Paws Piece

Positive Peace Umich

Index1NC Shell...........................................................................................3Link-Capitalism/State.........................................................................7Link-Omission....................................................................................8Link-Negative Peace/Security Reps...................................................9Link-Negative peace........................................................................10Link-War Discourse..........................................................................11Link- Nuclear Crisis..........................................................................12Link- Balance of Power/Deterrence/Inevitability...............................14Link- Media......................................................................................15Link- Stories/Media..........................................................................16Link-Hegemony................................................................................17Media Link........................................................................................18Link- Generic....................................................................................19Link- Education................................................................................21Link- Physical Violence....................................................................23Link- Ending War..............................................................................23Alternative........................................................................................25Alt Solvency.....................................................................................27Alt Solves-Social Movements...........................................................30Alt Solves-Individuals Key................................................................32Alt-Comes First................................................................................33Alt Solves-War.................................................................................34AT: Alt not possible..........................................................................35Alt- Rejection....................................................................................36Alt Solves.........................................................................................37Alt Solvency....................................................................................38Alt Solvency.....................................................................................39Alt-Reform Key.................................................................................40Alt Solvency-Reform Key.................................................................41Alt-Reform Key.................................................................................42Alt-Solves Global War......................................................................43Alt Solves-Terror..............................................................................44Alt Solve-Root Cause Terror............................................................45Alt Solves-Democracy......................................................................46Alt=Nonviolence...............................................................................48Alt- Non violence Solves..................................................................49Alt-individualism good......................................................................51Alt- Changing rhetoric solves...........................................................52Alt Solvency- Edu. solves change....................................................54Alt- Teaching Peace.........................................................................55Alt- Teaching Peace.........................................................................56***Framework***...............................................................................57Framework.......................................................................................58Framework-Role of the Ballot...........................................................61Framework-Epistemology................................................................62Framework-Epistemology= Media Distortion....................................65Framework-Discourse First..............................................................66Framework- Best Forum..................................................................68Framework-Peace Reps First...........................................................69Framework-Marxist IR Good............................................................75Framework-Marxist IR Bad...............................................................76Framework-Util Bad.........................................................................77FW: Human Nature=Prior Question.................................................78Realism Bad.....................................................................................79Realism Bad-Negative Peace..........................................................90Realism Bad-Negative Peace..........................................................91Realism Bad-Negative Peace..........................................................92Realism Bad-Civic Engagement.......................................................93Realism Bad-War.............................................................................94Realism Bad-No Solvency...............................................................95Realism Bad-Economy.....................................................................96Interventionism Bad.........................................................................97Realism Bad- No Positive Peace.....................................................98

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AT- Realism Inevitable.....................................................................99AT – Realism Inevitable.................................................................100Liberalism Bad...............................................................................101Liberalism -> Biopolitics.................................................................107Liberalism -> Bare life....................................................................108Liberalism/Humanitarianism Bad....................................................109Realism and Liberalism Bad- Enviro..............................................110Can combine Realism and Liberalism............................................111Can Combine Realism and Liberalism...........................................112***Negative Peace Bad***..............................................................113Negative Peace bad.......................................................................114Negative Peace -> Bare life...........................................................115Neg Peace Bad..............................................................................116Negative Peace..............................................................................118Negative Peace Bad-War...............................................................119Negative Peace Bad-Discourse=> Violence...................................120Neg Peace Bad-Endless War.........................................................122Neg Peace Bad/Turns Case...........................................................124Neg Peace Bad-War......................................................................125Neg Peace Bad-Genocide/Rights..................................................128Neg Peace Bad-Ignores Strutural Violence....................................128Negative peace -> Imperialism.......................................................130A2: Negative Peace Inevitable.......................................................131A2: Negative Peace Good..............................................................132Pos Peace Good-Genocide...........................................................133Positive Peace key-Civic Engagement...........................................134Positive Peace= Best/prerequisite.................................................135Democratic Peace = Wrong...........................................................136Peace threatens Elites...................................................................137***Structural Violence Bad***.........................................................138Structural Violence Bad..................................................................139Structural Violence Bad-Root Cause..............................................140Structural violence Bad..................................................................141***State Bad***...............................................................................142State Bad.......................................................................................143State Bad-Structural Violence........................................................144State Bad.......................................................................................145***AT: Aff Args***...........................................................................145AT - Deterrence..............................................................................146AT: Empiricism...............................................................................148AT – Humans Violent.....................................................................149AT – Pluralism Bad........................................................................150AT - Empiricism..............................................................................151AT- Experts....................................................................................152AT - Perm.......................................................................................154AT – Neg peace o/w Pos Peace....................................................161AT - Utopian...................................................................................162AT– Pacifism Bad...........................................................................163AT - Hegemony..............................................................................164AT - Constructivism........................................................................164AT – Your offense = inevitable.......................................................166AT – We fix liberalism....................................................................167AT - Foucault.................................................................................168AT: Neg peace first........................................................................169AT-Postmodernism........................................................................170AT- Gilligan/Structural Violence.....................................................171A2: No Difference between personal/structural violence................173A2: Structural Violence Inevitable..................................................174A2 – Reps Ks bad/ = Paralysis.......................................................175AT- Plan Good- Outweighs Negative Reps (1/2)............................177a2: Plan Good- Outweighs Negative Reps (1/2)............................177A2 Militarism Good.........................................................................178***Aff Answers***............................................................................181Aff - Perm.......................................................................................182Aff - Perm.......................................................................................183Aff – Alt Bad...................................................................................185Aff – A2 Structural Violence...........................................................187

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Aff – A2 Epistemology....................................................................191Aff – A2 Root cause.......................................................................192Aff – State Key...............................................................................193Aff - Structuralism Bad...................................................................194Aff - Liberal Humanitarianism Good...............................................195Aff - Liberalism > Democracy.........................................................196AT: Discourse Shapes Reality........................................................197Interventionism Good.....................................................................198Positive Peace Fails.......................................................................199AT: Social Construction..................................................................200Censorship = Bad..........................................................................201Aff: Reject Alt- No Solvency...........................................................202Aff- No Alt Solvency.......................................................................203A2: We solve Negative and Positive Peace...................................204A2: Just War..................................................................................205FW- Policy Key...............................................................................206Framework-Critical Theory Bad......................................................207

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1NC ShellTheir description of war and conflict presupposes that violence is the baseline human emotion that needs to be regulated by liberal governance. This necessitates a violent methodology of crises control.Richmond 8 [Oliver Richmond, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2008. ISSN 0305-8298, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 439-470]

What is peace? This basic question often appears in contemporary literature to have been settled in favour of the

‘liberal peace’, made up of a victor’s peace at its most basic level, an institutional peace to provide international

governance and guarantees, a constitutional peace to ensure democracy and free trade, and a civil peace to ensure freedom and rights within society.2

Yet, the liberal peace has, in many post-conflict settings, proved to create a ‘virtual peace’, empty states and institutions that are ambivalent about everyday life.3 In this context peace is widely referred to but rarely defined.

Though the concept of peace is often assumed to be normatively irreproachable, formative in the founding of the

discipline, and central to the agendas of liberal states, it has rarely been directly approached as an area of study

within IR. Instead various sub-disciplines have taken on this challenge. Developing accounts of peace helps chart the different

theoretical and methodological contributions in IR, and contributes to IR’s envisaged mission by highlighting the complex issues that then emerge . These include the pressing problem of how peace efforts become sustainable rather than merely inscribed in international and state-level diplomatic

and military frameworks. This also raises issues related to an ontology of peace , culture, development, agency

and structure, not just in terms of the representations of the world, and of peace, presented in the discipline, but in terms of the sovereignty of the discipline itself and its implications for everyday life.4 In an interdisciplinary and pluralist field of study – as IR has now become – concepts of peace and their sustainability are among those that are central.5

Orthodox IR theory (by which I mean those deploying positivist methods for realist, liberal, or Marxist-oriented approaches) has been in

crisis for some time. Orthodox IR has found it very difficult to attract the attention of those working in other disciplines, though

critical IR scholars have themselves drawn on other disciplines.6 Even t hose , for example, working in the sub-disciplines of peace and conflict studies, an area where there has been a long-standing attempt to develop an understanding of peace, have often turn ed away from IR theory because it has failed to develop an account of peace, focusing instead on the dynamics of power and war , and assuming the realist inherency of violence in human nature and international relations, and the sovereignty of such views, encapsulated by the state, over rights and justice. This raises the question of what the discipline is for, if not for peace. For many, IR theory simply has not been ambitious enough in developing an ‘agenda for peace ’ in addition to investigating the causes of war. Axiomatically, Martin Wight once wrote that IR was subject to a poverty of ‘international theory’, focusing as it did on the problem of survival.7 Commonplace arguments

usually support the view that liberal polities, notably in the western developed world, are linked oases of democratic peace, and legitimate their constant struggle for survival – or a ‘war for peace’.8 This infers a peace-as-governance. Yet, many orthodox approaches to IR theory routinely ignore the question – or problem – of peace: how is it constituted, one peace or many? Many hoped that science would, as Hobbes wrote,

open the way for peace.9 Hobbes, writing in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, wrote Leviathan (often held up to be the

epitome of tragic realism in IR) to illustrate that peace was plausible in spite of hatred, scarcity, and violence. Of course, he

also developed the notion of the Leviathan as a way to moderate the ‘natural state’ of war. IR has focused on war as a natural state rather than peace and the supposed Freudian death instinct has resonated powerfully through the discipline,10 legitimating liberal notions of global (even hegemonic) governance, conditionality, and on occasion, coercion . Yet, as Fry has argued, a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence shows that peace, conflict avoidance, and accommodation, are the stronger impulses of human culture.11 Critical innovations in the discipline infer searching questions in terms of methodology, epistemology, and ontology about peace,

ranging from ways of knowing peace, knowing the minds of others, connecting with debate on gender, culture, and identity. This concerns peace as emancipation, and post-structuralist concerns with discourse, knowledge and power, identity,

othering, and empathy. This has opened up pluralist methodologies, empowered feminist readings of the discipline and of peace,

a move towards texts, language, artistic expression, and emotions as legitimate sites of concern. These developments have provided fertile ground for placing an everyday peace at the centre of IR. This paper explores such issues in the context of a collage of orthodox and critical IR theory, methods, and ontology, and offers some thoughts about the implications of placing peace at the centre of IR.

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Representations of war as a bounded temporal event sanitize peace time militarism and produce a politics of crises control that is incapable of dealing with complex societal interconnections that produce violence- the result is an inability to combat structural violenceCuomo 1996. [ Chris Cuomo. Ph. D, University of Wisconsin, Madison Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati. “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence”. Hypatia Fall 1996, Volume 11, Issue 4, pg 30]Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and

specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the

environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered

and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world

results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism , declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for

social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist

oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and

who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that

make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declara- tions of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over , all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistanc e . For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways

in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing

hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.

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1NC ShellStructural violence outweighs – focus on nuclear impacts destroys peace movements and causes paralysis and oppression – nuke war won’t cause extinction – their authors are biased hacks trying to preserve their power through a politics of extinctionMartin, 84 [Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modeling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA 5-16-84 http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html]

By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of

'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in

nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with

fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global

fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably

means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to

ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels,

and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more

people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday

scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction.

Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets

away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in

nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[6] The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be

fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people

may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of

the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world . Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer

witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that

preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can

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justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war . Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues

are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state,

capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist

movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10]

But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.

Structural violence outweighs other impactsFischer 02 - Director, European University Center for Peace Studies (Dietrich and Jurgen Brauer, Twenty Questions for Peace Economicshttp://www.aug.edu/~sbajmb/paper-DPE.PDF)

Galtung coined the notion of “structural violence” (as opposed to direct violence) for social conditions that cause avoidable human suffering and death, even if there is no specific actor committing the violence. Köhler and Alcock (1976) have estimated that structural violence causes about one hundred times as many deaths each year as all international and civil wars combined. It is as if over 200 Hiroshima bombs were dropped each year on the children of the world, but the media fail to report it because it is less dramatic than a bomb explosion.

Representation must be evaluated prior to questions of policy Doty, assistant professor of political science at arizona state university, 1996 [roxanne lynn, imperial encounters, p. 5-6]This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations under lie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these repre sentations make various courses of action possible . As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse . So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real , " though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geo graphic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices con stitute it as an "invasion , " a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located . To at tempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive prac tices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality , appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and'performative character of discourse.'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the “first world”. Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

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Link-Capitalism/State

We can’t achieve a positive ontology or epistemology of peace until the contradictions of capitalism or the state are resolved.Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 131)

Critical theories offer a vision of an emancipatory, everyday and empathetic form of peace in the context of a post-conventional, post-Westphalian IR. This is a post-sovereign peace, though it extends aspects of idealist, liberal, structuralist and pluralist debates (a common peace system and emancipation), to produce a powerful critique of the liberal peace and its underlying liberal-realist problem solving framework which rests on territorial sovereignty. It is driven by an intellectual question about

what form emancipation would take in material and discursive terms, and how it can be achieved. It offers an account of a systemic process of emancipation

built into the communicative institutions of IR, as well as an attempt to show how individuals can achieve emancipation within such moral communities. This

implies a negotiated but universal peace through a radical reform of politics, attainable through dialogue in various fora. This positive epistemology of peace suggests an overall ontology of peace (as opposed to an institutional, class-based, or balance of power ontology): emancipation is both plausible and pragmatic, and

an epistemic basis and methodology to realise this is possible, despite the age-old problems related to entrenched understandings and discourses of interests and difference. This form

of peace may only come about when the inherent contradictions of capitalism, of the nation state, self-determination and identity, and the requirements for free universal communication, are resolved, along the lines of the methods offered by critical theories. Indeed, these suggest very pragmatic agendas when put into the context of the post-sovereign, emancipatory and everyday form of peace that this engenders (far from a relapse into 'relativism' or an impractical inability to establish a basis for action and thought, as many orthodox theorists suggest). Indeed, the notion of an empathetic, everyday peace implied by critical theory also links with debates about peace as a form of care in its different IR contexts -representing a more active and interventionary form ofpeace.61

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Link-Omission

The omission of peace discussion is just as important as harmful depictions – refusal to discuss these issues is the cause of harmful epistemologies of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 151)

There are several key dimensions to sketching out an explicit analytic framework through which one can understand the concept of peace inherent in each of IR's theoretical debates. The first is to note that there is either implicitly or explicitly a concept of peace inherent in each and every debate, though this is rarely acknowledged. Indeed, if every debate acknowledged this as well as the usual discussion of casual adjustments or preventive measures, the concepts of peace might have been less obscure and thus would have been factored into policy decisionmaking where it is linked to

prescriptive forms of IR theory. In other words, if intellectual and policy approaches considered their implications for specific concepts of peace in

conceptual, theoretical and methodological terms, as well as their underlying ontologies, this would provide them with a clearer approach to assessing their implicit construction of an epistemological framework to support an ontology of peace, its institutions, its emancipatory claims, its empathetic capacities, in an everyday context. It would also, of course, hold to account theories and decisions and in particular would probably focus research and policy far more closely on how to create a self-sustaining peace.

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Link-Negative Peace/Security RepsNegative peace ignores individual security while focusing on constructed ideas of threats to international security. This makes solving for peace impossible because human rights, economic injustice and political oppression are always ignored Bilgin 2003. [Pinar Bilgin. "Individual and Societal dimensions of Security". International Studies Review. Volume 5, No. 2. pp. 203-222.]

[In the post-Cold War era, the academic debate on security was accompanied by practitioners' increasing interest in "human security," which in turn was warranted by a series of developments that were visible during the Cold War but became more apparent in its aftermath. These developments included (a) growing disparities in economic opportunities both within and between states; (b) increasing hardships faced by peoples in the developing world who found themselves on the margins of a globalizing world economy; (c) diminishing nonrenewable resources leading families and groups to become refugees; (d) rising anti-foreigner feelings and violence in reaction to migration pressures from the developing to the developed world; and (e) proliferating intrastate conflicts increasing public interest in, and pressure for, humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, it was not only an increase in public awareness of the aforementioned developments but also growing consciousness of the costs incurred as a result of the kinds of security practices produced by the established ways of thinking that provided the impetus for an alternative approach. In the post-Cold War era, a range of actors including academics, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations explored individual and societal dimensions of security. What follows is a discussion of the key issues and approaches that arose during the 1990s. Whose Security? In the post-Cold War era, academic studies on security took a more sociological approach than before. In a pathbreaking article, Ken Booth (1991) questioned whose security existing approaches were designed to address. Depending on the referent, security analyses point to different threats and prescribe different solutions. For example, from the perspective of a superpower concerned with the maintenance of its regional and global interests in the post-September 11 environment, it is the so-called rogue or failed states that constitute the major threat to international security because they can provide hideouts to terrorist networks (National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002). In effect, state failure has found itself a place on top of the US security agenda in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Previously, failed states were considered to be problems only when their situation became acute enough to threaten the world beyond their legal boundaries. Failing states, whose leaders adopted an 207 Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security anti-Western stance in an attempt to alleviate problems with domestic cohesion by diverting attention away from their internal problems to those involving foreign and security policy (as Iraq did in 1990), were labeled rogue states, and the problem was addressed accordingly (Bilgin and Morton 2002). Consider US President George W. Bush's (2002) definition of the main threat to international security as the "the axis of evil," which comprises three countries -Iraq, Iran, and North Korea-represented as "outlaw regimes that possess and are developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the missiles to deliver them." These three countries, according to President Bush, are viewed as constituting a threat to international security not only because of their destructive potential, but also because of their support for international terrorism and the repression of their own people. From the perspective of peoples in the region, however, who took to the streets to demonstrate against US policies toward Iraq and Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, it is human rights violations, economic injustice, and political oppression that constitute the major threats to their security. Indeed, from the perspective of a Saudi woman, it might not be an Iraqi weapon of mass destruction program but her own government's policies that lower her life expectancy. From the point of view of Egyptian schoolchildren, the accumulation of weapons systems threatens their security primarily by directing valuable resources away from their education and their families' health care. The stark contrast between the security interests of governments and individuals-the so called "scuds versus butter" dilemma all Middle Eastern governments must face (Sadowski 1993)-is also voiced by Moroccan author, Fatima Mernissi (1992:169), who has asked: "How can Arab women hope to overcome opposition in their societies and go out in search of paid work if the economies of their countries are devoting a large part of their wealth to unproductive expenditures like the importation of weapons that don't even serve any useful purpose, as the Gulf War amply demonstrated?" Viewed through her lenses, those extra-regional governments who sell the weaponry, those regional governments who give high priority to regime security and invest in the military, and those individuals and social groups who dare not challenge the status quo out of fear of the changes that democracy and human rights may introduce into their daily lives could all be considered partners in this crime committed against individuals' security. In sum, the simple question "whose security?" has provoked a lively debate on whether individuals should replace states as the primary referent of security. Individuals as the Primary Referents of Security Assessing the differences between individuals' and governments' security concerns, Booth (1991) argued that individuals' security should come first. In advancing his case, he made three interrelated points. First, states cannot be assumed to act as providers of security at all times because some are willing to make significant portions of their population insecure in an attempt to secure themselves (for example, the Iraqi government that violates the human rights of its own people), and others fail to respond to the needs of their citizens (for example, Somalia). In other words, the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with that of the people who live within its physical boundaries. Second, even those states that fit the textbook definition by standing guard over their populace are generally doing so as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. Third, and finally, differences among states in both character and capacity make

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Link-Negative peace

The affirmative’s fictional views of peace in attempt to create a concrete idea of security construct a false realityBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg. 10 3-18-06.]

However, the thing/construct and substantive/formal distinction may be taken to be methodological rather than ontological. This is because, in a non-Platonic philosophy, constructs are human creations, hence dependent on the concrete things called ‘thinkers.’ Besides, whereas some constructs, such as those of deity, cloven knight, and parallel universe, are wild fictions, and moreover indispensable to understand and handle concrete things . For instance, the natural kinds, such as the chemical and biological species, may be regarded as sets; and many properties of concrete things, such as speed and population, can be analysed as functions. Thus, we face the paradox that we need fictions (of the tame kind) to account for real things, just as we may use wild fictions to create the illusion of escaping from reality. In short, fiction is the path to and from reality.

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Link-War Discourse

The recognition and usage of terms connected with war result in actual warBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.63. 3-18-06.]

The point of entry of idealism into the social studies is the ontological thesis that there is no such thing as society: there would be only individuals, and these act freely following their own interests, beliefs, and intentions. This ontological thesis generates methodological individualism. This is the thesis that the goal of the social studies should be to find out how social facts emerge exclusively from individual choices and actions. The individualist project sounds attractive by comparison with the holist thesis that individuals are but pawns of higher instances, such as God, destiny, race, church, or party. But the project is unrealistic and even logically untenable, because social roles cannot be defined except by reference to social systems. For example, a warrior is, by definition, someone who is expected to fight in a war. And in turn wars, far from being intimate affairs, consist in armed clashes between groups of individuals characterized by supra-individual traits, such as imperial or colonial, oil-rich or oil-hungy, right-wing or left-wing, and so on.

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Link- Nuclear CrisisThe affirmative’s call to action reflects underlying theories of “balance of power”, “crisis”, and “deterrence”- these theories rely on ancient concepts of human interaction- this artificially inflates risk and is a self-fufilling prophecyRon Hirschbein, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Peace Institute at California State University, Chico, “Massing the Tropes: Metaphors of Nuclear Strategy,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.19-22.

I asked my friend Mark what serving as a medic in Vietnam was like? His reply was memorable: "I had no metaphors, just reality." How much does it exaggerate to suggest that those who manage the U.S. nuclear arsenal suffer the opposite affliction? They have no reality, just metaphors—no one has experienced a nuclear exchange between belligerents. (I have in mind strategists at universities, war colleges, national laboratories, and "think tanks"; and decision-makers in agencies such as the U.S. department of defense. U.S. department of energy, and U.S. national security council.) I wrote this paper because I believe that decisions about the development, deployment, and detonation of nuclear weapons are informed by outdated metaphors. Not surprisingly, U.S. strategists do not share this perspective. The published literature, declassified documents, and personal interviews strongly suggested that the time-honored strategic metaphors explicated in this study— the balance of power, deterrence, crisis, and inevitability—are afforded the canonical status of changeless laws of international relations. No wonder strategic debates seem like Jesuitical contests between competing interpretations of the canon.I am not the first to note the antiquity of the strategic canon. Bruce Blair, director of the Center for Defense Information, is among the analysts who warn that the strategic mindset remains unchanged and consequently outdated. Thousands of weapons remain on hair trigger alert, and "The United States ... plans and operates strategic forces as if the Cold War never ended.'0 Perhaps the situation is at once more curious and disturbing than Blair suggests. Strategizing is informed by a time-honored mindset much older than the cold war, a paradigm crafted out of the same metaphors that Thucydides invoked to understand ancient conflicts. It may not exaggerate to suggest that the United States plans and operates strategic forces as if the Peloponnesian War never ended. Could it be that the newest weapons are managed with the oldest concepts ? Mainstream strategists note the antiquity of strategic concepts; yet. they enshrine these tried but untrue notions as the centerpieces of their thinking. The "balance of power"—the quintessence of United States' strategizing— predates nuclear weaponry. According to Kenneth Waltz: "Thucydides explained the policy of.. . [the] King of the Persians, as one of holding "the balance evenly between the two contending powers/ Athens and Laccdaemon."** Waltz shows that this notion of equilibrium also guided Roman legions and Italian city-states, and—according to this influential thinker—the fate of the planet hinges on the balance of power.4 Despite the widely acknowledged unpredictability of human events, strategists insist that crises will remain a prominent and dangerous feature of international relations. Accordingly, they devise coercive diplomacy and nuclear war-fighting plans for meeting these putatively inevitable, dangerous challenges. The view that every epoch is an age of crisis echoes ancient Greek tragedies. Historian Randolph Stam explains that the Greeks conceptualized a crisis as the climax of a tragic drama that reveals the truth about men and events: The "Father of Scientific History (Thucydides] left more room for the tragedian than some of his interpreters, for such a framework could lend itself to drama as well as [historical] science."5Like their ancient counterparts, U.S. strategists are also captivated by visions of fate—certain events seem inevitable. Strategic scenarios posit predicaments in which decision-makers allegedly have no choice—predetermined responses are "required." In Berlin's words: It is as if "we cannot resist the central currents [of history], for they are much stronger than we.'* Concepts should not be dismissed merely due to their antiquity. Those of us who are aging philosophers insist that our concepts should not be derided merely because we are chronologically challenged. Or could it be that, like aging philosophers on a good day, ancient strategic concepts are quaint but irrelevant? Perhaps notions such as equilibrium, crisis, and inevitability are mere de rigueur rhetorical embellishments. Do these time-honored concepts actually inform long-range planning and decision-making at critical junctures? If so, what is the nature of these concepts? Are they representations of immutable political realities or useful analytic models? In what sense are these hoary concepts metaphorical? Metaphors arc problematic. They are constructed concepts, not observed things. Many of our cherished concepts are comforting fictions. The world according to Friedrich Nietzsche is a fictive realm of our own creation: a make-believe domain in which imaginative metaphors express the relations of things to individuals. No wonder he ridiculed naive empiricism as the doctrine of the immaculate perception.' Such skepticism is filling when we explore strategizing, for good news and bad news exists about what United States's strategists know—and do not know. The best news concerns what strategists do not know. They labor under a fortunate empirical deficit: a nuclear exchange between belligerents has never occurred. The bad news is unprecedented: The United States lies defenseless, utterly vulnerable, to nuclear attack. The potential horror is unspeakable. However, strategists do not remain silent. To paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein: Of that which we cannot speak we must remain silent. Strategists have much to say about present exigencies and future scenarios.Since strategists cannot speak of reality, they mass the tropes and speak metaphorically. Metaphors intended for public consumption arc recognized for what they are—figures of speech. Hawks, doves, owls—and probably a few turkeys—inhabit the nuclear aviary. (No wonder those who serve under these birds require a "nuclear umbrella.") Strategists often confuse facile historical metaphors with indelible "lessons of history"—morality plays that reveal not-to-be-forgotten truths. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May call attention to the historical metaphors that inform strategic doctrine. These tropes exaggerate the similarities between past and present while concealing the differences. I use a cliché—but an accurate one—to suggest that decision-makers are always fighting the last war. A chastened Robert McNamara laments that he had the lessons of the Second World War in mind in organizing the United States' invasion of Vietnam.*' (If I may invert yet another aphorism: Those who cannot forget the past are condemned to repeat it.) I do not wish to reinvent reinventing the wheel by exploring the misuse of historical metaphors. I believe that strategic doctrine is not merely guided by historical analogies; it is also informed by metaphors construed as breathtaking eternal truths, truisms beyond time and place afforded the status of Newtonian-like laws of international mechanics. To invoke Nietzsche again: "What then is truth? A movable

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host of metaphors ... Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions____To be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors.**1Even a cursory glance at the theory and practice of U.S. strategizing reveals the profound influence of these tired concepts. Thucydides would have no trouble grasping the declassified documents that comprise the "nuclear history project** at the national security archive, and extensive collection of many declassified documents that informed cold war strategizing. The musings of the "father of history” still supply the salient concepts that inform crucial policies and decision-making at critical junctures. My interview with Lugene Carroll, a former NATO commander and U.S. Pentagon strategist, indicates that the hoary concepts mentioned above are the indelible templates of strategic theory and practice.11 This research led me to believe that marshaling fresh tropes may be the key factor in promoting arms control and eventual disarmament. In order to initiate such an understanding, this paper confronts the following issue: In what sense are the time-honored concepts that inform strategic discourse metaphorical, and what meanings do strategists read into these ambiguous tropes? The answers hazarded are offered as exploratory hypotheses designed to spark further research and reflection.

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Link- Balance of Power/Deterrence/InevitabilityConcepts of balance of power, deterrence, and inevitability are metaphorical and rely on outdated theories Ron Hirschbein, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Peace Institute at California State University, Chico, “Massing the Tropes: Metaphors of Nuclear Strategy,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.22-23.

Within the nuclear family of strategic decision-makers, the balance of power was referred to as the delicate balance of terror. Strategists speculated about how credibly and precisely to titrate the threatened apocalypse. These days terrorism gets bad press. Linguistic legerdemain is essential: the balance of terror becomes the "balance of power" in order to protect the guilty. No longer linked to nuclear terror, the balance of power is likened to an antique laboratory scale. Just as the fulcrum is stable when counterbalanced by equal weights, so the international order is stable when counterbalanced by equally powerful adversaries. Strategists deem it both reasonable and fair (if one accepts the status quo) to preserve the existing order through carefully measured power politics—for every action an equal and opposite reaction exists.Adjusting the balance of power is a perennial preoccupation. Mavericks have dismissed the notion as "a mischievous delusion which has come down to us from past times.” 12 Nevertheless, as Hans Morgenthau, the dean of political realism, insisted, the balance of power "consists in two scales, in each of which arc to be found the nation or nations identified with the same policy of the status quo or of imperialism."11 This figure of speech remains captivating. Today, nuclear weapons are likened to ballast that tips the scales in a nation's favor. While balance is readily measured on real scales, the metaphorical scales of the strategic imagination elude precision. Ambiguity is evident: Some strategists equate balance with nuclear superiority; others posit equilibrium as the guarantor of stability. I hypothesize that the balance of power is a matter of interpretation—a figure of speech that can be neither defined, measured, nor calibrated. This difficulty is not academic. Aside from resembling the scales of justice, the balance of power fulfills the putative strategic objective—deterrence: A well-calibrated nuclear arsenal dissuades adversaries from acting against U.S. interests. But is deterrence also an ambiguous metaphor*? Unlike physical science, which begins with metaphor and ends in algebra, game theory begins with algebra and ends in metaphor. Game theorists liken deterrence to zero-sum games or prisoners' dilemmas. Others liken deterrence to an experiment in applied psychology— an exercise in fear, not calculation, on account of this ambiguity and controversy. I hypothesize that deterrence is not an observable phenomenon; deterrence is metaphorical construct that eludes definition, let alone verification.Strategists err when they liken these incidents to inevitable challenges beyond their control. Paraphrasing Epictetus, I suggest that the world is not source of crises, but our metaphorical interpretations of the world. I do not deny political realities; I stress the possibility of alternative interpretations of reality. Dwight D. Eisenhower counseled his successors to construct international challenges as chronic problems to be solved in due course rather than as acute crises demanding urgent and perilous resolution. He followed his advice by interpreting a variety of international challenges as problems to be resolved patiently in due course rather than crises demanding urgent risk taking. Eisenhower's wise counsel went unheeded. His successors defined a diverse array of international events as crises: incidents requiring immediate, perilous action that increased the risk of war. Evidently, unlike Eisenhower, subsequent presidents had something to prove. They were loath to represent themselves as mere caretakers routinely managing problems to be resolved in due course. Crisis construction pays handsome personal and political dividends. Crises are metaphorical; they are concepts, not things. Some liken these critical junctures to natural disasters beyond their control. Just as San Francisco is destined to endure "the big one,” those in the halls of power are destined to endure more unnerving crises. As Colin Powell lamented: "I faced twelve international crises during the first two years of my tenure [as chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and the only thing I am sure of is there is a thirteen out there.” (Will the thirteenth be the unlucky one that ends in disaster?)John F. Kennedy likened a crisis to an existential test of authenticity and identity. The vintage crises of the Kennedy Administration were constructed strategic dramas that reveal the truth about men and events. The president desperately tried to prove that he was a 'Winston Churchill, not a Neville Chamberlain." Given his indecisiveness during the Cuban missile crisis he proved he was both.

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Link- Media

The media’s glorification of violence has manifested itself in the 1AC- the call to action perpetuates the cultural belief that war is inevitableMelissa Burchard, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC- Asheville, “The Power of Entertainment: Violence in the Stories of our Times,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.33.

We tell stories about our need for violence, about how violence is necessary in a world like ours, how war will inevitably come again, and how we must be prepared to fight and win. We also tell stories about how we must not lose. Sometimes these stories are about literal warfare, such as, the Iliad, King Arthur, the American Revolution and Civil War, and the wars of this century. Contemporary stories told on the screen continue these traditions' in the genre of war stories, but in westerns, science fiction, drama, and so-called action and adventure stories as well. Some of these, like the movie Deerhunter, which deal primarily with themes of loss and sorrow, are told to help us deal with the "emotional trauma and aftermath of war. But many, such as, the older The Guns of Navarrone and the recent Independence Day, are of the glory and honor which is to be won, of the camaraderie of soldiers, and of the final victory. These same stories, and others, like Sergeant York, may also be hero tales: stories of what it means to be a hero, to take on a larger cause than oneself, and to sacrifice self for others. These stories contribute deeply to a cultural preparation for war, and to an emotional readiness to use violence in defense of the status quo. The impact of such stories, told over and over in various cultural settings, by older relatives, as school assignments, in Memorial Day services, and in films and novels, is to create a broad cultural understanding of the inevitability of conflict and the necessity of violence for resolving conflict. ' I suggest that this belief in the inevitability of conflict and violence has been present in our culture for so long that we no longer see it at all, but rather are expected to "know" it on a deep and perhaps intuitional level and to work in the world on the basis of its being true. Potter reports that media industry members defend violence in media by claiming that all drama is based on conflict and that conflict requires violence for its development and resolution. 12 Another source says: either the Old Testament or the Iliad was the was Western, and the Mahabharata wasn't such a big improvement .... This frontier sex-and-violence stuff runs deep, from Hannibal to Attila to EI Cid to Sergio Leone. What all Westerns have always been about is clout and turf and sexual property rights and how to look good dying. The fact that violence has always been present in our culture lends credence to the stories and seems to support the cultural understanding. But the violence of our culture does not simply create the need for the stories. The stories themselves help create what are considered culturally appropriate dispositions toward violence

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Link- Stories/Media

Stories like the 1AC are used to legitimize and exacerbate violence- the aff acts as a “hero” that is justified in fighting to stop a threat Melissa Burchard, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC- Asheville, “The Power of Entertainment: Violence in the Stories of our Times,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.35-36

Consider the example of children's animated television. This genre has become notoriously violent as the superhero format has crowded out many others. One of my favorites (in the sense of its being a rich source of fascinating representations) is the X-Men . This show has been popular in the United States over the last several years (in 1995 it earned the second highest Saturday morning Nielsen ratings for children aged two to eleven).2o Its program is typical of the genre. The "good guys" are a group of misfits brought together by necessity or chance; they are continually faced with enemies who wish to destroy them or the world or large portions of it. The evil plots of the enemies are so evil that nothing short of full-scale violence could possibly succeed against them. The good guys thus must use violence, but since they are using it for good purposes, for them to use violence is not wrong. Similar to the trend in television, a current movie trend is exemplified by the plots of DieHard and ConAir and even by movies for families such as Home Alone. In these movies, some individual (or small group) is confronted by a gigantic, overwhelming threat. The entire story turns around the main character(s) being able-and willing-to creatively foil the bad guys' evil plot. Again, the hero uses huge and outrageous violence, but because the hero's intentions are the right ones, this use of violence is not wrong. In many scenarios, the use of violence is coupled with humor, which contributes to its appeal and acceptability by trivializing it.21 One study found that about a quarter of the violence in television is "committed in a humorous context, and that the humorous context was more common in programs for children than in those for a general audience.' Potter reports that the similarity of the plotline described above is sufficient to speculate "that this narrative line applies to all violence presented in the media...23 A steady diet of such programming almost certainly contributes to teaching a preparation for using violence, and general agreement exists among critics that this is indeed one way in which media' violence has an impact. 2 The similarity of the narratives together with the sheer amount of media violence being consumed means that viewers are exposed to enormous amounts of violence. This in itself is different from the stories that have been told and, until recently, written-the amount of violence used is astronomical.

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Link-Hegemony

The aff’s hegemonic ideals ignore oppression and suppression of people which makes positive peace impossible—this makes it impossible to solve for the root cause of all conflict Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 117.]

[ Several meanings of peace emerge in the context of the debates about 'positive' and 'negative' peace stemming from peace research. Peace can be seen as the absence of war, as justice and development, as respect and tolerance between people, in terms of environmental balance, as a spiritual quality, and 'wholeness.83 Indeed, as Miall has pointed out, peace studies is concerned with the movement away from war to peace along a continuum ranging from, ...destructive wars, through to lesser armed conflicts, to crises and potential conflicts, to 'unstable peace', to zones of peace where violent conflict is highly unlikely, to enduring peaceful relation ships that survive for centuries through to a peaceful world which has learned to permanently end war. Peace studies are legitimately concerned with movements from war towards peace at any point on this continuum. This notion of a linear axis of peace and war is a classic move made to graduate, but also to maintain, a distinction between these two con cepts in the conflict studies literature and to ward of any ambiguity between them. This continuum is also represented by Galtung's notion of positive and negative peace in which 'structural violence' distinguishes between the two. In the context of peace studies, this means that its fundamental preoccupation with preventing conflict and building a positive peace provide key markers in this exploration of peace and its conceptualisation. Conflict prevention involves addressing the roots of conflict in political, economic, cultural, and social structures, attitudes and beliefs that institutionalise and legit imise violence. Peace studies indicates that if a positive peace is to be built, what is required is the identification and transformation of hegemonic relationships that hinge upon the oppression or suppression of peoples. Here it concurs to some degree at least with the agendas of conflict resolution and critical and post-structuralists approaches to ending conflict. Though it might be argued that there is little basis for agreement in the various schools of thought, apart from a somewhat vague position that peace is the absence of war and is to be balanced against other values such as order, freedom, security and justice...'85 it is clear that aspects of all of these versions of peace are present in the contemporary liberal conceptualisation of peace: the dominant conception in the West is of a liberal peace in which citizens enjoy negative freedoms from coercion, want, and fear, and positive freedoms to associate, organise, and hold and express their beliefs. Democratisation and human rights underpin the liberal peace, international institutions are expected to settle disputes peacefully and liberal states use methods other than force to settle their disputes with each other. As in the Augustinian and. Grotian tradition, just wars still have to be fought by legitimate collective authority against aggressors and dictators who pose a threat' to international peace and security.86 ~ This genealogy of the liberal peace indicates its antecedents lie in somewhat contradictory frameworks: secular nationalism and its monopoly of the means of violence; in non-secular understanding of common morality; and in an implicitly cosmopolitan understanding of an international society with shared legal norms and regimes. One of the most significant contributions which underpins much contem porary reflection on mainstream approaches to peace can be found in the debates surrounding the 'democratic peace'. The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other allows for the construction, both conceptually and in practice, of the concept of the 'zone of peace'. The expansion of this liberal version of peace may '...produce a periphery of turbulence around a liberal core.’]

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Media Link

Violent storytelling leads to actual violence- the media tells us how to deal with problems, legitimizes aggression, and acts as an arbiter to children. Counter-conditioning society is the only way to solve. Melissa Burchard, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC- Asheville, “The Power of Entertainment: Violence in the Stories of our Times,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.36-37.

The connections between violence in film and television, and the increase in the use of violence among viewers of such media are well documented. Leonard Eron, an authority on media and children, reported to a U.S. senate committee that "[t]here can no longer be any doubt that heavy exposure to televised violence is one of the causes of aggressive behavior, crime, and violence in society.” We have expressed surprise at this; but why should we have been surprised? The constant telling of intense visual stories that encourage the readiness to use violence supposedly justified by good intentions results in an increase in readiness to do violence, and thus in an increase in actual violence. Children can watch an endless stream of television and movies in which the use of violence is encouraged or taken for granted, and in which the conflict is deliberately construed so as to justify the use of violence for its resolution. Such basically identical stores, being told and retold in this extremely intense media, are likely to have an impact on the psyche. As noted earlier, general agreement now exists that they do. They are also likely to require a bit of counter-conditioning in order to keep children or adults from acting on them. But such counter-conditioning is often absent. George Gerbner, for example, believes that people get most of their stories from television rather than other sources, and that from these television stories they derive their assumptions about how the world works.28 Potter claims that "[m]edia stories tell us how we should deal with conflict, how we should treat other people, what is risky, 'and what it means to be powerful… In the absence of deliberate and continuing counter-conditioning, we ought to expect an increase in violence, of the types represented in our stories, from those whose lives and identities are created in part out of their experiences of them. Let me emphasize that I am not arguing a simplistic, "magic bullet" theory of media effects on people. The effects of media representations are not simple and are not necessarily direct; on the other hand, effects are clearly present. An extremely important variable with regard to those effects is the kinds of counter-conditioning that people receive. If children see other models of conflict resolution successfully played out again and again, in other arenas, then they are much less likely uncritically to adopt the methods demonstrated for them in television programming. Consequently, children need a variety of models and need others to consciously demonstrate methods of nonviolent conflict resolution. Anthea Disney, for example, points out that inner-city children, who are probably more susceptible to the effects of media violence because they watch more television due to limited options, also "have fewer male role models countering the TV superhero who’s solving problems with violence. “Others discuss the importance of media-literacy skills for children. Adults must deliberately help children learn ''the difference between reality and fantasy and to know how costumes, camera angles and special effects can fool them.',31 These deliberate counters to the effects of media violence are the kinds of measures needed to prevent such violence from having too much effect.

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Link- GenericCurrent public policy discourse focuses only on negative peace- this embodies societal power relationships and moots out the possibility of positive peaceWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.5.

Can peace be an issue for public policy? For democratic societies, this question may seem rhetorical, since contemporary democratic states stipulate that citizens, or at least their representatives, give consent before war is waged. As far back as 1795, Immanuel Kant contended that whenever the consent of citizens is not necessary for waging war, genuine peace is not possible and, for this reason, supported constitutional, representational government.1 However, because debate on whether to wage war is an issue for public policy in a constitutional, representative government does not mean that discussion of whether to pursue genuine peace will be an issue for public policy. Moreover, the structure of public policy discourse may itself thwart pursuit of genuine peace. While I believe that genuine peace, what many call "positive peace," can be pursued within the public policy forum, I also believe that discourse is generally distorted.Public policy occurs as a specific form of discourse, one forged within the political sphere. Public policy discourse comprises a distinct type of discourse that is governed by specific norms. Some philosophers, building on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, see such discourse as a distinct language game. Going further, sociolinguist Pierre Bourdieu has shown that discourse is inseparable from the distribution of power in society. (This insight is becoming common in treatments of language and politics.) In my work, I stress how the dimension of power within discourse is manifest in various forms of linguistic alienation and linguistic violence. In this chapter, I focus more narrowly on public policy discourse. My thesis is that relations of power, even within democracies, structure public policy discourse in ways that disadvantage peace activists.

Challenging negative peace is key- passive acceptance thwarts movements toward positive peaceWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.8-9.

I turn to the next challenge for those who wish to influence public policy discourse about peace. The language of peace is an important component in the pursuit of peace and justice. The language of peace, like the condition of peace, can be negative or positive. The challenge posed is well-known to peace activists: contentment with negative peace can thwart pursuit of positive peace. In relation to discourse, the language of negative peace is generally privileged within public policy discussions. In commenting on the distinction between the language of negative peace and the language of positive peace, I focus on how the structures and rules of public policy discourse provide greater linguistic capital to speakers of the language of negative peace, but I also address the requirements for a language of positive peace.

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Link- Education

The government is losing hope in tranquility- rhetorical criticism of contemporary peace education is moving us away from positive peaceIan Lister, Review of “Three Decades of Peace Education around the World” by Robin T. Burns, British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Tun., 1998), pp. 234-235 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Society for Educational Studies

It also reminds me of some of the achievements and the problems of Peace Education. Peace educators kept the concern for peace, and peacemaking, on the agenda of education and on the agenda of the politicians. In Europe after 1945 the paramount aim of many educators and politicians was to avoid World War Three. Peace educators put the case that "Peace Studies" (and not only "War Studies") merited inclusion in the curricula of schools and universities. They also argued for peaceful relations within societies and between people. Much of their work was inspired by humanistic psychology. Some practical pedagogues (like David Hicks, Robin Richardson and David Selby) were committed to developing action skills (capabilities for making a better world) in the young. However, a lot of peace educators were theoretical rather than practical. Some of the key concepts which they coined - such as "positive peace* and "negative peace" and "structural violence" - were open to abuse. Sometimes peace educators were too easily identified as pacifists, funded by Quaker gold, and too easily portrayed by Cold Warriors (such as Thatcher and Heseltine) as advocates of "one-sided disarmament". It was the lot of peace educators in many countries to be attacked by their own government. The British government supported peace educators if they would go to Northern Ireland and the West German government wanted its peace educators to go to East Germany. In Britain the 1988 Education Act and the National Curriculum (with its affirmation of traditional knowledge forms) tried to bury all the "new educations", including Peace Education. Instead of "the new educations" (such as peace education, multicultural education, development education and human rights education), pupils were offered, first, History and, then at the age of 14, optional History. Critics complain that students have been taught the "wrong" history (such as "the black armband view of history", making the young feel ashamed of the British Empire). My observation now is that many school graduates appear to have no history at all.

