratic space in an era of injustice and inequality – a byproduct of globalization. These

movements will also take on a global nature, with anti-globalization groups from all over the

world working in concert in order to combat the unjust consequences of globalization. In other

words, the multi-class coalitions necessary for the combat of national regimes will become

multinational coalitions formed in order to combat the rise of corporate globalization. This in

light of the economic problems created by globalization will create a “culture of resistance”

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among these different groups a culture that will unite these disparate groups together under the

common goal of combating corporate globalization while at the same time fostering the

development of a fairer economic system and more democratic political system.

However, although Foran‟s analysis of the causes, processes, and outcome revolutions

seem to fit the Iranian case and revolutions that may happen in the future, his theory is not

without its weaknesses. First, although Foran emphasizes the role that multi-class coalitions in

bringing down the regime, he does not explain what happens to the coalition after the regime

collapses. For instance, his theory has difficulty in explaining why the clergy was able to assume

a leadership position and eventually assume national power. The reason, as the Iranian case made

apparent was that the clergy had the organizational resources that other groups did not. For

example, the mosques served as independent institutions safe from the repression of the Shah‟s

repression. The liberals, nationalists, leftists, and other groups simply could not organize their

supporters to the same degree that the clergy could.

As a result, two things occurred. First, these other groups became increasingly repressed

by the Shah and were rendered less organizationally effective because of this repression.

Second, these groups began to support the clergy in its activities against the regime and

eventually submit to the authority of the clergy. Therefore, the clergy could slowly assume

leadership of the revolution during its very latest stages. In this regard, the revolution did not

assume an “Islamic” character until the regime was actually overthrown. Regardless, the clergy

played an influential and indispensible role in the overthrow of the Shah‟s regime – a role that

other groups had great difficulty taking. The movement against the Shah involved the

cooperation of many different actors - a phenomenon that Foran‟s theory points out. However,

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what his theory lacks is an adequate explanation of how one group involved in the coalition

could eventually overtake the others in a the post-revolutionary struggle for power.

Therefore, a useful addition to Foran‟s theory would be an analysis of revolutionary

outcomes. Foran makes a preliminary attempt at this endeavor by pointing out the various

reasons why some revolutions are not successful, even reversed in some cases. For example,

Foran points out the reason why the Nicaraguan Revolution was reversed was because the FSLN

could not hold the coalition that brought it to power together in the face of growing economic

trouble and the Contra War. However, as Iran demonstrates even if the post-revolutionary

coalition does break down the revolutionary leadership that assumed power can still remain in

power. The clergy, through its organizational superiority and growing coercive resources was

able to hold on to power in the face of growing opposition from the liberals and nationalists who

opposed their political leadership. Through force and repression the clergy gained the upper

hand and eventually pushed its political contenders from power.

Therefore, the formation of multi-class coalitions is extremely problematic for the very

reason that different groups, in the end, have different interests and goals. While it is true that

these groups cooperate in the overthrow of the regime in power - their relationship cooperation

seems merely a marriage of convenience. Cooperation, in other words can only last while the

obstacle that keeps these individual groups from accomplishing their goals still exists – the old

regime. Once this impediment is gone, the incentive for these groups to cooperate diminishes.

The groups (s) that have the most organizational resources will suppress competing,

organizationally weaker groups, and eventually rise to the position of political dominance.

Therefore, an understanding of how this conflict between different groups plays itself out after

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the fall of the regime is perhaps the most important addition that could be made to Foran‟s

theory. As it stands, the theory has makes very broad assertions about what constitutes a

successful social revolution. Quite simply, Foran claims that a social revolution is successful

when it remains long enough to create “social change.” How revolutionary leaders manage to

remain in power long enough to foster this “social change” is a question that he leaves

unanswered. Therefore, in order for Foran‟s theory to be more complete it must include the

notion that in the event of post-revolutionary breakdown the group from the coalition that

becomes the dominant political actor has the organizational resources and political skill to

outmaneuver and effectively defeat its opponents.

Besides the analysis that Foran develops for revolutions that happened in the past, he also

tries to explain how revolutions will occur in the future. Foran claims, citing the EZLN as an

example, that revolutions will be more democratic in the future and less focused upon seizure of

state power and the institutionalization of a new political and social order. Rather, groups such

as the EZLN will attempt to open democratic space by calling for the inclusion of alienated

groups while pushing for economic, political, and social justice. However, this does not paint a

complete picture.

As mentioned, globalization has also unleashed a non-democratic and dangerous

opposition to globalization in the form of militant Islam. What Foran ignores and even

downplays in one instance is the influence and support that these groups have. The radical

Islamic creed has vast appeal among different segments of society, from the well educated to the

poor. These groups, in other words have propagated a message that has mass appeal because of

its ability to relate to the various types of grievances felt among different strata of society. For

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example, the message of militant Islam that the United States is an Imperial power that supports

a hostile state, Israel, and sets up puppet regimes to control the vast oil resources of the region.

This message appeals to the better educated that may have a clearer sense of the weakness and

perceived subservience of the countries of the Arab world than groups who may have less

education. Simultaneously, these groups appeal to the poor, less well educated strata of society

because they articulate a message of economic justice with a radical Islamic twist. This type of

message helps to increase the ranks of these groups thereby increasing their revolutionary

potential. Furthermore, a useful addition to Foran‟s theory would be an analysis of how

globalization not only may encourage the growth of networks that promote democracy but ones

that view democracy as the antithesis of their point of view. Globalization has unleashed to

strains of thought about how to deal with its negative effects. A more complete and analytically

sound theory takes both of these into account.

Finally, what revolutionary theorists of the future could perhaps study is the effectiveness

of these national and global networks against globalization that Foran presents in his theory. Do

these loosely affiliated groups have the organizational capacity to effectively challenge the status

quo? Or is their very weakness lie in the fact that the global networks and coalitions are so loose

and inclusive that organized action becomes highly problematic? As the Iranian case

demonstrates the reason why one group was so successful in taking and maintaining power was

because it possessed considerable organizational superiority vis-à-vis other groups. Even if the

aim of future revolutionary groups is not to take power in traditional sense, changing the system

still requires considerable organizational resources. Therefore, a relevant and useful addition to

Foran‟s theory includes an analysis of what makes groups more successful than others in

accomplishing their goals even if these groups are part of a larger coalition.

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Foran was correct in assessing that the revolutions of the future will take on a different

character than the revolutions of the past – even if they share the same general dynamics.

However, there is still much work to be done. As the struggle against globalization continues,

Foran‟s notions will continued to be put to the test and perhaps new theories will grow from the

observations that Foran has made. Therefore, considerable opportunity remains for the study of

how individuals can come together and change the world around them – although it is still not

clear exactly how this will occur. Foran, however, provides a useful frame of analysis from

which future scholars can make their observations as the struggle against corporate globalization

continues. Revolutions will remain alive in the academic lexicon even if their shape and the

analysis of this interesting social and political phenomenon continue to evolve.

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