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Link- Physical ViolenceThe affirmative’s focus on preventing physical violence ignores ever-present, ongoing structural violenceJohan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 170-72

The third distinction to be made is on the object side: whether or not there is an object that is hurt. Can we talk about violence when no physical or biological object is hurt? This would be a case of what is referred to above as truncated violence, but nevertheless highly meaningful. When a person, a group, a nation is displaying the means of physical violence, whether throwing stones around or testing nuclear arms, there may not be violence in the sense that anyone is hit or hurt, but there is nevertheless the threat of physical violence and indirect threat of mental violence that may even be characterized as some type of psychological violence since it constrains human action. Indeed, this is also the intention: the famous balance of power doctrine is based on efforts to obtain precisely this effect. And correspondingly with psychological violence that does not reach any object: a lie does not become more of a truth because nobody believes in the lie. Untruthfulness is violence according to this kind of thinking under any condition, which does not mean that it cannot be the least evil under some widely discussed circumstances.The fourth distinction to be made and the most important one is on the subject side: whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. Again it may be asked: can we talk about violence when nobody is committing direct violence, is acting? This would also be a case of what is referred to above as truncated violence, but again highly meaningful. We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect.12 In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of these words, and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.'3 Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on.'4 Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed.l5 The situation is aggravated further if the persons low on income are also low in education, low on health, and low on power - as is frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure.'6 Marxist criticism of capitalist society emphasizes how the power to decide over the surplus from the production process is reserved for the owners of the means of production, who then can buy themselves into top positions on all other rank dimensions because money is highly convertible in a capitalist society - if you have money to convert, that is. Liberal criticism of socialist society similarly emphasizes how power to decide is monopolized by a small group who convert power in one field into power in another field simply because the opposition cannot reach the stage of effective articulation. The important point here is that if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as during a siege yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized today.17 We have baptized the distinction in two different ways, using the word-pairs personal- structural and direct-indirect respectively. Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as action. It corresponds to our ideas of what drama is, and it is personal because there are persons committing the violence. It is easily captured and expressed verbally since it has the same structure as elementary sentences in (at least Indo- European) languages: subject-verb-object, with both subject and object being persons. Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure. Thus, when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another.The fifth distinction to be made is between violence that is intended or unintended. This distinction is important when guilt is to be decided, since the concept of guilt has been tied more to intention, both in Judaeo-Christian ethics and in Roman jurisprudence, than to consequence (whereas the present definition of violence is entirely located on the consequence side). This connection is important because it brings into focus a bias present in so much thinking about violence, peace, and related concepts: ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets - and may hence be catching the small fry and let- ting the big fish loose. From this fallacy it does not follow, in our mind, that the opposite fallacy of directing all attention against structural violence is elevated into wisdom. If the concern is with peace, and peace is absence of violence, then action should be directed against personal as well as structural violence; a point to be developed below.

Link- Ending War

The affirmative’s view of peace only takes into account the absence of war- this view ignores the criteria for true peace such as equality, justice, and sustainabilityJohn Fien, Professor of Sustainability in the Innovation Leadership programme of RMIT University, interdisciplinary background in education and training, natural resource management, public participation and sustainable consumption, “Education for Peace in the Secondary School: The Contribution of One Subject to an Across-the-Curriculum Perspective,” International Review of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1991), Springer Publications, pp. 337-38

The problem of war and violence is only one of at least five problems confronting peace identified by Gaining (1976, 1980) and Hicks (1983, 1988a). The other four barriers to peace are economic inequality, social injustice, environmental destruction and social alienation. Gaining

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and Hicks argue that, turned around, the "problems of peace" give rise to five values which underpin a peaceful and just world: Problems of PeaceValues Underlying Pen Violence and war Non-violence Economic inequality Economic welfare Social injustice Social

justice Environmental destruction Ecological sustainability Social alienation Democratic participation Thus, putting an end to war and personal violence would not necessarily stop people going hungry, house and clothe the poor, or put an end to racism or environmental destruction. It would only put an end to direct violence and would be, quite literally, a negative peace with all the historical and structural causes of poverty, racism, prejudice and greed unaddressed. Replacing inequality with economic welfare, injustice with social justice, environmental destruction with sustainable development, and alienation with participation are needed to end indirect or structural violence and provide the conditions for positive peace. As Pope Paul IV said, “If you want peace, work for justice”. The geography of Bunge’s “heavenly planet” (Bunge 1986) is based upon this view of positive peace and the ending of structural violence.

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AlternativeThus our alternative: vote negative

Rejecting the affirmatives representation of power is key to breaking out of the mental straight jacket of negative peace Carroll 72 – Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 604 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc.

Rousseau, of course, would have found nothing paradoxical about the idea that movements which reject international status competition in favor of domestic concerns might contribute significantly to peace. In fact, Rousseau's ideas echo strongly, if un- consciously, in these observations and conclusions of Wallace. The search for a solution to the war problem in the international arena is in effect abandoned as hopeless. The only hope appears to lie in turning attention away from the "fixed-sum game of international hierarchy" altogether, to focus on domestic concerns instead. And the vehicle of hope for the future is not the elite decision makers, but the movements of "domestic unrest," which is to say, the agitation of the "powerless," who today are "fostering the belief that national status position is not always worth fighting for." Competence, Power, and Peace LOOKING WHERE THE LIGHT IS, VERSUS LOOKING WHERE THE KEY WAS LOST Breaking out of the mental straightjacket of the cult of power is one of the most difficult intellectual tasks one can set oneself today. To think about power as competence rather than as dominance and to explore the implications of that shift; to shake off the preoccupation with the powerful and look for the power and competence in the allegedly "powerless"; to free oneself from the confines of living and thinking in the value- universe of the topdogs-these are remark- ably painful undertakings; the more so, since the temptation and pressure to fall back into the cultist framework of thought is strong and constant. We are most familiar with the manifestation of this in revolutionary movements which challenge and pull down the overlords of the moment, only to construct their own institutions of bureaucratic or despotic dominance.

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Alt Solvency No alt, but decon finds onto. Traditional IR causes endless war, we should lay bare realism/biopolitics. PERM IMPOSSIBLE. State bad.Richmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 145-146)

Post-structuralism subverts orthodox IR theory, particularly the state-centric and sovereign orthodoxy offered by realism, idealism and liberalism, and takes the project that Critical theory offers much further than the latter's claims of universalism would allow. Indeed, in comparison to post-structuralism, Critical theory begins to resemble liberal approaches in that it ultimately rests on moral universalism, and an assumption that all individuals, states and actors would, if they could, opt for both freedom and restraints on this basis. Because poststructuralism focuses on the problems of modernity which arise from the Enlightenment project it also offers a powerful critique of this project, without necessary offering an alternative. It implies that an ontology -or multiples of peace however, could be uncovered through language, genealogy and deconstruction, which instead uncovers the violence of the disciplinary liberal-realist project. It is not only such radical insights that are significant about post-structural readings of peace, but also the insights they provide in methodological terms, and the sensitivities they engender in ontological terms. These illustrate how orthodox IR theory represents the world mimetically, giving rise to a repetition of the 'lessons of history' in a self-fulfilling prophecy.72 To gain a multidimensional understanding of IR post-structuralists argue one needs to unsettle and embrace anti-mimetic approaches to representation that recognise universal subjectivity, rather than trying to replicate an eternal truth or reality.73 Poststructuralism offers a clear idea of what intellectual and methodological approaches can uncover that is wrong with the world, and its discursive construction. They have a sense of a notion of an ontology peace in which all should benefit, but little notion of the methods required to construct this peace in the pragmatic terms demanded by po1icymakers or orthodox theory. It also, of course, offers a sophisticated reading of the ontologies of violence. Poststructuralism poses the question: can a vocabulary that transcends even the critical notion of an emancipatory form of peace be found, given the deep-rooted nature of problematic assumptions, discourses and practices which mark political relations? It is unable to accept meta-narratives that offer universal truths, and in this way, its vision of peace is fundamentally different -based upon an ontology, a methodology, and episteme that rejects meta-narratives -to that of the other approaches discussed so far. This implies a claim to give rise to an understanding of peace which is pluralist and free of violence, while viewing other, especially state-oriented or universalistic theoretical approaches with a powerful scepticism designed to unmask the way they effectively legitimate an unjust status quo. What is more, and what differentiates post-structuralism from other more conservative perspectives, is that they accept that pluralism and relativism may mean that there are no truths, no universal norms and no eternal or timeless characteristics of behavioural traits that may determine the present or the future. This offers a more subtle form of emancipation, incorporating an understanding of the politics of resistance, solidarity and indigenous movements (perhaps through a consideration of international political sociological dynamics) rather than following the conceptualisations offered through elite intellectual and interventionary practices and action in topdown hegemonic institutions. Thus, it could be said that post-structuralism implies an ontology, or multiple ontologies of peace as discourse, not through active and material intervention of elites, as even Critical theory suggests, but through the laying bare of the disciplinary and biopolitical nature of liberal-realist discourse, allowing for a broad ranging empathy and a purer form of self-emancipation. This ontology of peace through discourse cannot in any way be connected with disciplinary biopolitics, assumptions of the inherency of violence due to nature or structure, and certainly not to the Enlightenment metanarrative of rational progress, which it rejects as engendering and disguising violence and oppression. It must at all costs avoid becoming a differend.

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Alt Solvency

There is no concrete alternative – rather, successful critique requires rejecting the notion that an alternative is needed in favor of criticizing the regimes of knowledge upon which current practices restRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 138)

Ashley helped open up this discussion in the context of IR theory, taking his queue from thinkers such as Foucault, Kristeva and Derrida, in order to develop a critique of IR’s orthodoxy. This started by illustrating how the modernist discourse of IR is itself internally contested: [the] modernist discourse is open in principle to a variety of interpretations of the sovereign man that it puts at its centre and whose voice it speaks. The liberal’s ‘possessive individual man’, the Marxist’s ‘labouring man’, the romantic ecologist’s ‘man in harmony with nature’, the Christian humanist’s ‘man in brotherhood with man’… Ashley offers an array of the achievements of post-structuralism, which open up the question of a how a deeper, representative, reflexive, inclusive, flexible and self-sustaining peace may be achieved. He argues that post-structuralism offers the only possibility of critique in IR, because it is not associated with offering any other alternatives. As an anti-foundationalism approach, rejecting the Enlightenment basis that critical theory, for example, sought to salvage, post-structuralist approaches to IR recognize the regimes of knowledge that Foucault suggested all claims of knowledge made. Yet, even by this most critical of voices, peace is not directly alluded to, though of course many dimensions of peace are enabled by the uncovering of the relationship between power and knowledge, the hidden binaries of orthodox theory and increasingly fertile sites of research in areas such as gender, memory, film, music and aesthetics.

The alternative recognizes a hybridity of perspectives which is key to successful movements away from the state – this opens up space for new solutions and conceptualizations of peaceRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 147)

One avenue that offers a perspective on how an ontology of peace may be thought of is derived from the notion of hybridity as developed by Bhabba.74 This implies the overlay of multiple identities and ideas, and their transmission without necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea. In this sense, social movements and alternative spaces which are not necessarily delineated or patrolled by states (such as the internet) are crucial, as Walker argues that 'critical social movements' are able to operate and develop in new issue areas and find new spaces in, and methods with which to open up these areas for debate. This results in radical challenges to the mainstream orthodoxies of politics and IR and, effectively, new forms of political and human community. This means that peace itself is radically reconceptualised, not necessarily as an objective but as a method and process, and never a final end state. In this context difference is accepted, others are acknowledged, but not at their own expense or that of hybridity. Uncovering hybridity -the fluid and intersecting identities shared by all-forms a via media between difference.76

Alternative is key to question universal truths and institutional knowledge productionRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 147)

Post-structural approaches offer at the very least an 'enhanced reflexivity' particularly in view of embedded assumptions and norms, for both the restructuring of IR theory and therefore for peace.77 It questions the possibility of a universal ethic of an emancipatory approach to peace as offered by Critical theorists. It problematises the claim of IR theory to be able to interpret, catalogue and organise on behalf of the other. It engenders resistance to an accepted norm and institutional approach to knowledge, and the privilege that the discipline's orthodoxy claims in order to interpret the 'unknowable other'. It raises the question that Dillon has asked about how one knows one is emancipated,78 and furthermore, how one can assume legitimately the privilege of knowing the mind of the other (a privilege that orthodox approaches claim unquestioningly) so their emancipation can be facilitated

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Alt Solvency

The alternative’s broad investigation of the multifaceted nature of peace is key to ensure self-sustainability – their hegemonic mode of though guarantees a bias which cannot be combined with thisRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 151-152)

Related to this are debates over different methods by which the type of peace extant can be evaluated. Clearly it is inadequate to merely research the nature of the international or a society through its documents and codification. There needs to be a normative and philosophical investigation. Ethnographic methods might be deployed

in order to deepen the understanding of the multiple dimensions of peace in social, cultural, aesthetic and environmental terms. Clearly, the broader the understanding of the multiple dimensions of peace, from levels of analysis, actors and issues, to methodological, ontological and epistemological issues, the more plausible it is to talk of a self-sustaining peace, as opposed to a hegemonic peace through external governance coloured by its interests and biases. Critics may warn that this is too complicated an approach to have any policy relevance, requiring

instead prioritisation and parsimony, yet re-applying the same solutions in the hope that they may finally work runs the risk of unanticipated consequences for the lives of really existing individuals that IR's orthodoxy appears to prefer to hide. Yet, in a globalising and democratising world they can no longer be hidden beneath the state, its associated institutions, or statistical descriptions. Approaches to peace able to

consider such dimensions would then become another basis upon which IR theory can be evaluated, and on which policy and practice can be formed. This would also make explicit the agendas of those who claim to represent power and truth, who claim to have privileged knowledge of the international, and claim the capacity to discursively represent and change the world through political, economic and social policy. The reclaiming of peace as a key

component of the IR project would have major implications for the sustainability of peace as it is experienced across the world. This would just relate to a Western normative framework, but the negotiation of forms of peace that reflect local ontologies as well as the need for emancipation, and selfsustainability in a broader global context, far beyond the often colonial mentality of aspects of the Western IR academy and the reflection and perpetuation of an Enlightenment and liberal project sharpened by Western strategic interests.

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Alt Solves-Social MovementsAlt solves, devolving power from the state to the individual is vital to reinstate confidence in peace movements Carroll 72 – Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 604 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc.

Many of the powers of the "powerless" are similarly invisible by virtue of one or both of the same two characteristics: they deal with intangibles, and they spring from the

thoughts and behavior of the large number of individuals who make up "the people," rather than from any defined group or institution. Nevertheless, they may indeed be the most important forms of social power, though the most difficult to mobilize around any conscious policy, particularly any policy of social change. At the same time, it is probably upon just these forms of power that all major, long-term social change-such as a change from the war system to a peace system would be- depends. THE POWERS OF THE "POWERLESS" I do not know whether anyone has tried to make an inventory of the powers of the allegedly powerless; perhaps there is something of this sort in anarchist writings somewhere, but I have not seen anything

recently. As a beginning toward such an inventory, I set down the following list, not in any particular order of importance or priority: (1) disintegrative power, (2) inertial power, (3) innovative power; norm-creating power, (4) legitimizing power; integrative power; socializing power, (5) expressive power, (6) explosive power, (7) power of Conflict Resolution / Volume XVI Number 4 PEA CE RESEARCH resistance, (8) collective power; cooperative power, (9) migratory power; population power. There is no room in this paper for a full discussion of these types of power, or capability, of the "powerless," nor would I be prepared to offer such a discussion at this time, since it is only quite recently that I have begun to think along these lines. Nevertheless, a few words may be said to clarify what I have in mind in each case, and what each may have to do with the prospects for

peace. (1) Disintegrative power. This is the power that large masses of people always have, by undirected but convergent individual action, to break down social organizations, economic institutions, and political structures-it is this power which we see at work today in the disintegration of our cities; the degeneration of service industries like tele- phone and telegraph, railroads, postal service, medical care, and the welfare system; the overloading and burgeoning deficiencies and injustices of the legal system; the defi- ance of "law and order" not only by "organized crime," which is, in fact, part of the structure of power-as-dominance, but increasingly by disaffected or alienated individuals, gangs, and political groups, not only in the ghettos of poverty, but now also throughout the class structure, from middle- class teenagers on pot to the daughters of millionaires making home-made bombs. This is the kind of power which has, in the long run, destroyed great empires and brought highly developed technologies of the past- the ancient irrigation systems of the Tigris- Euphrates and Nile valleys, the engineering marvels of Rome-into ruin. To some extent, disintegrative power is linked to other powers of the "powerless"-such as migratory power and reproductive power, the power to make significant change in the size and distribution of population. Disintegrative power is linked also to what might be called "dissociative" or "separatist" power. I have not included these as such in the above listing, because they seem to imply an organized or conscious, directed form-separatist movements, isolationist policies. Organized, conscious, collective action is by no means excluded from the range of powers potentially and actually within the reach of the "powerless," as we indicate further below; but they are forms of action more readily available to topdogs, difficult to initiate and sustain among the "powerless," and prone to fall into topdog control. Separatist movements and dissociative policies, however, depend heavily upon the disintegrative and other powers of the "powerless." As it comes to be more fully recognized (at present mainly in the broad school of peace research) that dissociative policies may be more suitable peace strategies in some conditions than integrative policies, the importance of focusing attention on the disintegrative power of the "powerless" in peace research may emerge more clearly. 8 I will venture to suggest here, though it may sound apocalyptic, that the world's best hope for avoiding thermonuclear war may lie not in world integration,

but in the political and technological disintegration of the nuclear superpowers. (2) Inertial power. This is the power of resistance which takes no organized or politically conscious form, but which confronts topdogs in all their efforts to organize societies according to their will and design. The extent to which they are successful in doing so is the measure of their power, in the conventional sense of the word: control, influence, dominance over others. But it 18. On the need to give serious attention to dissociative peace strategies, see Johan Galtung, "Some Basic Assumptions of Peace Thinking," International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, mimeo. 609 610 must be borne in mind that any such success is achieved against the resistance of the inertial power of masses, who are well aware that they would rather not work or fight for other people's profit, and must therefore either be persuaded to do so by manipulation or coerced into doing so by physical or economic force. The inertial power of the "powerless" is usually seen (not surprisingly, since it is usually viewed from the topdog standpoint) as something undesirable, something which perpetuates "things as they are," including the dominance of the powerful and their ability to maintain the war system. But I would suggest that, were it not for the basically pacific inertial power of the masses, war, glorified and led by topdogs throughout the history of civilization, would have been far worse a scourge than it has been. Whether the masses are basically pacific is, of course, a point still in dispute, which there is no room to argue here; suffice it to note, with Werner Levi, that: "In modern wars there are never enough 'aggressive' men flocking to the recruiting stations, while on the home front attractive salaries for war work seem to have greater attraction than the psychic rewards of a contribution to the war effort. Everywhere men are drafted into armies. Their and the general public's fighting spirit is aroused by government effort at great expense and not always successfully" (1966, p. 151). On the other hand, once stirred to bellicosity and mobilized to support it, the same inertial power may under some conditions get out of control, as it appears to have done in World War I. In either case, it would appear that the inertial power of the powerless is a matter more central to the problem of

war and peace than has been fully recognized by peace researchers.1 9 19. It has been treated to some extent, in a deterministic fashion, by Lewis F. Richardson, particularly in his articles on "War Moods," 1948. BERENICE A. CARROLL (3) Innovative power. Innovation and creativity are qualities usually attributed to topdogs, or at least middle-dogs; when they appear in underdogs, or persons who started out as underdogs and "pulled themselves up," it is usually regarded as exceptional. This viewpoint is reinforced in the advanced societies by educational systems which clas- sify children at an early age into "gifted" and "slow" or "academic" and "technical" categories, in which the "gifted" and the "academic" groupings are expected to show creativity and originality, the "slow" and "technical" groupings expected to plod slowly along behind, conforming to the instructions given them by others and at best able to make technical "applications" of the true innovations discovered by the intellectually better-endowed. This class system of the intelligence is coming under increasing challenge in educational theory as well as in the radical movements today. Johan Galtung also points out in his paper, "Feudal Sys- tems," that part of the exploitive function of the system is to "transport ideas upwards": This is perhaps seen particularly clearly in the relations between students, assistants and professors. The assistant conducts a seminar over his own research and the students contribute a number of ideas. The assistant notes them down and uses them without any compensation in the form of, e.g., written acknowledgment. This is then repeated by the professor when he organizes a seminar for his assistants (or graduate students), and the same thing happens to him when he goes to a conference as a low-status person. The basic rules of the feudal quotation matrix (the "who quotes whom" matrix) are three: never quote downwards, rarely quote horizontally, do quote vertically upwards-particularly if you can add "in a private communication" [1970, p. 147]. Conflict Resolution / Volume XVI Number 4 PEACE RESEARCH To what extent the inventions and creations attributed to topdogs are thus simply stolen without acknowledgment from underdogs, we cannot know. On the other hand, it appears not only possible but quite likely that, in the social arena, ideas and proposals for radical change would come from below-from those who suffer from "things as they are" and would benefit from changing them-rather than from above-from those who benefit from things as they are and have a stake in preserving them. It can indeed be argued that the role of topdogs, or of leaders of the underdogs who come from upper- or middle-class backgrounds, is basically one of response rather than of initiation. It is the underdogs who initiate demands and proposals for change, sometimes in forms which at first sight seem extreme and irrational, and sometimes by behavior which seems inchoate as well as violent (jacqueries, ghetto riots, demands for reparations from churches). It is only in response to such initiatory acts or demands from below that the topdogs (depending on their consciences and their situations) either organize political structures (parties, guerrilla armies, etc.) to represent and give more "realistic" form to the underdog demands; or take action to suppress, to compromise, or to give way to those demands. This process is frequently concealed in scholarly studies by the predi- lection of scholars for looking only at the powerful, and for assuming or asserting that "spontaneous action of the masses" is a myth; the historical record on this point remains to (be clarified. Contemporary experience, however, suggests strongly that the most innovative demands and proposals, those that seem most extreme and unrealistic because they depart furthest from accepted norms, come from the underdogs and the alienated, not from their middle- class sympathizers nor from the topdog groups struggling to keep up with the demands. 611 It is an interesting and highly significant point that the demand for an end to the war system has not been initiated by the masses, though it is one to which they have responded favorably. If the argument of this paper is correct, no solution to the war problem will be found until we have a better understanding of why peace is not an urgent demand of the "powerless," despite their pacific inclinations, and of how or when it might become so. Though peace itself has not been an urgent demand of the "powerless," their innovative or norm-creating function in the international system has been noted, for example, in an article analyzing the behavior of states according to rank in the Interna- tional Court of Justice, in which Ib Martin Jarvad found that the function of the ICJ has been primarily a norm-creating one, rather than one of settling disputes according to norms already established; that high- ranking nations, though more involved in disputes than low-ranking nations and better represented on the board of judges, are lower in acceptance of the ICJ than low- ;,nking nations and more inclined to confine the court's judgments to settlement of disputes according to

established norms. Low- ranking nations, on the other hand, were (CARROLL 72 CONT) found to stress the norm-creating functions of the Court (Jarvad, 1968). (4) Legitimizing power. This is the power which Boulding calls integrative power, and which might also be called socializing power-the power of shaping the habits and attitudes of the individuals and small groups of which any society is composed, and upon whose habits and attitudes its governing power depends. Of course, the institutional structures of society-schools, churches, corporations, factories, communications media, government agencies-all have significant socializing power, which is thus in some degree in the control of the ruling elites which direct these institutions. On the other 612 hand-as those who are trying to achieve changes in one of the most basic forms of socialization, sex role differentiation, are learning-the institutional structures of society themselves reflect the earlier and more pervasive socialization of the individual in the family and the early peer group. Thus, the extent to which a set of political institutions governing society is supported, actively or passively, by the population it governs, is determined by the convergent or divergent attitudes of many individual or small-group units, rather than by any conscious policies or strategies of elite groups, whether coercive or manipulative. When that support is present, at or above some as-yet- undetermined threshold, coercion and manipulation can serve to reinforce and preserve it; but when it is absent or withdrawn, no amount of coercive commands or manipulative strategems will suffice to maintain the power of those who had thought themselves powerful. This point has been taken up by Hannah Arendt, who disputes the common identification of government (or politics) with command and control, as well as the frequent identification of power with violence. She notes, to begin with, that "the will-to- power and the will-to-submission are inter- connected" and that, conversely, "a strong disinclination to obey is often accompanied by an equally strong repugnance to dominate and command." Erich Fromm and other psychologists also link the free person- ality, not with the "will-to-power" in the sense of a will to dominate, but with autonomous creativity, the power to do and to love independently. With respect to government in particular, Hannah Arendt points out that there exists an old and strong tradition of political thought which rejects the notion of government as dominion of man over man: BERENICE A. CARROLL When the Athenian city-state called its constitution an isonomy, or the Ro- mans spoke of the civitas as their form of government, they had in mind another concept of power whose essence did not rely upon the command- obedience relationship. It is to these examples that the men of the eight- eenth-century revolutions turned when they ransacked the archives of antiquity and constituted a form of government, a republic, where the rule of law, resting on the power of the people, would put an end to the rule of man over man, which they thought was "a government fit for slaves." . .. It is the support of the people that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this support is but the continuation of the consent which brought the laws into existence to begin with. .. All political institutions are manifestations and materiali- zations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them [1969, pp. 14-15]. Arendt argues, further, that power and violence are not only distinct, but actually opposites. "Violence can always destroy power," she writes, and "out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience." But: What can never grow out of it is power.... To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished, it is paid by the victor in terms of his own power [p. 20]. And by the same token: To speak of nonviolent power is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it [p. 22]. Conflict Resolution / Volume XVI Number 4 PEA CE RESEARCH The impotence of violence is most clearly witnessed at that moment of revolutionary disintegration of governmental power in which the commands of the government are no longer obeyed, and the armed forces will no longer use their weapons against insur- gents: Where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence are of no use; and the question of obedience is not

decided by the command- obedience relation but by opinion, and, of course, by the number of those who share it [p. 17]. This "opinion, and... the number of those who share it," is what I call the legitimizing power of the "powerless," (5) Expressive power; and (6) explosive power. What I have in mind in these instances is primarily the power of the "powerless" to express their discontent or even rage by behavior and demands which exceed- sometimes to the point of violence-the social, legal, and moral norms which ordinarily bind most members of society, and which ordinarily bind its middle-class members most tightly. I have differentiated the two in order to distinguish between the more explosive forms of expression-such as riots, mob violence, bombings, assassinations, and spontaneous mass demonstrations (such as took place in some cases in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, when the "leaders" of radical groups and student bodies found themselves confronting a mass of demon- strators over whom neither they nor anyone else had any directive power or control)- and other ways in which discontent may be dramatically, but less violently, displayed (including art, literature, theatre, "ex- tremist" political speeches and demands, organized nonviolent protests, etc.). In both cases, however, the power involved is a warning power and, to some extent, an educative power unlikely in itself to bring 613 about significant change or even significant response from above, in the short run, but likely in the long run to spread and mount in intensity and strength if ignored or

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met with attempts at repression. Expressive and explosive power are warnings of the ultimate disintegrative, dissociative, and delegitimiz- ing power of the "powerless." Explosive power is by definition an expression of protest, discontent, or rage, but expressive power might also be conceived in a positive sense: it might be called "love power." In this sense, it is closely related to integrative power, rather than to disintegrative power, and it takes a variety of forms, from love on a personal level between individuals to collective manifestations like the Woodstock festival, and to less ephem- eral, more widespread, and perhaps less visible manifestations in efforts to develop "black consciousness" ("black is beautiful") or to experiment with various forms of communal living and "earth culture." It has also been suggested that expressive power in this sense manifests itself in the culture of the "powerless" as a kind of freedom of human expression and interaction from which topdogs have cut themselves off by their preoccupation with alienating institutions-institutions which provide them with rewards in material goods and status, but cut them off from their own humanity. To what

extent this process of alienation is more or less extensive among topdogs as compared with underdogs remains to be explored.20 (7) Power of resistance; and (8) collective or cooperative power. These are largely self-explanatory, and have been touched on 20. Jacqueline Flenner, who suggested the idea of "expressive power" to me in the course of conversations on the powers of the powerless, regards alienation as being higher among topdogs; Galtung, on the other hand, holds that increased opportunities and facilities for interaction are among the advantages of topdogs, while underdogs are isolated and atomized

(1970). 614 above (p. 609) in discussing the difference between dissociative and disintegrative power. The power of resistance is differentiated here from inertial power to indicate organized, or at least politically self-conscious, forms of resistance . Like collective and cooperative power, then, the power of resistance implies some degree of concerted action directed to conscious political or social goals, not simply the convergence of independent individual opinions or actions. As noted above, such forms of concerted, conscious action are possible to the "powerless" and may even embody a conscious effort to eliminate dominance relationships from the resistant or cooperative group, as in certain groups committed to nonviolent direct action, or to egalitarian communalism. In some instances, the resistance of the "powerless" has been mobilized in nonviolent action on a massive scale, most successfully in India, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. On the whole, however, organized forms of resistance and collective action on the part of the "powerless" (unless backed by more conventional power, as in various movements of resistance against German rule in Europe during World War II) are the weakest forms of the power of the "powerless" at the present time; they may have, however, enormous potential for development. These kinds of power of the "powerless" have received considerably more attention in the field of peace research than the others we have discussed here, yet not as much attention as

subjects which focus attention on the powerful, as indicated above; and not nearly as much as the subject deserves, if peace research is to be truly committed to peace. (9) Migratory or population power. The power of the "powerless" to move or to reproduce themselves or not is one of thos. which may be peripherally influenced by deliberate policies (relating to birth control, abortion, rewards, or penalties for child- BERENICE A. CARROLL bearing, immigration controls, etc.), but which appear to be largely independent of any conscious direction or control by governments or institutions. It is a power which may have either disintegrative or integrative effects. It may affect the prospects for peace not only negatively, by increasing the pressures and tensions of competition

for resources and status, but also positively, by fostering a sense of human community: Up to now, integrative power in the international community has been very weak. This type of power, however, is something which is bound to develop as the sense of the community of mankind grows, especially under the impact of the space age. The concept of earth as we see it from space as a beautiful little spaceship, clothed in the everchanging mantle of the atmosphere, with a crowded crew and limited resources is bound to have an enormous impact on man's image of his world and of himself, and this in turn will have a profound impact on the international system [Boulding, 1970b, p. 60]. Conclusion This discussion of the powers of the "powerless" is admittedly quite incomplete and highly speculative. It is offered only as a beginning toward reinterpreting the idea of power in terms of competence instead of dominance, and exploring what the implications of such a reinterpretation would be in the

field of peace research. In brief, what has been suggested here is that the prevailing preoccupation with the powerful-with major powers and their elites, with nation-states and their capabilities for war and for imposing their will on others-is unlikely to bring us any closer to peace, since it assumes the perpetuation of the power system which may well be at the root of war. But if the Conflict Resolution / Volume XVI Number 4 PEACE RESEARCH conception of power as dominance is wrong, or if it is no better than a partial and basically misleading conception, then Han- nah Arendt may be right in rejecting the view "that the most crucial political issue is, and always has been, the question of Who rules Whom?" And in the international as well as the domestic political arena, she may be right in concluding: It is only after one eliminates this disastrous reduction of public-affairs to the business of dominion, that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear or rather reappear in their authentic diversity [1969, pp. 15-161.

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Alt Solves-Individuals Key

Critical theory emphasizes individual involvementRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 124)

The ambition to build a universal framework for a legitimate peace via emancipation reflecting an empathetic approach to IR is derived from Horkheimer’s argument that critical theory transcends the mere explanation of social laws or patterns by attempting to transform social systems. In doing so it elaborates a position in the agency-structure debate that posits the plausibility of human resistance and the subsequent reform of oppressive structures, however powerful. In other words, immutability is not the key characteristic of IR, but instead individuals make their own history (in

opposition to the realist assertion that power and anarchy defines the international and defines peace). Social movements, NGOs and civil society actors are also significant actors in these terms, as well as states, international organization and international financial institutions. All such actors, along with individuals, are engaged in the critical emancipatory project of peace, relating as Linklater has argued to the active creation of ‘moral communities’, states or otherwise. Power and anarchy are consequently simply expressions of the failure of this discursive project, but do not mean it is an implausible project.

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Alt-Comes First

Defining peace is a pre-req to successful policy formulation – we must proceed with a proper epistemological and ontological foundationRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 153-155)

Critical theory is more focused on the emancipation of the individual and an ontology of emancipation, and draws on a range of political philosophy and social theory in order to construct a discursive framework in which a politics of peace can be constructed and embedded. This has, however, been criticised for resting on Western norms and traditions, not least for envisioning a world in which basic norms, structures and frameworks can be found or developed which are common to all, and claiming that this process can be insulated from the dangers of hegemony and institutional capture. Critical theory's response has been to problematise universality while at the same time seeking a way to retain it. Post-structural approaches to IR theory seek to take this process much further, both drawing eclectically on a range of representations of the political and international space, through the investigation of the discursive modes of power/knowledge that are deployed by elites to protect their power, and which can be unravelled in order to develop peaceful discourses. The resultant juxtaposition of different methods, disciplines and modes of analysis and representation within IR enable an engagement with ontologies of peace as a way of circumventing some of the limitations with Critical theory's emancipatory peace. This via media is inter-disciplinarity. Table 1 outlines the implications for peace of the main approaches to IR. In addition, various sub-disciplines and areas imply other dimensions of peace. Placing peace at the centre of the discipline indicates that to fully engage with the international, IR theory needs to embrace (through critical 'verstehen' approaches to social action)14 its complexity rather than avoid it. IS This means it should also have some sense of the peace that it implies (see above) to avoid the accusation that IR has become complicit in these oversights in order to support a hegemonic and essentially liberal order. 16 Though the liberal peace offers a form of emancipation this is potentially hegemonic, and perhaps reflects what Rorty has described as a 'liberal utopia'.17 As Walker has argued, IR theory fails when it attempts to present a truth as anything other than a 'historically specific spatial ontology' .18 But there is an additional problem. If peace is assumed to be a goal of discursive approaches to the IR, not defining it in advance, perhaps in relation to a specific theory, sheds doubt on that intention. Defining it in advance without a careful negotiation of peace through an inter-subjective process offers a more sophisticated discursive framework, but also is rather instrumentalist in the light of Walker's argument that all IR theory is linked to specific moments and places in history. This is the paradox of thinking about peace in orthodox IR -it creates an instrumentalist need for theory and practice to offer progress from a war system to peace system in advance of its engagement with a specific conflict context, meaning that great care must be taken to separate this intention from an alien, blueprint approach to peace that is then transplanted into conflict zones. This raises the broader question of how IR can engage with the other without falling into a 'white man's burden', Orientalist and coercive syndrome, while assuming that a specific epistemology of IR and peace is superior and can be transplanted into any location without regard for context. Thus 'peace' as a process offers a contradiction -it requires a method, ontology and epistemology which are negotiated locally, but prompted externally by agents who must engage with the other, but cannot know one another, at least in a short time and at the depth of detail required for such ambitious relationships. These concerns underline the possibilities offered by critical approaches to peace.

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Alt Solves-WarEndless war is inevitable unless we re-conceptualize the meaning of peaceReid and Yanarella 1976. [Herbert G. Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky. "Toward a Critical Theory of Peace Research in the United States: the Search for an 'Intelligible Core'". Journal of Peace Research. No. 4, Volume 13, 1976.]

[ For too long, radicals have been blind to the real strength of the system, leaving the hidden source of its power framed in the anomalous term, 'false consciousness.' Within peace research, Berenice Carroll in her seminal article, performed a vital service to the American peace community. Without consciously drawing upon Gramsci's works or those American historians and political theorists writing in the same vein, she developed two Gramscian-type conclusions: (1) that 'peace research ought to say farewell to the conception of power as dominance and give up its current preoccupation with persons, groups, and institutions conceived as powerful', looking instead to the power and competence of the allegedly powerless; and (2) that 'no solution to the war problem will be found until we have a better understanding of why peace is not an urgent demand of the 'powerless' despite their pacific inclinations and of how or when it might become so'. The development of a counter-hegemonic strategy has been assisted by the work of Edward Weisband and Robert Packenham dealing with the role of Lockean-liberalism in American foreign policy and in U.S. relations with the Third-World. While Weisband's monograph has done much to expose the liberal moralistic character of American foreign policy since this nation's founding, more work is necessary on the dynamic relationship between foreign and domestic policy in the American corporate liberal state. Carl Oglesby's 'treatment of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 provides one line that research might take, but we are thinking more in terms of radicalizing some of Louis Hartz's views on how American elites respond to defeat in foreign policy adventures. In The Liberal Tradition in America, Hartz sees the real danger in the tendency of irrational Lockeanism combined with nationalism to transmute itself into zealous Americanism in a period of military defeat or ideological assaults. Thus, a new round of political witchhunting and ideological expurgation in domestic politics could start. Seeing such intolerant crusades in the domestic arena as 'moralistic binges' might elucidate how political elites in the United States use these episodes, sometimes as scapegoats for the excessive moralistic objectives placed on foreign involvements (the fall of China and McCarthyism), and sometimes to break up domestic radical groups (World War I and the 'Red Scare'). Finally, one might consider how international incidents are manufactured in the wake of defeat (e.g. the Mayaguez incident) when, for whatever reasons, the domestic sphere is closed off to the political mobilization of bias. It is clear that much can be mined in this ideological interface between American foreign policy and liberal society. A counter-hegemonic strategy will have to illuminate the structural basis of violence in American society as well as the elements of consent and official violence mentioned above. Because of the powerful hold of the American Dream upon the beliefs of most Americans, the function's of violence in this society are poorly understood by its ci'tizens. The same is true of the polymorphous form in which violence may be masked. Any movement toward peace research will be indebted to the work of Johan Galtung on the notion of structural violence, which was elaborated by critical students of peace research like Dieter Senghaas. Peace researchers will have to demystify the rhetoric of equality and the other myths supporting power and privilege, to uncover the structural nature of social injustice 'built into America's liberal-capitalist and techno-corporate order. ]

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AT: Alt not possible Peace reforms possible- empirically proven Fujikane 03. [Hiroko Fujikane. "Approaches to Global Education in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan". International Review of Education. Volume 49, pg 133-152, March 2003]

[In this context, the discussion of ideas about education for peace re-emerged. It incorporated some elements of education for international understanding, development education and multicultural education (Burns and Aspeslagh 1996). The revised concept of peace education carried some radical theories which developed in the 1970s, including Galtung's concept of "structural violence" and Freire's idea of liberation from oppression through action. In the new debates, peace no longer meant only the absence of war ("negative peace"). The stress was on "strong, or positive peace" (Galtung 1971). Peace education envisaged a society without indirect violence, such as political or economic oppression, discrimination, and the destruction of the environment. Freire's advocacy contributed to shifting the focus of peace education from its content - education about peace - towards its process – education for peace, while encouraging a participatory and co-operative approach to peace building (Freire 1972). Such discussions in turn required re-consideration of the role of state education. In this sense, peace education was always outside, or even opposed to, the official educational policies of all three countries. In many cases, the advocates were small groups of enthusiastic educators, writers, and individuals who attempted to challenge the dominant paradigm. Although the Peace Education Commission of the International Peace Research Association had been a place for world-wide discussion since the 1970s (Burns and Aspeslagh 1996), a range of interpretations and practices existed according to the different locations of the advocates (Bjerstedt 1989). The United States experienced the rise of local movements in the 1970s, in which the term "Global Education" had been used to challenge traditional teaching. The early advocates, such as Hanvey, Anderson and Becker, claimed that the traditional approach termed "International Education", which normally contained subjects such as "International Relations" and "Area Studies", should be revised to improve understanding of the world (Anderson 1977; Becker 1974; Hanvey 1975). The new idea targeted all citizens from young to old, and encouraged participation in rather than mere understanding of the world (Kniep 1986). In the late 1970s, several states recognised and addressed the need for Global Education, and many national organisation and agencies conducted global education projects (Kobus 1983). Under the Carter administration in the United States, the Department of Education strongly supported such activities (Crum 1982). Much influenced by this, in the United Kingdom the One World Trust 139 started a project in the 1980s to develop curriculum and teaching methods for World Studies. The idea embraced integrated studies for a better understanding of the world. The project flourished in the late 1970s and the 1980s: pilot studies were organised, manuals for teachers were published, and Mode III CSE for World Studies was developed (Hicks 1990).]

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Alt- Rejection

The alternative is to reject the affirmative. Our rejection allows us to accept the dynamics of the word “peace”, opening up new space for attainable change.

Johan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 185-6

We may summarize by saying that too much research emphasis on one aspect of peace tends to rationalize extremism to the right or extremism to the left, depending on whether onesided emphasis is put on 'absence of personal violence' or on 'social justice'. And these two types of extremism are of course not only formally, but also socially closely related and in a dialectic manner: one is often a reaction to the other. When put into practice both may easily develop into well-known social orders where neither of the two aspects of peace are realized: gross social injustice is maintained by means of highly manifest personal violence. The regime usually tries to maintain a status quo, whether it means forceful maintenance of traditional social injustice that may have lasted for generations, or the forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice brought in by an attempt to overthrow the old system. If 'peace' now is to be interpreted as an effort to play on both, one may ask: does this not simply mean some kind of 'moderate' course, some effort to appear 'objective' by steering carefully between the two types of extremism outlined above? There is no doubt a danger in this direction. Efforts to avoid both personal and structural violence may easily lead to accept one of them, or even both. Thus, if the choice is between righting a social wrong by means of personal violence or doing nothing, the latter may in fact mean that one supports the forces behind social injustice. And conversely: the use of personal violence may easily mean that one gets neither long-term absence of violence nor justice. Or, we can put the argument in a slightly different framework. If we are interested in e.g. social justice but also in the avoidance of personal violence, does this not constrain our choice of means so much that it becomes meaningful only in certain societies? And particularly in societies that have already realized many social-liberal values, so that there is considerable freedom of speech and assembly, and organizations for effective articulation of political interests? Whereas we are literally immobilized in highly repressive societies, or 'more openly repressive societies' as modem critics of liberalism might say? Thus, if our choice of means in the fight against structural violence is so limited by the non-use of personal violence that we are left without anything to do in highly repressive societies, whether the repression is latent or manifest, then how valuable is this recipe for peace? To this we may answer along many lines.One answer would be to reject the definition given above of peace, because we want 'peace' to refer to something attainable and also in fact attained, not to something as utopian as both absence of personal violence and social justice. We may then slant the definition of 'peace' in the direction of absence of personal violence, or absence of structural violence, depending on where our priorities are. In our definition above we have suggested that the two enter in a completely symmetrial manner: there is no temporal, logical or evaluative preference given to one or the other. Social justice is not seen as an adornment to peace as absence of personal violence, nor is absence of personal violence seen as an adornment to peace as social justice. Unfortunately, on the printed page, one has to appear before the other or above the other, and this is often interpreted as priority (compare the recent debate on whether a certain group's political slogan should be 'peace and freedom' or 'freedom and peace'). Actually, somebody should invent some way of printing so that absolutely no connotation of priority is implied.

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Alt SolvesFocus on negative peace legitimizes violence in order to maintain this peace—only focus on positive peace will eliminate violence Bilgin 2003. [Pinar Bilgin. "Individual and Societal dimensions of Security". International Studies Review. Volume 5, No. 2. pp. 203-222.]

[The need for such coordinated activity was heightened in the Cold War environment by the imminent threat of global nuclear catastrophe. Olaf Palme, in his introduction to the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982:ix) titled Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, wrote: Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope of victory in a nuclear war, the two sides would be united in suffering and destruction. They can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction. By putting common security into practice, Gorbachev changed the Soviet approach to arms control, accepting sufficiency rather than seeking parity with the United States (Allison 1991). Accordingly, the Soviet Union was able to make unilateral concessions to reduce their arms, which in turn took away the West's threat and paved the way for the end of the Cold War. Although it was students of common security who emphasized the need for global security and pointed to its nonmilitary dimensions, academics involved in peace research laid the intellectual groundwork for these ideas by producing studies that focused on individuals and social groups as referents for security. Students of peace research also suggested alternative security practices (that is, nonmilitary, nonzero sum, nonviolent approaches), putting special emphasis on peace education and the role of the intellectual (Garrison and Phipps 1989; Dunn 1991; Rabinowitch 1997). Works by Johan Galtung and Kenneth Boulding were critical in urging us to consider individual and societal dimensions of security. According to the maximal approach introduced by Galtung (1969), peace did not just mean the absence of war; it was also related to the establishment of conditions for social justice. In making this point, Galtung distinguished between personal and structural violence. The latter is defined as those socioeconomic institutions and relations that oppress human beings by preventing them from realizing their potential. Violence, for Galtung (1996:197, emphasis in the original), is all those "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible." Moreover, he defined cultural violence as those mechanisms that render acceptable both direct violence (as in killing, repression, and delocalization) and structural violence (as in exploitation, penetration, and marginalization). Thus, Galtung turned both the use of violence and the ways in which violence is legitimized by the society into a subject of study. By adopting a broader definition of violence and an approach that focused on human needs, he and other students of peace research shifted the focus away from the state and the military dimension of security to individuals and social groups and their needs. Galtung underlined the futility of trying to achieve peace without tackling the structural causes of the insecurity of individuals and social groups as well as states. Distinguishing between negative and positive peace, he argued that peace defined merely as the absence of armed conflict is negative peace. Positive peace, maintained Galtung (1996:32), means the absence of both direct (physical) violence and indirect (structural and cultural) violence. He emphasized that to attain positive peace, it is not enough to seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and relations must be geared toward the enhancement of dialogue, cooperation, and solidarity among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment.]

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Alt Solvency

Focus on violence and nuclear annihilation creates unstable peace—shifting away from thinking about deterrence is a prerequisite to solve all violence Bilgin 2003. [Pinar Bilgin. "Individual and Societal dimensions of Security". International Studies Review. Volume 5, No. 2. pp. 203-222.]

Kenneth Boulding's (1978) conception of stable peace was invaluable in emphasizing that peace maintained through the use of threat and force cannot be stable. He explained stable peace by comparing it with unstable peace (that is, peace maintained through threatening mutual annihilation, namely nuclear deterrence). Unstable peace is defined as a condition in which no real expectations exist that peace (understood as the mere absence of armed conflict) will be maintained in the future. Stable peace, in contrast, exists when two sides learn how to make peace by creating trusting relationships that disarm people's minds as well as their institutions. Such relationships, argued Boulding, can stand the stress of crises that threaten to tear them apart because everyone has a firm expectation regarding the nature of future relations. Another contribution of peace researchers was their emphasis on the increasing inappropriateness of established ways of thinking about security given the security concerns of individuals and social groups in the West. The practices of Western European peace movements during the 1970s and 1980s served to drive this lesson home (see Kaldor 1997). This concern was shared by students of Third World security, who maintained that Western-oriented, state-based approaches to security were unable to address the security needs and interests of states as well as nonstate actors in the Third World. These Western approaches focused on East-West stability and its maintenance through nuclear deterrence and nuclear power balancing, whereas Third World states sought to reject the automatic categorization of their problems into an East-West framework. Third World Security Approaches Students of Third World security have criticized the almost exclusive focus on crises and conflicts that has comprised the established (Cold War) ways of thinking about security. They are concerned about the neglect of longitudinal security processes-the processes of development through which the security of individuals and social groups are maintained (Al-Mashat 1985). Galtung's stress on the structural causes of insecurity struck a chord with Third World policymakers in an era marked by the formation of the nonaligned movement, the Group of 77, and calls for a New International Economic Order at the United Nations. The nonaligned movement emphasized the differences between their security agendas and that of the superpowers. The ideology of the movement constituted a fundamental challenge to mainstream thinking at the time. 205 Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security During the 1980s, some students of Third World security took up these issues once again (see, for example, Thomas and Saravanamutu 1989; Sayigh 1990). Caroline Thomas (1987) differentiated between two approaches to security. The first approach was adopted by those states in the developed world that were relatively satisfied with the status quo and saw security mainly in terms of its maintenance. They privileged the stability of the existing system as a foremost security concern. The second and more holistic approach, argued Thomas, was adopted by those states in the Third World that included economic, political, and environmental issues in their security agenda. The search for security in the Third World was mostly about maintaining domestic security through state-building and establishing secure systems for dealing with food, health, money, and trade as much as it was about building up the military. Accordingly, many (but not all) Third World states saw a change in the status quo not necessarily as a threat but rather as conducive to security-provided, of course, that the change was toward the creation of an international economic structure sensitive to the needs of developing states. Although the distinction Thomas drew between the security needs and the interests of developed and developing states is helpful, the reader should note that not all developing states were against the status quo. Indeed, it was not always the case that Western conceptions of security were top-down, whereas those of the Third World were bottom-up. Rather, there were both developed and developing states (and nonstate actors) among those that propagated top-down views of security. For instance, when some Third World policymakers spoke of the need to address the nonmilitary dimensions of insecurity, they often meant the need to put limits on the exercise of democratic freedoms for purposes of state consolidation. The practical implication of this state-based approach to security was the government's domination over society in which the public's sacrifices were viewed as obligations. The state's privileges, in turn, were justified as being necessary to its survival. Accordingly, those who dared to challenge the security practices of their states and focused on individual or societal dimensions of security were margin- alized at best; they were accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst. Bottom-up views of security voiced by nonstate actors in the Third World did not get heard unless the groups adopted violent practices in an attempt either to form a state (as the Palestine Liberation Organization did) or to capture state power in their own countries (as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah did). The efforts of groups, like the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, that undertook grassroots activism during the 1980s by setting up a network of medical clinics and charitable associations to serve the poorest and most crowded localities not reached by the government were clouded by the violent practices that characterized most of their activities in the period following the 1991 elections. However, some significant exceptions to this generalization exist. Gandhi captured the world's attention as well as its sympathy during the period that preceded India's independence (see Barash 2000).]

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Alt Solvency

Alt solves—shift away from current peacekeeping efforts creates a movement towards positive peace and effective conflict resolution Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 99.]

[Conflict resolution approaches are often represented as a methodology through which citizens are able to deal with a conflict in a non-zero-sum manner, but without any intention of influencing the zero-sum debates that may continue at the official level. This is a limited, inherently conservative, and contained view of the process that fails to acknowledge the connection between civil society and constitutional or institutional versions of peace. A better representa tion of conflict resolution would be to acknowledge that it provides a far more radical perspective on conflict and peace in which neither can occur without accepting the agency of the individual and civil society in both. In terms of the development of a specific conceptual isation of peace, within such debates there is an implicit acceptance of the norms and regimes associated with pluralism and democracy, human rights and social welfare. What second generation approaches offer the debates on peace therefore, are a set of alternative perspec tives and strategies through which the civil aspect of the liberal peace can be constructed. From this insight, it is only a short step to estab lish an intellectual and policy framework that incorporates both first and second generation approaches in the quest to establish the liberal peace in conflict zones. The theoretical and methodological impact of conflict resolution approaches has become a significant part of the liberal toolkit against conflict despite the fact that some of its claims - the identification of human needs, the scientific rather than normative aspects of conflict and its resolution, its impact upon but separation from first generation approaches, its complementary possibilities for official mediation, its claim to neutral facilitation and so on - are problematic. Yet, they have also helped develop the rigid Westphalian notions of diplomatic forms of communication, and implicitly added a normative aspect and association of the individual and civil society with 'positive peace'. In turn, this positive peace contributes to the debate on the liberal peace, which has been con ceptualised as a 'cosmopolitan turn' in conflict resolution. 42 These second generation approaches offer insights in the causes of conflict methods that lend themselves to the work of non-state actors and NGOs in particular in their contribution to the creation of human, rather than state, security. Peace is therefore constructed by the identification and allocation of human needs, which, perhaps most importantly, requires listening to the voices of non-state and unofficial actors. This purports to offer a peace, close to an ideal form, in which human needs are fulfilled, and there exists a transna tional 'cobweb model' of transactions that form a world society.43 This is one of the few explicit theorisations on the type of peace that the application of a specific approach to dealing with conflict, in this case conflict resolution forms of facilitation or workshops, would reduce. ]

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Alt-Reform Key

Allowing the state to solve for peace results in war—only a bottom up reform solves Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 58.]

[This Enlightenment derived process, drawing on the liberal interna tionalism of the immediate post-WWI world, the functionalist agendas of post-WWII, and on an uneasy mix of self-determination, liberal democracy, neoliberal economic reform, human rights, a balancing of state and human security, international legal regimes such as interna tional human rights and humanitarian law, has increasingly become an accepted part of the liberal projection on how globalised world pol itics operates. It is also clear, however, that without states, this projec tion of peace may be extremely difficult as states still provide the basic building blocks upon which all these actors and activities are based. Though states make war possible, many other actors are also involved (the democratisation of the means of violence has undermined this Weberian argument), but specific states do make the liberal peace pos sible . This is not unproblematic given that states and the officials that run their defence, military, and foreign policies are conditioned to assume war rather than peace is the most plausible outcome in interna tional relations. They are also conditioned to perceive dangers in peace that may undermine the status quo, rather than see peace as a danger in itself . The problem with states, of course, is that they themselves need to be stable and secure before they can indulge in a liberal interna tional agenda. Peace is actually an artificial, intricate and volatile state.24 The emerging liberal peace acknowledges this problem, that peace may not be a natural condition, organic to society given certain condi tions, and it may indeed rest upon all manner of preconditions, social, economic, political and cultural . This essentially leads into a repetition of the domestic analogy: the conditions of international peace can only: arise through institutional and organizational arrangements that reflect the arrangements made inside states which have achieved a domestic peace. This is represented in the integration of the constitutional peace agenda of the early peace plans investigated in the previous chapter with the institutionalist project, which emerges in the twentieth century. This is, of course, very problematic because many contemporary liberal states, which view themselves, or are viewed as part of the liberal international peace, are not themselves necessarily fully peaceful domestically. For example, it should be sufficient to point to the secessionist or irredentist conflicts that marred the politi cal landscapes of Britain, Ireland, Spain, France, Turkey, Morocco, Cyprus, in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, and so forth. Furthermore, there are still indigenous and traditional interstate conflicts across the world. In addition to this merging of the constitutional and institutional argu ment, the civil peace framework is also significant. The core of this argument about peace is that it should include a bottom-up process in which states become pacified and then contribute to an international peace, replacing or complimenting a top-down process in which inter national organisations and institutions, dominant liberal states, and private actors pacify conflict zones and then install the institutions of peace from the top-down . During the twentieth century these strands seem to have emerged as the dominant and most plausible approaches to creating this version of peace. Peace results from either a top down process performed upon conflicts by outside coalitions of actors, or it emerges from intra and inter-societal consensus and is then reflected in developments at the state and international level.]

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Alt Solvency-Reform Key

Reforming concepts of peace to determine our role as individuals is key to solve all impacts Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 119.]

[There is an important literature emerging, constituting a fourth generation of approaches to ending conflict, that focuses on the question of how one can move beyond the installation of a hegemonic peace in conflict zones, instead replacing it with one which reflects the agency and needs of individuals and groups within conflict zones, and the construction of peace settlements which are sensitised to the local as well as the state, regional, and global. This reflexive version of peace associated with different emancipatory discourses is far from new. Indeed it coloured the work of many work in the field and associated sub disciplines, but without explicit explanation. This may partly have been because of the problems of providing a value-oriented discussion of such a powerful normative concept or because anything other than a narrow version of peace lacks parsi mony and therefore policy relevance (such as Galtung's negative/ positive framework).91 The problem here is that peace is a politicised concept, and the current liberal peace framework operates by claiming universality. If every peace is envisaged as permanent and every war the last, then clearly there are enormous stakes to be had in claiming a part of the new or current peace. Thus, for example, reframing peace as communicative action based upon Habermasian dialogic relations underlines the negotiation and mediation which are played out in any discussion of peace between actors, interests, norms, and values, past, present and future as well as the role of individuals in claiming agency in their emancipation.92 This type of process, of learning and of feed back, does not seem apparent in most theorisations and practices that contribute to peacebuilding and the peacebuilding consensus. This development of a fourth generation in conflict theory seems to be a counter-discourse to the mainstream dogma of peace. However, it is also problematic because the sort of universalism inherent even in an emancipatory discourse such as in critical theory, which privileges liberal positions, may tend toward the notion that one actor in a rela tionship has better knowledge or more expertise in a particular area and therefore must act to emancipate the other. In one sense, this is exactly the conundrum faced by the liberal peace and its associated peacebuilding consensus. At least the liberal version of peace has the integrity of a specific adjective to qualify its status as an ideal form, however.]

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Alt-Reform Key

Positive peace is impossible under current government approaches- only a bottom up reform solves Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 98.]

[The understanding of peace that has emerged from these approaches is still very limited and works only by focusing on one specific dimension of the conflict environment. Civil society, the state, or the reform of international structures seemed unlikely in the context of the Cold War, to bring anything more than a negative peace, geographically bounded, temporally projected as leading to a better ideal future, and based upon the threat or use of force. What is most important about the apparent tension between conflict resolution and conflict manage ment debates is actually that the notion of a resolution of conflict pre sents a far more attractive policy and intellectual discourse about the sort of peace that would be the result of third party intervention in a democratic polity. This positive peace, as Galtung has described it, carries such discursive and normative power that what soon became apparent was the requirement for more sophisticated methods to achieve it than either first or second generation approaches provide ,It is easy to see why conflict resolution has also contributed to a number of emerging research programmes, such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As Miall has pointed out, there is a clear conver gence between the agendas of peace research and conflict resolution with the peacebuilding project. This has occurred specifically in the context of conflict prevention, now a major part of the repertoire of international and regional organisations such as the UN and the OSCE.39 The EU is particularly advanced in its institutional approach in these areas, though this is in terms of conceptualisation rather than practice at present.40 It is well known that conflict resolution approaches developed out of a need to find a process that could facili tate the 'resolution', rather than management, of intractable conflicts. They developed in particular with a view to the redressal of non-state and identity conflict. They focused upon a bottom-up, grassroots analysis, rather than the state-centricity of management approaches, and attempted to understand the role of the individual in order to move beyond traditional diplomatic or quasi-military forms of settle ment. Consequently, the conflict resolution literature assumes a much richer notion of peace in a world society where human needs are met. Despite these ambitions, it is clear that the Westphalian system of conflict management is still preponderant, and frames, stimulates and delineates most discussions about conflict.41 Though more emphasis is placed upon the non-state level and on the agency of non-state actors and inter-subjective factors, there is little acknowledgement of cultural or other social and particularist differences between individuals or soci eties. Despite such weaknesses, what this indicates is that conflict reso lution approaches highlight the depth and breadth of conflict more accurately than conflict management approaches, and also therefore offer the potential to establish methods through which a broader form of peace can be constructed. The conceptualisation of peace, inherent in this sort of thinking underlines the need to address the individual, and also to understand the agency of the individual in the reconstruc tion of peace. This type of thinking highlights the fact that conflict is both multidimensional and multi- level, and any attempt to construct peace needs to reflect this depth and breadth.]

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Alt-Solves Global WarAttempts to restore negative peace creates terrorism, ethnic conflicts and global war—alternative epistemology of peace solvesRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 78.]

[The much-contested phenomena of globalisation has had a major impact on the development of approaches to the construction of peace. Globalisation has raised public and political pressure and awareness in the West to respond to conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and inequali ties on their periphery and beyond, and reconstruct a liberal peace. Yet, at the same time aspects of globalisation have also underlined the prob lematic aspects of the one-size fits-all liberal peace model that are perpetuated through conflict endings, while also providing capacities which may allow terrorism, or provoke particularism and ethnic con flict . This also has an impact on how those caught up in conflict react to intervention and peacebuilding approaches. These concepts and practices tend to be based on developing Western liberal norms pertain ing to an uneasy collusion between so-called human and state security. This tension drove the increasingly interventionary practices observable in response to conflicts in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and others, and also caused a backlash against inaction in the case of Rwanda. This glob alisation of a specific ontology and a 'positive epistemology' of peace in many contemporary responses to conflict is constituted by conflicting forces that require more intervention into its different aspects, ulti mately requiring the importation into conflict zones of alternative forms of governance . The globalisation of responses to conflict has thus produced pressures for more comprehensive approaches to interven tion. This can be seen in the apparent 'peacebuilding consensus', which appears to have tested the will and consensus of the international com munity in ways which merit further examination. The globalisation of responses to conflict in order to construct a new peace is conditioned by the norms that infuse dominant states and major international institu tions such as the World Bank and organisations such as the UN, as well as NGOs and other actors. This globalisation of peacebuilding as a liberal and democratic ideology, 109 promoted by a liberal conception of international order, has created a great burden for the UN system in particular. The irony is that though it is driven by Western perceptions of humanitarianism, the dominant Western state - the US - was until after-the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, unwilling to support the UN and foot the bill for, or take part in, the projection of such a norma tive order, focusing instead on its own strategies for economic globalisa tion and concurrent political liberalisation. Where necessary, as was seen in Somalia, in the later responses to the conflict in Bosnia, in Kosovo, Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003, US foreign policy has tend to veer towards the use of force and the renegotiation of the norm of intervention to incorporate 'preventive war' , with or without the UN.]

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Alt Solves-Terror Non- violence solves terrorism- empirics Cassese 1989 (Antonio, the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia, Chairperson for the International Commission of Inquirey on Darfur, “The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 38, No.3 (Jul., 1989), p 591-593)

MECHANISMS for peaceful responses to terrorism are to be found in a number of agreements of various kinds. To date it has not been possible to gain acceptance of a universal treaty covering all kinds of terrorist acts. (A convention of this type was drafted in 1937 and even approved by the League of Nations,5 but was a total failure-only 24 States signed it and only one ratified it.) Regional treaties of this type have also proved elusive. To date, there has been only one-the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism ("the 1977 European Con- vention")6-to which further reference is made below. There have been, however, a number of multilateral treaties covering specific types of terrorist acts (sometimes incidentally to other subject matter): hijacking aircraft (the 1970 Hague Convention);7 sabotaging aircraft (the 1971 Montreal Convention);8 attacks on so-called "internationally protected persons", for example heads of State, heads of government and diplomats (the 1973 New York Convention);9 taking hostages (the 1979 New York Convention).10 And we now have the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, of 10 March 1988 ("the 1988 Maritime Conven- tion"),11 dealing with hijacking ships. This was an International Mari- time Organisation initiative, prompted by the Achille Lauro incident. We should not forget, also, in this connection the various treaties that regulate the conduct of armed conflict. If we see terrorist acts as any acts of violence committed against innocent people for the purpose of coerc- ing States in some way, it immediately becomes apparent that terrorism may be committed in war as easily as it may be committed in the context of peaceful relations. It is significant, therefore, that the 1907 Hague Regulations,12 the four 1949 Geneva Conventions'3 and the two 1977 Additional Geneva Protocols14 all contain provisions protecting civilians and banning terrorist attacks. These apply not only to international wars, but also (so far as the Geneva Conventions and Additional Proto- cols are concerned) to wars of national liberation, civil wars and other "internal" wars. A final category of treaties relating to terrorism is that of bilateral treaties, particularly those relating to extradition and co-operation between judiciaries. While generally not specifically directed to terrorism, these can be useful, for instance, in securing the extradition of those who have committed terrorist acts against a State's nationals and have then taken refuge in the territory of the other party to the treaty. The main aim of all these treaties is to co-ordinate national judicial measures so as to ensure that terrorists are brought to justice some-where. All the multilateral instruments just mentioned enshrine the principle aut judicare aut dedere: contracting States on whose territory those reasonably suspected of terrorist acts happen to be must either try them or hand them over to whichever other contracting State requests their extradition in accordance with the treaties. They cannot just allow the terrorists to go scot free. An important feature of these treaties is this "universal" jurisdiction. All contracting States have the jurisdiction to try those suspected of acts of terrorism, whether or not the acts harmed their territory or pos- sessions or nationals: it is sufficient for contracting States simply to have laid their hands on the suspected terrorists.

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Alt Solve-Root Cause Terror

Positive peace solves the root cause of terrorismCassese 1989 (Antonio, the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia, Chairperson for the International Commission of Inquirey on Darfur, “The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 38, No.3 (Jul., 1989), p 606-609)

So far this article has considered only two possible responses to terrorism: the peaceful and the coercive. A third is suggested below, but first let us analyse these two responses in terms of the relative "imme- diacy" of the goals being pursued. The coercive response is clearly an effective short-term response and for this reason often seems attractive: the terrorists are killed or captured before they can carry out, or complete, terrorist attacks. No time is "wasted" during which innocent lives could be lost. But, as already suggested, the problem with this is the inescapable fact that violence only begets more violence; thus, the hijack of hijackers becomes, not the end of hijacking, but the beginning of new hijacking. The various peaceful responses are often effective in the medium term. Clearly, it takes time to negotiate, to co-operate, to go through the whole process of extradition, but in the end those who commit terrorist crimes are put in gaol and no shots are fired, no blood is spilled, no diplomatic "rifts" are created. There is certainly great benefit in strengthening the possibilities for this kind of peaceful response. This means of course that more States need to ratify the various treaties providing for the "extradition or punishment" of terrorist offenders, and that more of those States which have ratified them need to comply with them. It also means that the ambit of the treaties needs to be widened and (the perennial problem) some better system of enforcement needs urgently to be introduced. Yet ultimately, I do not believe that extradition treaties or treaties on co-operation in dealing with hostage-takers and the like will provide us with a long-term solution to the problem of terrorism. This is the third kind of response-the long-term response-fore-shadowed above, and it is obvious that it cannot just consist in endless agreements between States. States can go on agreeing for ever, while every day new terrorists, stateless or antagonistic to their own State, antagonistic to every State, are born and nurtured. Although this response is apt to be overlooked, a large measure of support for it already exists. In particular, the two most recent General Assembly resolutions on terrorism (1985 and 1987)56 urge States to contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, including, inter alia, colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may endanger international peace and security. Here we find reference to some elements of structural violence believed by the General Assembly to stand in the way of the lasting elimination of terrorism. The problem was also eloquently highlighted by the Ghanaian representative in the Security Council in the debate following the Israeli interception of the Libyan aeroplane in February 1986. He stated: the international community, including the [Security] Council, must sum- mon the necessary political will to delve into the reasons why the frustrations of the dispossessed are vented in this manner. A glib condemnation of terrorism alone, without a scientific and impartial study of its origins will not, we are afraid, eradicate the phenomenon.57 To conclude, if we really want to overcome terrorism we need to start aiming higher-and longer-towards an elimination of the causes giving rise to terrorist activity. Suppressing the "symptoms" may be easier and quicker to achieve through coercive or co-operative measures but is infi- nitely less durable. To use Galtung's terminology: while negative peace is liable at any moment to shatter into a thousand disgruntled, frus- trated, agonised pieces, positive peace lasts.

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Alt Solves-Democracy

Our bottom-up movement toward territorial self-determinism- it promotes grassroots democracy and decreases nationalist militarism

Avery Kolers, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of North Carolina- Charlotte, “Self-Determination in a Cosmopolitan World,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.109-110.

My discussion has been vague and suggestive; I cannot fully detail the kind of institutions I envision as animating a just world of culture-based states with effective territorial self-determination. I hope to have offered the beginnings of such a picture. Once self-determinists take seriously the central tenet of cosmopolitanism that the world system is indeed a system-the defense of self-determinism can be fleshed out in a way that is at least as attractive as other theories currently available. The territorial self-determinism as sketched is superior to nationalism and cosmopolitanism because self-determinism takes seriously the three dilemmas inherent in transnational governance-flexibility to circumstance versus fidelity to authorization; local discretion versus impartial formality; and enforcement of law versus minimization of lawbreaking. I hope in the process to have sketched an order that promotes grassroots efforts to find communities of interest around the world; finds regional solutions to regional problems; offers recognition, mediation, and enforcement, when inter-or intrastate disputes arise; and helps to set transnational policy regarding the environment, distributive justice, and other issues of global concern. I have offered reason to believe that this kind of international regime can be responsive to grassroots politics and need not create a global government or standing army. Political philosophers cannot avoid tackling the problem of dealing with conflicting claims in a way that minimizes the likelihood that they will spiral into violence, and dissolves conflicts when they arise. We must aim not merely to dissolve conflicts but to do so in a way that is both substantively and procedurally just, through institutions that are maximally open to the least powerful. In addition to suffering from the three dilemmas discussed above, current global institutions such as the World Tilde Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United Nations, are easily captured by the great powers to maintain their dominance.32 I have doubts that these institutions are on the right track, though to be fair, each institution-especially the United Nations- contains kernels of fairness that could be augmented under the right conditions.33 We have reason to try to imagine the requisites of international justice and peace from the bottom up. Such bottom-up rethinking of international justice must emphasize self-determination as a valuable counterweight to the pressures of global standardization. Self-determinists need not be naive about or ignorant of the global basic structure and its tendency to decrease-for better and for worse-the degree of self-determination available for cultural groups and their members. Self-determinists can also help to develop a sophisticated picture of international organization, a picture that rejects the nationalist's de-emphasis of the demands and priorities of global justice, but that also rejects the cosmopolitan's inattention to grassroots social movements and effective local control of collective life. I hope this chapter has contributed to that daunting task. Only indirectly have I defended self-determination on moral grounds; my aim has been to show that cultural self-determination remains viable even in light of globalization.

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Alt- International Cooperation

International organizations should cooperate to create positive peaceDennis J. D. Sandole, Professor of conflict resolution and international relations and the institute for conflict analysis and Resolution at George Mason University,“Changing Ideologies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 542, Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation Published by: Sage Publications, Inc., (Nov., 1995), pp. 145.

10. But NATO, as basically a Realpolitik, negative-peace-oriented institution, must always be part of a more comprehensive, basically Idealpolitik-oriented strategy, to en-sure that peacekeeping creates the conditions necessary for effective positive-peace conflict resolution and that mechanisms and personnel for effective conflict resolution are avail-able, to accompany the peacekeeping forces or to follow in the wake of the establishment of an effective negative peace. Otherwise, variations may occur on the Cyprus theme or, worse, the Croatia, Bosnia, or Somalia themes. As the survey findings indicate, NATO, along with the FYug and NSWP, may be part of a post-Cold War meta-culture that is more flexible than the NNA and FSU. NATO may be ideally suited, within the CSCE, to lead this meta-culture— and perhaps, by example, the NNA and FSU as well—into an NEPSS, comprising integrated systems of conflict resolution networks. NATO's establishment of the NACC and, more recently, the Partnership for Peace is an example of its movement in this direction. A constructive inter-IGO dialogue should be established as part of a greater NGO-IGO dialogue, to explore opportunities for collaboratively pooling resources to deal more effectively- and less expensively- with problems of common concern: to transform “inter-blocking” into interlocking, interacting, and mutually supporting international organizations, to, among other things, deal more effectively with current and future Yugoslavias.

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Alt=Nonviolence

Viewing the world through perceptual, conceptual, and action-theoretical visions are key to maintain nonviolence through the arts and sciences-only the alt solvesBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.22. 3-18-06.]

At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical). This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need to be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception. We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it. And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act. In other words, perceptible things elicit appearances; interesting things, whether perceptible or imperceptible are understood through conceptual models; and useful things call for plans of action. Note the subject-related concepts in the foregoing: “perceptible,” “interesting,” and ”valueable.” They bridge the subject to the object, the knower to the known, the actor to the thing he wishes to act upon-in short, the inner world to the outer one. To continue in this metaphorical vein, we add that action-In particular work, science, technology, art and politics-build those bridges.

Human focused security solves best-we must learn to perceive situations before actingBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.75. 3-18-06.]

Contemporary psychologists follow Newton’s advice, and attempt to explain phenomena along the lines sketched by the great Hermann von Helmholtz’s many contributions is the idea that perceptions are signs (indicators), not images (Abbildungen), of outer-world facts: “[W]e can only learn how to interpret these signs by means of experience and practice” (Helmholtz 1873: 274). In other words, sensory stimulation triggers complex brain processes involving cognition and memory, and sometimes expectation and emotion well. Shorter: the ability to sense is innate, whereas the ability to perceive is learned. Leonardo said it centuries earlier: We must learn to see.”

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Alt- Non violence SolvesDiscursively and non-violently challenging negative peace is key to change- we must work outside the system to change it

William C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.12-13.

The fact that words and language games, even forms of life, are conventional means a natural basis exists for their maintenance does not exist. New conventions can be adopted. From individual words to entire forms of life, we can make changes which serve broader and loftier interests than current conventions. A peace movement can make an important contribution toward the shifting of public policy discourse toward social values that denaturalize the war myth and repoliticize the quest for peace and justice. In Peace Politics, Paul Joseph observes:Peace Movements are expressions of hope. People give their time, money, talent, and energy against what appear to be overwhelming odds. By almost any measure, the resources of a peace movement are far less than the political, economic, and symbolic assets possessed by the national government. And yet a vision of peace remains. Governments cloak themselves in national glory, national duty, and the national interest. Citizens are sometimes swayed by these appeals. But many are also moved by the images of children sacrificed for no apparent gain, economic destruction for no possible good, and the perpetuation of international violence as a totally illegitimate method to solve problems.39Joseph stresses that a peace movement should not be judged by narrow criteria of whether it was successful in the legislative initiatives it sought to stop and the ones it sought to pass. If the scorecard were based on such criteria, many peace movements would have to be judged as not being successful. In a more general way, Joseph notes that the peace movement in the peace movement in the United States contributed to ending the cold war.40 Maybe a peace movement may make its greatest contributions to change in other forums than that of public policy per se. It may be its passionate proclamations, its massive marches, and its peaceful protests that attract the attention of the media gatekeepers. These efforts play a role in shaping the social values that inform public policy.In challenging dominant discourse, social groups are engaged in what Bourdieu terms "heretical subversion." By linguistically challenging the established order, heretical discourse seizes on "the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation of this world."41 The practice of heretical subversion is similar to what Richard Rorty means by abnormal or edifying discourse."12 Heretical subversion exposes the system of representations as non-natural, arbitrary conventions like Foucault's episiemes and is able to "contribute practically to the reality of what it announces by the fact of uttering it... of making it conceivable and above all credible."4'According to Bourdieu. when social groups engage in heretical subversion in an informed manner, they can find:in the knowledge of the probable, not an incitement to fatalistic resignation or irresponsible utopianism, but the foundations for a rejection of the probable based on the scientific mastery of the laws of production governing the eventuality rejected.44In simpler terms, Bourdieu suggests that we need not give into "fatalistic resignation;" linguistic change that can further the cause of positive peace is not an "irresponsible utopianism."

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Alt-individualism good

Focusing on the state of the individual is critical to create realism that guarantees freedom of willBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.47. 3-18-06.]

True, a few years later, in his Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant held that belief in the existence of God is a postulate of practical reason –perhaps a way of saying that, even if God does not exist, it is prudent to pretend that He does. So, God entered Kant’s philosophy through the service door, and never made it beyond the kitchen. Furthermore, Kant drew a firm line between knowledge and belief, in particular religious belief. The knowing subject, not God, was the centre of Kant’s world. Fichte took this blasphemy: he stated even more clearly that the self is the fountain of reality. And he added that the advantage of this view is that it guarantees the freedom of the will-provided, presumably, it is strong enough to will the creditor and the hangman away.

Individualism is key to reforming realism-it denies the existence of social systems to overcome realist limitations of the individualBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.64. 3-18-06.]

As with social roles, so with social ranks. For instance, the landowning class is not just the collection of persons who possess land cultivated by others; those persons are also backed by a state that enforces that privilege. And a state or government is not reducible to individual items or features; it is a social system characterized by emergent properties, such as having the monopoly on taxation and legal violence. And methodological individualism denies the very existence of social systems, supra individual entities that have emerged in the course of history to overcome the limitations of individuals.

Focus on the individual solves realism-the individual learns to interpret actions exclusively in terms of beliefsBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.64. 3-18-06.]

Thus, the individualist-idealist anthropologist, economist, sociologist, political scientist, or historian will attempt to interpret (hypothesize) individual actions exclusively in terms of personal beliefs and intentions. (in particular, if he is a rational-choice theorit, he will focus on subjective utilities and subjective probabilities.) Consequently, he will either miss or seriously misunderstand all the macrosocial events and processes that have shaped our societies, such as capitalism, imperialism, nationalism, war, democracy, secularism, socialism, fascism, feminism, technology, and science.

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Alt- Changing rhetoric solves

Transforming peace rhetoric solves- it facilitates open society, justice, and non-violence William C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.14-15.

The language of positive peace facilitates and reflects the move from a lull in the occurrence of violence to its negation. The establishment of a language of positive peace requires a transformation of cultures oriented to war. The discourse of positive peace, to be successful, must include a genuine affirmation of diversity both domestically and internationally . The effort to establish the language of positive peace requires the creation of a critical vernacular, a language of empowerment that is inclusive of and understood by the vast array of citizens. Several attempts have been made to spread the use of nonviolent discourse throughout the culture. 46 The Quakers's "Alternatives to Violence" project teaches linguistic tactics that facilitates the nonviolent resolution of conflict. Following initial endeavors al teaching these skills to prisoners, this project has been extended to other areas. Related practices are found in peer mediation and approaches to therapy which instruct participants in nonviolent conflict strategies. Educational institutions are giving increased attention to Gandhi in order to convey nonviolent tactics as an alternative to reliance on the language and techniques of the military and to multiculturalism as a means of promoting an appreciation of diversity that diminishes the language and practice of bigotry and ethnocentrism.At an international level, UNESCO's "Culture of Peace" project seeks to compile information on peaceful cultures. Even though most of these cultures are pre-industrial, their practices illustrate conditions that promote peaceful conflict resolution. This project, which initially assisted war-torn countries rebuild (or build) a civic culture, can be applied more broadly.The language of positive peace is quite compatible with the democratic spirit and is diametrically opposed to authoritarian traditions. Since the language of positive peace resists monologue and encourages dialogue, it fosters an approach to public policy debate that is receptive rather than aggressive and meditative rather than calculative. The language of positive peace is not passive in the sense of avoiding engagement; it is passive in the sense of seeking to actively build lasting peace and justice. In this sense, while the language and practice of positive peace facilitates the continuation of politics rather than its abandonment, it also elevates diplomacy to an aim for cooperation and consensus rather than competition and compromise. The language of positive peace provides a way of perceiving and communicating that frees us to the diversity and open-endedness of life rather than the sameness and finality of death that results when diplomacy fails and war ensues. The language of positive peace, by providing an alternative to the language of war and the language of negative peace, can introduce into public policy discourse shared social values that express the goals of a fully politicized and enfranchised humans.

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Alt Solvency- Edu. solves change

The alternative solves- our individual movement toward peace acts as a catalyst to global social change- this is the only way to solve the root cause of the affirmative harms

John Fien, Professor of Sustainability in the Innovation Leadership programme of RMIT University, interdisciplinary background in education and training, natural resource management, public participation and sustainable consumption, “Education for Peace in the Secondary School: The Contribution of One Subject to an Across-the-Curriculum Perspective,” International Review of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1991), Springer Publications, pp. 340-41.

Education for peace is not just about studying the "problems" of peace, however, it also seeks to empower the individual as an agent of positive peace and, thus, places much emphasis on sharing success stories with students in which the work of individuals and groups in overcoming adverse economic and political structures is highlighted. The work of Greenpeace and other environmental groups in successfully obtaining an embargo on most whaling activities, the tree saving and re-afforestation work of the Chipko women of Uttar Pradesh, and the campaigns of the Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation in saving the beautiful Franklin River and the remaining rainforests of north-east Queensland are examples of success stones in the environmental area that may be used by geography teachers to good effect in this regard. The BBC television series. Only One Earth and Timberlake's (1978) book from the series provide a number of other successful examples of positive peace-working from many different parts of the world. To complement this global emphasis, education for peace through geography can help empower students to be active agents for the betterment of their local communities, as well. This includes studies to improve communication and interpersonal skills, to promote the no n-violent resolution of conflict, and to identify opportunities for individuals and groups to work for change. This is what is meant by the term "thinking globally and acting locally", in peace education. Positive peace is built by people with the willingness and the skills to challenge the local, national and global structures with which the world economic system seeks to bind them. These structures include poverty, patriarchy, racism and militarism. Being aware of these structures is a powerful tool for understanding one's own or one's group's position in the world and the things that must be taken into account in bringing about changes. Burns (1986) writes that just as it is hard to resolve a conflict if it is not clearly articulated, it is difficult to do more than ameliorate problems if the underlying structures that cause and perpetuate them are not challenged. Yet, while structures can (and do) bind and disempower the uncritical, it is important to realize (and to teach) that these structures are not immutable. Within these structures there is a role for human choice between alternatives and some encouragement lo individuals and groups to challenge the structures and work to change them (Ficn 1988). This is the dialectic between social structure and human agency which the human geographer, Roger Lee (1983) has described as "the most fundamental idea to impart through education'* because of its "central importance to the future of human survival". Teaching the concepts, skills and values of political literacy through geography can help empower and motivate individuals and groups to work for change and, thus, has a major role to play in promoting positive peace. Practical examples of how this may be achieved through geography are provided in recent publications such as Huckle (1983b, 1988, 1989. 1989-1990), McElroy (1988) and various chapters in Hicks (1988c), especially those by William son-Ren (on teaching about power) and Huckle (on environmental politics and political literacy). Among the examples used in these publications are many activities which encourage geography students to reflect and act upon their perspectives on environmental issues, nuclear energy and minority rights.

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Alt- Teaching Peace

Contemporary schools designate peace studies as an independent study- peace skills should rather be integrated into current curriculum

John Fien, Professor of Sustainability in the Innovation Leadership programme of RMIT University, interdisciplinary background in education and training, natural resource management, public participation and sustainable consumption, “Education for Peace in the Secondary School: The Contribution of One Subject to an Across-the-Curriculum Perspective,” International Review of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1991), Springer Publications, pp. 336

The debate amongst peace educators over the name of their movement is more than a semantic one. The current preference for "education for peace' over "peace studies" or "peace education' stems from the wish to emphasize, at least at the primary and secondary school levels, that a discrete subject concerned with peace issues should not be developed. That is, education for peace perspectives should be a cross-curricular feature of ail subject in the school curriculum, not a separate, albeit inter-disciplinary subject called "peace studies" which would be studied only at set periods and times each day. As Hicks (1988a: 10) argues, "We are not talking about a separate subject on the timetable but the creation of a dimension across the curriculum, a concern that may be explored in different ways with any age group and in any subject" In contrast with the legitimate content focus of "peace studies" at the tertiary level, "education for peace" is interested in the hidden curriculum as much as it is in the formal curriculum. Burnley (1963:2) notes that; Peace education is not only what is ought — it cannot be equated with content. Its foundations lie in respect for children as people, the acceptance of their ideas and sensitivity to their feelings. The atmosphere of the classroom should be one in which co-operation and trust flourish.

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Alt- Teaching Peace

Contemporary geographical education promotes nationalism and violence- including peace in today’s curriculum is the ONLY way to solve peace and avert extinction John Fien, Professor of Sustainability in the Innovation Leadership programme of RMIT University, interdisciplinary background in education and training, natural resource management, public participation and sustainable consumption, “Education for Peace in the Secondary School: The Contribution of One Subject to an Across-the-Curriculum Perspective,” International Review of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1991), Springer Publications, pp. 336-37

To peace educators, peace is a positive and practical concept, a process not a condition, which involves action to redress the causes of conflict by practicing conflict resolution skills, promoting good community relations, and working to remedy the causes of hunger, distress, violence and inequality both at home and overseas. This perception of peace and its educational tasks has distinct relationships with multicultural education, human rights education, development education, feminist education, teaching for constructive interpersonal relationships, and education for international understanding. John Huckle (1983a 15 3) has told geography teachers that this means directing their teaching towards playing "a significant role in creating fulfilled and happy individuals in a fairer and less troubled world". This goal was evident in the appeal at the 1984 International Geographical Union Congress for geographers worldwide to work for a peaceful and just world: In the struggle for peace it is important to indicate clearly the sources of the threatening catastrophe. Geographers can oppose imperialistic propaganda by telling the truth about the actual lives and peaceful aspirations of people of different countries. At the same time, experts in the field of economic and social geography can help in exposing the actual initiators of the arms race — bosses of the military-industrial complex, who pursue super-profits and governmental orders, and with these aims an ready to keep our planet on the brink of war. We are deeply convinced that it is necessary to put an end to the wasting of productive force* and of natural resources on the arms race, that the use of the contemporary scientific and technological potential of humanity for peaceful coexistence — and not for military conflicts — would open new prospects for satisfaction of material and spiritual needs of people and for a better quality of life, especially in the developing countries. Overall disarmament would improve the international climate, would contribute to scientific and economic collaboration in solving many problems which concern all honest people: those of fighting hunger and maladies, of supplying food products, energy and raw materials, of conserving the environment, of using marine resources and space research for peaceful purposes. (Geranmov 1985:200-201) The view of geography and geography teaching reflected in this appeal indicates a remarkable change from the old days of "capes and bays" geography or the heady days of the spatial paradigm in geography when scientific credibility, objectivity, quantification and theory were the goals. By contrast, today, the goals of geography and geographical education reflect "geography of concern" (Bale 1983), "teaching geography for a better world" (Ficn and Gerber 1988), and creating "the geography of a heavenly planet" (Bunge 1986). Bringing these approaches together. Smith (1977:7) has written that the well-being of a society as a spatially variable condition should be the focal point of geographical enquiry... It simply requires recognition of what is surely the self-evident truth that if human beings are the objects of our curiosity ... then the quality of their lives is of paramount importance. This concern for human welfare represents more than a shift in content emphasis for geography teaching. Major shifts in the world views of teachers and syllabuses, educational goals, the organisation of schools, and criteria for the selection of curriculum content and learning experiences, all these are important dimensions of education for peace. Geographers have been at the forefront of studies of the ecological implications of the global nuclear threat. The credibility of the nuclear winter thesis that indicates that even a minor exchange of nuclear weapons could end all life on Earth (Ambio 1982; Ehriick et al. 1983; Elsom 1984) has given such studies added impetus. In educational terms, this has led the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to argue that: No question is more important to all of us than that of safely resolving conflict in our complex and interdependent world. With the fate of the earth itself at stake, the inclusion in our curriculums of courses and readings relating to peace and international security is not only timely, but critical. (Simmons 1484:3) 51

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***Framework***

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FrameworkK is a pre-requisiteDunn, Research Fellow in International Relations, Keele University, UK., 1983, (David J., January, “Peace Research: Is a Distinction between 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Useful?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969, TH, p. 74)

In a real sense, yes. Why peace research anyway? Why not peace action impelled by an evangelic spirit, because the initial stress was laid on the accumulation of knowledge, embodied in the research process, with peace as its guiding goal. Recall the comment of Singer, for whom rhetoric is not enough. Put by another pioneer in peace research, Herbert Kelman, the issue is one of rigour versus vigour in social research, more specifically the quality of research. 'The real issue in the evaluation of social research revolves, in short,

around the quality of the thinking and the imagination it represents. There is no substitute for good thinking and good imagination, no matter what methods we use. And no method automatically ensures us of either one of these.'9 To stress peace research meant to try to ensure, in a field

potentially so nebulous as the study of peace, that work that did take place would be of particular quality. And the better the quality of that work, the more seriously it would be taken by a wider constituency of policy makers, amongst others. Such a process is not entirely implausible. Moreover, it does not necessarily imply that peace research logically entails peace action. The issue is a difficult one, but it is amenable to analysis. Here Kenneth Boulding's approach is useful. In her study of his life and thought, Cynthia Kennan says of his view of knowledge: 'For him, knowledge is the key to breaking out of the chain of necessity, to having an accurate enough image of the world and of possible futures so that man can make a viable choice among alternatives.'10 On his own account, Boulding argued long ago for the power of knowledge: 'Freedom, if I may be pardoned for parodying the Holy Writ, is power, law and understanding and the greatest of these is understanding.'11

Questions of peace formulation are criticalRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 1-2)

This raises the question of what the discipline is for, if not for peace? For many, IR theory simply has not been ambitious enough in developing an 'agenda for peace' in addition to investigating the causes of war. Axiomatically, Martin Wight once wrote that IR was subject to a poverty of 'international theory'. He also argued that its focus is the problem of survival.4 Such arguments are commonplace even in the context of more critical theoretical contributions to IR theory. These usually support the argument that liberal polities, notably in the Western developed world, are domestic oases of democratic peace, and obscure the possibility that such liberal polities are also likely to be engaged in a constant struggle for survival, or a war for 'peace'. How might war and peace coexist and why such a singular lack of ambition for peace? Thinking about peace opens up such difficult questions. Yet, many approaches to IR theory routinely ignore the question -or problem -of peace: how it is constituted and one peace or many? Yet, even 'successful' empires have developed an interest in an ideological and self-interested version peace,6 whether it was a Pax Romana, Britannia, Soviet, American, religious, nationalist, liberal or neoliberal peace.

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http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969


Framework

The liberal peace is in crisis now – only moving towards a better understand of peace can solve warRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 4)

More than ever, research and policy informed by a contextual understanding of peace is needed, rather than merely a focus on fear reproduced by worst case security scenarios stemming from a balance of power or terror derived from military, political or economic analytical frameworks that

assume violence and greed to be endemic. Indeed, in the contemporary context it is also clear that any discussion of peace as opposed to war and conflict must also connect with research and policy on development, justice and environmental sustainability. These are the reasons why, for example, the liberal peace -the main concept of peace in circulation today -is in crisis. Much of the debate about war that dominates IR is also indicative of assumptions about what peace is or should be. This ranges from the pragmatic removal of overt violence, an ethical peace, ideology, to a debate about a self-sustaining peace. Anatol Rapoport conceptualised 'peace through strength'; 'balance of power'; 'collective security'; 'peace through law'; 'personal or religious pacifism'; and 'revolutionary pacifism'.14 Hedley Bull saw peace as the absence of war in an international society,15 though of course war was the key guarantee for individual state survival. These views represent the mainstream approaches and indicate why the creation of an explicit debate about peace is both long overdue and vital in an international environment in which major foreign policy decisions seem to be taken in mono-ideational environment where ideas matter, but only certain, hegemonic ideas.

All attempts to prevent peace fail within the current framework – only alternative conceptions of peace can solveRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 16)

As shall be seen during the course of this study, IR theory, conflict theory and, indeed, policy debates often make the mistake of assuming that the project of peace is so apparent as to not require detailed explanation. This is part of the problem of peace. What is peace, why, who creates and promotes it, for what interests, and who is peace for? IR theory makes a number of key assumptions across its spectrum of approaches. The essentialisation of human nature regardless of culture, history, politics, economy or society, is common. The extrapolation of state behaviour from a flawed view of human nature as violent assumes that one reflects the other. This also rests on the assumption that one dominant actor, in this case often the state, is the loci around which power, interest, resources

and societies revolve. In this sense, IR is often perceived to be immutable, reflecting the forces which drive it and their permanence, ranging from structures, the state, lOs and

other key influences. Alternatively, these immutable forces may simply disguise an intellectual conservativism in which individuals as agents simply repeat the errors of old as they believe that nothing can change. This 'self-fulfilling prophecy' argument is often reflective of both

an acceptance of the key difficulties of IR, as well as a reaction against them. Furthermore, all of this assumes that there can be value-free investigation in the discipline. Or is all

knowledge effectively discursive and ideational? By attempting to understand and interpret peace, are we empowered to bring about change, or destined to be confronted only by our inability to do so?

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Framework

Peace debate is critical to successful policy formualtionRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 18)

In contemporary IR an ambitious version of peace is increasingly expected, which includes security at the domestic, regional and global level, a fair, equitable and meritocratic distribution of social, political and economic resources, prospects of advancement for the world's population, and respect and assistance for others. The contest over peace, its theorisation, methods, ontology and epistemology is one of the underlying narratives in IR, and in this study. The vast majority of the world's states' foreign and domestic policy objectives, of the mandates of regional and international organisations and institutions, ranging

from the UN, OSCE, EU, World Bank and IMF, and many agencies and NGOs, encompass such goals. Yet, this study illustrates how any investigation has to recognise its multiple natures, and therefore face the question of whether it is sufficient to enter into the project of building a normative, empirical and theoretical case for a particular conceptualisation of peace. This opens up ontological questions related to the everyday experience of peace. Conceptually, this may restore the early promise of IR's agenda, rather than being held hostage by accounts that focus upon the 'realities' of the moment, the banality of power, a jingoistic national interest constructed by sovereign man, narrow, cultural obsessions with artificially limited discourses, reductionism and parsimony, and the glorification of power, institutions and parochial moral codes over human and everyday life. Peace is not ontologically prior to experience or

learning, but it is socially constructed and influenced by trends, methods and responses to a subjective world, and is forever 'becoming'. To make peace a research agenda central to the discipline, as well as the many different contexts that peace might have, draws together different, critical strands of the discipline and beyond, aiding in the rediscovery of its central role of remaking the world as a better environment for all, by their common consent, and in their name. Indeed, the challenge of inserting a consideration of concepts of peace into the centre of the discipline represents such significant potential that even the most parsimonious and positivist approach can surely not afford the risk of rejecting it.

Realism makes understanding the foundations of peace research impossibleRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 53-54)

Examining the realist tradition via the mechanism of peace accentuates problems with its focus on the state as the unit of analysis, as a rational actor in pursuit

of power, influence and security in an insecure environment. This means that there is no room for normative debates, or for other actors and their issues, identities or interests. Peace is limited and constructed according to the post-Enlightenment culture of European diplomacy. State preparedness to use force may guarantee survival but also it also hints at the anarchy which limits it, and a possible attempt to create a victor's

peace: this is the paradox of Bismarck's realpolitik. This is a recipe for conflict rather than peace. State-centricity ignores the agency of non-state actors such as rebels, secessionists and terrorists. It may also emphasise their concerns. Territorial sovereignty and its association with recognition and representation issues leads to the assumption that territories can be simply represented by sovereign actors, and inhabited by homogenous identity groups, without giving rise to competing claims for its control or identity conflicts. Individual agency, culture, identity and 'non-rational' aspects of life are automatically discounted as irrelevant. In this way, realism presents a highly simplified cartographic version of the world, and tragically establishes the conditions in which even a limited peace is unlikely. Indeed realism's presentation of international relations and international politics as 'eternal' and, of course, tragic, effectively negates historical development and evolution: when arguing that we must learn from history to understand IR, realism focuses on history's conflicts. Indeed, it is shaped by such a negative view of human nature and human history -and of power -that it neglects much in order to prove a simple point -that domination and hegemony are the only true conditions of peace, and that where this is not possible, anarchy will prevail. Where peace is envisaged it is normally a version of the victor's peace.

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Framework-Role of the Ballot The judge’s role is to act as a spokesperson for change- representation is the only way to give movements legitimacy William C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.10-11.

The third and less well-known challenge for those who wish to influence public policy discourse about peace concerns problems associated with delegation. For a peace movement to have public policy sway, it must put forward spokespersons who will face dual linguistic alienation.33 They must contend with linguistic alienation from the terminology of the public policy establishment, they face the prospect of linguistic alienation of their constituents in the process of delegation. Bourdieu has analyzed the problems involved in bringing alternative social values to public attention. In order to challenge the dominant discourse, a social group needs to be heard. Their messages may be understood, but that is not the point. Their messages need legitimacy. For a message to have authority, it needs to be spoken or written by someone with authority, someone with a title who represents a constituency. A representative or delegate is needed. As Bourdieu says. "Individuals ... cannot constitute themselves (or be constituted) as a group, that is as a force capable of making itself heard . . . unless they dispossess themselves in favor of a spokesperson. '04 Although the group puts forth the delegate to represent its interests, the delegate, by representing the group, gives the group a status that it previously did not possess. Imagine a mob at the doors of government, clamoring for an audience. The "natural" question is "Who speaks for you?" The delegate, not the social group, enters the halls of government. The delegate has voice but is literally separated from the group. Real alienation is only about to begin.

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Framework-Epistemology

Epistemology is key to moving towards sustainable peaceDunn, Research Fellow in International Relations, Keele University, UK., 1983, (David J., January, “Peace Research: Is a Distinction between 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Useful?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969, TH, p. 72-73)

The size of the radical input to peace research cannot be overlooked. That it changed peace research is undeniable. What is at issue is the nature of its impact. Was the radical input for good or ill? Resolution of this issue depends on value commitment. In a post-colonialist age, radicals stressed neo-colonialism; as colonies gave way to new states, the stress moved to the whole spectrum of dominance relationships, usually discussed in terms of 'positive peace', contrasted with a narrower 'negative peace', and linked with issue of structural violence. In retrospect, radicalism stressed a broader view of conflict and peace, not least in terms of architectonics of peace that were not susceptible to analysis only in state-centric terms. If this was a positive gain, what were the costs? No less an eminent peace researcher than David Singer is in no doubt at all: 'in sum, the radical wing has not only, by my criteria, given peace research a bad name, but it has corrupted the communication channels, sown conceptual confusion and discredited the scientific mode'.5 In a separate assessment, Singer amplifies his clear commitment to the scientific element in peace research, for he argues: 'In my judgement, moral concern and skilful rhetoric will not suffice. But if we can couple our

concern with competence, and our rhetoric with knowledge, we may yet turn the world away from disaster. All too many peace researchers

and peace activists do not understand that the most important revolution we can make is an epistemological revolution.'6 This is clearly the view of a

'committed' scholar, but one whose commitment is linked to a particular strategy of advance. 'Not only does it seem to me that we are more likely to get irreversible transformation in the desired directions via incremental reform, but it also seems that by explicitly eschewing violence we may begin to change the complexion of the struggle itself.'7 Such statements are eloquent on their own account and need no further comment, except to say that they stand as one strand of a careful, committed and scientific scholarship.

Their authors operate upon a flawed epistemology that problematizes their truth claims – even when they act in good faithRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 5-6)

Any discussion of peace is susceptible to universalism, idealism and rejectionism, and to collapse under the weight of its own ontological subjectivity. This study is indebted to a genealogical approach that can be used to challenge the common assumption of IR theorists that peace as a concept is ontologically stable, in terms of representing an objective truth (plausible or not), legitimating the exercise of power, and representing a universal ethic.17 To rehearse this, a genealogical approach allows for an investigation of the subject without deference to a meta-narrative of power and knowledge in order to unsettle the depiction of a linear projection from 'origin' to 'truth'. The camouflaging of the subjective nature of peace disguises ideology, hegemony, dividing practices and marginalisation. In addition, it is important to note the framework of negative or positive epistemology of peace, as developed by Rasmussen, which indicates an underlying ontological assumption within IR theory as to whether a broad or narrow version of peace is actually possible. 18 Many of the insights developed in this study of IR theory and its approaches to peace arise through the author's reading of, and about, and research in, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the context of the many conflicts of the post-war world, the UN system, and the many subsequent 'operations' that have taken place around the world. The investigation of discourses indicates the problematic dynamics of positivist approaches19 and allows for a deeper interrogation reaching beyond the state than a traditional positivist theoretical/empirical approach.20 This enables an examination of competing concepts and discourses of peace derived from IR theory rather than accepting their orthodoxies. Peace, and in particular the liberal and realist foundations of the liberal peace, can be seen as a result of multiple hegemonies in IR.21

Deploying these approaches allows for an identification of the key flaws caused by the limited peace projects associated with peace in IR, and for a theoretical and pragmatic move to put some consideration of peace at the centre of what has now become an 'inter-discipline'. For much of the existence of IR, the concept of peace has been in crisis, even though on the discipline's founding after the First World War it was hoped it would help discover a post-war peace dividend. In this it failed after the First World War, but it has been instrumental in developing a liberal discourse of peace after the Second World War, though this in itself has become much contested (as it certainly was during the Cold War). Even peace research has been criticised for having the potential to become 'a council of imperialism' whereby telling the story of 'power politics' means that researchers participate and reaffirm its tenets through disciplinary research methods and the continuing asplration for a 'Kantian University'. This effectively creates a 'differend' underlining how institutions and frameworks may produce injustices even when operating in good faith. This requires the unpacking of the 'muscular objectivism that has dominated IR in the Western academy and policy world, allowing an escape from what can be described as a liberal-realist methodology and ontology connected to positivist views of IR. The demand that all knowledge is narrowly replicable and should be confirmed and implemented by 'research' in liberal institutions, organisations, agencies and universities without need for a broader exploration is not adequate if IR is to contribute to peace. Thus, underlying this study is the notion of methodological pluralism, which has become a generally accepted objective for researchers across many disciplines who want to avoid parochial constraints on how research engages with significant dilemmas, and who accept the growing calls for more creative approaches to examining the 'great questions' of IR. To gain a multidimensional understanding of peace as one of these great questions, one needs to unsettle mimetic approaches to representation that do not recognise subjectivity, rather than trying to replicate an eternal truth or reality. IR theory should fully engage with the differend -in which lies its often unproblematised claim to be able to interpret the other -that its orthodoxy may be guilty of producing, and open itself up to communication and learning across boundaries of knowledge in order to facilitate a 'peace dividend' rather than a 'peace differend'.

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Establishing the best epistemological foundation of peace is critical to shaping effective policies Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 160-162)

Perhaps the methodological question is the most controversial in that it raises important epistemological questions about how research interrogates the foundations of political organization, whom it favours, and what it is constructed for. In particular it opens up the question of who the

discipline privileges, how the construction of IR and society interact, and the type of knowledge that is required to understand this. Of course, in the realm of

IR, and in particular relating to peace, this demands that policymakers are able to influence IR correspondingly in order to reproduce a specific approach to peace. Thus the methods used to investigate IR, and the question of peace, are vital in this epistemological circle, in which knowledge is produced and passed on to policymakers to act upon, or at least to modify their policies. This also relates to the problematic claims of the orthodoxy of IR towards a value-free approach to politics, when basic assumptions about human nature (peaceful or violent), about the nature of political organization, about political, social and economic ideologies, are related to the interests of societies, groups and polities. For this reason, a single peace, whether

institutional or emancipatory, translatable across all such groupings, interests and ideologies is unlikely to stand up to an inter-disciplinary investigation. Clearly, different methodologies reproduce different concepts of peace. The traditional positivist methods sees peace as being a concept that lies in the creation of specific domestic and international frameworks, which can be engineered, and in which rational calculations can be made about how this is done. A value free, neutral and universal peace can be reproduced. Yet, because positivism is often associated with the liberal-realism hybrid, the paradox is that peace is limited to simply the removal of overt violence while at the same time building for a more ambitious form of peace built on governance. Where some positivist/rationalist approaches are more ambitious, such as the peace research school, the focus is on the democratic peace as a universal, rational and practical framework. Positivist approaches tend to be fundamentally materialist, relating interests with resources, which need distributing in order to consolidate even limited frameworks of peace. These approaches are dominated by a methodology that focuses on officialdom, on a hierarchy of administrative and bureaucratic actors, and therefore by a focus on methods used to interrogate the actions of states as essentially rational actors. The onus is on states to create or provide peace, which is by necessity a product of state politics and interests, of which the optimum configuration is a democratic state if the crudest forms of violence are to be avoided. The notion of 'sovereign man' controlling a peace that is fragile because of the vast numbers of powerful interests that need to be incorporated, is representative of the tragedy of orthodox IR. More pluralist approaches, drawing across disciplines, manage to escape these limitations. The incorporation and study of the inter-subjective nature of issues such as identity, power, and knowledge has necessitated methodologies that facilitate research in these areas, and in particular examine how individuals, societies and communities operate within this context. For example, the adoption of discourse analysis and ethnography allows for greater access to everyday life, and to facilitate a clearer understanding of how norms and institutions and their creation or development have an impact upon the individual in discursive terms. The sort of ethnographic work conducted in anthropology and sociology, which is selfreflective, aware of the corruption of data from 'informants', often spans an entire academic career spent examining one or two small areas. Methodologically speaking, post-positivist and ethnographic approaches to IR do try to emulate this level of attention.29 This is an area where a clearer understanding of what motivates individuals and social groups to enter into conflict, criminality and black markets, or to contribute to a more harmonious existence with their neighbours, can be acquired to understand how emancipation and ontologies of peace might emerge.

Our epistemology shapes how we formulate policy- challenging it is key to effectivenessNancy Nyquist Potter, “Introduction”, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004.

This book is divided into four sections. In the first section, authors examine relationships between our conceptual frameworks and our attitudes towards violence. How is the way we interpret the world shaped by an existing discourse? What effects do discursive and representational practices have on the possibility of developing positive peace? A particular theory of knowledge underpins questions such as these: that what we count as knowledge and what we take to be true are at least partly determined by our conceptual schemes. On this view, our perceptions of the world are always mediated by the values, ideologies, ontological commitments, and belief systems we already hold, so we in a sense construct our representations of reality. For example, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Luce Irigaray argue that discursive practices constitute social arrangements of inequality and oppression and that any hope of genuine liberation will require a careful analysis of existing discourses and their histories.' The authors in this section similarly press questions about communicative entrenchments, the role of representations, the constitutive power of metaphor, and oppressive ideological commitments.

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The aff’s plan is rooted in a desire to create negative peace—ignores the question of what peace should be promoted, only re-conceptualizing the epistemology of peace can solve the root cause of conflict Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 86.]

[Debates within peace and conflict studies tend to focus on the nature of the conflict, and upon the specific strategies that can be used to prevent or respond to it. While such approaches do of course carry implicit implications for the nature of the post-conflict situation that interveners aspire to,

this tends not to be extensively conceptualised. For example, conflict management approaches (or 'first generation' approaches) focus on the strategies that can be used to create a negative peace, which is viewed to be a compromise between continued conflict and an ideal peace. This is viewed to be a form of order in which overt violence is rarely, if ever, present, even if it rests upon military or other forms of enforcement. Conflict resolution approaches focus on a peace that fulfils basic human needs contributing to a world society, which is much closer to a debate about creating an ideal peace (this is commonly described as a 'positive peace'). Similarly, peace research approaches focus on the structures of the international system of conflict societies that impede a peace based upon social and economic versions of justice. In these terms, peace is explicitly conceptu alised as social justice, economic viability and sustainability and democratic political representation within states and civil society, which in turn will reflect a broader transnational and international peace. These 'second generation' approaches have gained much legiti macy in both academic and policy discourses because they offer an ideal form of peace and argue this can become a reality. Peace oper ations and peacebuilding approaches bring together the previous strategies and attempt to develop a more multidimensional approach involving multiple actors at all of the main levels of analysis. These 'third generation approaches' effectively lead to the construction of the liberal peace through a complex epistemic process in which specialist knowledge, expertise, capacities, norms, actors, regimes, and institu tions converge in particular forms of conditional and regulative gover nance , each strand legitimated independently by its adherence to different aspects of a peacebuilding consensus on how the liberal peace can be built.3 What is interesting, however, about this academic debate and its practices, is that while their methods have been heavily conceptualized, their objectives have received rather less attention. The same goes for their intellectual and practical roots. These approaches to ending conflict are now used to create a version of the liberal peace, framed by the Wilsonian triad.4 In practice, and sometimes despite the best intentions, this is often an extremely limited and illiberal version of peace (dependent upon outside actors), as a cursory look at conditions in at least some of the world's conflict zones where such strategies have been applied indicates. Peace is often constructed even in conflict theory as a remote ideal form, as a utopian condition, or as a universal condition, which might be attained given the right methods. In practice, peace often lies in the writ of the victors in a conflict , a 'Cold War', or a negative peace, though efforts to bring peace are commonly presented in academic and policy discourse as aiming at a liberal peace and therefore beyond question and reproach as an end in itself . Most of the debates in this literature focus on the methods of peacemaking and on the technicalities and strategies employed to respond to conflict, rather than on the perhaps equally important question of what type of peace is being envisaged. The implication of this can be seen running throughout the evolution of conflict theory as this chapter illustrates.]

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Framework-Epistemology= Media Distortion

The affirmative reliance on the media demonstrates a bankrupt epistemology- the media can easily manipulate truth and public opinion by publishing articles they get paid the most forWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.6.

Before turning to the effects of the war myth, I acknowledge that, despite the importance of advancing peace within discussions of public policy, the primary vehicle for shaping public opinion is the news media. Three main theories of communication show some of the ways in which the news media shape public opinion.(1) Cultivation theory, which investigates factors that shape public beliefs and values, has found that mainstream social values in the United States do not arise from the masses; instead, they are cultivated through repeated exposure to ideologically consistent messages. Exposure to the news media, which is widespread and regular, largely absorbs or overrides differences in perspectives among viewers, creating a homogenized view of the world that downplays more diverse viewpoints.(2) Agenda setting, which addresses what the public regards as important and how the public understands the world, has established that most people turn to news sources for their information and that the news that gets covered is controlled by a small, but powerful, group of "gatekeepers." This research has shown that newspaper editors, station managers, news directors, and individual reporters, themselves products of their culture, nonetheless decide what stories get covered.7(3) Parasocial interaction, which focuses on how authorities connect to those who rely on them, has shown that authorities enhance their influence when the public regards them as members of their peer group. In this regard, anchors in broadcast news have this prospect to a much greater degree than public policy analysts. Nevertheless, insofar as we are interested in depth and cogency of analysis, the public policy forum provides a more appropriate, if less influential, mechanism for forging informed positions among the public.

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Framework-Discourse FirstDiscourse shapes the possibility of peace being achievedRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 11-12)

For contemporary realists such as Waltz or Mearshimer, peace is very limited, delineated by a natural confluence of interests rather than a mechanistic Irlorm or management of interests or resources. For contemporary and broadly liberal thinkers like Falk or Keohane, or pluralist thinkers like Burton, the latter provides the basis for a more humane peace guided by liberal norms and human needs. For English School thinkers, and for constructivists, peace is equated with the liberal nature of the state, which provides security and manages equitable and transparent transnational mechanisms of exchange and communication. In terms of social constructivism, peace could be both pragmatic and ideational, and constructed by actors with the resources and broad consensus to provide both social legitimacy and material value. To some degree, critical theorists and certainly post-structuralists see more ambiguity in peace and war and recognised that peace would only be achieved in pluralist forms by uncovering the relationship between power and discourse, and the ways in which behaviour is constrained and conditioned by the hidden exercise of hegemonic power. Peace is impeded by hegemony, 'Orientalism', or by methodological, ontological barriers erected by the tradition of liberal-inspired post-Enlightenment rationalism and institutionalism. Critical theorists and post-structuralists are interested in identifying the structures of hegemony and domination and, in the case of the former, neo-liberal creating universal programmes providing a cosmopolitan response.

Social construction of peace shapes realityRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 82-83)

Constructivism is mainly concerned with the role of states as central to the moderation of anarchy and the process of socialisation. As constructivist approaches argue that state behaviour is determined by their identities and interests, this implies that their construction of peace is also determined by their interests and their identities. Of course, there is an important proviso here -that anarchy and interests may also change. This represents a picture of an identity and interest-based peace deployed for others, on a normative and interest basis, which may well fluctuate over time. The problem here, of course, is that normative change should be very different to interest-based change, and because constructivist approaches ascribe states as agents and actors IR, it is very difficult to imagine them changing the peace they project. From this perspective, as socially constructed states create or control international anarchy they also create and control peace, and they do this according to their own values and interests. Often values are dressed up as interests and vice versa. Socially constructed states therefore socially construct a broader peace in their image, according to their own identity, and within the broader international structure, which of course acts as a constraining factor on their own agency. Their agency consequently depends upon their resources, and in these terms constructivism bridges both realist and liberal debates about peace. While constructivism emphasises the role of identity in the politics of peace, it also endorses the role of the state as both a provider and controller of peace. This means that constructivism envisages a hegemonic actor, probably a state, which dominates both the identity of peace and so its discussion and formation. This actor will probably form, drive, materially support and dominate any peace, clearly connecting a constructivist peace with a liberal-realist hybrid peace. Adler and Barnett have worked on questions relating to peace and security derived from constructivism. They have developed the idea of 'security communities' in which states act in groups to establish a community with its own institutions aimed at providing a stable peace.72 In a pluralistic, transnational, security community, states retain their own sense of identity while at the same time sharing a 'meta-identity' across the security community.73 This raises the question of how the norms and institutions of a security community influence their member states and how states become socialised into a security community in the first place. As a consequence, constructivism has implicitly also become involved in the debate over increasing the breadth of IR's understanding of security, though of course the focus is still on the state. Here the work of Waever and Buzan, and the 'Copenhagen School' on 'securitisation' has made the key contribution. This has effectively defined securitisation as a discursive process dependent upon societal and historical contexts leading to an existential threat to a particular community.74 This means that peace in these terms moves far from the pragmatic questions related to battle deaths and a status quo, ceasefire and 'Cold War', towards a discussion of the qualitative conditions of peace for those who actually experience them. This is an important step forward in IR's engagement with the concept of peace, though it does not go as far as more critical approaches imply is possible in constructing a type of peace that would be acceptable to all-as Aradau's work connecting emancipation with 'de-securitisation' illustrates.75

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Framework-Discourse First

Representation is a central part of peace construction – liberal peace can only remain strong when remaining in isolation from other modes of representationRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 140)

From this perspective much of IR's orthodoxy is anti-peace. Even liberal or idealist accounts effectively favour a discursive and hegemonic framework derived from Western/developed ontologies and interests. Its isolated reduction and abstraction of human life within 'international relations', instead made up of 'actors, anarchy, interdependencies, threats, rationality', power and interests leads to dangerous rational calculations that ultimately sacrifice human, everyday life and the chance of peace.36 IR represents its knowledge systems as universal, when in fact they are local to the west/north.37 Such representational habits38 and knowledge systems are prone to isolating themselves in order to maintain their belief in universality.39 For example, Sylvester has shown how Waltzian neo-realism led to a form of IR in which 'parsimonious explanatory power traded off the gender, class, race, language, diversity, and cultural multiplicities of life' .40 Similarly, Watson has shown how a large percentage of the world's population -children -are surprisingly absent from IR for similar reasons.

It is critical to evaluate the discourse of peace- peace has no inherent meaning without discussion Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 6.]

[The discourses and concepts of peace lack a research agenda that might clarify the contestation of the concept of peace . Instead, where there should be research agendas there are silences and assumptions. Contemporary approaches to creating peace, from first generation conflict management approaches to third generation peacebuilding approaches, rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create, or question the conceptualisation inherent in their deployment. Conflict zones are represented as terra incognita upon which one can superimpose such activities without fear that the outcome, even if successful, may not actually resemble the vague ideal form of peace which is so often generally assumed to be their aim. Foucault's notion of a discourse helps to illuminate this darkness, because it indicates how multiple debates do exist though rarely openly acknowledged .28 This is not a framework for analysis but it does provide a capacity to see theory as intertwined with practice, of equal significance, and inherently more decisive -than a more traditional positivist theoretical/empirical divide would suggest .29 It allows a basic foundation for the multiple and competing versions of peace to be both identified and analysed . In other words, using a discourse framework enables this study to examine competing concepts and discourses of peace, as opposed to accepting as unproblematic the orthodoxy that involves starting with a conception of peace as an ideal form and then exporting it though the forms of intervention inherent peacebuilding approaches into conflict environments. Rather than constructing peace in this fashion, it is first necessary to deconstruct it. Peace does not exist outside of thought, interest and resultant policymaking, but is actually a result of them . Imagining peace, and elucidating the resultant discourses through theory and in our dealings in conflict zones, has become a powerful, perhaps even radical, process of reform and change . Western political thought and policy has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal frameworks, by which conflict in the world is judged. But there is not necessarily a clear agreement about why this has happened, and with what result. In the context of this latter question Gramsci's concept of hegemony is useful, though perhaps more so in its post-Gramscian context of plural 'hegemonies' than in its classical sense of the hege monies of a single state in a confederation over others. In this context, peace can be seen as a result of multiple hegemonies in IR col luding over the discourses, of, and creation of, peace. Consequently 'peace' has no inherent meaning, but must be qualified as a specific type among many. One must take note' of who describes peace, and how, as well as who constructs it, and why.]

Talking about peace creates peaceJohan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167.

This practice is not necessarily harmful. The use of the term 'peace' may in itself be peace-productive, producing a common basis, a feeling of communality in purpose that may pave the ground for deeper ties later on. The use of more precise terms drawn from the vocabulary of one conflict group, and excluded from the vocabulary of the opponent group, may in itself cause dissent and lead to manifest conflict precisely because the term is so clearly understood. By projecting an image of harmony of interests the term 'peace' may also help bring about such a harmony. It provides opponents with a one-word language in which to express values of concern and togetherness because peace is on anybody's agenda.2

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Framework- Best Forum

Crafting critique to be compatible with policy is the best way to achieve change- the Journal of Peace Research proves

Nils Petter Gleditsch, Research Professor, CSCW; Editor, Journal of Peace Research; Professor of Political Science, NTNU, “Journal of Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 2Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.,

In 1971 a second editorial announced that JPR was 'entering a second phase'. The editors' complained about the remoteness of most social science from society. While generalization was a virtue in natural science, social scientists were to place more emphasis on the single case, use anthropological methods of field study and adopt a methodological principle or validation by those who are studied or have intimate knowledge of the subject. The 'empirical fallacy' must be avoided as well as the 'theoretical fallacy'. Thus: policy should have primacy over theory and theory over data. 'We envisage a peace research that starts from experience and leads to action', the editors pronounced, while also admitting that they were groping for something whose contours they did not see clearly. An increasing militance was reflected in the cover text which now definitely encouraged authors to round off their discussion with a section on policy implications and warned them that 'articles directed towards ways and means of resolving conflicts will be favoured over purely empirical or theoretical articles'. In 1974 the editors listed a series of four questions that authors were to ask themselves; these included 'What is the peace relevance of my article?' Although not an editorial, Galtung's article on 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research' (1969) should be noted in this context. It redefined the concept of positive peace (as the absence of structural violence) and served, among other things, as an attempt to chart new directions for peace research in the face of harsh criticism from student radicals and academic neo-Marxists. In the third and most recent editorial in 1978, 2 unease remained on the question of relevance, although it was mixed with satisfaction at having succeeded in establishing an academic journal of some standing. Articles were nevertheless felt to be too repetitive of established viewpoints, too involved in theoretical hair-splitting, too little concerned with action. The editors announced that JPR in the future wished to 'devote itself more consciously to the task of developing theories on a strategy for change'.

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Framework-Peace Reps First

Identification of peace is a prerequisite to debating about conflict management and humanitarian crisis Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[These issues are addressed in following chapters in the context of intellectual and policy debates about war, peace, order, conflict management, resolution and peacebuilding, and their more recent application to conflicts, 'new wars' and humanitarian crises. This requires a focus both on what the identification of violence and resolution of war means for the creation or installation of peace, and on the broader intellectual and policy implications of such associated notions of peace . There has been an increasing convergence of such debates as is illustrated to some degree in the evolution of peace interventions from Cambodia in the early 1990s to the more recent peace operation in East Timor. Furthermore, this evolution has occurred in the context of the privatisation or subcontracting of many these tasks to the humanitarian community. Indeed this community often takes on roles that would not otherwise be fulfilled. 61 This is also linked to debates about the normative basis of humanitarian intervention,62 an alliance of development with other facets of peace interventions, human rights, and rights or needs based approaches to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Surrounding these developments there continues to lurk the question of consent, and problem of the effec tiveness of these multidimensional interventions in the context of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods .63 The desire to enhance such approaches' effectiveness, partly as a result of the globalisation of a par ticular, liberal version of peace associated with certain forms of gover nance, and a desire for its reaffirmation, has led to both a resolution approach to peace, as well as its subcontracting and privatisation. This is the terrain in which peace processes have increasingly come to be seen as opportunities to establish new forms of governance. Around this construction of the liberal peace, there has formed an epistemic community focused upon the activities that are required to construct the forms and institutions of governance now viewed as a sustainable basis for the ending of conflict .64 Here, power and knowledge in terms of resources and expertise have been quietly amassed in the hands of this community in order to export the liberal peace .]

Understanding peace is a prerequisite to policymaking Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[As with many conceptual debates a tyranny of multiple terminologies about the notion of peace abound, most of them assuming peace to be an ideal form, possibly achievable, but nevertheless to be aspired to, to be universal, and so apparent as not to require serious debate. However, not only is it important to understand the roots and condi tions of conflict and peace, but it is also important to start with an understanding of the essentially political, ·and therefore subjective, nature of the act and project of defining conflict and peace. As with the definition of terrorism for example, there is the problem of what peace is, and why, who creates and promotes it, and who peace is for. This also requires an identification of what constitutes conflict; vio lence and war, which then raises the question of who defines what constitutes conflict? At what level of conflict does the intervention of stales, international organisations, or NGOs occur? When are condi tions sufficiently conflictual spark multiple interventions, and what are such interventions aiming to achieve? The following chart indi cates two possible ways of exploring the conceptualisation of peace, revolving around the subjective/objective distinction that has become an integral part of ontological debates in IR, conflict, and social theory. As the above questions show, the simplicity of the objective list of questions about peace raises some serious problems, as does the complexity of the subjective list of questions. However, the age-old myth that peace exists as an existential condition, neither temporal nor spatial, needs little thought before it is discredited. Peace always has a time and a place, as well as representatives and protagonists in diplomatic, military, or civilian guise, and exists ill multiple forms in overlapping spaces of influence. It should never be assumcd to be monolithic and universal in that the ontology and methodology of peace vary according to cultural, social, economic, and political conditions. Nor should it be seen as necessarily totalising if it does become universal, though one should always be wary of this possibility. Yet, almost inevitably thinking on peace has also followed the Platonic notion of an 'ideal form', which is partly why the concept is so often imbued with such mystical legitimacy . In the light of the above, this study seeks to illuminate and explore the main concepts of peace and their usages through an examination of relevant literatures and policy discourses. Furthermore, it seeks to chart the ontological, epistemological, and normative aspects of these debates. This leads to an examination of the nature of the now dominant concept of peace - the liberal peace - which has rarely received any sustained investigation. Perhaps what is more important is the attempt to open up a research agenda on the various forms of peace , to negate its constant use as an ideal form, to give room for the voices of dissent about its dominant models 10 be heard, and to investigate the potential for alternative or co-existing forms . While the latter is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that such spaces need to be opened up for future research. Finally, this study offers an assessment of the contemporary policy and academic discourses of peace, and their implications, because to even uncover assumptions is to become sensitized to them. This may produce more opportunities for the negotiation and renegotiation of sustainable forms of peace . ]

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Focus on peace is crucial to understanding the root cause of all conflictsRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[What is implicit in much of the literature on or from this period, and policymaking vis-a-vis peace, is that the key task is often seen as the 'restoration' of peace, rather than its creation.65 This conservative theme-continues well into the twentieth century when debates about peacekeeping often revolved around ambiguous mandates involving wording indicating a 'restoration' of peace, security, and order. Implicit in this is the notion of a return to some pre-conflict ideal, in essence a balance of power favourable to a specific party . Clearly, this dominant approach implicitly meant (and means) that the roots of a conflict were ignored, that disputants were reluctant to address them, or simply were not aware of them so inculcated were they in a specific discourse which ultimately focused upon peace as the absence of war, despite the emergence of agencies, international humanitarian law, NGOs, and advocacy movements , which had their sights trained upon something more sophisticated. A return to a pre-conflict peace in this context would seem in many cases to be a recipe for the continuation of conflict. Furthermore, the sense that peace could actually be con structed rather than merely preserved, and usefully be created in the interests of its sponsors was beginning to emerge - a version of what would be familiar in the twentieth century as the institutional peace, accompanied by the peace projects being projected by growing numbers of non-state actors. At the same time, in the growing non governmental movements of the period, there was also a realization that the individual and civil society had to be included in this project. The foundations of the contemporary liberal peace were already present and underpinning the evolution charted above was a tendency to cling to peace as Platonic 'ideal form', despite the obvious diplomatic tendencies of the day and the competing understandings of order associated with imperialism and nationalism. The liberal peace was still in an embryonic form .]

Peace research should focus on structural violence before warsEverts 1972 (Philip P, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Leiden University and also serves on the Government Advisory Council on International Affairs, “Developments and Trends in Peace and Conflict Research,1965-1971: A Survey of Institutions” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium Dec., 1972 p. 478- 479 http://www.jstor.org/stable/173536)

Peace research came into being as a concomitant to the rapid devlopment of science, particularly social science, in the post- 1945 world and in response to the primary challenge: the danger of destruction through atomic warfare. It addressed itself primarily to the various forms of conlifct between the major powers. Its concepts, theories and methodology became very much shaped by this particular conflict between the major powers. But in the gradual shift in attention to the problems of the struggle for the liberation and the political and economic development of the poor and dependent countries and the violence accompanying these processes other concepts, models and theories come to the fore and the adequacy of much established thought is being questioned. The tension between the values "peace" and "justice" acquires new visibility. Where the consequences of either open or structural violence are lost sight of we are guilty of political or ideological bias. It is of course trivial to say that the problems of war and peace are complex and can and should be approached at a number of levels. Since it has become gradually accepted that the relations between nations cannot readily be separated from those within nations two levels, that of the nation-state and that of the international system, present themselves in the first place (although it is doubtful whether the nation-state, the concept of sovereighnty notwithstanding, is at all a useful independent unit of analysis in this respect). But nation-states are no living beings, they are composed of individuals and groups interacting with one another. They in turn present a third level of analysis, of individuals and groups within the nation-state. Not only is research necessary and valid at each of these levels. The interaction between the levels should also be looked into. Although it is easy to see that from this the logical conclusion follows that many disciplines should be able to contribute to peace research and should cooperate, it is less easy to see how this process of interpenetration, moving from multidisciplinary to inter- and even transdisciplinary research can take shape. Peace research does not dispose yet (if it ever will) of one consistent overall theory in which the contributions from the various disciplines can easily be placed. What we have are at most little "islands of theory" lying in an uncharted ocean (Wright, 1942; Pruitt and Snyder, 1969; Newcombe and Newcombe, 1969).

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The aff’s claims are based in a flawed worldview- understand peace is a prerequsite to understanding violence Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 133.]

[The study of peace is usually overlooked in the face of the need to understand violence. When one does begin to study the conceptualisa tion of peace through the various research programmes and theoretical approaches available, it becomes very apparent that all is not as it seems. Utilising a genealogical view of the development of approaches to ending conflict indicates that the outcome - the order – they produce, may only contribute to the hegemony of dominant actors. In other words the processes used to construct contemporary peace could be argued to mainly serve the interests of dominant actors in interna tional politics rather than to achieve a version of peace based upon a much broader consensus, including those who are its recipients. Defining and then negotiating peace cannot be examined without some kind of parallel examination of the reproduction of specific orders, which peace processes effectively revolve around. What is clear about the current theorisation of the practices and discourses of conflict and approaches to end conflict is that there is an impetus towards a broad and institutionalised peacebuilding consensus from within the liberal international community, and that this is aimed at constructing a conditional and liberal peace. The methods inherent in this peacebuilding consensus are heavily theorised and are developing rapidly. However, the liberal peace and all that it entails has tended to escape any sustained examination, but rather is made up of a series of norms, concepts, and regimes, which have emerged as a resulted different strands of thought, theory, policies and strategies used in different issue areas. The reality of both the peacebuilding consensus and the liberal peace is that they mask dissensus and are heavily contested both in discourse and in practice.]

Research studies show that peace research should be about structural violenceEverts 1972 (Philip P, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Leiden University and also serves on the Government Advisory Council on International Affairs, “Developments and Trends in Peace and Conflict Research,1965-1971: A Survey of Institutions” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium Dec., 1972 p. 503-504 http://www.jstor.org/stable/173536)

Subject matter and priorities: The first question in this section was phrased as follows: "Some researchers feel that peace research should only deal with relations between nations, others feel it should discuss conflict and intergration within nations as well. What do you think?" Table 11 shows that in 1966 there were still 41% of the respondents in favour of restricting peace research to relations between nations. This percentage has decreased to 9%, whereas there is now almost complete concensus about the importance of studying internal relations as well. The Non-NA institutions are somewhat less outspoken in this respect. But in general the compartmentalizaiton of (political) science in a part dealing with national affairs, is, at least among our respondents, now firmly rejected. The trend is borne out by the answer to the next question, dealing with preferences for the study of the avoidance of war (negative peace) versus the study of conditions for a more peaceful world (positive peace). As Table 12 shows, there is only a small minority in favour of restricting oneself to study of the avoidance of war. A large majority feels that peace research should concentrate on or at least include studies on positive peace (44% plus 28%). This preference for the study of positive peace- which is even stronger among the New-NA institutes- underlines the outcome of the previous question, because it has to do primarily with qualities like justice and equality within nations.

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Framework-Reps First

Representations comes first- the affirmatives’ problem solving theory has ideological biasesNeufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 29-30)

In a contribution that predates the Third Debate by several years, Robert Cox (1986) has evidenced a clear awareness of the core elements of theoretical reflexivity. Beyond attention to basic assumptions, Cox also has shown a clear awareness of the politico normative content of any theoretical enterprise. Specifically, he has argued that it is necessary to recognize that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" and that theory is shaped by a problematique rooted in the "human experience that gives rise to the need for theory" (Cox, 1986:207,217-218). Accordingly, there is "no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space." As a consequence, Cox has argued, "when any theory so represents itself, it is more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective" (Cox, 1986:207-208). In short, paradigms and theories are expressions of diverse perspectives linked to disparate social and political projects. It is therefore a central task of the theorist to achieve "a perspective on perspectives" by becoming "more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself," by becoming "clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives" (Cox, 1986:208). As such, Cox's position represents a clear break with the positivist notion of truth as correspondence and distinguishes itself clearly from the stance of commensurable and therefore comparable. At the same time, it is important to note that Cox broke as well with the position of Stance II. Refusing to equate incommensurability with incomparability, Cox has affirmed that achieving a perspective on perspectives is oriented to a specific goal: "to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective" (Cox, 1986:207-208; emphasis added). The perspective on perspectives that Cox has presented involves a distinction between two types of theorizing-two distinct, rival, and incommensurable paradigms. The first Cox has labeled "problem-solving theory," an approach distinguished by the fact that it "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action" (Cox, 1986:208). In contrast to problem-solving theory, the second approach, that of critical theory, is distinguished by the fact that it "stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about"; that is, it "does not take institutions and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing" (Cox, 1986:208). Despite the recognition of the incommensurability of these two approaches, Cox has shown himself quite ready to engage in a reasoned comparison of them by means of a critical examination of their politico-normative content. The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to" limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination. The ceteris paribus assumption, upon which such theorizing is based, makes it possible to arrive at statements of laws or regularities which appear to have general validity but which imply, of course, the institutional and relational parameters assumed in the problem-solving approach. (Cox, 1986:208) However, Cox has insisted, problem-solving theory's assumption of a fixed order is not merely a convenience of method, but also an ideological bias. Problem-solving theories can be represented ... as serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order. Indeed, the purpose served by problemsolving theory is conservative, since it aims to solve the problem arising in various parts of the complex whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole. (Cox, 1986:208) While acknowledging problem-solving theory's strengths, Cox nonetheless has judged critical theory superior on the basis of its emancipatory politico-normative content, as shown by three basic attributes. First, critical theory recognizes that it stems from a perspective. Second, "critical theory contains problem-solving theories within itself, but contains them in the form of identifiable ideologies, thereby pointing to their conservative consequences." And third, critical theory, having as a principal objective the clarification of the "range of possible alternatives," "allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order" (Cox, 1986:209-210).

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Framework-Reps First

Our framework indicts your methodology; the claims of the affirmative represent a dogmatic view of aggression that fails to address the underlying structural violence

Kim 76 - The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique, Samuel S. Kim, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1976), p. 254-5, Sage Publications, Ltd.

If accepted without critical scrutiny, the application of the Lorenzian theory to the social sciences in general and to peace research in particular can be misleading and even dangerous . This paper challenges the Lorenzian theory on conceptual, methodological, and substantive grounds and draws up some broad policy implications for peace research. However, a few caveats are in order at the outset. The present critique should not be regarded as an apology for anti- evolutionary approaches in the social sciences. Nor should it be regarded as an instance of parochial resistance to cross-disciplinary approaches in peace research or as a traditional opposition to 'scientific' method in political science. Rather, it is predicated on the belief that indiscriminate cross- fertilization can be of little heuristic value to the advancement of peace research as a value-oriented policy science.3 The Lorenzian Theory The core of the Lorenzian theory of human and animal behavior is the assertion that 'aggression' - defined as 'the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species (Lorenz, 1966: ix) - is phylogenetically programmed and, therefore, ineradicably instinctive behavior. Aggression is not a learned reaction to social cues or environmental stimuli but a species-specific instinct man has inherited from his anthropoid ancestors in the service of evolutionary adaptation and survival. All the amazing paradoxes of human history would somehow fall into place, Lorenz would have us believe, 'like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, if one assumes that human behavior, and particularly human social behavior, far from being determined by reason and cultural tradition alone, is still subject to all the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted instinctive behavior' (1966: 237; see also 1970: xii). In his enthusiasm for the popularization of ethology, Lorenz (1966: 29) conveys the impression that this conceptual net can stretch so far and wide as to cover 'the alarming progression of aggressive actions ranging from cocks fighting in the barnyard to dogs biting each other, boys thrashing each other, young men 'throwing beer mugs at each other's heads, and so on to bar-room brawls about politics, and finally to wars and atom bombs'. In order to make the ambiguous concept of 'instinct' integral to his theory of human and animal behavior, Lorenz ha's reified it. Closely following the formulation of Tin- bergen (1951), Lorenz views instinctive acts as rigidly stereotyped innate movements ('fixed action patterns') which are coordinated in the central nervous system. Lorenz flatly asserts that 'the motor co-ordination patterns of the instinctive behaviour pattern are hereditarily determined down to the finest detail' (1970: 313). Instinctive acts are thus neurophysiologically motivated leased in t'he internal system of the organism - 'a virtually close system' in Lorenz's (1970: 323) own words - quite independently of the animal's experience and environment.4 Ano'ther salient feature of the Lorenzian theory is its insistence on the spontaneity of aggression…CONT…From the and re- standpoint of peace research, however, the most troubling aspect of the Lorenzian definition of human aggression is its weakness in dealing with institutionalized aggression - the injury, harm, and violence indirectly inflicted upon one group of individuals by another group of individuals through institutions and structures of society, or what Galtung (1969) terms 'structural violence' . The irony is that the greater the capability an actor possesses in terms of such coercive weapons as position, wealth, persuasive skills, and the like, the greater the probability that his 'aggression' will be expressed in an indirect institutional or structural form rather than in a direct personal/physical form. Even the widely accepted (non-Lorenzian) definition of aggression as 'any behavior whose goal is the injury of some person or thing' (Berkowitz, 1968a: 168) raises the conceptual problem of attribution of intent. Strictly speaking, intent is not a behavioral attribute but a circumstantial inference de- duced from any behavioral pattern which is, or appears to be, nonaccidental. This raises an interesting conceptual problem. Is an actor who attempts to injure some person or object seriously, but fails, as 'aggressive' as an actor who unintentionally injures some person or thing? Clearly, lack of consensus on the extent of attribution of intent remains a major obstacle in operationalizing the concept of aggression. Independent of its conceptual difficulties and substantive weaknesses, the Lorenzian approach to aggression and war is flawed on methodological grounds alone. This is due to Lorenz's recurrent tendency to stray be-yond the boundary of well-established scientific standards and procedures. Instead of the formulation of operational hypotheses that can be empirically verified, or the development of theses based on evidence, one finds an unrestrained mixture of metaphorical reasoning and dogmatic conviction , a pervasive confusion of analogy and homol. gy, and an unabashed exercise in cross-species extrapolation and long inductive leaps. Most important, Lorenz fails to construct a relevant or testable paradigm for the study of war .

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The aff’s truth claims arent’t absolute- they rely upon themselves. Representation shapes realities- different justifications lead to different policies. Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 14-16)

The tenet of truth as correspondence rests upon a particular assumption: that of the separation of subject and object, of observer and observed. In other words, the tenet of truth as correspondence assumes that through the proper application of research design and techniques, the researcher(s) can be factored out, leaving behind a description of the world "as it truly is." In short, the tenet of truth as correspondence is the expression of the goal of rendering science a process without a subject. The consequence of this tenet and of this assumption is that a number of problematic issues are swept aside. In making the separation of subject and object a defining condition of science, the positivist approach ignores the active and vital role played by the community of researchers in the production and validation of knowledge. Truth as correspondence ignores the fact that the standards that define reliable knowledge are dependent upon their acceptance and application by a research community.As a result, a number of important questions not only go unanswered, they are never raised. These include questions of the historical origin and nature of the community-based standards that define what counts as reliable knowledge, as well as questions of the merits 9.Lthose standards in the light of possible alternatives. These questions do not arise in positivist-inspired theorizing because the central standard of scientific truth-that of truth as correspondence-isseen to belong not to a time-bound human community of scientific investigators, but to an extrahistorical natural realm. In short, the knowledge- defining standards of positivsm are understood to be "nature's own" (Rorty, 1979:xxvi). In contrast, a theoretically reflexive orientation is one in which the starting point stands in radical opposition to that of positivism in that it rejects the notion of objective standards existing independently of human thought and practice. Reflexively oriented theorists draw philosophical sustenance from the efforts to develop a postpositivist philosophy of science associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, as well as the linguistic turn in social and political theory manifest in the Wittgensteinian analysis of language games, neopragmatist renditions of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics, and Michel Foucault's analysis of power knowledge discourses. As different as these approaches are, all serve to undermine the assumption that it is ever possible to separate subject (the knower and object (the known) in the manner postulated by positivism. Simply put, if the paradigm (language game/ tradition/ discourse) not only tells us how to interpret evidence, but determines what will count as valid evidence in the first place, the tenet of truth as correspondence to the facts can no longer be sustained. The notion of reflexivity directs us beyond merely identifying the underlying assumptions of our theorizing to recognizing that the very existence of objective standards for assessing competing knowledge claims must be questioned. Furthermore, it moves us to understand that the standards that determine what is to count as reliable knowledge are nature’s, but rather always human standards- standards that are not given but made, not imposed by nature but· adopted by convention by the members of a specific community. In so doing, we are compelled to acknowledge the politico-normative content of scholarly investigation. Seeing knowledge-defining standards as community-created conventions in specific contexts moves us to see that evolving descriptions and ever-changing versions of objects, things, and the world issue forth from various communities as responses to certain prolems, as attempts to overcome specific situations, and as means to satisfy particular needs and interests. (West, 1989:201; emphasis added). In short, ideas, words, and language are not mirrors that copy the "real" or "objective" world- as positivist conceptions of theory and knowledge would have it- but rahter tools with which we cope with "our" world (West, 1989:201). Consequently, there is a fundamental link between epistemology- the question of what counts as reliable knowledge- and politics- the problems, needs, and interests deemed important and legitimate by a given community. The inextricably politico-normative of scholarship has an important consequence for the social sciences in terms of the incommensurability thesis (i.e., that contending paradigms are not only incompatible but actually have no common measure). In the case of the natural sciences, one may reasonably contest the thesis that contending paradigms are incommensurable, given their shared politico-normative goal of instrumental control of nature. In the case of the social sciences, however, different paradigms are incommensurable, given their shared politico-normative goal of instrumental control of nature. In the case of the social sciences, however, different paradigms not only have different terminologies, but are often constructed in terms of quite different values and oriented to serving quite different political projects. Consequently, the thesis of the radical incommensurability of contending paradigms in a social science such as international relations is much more difficult to dispute.

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Framework-Marxist IR GoodMarxist IR is key – ends violence not just between states but against the working classRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 3: Marxist Agendas for Peace, TH, p. 60-61)

Marx offered an understanding of relations between classes in the context of capitalism and their implications for both domestic and international relations. He argued that for mutual interest to emerge, which was a prerequisite of the form of peace implied by Marxism, capitalist property relations must be abolished in order

to remove the exploitation that occurred between 'nations', leading to social justice. 17 The class framework enabled a transnational view of IR in which a struggle over the nature of order takes place not just between states, but also between mobilised classes aiming at economic justice and equality (by taking control of the means of production and removing private property). This was not only concerned with developing a form of peace (in the form of a classless society) through

communism or socialism, however, but also with the problem that the brunt of any war or conflict was borne by the working classes (a

subtle addition to Kant's position), implying a need for peace between states, even if they were capitalist. Indeed, what was most significant in this approach to international relations was that the transnational organisation of the masses who would take discursive and practical action to resist elite structures of exploitation was actually possible and represented a viable alternative to the top-down and state-centric nature of domestic and international politics. This emancipatory

discourse is one of Marxism's most important contributions, if ironic, to IR's approaches to peace.

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Framework-Marxist IR Bad

Marxist IR causes aggression between communist and non-communist states – even if it achieves internal justice. Empirically – it has been far worse than realism.Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 3: Marxist Agendas for Peace, TH, p. 62-63)

For these reasons, during the Cold War, this contradictory ideological framework appeared to be aggressive to non-communist states, and a recipe for war, even if it claimed to offer equality and social justice within the revolutionary state. For this reason, capitalist democracies bitterly contested the implied claims that Marxist-derived approaches created a better, more just, society (and hence, peace). Ironically, however, this version of peace claimed it provided social justice, in particular economic equality, through resisting and overturning feudal and imperially supported class structures (effectively structural violence), which prevented the proper valuing of labour and so of social justice. The irony of achieving peace and justice through a recourse to violence -a mark of many such theories -was clearly present in this framework. Indeed, many left-leaning intellectuals, artists,

writers and thinkers of the 1930s and 1940s actually adopted communism because of its prioritisation of social and economic justice, including the likes of Picasso and Orwell,

but were later to reject it because of the aggressive and warlike practices of the Soviet Union in satellites such as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968. Indeed, the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism is notorious for its violence and proxy wars, for issuing claims and counterclaims against their adherents of imperialist and neo-imperialist tendencies, suppression, and an empty rhetoric of peace. Of course, it should be noted that the attraction of Marxist-Leninist based ideologies was based not on its practice, but on its aspirations for change and reform and, as with idealism, liberalism and realism, should be contextualised by the inequalities, development differentials and structural violence they were aimed at. These may have been significant contributions to an understanding of what peace may entail, though of course, as it became clear what existing communism really entailed, the positive epistemology of peace that it apparently offered was little more than a chimera. Revolution, refonn and the resistance to capitalism offered an ideal of peace but in practice was far more brutal than the negative epistemology of peace that realism offered.

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Framework-Util BadUtilitarianism has bad reasoning Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 17-18)

This limiting of reason, moreover, has resulted in the marginalization and impoverishment of normative discourse. Given the positivist emphasis on the centrality of a neutral observation language, the treatment of normative issues in mainstream social science has typically taken the form of descriptive accounts of individual value preferences. One might, of course, engage in crude utilitarian calculation to determine the course offering the most in terms of human happiness. Foreclosed, however, is the reasoned adjudication of the inherent value of competing normative claims. Indeed, in the realm of normative discourse the hold of the positivist model of social science has been so powerful that it made us "quite incapable of seeing how reason does and can really function in the domain" (Taylor, 1985:230).5 Consequently, the means of exorcising the Cartesian anxiety lies in elucidating a conception of reason that is not limited to episteme, and does not depend on a fixed Archimedean point outside of history or the existence of a neutral observation language, It is worth noting, moreover, that just such an effort has been under way in contemporary social and political theory. It is evident in Charles Taylor's privileging of Hegel's interpretive or hermeneutical dialectics-a form of reasoning that, in contrast to the claim of strict dialectics (which makes claims to an undeniable starting point), posits no such foundation and yet still aims to convince us by the overall plausibility of the interpretation it gives (Taylor, 1979:64). It is evident in Hans-Georg Gadamer's linguistically based reappropriation of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, which, in contrast to episteme, is oriented to the exercise of reasoned judgment in the context not of the timeless and unchanging, but of the variable and contingent. It is also evident in Jiirgen Habermas's contribution to the theory of communicative action, in particular the discursive validation of truth claims. Perhaps most strikingly, given the predominance achieved by the notion of "paradigm" in contemporary international relations theory, it is evident in Richard Bernstein's reevaluation of Kuhn as someone whose work does not lead us to the myth of the framework-as was charged by Popper-but rather evidences a movement toward a form of practical reason having great affinity to Gadamer's reconceptualization of phronesis.6 In all of these efforts and more, the emphasis is upon the elucidation of a dialogic form of reason that refuses to limit our conception of human rationality to a mechanical application of an eternal, unchanging standard; that affirms that a broader and more subtle conception of reason is possible than that which underlies both the positivist tenet of truth as correspondence and that of radical relativism as the logical consequence of incommensurability; that experiences no self-contradiction when employing a "language of qualitative worth,"? and is thus as suited to a consideration of normative claims as it is to empirical ones.

Using this type of calculation prevents political change- it is impossible to calculate which is more importantJohan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 183

But however attractive such calculations may be - for reasons of intellectual curiosity about the dynamics of violence, structural and personal, even to develop much higher levels of theoretical insights in these phenomena thanwe possess today - this is not the same as accepting cost-benefit analysis in this field as a basis for political action. The point here is not so much that one may have objec- tions to projecting the mathematical 'one human life-year = one human life-year', regardless how it is lost or gained, on to the stage of political action, but rather that this type of analysis leads to much too modest goals for political action. Imagine that the general norm were formulated 'you shall act politically so as to decrease violence, taking into account both before and after levels of personal and structural violence'. A norm of that kind would be blind to possible differences in structural and personal violence when it comes to their potential for getting more violence in the future. But it would also condone action as long as there is any decrease, and only steer political action downwards on the violence surface, not lead to a systematic search for the steepest gradient possible, even for a descent route hitherto unknown to man.But equally important is to recall that it is hardly possible to arrive at any general judgment, independent of time and space, as to which type of violence is more important. In space, today, it may certainly be argued that research in the Americas should focus on structural violence, between nations as well as between individuals, and that peace research in Europe should have a similar focus on personal violence. Latent personal violence in Europe may erupt into nuclear war, but the manifest structural violence in the Americas (and not only there) already causes an annual toll of nuclear magnitudes. In saying this, we are of course not neglecting the structural components of the European situation, (such as the big power dominance and the traditional exploitation of Eastern Europe by Western Europe) nor are we forgetful of the high level of personal violence in the Americas even though it does not take the form of international warfare (but sometimes the form of interventionist aggression).

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FW: Human Nature=Prior Question

Determining and agreeing upon human nature is key to effective anti-violence policy

Nancy Nyquist Potter, “Preface”, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004.

Some people believe that violence is the darker side of human nature, while others argue that it is an inevitable and even necessary aspect of developing subjectivity. Some analysts (and politicians) equate violence with madness but then define both those concepts in ways that exempt the dominant or powerful from being counted as violent or mad. Still others believe that violence is an aberration or distortion of human goodness that comes about when people are deprived of things integral to healthy development, such as, recognition, respect, and economic equality.How we conceptualize human nature is likely to influence what we take to be viable solutions to violence. But whether violence comes to us "naturally" or some other way, most of us are in agreement that it needs to be curtailed as much as possible.

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Realism BadRealism only helps the powerful and rests upon flawed notionsRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 4-5)

With the exception of orthodox versions of realism and Marxism, approaches to IR theory offer a form of peace that many would recognise as personally acceptable. Realism fails to offer much for those interested in peace, unless peace is seen as Darwinian and an unreflexive, privileged concept only available to the powerful and a commonwealth they may want to create. Most realist analysis expends its energy in reactive discussions based upon the inherency of violence in human nature, now discredited in other disciplines,16 which are ultimately their own undoing. This is not to say that other approaches do not also suffer flaws, but the focus on individuals, society, justice, development, welfare, transnationalism, institutionalism or functionalism offers an opportunity a negotiation of a form of peace that might be more sustainable because it is more broadly inclusive of actors and issues. In other words, parsimony, reductionism and rationalism run counter to a peace that engages fully with the diversity of life and its experiences.

Realist peace rests upon flawed assumptions, cannot achieve true peaceRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 10)

Debates about peace span both classical and contemporary literatures, and a range of intellectual debates. These include what modem realists often described as the realism of Thucydides, Augustine, Hobbes and Schmitt, in which peace was to be found in bounded and often tragic strategic thinking in which unitary actors delineate their own versions of peace within the framework provided by sovereign states. The tragedy of these approaches lies in their unitary internal assumptions of a shared peace within political units based upon common interests and values, and the difficulties in maintaining peaceful relations with other external polities that have their own notions of peace. Peace in these terms is derived from territorial units determined to protect their identities and interests, and is therefore extremely limited. For this reason, an international system comprising states pursing their interests is said to exist, which denotes few shared values beyond domestic politics, and rests upon the hierarchical ordering of international relations. This is based upon relative power and alliances derived from shared interests rather than shared values. Peace is conceptualised as very basic, or as a utopian ideal form, which is unobtainable.

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Realism Bad

Realism is a flawed methodology, seminal texts support peaceRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 44-45)

Melian dialogue which is generally interpreted to be a pragmatic endorsement of such practices.17 In this milieu of the inherency of violence in humanity and states, as Machiavelli pointed out, there is little room for moral codes and cooperation, but rather cynicism and amorality, through which realism is deployed to read history and to explain IR as a Hobbesian state of nature. For Machiavelli, human nature was self-interested and morality and justice could be nothing more than a reflection of the hegemony of great powers. 18 In a similar vein, Rousseau is represented as focusing on the darker side of human nature. 19 These texts have been appropriated in certain ways by the realist canon and methodology to prove that power and violence underpin the workings of the international system in an ahistorical and irredeemable way. History and politics prove there is no alternative, and so given this position, IR is about managing interests, balancing power and at most making alliances between 'like-minded' states. As Hobbes infamously pointed out, peace was extremely limited, and war extremely far-reaching. His notion of a 'state of nature' posited that a disposition towards war in international relations was simply a reflection of human nature. What is more, for Hobbes and for realists since Hobbes, this approximated a scientific law -the nature of the individual is reflected by the international state of nature. It is from these strands that contemporary realist thought has drawn upon a tradition of states as unified, and rational, and able to act as one in their pursuit of a 'national interest' thereby maximising their latent capacity for both defensive and offensive international engagements. Of course, as George has pointed out, these readings are particular to modern realism because of its methodological approach: other, perhaps more optimistic, though just as subjective, readings can also be gleaned from the same texts. Indeed, the rationalisation of fear that Hobbesian thought offered can be taken as a starting point for thinking about peace. Though Hobbes saw peace as limited he also argued that it could be achieved through a commonwealth overseen by a Leviathan, representing a civil peace and social contract. Indeed, Hobbes offered education rather than the use of force as a path to peace. This is a rather more sophisticated account than a balance of power between states in which peace is simply the fragile moment in between conflict. In other words, Hobbes is concerned with a peace within and between societies, even if his prescriptions for a Leviathan appear to lead to anarchy or authoritarianism rather than freedom. Indeed, for Hobbes, peace was a state of non-interference in the lives of others in a commonwealth where a civil association existed, which appears to reflect the modern liberal state very closely.24 This begs the question as to why realism focuses on the anarchy offered by Hobbes' work, and why it assumes that a domestic peace can coexist with international instability. The assumption is that international instability interferes with domestic peace, rather than the possibility that the commonwealth Hobbes envisaged might tame the international: 'Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that War shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it. '25 However, on balance, the sum of his thinking seems to indicate that a basic level of peace is the best that could be aspired to in the absence of a commonwealth. He was also aware of the dangers of universalism,26 and the claim that there was universal framework that powerful actors could then deploy through war and violence to their advantage, on the assumption that other actors and states could be coercively assimilated. This would mean an imperialist victor's peace, and Hobbes was clear that he would rather see a limited peace that reflected the norms and sentiments of its local and integral actors. In asserting this position, Hobbes identified one of the key dilemmas in the consideration of peace for idealists, liberals and realists. The position that peace can only be very limited and every state or commonwealth defines its own version of peace has served as a reason why more sophisticated agendas for peace are not worthwhile in realist thought, because they are implausibly interventionary and not pragmatic, particularly given the limited resources of anyone state, and competition between states. What is clear, however, is that even amongst the founding canon of realist works, there are also discourses of peace focusing upon the alleviation of the state of nature.27 Despite such subtleties, texts such as Leviathan are taken to provide validification of modem realism's denial of an ambitious peace, and the view that war is part of the 'fall' of humanity along the lines envisaged by Augustine.

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Realism BadRealism leads to imperialist expansionRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 45-46)

The view that war may be inevitable, and even desirable, became suffused throughout modem realism as it drew selectively on this canon, even though it also contained notions of peace. The notion of peace that emerges is bounded, spatial and temporally limited within specific states. It represents a victor's peace, founded upon the use of force and a form of imperialism. Imperialism gradually became a key part of a realist notion of peace (and contributed to the later development of the liberal peace). The British Empire's exploration of new sea routes during the Elizabethan era led to a rapid realisation of the potential for trade, and ultimately the financial and military benefits of territorial acquisition and control. In 1570, John Dee wrote his Brytannica Republicae Synopsis,30 which famously became the basis for imperial expansionism. It soon became acceptable to talk of imperial or colonial hegemony as a realist form of peace. Superior races, technology and expertise, probably God-given, became the intellectual and normative basis of Western imperialism across the world. The highest form of realpolitik had become imperialism, as Morganthau was later to explain.3 ! The development of imperialism reflected the requirements of capitalist states in the developing international political economy. This later developed into what was known as 'liberal imperialism' during the late nineteenth century in which the imperial power had a responsibility towards the development of subject people (who were implicitly seen as primitive and/or barbaric). However, the strongly territorial nature of imperialism meant that, along with its serious ethical problems, it was also very unstable, open to challenges from the colonised and from competing imperial powers.

Realism causes endless warRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 45-46)

These tensions within the realist tradition meant that in practice it was gradually modified by a more liberal notion that war should only be waged by a legitimate authority as a last resort and in response to an act of unjustified aggression. After the Congress of Vienna, for example, peace now depended upon territorial states and their international arrangements which preserved a patchwork of interests between states through the balance of power. This supported a peace resting upon international treaties and alliances, as was envisaged by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and many others to follow. Territorial, secular, state sovereignty emerged as the guarantee and arbiter of territory and hence peace, envisaged as a balance of power between juxtaposed territorial units, which mounted a possible threat against others. This was the nature of what might be called the Westphalian peace. War was the painful process through which the balance of power mechanism corrected itself. Peace was more or less what existed in between such corrections. However, the view that war was part of the natural fabric of international life was increasingly displaced by the view that peace should be so, as was bitterly contested in the first great debate of IR. The realist hypothesis that peace could only exist as an ideal form in a utopian future ruled by a Leviathan was countered by the idea that a form of peace could and did exist in the context of well-governed nation states where a social contract existed. Yet, the notion that war was a normal part of international life continued to underpin the thinking of many of the elites who oversaw international relations.

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Realism BadRealist methodology flawedRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 47-48)

Carr attempted to recast realism as the science of IR in the emerging methodological style of the day. This, as George has shown, was based upon the pre-eminence of 'fact over value, is over ought, and object over subject', though Carr was also well aware of the significance of the normative aspects of IR. Peace was seen to be a 'value', an 'ought', a 'subjective' concept,33 and therefore inferior to, or limited by the realist version of 'fact', 'is' and 'objective' approaches. Indeed, for Carr, a form of peace defined as morality at the international level was merely the projection of the interests of dominant states. Peace was merely a hope, though it must also be noted that he was concerned with the inseparable relationship between power and morality, and the problems of crude, amoral realism, and of universal claims for a specific morality: the utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is based on self-seeking. Bull also thought that 'idealist' claims simply rested upon a passionate hope for IR, rather than an understanding that had any intellectual depth.36 For Morgenthau, a balance of power emerged from the struggle between states in order to regulate the worst effects of that struggle. This was developed in the context of a Weberian 'verstehen' approach to observing the role of statesmen in deploying 'interest defined as power' in international politics.38 Out of this came a very limited victor's peace, theorised to reflect interest defined as power and the competition between 'nations',39 with little acknowledgement of its related value systems and norms. Morganthau developed perhaps the most important explanation of realism from a philosophical and historical perspective, and of the inevitable 'flouting of universal standards of morality,40 (though later in his career he was particularly critical of the behaviouralist turn that realism had taken, and of realism itself in the context of its inability to go beyond the state of nature).41 Realism aimed at the control of war rather than its proliferation. However, even those realists that favoured a historical or philosophical approach disliked the pretences of a science of realism, which many felt did not take this aim far enough. From out of these assertions developed a claim by realists that they described an eternal reality and had constructed a pragmatic approach to explaining and managing it. This recast realist canon again turned to earlier thinkers in order to support this claim, in the process often misrepresenting the subtleties of their claims43 because of their aspirations towards producing a science of IR. Yet such claims clearly objectified and essentialised, not to mention reduced, the key components and claims of IR, leading to the positivist realist depiction of an endless cycle of the historical repetition of war, interest and breakdowns in the balance of power. Realism revolved around the tendency of states to exist in their own moral universe, and therefore to compete even on a normative basis.44 Both Morganthau and Niebuhr thought that any kind of universal ethical concern projected at the international level -as idealists and liberals called for may indeed be a cause for war, rather than a cause of moderation.45 From the perspective accorded by an examination of peace, the first 'great debate' of lR which seemed, by the time of the Second World War, to have been settled in favour of realism, appears to have been an artificial debate in which twentieth century realists interpreted canonical texts in the new context of the interwar period and the Cold War. This was in order to endorse a science of realism via commentary that was biased towards the view that only realism could explain IR, and to discredit idealist and liberal thinking on peace. This raises the question of whether classical realism and the first great debate is mainly an invention of a certain epoch of modern realist IR, imposed on history to determine the present and the future according to a negative epistemology of peace.

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Realism Bad

Realist epistemology fails and ignores famine, disease, civil war, and moreRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 48-49)

During the second half of the twentieth century realist thought moved from historical and philosophical base towards adopting the formats offered by behaviouralism and positivism, as illustrated by Wolfers' 'billiard ball' model, which represented a 'scientific image' of realism47 (culminating in the rational choice models which have dominated corners of realist and liberal theory). The move to place realism within the ambit of a science of international relations was part of a broader positivist movement in social science, focusing on the behaviouralist argument that observable behaviour was crucial. This so-called 'second debate' in IR was effectively an attempt to legitimate the assumptions realism was already based upon. Such rational actor models focused upon utilitarian calculations of interest and power (even offering the proposition that nuclear war might have utility) and endorsed the notion that state interest could be defined as power underpinned by a basic concern with self-preservation. There was little room for any discussion of peace in these approaches, during the Cold War, where in one period between 1983 and 1988 three trillion dollars were spent on weaponry by both superpowers.48 At the same time, issues such as famine, disease and civil war continued, often ignored by IR. Self-preservation was defined in terms not of the construction of a broader peace but in terms of the preservation of the state as an umbrella for the nation. This endorsed the Weberian state control of violence to preserve its domestic integrity and its position in competition with other states

Realism doesn’t assume the cold war, making it an ineffective way to solve problemsRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 51-52)

In sum, neo-realist thinking continued to rest upon the assumption that there is a clear divide between subjective and objective thinking, between the domestic and the international, and that the objective world 'out there' is made up only of self-interested states that shape the international system from the top down in a hierarchy induced by relative power. Cooperation is a chimera because states are egoistic rational actors and regimes are at best an expression of coincidental utility between states. Neo-realism eventually produced the offering, not of a sophisticated view of peace (though it moved towards accepting liberal hegemony at the end of the Cold War as a limited form of peace), but a view of civilisational conflict, of competition for hegemony between China, the EU and the US, and a continued logic of nuclear deterrence.7o Of course, the logic of the 'war of terror' after 2001, with attacks taking place across the world aimed at the liberal state and Western interests, falls outside of the realist paradigm of rational state actors pursing a national interest, though the realism response that such violence can only be ended on the basis of a victor's peace, through which states reassert their hegemony and their Weberian control of the means of violence, appears to have remained relevant to the debates in IR. However, as Gaddis and Hoffman both illustrated in their critiques of realism's failures at the end of the Cold War, there were many serious oversights in such thinking and its influence on policymaking, not least the general implications for the conduct of the most powerful states during the Cold War, such as the US.7! So far realism has failed to offer a response to such problems, or to the broader question of the sort of peace its intellectual and policy frameworks might offer. Though the first great debate ended in the Second World War with a realist assertion that survival was the best that IR could achieve, neo-realism failed to respond to the end of the Cold War, or the ambition that developed for a broad, albeit liberal, peace amongst many thinkers and policymakers.

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Realism Bad

Realism is too simplistic and has many flawed assumptionsRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 52-53)

The underlying realist assumption that human nature, transferred to the state, is the basic constraining factor for peace in IR depends upon the equally questionable notion that human nature itself is not contingent on cultural, political, economic, social and historical contexts. Furthermore, it depends on the long discredited inherency argument that humans are basically violent creatures. Yet, these very shaky assumptions form the basis upon which the main version of peace in IR for realism emerges -the victor's peace. Territorial states represent an a priori formulation of nations and their interests and in this immutable world of conflict, anarchy, the state of nature and the balance of power, allow for either minimal survival or a maximum of an imperial hegemony. All of this emerges from the assumption that the first task of individuals and states is security, and strategies are deployed against the inevitable threats of existential and physical challenges to their values, norms and resources. This amorphous set of challenges highlights a mode of thinking which establishes interest as power: the unit exercises power derived from its control of these resources in order to secure itself and its interests, and to reduce or negate current and future threats. Until these threats have been negated, the narrative of peace in realist versions of lR is extremely limited, and its absolute end goal is a victor's peace in which all other actors are either subservient or are removed. Almost exclusively, the forces that are seen to drive world politics are destructive, self-interested, and also predictable. Politicians and officials are constrained by national interests rather than laws and morality, and are ultimately obligated only to their own constituencies, eternally defined as the citizens of their territorially sovereign state. These were the factors that a 'science of international politics' should focus on: experience had shown that international institutions and law merely provided camouflage for the realities of state power and competition.72 This meant that preparations for war were eternally required to make it more unlikely. Pacifism and preparations for peace through international law and institutions, while normatively desirable, merely underestimated the realities of power and resulting violence in international relations. Implicit in these approaches is the notion that realism presents the world as it is. These claims to present an objective view of world politics, war and order imbued political realism with extraordinary claims of legitimacy and realist theorists with the ability to make vast and authoritative, but largely unsupportable, claims about IR. Ultimately they were a form of censorship which prevented an open discussion of a broader peace, deeming it naive and risking association with appeasement strategies, such as those preceding the Second World War. Yet, this itself was dangerously simplistic and naive; the focus on war meant little preparation for peace, lacking even the liberal or structuralist concern with building a world order marked by some form of justice -other than that of the victor. Because 'reality' dictates there can in practice be no peace, as peace has never been extant in anything but a limited form, realism theorises a world order in which little more than a cold peace might ever exist. Yet, realism appeared to claim it had settled all of the key methodological and epistemological debates, and indeed represented ontological stability, while yet all around in IR and other disciplines these battles still raged. Realism, and its extension into neo-realism, was indicative of the 'backward discipline', still engaged in the search for objective laws even in the context of complex and fluid, social, economic and political dynamics and the tension between individuals and their identities and political organisation.73 Realism -and mainstream IR -clung to its simplistic, reductionist and hegemonic representation of the world, and of a victor's peace.

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Realism Bad

Realism is bad- humanitarian interventions demonstrate that nations don’t have to act in their own self interestRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.115-116.

Policy-makers, too, are showing some movement away from the exclusive reliance on the Realpolitik and self-interest of the cold war era at least selectively to embrace the concept of humanitarian intervention in their rhetoric of foreign policy justification: In the 1990s, the Western powers began to take up the idea, leading to the ''universal forcible intervention in a state's territory, violating sovereignty under the authority of the U.N. Security Council, avowedly in pursuit of humanitarian aims" .... 6 These interventions included the establishment of "safe havens" for the Kurds of northern Iraq in 1991, the Somalia intervention in 1992-93, and later Bosnia and Kosovo. Speaking as Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan asserts that the "traditional concept of national sovereignty is no longer valid" and that nations have a "duty to intervene when crimes against humanity are being committed." At the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September 2000, he "call[ed] for the adoption of a doctrine of universal humanitarian intervention.”7 British Prime Minister Tony Blair, perhaps the most outspoken advocate of aggressive humanitarian intervention among current world leaders, declared in a major speech in April 1999, at the height of the Kosovo crisis, that "on some occasions, human rights are more important than national sovereignty.** He concluded by saying: We need to enter a new millennium where dictators know that they cannot get away with ethnic cleansing or repress their peoples with impunity. In this conflict [he was referring specifically to the bombing of Serbia] we are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated. For a world where those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide.9

Realism is a coping vocabulary Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 25-26)

Highlighting the links between paradigms and specific socialpolitical agendas is one of the ways in which Stance II adherents demonstrate a clear advance over those of Stance I in terms of reflexivity. The treatment of the realist paradigm in international relations theory serves as a good example. As Smith has argued, because' international relations theory, as primarily an "American discipline," has been so closely identified with the foreign policy concerns of the country, it is not surprising that the assumptions of Realism have proven to be so difficult to overcome. This is because the focus of Realism, namely how to maximize power so as to manage international events, fits extraordinarily well with the needs of a hegemonic power. The three key elements of Realism's account of world politics, the national interest, power maximization and the balance of power, are particularly well suited to the requirements of a foregin policy for the U.S. (Smith, 1987: 198-199) In short, from the perspective of Stance II, realism is understood not as a neutral description of the world as it truly is, but rather as a coping vocabulary of a specific community (e.g., U.S. state managers) designed to address certain problems or to satisfy particular needs and interests. Furthermore, the assessment of realism as a coping vocabulary can be undertaken only in relation to the problems defined and the needs and interests identified. Consequently, the success of realism has, with due respect to Holsti, had less to do with its alleged accuracy in grasping the facts of international politics than with its demonstrated utility for guiding state managers in their activities of state-and nation-building. That is to say, the realist paradigm has validated its truth claims by demonstrating its ability to guide state policymaking.

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Realism Bad

Realism makes contradictory assumptions about peaceRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 53-54)

A form of this thinking is offered by Mearsheimer, who sees no possibility for anything other than a realist form of peace without a sovereign power to oversee the activities of states in an anarchic international system. Nuclear weapons are therefore described as an agent of peace because of the terrible consequences of their use! 74 Increasingly, however, the sanctity of such thinking was underpinned by strong challenges within liberal quarters, for example from those working on the 'democratic peace' project. Even so Mearsheimer argues that liberal and liberal institutionalist visions of international order are fatally flawed because they underestimate how deep the roots of realism run in the international system.75 What is remarkable about this style of debate is that it assumes that the nature of peace is incontestable, even if it cannot be achieved. Peace is an uneasy truce between states or civilisations, at best moderated hegemonic states, mainly dependent upon military and economic power and interest. Within this structure, the realist tradition suggests a multiplication of types of peace in domestic settings, in an uneasy truce with each other. This suggests that a domestic peace can exist even while the international sphere is organised for war. This binary of war and peace, connected and disconnected, is of course an unlikely proposition. The problem here is that a domestic aspiration for peace, which one must assume would rest on an amicable arrangement and social contract between inhabitants and government, results in a general aspiration for international power and interest, which emerges above and beyond that promoted by the requirements of defensive national security. This leads to an interpretation of an offensive national interest from the perspective of other states even if security is discursively constructed as 'defensive' (this has been a recurrent theme within the domestic debate on reforming Japan's 'peace constitution' since its sovereignty was restored in 1952 after the end of US occupation). In addition, history and the contemporary world are replete with examples of states which did and do not pursue power even in this easily misinterpreted defensive sense. Thus, the assertion that anarchy drives the actions of states and thus produces the dynamics which realism describes is only relevant for some states. For these states, realism describes a dynamic whereby in the absence of a commonwealth, a small number of aggressive states constantly destabilise the international system either in the discursive or perceptual realms, in order to survive or assert their hegemony. In this eternal world, history preaches that peace is limited and war is inevitable while at the same time noting that if the lessons of history are ignored, perhaps by those with a more utopian outlook, the outcome will be more, rather than less, violent. In this view, sovereignty lies with the powerful, always within the state framework and the only way out would be through like-minded states forming a club for mutual self-defence while at the same time being wary of each other's capacity to default from this club. In this tautological world, peace might be guaranteed by a central authority, though this is unlikely because no state would allow another to exert hegemony.

Realism is flawed – it rests upon the basis that it is possible to know the otherRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 155-156)

They also point to one of the key problems with orthodox IR's engagement with peace -or indeed with its lack of it. This is the result of a methodological weakness, which has both ontological and epistemological implications. The discipline's deeper contest is over how far its right to interpret the other, who may be unknowable at least without a deep investigation of more than simply political and state level structures, extends. 19 This raises the questions of legitimacy and intervention. The privileged claim to know the mind of the other was increasingly contested as the discipline moved through realism toward critical and post-structural approaches. Yet, it is on this basis that many of the assumptions inherent particularly in orthodox IR theory are derived – and through which] many of the disciplines’ stereotypes about power, sovereignty and identity, as well its silences, are reproduced. But this right is so valuable, particularly in a context of an environment in which peace is defined by hegemons, that it is important to problematise it so that IR theory does not merely reaffirm and replicate the very problems it is supposed to address. It is through addressing the problem of peace directly tht these problems might be responded to.

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Realism Bad

Attempts to use logic to understand the world through negative security politics represent a flawed ontology—the world isn’t logical Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg. 10. 3-18-06.]

The usual way of characterizing a particular thing is to list its salient properties, such as sex, age and occupation in the case of persons. (Actually what we list when individuating or identifying an individual is property instances or “troupes,” such as thirty years of age.) This procedure is at variance with Quine’s celebrated formula “no entity without identity.” This formula is virtue axiom of extensionality: “Two sets are identical if and only if they have the same members.” But Quine’s formula is irrelevant to the study and handling of material objects, for no two such things can be exactly identical, although the elementary particles may be exchangeable. This result should not be surprising because logic, even when enriched with set theory, is insufficient to build ontology, since it does not describe the world. In sum, a reasonable ontology must start with concepts of thing and its properties. And if it is to be compatible with modern science and technology, that ontology will conceive of concrete things as changeable. Consequently, it will be able to give a reasonable account of facts, such as thing being in a given state or going over to a different state.

The affirmatives view of realism as classifying other states as threats is false, it attempts to connect unrelated issues.Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.16. 3-18-06.]

What holds for empirical analyses also holds for conceptual, in particular semantic, analyses. This analysis starts by identifying the referents of the constructs in question. That is, we begin by stating what is being talked about. For example, the referents of the constructs in question. That is, we begin by stating what is being talked about. For example, the referents of the statement “Buildings are taller than people” are buildings and people. And the statement describes a fact, or rather a whole collection of facts, even though the relation “taller than” is non-binding.” In general, the statement that thing b stanfs in R-relation to thing c, or Rbc for short, describes a fact if the statement is true. Neither the relation nor the corresponding relata are independently real: what is real is the fact that Rbc. To paraphrase Hegel, in cases like this, das wirkliche ist das Ganze: the whole is real.

Realism is never the true picture of the world-it relies on only partial truth claims-even the most accurate theories must be improved upon. Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.24. 3-18-06.]

Contrary to a widespread opinion, scientific realism does not claim that our knowledge of the outer world is accurate: it suffices that such knowledge be partially true, and that some of the falsities in our knowledge can eventually be spotted and corrected, much as we correct our path when navigating in new territory. Thus, the fallibilism of thesis (2b) is balanced by the meliorism of thesis (3a). Reality checks (empirical tests) will show again and again that even the most accurate theories are at best more or less close approximations that can be improved upon. Rescher (1987) calls this thesis approximationism; I regard it as a constituent of scientific realism (e.g., Bunge 1967a). The frequent occurrence of error, perhaps even better than the occasional finding of truth, proves the existence of the real world (Bunge 1954). Indeed, while a subjectivist could argue that scientists construct the world as they perceive or conceive it, he would be unable to account for error because they claim to have instant access to full truths.

Realism is flawed-its ontology is derived from facts-there are no facts only a world made of appearance

Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal

[Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.24. 3-18-06.]

Allow me to repeat: According to Kant, the world is made of appearances, that is, facts as perceived by some subject, not facts themselves. Consequently, the existence of the world would depend on that of sentient beings. Shorter: No sentient beings, no universe. As Norbert Elias (2000: 475) put it, the Kantian subject of knowledge, shut up in his aprioristic shell, can never break through to the thing in itself: his is the homo clauses. This fiction, central to individualism, has been pervasive in modern epistemology since Descartes, and in the social studies since about 1870, when it was used and popularized by the neoclassical micro-economists. It also occuris in the neo-Kantian philosophy of the influential sociologist Max Weber-though not in his scientific work, which is rigorously realist

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Realism bad

Realism flawed-those in power alter it independently to reinforce their powerBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.66. 3-18-06.]

There is of course some truth to social constructivism, namely, the tautology that all human social facts, from greeting and trading to child rearing and warring, are social facts. But nobody starts from scratch, and nobody constructs social reality by himself. To be sure, humans make themselves, and invent, maintain, and repair social systems; but, as Marx famously added, they do so starting from a pre-existing social reality and with the help of others. Only philosophers and inmates in a lunatic asylum think that someone can create reality rather than just alter it. Correction: a senior adviser to President George W. Bush told a veteran journalist that guys like him were “in what we call the reality-based community…that’s not the way the world really works anymore…We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality…we’re history’s actors…and we, all of we, will be left to just study what we do” (Suskind 2004). The claims of social constructivists are just as grandiose. For example, according to Fleck, syphilis was constructed by the medical community;

Realism bad-created to undermine philosophical perception key to improving realismBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.76. 3-18-06.]

Some appearances can be explained in purely physical or chemical terms. For instance, a Sun eclipse is explained by the interposition of the Moon. And the variety in the colours of quartz, beryl, diamond, and other gems is explained by the presence in them of tiny amounts of chemical impurities. For example, emeralds are beryl stones that look green under white light because they include tiny amounts of chromium, which absorbs the light waves of all wavelengths except for those that cause the sensation of green. Emeralds can lose that colour when strongly heated if subject to acids, but not spontaneously. Hence Goodman’s (1954) infamous “grue” (or “bleen”) imaginary emerald, green before a certain arbitrary date and blue thereafter, is an idle fantasy. Indeed, emeralds cannot change colour at any date unless strongly heated or unless their chemical composition is altered. Thus, the value of the “grue” paradox to shed light on induction is only this: Beware appearances and artificial examples concocted just to support or undermine philosophical speculations (Bunge 1973b).

Realism is manipulated in the interest of political organization by playing upon humanity’s innate fear of the other Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.77. 3-18-06.]

The unscientific philosophers of mind claim that phenomenal qualities, or qualia, are inaccessible to scientific investigation, and perhaps een to ordinary knowledge, because they are private: I cannot feel you pain or taste strawberries in the same way as you do. Admittedly, mental experiences are not transferable; but they are describable, and some descriptions can be understood because all adults share not only roughly the same basic brain organization but also myriad similar experiences. In any event, subjective experiences are being studied objectively as neurophysiological processes influence by cultural traditions and social circumstances. (For, example,it is well known that many tastes are acquired; and it has been found that Himalayans have a significantly higher apin threshold that Mediterraneans.) That is, phenomena are being explained by noumena. What about social attitudes, such as selfishness and altruism? The sociobiologists contend that altruism is “selfishness in disguise,” as Dawkins (176:5) put it, cpying the old utilitarian maxim This certainly holds for reciprocal altruism (“I scratch your back and you scratch mine”). But what about authentic altruism, as exemplified by giving without prospects of reward? The sciobiologists claim that such gifts are offered, if at all, only to kin, because genes are selfish and force us to behave in such a manner as to propagate them. However, there is ample ethological evidence for the occurrence of cooperation among biologically unrelated individuals, even of different species. Hnece, an alternative explanation of altruism is needed, This comes from the study of primates (e.g., de Waal 1996) and people (e.g., Bateson 1991). These studies have shown that humans and the great apes are empathetic, and that the performance of deeds make us feel good (Rilling et al. 2002). Other studies found a significant reduction in mortality among old people who help others (Brown et al 2003). Still other research has shown that the social emotions, in particular altruism and fear of “the other,” can be manipulated in the interests of political organizations, to the point that real social engineers are today’s political consultants”

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Realism Bad

Realism is flawed-the human brain does not rely upon facts, but instead relies upon perception of a situation-this is critical to improving upon realism Bunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.80. 3-18-06.]

In social matters, the noumenon-phenomenon relation is far more complex than in other realms. This is because of the so-called Thomas theorem: we do not react to social facts but to the way we “perceive” (actually imagine, conceptualize, and evaluate) them (Merton 1976: 174-6). For instance, many of us by well-advertised junk food and vote for friendly looking crooks. And in all early civilizations the rulers were regarded as either supernatural beings or as intermediaries between deities and commoners, and were revered and feared in consequence. The very maintenance of the cosmos was supposed to depend upon the strict observance of the social and religious conventions. This may explain why class conflict was not a major feature of early civilizations

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Realism Bad-Negative PeaceRealism is a negative epistemology – peace is not seen as achievableRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 11)

Lying behind such thinking is one of the core implicit debates in IR theory. Peace is seen to be something to aspire to though it is perhaps not achievable. This failure rests on human nature for realists, or the failure of institutions for liberals, and is reflected in the nature of states and organisations, which at best can attain a negative peace. This is the hallmark of conservative and realist thought, though for liberals, a positive peace is plausible through the adoption of certain domestic and international practices that are aimed at guaranteeing the rights and needs of individuals. For some, idealism could also be pragmatic, and merely rest upon the discovery of the obstacles to peace, and then upon the deployment of the correct methods required to overcome these obstacles. The Westphalian international system represents a compromise upon both positions. This is indicative of Galtung's negative and positive peace framework, which is the most widely used conceptualisation ofpeace.36 This can be extended, as Rasmussen has indicated, into a negative and positive epistemology of peace, meaning that ontological assumptions are made about whether a negative or positive peace can exist.3? The dominant mode of thought, however, which informs most IR theorists and policymaking today is that 'the logic of strategy pervades the upkeep of peace as much as the making of war' .In other words, a negative epistemology of peace arises from strategic thinking, and even the application of force or threat. War can even therefore be seen as the 'origin of peace' by exhausting opponents and their resources.39

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Realism Bad-Negative Peace Realism can only achieve negative peace and rests upon a flawed epistemology – it only reflects the interests of officialsRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 56-57)

Realism offers a domestic peace limited by the need to be prepared for war, and victor's peace at the international level. It eschews any kind of positive normative debate (as Thucydides is often famously argued to have upheld and despite the possibilities offered by a Hobbesian commonwealth of fear). As an agenda for peace, the realist tradition offers little, particularly in its positivist, neo-realist incarnation, that would be rhetorically accepted to today's political leaders or officials in IR beyond the limited order of the Westphalian, territorial, sovereign peace. As a research programme, it failed to foresee the end of the Cold War or explain multipolar frameworks for IR, and appeared to advocate a belief in unstable balances of power and deterrence that in a nuclear context is extremely dangerous.79 As Booth has pointed out, realism failed in the Cold War as well as at the end of the Cold War,80 and it never inhabited an uncontested space, given the importance of idealism, liberalism, liberal-internationalism and liberal institutionalism at various stages of the discipline's development. Indeed, it might be said that the first great debate was a debate over the epistemology of peace, with realism's negative view strongly supported by the World Wars, and the Cold War. Realism has come to be determined mainly by North American positivism, and formulaic methodologies designed to reduce IR to key actors, dynamics and issues. As a consequence of its rejcction of subjectivity, it slavishly reproduces an 'objective reality' and represents a cult of anti-peace thinkers, who reject both a universal or pluralist basis for peace, or that interests and peace might be linked. As Vasquez argued realist theory led to war over peace.81 Indeed, Walker points out that political realism entails the evasion of the necessary skills to understand the 'reality' of IR.82 Certainly, this appears to be the case with the so-called second debate, in which realists sought to provide a scientific basis for their objectification of the dynamics of order in world politics. Realism is little more than the story of war between states, and how this dominates IR. While this is an important story, the way it only represents one perspective, fails to move beyond the politics of fear (despite occasional mention of a commonwealth of a world government), and concentrates on this perspective in order to provide an agenda for peace is clearly futile. It is akin to driving dangerously so one can learn how to make oneself a safer driver. The realist tradition is tautalogous, paradoxical, and rests upon a blinkered version of human political history, constructed to perpetuate the predominance of state, elite and official discourses about the world. Because it depends on official actors and official records it only reflects their own professional interests as representatives of states, and so misses an enormous amount of information, other histories, and other representations, in its analytical framework. Realism only explains peace as a result of hegemony or collapse. This is defined by a negative ontology and a tragic epistemology relating to realism's inherency view of human nature, the state of nature, and their tragic repetition. It offers a narrow methodology that legitimates a perspective based upon binary inside/outside structures. These effectively reify the incommensurability of different identities and sovereignties. Even during the height of realism there were powerful discursive frameworks which illustrated another story of IR, and one which was deeply influential and had important implications for a far more sophisticated version of peace than the victor’s peace realism offered. Realism has offered an important set of tools to understand security frameworks for state: these insights are an important part of any discussion of peace – but only a part. Realism’s ontological and methodological assumptions, which have grown up around it, need not be accepted as they have proven to be an obstacle to anything more than a negative peace.

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Realism Bad-Negative Peace

Realism should only be used as a means to an ideological end- military expansion ensures that positive peace is never a reality Sandole 95, Dennis J. D. Professor of conflict resolution and international relations and the institute for conflict analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, “Changing Ideologies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 542, Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation Published by: Sage Publications, Inc., (Nov., 1995), pp. 134

Theory in this study is concerned with (1) causes and conditions of the initiation and escalation of violent conflicts and (2) processes and mechanisms for preventing or other-wise dealing with such conflicts.7 In applying both types of theory to violent ethnic conflict in post-Cold War Europe, I have come to the conclusion that the evolving peace and security system in the new Europe should comprise integrated systems of conflict resolution networks, reflecting vertical as well as horizontal integration. 8 " Vertical" in this context means integration between conflict prevention, management, settlement, and resolution mechanisms,9 operating at different levels of social-political organization. If conflict initiation and escalation reflect multiple levels of causes and conditions, then attempts to prevent or otherwise deal with conflict should reflect those levels as well. Vertical integration can reflect, for example, the local, nearly local (mechanisms in neighboring societies), national, regional (EC/EU, Western European Union, NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States, CSCE) and global (U.N.) levels, with Track 2 (nongovernmental) mechanisms liaising with and complementing Track 1 (governmental) processes whenever possible. Examples of Track 2 mechanism include Partners for Democratic Change, International Alert, the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network, and the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. "Horizontal" means integration between negative and positive peace mechanisms: in order for an integrated system of conflict resolution networks to succeed—for example, in the former Yugoslavia—it should include some degree of Realpolitik , but only as part of a larger whole consisting primarily of Idealpolitik measures and processes, to move to but then beyond negative peace (cessation of hostilities) and toward positive peace (elimination of structural violence). This means that Track 1, armed peacekeeping forces, representing the United Nations, CSCE, or NATO, might, under very clear conditions, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary condition for moving toward positive peace.10 Such clear conditions should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another. In such a case, the objectives of the peacekeeping operation would not include a "Balkan Storm," the bombing of civilian centers, and the killing of tens of thousands in order to win, or to impose solutions, or—what is, in any case, impossible — to solve the conflict through military means. They should, however, serve to prevent genocide; to permit international relief operations to reach threatened populations; and to separate the warring parties in order to afford them a cooling-off opportunity, as a necessar y (but not sufficient) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict that they have been waging through violent means.

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Realism Bad-Civic Engagement

Realism decreases civic participation it ignores the positive effect that a civil society can haveRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 102)

This rests on the view that conflict arises out of a repression of human needs and is a social phenomenon l6 as well as a psychological phenomenon. Relative deprivation theory, for example, identifies a sense of injustice as a source of social unrest, and the frustration-aggression approach sees frustration as a necessary or sufficient condition for aggression. I? What is most challenging about conflict resolution approaches is that they are derived from, and project, a civil society oriented discourse. Public and private actors, operating at the level of the group or individual, are empowered to construct a positive peace which directly addresses the societal roots of conflict, rather than merely its state-level issues.18 This means that violence is seen to be structural as well as direct or overtly expressed and structural violence is seen to be at the root of intractable conflicts.19 These are rooted in discriminatory, biased or inequitable social, economic and political structures. This approach, when placed in the context of realist inspired conflict management, was a radical one, and was developed in the context of liberal, pluralist and Marxist approaches to the discipline of IR. Liberal arguments raised the possibility that conflict was not endemic nor rooted in human nature, pluralist arguments translated this into the context of Burtonian human needs theory and a 'world society', and Marxist approaches raised the issues of justice, equity and emancipation from class and socioeconomic discrimination for many contributing from the peace research school. By implication these contributions highlighted human needs over state security and structural violence and the need for alternative forms of communication to be developed which enabled the full representation of all voices and issues in conflicts, and prevented realist and state-centric approaches from imposing a self-fulfilling minimum level order in which the roots of future conflict might lie. This approach to conflict has been crucial, not just in the contribution of new perspectives to peace that moves beyond simplistic notions of state security and state interests, but also in providing a conceptual and methodological framework for non-state actors (NGOs, for example) and civil society to respond to the misallocation of universal human needs for identity, political participation and security, which are non-negotiable because they are founded on a universal ontological drive.21 From this assertion it was a short step to the realisation that the repression and deprivation of human needs is the root of protracted conflicts, along with structural factors, such as underdevelopment. This equated development with peace offered a conceptualisation of peace based upon values and transnational networks shared by states, civil societies and international organisations. As a result of this line of thought, it emerges that peace can be built from the bottom up by civil society actors along with states and transnational actors. This reflects the liberal-realist hybrid, though the focus is now on civil society discourses of peace and their impact on realist notions of peace.

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Realism Bad-WarRealism and other single-variable models fail to explain the root cause of warSinger 80 – David, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6, (1980), pp. 350, Annual Reviews, “Accounting for International War: The State of The Discipline”

But regardless of the motives and Assump-tions, we usually end up with a typology that helps to perpetuate and legitimize these parochial orientations and to encourage the appearance, disappearance, and reappear-ance of those 'theories' that are all too typ-ical of the no-growth, non-cumulative disci-plines. Thus we find heavy, if not sole reli-ance on such factors as power discrepancies (Blainey, 1973), surplus capital (Lenin, 1939), business cycles (Secerov, 1919), demo-graphic pressures (Organski, 1968), resource needs (Choucri & North, 1975), elite person-alities (Stoessinger, 1978), national moods (Klingberg, 1952; McClelland, 1961), mis-perceptions (White, 1968), and so forth. These at least have the virtue of resting upon variables that show some variation across time and place. But other alleged models of a single-variable sort fail to even recognize that a phenomenon as irregularly (and in-frequently) distributed across time and space as war cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena. Thus, it is difficult to take seriously such putative ex-planations as the human drive for power (Morgenthau, 1948) or territory (Ardrey, 1966), the instinct of aggressiveness (Lorenz, 1967), or libidinous drive (Fornari, 1974).

-95-


Realism Bad-No Solvency

Realism is insufficient- doesn’t consider non state actors- neorealism solvesCox and Sjolander 1994 (Wayne S and Claire Turenne, lecturer in political studies at Queen's University and assistant professor of political science at the University of Ottawa “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 2-3) During the 1960s, international relations' Second Debate asked questions as to which method was most appropriate in the search for knowledge in the field. A reflection of the larger "behavioral revolution" that was burning throughout the social sciences, the Second Debate focused upon the choice between the scientific method, with S its implied capacity for value-free research, and historicism, often accused of ransacking history in the interests of (normative) theoretical objectives, the outcome of this Second Debate was found in the imperfect dominance of behavioralist methods and of an underlying positivist scholarship in international relations. In part, the dominance of behavioralism was attributable to its success in defining the research agenda of related social science disciplines-in particular, economics and psychology. As well, the rationalist basis of the scientific method in disciplinary terms coincided well with the rationalism of postwar Western society, particularly in its emphasis on science as the potential solution to all problems. Finally, the behavioral revolution was successful insofar as it appeared to proffer the tools that would further the research-problem orientation of realism; war studies, for example, could now depend on huge data bases that detailed the occurrence and mortality of wars throughout the ages. By the early 1970s, an uncomfortable relationship had developed between the conclusions derived by behavioralist-realist scholarship and changing international realities. This lack of congruence was particularly worrisome for the research-problem-driven field that international relations had become. The oil crises of the 1970s challenged the realist assumption that large, industrialized states were the only crucial actors in global politics and suggested that a preeminent focus on military and war studies might not capture the major sources of potential international conflict. At the same time, the Vietnam War seemed to challenge many of realism's state-power assumptions, and the activities of multinational corporations along with the dependency relationship between the First and Third Worlds raised questions as to the realist assumption that War and peace were the most important problems faced by the international system. The shifting grounds of international politics also led to charges that the method of international relations scholarship had driven the field to trivialize that which could not be quantified, and had thus further limited the discipline's ability to respond to international changes. The initial response to these challenges was to be found in one simple idea-greater intellectual pluralism. Although the study of international relations remained basically a realist and, more fundamentally, a positivist pursuit, the margins of the discipline became open to new scholarship that redefined both its content and method. The pluralist "moment" of the 1970s created its own confusions, however-confusions that were particularly frustrating to a discipline long used to defining its contributions to knowledge in terms of specific research agendas.By the late 1970s, therefore, international relations set about redefining itself yet again, this time as neorealism. The neorealist project expanded the boundaries of the field as it had been defined under realism (legitimizing the study of nonmilitary issues, for example) while it reasserted the primacy of positivist "science" (although not insisting on the quantitative bent of the behavioralist revolution). Not surprisingly, the strongest critics of neorealism emerged large!'" although not exclusively, from outside the U.S. international relations community. These critiques were in great part heightened by neorealism's claim not to have a political project, a position consistent with the positivist claims of value neutrality inherent in neorealism’s orientation to science. By further marginalizing the critics who had been allowed, if only to a limited extent, to flourish under the pluralist moment, neorealism almost necessarily led to a questioning of the political premises of its agenda. The clash between critics and neorealists crystallized in the interparadigm debate of the 1980’s. For the first time in the evolution of international relations, metatheoretical distinctions between paradigms became important at least for some.

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Realism Bad-Economy

Realism leads to bad economic decision making Legare 1994 (Gregg J., lecturer in political studies at Queen's University, “U.S. Hegemony & the Management of Trade”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 77-78)

There are several considerations that make regime theory highly misleading as an analytic tool for examining the international energy economy. Foremost among these is the proposition that state power sets the conditions for societal power and brings order to international relations. On the realist model, political hegemony over oil resources was a key to U.S. hegemony in the postwar period. We do agree that order, prosperity, and growth in the industrial world since 1945 (and also before) were crucially dependent on cheap and secure oil supplies. The global hegemony of the West was largely grounded in access to the energy resources of the South. However, these were provided by a regime composed not of state actors but of private multinational oil corporations (the "Seven Sisters"), linked by a series of formal cartel arrangements. Periodic attempts by states to move in and secure control were, until 1970, defeated by this constellation of private power. In contrast, the realist formulation of the international political economy and its emphasis on state power glosses over the central fact that in a capitalist economy, preponderant economic resources are in private hands and are not the property of states. Thus, although hegemony is ascribed to states, the economic power resources for hegemony are largely private property, in this case the property of transnational oil companies. What is missing here is a theorization of the linkages between the two (the public and the private) and how a hegemonic state might either control those resources or be controlled by their owners. Thus a crucial gap in realist international relations is the lack of a thorough analysis of state-society relations at an international level.

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Interventionism Bad

Contemporary humanitarian interventions use military might to stop violence- this is counter-intuitive and leads to endless cycles of violenceRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.116-117.

Although the humanitarian principle itself supported by a powerful moral intuition seems strongly to favor humanitarian intervention in theory, many interventions, described as "humanitarian," on closer examination, look neither humanitarian nor morally justifiable. Most actual humanitarian interventions do not fit the pattern of those justifiable or obligatory hypothetical humanitarian interventions, such as preventing the Holocaust and saving 800,000 Rwandans, which forms the basis of the moral intuition in favor of humanitarian interventions. In fact, humanitarian interventions frequently do more harm than good.A case in point is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "humanitarian" intervention in Kosovo in 1999. NATO justified its intervention in Kosovo as an attempt to prevent the reported genocidal ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo. (Guilt about the failure to prevent a similar genocidal ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1989 -1991 was undoubtedly an additional motivating factor.) But far from preventing or ameliorating the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the NATO intervention actually accelerated and increased it; probably no lives were saved by the intervention, and many were lost that otherwise would not have been.10What was originally justified as a military operation designed to save Albanians in Kosovo quickly turned into a two month long bombing campaign against both civilian and military targets throughout Serbia, far removed from Kosovo. The result was an extensive loss of civilian life and destruction of Serbian infrastructure. The bombing of civilian and military targets throughout Serbia was intended to intimidate Serbian citizens and officials through terror to put pressure on their government to conform to the goals of NATO and the United States.Such actions are hardly humanitarian. In order for an action to be genuinely humanitarian it cannot use terror as a means to its end. A humanitarian action aims to alleviate or prevent human death and suffering. An action which increases death and suffering cannot be humanitarian. A humanitarian end does not justify non-humanitarian means; an action which is a non-humanitarian means to a humanitarian end is not a humanitarian action. T hat is not to say that the action might not nevertheless be morally justifiable.

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Realism Bad- No Positive Peace

Realism should only be used as a means to an ideological end- military expansion ensures that positive peace is never a reality Dennis J. D. Sandole, Professor of conflict resolution and international relations and the institute for conflict analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, “Changing Ideologies in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 542, Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation Published by: Sage Publications, Inc., (Nov., 1995), pp. 134

Theory in this study is concerned with (1) causes and conditions of the initiation and escalation of violent conflicts and (2) processes and mechanisms for preventing or other-wise dealing with such conflicts.7 In applying both types of theory to violent ethnic conflict in post-Cold War Europe, I have come to the conclusion that the evolving peace and security system in the new Europe should comprise integrated systems of conflict resolution networks, reflecting vertical as well as horizontal integration.8"Vertical" in this context means integration between conflict prevention, management, settlement, and resolution mechanisms,9 operating at different levels of social-political organization. If conflict initiation and escalation reflect multiple levels of causes and conditions, then attempts to prevent or otherwise deal with conflict should reflect those levels as well.Vertical integration can reflect, for example, the local, nearly local (mechanisms in neighboring societies), national, regional (EC/EU, Western European Union, NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States, CSCE) and global (U.N.) levels, with Track 2 (nongovernmental) mechanisms liaising with and complementing Track 1 (governmental) processes whenever possible. Examples of Track 2 mechanism include Partners for Democratic Change, International Alert, the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network, and the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly."Horizontal" means integration between negative and positive peace mechanisms: in order for an integrated system of conflict resolution networks to succeed—for example, in the former Yugoslavia—it should include some degree of Realpolitik , but only as part of a larger whole consisting primarily of Idealpolitik measures and processes, to move to but then beyond negative peace (cessation of hostilities) and toward positive peace (elimination of structural violence). This means that Track 1, armed peacekeeping forces, representing the United Nations, CSCE, or NATO, might, under very clear conditions, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary condition for moving toward positive peace.10Such clear conditions should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another. In such a case, the objectives of the peacekeeping operation would not include a "Balkan Storm," the bombing of civilian centers, and the killing of tens of thousands in order to win, or to impose solutions, or—what is, in any case, impossible—to solve the conflict through military means. They should, however, serve to prevent genocide; to permit international relief operations to reach threatened populations; and to separate the warring parties in order to afford them a cooling-off opportunity, as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict that they have been waging through violent means.

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AT- Realism Inevitable

The west is currently dominated by a liberal notion of peaceRichmond 08, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 92-93)

Furthermore, though liberalism clearly has a privileged position in relation to peace in modern, Western thought, it is, as Fischer has pointed out, not the only ethical system that aims at a type of peace as his exploration of Hindu, Muslim and Marxist thinking illustrates. However, liberalism is dominated by the canon of Western thought, from Aristotle to Locke, meaning that contemporary models for peace reflect a specific and often exclusive culture and normative framework, which though inferring pluralism, is biased towards a contemporary liberalism (that ironically may value prosperity more highly than glory and democracy).133 Liberalism considers these factors to be self-evident and universal; where they are not understood forms of enlightenment are required so that everyone will see their good sense. Yet, as Fischer has shown such logic does not apply in other cultural contexts (for example in Hindu societies) and perhaps most importantly, liberalism substitutes 'rights for virtues' .134 Thus, constructing the liberal-democratic peace through state-building, forms of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, or more indirectly via the conditional effects of globalisation may mean a 'loss of community',135 trust and social ties. These tensions can be clearly seen in the recent debates about the 'new wars' of the 1990s and the development of humanitarian intervention, which was seen as a route through which the liberal peace could be installed in many postintervention settings around the world. 136 This debate has increasingly highlighted the fragility of the norm of non-intervention where gross violations of human rights are taking place, and the 'duty' and rights liberal states have to intervene to install the liberal peace as a response along pluralist or solidarist lines. These debates operate within the liberal discourse of peace, and commonly assume that humanitarian intervention should be perceived as just, be proportional, assured of success, and coincides with other national interests.137 Bellamy argues that the pluralist and solidarist approaches indicate that either intervention will not be undertaken unless national interests are at stake, or that a cosmopolitan international society can construct a conceptually sound response with both international and local consensus to carry it out. l38 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, for example, expressed the solidarist view that the right to intervene is increasing set against the 'responsibility to protect' .139 Such assumptions represent the apogee of liberal-international thought through peace becomes a form of liberal hegemony. This creates an uncomfortable hybrid between liberalism and a 'civilising mission', and the defence of human rights, property, democracy, as well as international law, a notion of just war, and restraints on the use of violence, reflecting pragmatic pacifism but falling short of radical pacifism. 140 Despite these paradoxes, liberalism is essentially the dominant ideology of the West related to peace, 141 elevating the state while also trying to control and monitor its excesses, and incorporating pragmatic pacifism to protect human life, while also retaining the threat of force for just war purposes. 14

-100-


AT – Realism Inevitable

The west is currently dominated by a liberal notion of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 92-93)

Furthermore, though liberalism clearly has a privileged position in relation to peace in modern, Western thought, it is, as Fischer has pointed out, not the only ethical system that aims at a type of peace as his exploration of Hindu, Muslim and Marxist thinking illustrates. However, liberalism is dominated by the canon of Western thought, from

Aristotle to Locke, meaning that contemporary models for peace reflect a specific and often exclusive culture and normative framework, which though inferring pluralism, is biased towards a contemporary liberalism (that ironically may value prosperity more highly than glory and democracy).133 Liberalism considers these factors to be self-evident and universal; where they are not understood forms of enlightenment are required so that everyone will see their good sense. Yet, as Fischer has shown such logic does not apply in other cultural contexts (for example in Hindu societies) and perhaps most importantly, liberalism substitutes 'rights for virtues' .134 Thus, constructing the liberal-democratic peace through state-building, forms of peacebuilding and conflict resolution,

or more indirectly via the conditional effects of globalisation may mean a 'loss of community',135 trust and social ties. These tensions can be clearly seen in the recent debates about the 'new wars' of the 1990s and the development of humanitarian intervention, which was seen as a route through which the liberal peace could be installed in many postintervention settings around the world. 136 This debate has increasingly highlighted the fragility of the norm of non-intervention where gross violations of human rights are taking place, and the 'duty' and rights liberal states have to intervene to install the liberal peace as a response along pluralist or solidarist lines. These debates operate within the liberal discourse of peace, and commonly assume that humanitarian intervention should be perceived as just, be proportional, assured of success, and coincides with other national interests.137 Bellamy argues that the pluralist and solidarist approaches indicate that either intervention will not be undertaken unless national interests are at stake, or that a cosmopolitan international society can construct a conceptually sound response with both international and local consensus to carry it out. l38 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, for example, expressed the solidarist view that the right to intervene is increasing set against the 'responsibility to protect' .139 Such assumptions represent the apogee of liberal-international thought through peace becomes a form of liberal hegemony. This creates an uncomfortable hybrid between liberalism and a 'civilising mission', and the defence of human rights, property, democracy, as well as international law, a notion of just war, and restraints on the use of violence, reflecting pragmatic pacifism but falling short of radical pacifism. 140 Despite these paradoxes, liberalism is essentially the dominant ideology of the West related to peace, 141

elevating the state while also trying to control and monitor its excesses, and incorporating pragmatic pacifism to protect human life, while also retaining the threat of force for just war purposes. 14

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Liberalism Bad

Liberal Peace fails – it abdicates agency to nationalists causing war and imperialismRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 26-27)

Obviously, the development of international norms, cooperation and organisation could not be unilaterally undertaken, and would require some form of

international organisation and law whereby the interests inherent in the international may outweigh those of the parochial (as formulated by Grotius' work on natural law, based upon human sociability and international norms guaranteeing self-preservation).45 Yet, in a common counterargument, the romanticism of political community described by Herder46 indicated the danger that nationalism posed towards such liberal-internationalism, especially in the expression of selfdetermination symbolised by the French and American Revolutions.47 Ironically, self-determination, originally a prescription for liberal freedoms and associated with the idealism of a common community, was to give rise to conflicting claims over territorial sovereignty -in other words inter-state or anti-colonial conflict. Self-determination aimed at constructing a just peace but instead, it underlined the impossibility of a type of justice built upon the redistribution of territory and sovereignty according to [ethno] national identity. Yet, it rapidly became an antidote to imperialism and colonialism. This version of peace rested upon rampant self-determination and nationalism, and was in fact no peace at all. Early attempts at self-determination, which appealed to such contradictory idealist and liberal sentiments, such as that of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, strove to create a 'peaceful' nation state through violence. By 1871, this was the order of the day in Europe, in combination with the frantic search for empire. Nationalists took control of this agenda, which for conservatives was to preserve their wealth and power, and for liberals had become a civilising mission.48 These two aims combined in a tumultuous period during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during which nationalism, imperialism and

industrialisation appeared to combine to offer a future, utopian peace in the minds of many -a new peace. liberal imperialism softened the notion that profit could be made from virgin territories, supposedly establishing a responsibility through which the imperial or colonial power should aid in the development of that territory and its peoples. For example, in the late nineteenth century British Prime Ministers Disraeli and Gladstone had opposed each other on the 'peace project' that was derived from British imperialism, with Disraeli believing that the empire only had responsibility to itself (meaning Britain itself), while Gladstone had a vision of liberal imperialism through which the empire spread the 'benefits of peace' to its subjects. Formal and informal colonial rule continued this trend towards a basic consideration of the legitimacy of such adventures. But there was a growing tension between occupier and local inhabitants over whether this could be termed 'peace' given the cultural and racial attitudes of superiority normally adopted by the coloniser, such as in 'British India' and in the light of the political developments outlined above, imperialism and colonialism lost their legitimacy amongst both the states and peoples of the world in the twentieth century.

Liberal peace allows for domination and structural violenceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 33)

In addition, Wilson believed peace would be organised and enforced by a community of states.79 It would be a liberal peace in the image of the states that had imagined it, though he argued that this did not mean it was a victor's peace or indeed that it was idealistic.80 In this way, utopian thought on an ideal form of peace was overtaken by the

liberal peace which would, in theory and practice, rest on a set of common pragmatic elements and institutions. It required a hegemon who would construct the peace in its image: rights for all of its actors would be delineated, provided, enforced and patrolled, according to a set of core values, based on just war thinking, self-determination and democracy, international law and an embryonic form of human rights, and the norms of cooperation and consent.

Realists scoffed that even this liberal version was a utopian peace, but in practice this is what the 'long twentieth century' gave rise to. This type of peace did not preclude domination, structural violence and hegemony. However, liberal-democratic states, which provide rights for their inhabitants, and conducted 'peaceful' international relations as a result for the reasons Kant famously outlined, would be the only choice for the structure of international relations. Once this had been accepted all other reasonable rights would follow. Because this was a universal norm anyway, there were apparently no other voices to learn from. For the time being, self-determination and its problems would be the major architects of the new international system. This was based upon the core assumptions of liberal thought -rationality, a belief in progress, liberty, and the checks and balances on otherwise unchecked power. The notion of universal human rights, later enshrined in the UN framework, made it clear that peace did not just belong to or result from states, but also to individuals. States now had responsibilities to individuals, who had rights and agency.

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Liberalism Bad

Liberalism causes war, several reasonsRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 90-91)

Doyle has developed a nuanced critique of liberalism and in particular its claims to have 'pacific' qualities.1I8 For Doyle, neither realist nor Marxist theories account for long periods of peace defined by liberal principles within and between groups of states. Doyle argues that the three main traditions of liberalism, which include liberal pacifism, liberal

imperialism and liberal-internationalism all propose democracy as an essential component of peace. But they also make underlying normative assumptions about liberalism's universality that when confronted, leads to conflict between its supporters and those that reject its internal value system. Liberal states are prone to war with non-liberal states, making a separate peace amongst themselves, and have 'discovered liberal reasons for aggression' .11 9 Liberal imperialism is derived from the fact that liberal states have an imperative of expansion because domestic liberty leads to increasing populations and demand. Doyle points to Machiavelli and Thucydides as supporters of

this thesis which is aimed at glory through expansion to meet the needs of the population.120 At the same time a further imperative exists which is to compete with other expanding states. Finally, liberal-internationalism leads to the pacification of IR and the establishment of a Kantian zone of peace (supporting the democratic

peace argument and the claims of liberal pacifism).121 Liberalism presents peace as lying in the pursuit of material interest (as with Schumpeter), or in ruling others for fear of being ruled (as with Machiavelli), or by laws that denotes the equality of all (as with Kant). In this sense, the liberal principles of peace (especially democracy) may be conditions of peace, but they are not the only conditions. 122

Liberal peace and top-down universal governance is problematic and needs to be moved away fromRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 94)

What is also clear here, however, is that the civil aspect of the liberal peace, and the acceptance of the agency and rights of individuals in the private

sphere in IR, has given rise to some fundamental anomalies in IR, leading to a need to rethink the methodological, ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the liberal peace. This is certainly so if a social contract is to be reproduced between citizens, state and the international. This is especially problematic given the tendencies for liberal-international planners to think in terms of universal and top-down notions of governance, law, civil society, democracy and trade, and perhaps even more importantly on the requirement

for international intervention if these are to be achieved. A utopian version of peace now seems somewhat quaint and representative of an era and ontology that could not be sustained. As criticism mounts of the liberal peace, similar issues may also emerge as more sceptical accounts of liberalism emerge (or are rediscovered) of liberalism's tendency towards illiberalism. 152 Indeed, IR theory's orthodox may well now be concurring in an imperial liberal state-building tendency.153

Liberalism excludes people from peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 96)

Yet in the pantheon of practical attempts to evoke the liberal peace through peace processes, humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding and state-building,

this has often evoked strong resistance on the part of local actors and different interest groups. Liberal objectives often appear from this

perspective as imperialistic to those outside of the developed countries, partly because it has, as Geuss has argued, been unable to prevent poverty or inequality. As Williams has argued in another context, there is a certain hubris about the exceptionalism that the liberal peace is treated with by many mainstream

thinkers, which may well turn out to be its nemesis. This may be because of its economic weaknesses, its assumed cultural and developmental

models, and its perceived imposition, which undermines local power structures and interests. Indeed, such approaches have effectively margnalised large numbers of people from ‘peace’ by assuming a restrained definition which does not preclude structural violence, poverty and oppression.

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Liberalism Bad

Liberal peace is hegemonic and hierarchicalRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 114)

From the fourth generation perspective, the liberal peace project is ontologically incoherent. It offers several different states of being -for a state-centric world

dominated by sovereign constitutional democracies, a world dominated by institutions, and a world in which human rights and self-determination are valued. The only way in which

this peace system can be coherent is if it is taken to be hierarchical and regulative, led by hegemons which set political and economic

priorities, and this provides the framework in which human rights and selfdetermination can be observed. Democracy provides the political system in which this process is made representative. The trouble with this is that the individual is subservient to the structure and system, which may be enabling in some contexts but in others it may not. Where the gaze of the guardians of the liberal panopticon cannot reach,66 abuses may follow, often committed by those elites who control the various systems that make up the liberal peace. Effectively this means that the individual who is relatively powerless is required to perform 'liberal peace acts' such as voting, paying taxes, engaging in the free market, and exercising rights, to keep the international gaze satisfied but not to expect that this performance carries any actual weight. Quite clearly, the assumptions which go with the liberal peace are contested across the world, in Islamic settings or those of other religions, in authoritarian states, in tribal and clan settings, and societies where traditional and cultural practices exist which do not fit with the Western conception of human rights and democracy. At a very basic level, muted by the preponderance of the liberal-international system, the very ontology and related epistemology of the liberal peace are being disputed by local communities, not necessarily on an

ideological basis, but quite often because of its inefficiencies, its distant directors and executors, its cultural biases, and its failures to provide sufficient resources to support the everyday lives of such communities.

Liberal peace ‘trains’ subjects to adopt it, can’t choose own peace or have a true ontology of peace (Welfare solves)Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 114-115)

As a result of the critical turn in peace and conflict studies, state-building and its association with (or probably cooption of) the liberal peace, has been identified as a massive, interventionary, process of social, political and economic engineering. It represents the hegemonic domination of political norms in IR by a core group of actors, led primarily by the US and its associated ideologies. In practice there is a clear tendency to brush over its deficiencies meaning that the liberal peace is in practice a 'virtual peace' reflecting Baudrillard's third aspect of hyper-reality -where the copy is more real than reality itself,67 especially to external viewers. Because the liberal peace values institutions, power and resources, through a rational engineering process, societies and polities are expected to mould themselves to the liberal peace model. Thus positivist, rational approaches to IR succeed in building the institutional aspects of the liberal peace, but it is difficult to see in this liberal peace the roots of a sustainable polity in conflict situations, which has the depth in particular to redress cultural and welfare related aspects of conflict. There are echoes of Said's 'Orientalism' here.68 'Primitive' polities, so the argument goes implicitly, need to be governed directly while subjects are trained in the ways of the liberal peace. Once this has been completed, Western rationalism dictates that progress will mean that peace almost inevitably follows. These assumptions are recycled endlessly in the policy and academic literatures on peace as a form of print

capitalism.69 This disguises the fact that the liberal peace is strongly contested by actors who want to determine their own peace. In the context of liberal peacebuilding, the omission of the landscape of everyday life, including its welfare aspects, cultural activity and recognition, and increasingly significant environmental base, form a core blindspot negated by neo-liberalism but vital to any sustainable peace. This agenda would require that individuals and families have sufficient welfare and resources to enable them to enter into stable relationships with their neighbours, as well as with the institutions of government and state. Their cultural and identity dynamics would be

recognised rather than negated, and their environment would be preserved and improved such that it also contributed to stable relationships within the locale and state. Security, shelter, food, income, transport, cultural and educational facilities, provide continuity on which an emancipatory peace, or indeed an ontology of peace might then be built.

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Liberalism Bad

Liberal peace is hollow, the institutions and agreements are formed externally and don’t correspond to local needsRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 116)

In these terms, the construction of peace through peacebuilding strategies of a both top-down and bottom-up nature reflects the liberal-realist theoretical hybrid. Liberal approaches, critical theory and constructivist approaches all concur on the necessity of the incorporation of the subjective and objective, of force and freedom, of the state as the key actor which is motivated by power and interest, and on the moderating and 'civilising discourse' of universal liberal norms, which may both be universal and relatively subjective. Hence, peace is constructed through the reform of governance. Governance frameworks

enforce compliance on the basis of prior agreements, though these agreements are often negotiated externally to the conflict environment being addressed, and almost

certainly by external actors. This is generally taken to imply that there is a universal basis for the construction of peace agreed by the vast majority of the world's actors, states,

organisations, governments, administrations and communities. Yet, as fourth generation approaches illustrate, the liberal peace is mainly experienced in post-conflict zones as a shallow 'virtual peace', which in fact accentuates the gap between an international custodians' aims, capacities and interests, and those of local actors. This effectively is a simulated peace though the hope is that it will eventually become self-sustaining rather than sustained from afar. State frameworks that emerge as a result of liberal peacebuilding tend to house 'empty' institutions which are, at least in the short to medium term, of little benefit to individuals and society in terms of their everyday life.

Liberalism excludes minorities and its attempts to solve war only perpetuates more. It implicitly excludes people who don’t agree with the majority/institutional functioningRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 139-140)

Probably the easiest targets for post-structuralism are the claimed 'timeless wisdom' of realism and the universal claims of liberalism. This also lays bare the claims of sovereignty equated with state power and territorial control, in which the state is a rational actor as a response to anarchy. In particular, the claim of a post-Kantian, privileged, universal and rational meaning to history, politics and society that was just waiting to be uncovered by those who had access, is discounted as logocentrism.33 A Western meta-narrative of 'timeless wisdom' represents war and violence as an inevitable aspect of political actors' interactions, and

tends to be extremely conservative in its representation of peace, though it also acknowledges that a normative framework for peace exists. However, the way realism is deployed in IR and in the policy world more generally accepts security as the main priority before all other objectives can be seriously addressed. Post-structuralists

would argue that this means that the states' obsession with security becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of surrealist proportions.

Similarly, this critique can be extended to liberal claims about states, internationalism and international society whereby such universal norms are represented as fact, but actually merely disguise the interests of powerful actors. So much energy is taken up with

the consideration of the often negative connotations of realism, for example, that little time and energy is put into any discussion of transformative agendas relating to emancipation, or to understanding difference. Liberalism claims that transformation can take place as long as it is universally constructed, effectively disguising the interests of its most powerful supporters. What is worse, for many social groups that do not conform to the mainstream representation provided by the state, exclusion occurs. In this sense race, gender, identity, class and environmental discrimination are inbuilt into a system which depends on coercive homogenisation and assimilation, and does not recognise the alternate cartographies produced by such dynamics and issue areas.

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Liberalism Bad

Liberal peace causes the root cause of the violence it tries to solve – multiple recent examples prove its failureRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 149-150)

Indeed, the dilemma for orthodox IR theory is that the focus on worst case scenarios, pragmatism, rationalism, state frameworks and interests, means that the challenge of critical and particularly post-structural approaches cannot afford to be ignored. It is a contradiction that orthodox theory, adept at claiming its capacity to respond to 'real' worst case scenarios, rejects the claim that its approaches replicate the roots and issues that lead to violence -any risk of this should be responded to within this realist ontology (perhaps explaining why the liberal peace has become so ubiquitous), Mainstream IR has become associated with closure, the proscription of dissent, and with the distancing of everyday life.3 This is especially so in the contemporary world where conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 'war on terror', weak or failing peacebuilding projects in many other countries, as well as poverty and environmental dangers, appear to have dispersed the so-called

post-Cold War liberal 'peace dividend'. Despite the inference that the liberal peace is a 'civilised' compromise between idealism and realism, the discourses and practices associated it are often more representative of the dystopian than the moderated utopian. This is particularly so in its

application and experience outside of its Western roots, and in the current applications of a recently evolved muscular liberal peace, which can be observed in the state-building attempt in Iraq. The attempt to mimic the liberal state in Iraq has done much to discredit the universal claims

of the transferability of the liberal peace in political terms,4 adding to the obvious failures of its neo-liberal components, which have been observed in a wide

range of case from the UN assistance mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s to the return of UN peacekeepers to East Timor after the crisis of 2006. Thus, the liberal peace spans both civil and uncivil forms of peace, being based on international consensus, but often on a much weaker local consensus. Indeed, the rhetoric of local ownership, participation and consent is often a disguise for non-consensual intervention, for dependency and conditionality, there being little space for empathy, emancipation or indigeneity in the liberal peace framework, other than through a romanticised view of the local.

Liberal peace fails – can’t achieve its own goalsRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 35)

The UN system became by far the most significant (and maligned) mechanism of this liberal peace as it developed after the Second World War, via the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, international agency and international financial institutions. Indeed, the tension between utopian hopes for a ideal form of peace in the future, liberal notions of limited and regulated freedom, and realist concerns with the need for a strong security architecture are all put of the UN framework, as is immediately obvious from the UN Charter, and the roles of its institutions and agencies.89 Effectively, the liberal peace required governance at a global and local level, and this is what the UN was tasked to do, because of its universal membership and claims to represent universal norms, but of course without overriding the sovereignty of its member states. Very

quickly, however, it became clear that this broader notion of peace now being represented by the UN system had even broader implications. If inter-state war had been rejected, so should civil war and imperialism. If poverty, development and human rights were to be on the agenda, then they should not just be identified and discussed, but also ameliorated. In this sense, with an increasingly identified 'right' to peace also came the responsibility to create and support it. This represents the classic liberal conundrum -in the light of a failure to discover a universal consensus, a more limited consensus must be found for the basis of a peace for most, which will be imposed on those at the margins who may resist it.

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Liberalism Bad

Liberalism causes the exclusion on developing countries and is neither liberal nor open- forces trade policies which benefit the richSjolander 1994 (Claire Turenne, assistant professor of political science at the University of Ottawa, “U.S. Hegemony & the Management of Trade”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 32-33)

Despite its ideological component, the outset of the crisis-the partial collapse of Bretton Woods, the oil shocks, the diffusion of manufacturing production to an increasing number of countries, and the rise of multinational and transnational corporations-began to repoliticize what had been accepted as natural under the hegemonic consensus of Pax Americana. In part, the growth of new forms of protectionism can be interpreted within the context of this repoliticization, particularly given the relative successes of the GATT in reducing explicit barriers to trade. Unsurprisingly, the partial erosion of the consensus around Pax Americana finds its most schizophrenic response within the United States. As the economic crisis began to impose burdens of restructuring upon the U.S. economy, trade quickly became a more parochial concern, finding expression in legislative maneuverings within the Congress. The logic of Pax Americana, however, despite the fact that its benefits were no longer falling as disproportionately to the U.S. state as a whole, still dictated that important benefits were to be derived for certain segments of U.S. capital. Calls to protectionism from segments of labor and national capital had to be weighed against calls to further liberalization by nationally headquartered international capital. Paradoxically, as the logic of Pax Americana within the context of the economic crisis encouraged capital nationally based in other countries to internationalize, states other than the United States equally became subject to increilsed pressures to liberalize their economic policies-that is, to internationalize-rather than to define' them more restrictively. The irony of the hegemonic order of Pax Americana is found in the fact that as trade policy is politicized in the United States as elsewhere-as the benefits of the natural order of liberalization are questioned-the internationalization pressures embedded within it have never been manifested more strongly. The crisis of hegemony, therefore, can thus be seen as one in which the U.S. state assumes more of the role of a state comme les autres, rather than be construed as a crisis of the order of Pax Americana per se. lt is important to note, however, that multilateralism and the natural order of trade liberalization has hardly been without its contradictions. Whereas the ethos of multilateralism implied a global scope and orientation, multilateralism as manifested at its inception was actually the policy choice of a fairly circumscribed group of states in the postwar world, and was restricted in important ways. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, devastated economically and increasingly isolated politically, limited their participation in the definition of this new multilateral economic order.s As well, given that most of the South had yet to assume an independent role on the world stage, the voices of developing states were effectively muted in this process. Equally, national and regional regulations and intervention, which contradicted the liberal premises of the order but had been allowed "temporarily" to facilitate reconstruction and stabilization in specific European countries, remained in place until the end of the 1950s. In other words, at its inception, the open, liberal multilateral economic order was neither particularly open nor particularly liberal. Multilateralism as part of an ideology, however, was functional to the liberalization implied in Pax Americana; it sowed seeds instrumental to the expansion of the world economy and its political component served the internationalization of capital well by encouraging the internationalization of the state. In the rhetoric of fair and free trade, however, it is important to remember that liberalization and multilateralism were not then, nor are they now, synonymous.

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Liberalism -> BiopoliticsLiberal peace is a biopolitical form of disciplinary control – this is made possible on through the camoflauging of control through liberal norms and appeals to peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 140)

It is within the confines of post-structuralism that the critiques that began to emerge in English School thinking, constructivism and critical theory of realist liberal versions of peace have become fully realised as being in danger of perpetrating a form of structural violence, and carrying undertones of domination, hegemony and oppression. Again, this is not an implicit posture as there is very little in the post-structural literature which directly addresses the concept of peace -nor could it given its opposition to prescription. The post-Enlightenment 'good life' from this perspective is not innocent or naive about its perception of emancipation and universalism, but rather represents a cynical move to camouflage the selective manner by which these are spread across the world. Thus, for example, liberal peace can be seen

as a concept that it is very unlikely to be satisfactorily defined or achieved for all. This version of peace sees it projected from a central sponsor, and even the efforts

of liberals and critical theorists are critiqued on the basis that one can never fully understand an other's peace. The liberal peace represents biopolitical governance of a disciplinary nature, from this perspective.34Thus, symbolism, language and other modes of representation must be suspected of camouflaging interests and dominance, and peace ultimately becomes a vehicle through which ideology, legitimacy and identity are contested territorially, sovereignly and existentially in order to exert biopolitical control over its subjects. At the same time, it must also be noted that such critiques are also served and made possible by the systems that they attack.35

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Liberalism -> Bare life

Liberal institutionalism prioritizes Western systems of thought and institutions – this monopolizes how peace is constructed resulting in the exclusion and conversion into bare life of those who are being “changed”Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 141-142)Another body of work has extended the post-structural critique into a development context. For example, orthodox approaches to development studies aim to develop living standards and prosperity in the developing world, using Western knowledge and technology rather than indigenous approaches. Its focus explicitly prioritises the economic over the social and cultural. As a result development work often has little connection with local culture but rather focuses on material gain as it is conceptualised by Western governance. This has been heavily criticised not just from the point of view of being

counterproductive, but also inherently violent and a way of monopolising the 'developing' body and mind in order to homogenise polities

within the broader liberal community of states.46 This neo-colonial/imperial critique requires that local knowledge and culture be reconfigured within a

democratic, neo-liberal state-building process entirely controlled by liberal peacebuilders. As Sylvester has argued, this is in danger of creating 'bare life' for those who are being 'developed' ,47 whereby their inter-subjective existence is not valued unless it corresponds to the objective liberal project. As Agamben writes, bare life comes about because of the Western political habit of exclusion that simultaneously claims to be inclusive.48 Thus bodies are managed and governed and resistance is not tolerated. Opposition is described as terrorism or corruption, and those who then police the liberal system are counter-described as fascists.49 Even if society aspires to the liberal project, however, neo-liberalism means bare life for many who suffer from poverty even despite their aspirations for a liberal state. For many critical and post-structural influenced thinkers, what appears to be developing as a result of the liberal-realist IR project follows similar lines to the critique that Fanon adopted of the post-colonial state, particularly Algeria. He argued such states were economically defunct, could not support social relations, and resorted to coercion to control unfulfilled citizens.50 As Fanon indicated, economic, social and cultural life are interlinked, and cannot be divorced in the way that [neo] liberal versions of IR assume.

Liberalism places itself in opposition to the “barbaric other” who resists liberal norms. This causes direct domination of the non-liberal subject creating bare lifeRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 142)

This connects to another set of debates emanating from post-colonial theory that represent Western liberalism as constantly juxtaposing itself with others who are identified as 'barbaric' again the liberal norm.5l Barbarians are noted only for their violence and because those who are not engaged in violent acts of resistance or terrorism are essentially the pupils of liberalism they are invisible52 until they have graduated into the school of mature liberal societies and states. For Said, of course, the cultural implications of this denote 'Orientalism' in which

liberals discursively dominate and dehumanise the non-liberal, non-Western subject.53 For some this means death through conflict, humanitarian intervention, preventive war, torture, genocide, human rights abuse, with little direct concern from the liberal-international community. The liberal modernisation project clashes with the local where identity and cultural concerns defy rational progress towards liberal governance. Indeed, some have argued, following Polyani, that capitalism and its inculcation into multilateral development institutions is indicative of a disciplinary approach in which social relations are dismembered if they impede neoliberalism.54 Polyani argued that fascism was the outcome of neo-liberalism's failure,55 whereby civil society's resistance was disciplined by the capitalist state. On a larger scale, this sort of disciplining has become part of global governance whereby the role of IFI-imposed strategies would lead to bare life.

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Liberalism/Humanitarianism Bad

Liberal humanitarianism causes intervensionism and is ineffective – the UN provesRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 76)

One of the paradoxes that this has highlighted for English School scholars has been that if human rights are universal then humanitarian intervention may be necessary against governments that do not provide their citizens with human rights, as has occurred since the end of the Cold War in Somalia in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999.22 Human rights were now being offered as an international normative standard and, where they were absent, coalitions of liberal states from within international or world

society were now empowered to use force to make sure that they were provided. This created a difficult situation in which some actors have to assume the right and capacity to decide when an intervention occurs; for whom, why and at what level of abuse should a response

occur. This then draws external actors into the local domestic political, economic and societal frameworks of another state, involving them in the governance of others in what appears to be a liberal form of trusteeship. As Wheeler has argued, the pluralist and solidarist versions of this debate offer different degrees of this capacity to

decide what is best for others. Implicitly, this means the concept of peace offered by the English School, which lay in the expansion of international society and human

rights, meant exporting that peace. Thus, international society indicates a basic set of universal standards between states and within societies as its basis, upon which

cooperation and social relations are based. This also raises the difficult question of whether this expansion of international society can be a basis for a

sustainable peace -as the peacebuilding and state-building experience of the UN in the post-Cold War environment aptly illustrates. It has also laid bare inconsistencies in international society's expansion,25 as the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 famously illustrated. Indeed, some critics have argued that international society is a soft replacement for a colonial empire controlled by an imperial hegemon. In order words, English School thinkers simply developed sophisticated veneer for a new neo-colonial or post-colonial international system that camouflaged its imperial antecedents especially for audiences from the US and the former colonies.

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Realism and Liberalism Bad- Enviro

Realism and liberalism destroy the environmentRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 88-89)

Inevitably, environmental approaches represent a significant challenge for liberal, realist and structural thinking -relating to critical IPE -

and instead points to the normative and also inter-subjective dynamics of how environmental resources are understood and distributed. This is a challenge to the realist race for resources between states which though rational within the states-system, irrationally discounts the environment. It is also a challenge to the liberal attempt to multilaterally govern behaviour politically, socially and economically to promote cooperation and an international society of states by basing its calculations of shared norms of representation, production, human rights and political and legal

restraints. Liberalism does not include a concern with environmental constraints, other than through the neo-liberal pricing mechanisms set by dcmand

and supply. Structuralist arguments fair little better as their focus on dismantling economic classes and inducing equality amongst productive individuals and at

a global level relates to the distribution of resources rather than the environmental costs of their extraction, processing and distribution. Constructivist and critical strands of thinking about IR provide space for environmental issues, though instead these tend to focus upon norms, identity, emancipation and communication as central problems. Indeed, environmental discourses are predicated upon the centrality of the problems caused by the fact that no provision is made in IR for the side effects of the value, usage and distribution of exhaustible resources, from raw materials to land, nature, water and the atmosphere, as well as problems brought about by pollution, population growth and disease. 105 They illustrate how neo-liberal economics in a globalised world economy are unsustainable, thus challenging neo-liberal orthodoxies on the relationship of development with peace.106 Opinion is divided over whether such threats actually exist, are plausible, are more immediate, can be treated incrementally, or demand radical and immediate reform in order to prevent an environmental catastrophe. 1G7 The ecocentric response is that if humanity is to sustain itself, it must place itself after nature, the environment and the biosphere, meaning a fundamental reordering of the framework of the liberal-realist regimes that support the liberal peace, as they are dependent upon neo-liberal versions of development, free market capitalism, and global trade, with little concern for the environmental costs of orthodox security practices.1GS Escaping from a Cartesian view of the world whieh see the human as sovereign, and by extension the state as sovereign, and seeing the embedded relationship of human beings and their political, social and economic structures within the environment offers an important contribution to IR's understanding of peace: yet this is one where the human being is not necessarily emancipated, but instead must respect the structural constraints associated with readings of ecology predicated upon its fragility. Peace in this sense might mean accepting limitations on human capacity, not just to make war, but to develop. This represents a positive epistemology of peace, but one that challenges liberal assumptions of progress and also the critical and poststructuralist prioritisation of norms, identity and difference. However, some IR theorists working on environmental issues have argued that working on common environmental issues presents opportunities for peacemaking by building trust and cooperation. 109 Much of the literature points to the role of transnational non-state actors, advocacy groups and NGOs in highlighting the need for consideration of the environment in political, social and economic thought and policy. This illustrates the importance of civil society in affecting decisionmaking processes which relates to broader questions of sustainability and peace in this context. This is another example of transnational space in which civil actors connect globally in order to raise and advocate for an issue which state institutions and actors are blind to. Indeed, environmental factors are becoming a key arbiter of the concept of a sustainable peace, allowing for the development of ecological security, sustainable development and environmental justice. This requires that states are conditioned to respond to its structural constraints in ways which are sensitive to the concerns of civil society, or alternatively in ways which imply severe limitations on liberal freedoms. In this way, the environmental challenge transcends the orthodoxy of positivism and liberalism, and increasingly is seen as part of a post-positivist, normative and critical challenge to IR and its dominant realist and neo-liberal assertions, often drawing on the work of Habermas in so doing. It also clearly connects with the debates about development as a process of modernisation, or as the provision of 'freedom' in Sen's words, indicating how environmental debates span orthodox and critical approaches to peace.

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Can combine Realism and Liberalism

Can combine realism + liberalismRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 89-90)Kant, Schumpeter, and many other contemporary authors, have argued that liberalism has a pacifying effect through liberal, democratic principles which are the basis for state institutions, and through its adherence to free trade and capitalism. l12 Following Kant, Schumpeter saw these factors as having a key effect on society and the way in which resources were distributed, which consequently had a pacifying effect, leading to the emergence of institutions such as the Hague court. Kantian liberalism claims to offer peace, not just as a possibility, but as a normal condition of the interactions of liberal states. This is where

liberalism and realism have formed a hybrid concept of peace that has been most influential in thinking and policy in recent times, as Doyle has famously argued. Others have argued that the democratic peace has now become the closest to a law that IR theory has ever known. 114

Liberalism and realism can combine activist anarchy and -> positive peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 91)Much of this debate is reflected in the so-called 'neo-neo' debates of the 1980s which, as Weaver has argued, quickly became compatible with each other in that realism and liberalism now shared a rationalist research basis focusing on how rational institutions and institutionalism might temper the logic of anarchy.123 In this

synthesis, a focus on regime theory, cooperation and institutions as pathways to security developed a distinctly liberal approach to international order through with liberal hegemons developed an ordering and governing set of regimes and institutions to which all states and societies were to be bound. This then became the shape of what has become known as the 'Pax Americana' that developed after the end of

the Cold War, reflecting a liberal-realist hybrid offering a positive epistemology but still limited by the capacity of liberal states to propagate their universal norms outside of their own international society or community. However, neo-liberalism reflects the important nuance

of 'hegemony'. This can be interpreted as 'governance' whereby such states control political and economic environments in order to induce hegemonic stability, through systems such as through the Bretton Woods system, derived from US hegemony.124

Liberalism and Realism can combine – epistemology/ontology of the powerfulRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 93)Liberal thinking frames its concept of peace in the context of preserving, perfecting and sharing an order based upon a Western value system. This has formed the basis for an ontology of peace for the discipline of IR which, by: eschewing accounts that seek to understand and celebrate difference in favour of explanations based upon a decidedly Western view of rationality, International Relations has effectively served as a handmaiden to Western power and interests. The ontology of the discipline has been that of the powerful, and the epistemology and

methodologies that give rise to that ontology have reflected very historically and culturally specific notions of rationality and identity. 143 Orthodox IR has generally concurred with this project, though many idealist, functionalists, pluralists, peace researchers, nonnative theorists, conflict researchers and critical theorists generally have aimed to move beyond this. Within IR's orthodoxy, difference, identity, social, political and economic processes, frameworks and dynamics, are only acceptable if they fit within what is an essentially liberal-realist paradigm. In this paradigm, inherency notions fonn the basis upon which liberal institutions create peace which must safeguard basic security in the light of self-interest on the one hand, while also producing the conditions necessary for a broader peace. As Little has pointed out, this means such approaches have increasingly become intermeshed with realism.144

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Can Combine Realism and Liberalism

Can combine realism and liberalismRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 102-103)Despite these radical differences with conflict management approaches, there is a certain amount of continuity between first and second generation approaches, in which both the inherency argument (realism) and liberal frameworks for the governance of social, economic and political conditions are constructed to ward off aggression, define the limits of individual and state behaviour while also retaining a level of individual freedom. The familiar contours of the hybrid liberal-realism emerge from this, especially as the debate on conflict resolution evolved towards 'multi-track diplomacy',

peacebuilding and contingency approaches.23 This connects with liberal arguments about human security and the 'democratic peace',24 which are seen as a way to distribute political and material resources and, following on from human needs and structural violence theories,25 view conflict as socio-biological and

derived from a structural suppression of a basic hierarchy of human needs. This means that the notion of a civil peace challenges the more limited constitutional or institutional peace offered by conflict management approaches, but does not necessarily replace it. On the other hand, these contributions to second generation thinking also imply that conflict requires social engineering on the part of third party interveners to remove the conditions that create violence.

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***Negative Peace Bad***

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Negative Peace bad

Focusing on war preserves structural violence and injustice – structural violence causes far greater lossesHerf, Professor of Modern European History at the University of Maryland, 1986, (Jeffrey, Spring, “War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The West German Peace Movement,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538953, TH, p. 181-182)

In the late 1960s, Galtung gave critical peace research some of its key words: "negative" vs. "positive peace," "structural violence" and "counterviolence."15 The absence of war and violence between states was, he wrote, merely a "negative peace" saturated with "structural violence." What passed for peace was no

more than frozen or structured violence, preserving an unjust order. "Positive peace," on the other hand, requires justice. The realization of positive peace

will likely require violence in the form of revolutionary war to overthrow the status quo. Galtung greatly expanded the concept of what should be called violence. Thus, when individuals "are influenced in a way that causes their physical and spiritual/intellectual realization to be less than their potential realization," they are victims of "structural violence." If their "potential is greater than the actual and the actual is avoidable, then violence exists." Violence therefore includes hunger, consumerism, imperialism, racial and sexual discrimination, and the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union as forms of "structural violence." Because actual violence against persons may be necessary to overcome already existing structural violence, it is "barely possible" to decide which kind of violence is more important.I6 This "expanded concept of violence" leads to an "expanded concept of peace" entailing the absence of structural and personal violence. In overcoming injustice and structural violence, "the short term losses due to personal violence appear very small in relation to the permanent losses that result from structural violence.

Neg Peace destroys agencyRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 13)

War and peace are seen as separate concepts, which are the antithesis of each other, particularly for pluralists, liberals, constructivists and critical theorists

(peace may masquerade as war for some post-structuralists). Yet, this separation has always been weak. For example, in the debate on peace-enforcement or humanitarian intervention, and on state-building, there has been much tension. This is partly why the debates over state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s have been so controversial. The contemporary concept of the liberal peace, which is expressed in different ways throughout much of IR theory, also makes this separation. The liberal peace provides the 'good life' if its formulas are followed, for all, and without exception, and even if it rests on a coercive introduction through invasion or peace enforcement. This has occurred within a Western context, which immediately points to a major flaw in thinking about peace (and indeed in the capacity of this study), which is firmly rooted in a critique within this Western, secular context. Peace rests upon a set of cultural, social and political norms, often dressed up as being secular, though closely reflecting the non-secular religious writings on the issue. The Christian notion of crusades for peace, or the use offorce to construct peace, is taken for granted in this context. Lawful self-defence and just war remain integral to the preservation of this tranquil order, once all peace efforts have failed. From this have sprung the great peace conferences that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and which contributed to the emergence of the United Nations. Also visible have been the various social movements, charities and NGOs campaigning for human rights, voting rights, the banning of certain weapons, and more recently advocating and practical multiple forms of humanitarian assistance in conflict and disaster zones. Yet, where and when IR theorists do attempt to engage with peace as a concept, they often focus upon ending war, or preventing war, and in the context of units such as states, las or even empires. The role and agency of individuals and societies in the creation of peace tends to be less valued, the focus instead being on grand scale political, economic, military, social and constitutional peace projects undertaken beyond the ken and capacity of the individual.40

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Negative Peace -> Bare life

Negative peace/balance of power -> bare life, everday engagement key, western peace badRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 156-158)

This indicates that a focus simply on a negative peace and a balance of power, or an institutional framework for peace is not enough. These reproduce bare life,2° peace needs to become embedded within everyday life and the societies it affects. This may seem

naive to many working within a more orthodox tradition, but to others who are working beyond these traditions, orthodox approaches seem naive -destined to repeat the traumas of liberal-realist 'history'. Again, this indicates the need for an engagement with the political, social, economic, cultural and environment dynamics of everyday life, if an everyday form of peace is to replace a negative epistemology of peace. This clearly prioritises the individual, their identity, difference and consent, as well as stable and peaceful relations between them. Jabri has articulated a useful conceptualisation of peace in contemporary IR. She argues that: the politics of peace, the capacity at once to both resist violence and struggle for a just social order, is not just within the purview of the liberal state or indeed and international civil service, but it located primarily with individuals, communities and social movements involved in critical engagement with the multiform governance structures, as well as non-state agents, they encounter in their substantial claims for human rights and justice. The politics of peace must then rely on a conception of solidarity that has a capacity to transcend the signifying divide of state and culture, while at the same time recognising the claims of both.21 This represents a critical rendition of the concept of peace, to which can be added the need for empathy. In addition, according to Allan and Keller, justice through peace is preferable to justice through war and the most marginalised provide guidance to the powerful in understanding what peace means, requiring respect for free speech and human rights. This means that individuals have primacy over states in terms of their rights, freedoms and participation,22 recognition is central, as is the way in which categorisations are made to include or exclude others23. Recognition implies empathy, care and, thus, solidarity and reconciliation, but the latter cannot occur before the former. 24 The language of Western liberal institutionalism, or of sovereignty is, as Allan and Keller argue, not a basis for a 'just peace', because these offer obstacles to the recognition of certain others, favour liberals, and continue the process of marginalisation. Reconciliation cannot stem from this (hence the inability of many liberal states to recognise even their own native peoples). Allan adds to this analysis an element of 'care' which he argues extends the concept of peace beyond its positive connotations.25 This global care ethic supersedes a positive peace, drawing on the eponymous feminist concept,26 Tolerance and solidarity coalesce within care, according to Allan, in that difference and uniqueness are accepted, and sympathy for the difficulties of others and awillingness to assist are present.27

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Neg Peace Bad

Policies based on negative peace become self-fufilling prophecies—turns all solvencyBilgin 2003. [Pinar Bilgin. "Individual and Societal dimensions of Security". International Studies Review. Volume 5, No. 2. pp. 203-222.]

Martin Shaw (1993) responded to the question of whether the state or the individual should be the primary referent of security by arguing that our options need not be limited to two: the state or the individual. He maintained that we need a complex and multilayered analysis of a variety of referents including social groups and the global society as well as individuals and states. In making this point, Shaw emphasized the need to develop an understanding of the dynamic relationships in which these potential referents interact and affect each other's security. In other words, he advocated that "social relations" was the missing dimension in the security debate. This point was taken up by Bill McSweeney (1999) who maintained that security policies could not be formulated simply by aggregating individual needs or by attributing such needs to states. Rather, he made a case for a "reflexive theory of social order" that views the analysis of security as a dynamic process in which identities and interests are mutually constituted by social agents in search of security. Thus, McSweeney's proposed framework looked at individual human beings and communities not only as referents (whose security we should be concerned with) but also as agents who seek to enhance their own and others' security. This framework enabled him to understand how individuals and communities interact, and how new and broader communities are constructed as solutions to security problems through the manipulation of identities and interests by purposeful social agents (as with the formation of the European Union and the attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland). Security as Emancipation Booth's (1991) proposed solution to the current state of insecurity was to develop a framework that did not simply reproduce existing threats (as when containment policies produce rogue states and, in worst case scenarios, become self-fulfilling prophecies). Specifically, Booth (1991:319) placed human beings at the center and gave priority to human emancipation: "Security" means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints together with poverty, poor education, political oppression, and so on. Booth substantiates his argument by asserting that emancipation is in the spirit of our times, as witnessed by the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in South Africa as well as the progress in struggles that are still in progress (for example, in Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan). Mohamed Ayoob (1995) responded to Booth's call for adopting an emancipation- oriented approach by observing that such a practice would amount to imposing a model originating in the West onto Third World contexts. Ayoob (1995:11) argued that Third World states are the opposite of those found in the Western world that have "largely solved their legitimacy problem and possess representative governments that preside over socially mobile populations that are relatively homogenous and usually affluent and free from want." Accordingly, he called for continuing to give highest priority to the security needs and interests of states and regimes in the Third World. Although it goes without saying that major differences occur between the security needs of different types of states, emancipation-as defined by Booth (1991)-is not an added extra that can only be sought in those Western polities that are presumably free from want. On the contrary, emancipation is understood as a process through which security is sought; it is a goal that is kept on the horizon during state-building and the making of security policy. Thus, the need for strengthening existing state mechanisms in the Third World should not be made an excuse for marginalizing individuals' and social groups' needs. The challenge for emancipation-oriented approaches to security is to find a way of addressing the security needs and interests of a variety of referents at different levels (see Bilgin, Booth, and Jones 1998). When adopting an emancipation-oriented approach to the study of security, one confronts the problem of trying to define what emancipation means in different parts of the world (Pasha 1996). Even well-intentioned efforts could be viewed as adopting a patronizing attitude toward peoples of other cultures. Suggesting that issues such as human rights or the provision of basic education and health care should be a part of the security agenda could be taken as a claim to know peoples' real interests better than they themselves do. However, presenting citizens with choices that have been obscured by state-based approaches to security may also be interpreted as a claim to know what peoples' real interests are. Given the ways in which dominant discourses have shaped security agendas, one could reasonably assume that regional security agendas could have been set up differently had other (individual and societal-focused) discourses come to prevail. Insecurity Dilemma The security predicament of individuals and social groups was also pointed out by Brian Job (1992) who observed that the security environment of the majority of the world's population did not improve with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the superpower conflict. Indeed, people in the developing world, who constitute a significant portion of the globe's population, continue to suffer gross injustices, often at the hands of their own governments. ]

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Neg Peace Bad

Humanitarian intervention masks the causes of the original violence and perpetuates the idea that violence is justifiableRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.125-126.

In thinking about humanitarian intervention—whose putative aim is the prevention or cessation of widespread violence, suffering, and death—it is tempting to contrast the interveners with the situation they are (in the best possible scenario) trying to alleviate. The interveners are good; those against whom they are intervening are bad. Since the targets of intervention are violent, it is all too easy to conceptualize the interveners as nonviolent. For those favorably disposed to humanitarian intervention, imagining an intervening force suddenly appearing on a scene of violence and destruction is easy: their mere appearance will end the violence, with no need for additional violence. We should not forget that the kind of intervention at issue in discussions of "humanitarian intervention" is usually military intervention, a situation in which one group attempts to impose its will on another by force. Repeated experience has shown the fallacy of believing that military actions can achieve even morally justified aims—such as saving lives—without additional, unintended "collateral damage" (as in Somalia). Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the "friction" of war, the fact that even organized violence always has unintended consequences, because the course of violence is so hard to predict and control: Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is in- conceivable unless one has experienced war Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper .... Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.19 The militaristic thinking inherent in armed intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, serves ultimately to reinforce a culture of violence and so is counter-productive in the long run to the ends of humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the situations in that humanitarian interventions are most likely to be justified are those least susceptible of military solutions. The attractiveness of military intervention comes from looking primarily at crises that call for quick, short-term remedies. Military solutions emphasize crisis management, not long-term solutions. A military solution to a humanitarian crisis is similar to a police action whose chief aim is to quell a riot before more people are injured or to prevent a criminal from killing more victims. Such a police action does not—and is not intended to—address the underlying causes of the violence it seeks to stem. The kinds of problems humanitarian intervention is called upon to solve are hardly ever only military problems. Actual situations are almost always very messy; Somalia and Kosovo are especially vivid examples. Even well-intended and well-controlled interventions are ineffective long-term solutions to underlying problems.

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Negative Peace

Contemporary humanitarian interventions use military might to stop violence- this is counter-intuitive and leads to endless cycles of violenceRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.116-117.

Although the humanitarian principle itself supported by a powerful moral intuition seems strongly to favor humanitarian intervention in theory, many interventions, described as "humanitarian," on closer examination, look neither humanitarian nor morally justifiable. Most actual humanitarian interventions do not fit the pattern of those justifiable or obligatory hypothetical humanitarian interventions, such as preventing the Holocaust and saving 800,000 Rwandans, which forms the basis of the moral intuition in favor of humanitarian interventions. In fact, humanitarian interventions frequently do more harm than good. A case in point is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "humanitarian" intervention in Kosovo in 1999. NATO justified its intervention in Kosovo as an attempt to prevent the reported genocidal ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo. (Guilt about the failure to prevent a similar genocidal ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1989 -1991 was undoubtedly an additional motivating factor.) But far from preventing or ameliorating the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the NATO intervention actually accelerated and increased it; probably no lives were saved by the intervention, and many were lost that otherwise would not have been.10What was originally justified as a military operation designed to save Albanians in Kosovo quickly turned into a two-month long bombing campaign against both civilian and military targets throughout Serbia, far removed from Kosovo. The result was an extensive loss of civilian life and destruction of Serbian infrastructure. The bombing of civilian and military targets throughout Serbia was intended to intimidate Serbian citizens and officials through terror to put pressure on their government to conform to the goals of NATO and the United States.Such actions are hardly humanitarian. In order for an action to be genuinely humanitarian it cannot use terror as a means to its end. A humanitarian action aims to alleviate or prevent human death and suffering. An action which increases death and suffering cannot be humanitarian. A humanitarian end does not justify non-humanitarian means; an action which is a non-humanitarian means to a humanitarian end is not a humanitarian action. T hat is not to say that the action might not nevertheless be morally justifiable.

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Negative Peace Bad-WarWars caused by attempts to protect peace are worse than wars that would occur without interventionRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 11.]

[Such debates and the discourses and practices they described have been instrumental in what has become perhaps the most sophisticated debate about peace in contemporary times, and which has now entered seemingly irrevocably into the consciousness of policymakers, and academics. The various formulations of liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist debates about governance, which have emerged at different points of the realist-idealist axis, describe an evolution of agreed regimes moderating the relationship of states in an interna tional society.49 These debates, which eventually culminated in at the notion of the liberal peace, assume that while the nature of war may be contested, the nature of peace is not. These assumptions that the conceptualization of peace is uncomplicated and uncontested are rarely challenged. For example, one could argue, controversially perhaps, that war and peace may have a great deal in common than might generally be thought. Indeed, war and peace are, in non-idealist formulations, almost indistinguishable and in recent history, this has become more, rather than less, apparent. There has always been a close relationship between the two concepts of peace and war, and more specifically between peace and intervention. This can be traced back throughout history, but specifically relevant to contemporary IR are two main waves of intervention by European states. The first was in the name of Christianity during the Crusades during the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, and during the conquest of the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The second wave can be found in nineteenth and twentieth century imperialism, which was, of course, conducted in the name of European civilisation.50 This tension continues to be reflected in contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention. One only has to examine the ideological formulations of the twentieth century to see how violent peace and its attainment might be. War has always been used to establish or expand a specific version or conceptualisation of peace, a peace that is just in the eyes of defenders or aggressors, as the 1990 Gulf War over Kuwait's sovereignty or the Crusades over the possession of the Holy Land might illustrate. Defining and construct ing peace has therefore always been a self-interested endeavor, even for idealists. Violence deployed to attain a specific version of peace may or may not be relatively less than the violence that would occur if an intervention did not take place (as with the argument commonly made over the use of atomic weapons against Japan at the end of World War II).]

The aff’s plan is based off of false concepts of peace that only satisfy their own view of what peace should be—this ends in endless cycles of warRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[It is even more apparent today that war is a tool of a shifting concepntualisation of peace, inextricably linked to its creation and expansion, and used to achieve a version of peace acceptable to the hegemonic few, or to the many, as was well illustrated by the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and US and UK involvement in Iraq in 2003-4. Concepts of peace may also be used as a tool of war used to justify, legitimate, and motivate a recourse to war, as is apparent in the contemporary war against terrorism, and as was seen in the US military action in Afghanistan in 2001-2. The consolidation of

a specific version of peace might also be said to have been a motivating factor in the use of atomic weapons that ended the war in the Pacific in 1945. As the recent Cold War and post-Cold War environments have illus trated, versions of peace and types of war coexist at the different levels of the international system. They have a close and intricate relation ship in which both provide agency for the ending or establishment of certain structures. Types of war may provide the impetus for types of peace: versions of peace may provide the impetus for violence. The most significant question that arises from this argument is whether the factors that distinguish war from peace need to be preserved and accentuated, or whether peace and war can

plausibly exist as a hybrid of each other. US presidents Jefferson, Franklin and Roosevelt were all aware that the attainment of peace normally involved a willingness to contemplate a recourse to war. There seems to have been a shift from efforts to establish and preserve clear distinctions between peace and war that characterise the Westphalian period of the international state system in particular, to an acceptance that the two can also essentially be ambiguous hybrids. This would seem to be characteristic of the medieval Crusades, or of humanitarian war, and of the war against terrorism that have marked the post-Cold War world. There are enormous implications, if this is the case, for the practice and study of IR. Might the hybridisation of peace and war herald a new 'state of nature' or a long-term struggle against kakistocracy and violence that has as its end the eradication of most, if not all, forms of violence and leading to peace as an ideal form or a subjective ontology ?]

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Negative Peace Bad-Discourse=> Violence

The affirmative’s discourse about war assumes that it is inevitable- this serves to prevent society from discovering the violence, war crimes, and genocide that are being committed against the “enemy” in times of warWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.7-8.

Duane Cady coined the term "warism" to refer to the way in which within almost all societies war is taken for granted.9 Connecting Cady's observations with the treatment of myth developed by Roland Barthes, I characterize warism as a myth that asserts as fact and without explanation that war is natural. In Mythologies, Barthes presents myth as depoliticized speech and asserts:myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact.10While the account that Barthes gives is similar to the one provided by Cady, it stresses how myths present phenomena as natural and sever them from their history, specifically from the political forces that shaped this history. When war is understood as pan of our nature, rather than our history, the war myth, in the terms of Barthes, provides us with "tile simplicity of essences" and "a blissful clarity" that masks the complexities of our past and alternatives for our future. If myth is depoliticized speech, then the priority of the political dimension of human existence needs to be recognized. This point is made explicitly by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi when he says, "No real operation on language can be only linguistic. To operate on language, one has to operate on society. Here as everywhere else, politics comes first."12 The way in which myths work against recognition of the priority of the political strikes me as the point behind Fredric Jameson's discussion of the political unconscious.13 He suggests that, in order to advance social goals, we need to expose the political dimension that so often lies beneath the surface of discourse. This political dimension needs to be retrieved if we are to recognize that the power relations legitimated by, yet masked in, myth can be challenged and political structures that correspond more closely to broadly shared values can be constructed. One of the dangers is that myth can pass as "common sense." Drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas, Norman Fairclough assorts that commonsensical assumptions are ideologies and that language is the form of social behavior in which we most rely on commonsensical or ideological assumptions.14 Reaching the same conclusion as did V. N. Volosinov much earlier in this century, Fairclough contends "the ideological nature of language should be one of the major themes of modem social science." From his study of language, he concludes that a dominant discourse which largely suppresses dominated discourses ceases to be seen as arbitrary and comes to be regarded as natural and legitimate. He terms this process "the naturalisation of a discourse type."17 Bourdieu suggests that; any attempt to institute a new division must reckon with the resistance of those who, occupying a dominant position in the spaces thus divided, have an interest in perpetuating a toxic relation to the social world which leads to the acceptance of established divisions as natural or to their symbolic denial through the affirmation of a higher unity …I make these points about myth in order to stress the need to repoliticize public policy discourse, especially when it concerns issues of peace. Since societies generally take war for granted, the assumption of the language of war as natural poses the greatest obstacle to peace. Societies have created a warist discourse that deals abstractly and indirectly with the horrors of war.'"' The public who hear or read warist discourse and even the officials who promulgate this discourse may not realize what is really occurring, let alone question whether there might be an alternative. The language of the military establishment, such as the U.S. department of defense, if not also the language of the diplomatic corps, such as the U.S. department of state, exemplifies the primacy of warist language.20 Endeavors to establish a legitimate discourse about war, to propound an acceptable theory of war, have been ongoing. From Sun Tzu's The Art of War in ancient China to Carl von Clausewitz's On War in nineteenth century Europe, the public policy debate has not been on whether war is moral or whether it should be waged, but how to wage war effectively. While the advent of nuclear weapons may have led strategists to pull back from the concept of "total war" in favor of a concept of "limited war," it has prompted them to make a genuine call for an "end of war." The language of war moves from the use of euphemisms that mask the horror of war through the use of propaganda that demonizes the enemy and legitimates violence against them.2 At the level of euphemism, an aggressive attack by a squadron of airplanes which ordinarily would be called an "air raid" may be referred to as a "routine limited duration protective reaction," or defoliation of an entire forest may be spoken of as a "resource control program." A more stark example of euphemism is found when the term "pacification" is used to label actions which involve entering a village, machine-gunning domesticated animals, setting huts on lire, rounding up all the men and shooting those who resist, prodding and otherwise harming the elderly, women, and children.At the next level, the language of war moves from euphemism to propaganda designed to legitimate this violence. For example, in times of war, each nation involved typically presents its adversary as an evil enemy and itself as the embodiment of good. Such distortion of language was used to defend British rule in India, Soviet purges, and the United States* atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in these cases, officials resorted to arguments which contradicted the purported aims and values of their governments. Over the last several decades governments and subnational groups havw turned to "totalitarian language" in their efforts to "win" the hearts and minds of the masses

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Negative Peace Bad-War

Conflict resolution that doesn’t address social justice and structural violence only perpetuates warSinger 80 – David, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6, (1980), pp. 350, Annual Reviews, “Accounting for International War: The State of The Discipline”

We need, therefore, a typology that: a) re-cognizes the qualitative differences among competition, rivalry, and dispute on the one hand, and sustained military combat on the other, and that b) also recognizes the com-plex interplay of necessary and/or sufficient conditions reflecting a wide range of mate-rial, structural, cultural, and behavioral phenomena. In addition, it should aid in integrating what we have discovered with what we hope to discover, and if possible, illuminate the research path that links the two. A discrete check list will not suffice; an integrated, but multitheoretical, framework would seem to be essential. Let us turn, then, to a scheme derived from the general systems literature that might possibly help us to organize what we know, and think we know, and to help stimulate the most appropriate next steps. This scheme has been laid out in considerable detail elsewhere, along with an elaborate epistemological rationale (Singer, 1971), but its bare outlines can be sum-marized here.

War is not caused by a singular uniform issue between states but a series of irregular eventsSinger 80 – David, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6, (1980), pp. 350, Annual Reviews, “Accounting for International War: The State of The Discipline”

If war itself does not appear and re-appear in a regular cyclical fashion, it is unlikely that it results to any important extent from any other single-factor cycle, be it com-mercial, agricultural, climatic, or demogra-phic. Rather, if there are indeed cyclical phenomena at work, there must be several of them involved in this process (Hart, 1946; Sorokin, 1937), with their concatenations falling at relatively irregular intervals. While there seems to be no concentrated research effort in this direction at the moment, it cer-tainly appears to be worth pursuing further, perhaps when more is known regarding the time-spaced istributions of some of the more promising explanatory variables. Let us, then, attempt a brief and admittedly selective survey of these latter as they impinge on the incidence of international war.

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Neg Peace Bad-Endless WarThe state constructs war in order to solve for peace- creates endless violence and human rights violations Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 60]

[The debate about 'just war' - a phrasal formulation that has been generally accepted without criticism despite its antithetical nature provides a further strand from which an understanding of peace can be identified. This debate has found its most convincing explanation in Michael Walzer's Legalist Paradigm.31 In this framework Walzer lays out a construction of war that may be used to create or maintain a just peace. This is mainly aimed at the protection of the norms of sover eignty and self-determination .32 The Legalist Paradigm revolves around the existence of an international society of independent states based upon an international law that protects the territorial integrity, sover eignty and self-determination rights of its members. Any use of force that poses a threat to this is therefore, illegal. Aggression justifies wars of self-defence and a war of law enforcement. This builds upon the notions of international society found in the UN Charter, the London Charter of 1945, which established the Nuremburg Tribunal, and the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928.33 It reflects an international system in which security and peace revolve around states and their inhabitants and the moral discourses therein. Difficulties clearly emerge for this paradigm once applied to phenomena of war and conflict which fall beyond its inherent predication upon state-centricity, challenges exist ing states, their boundaries, and their supposed Weberian control of the means of violence.34 However, Walzer is clear that his concern lies more with political communities rather than states, perhaps reflecting this contemporary shift in the various phenomena of violence. This approach to maintaining order makes the classic move associated with both realist and liberal thought of empowering states with the protec tion of political communities despite the fact that it is often states and their nationalist elites that are in conflict with local or transnational political communities. Walzer's' later amendments to the Legalist Paradigm moves some way to recognising these problems.35 In these he outlines a doctrine of pre-emptive war that allows states to respond to threatened attacks, in which boundaries may contain more than one political community, in which secessionism or irredentism may require intervention or even a counter- intervention, and in which the violation of human rights may possibly justify intervention. ]

The aff’s representations of power as control of physical violence legitimizes endless depoliticized war Carroll 72 - Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), p. 587 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc.

When we move from explicit definitions to common usage of the term power in international relations and peace research, we find it widely construed in terms of high rank on certain indices of status or high scores on certain measures held to be "indicators" or "dimensions" of power. Most commonly cited as indicators to measure the power of states in the international system are population, gross national product, and military strength (as measured either by size of armed forces or by military expenditures). More specialized indices sometimes suggested include: urban population (concentration in cities over 20,000 inhabitants), government revenues, weapons systems, industrial capacity, production or consumption of iron or steel (or of energy), natural resources available, food consumption (cal- ories per capita), physicians and dentists per capita, and area of territory under control of the government. One author has suggested that victory or defeat in wars fought be taken as the most direct index of "war power" (Rosen, 1970). Other elements sometimes mentioned but more difficult to measure include: national character, national morale, quality of government, quality of diplomacy, technical efficiency, geographical location, education, social mobility, political and religious attitudes and beliefs, and institutional characteristics. Similar indicators are sometimes taken as indices of high rank in the international status hierarchy: i.e., the hierarchy of superpowers, great powers, medium powers, and small powers (e.g. by Vayrynen, 1970, pp. 291-309; Jarvad, 1968, pp. 297-314). A more specialized index used to measure status, however, is the number of diplomatic missions received by a given state; or sometimes simply "the consensus of diplomatic historians" (Small and Singer, 1970, p. 151, no. 9; see also Wallace, 1971, pp. 23-25). Though it is sometimes stated explicitly that power is not identical with status, nor with the indicators cited above, which are said to represent the "power base" or "power potential" (e.g., Deutsch, 1968, pp. 22 ff.), the distinction often grows dim, especially when the indicator is military strength. Occasionally the distinction is explicitly

abandoned, as by Inis L. Claude: I use the term power to denote what is essentially military capability.... I am aware that power may be defined much more broadly.... Nevertheless, the capacity to do physical violence is the central factor in this study [1962, p. 6]. More often, the confounding of power with its indicators or with status becomes apparent from a tendency to use the terms interchangeably. Thus, in one recent paper, we find the phrase "distribution of national capabilities" used interchangeably with "distribution of 'power,'" and "capability concentration" used interchangeably with "preponderance of power" (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1970, p. 3, 33). In another paper, indicators of "power capability" are taken as indicators of "achieved status," as distinguished from "ascribed status" or "attributed diplomatic importance" (Wallace, 1971). The effect of confounding power, status, and capabilities in this way is seldom if ever to give or to recognize any inherent value in "capabilities." These are almost always seen as instruments or avenues to high rank in power or status. Sometimes this point is made explicit, as by K. J. Holsti (1967), but whether explicit or implicit, the effect is to degrade "capabilities" into servants of power, rather than to see them as independently valuable or as valuable for social goals other than those of power or status. TRADITION AND CHANGE IN CONCEPTIONS OF POWER The conception of power as dominance, control, or influence in social affairs is certainly not new. Voltaire held that "Power consists in making others act as I choose"; James Mill held that "Power ... means security for the conformity between the will of one man and the acts of other men"; Max Weber defined power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (as quoted by Bay, 1968, p. 250; also Arendt, 1969, p. 12). Moreover, this idea of power is enmeshed with other notions and values which have a long history in Western thought, expressed concisely in Bertrand de Jouvenel's assertion that "a man feels himself more of a man when imposing himself and making others the instrument of his will" (Arendt, 1969, p. 12). It is no accident that the subject of this assertion is "a man." The associative links between ideas of manliness and virility on the one hand, and domination, conquest, and power on the other, are strong and pervasive in Western culture. "Effemi- nacy," we may note, is a term almost synonymous with weakness, submission, decadence-and impotence or powerlessness. These associations of ideas need closer study than they have been given, though a beginning has been made in some of the writings BERENICE A. CARROLL of the contemporary women's liberation movement. But even here the prevailing conception of power as dominance is not directly challenged, though power so conceived is attacked. Kate Millett, for example, defines politics as Hans Morgenthau does: "The term 'politics' shall refer to power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another." And she adds that while an ideal politics might simply be conceived of as the arrangement of human life on agreeable and rational principles from whence the entire notion of power over others should be banished, one must confess that this is not what constitutes the political as we know it, and it is to this that we must address ourselves [1970

Negative Peace Bad-War

Representations of international competitiveness make war inevitable Carroll 72 – Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 604 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc

Thus Small and Singer have shown that the major powers 606 were "the most war-prone" of all members of the international system between 1816 and 1965: No major powers were able to escape this scourge, which may, in fact, turn out to be a prerequisite for

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achievement of that exalted status. On the other hand, most of the smaller states, and especially those in extra-European regions, enjoyed a fairly pacific record in terms of international war [1970, pp. 151-1521. Exploring further the hypotheses that "success in warfare might predict to frequency of involvement," and that the initiator of war-"the nation(s) which made the first attack on an opponent's armies or territories"-has a high probability of success, Small and Singer found that great powers had a high proportion of success in interstate warfare, that initiators of war "emerged victorious in 34 of the 49 interstate wars," and that "in almost 40 percent of the cases, the initiator turned out to be a major power attacking a minor power" (pp. 152-154). Without exaggerating the validity or the explanatory power of such conclusions, we may observe that, to the extent they are correct, they reinforce the hypothesis: big- ness and high rank in the international power hierarchy correlate positively with belligerency, while small states seem "relatively pacific." Thus we are back to Rousseau again: it is the system of inequality of states, the competition between states for prestige and dominance, and especially the inflated ambitions of those who are most successful in the competition, which lie at the roots of war, and no solution to the problem, no stable peace, can be achieved within that system. But if that is so, then peace research cannot hope to gain much toward finding ways to peace by continuing along the same lines of research. If, as Michael Wallace BERENICE A. CARROLL concluded, what is needed is "to reduce the salience of these dimensions of international hierarchy for national policy-makers in favor of matters of domestic concern," it is difficult to see how this can be achieved by seeking more accurate measures of status or power, by collecting more data on the power attributes and conflict behavior of nation- states, and by continuing to focus attention on the major powers and their ruling elites. If it appears that peace, even in the international arena, depends upon changes in attitude toward status competition on the one hand, and "domestic concerns" on the other hand; if peace requires the abandonment of the power system altogether-then it would seem that peace research should be placing its major emphasis on subjects which would be useful toward those ends. LOOKING AT POWER AS COMPETENCE The cultist conception of power is so widespread today that it might well seem to be best simply to discard the idea altogether. James G. March has argued that the explanatory power of "power" in the study of social choice is much less than is often supposed: Given our present empirical and test technology, power is probably a useful concept for many short-run situations involving the direct confrontations of committed and activated participants. Such situations can be found in natural settings, but they are more frequent in the laboratory. Power is probably not a useful concept for many long-run situations involving problems of component-overload and undercomprehension. Such situations can be found in the laboratory but are more common in natural settings [1966, p. 70]. If March is correct, the idea of power is of little explanatory use in the social sciences; and if Morgenthau and Millett are right in Conflict Resolution / Volume XVI Number 4 PEA CE RESEAR CH identifying politics "as we know it" with power-structured relationships of dominance, it would seem that power is something to be eradicated, if we want to alter the character of politics. But the idea of power, as we have seen above, has other-and, indeed, older- meanings than those of control, dominance, and influence in relationships between people; and it is an idea with strong roots, not easily eradicated. Thus we find it cropping up repeatedly in the rallying cries of radical movements: "black power," "student power," "power to the people," "sisterhood is powerful." To some extent, these slogans carry undertones of power in the cultist sense-the idea here would be that of a transfer of the power to rule from the present topdog groups to the challengers; in some cases, the slogan may be purely hypo- critical-a cynical cover for the political ambitions of self-appointed leaders of the group demanding power. But, despite these corruptions, the primary meaning of such slogans, and the meaning which gives them their appeal, is the idea of power as independent strength, ability, autonomy, self- determination, control over one's own life rather than the lives of others, competence to deal with one's environment out of one's own energies and resources, rather than on the basis of dependence. If Robert White is correct in discerning an independent competence drive in human psychology, this idea of power is bound to have a deep appeal and to have potentialities for mobilizing the very energies and abilities to which it refers. The converse is even more evident, because it is so much more common in everyday experience: the idea of powerlessness, and the related though not identical idea of impotence, engender apathy by calling up images of helplessness, inability, weakness, inadequacy, "effeminacy," and so forth. And one of the most pernicious 607 effects of the cultist conception of power is that it has built up a strong association between the lack of power in the sense of dominance and powerlessness in the sense of helplessness. To be without the power of dominance is perceived as being very nearly without the power to act at all, or at least as being without the power to act effectively.

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Neg Peace Bad/Turns CaseHumanitarian interventions are only expressions of the hegemonic ideals—makes solvency impossible.

Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 63.] [ These issues have formed the main interest of such debates, mainly focused upon the legal rights associated with humanitarian intervention and their normative implications within a liberal discourse of peace, and pragmatic issues such as organisation and efficacy. They have generally not discussed the implications for the liberal peace, however. In one of the best of the many recent contributions on humanitarian intervention Ramsbotham and Woodhouse provide a framework spanning initiation, process and mechanisms, objectives and actual outcome to determine whether an intervention is humanitarian in character.43 This refers to the debate on humanitarian intervention within a philosophical and practical framework, which demands a reflection upon basic normative and pragmatic assumptions about such forms of intervention associated with the liberal peace. Nye, for example, has argued that humanitarian intervention should respect the following requirements: that it is perceived as just; means and ends are proportional; success is likely; and that the humanitarian cause coincides with other national interests.44 This conception of humanitarian intervention implies that humanitarian crises, which do not affect the national interest of a state in the world, may go unat tended. Furthermore, this framework is very much dependent upon 'national' capacity ,and a 'national' definition of what constitutes a humanitarian problem and how this links into specific national inter ests. Its implications for the construction of peace therefore suggests it in the expectation that civil society would want to be at peace, and democratic peace theory, a key component of the liberal peace, is directly derived from this line of thought .] Attempts to maintain peace justifies global intervention and state control over human rights, makes all impacts inevitable

Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 83.]

[Clearly, the methodology and ontology of the liberal peace, and the technical frameworks it engenders and the many types of actors involved in its construction, aspire to stability and cooperation, for states, state and non-state actors, communities, and economies.156 Yet the objective of simultaneous liberal regimes prescribing state sovereignty, individual human rights, self-determination, and democracy with a free market and globalised system can be inher ent contradictory. The sovereign state may not be compatible with self-determination or human rights, and democratisation may not be compatible with economic liberalisation in multiple ways. The liberal peace implies a mutual acceptance and negotiation through a system of rewards and costs - in other words, through conditionality. All of this takes place in the context of global gov ernance - or key liberal state direction of political, economic, and developmental processes.157 This depends upon self-nominated actors determining what peace is for others, and in doing so replicating their own stereotypes, opinions, attitudes and behav iour, along with the liberal peace, as a universal example of sustain ability . As Duffield has argued, the' liberal peace is geared towards a logic of exclusion and selective incorporation.1158 It is constructed mainly by donor governments, NGOs, international organisations and international financial institutions, multilateral agencies, the military and corporations.159 This is, as Chandler has pointed out, a new international security framework, most recent propagated in the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty's report entitled The Responsibility to Protect and echoed in the UN's recent High Level Panel Report. 160 These reports propagate the right to use interventionist means to promote the liberal peace contra Realist state centrism and the consensuality of the right of non intervention in domestic affairs where the norms of the liberal peace are not instilled in a state's domestic and international dis courses161 and practices. Yet such interventions and norms are easily appropriated by actors in charge dealing with conflict to suit their own interests.162 What is also interesting about this new discourse of peace is its qualification as liberal . Somewhat ironi cally, this implies that at an ontological and epistemological level, there is now widespread, if only implicit, acceptance that peace is a subjective concept and there are different and competing formula tions of peace in circulation. If there is a liberal peace, does this also mean that there might also be an illiberal peace? The liberal peace represents the assertions and assumptions of those states and organisations which are its main backers, funders, and organisers, and have imagined this as a possible future. Yet another critical problem which contemporary discourses about constructing peace through peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention, and preventive . war disguise are the power relations, partisanship, and strategic interests that also exist. There is an elusive collusion and condition ality between these different actors, and their interests, that are required to carry out such interventions. All of these debates depend upon an enabling omniscient view, structure, or philosophy of the political environment and its innate qualities, in which sovereign man is able to distinguish between war, peace, threat, security and insecurity .]

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Neg Peace Bad-WarIR politics make violence inevitable and destroy social justice Carroll 72 - Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 591 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc

"Power" ("influence") refers to an individual's degree of control over his security.... To the extent that security is perfect, in the sense that the individual is assured access to all values he desires, and is assured success for all goals he wishes to promote, power is superfluous. In the psychological "power drive" sense of power, it is also true that the quest for power begins where the sense of security ends, for the infant and for the adult [1968, pp. 248, 258]. But this is almost exactly what White denies. He argues explicitly against the view that the competence motive can be explained as serving a more basic need to reduce anxiety (1959, pp. 299-300, 307 ff.), and as we have seen above, he contends that the competence motive is an independent urge, whose satisfaction lies in activity, exploration, and effective interaction with the environment, in and for themselves. A similar difference in interpretation may be noted with respect to the relationship between power and autonomy. Autonomy is sometimes seen as closely linked with power in the sense of interpersonal or intergroup control or influence, and, in this context, both are conceived to be closely linked with security.7 J. David Singer, for example, writes: The fact that nations invest a great deal of their energies in attempts to influence one another is perfectly obvious, but why this should be so is somewhat less apparent. One of the most frequently recurring themes among the peace-makers is that all would be well if nations would only "live and let live." .. . But in international relations the gross inadequacy of both the ethical and the political restraints make violence not only accepted but anticipated. As a consequence, the scarcest commodity in the international system is security-the freedom to pursue those activities which are deemed essential to national welfare and to survival itself. To be more specific then, we might assert that under the survival rubric the highest priority is given to autonomy-nations are constantly behaving in a fashion intended to maximize their present and future freedom of action and to minimize any present or future restraints upon that freedom. In such a system, no single nation can afford to "live and let live" as long as the well established and widely recognized anarchic norms [of the current international system] are adhered to, acted upon, and anticipated by, most of the others [ 1963, p. 422]. Briefly, the argument here seems to be this: A nation's highest priority is autonomy, 7. See Christian Bay's discussion of security (1968, Ch. 3 and passim).

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Neg Peace Bad-War

War is inevitable under negative peace and the pursuit of security Carroll 72 - Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 603 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc.

In this context, the idea of control of national power would not be entirely tautological, since one could conceive of an international system in which some superpower, some supranational authority like a world government, or some agreement among superpowers (as in Galtung's defeu- dalization at the top) would serve to regulate the placement of each lesser nation on the various dimensions of status and power. One could conceive of such a system, but Wallace points out: The problem is, of course, that as the system is now constituted, virtually no nation will permit the exercise of such control at the expense of its own present or future standing in the system, or even at the expense of any control it may have over the standing of others [p. 33]. Moreover, as Rousseau argued in opposition to proposals for world empire or world government, it is the system of inequality and interdependence of nations which in itself makes such proposals illusory and attempts to achieve them at best temporary and unstable (Hoffman, 1963, pp. 324-327). If the international system is a power or status hierarchy in which each unit is motivated by the desire to increase its standing in the hierarchy, the positions are bound to be unstable. From the top it might appear that a system of control of power or rankings in the system would be a way to secure peace (e.g., by eliminating much if not all the status inconsistency in the system); but, from below, any such system would certainly appear to be a way of keeping underdogs down. And, indeed, whatever the conscious intention, there can be no doubt that any such system of control would have a high utility for topdogs and low or even negative utility for underdogs. Under such conditions, Wallace sees little hope within the international system itself for peace: Given the slim prospects for any sort of control, it is ominous that even a cursory glance at current trends in the international system indicates the likelihood of even more status inconsistency in the future. On all major dimensions of power capability, the differences between rates of growth are widening, with some nations spurt- ing ahead at an ever-increasing rate. This sort of situation will inevitably lead to nations swapping positions on the hierarchy, generating at least temporary inconsistencies. Furthermore, the increasing level of international interaction may in the short run exacerbate the problem by bringing nations to a greater awareness of any anomalies in their status (1971, p. 34). And at this point, Wallace arrives at a remarkable conclusion: The point is not that mankind is thereby doomed to perpetual war, but that for control to take place, the causal chain will probably have to be broken at another link. One possibility, he then suggests, would be "to reduce the salience of these dimensions of international hierarchy for national policy-makers in favor of matters of domestic concern." In this context, Wallace sees contemporary movements of "domestic unrest" throughout the world as "paradoxically" contributing to international peace: Particularly encouraging is the degree to which many of these movements represent a refusal to accept psychological satisfactions based on their nation's performance in the international arena as a substitute for concrete improvements in domestic life style. It might be argued, in fact, that these movements have already had an important impact on the level of international violence by fostering the belief that national status position is not always worth fighting for. And he concludes: Whatever the case may be, the findings presented here indicate that no significant measure of control over war is likely to be achieved if the chief international preoccupation of decision-makers is with the fixed-sum game of international hierarchy.

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Neg Peace Bad-Genocide/Rights

Spreading peace through democratic policies causes genocide and human rights violations Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 66.]

[Snyder has made one of the most concerted critiques of democratisa tion in action, and its implications for the development of stable polities. Democratisation is not necessarily a process that begins with the holding of free and fair elections, especially in instances where post-colonial patronage, political alignment, and factionalism means that politics during democratisation accentuates ethnic division s.61 Thus, democratisation may occur later on during a process of stabilisa tion. This represents a step back from the assumption that democrati sation is a foundational part of the liberal peace and opens up the possibility of other, preliminary, and possibly illiberal, formulations. The assumption that democracy is a route to 'peacefulness' can also be countered on the basis that democracy has a colonial dark-side in which democratic and liberal states were often the worst offenders against indigenous inhabitants of their colonies in terms of commit ting acts of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, Michael Mann goes as far as to argue that genocide became an extreme consequence of 'We the people .. .'. Perhaps, as Zakaria has argued, the main task facing the proponents of the democratic/liberal peace is to '...make democ racy safe for the world .'64 Perhaps, what is most important from the point of view of the construction of the liberal peace is that it tends to ignore the fact that there are differing levels of democratisation and that: illiberal transitional period into a well-established market democ racy is a period in which the institutions of state and civil society are extremely fragile. There were many continuities with the situations that emerged in states which collapsed once Cold War structures were removed with the situation on the ground during decolonisation, and the response of the international community in many cases was to assume that the democratic peace thesis' was sufficient basis upon which state recon ruction could be legitimately grounded . This, of course, raised the uestion of whether this was sufficient to legitimate forcible installa ns of liberal democracy. Despite these concerns, democratisation has come a cornerstone of the emerging consensus on the liberal peace has been illustrated in much of the relevant UN documentation Since Agenda for Peace. Kofi Annan has argued that democratic gover nance, along with human rights, is essential in restoring 'domestic peace'.6S Furthermore, he has linked this to what he calls 'democratic international peace', which reflects a policy consensus on the democra tic peace argument .66 The UN organization continues to be the organi sation around which much of the conceptualisation of the liberal peace as an ideal form is focused. UN General Assembly resolutions have recently laid out the character of this particular conceptualisation of peace, in which the construction of the liberal peace revolves around education, consensus, non-violence, sustainable economic and social development, human rights, social equality, democratic partici pation, pluralism, and access to knowledge and free communication.67 This characterisation stems from long-standing UNESCO project dating back to 1989.]

Negative peace leads to genocide Muthien 2000 (Bernedette, an activist and social science researcher, “Human Security Paradigms through a Gendered Lens”, Agenda, No. 43, Women and the Aftermath 2000, p. 49-50, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4066110)The human security paradigm is designed to provide a more holistic comprehensive definition of security and protection from all forms of harm, These include indirect or structural, cultural, and direct or personal, and their respective antitheses, as postulated in Galtung's (1996) model. Structural violence (with its antithesis structural peace) refers to, for example, discrimination based on class, race or gender, violence embedded in the very structure of society. Personal or direct violence implies a direct verbal or physical attack of one person on another. Cultural violence 'serves to legitimise direct and structural violence' (Galtung, 1996:31). While violence against women is direct and personal (eg a man assaults a woman) it also embodies structural sexism and gynecide, as well as cultural legitimisation which seeks its continuous replication. A subtle example of structural violence in this instance would be victim blaming which is institutionalised in law and legal practice. More pronounced forms include common practices which are sometimes codified in law, such as female genital mutilation, forced child brides, and femicide/infanticide. In relation to cultural violence, this is evident for example when sur- vivors internalise their personal and systemic brutalisation. This relates to those sexist attitudes that keep women's opportunities limited. The human security paradigm attempts to address critical questions about who is secure, and who not, and whose interests are served. Reactively, human security would include the absence of physical violence or negative peace. But proactively, human security involves establishing mechanisms (policies and structures) that will ensure that individuals and communities enjoy personal, structural and cultural security, in other words positive peace. Reardon (E-mail communication, January 1999) speaks of four sources of human security: the environment, basic needs (for example food and housing), identity and dignity, and finally, protection from harm. She asserts that human security of groups and individuals is essentially the expectation of well-being: Everything that is done in the name of security is ostensibly to fulfil that expectation. Human security derives primarily from the expectation that four fundamental conditions of security will be met: one, that the environment in which we live can sustain human life; two, that our basic physical survival needs for food, clothing and shelter will be met; three, that our fundamental human dignity and personal and cultural identities will be respected; and four, that we will be protected from avoidable harm. If a society can meet these conditions for most of its population it is generally a secure

Neg Peace Bad-Ignores Strutural ViolenceThe plan is doomed to fail- it ignroes the social basis of war. Focusing on war ignores structural violence Cox 1994 (Wayne S., lecturer in political studies at Queen's University, “U.S. Hegemony & the Management of Trade”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 61-62)

As a state-based theory of global politics, realism tends to gloss over the significance of ethnic, national, and/or civil fragmentation within states. As a result, realism assumes that most states in the international system are nation-states or that the domestic concerns of a multinational state are somehow less significant than its international considerations in the definition of state action on the international stage. Beyond this, however, one must note a more complex assumption of these state-centric classical realist and neorealist theories. State-centric understandings of

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international relations are unable to theoretically divorce the concepts of state and society. In assuming that states are unitary actors in the international system, these theories do acknowledge that society is composed of all social relations within the geographic boundaries of the country. Despite this acknowledgment, theoretical primacy is given to the state in the international context.3 This implies that there is no causal link between the complex social relations within and among states and the international state system per se. Morgenthau has confirmed this assumption by defining the study of international relations as only the study of states and the international state system. According to Morgenthau, the state unit is the theoretical delineation between domestic civil society and relations at the international or global level. "In other words, what factor making for peace and order exists within national societies which is lacking on the international scene? The answer seems obvious-it is the state itself" (Morgenthau, 1973:479). Some of the implications of this state-centric approach are clear. To begin, all suh-and/or transstate relations are inevitably reduced to state-level analysis or ignored as having little impact upon conflict outcomes. Within or among states, ideas of nationalism, ethnic self-determination, revolution, economic classes, inter- and intrastate trade, economic development, and regional disputes are treated as elements of a theory in which states are viewed as unitary power-maximizing actors. Political realism and neorealism ~uite simply assume that states are unitary actors despite theoretical or methodological evidence to the contrary. As Waltz has contended states "are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended" (Waltz, 1979:91). Diaspora national groups, ethnic minorities within states, and multistate nation-groups are considered by realists only insofar as these groups relate to existing states, and even such considerations are usually relegated to the realm of "low politics."4 Social divisions within states are equally regarded as subparts of an all-encompassing statewide society. Long-term relationships of exploitation and violence between social groups within anyone society cannot seriously be considered by a state-centric theory that rests on unitary state assumptions. The result of such assumptions is that realist conceptions of war pose a theoretical impediment to the full understanding of the social basis of conflict. Such a division between domestic and international levels of analysis must be rejected as wholly inadequate and distorting if we are to capture fully the roots of violence in international society. The notion of the state as presented in this chapter is necessarily multidimensional. Although states do possess population, territory government, and political sovereignty, it cannot be assumed that states in the international system are in any way homogeneous. Moreover, there is a clear need to theoretically divorce the concepts of state and society in both the domestic and international context. Social groups are both independent of and conditioned by the State. Although many social groups (particularly those who use collective violence as a means toward political ends) exist within states, many transcend sovereign boundaries. At the same time, states possess the mechanisms that can be used by these social groups to advance some of their interests. As a result, state elites, bureaucracies, militaries, state polices, and so on are involved in a complex dialectical relationship with social groups, the agents of other states, and institutions.

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Negative peace -> ImperialismCombined with capitalism, negative peace justifies imperialism

Joseph C. Kunkel, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Dayton where he teaches a course in ethics and modern war, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Editorial Foreword

To understand what is at stake readers must distinguish positive from negative forms of peacemaking. Negative peace maintains that war and individual aggression are natural human traits, and the way to control such behavior is by force. Negative peace is culturally and politically preferred in the United States. Public policy aims at forcing those who aggressively injure others to restrain their harmful actions; policies restrict such abusive actions by overpowering the perpetrators. U.S. reactive policies in Afghanistan and Iraq after 11 September 2001, and the consequent extensive homeland security measures put in place are examples of negative peace. Negative peace seeks to create an absence or reduction of terror by increasing armed security forces. When aggressive capitalistic practices are added on a global basis this approach seems indistinguishable from authoritarian empire-building.

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A2: Negative Peace Inevitable

Negative peace is not inevitable- it only seems that way because Americans live in fear of othersJoseph C. Kunkel, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Dayton where he teaches a course in ethics and modern war, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Editorial Foreword

In his 2002 movie release Bowling for Columbine Michael Moore crosses from Detroit, Michigan in the United States into Windsor, Ontario in Canada. Moore does not find the same need for security and protective guns in Canada as in the United States. Canadian citizens possess guns but do not use them as a primary means for self-defense. They do not kill one another at anywhere near the rate that U.S. citizens kill others. Moore tells us there were only 165 killings with guns in Canada for an entire year. That figure compares with 11,127 killings in the United States: in the same year Japan had only 39 killings. Windsor, a fair-sized city, had not recorded a single gun related killing in the previous year. Indeed Canadians do not lock their houses when they go out or when they retire for the evening. The film makes the point that U.S. citizens are afraid of one another in a way that people in other major democracies are not, and that we behave and kill one another out of fear.Positive peacemaking goes to the root causes of societal violence and fear. Most philosophers do not hold the Hobbesian pejorative view that human beings arc naturally enemies and at war with one another. Canadian citizens appear to dispel the Hobbesian perspective. Philosophers are also divided on how far to carry individualism and aggression. Many women philosophers, such as. Nel Noddings and Sara Ruddick, start with a common human grounding in the naturalness of caring. Mohandas K. Gandhi says true democracy, with disparate and conflicting voices, can only function well in an atmosphere of nonviolence.

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A2: Negative Peace Good

Negative peace is bad- it sacrifices rights and lives in the name of security

Joseph C. Kunkel, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Dayton where he teaches a course in ethics and modern war, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. Editorial Foreword.

Positive peace foresees violence, but does not make the cure worse than the disease, except perhaps in highly unusual circumstances. The military option is treated as a last resort, not as an anticipatory response. The lives of innocent citizens are respected. Positive peace spends money on education, healthcare, child daycare, job training, the relief of hunger, and environmental concerns, and the removal of sexism, racism, and other forms of oppression that strengthen fear and distort democracies. There still arises a need for police, prisons, and some coercive force, but not for a trillion dollar missile defense system; for international inspectors of nuclear facilities, but not for experimenting with smaller nuclear weapons. In addition, capitalistic practices that produce only sweatshop jobs for the third world would be encouraged to put fair trade over free trade. Human rights for all are placed ahead of security for a few.

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Pos Peace Good-Genocide Protecting peace through intervention key to solve genocide Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 61.] [This readjustment shadowed a general dissatisfaction with the norm of non-intervention in liberal quarters, and particularly where the identification of the shape of the liberal peace was strongly affirmed. The contours of the debate indicated a tension between the main discourses of the liberal peace, and particularly between its state-centric aspects associated with its institutional and constitutional versions, and the civil discourse of peace. The state-centric norm of non-intervention soon betrayed its flaws and contradictions with the norm of universal human rights and this has given rise to numerous non-state or multilateral fora in which this tension has at least been partially addressed (while at the same time also being emphasised). The ICRC provides an excellent example of this tension. The ICRC is mandated to 'protect the lives and dignities of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance', by the Geneva Con ventions of 1949 which provided the organisation with legal standing under international law. The ICRC has very carefully, and often con troversially, preserved certain key conditions under which it operates in the field. The organisation observes strict neutrality, impartiality and independence, in return for the privileges (mainly of access) and immunities granted to it by host states. Of course, the implication of this is that the organisation has and will be torn between its status, its objectives of a liberal peace within a state's civil society, and the interests of states also operating in conflict zones. The norm of non- intervention effectively allowed human rights abuses, humanitarian disasters, ethnic cleansing and genocide, phenomena that undermined the assertion of a liberal international order. Such difficulties emerged in multiple contexts - in the Middle East after the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, in India and Pakistan during Partition in 1948, in the attempted secession of Katanga in the Congo in 1960, during the war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 and the subsequent intervention, in the attempted secession of Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (and numerous other cases). Indeed, it was the case of Biafia that brought to international attention the issue of intervention on humanitarian grounds . The very controversial role of humanitarian organisations such as ICRC and Oxfam were aimed at preventing genocide if Biafra was defeated. When in 1968, the Nigerian federal government forbade assistance to the rebels, the ICRC with drew but Oxfam and others continued. This, it has been argued, led to the continuation of the war and furthermore , upon the defeat of Biafra genocide did not actually take place. Humanitarianism was given an early political lesson. Henceforth, non-intervention became a much disputed norm in unofficial humanitarian intervention with some NGOs deciding to work only within the context of state consent. Famously, a splinter organisation from ICRC led by Bernard Kouchner broke with these norms, and rejected the historical status and guardianship of the ICRC of humanitarianism, and articulated a sepa rate and non-state 'right of humanitarian intervention'. Whether this was a legal right or norm was ambiguous, but the intent was clear. Humanitarianism and peace were too important to be left solely within the domain of state activity, and the civil discourses of peace and the coalescence of actors around them challenged the dominant state centric discourse of peace . Despite these developments, humanitarian intervention as a right was not exercised in the cases of the West Bengal crisis of 1971, the Vietnamese overthrow of Pol Pot in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979,36 but the 1990s heralded the return of an occasional practice of human itarian intervention,37 heralded by UN Security Council Resolution 688 and humanitarian action on behalf of the Kurds in northern Iraq during and after the first Gulf War. While the tension between state and non-state discourses on peace was not resolved, any divergence tended to be ignored in the context of the general adherence to the broader debate on constituting the liberal peace.]

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Positive Peace key-Civic EngagementPositive peace is key to civic engagementRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 104)

The challenge offered by second generation approaches carries such discursive and normative power that what soon became apparent was the requirement for more sophisticated methods than either first of second generation approaches provided for in the construction of a civil peace. The impact of conflict resolution and peace research approaches has become a significant part of the contemporary understanding of peace across the discipline of IR. This is despite the fact that some of their claims are difficult to sustain, including the clear-cut distinction between a negative and a positive peace, the identification of human needs, the scientific rather than normative, cultural, or emotional aspects of conflict structures, their impact upon but separation from first generation approaches and conflict management, their complementary possibilities for official mediation, and claims of neutral facilitation. This positive peace, which has been conceptualised as a 'cosmopolitan turn' in conflict resolution,26 has also

empowered non-state actors and NGOs to assist in the development of peace based on the identification and allocation of human needs according to the voices of non-state and unofficial actors. As Burton argued human needs are fulfilled through a transnational 'cobweb model' of transactions that form a world society. Conflict resolution debates owe much to a conceptualisation of peace derived from the empowerment of civil society and the individual, and the imaginary of peace it presents is constructed from the bottom-up, is not limited in geospatial terms, and is not greatly corrupted by realist obsessions with interests, state or power, or liberal obsessions with institutional frameworks.

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Positive Peace= Best/prerequisite

Pursuit of well-being and peace are the prior questions of life-realist worldviews are doomed to failureBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.32. 3-18-06.]

In sum, objectivity, though often hard to attain, particularly in social matters, is both possible and desirable. Moreover, it is mandatory in matters of cognition. However, objectivity must not be confused with value-neutrality, because the pursuit of certain values, such as well-being, peace, and security, is objectively preferable to the pursuit of others, such as pleasure derived from getting drunk of attending a public execution.

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Democratic Peace = WrongDemocratic peace theory ignores domestic violence, exacerbates conflict, and incentives coercionRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 90)This 'democratic peace’ is focused mainly on the interactions between states, and rests upon an artificial division between domestic and international politics. Democracy is thought to be essential to peace between states, but this means that the focus of the democratic peace is essentially at an international level; of course there have been major critiques of the role in democracy in pacification of

domestic politics. Indeed, some have argued that democracy may exacerbate conflict in some cases. 1I6 Because democratic states may not fight each other this does not mean that they do not fight non-democracies, of course. Indeed, the democratic peace argument may create an incentive for coercion to spread democracy. This entire edifice places a high value on institutional democracy, but downplays subjective issues, such as identity and culture, and has generally accepted neo-liberalism -which has extended the tendency of economics that Keynes identified to become 'a form of post-Christian theology' .ll7

Democratization failsRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 107)In this way, third generation approaches to peacebuilding are closely connected with the liberal peace and its underlying liberal-realist framework, and underlying methodological and ontological assumptions. This replicates the Kantian derived democratic peace argument and its focus on democratisation,38 adding a focus on development and marketisation, and on the rule of law and human rights. Yet, out of 18 UN attempts at democratisation since the end of the Cold War, 13 had suffered some form of authoritarian regime within 15 years,39 underlining the wider implications of peacebuilding beyond simplistic assumptions that the holding of free and fair elections mean that peace is automatically self-sustaining.40

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Peace threatens Elites

Conflict resolution threatens elitesRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 5: The contribution of peace and conflict studies, TH, p. 103)The peace implied by both is clearly an improvement on first generation approaches, but requires a fundamental reshaping of international praxis, which many would argue is either unrealistic, or a very long-term project. These approaches are often represented as a methodology through which citizens are able to deal with a conflict in a non-zero-sum manner, and are supposed to be non-threatening towards traditional high-level interactions. This fails to acknowledge the connection between civil society and constitutional or institutional versions of peace. Indeed, in providing a forum for the agency of individuals, and assuming that they will be in favour of a liberal form of peace, conflict resolution is also an inherently political approach which threatens elites who monopolise resources for their own alternative interests. Thus, second generation thinking provides a radical perspective of a peace dependent upon the agency of the individual and civil society, while also accepting the universal, liberal norms of pluralism and democracy, human rights and social welfare.

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***Structural Violence Bad***

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Structural Violence Bad

Structures have power, even if hidden – state bad? Structuralism = realismRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 3: Marxist Agendas for Peace, TH, p. 67-68)

Power remains a key concept in structuralism, though it is not related to the contestation by states of their relative power, but lies hidden in society, in the state economy and in the global economy, and is wielded by the conservative elites who control or comprise these different structures. Structuralist thinking is predicated upon a necessary tension between the structure, whether it is economic, political, social or geographic, which is inevitably material in

some way, and the agency of the individual. Especially in Marxism there is little escape in this dualism from an imbalance between elite hegemony or the dynamics of revolution. In essence, this offers a realist version of a victor's peace, in which the two vie for control and domination over each other, but are not able to construct relations of cooperation. Emancipation is offered as a reward for resistance, leading to a future form of peace based upon economic and social justice. This means that as opposed to realism and in common with liberalism (despite its rejection of both) structuralism claimed to offer a positive epistemology of peace, if only after a long period of turmoil and resistance. These dynamics are inescapable and represented as truth, meaning that its determinism reduces or negates the very agency of those it implies it will emancipate. Thus, the relative power of those who control the structure, or operate as part of the structure, and the agency of individuals culminates in hegemony without their awareness of its limitations. This was the basis upon which Gramsci developed his account of hegemony to explain why the anti-capitalist revolutions of Marxist approaches had not, for the most part, occurred in Europe.49 One of the key insights that was later taken up by critical and post-structuralist theorists such as Cox or Foucault, was that this hidden power could be uncovered, even if it was generally perceived to be part of a natural order (such as those denoted by capitalism, colonialism or imperialism, racism or feudalism). The underlying

assumption here implies that structures will generally be captured and hijacked by selfish actors who are determined to gain control of power and resources according to their own interests. Such actors will be in the minority, but by virtue of their elite status they will dictate a life of structural violence to be experienced by the vast majority. It is clear here that there are many similarities within realist thinking and the inherency of self-interest in human nature, which is reflected in the nature of states. For structuralists this is reflected in the nature of all structures, with one major exception. Where individuals and groups come together to express a majority decision to overthrow such structures of oppression they can do no wrong, and such a mass exercise of power should lead to social justice as the basis for domestic, transnational and international peace. The notion that hidden structures are instruments of power, whether in the hands of an economic oligarchy, a ruling class, or because of geopolitics, reflected negatively on the class system that set individuals above others by divine right, or by virtue of birth, land ownership and resource monopolisation. It awoke the peripheral masses to the problem that though their political rights might have been legitimated to varying degrees, their economic rights now needed to be addressed. At the same time, it also injected into the debates in IR a new dynamic with respect to the problem of peace. Could structures ever be overcome? Did social groups have enough agency to avoid marginalisation by structures, let alone ruling and wealthy elites? It also struck a chord with some versions of realism which saw that anarchy itself was a structure which could never be overcome, only fended off.50 Liberals also began to borrow from its focus on marginalisation and emancipation in order to build a case for a more proactive normative vision, which would legitimate both freedoms and interventions to bring about those freedoms more specifically for marginalised groups within society. Both of course resisted the notion of a cycle of revolution and counter-revolution.

Structuralism marginalizes the populace, it’s a flawed epistemologyRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 3: Marxist Agendas for Peace, TH, p. 69)

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of structuralist approaches to the mainstream understanding of peace (leaving aside Marxist-Leninist notions of utopia and

the revolutionary violence needed to attain it) is derived exactly from the agency present in the relationship between structures and the vast majority of actors which constitute societies or peripheries, and therefore IR. The uncovering of the significance of the conventionally defined 'powerless' subject in IR has given rise to a clearer understanding of the significance of peripheries and 'grassroots actors', the processes by which they are marginalised, how resistance occurs, emancipation, and of 'bottom-up' perspectives in IR. This represents an advance on the grand narratives of inherency, of liberal-internationalism, and represents a limited positivist epistemology of peace (if the structures of global oppression or marginalisation could be successfully overthrown by individual action). Despite structuralism's determinist grand narratives relating to the instability and injustice of capitalism, these indicate that individuals and social groups, and social and economic issues, arc constitutive of IR, rather than merely states and international organisations. In this way ethnic groups, social groups, linguistic, cultural and religious groups that are marginalised even by democratic processes, the status of the poor, the underdeveloped economies, and the role of women and children, and gender, and even difference and culture, suddenly all become constitutive of lR (depending of course on the abandonment of the Marxist notion that individuals are constituted mainly by their labour or economic productivity).

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Structural Violence Bad-Root Cause

Structural violence is the root cause of warCox 1994 (Wayne S., lecturer in political studies at Queen's University, “U.S. Hegemony & the Management of Trade”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 64-65)

The term structural violence is used here to describe a process of existing power struggles between social groups. Whereas mainstream international conflict studies place the focus of their analyses upon the actual physical act of violence (usually the direct result of the use of military force in the name of states), the theoretical framework proposed here seeks to broaden the definition of violence to include structural relations of hegemony between social groups. In effect, the physical act of violence is but the external expression of an ongoing structural relationship between social groups-a relationship built on structural violence. A definition of conflict that focuses upon the physical act of violence can therefore only describe the results of violence rather than understand the overall process itself. Johan Galtung has provided a basis for the model of sociostructural violence, arguing that "hostile aggression is no inseparable part of the innate structure of the 'minds of men,' but added to it from the outside, e.g. through special socialization processes" (Caltung, llJ64:l)5). According to Galtung, although IIwoutward observations of aggression (in this case, organized politicill acts of violence) are worthy of study in themselves, they are merely a reflection, or a result of, existing sociostructural relationships that are arranged by a set of power relations. These relationships result in an "interaction system [which] is a multi-dimensional system of stratification" (Galtung, 1964:96). From here, Galtung set up a seril's of possible relationships between groups, which are simply characterized as Topdog (T) and Underdog (U). Throughout his discussion, Galtung has focused on the notion of power relationships dictated by the Topdog.

Structural issues are the root cause of war Singer 80 – David, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6, (1980), pp. 350, Annual Reviews, “Accounting for International War: The State of The Discipline”

Despite the possible attractiveness of the above argument,f ew other investigatorsi nto the war/peace question have accepted it, and as a result, a fair fraction of research on the systemic conditions associated with war has emanated so far largely from the Michigan Correlates of War project. Further, of the three types of systemic conditions - mate-rial, structural, and cultural - most of the reproducible evidence to date reflects the structural dimension (Sullivan, 1976). Un-fortunately, there is little systematic work on such material attributes of the system as weapons technology, industrial development, resourcel imits, climate,o r demographicp at-terns. Similarly, outside of some preliminary efforts by Kegley et al. (1979), Choi (1978), and Gantzel (1972) little effort has been invested in the search for systematic con-nections between cultural conditions and the incidence of war. On the other hand, re-searchers of a scientific bent have been as assiduous in their examination of structural correlates of war as their methodologically traditional colleagues, and it is to that litera-ture that we now turn. Perhaps the most plausible of the system's structural attributes in the war/peacec ontext is that of the configurations generated by alliance bonds, with those generated by dis-tributions of power following closely behind. Looking first at the structural characteristic knowna s bipolarity, we usuallyh ave in mind the extent to which the nations in a given geographical region, or in the major power sub-set( a functional' region'), or world-wide, are clustered into two clearly opposed coali-tions. While there are several definitions of bipolarity and rather diverse operational indicators, it generally implies the degree of conformity to an 'ideal' condition in which all of the nations are - via military alli-ance - in one or another of two equally powerful coalitions with no alliance bonds

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Structural violence Bad

Focus should be on positive peace research-alleviating structural violence decreases the likelihood of warStohl and Chamberlain 72 Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of California[Michael and Mary. “Alternative Futures for Peace Research.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 16. Number 4. PeaceResearch in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), p. 525. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/173538.pdf]

rels." Are these approaches and the proposals for solution inherent in their conclusions consistent with the aims of the elimination of violence? Schmid (1970), for instance, has challenged peace research on the grounds that it is nothing more than a technique for pacification. Dencik (1970) has similarly suggested that we have a choice in peace research between pacification and revolution, between negative (i.e., prevention of violence) and positive (creation of systems where violence is unlikely to arise) peace, and that peace research should be on the side of revolution and positive peace. There is now a concern with structural or indirect violence. In terms of research ambitions, this is a radical departure. For example, it removes the cause of violence from individual goal frustrations and places the cause of much violence in the inability of a system to adapt to changes or challenges. There are however two directions this new emphasis should indicate. The first would maintain that violence need not necessarily be overt for its existence to be acknowledged. For example, any system which prevented one class or section of its membership from enjoying economic, cultural, social, or political benefits is, in effect, committing violence to that section. The second would concentrate only on the type of structural conditions which would or could lead or have led to direct violence. For the most part, researchers have been concerned with the latter aspect of structural violence, and their suggestions are in line with the theme of alleviating rather than eliminating these structural conditions to reduce the quantity of direct violence. This dimension well illustrates Dencik's (1970) thesis that peace research is concerned with maintaining a stable status quo and that it is concernce with pacification and not the long-term elimination of all forms of violence, overt or covert.

Efforts to combat violence fail without a detailed understanding of the structural causesRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[The British government's Department for International Developlment (DFID) is even more explicit in its linkage between the strategies I deployed for the redressal of conflict and the creation of peace. 12 A recent review of the British government's approach to peacebuilding showed that there was little coordination, and not enough focus on what was termed the capacity of conflict zones to 'absorb' peacebuild ing aid. Furthermore, it was recognised that humanitarian work pro vided access to conflict zones in order to stabilise them, but that this required a better understanding of the roots of the conflict, the local context, and the capacity and coordination of peacebuilders needed to be developed. It proposed that an agreed strategic planning mechanism and coordinating body is required, working on the basis of an agreed understanding of conflict. DFID is mainly focused on develop merit issues in this context, whereas the British Foreign Office focuses on good governance and human rights. Despite this difference, development is the main focus of intervention in a post-conflict phase. This document acknowledges that type of peace being built has not really been engaged with, though it is the professed goal of DFID and other British agencies and organizations.]

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***State Bad***

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State Bad

Moving beyond the state is a pre-requisite to creating sustainable peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 147)

This requires the acceptance of difference as a method for peace, rather than an emphasis on sameness or universality. The process of handing agency to critical social movements, for example, and providing ways in which they are empowered to develop their voices, identities and ideas, moves

towards indicating a post-structural methodology for achieving a more inclusive and less predatory form of peace. This points to a need for international actors and institutions, such as the UN, EU, World Bank, USAID, state donors and major NGOs to think and operate in terms of local ownership of the peace projects that they engage in, which must be focused on developing the agency of those actors on their own terms. This might be the

closest approximation that can so far be made on an ontological, discursive peace. This also highlights the need to move beyond institutional thinking about politics, power, sovereignty and representation and to engage with emotive, aesthetic, linguistic and cultural representations. This ontology of peace is dispersed, multi-centred, indicative of agency, and anti-hegemonic, and requires a complex interrogation of sites of power, resistance and marginalisation, in order to achieve its ontological ambitions.

The state and the military use flawed conceptions of international realtions to focus on war at the expense of society Cox 1994 (Wayne S., lecturer in political studies at Queen's University, “U.S. Hegemony & the Management of Trade”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 59-60)

This chapter puts forward a social framework for the understanding of violence in global society. It argues that the basic analytical tool used in the construction of theories of war-the state-is poorly conceptualized within mainstream international relations generally, and within conflict studies particularly. This poor conceptualization has resulted in a research preference toward state-centric explanalations of war at the expense of an analysis of the complex social contexts within which these processes develop. Such a preference is largely driven by the fact that states attempt to appropriate "the legitimate use of violence," regardless of the fact that such an attempt is often disputed by subordinate social groups who either reject the authority of the state or reject the international state system altogther. A field of enquiry that defines itself as the study of state actors provides an understanding of conflict from the perspective of a hegemonic system driven largely, but not exclusively, by the United States. For disempowered social groups, however, this picture is incomplete and potentially dangerous. As E. Fuat Keyman argues in Chapter 8, developing a more nuanced notion of the state is an inadequate way to understand the complex interrelationships between social groups and the state. A theoretical deconstruction of state-centered conflict analysis provides an important contribution to our understanding of violence at the theoretical/political level, as well as the empirical level. In keeping with the tradition of reflexive theory, deconstructed state-centricity reveals the extent to which scholars and practioners of international relations "see" violence. Of course, the way they see the world affects the potential solutions to the problem. Recent history suggests that the solutions (by political and military leaders and state-centric realist and neorealist scholars alike) are almost exclusively thought of in terms of state-controlled military responses to complex international and intersocial relations. In other words, the way you see violence often affects the way you do violence. The Gulf War is a graphic example of this, and its costs in human life should convince even the most committed partisans of state-centric power politics that there "has to be a better way." Moreover, the reflexive mode of theorization might be the only way in which practioners and some scholars of international relations will come to face the fact they are not merely reacting to the world as it is, but are involved in the inherently political act of constructing the world as it will be. As an alternative, a sociostructural framework is proposed that assists in analyzing the role of the state and its claim to the legitimate use of violence, and provides more effective theoretical tools to conceptualize both the social and state influences upon the process of violence. In order to begin the construction of this framework, however, we must fully understand the concept of the state as it is now commonly used in the study of war.

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State Bad-Structural ViolenceState-centrism is flawed- Structural violence is the root cause of wars Muthien 2000 (Bernedette, an activist and social science researcher, “Human Security Paradigms through a Gendered Lens”, Agenda, No. 43, Women and the Aftermath 2000, p. 48-49, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4066110)

This traditional notion of national security, in terms of armies, guns and war, emphasises the state as both the primary actor and level of analysis. Narrow state- centrism excludes other important actors and levels of analyses, including individuals and groups (ethnicities and religious groupings, political and ideological groups, and non-state actors like corporate mercenaries), as well as other institutions (eg transnational corporations [TNCsJ and multi-national corporations [MNCs], international financial institutions [IlFIs such as the World Bank, the global arms trade - from manufacturers to marketers to purchasers). The modern move away from inter-state war to intra-state conflict, in particular, stresses the importance of group and institutional analyses, eg the war in Angola involves regional, linguistic, economic groups, state and international dimensions. It involves both the largely southern National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) supporters and Luandese Popular Movement for the Independence of Angola (MPLA) supporters, as well as especially diamond and oil TNCs, other states, notably South Africa and Namibia, France and the United States. It includes non-state actors such as mercenaries, arms and other suppliers, locally and internationally. The traditional definition of security also emphasises protection from harm for citizens of a country within national boundaries. National boundaries in Africa are colonial legacies, often arbitrary, and variously disputed, eg the Kasikili/Sedudu Island conflict between Namibia and Botswana. Sovereignty of borders is often bestowed, with little or no consultation, and with little regard by the international community to the impacts on the inhabitants within the borders. Eritrea, for example, is deemed a sovereign state after its secession from Ethiopia, while Somaliland, where women contributed significantly to brokering peace, is not officially recognised. The idea of protection from harm for citizens is narrowly defined, and effectively means protection from foreign attack, but does not preclude offensive measures deemed in the interests of citizens and state. For example, South Africa and Botswana's military intervention in Lesotho in 1998, as well as Namibia's incursions into Angola against UNITA. So too, this traditional definition of harm does not include other aspects of safety, security or well-being, including the environment, basic needs, identity and dignity. A more holistic definition of protection from harm would mean more than the traditional protection from war and invasion by foreign armies. It would mean, to name a few examples, protection from hunger, protection from poverty, protection from sexual assault for women, children and men.The traditional national security definition of protection from harm refers to a state-level notion of harm, and does not protect citizens from homelessness, illiteracyand unemployment. Nor does it protect citizens' fundamental human rights, as enshrined in the South African Constitution, to be free of discrimination on the grounds of race, class, gender, spirituality or sexuality. Negative peace, or the absence of war, conforms to traditional definitions of security in general, and traditional protection from harm in particular. Positive peace, on the other hand, means both negative peace, as well as the realisation of even the most basic of social justice needs. Traditional notions of security are based on conventional (though flawed) distinctions between public and private spheres. Comm- unity activist, Wenny Kusuma (Interview, Cape Town, January 9-10, 2000) asserts that the state has traditionally been concerned with the male-dominated public realm. Thus issues outside of the public realm, including domestic violence, job discrimination, the status of women, have not been viewed as concerns of national security. According to peace educator and activist, Betty Reardon, (E-mail communication, January, 1999), the three major problems with the international security system are: (Firstly) it is dominantly masculine rather than human in conception; (secondly) it is designed to achieve the security of the state rather than that of persons or human groups; and (thirdly), what is most readily evident, it addresses only one of four fundamental sources of human well-being. The condition of worldwide insecurity exists because the present state-centred security paradigm places a priority on protection against harm from others over all other sources of human well-being. The militarised international security system is maintained at the expense of the abuse of the natural environment. It sets limits on meeting the economic and social needs of the world's poor. It disregards and violates fundamental, universal human rights, and provides inadequate protection against the harms of ill health, poor infrastructures, and accident and disaster provision, as inordinate resources, research, human talent and human effort are squandered on the armed defence of 'national security'. The system is inadequate, indeed, dangerous because it is imbalanced. It is derived by exclusively masculine, outwardly directed standards applied by the predominantly male 'national security' establishments who have not been socialised to focus on human needs.

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State Bad

Government peace projects fail—they don’t have an inside view of conflicts Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 158.]

[This has created practices in which states and organisations that ( profess to understand what peace is are able to intervene in conflict in order to educate others in their ways of peace, without necessarily renegotiating the peace frameworks that have arisen from the recipients' experience, culture, identity or geopolitical location. In effect, top-down approaches to the construction of the liberal peace indicate an assumption that there is little need to reflect upon itself and its assumptions - assumptions mainly created by the outcome of major 'world' conflicts and the conduct of Western diplomacy in order to address problems related to the preservation and advancement of con temporary order . The question of what peace might be expected to look like from the inside (from within the conflict environment) is given less credence than the way the agents of intervention desire to see it from the outside, and moderates searching for peace from within the conflict environment almost universally endeavour to expropriate Western models in their search for a solution. This resembles a quasi imperial framework related to the dynamics of the post-colonial state system and the flaws of quasi-imperial states.41 Ignatieff describes this as 'Empire Lite' and argues that nation-building rests upon a temporary tutelage required to install peace.42 The language deployed in these missions betrays its continuity with the indirect rule of the impe rial project whilst trying to induce a growing capacity for self-gover nance within externally defines regimes and restrictions .43 Where this type of selective intervention occurs, peace is assumed to be reconsti tuted by the establishment and importation of external governance frameworks, which it is then hoped will take root. This represents a 'thin-domination' akin to a form of imperial power.44 This is a fascinat ing development, presaged by calls for a revival of the Trusteeship council,45 for the establishment of a 'semi-imperialism', 'mandates' or 'benign. colonialism', to assume the governance of conflict zones.46 There has been an increasingly vocal debate about what looks on the surface to be a return of imperial or colonial practices in some policy, academic, and media circles with some arguing that we have little choice if the liberal peace is to be maintained and others resisting any return to practices associated with former imperial and colonial prac tices. Many of those in favour make the important argument that given the fact that such semi-imperialism is conducted through the UN system, this means that it is both multilateral and consensual, and therefore has little to do with past practices. Others argue that the UN system and its choice of conflicts to become involved with is domi nated by major Western state interests and therefore represents a clear continuity with such practices. Many believe that there is no real alternative to a '...quasi-permanent, quasi-colonial relationship between the "beneficiary" country and the international community.]

***AT: Aff Args***

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AT - Deterrence

Deterrence causes nuclear warHerf, Professor of Modern European History at the University of Maryland, 1986, (Jeffrey, Spring, “War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The West German Peace Movement,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538953, TH, p. 183-184)

In the interim, the argument has become commonplace: the drive to restore Clausewitz to the nuclear era evident in the American strategists of limited war erased the distinction between deterrence and actual use of nuclear weapons. Technological improvements in speed and accuracy of weapons were driving strategists to take "war-fighting" doctrines frightfully seriously. Deterrence theory revealed the "autistic" nature and inherent instability of the "deterrence system," its tendency to move closer to actual war-fighting doctrines. Given the illusory nature of the threat against

which deterrence was directed, it was Western deterrence theories and practices, not the military strategy and power of the Soviet Union, that posed the greatest danger to peace. enghaas's work was more than a criticism of deterrence theory. It was also "ideology critique" or "immanent criticism" in the Marxist sense. Hence, deterrence theory was an ideology linked to a particular society, the United States, and to Western capitalist democracies more generally. In Senghaas's words, his was a "study of the institutions, strategies and social order which stand in the way of the progress of humanity to a genuine peace order. "21 The strategies were deterrence and containment of communism and the Soviet Union, and the institutions were the military-industrial-university complex of the United States and capitalism.

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AT: human securityPositive peace enables to individuals to construct liberal peace independent of the state Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 73.]

[Notwithstanding multilateralism, which depends upon universality and non-exclusivity, such approaches have serious shortcomings from the perspective of post-structural debates and their implications for this association of the liberal peace with certain modes of governance. As Foucalt has argued, we '..live in an era of 'governmentality'.103 Societies and international relations are ordered by sovereign governments and where conflict exists, governmentality in a liberal vein is what is required from this perspective. This is controlled by states and their institutions operating in a traditional top-down manner. Thus, states and liberal gov ernance provide the international system with a continuity that is viewed by its dominant actors as sustainable . Given the emergence of a non-governmental, private and public strand of peace (the civil peace), it would also be accurate to say that non-state, non-official forms of gover nance have also become important at the civil society level in construct ing the liberal peace. This debate, associated with human security, is essentially a form of biopower in actors are empowered and enabled to intervene in the most private aspects of human life as their contribution to the development of the liberal peace . Consequently, the evolution of thinking about peace and the evolution of strategies for making peace have now converged upon strategies to install or reform liberal gover nance in recognisable state entities. Governance has become a key part of the vocabulary of IR . This governance is super-territorial, multi layered, incorporating official and private actors from the local to the global, institutionalised in the alphabet soup of agencies, organisations, and institutions,106 but such actors also rely on dominant states and their institutions for its direction. It is represented as neutral, objective, benevolent for the most part, and yet at the same time, is often also accused of effectively maintaining insidious practices of intervention upon host and recipient communities. 107 In this vein, it has been argued that global governance aims to increase power over life, rather than death as in geostrategic debates in IR, in its attempts to equate good governance with equitable development and neoliberal economic policy.108 It presents a collusion between socio-economic development and political reform, and results in a relationship of conditionality between its agents and recipients, as is mirrored in such relationships which include the World Bank, the UN and its agencies, and NGOs. This is effectively conceived as an example of social, cultural, political, and economic under-development, which the liberal peace attempts to reform and replace with a conditional relationship based upon hege monic intervention at worst, or through the installation of new modes of liberal governance, negotiated between hosts and interveners at best. ]

AT: Human Security Richmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 129.]

[Perhaps the development of the concept of human security encapsulates this evolution best. Yet, the attempt to construct a more inclusive terrain for the notoriously narrow and simplistic debates that have disfigured the discussion of security appears to have fallen into the same trap that classical debates on security were subject to. Classical debates, as illustrated by multiple versions of realism often culminate in the protection of the concept and framework of the Westphalian state, rather than the populations they house. The concept of human security broadens the agents and structures identified as being causes of insecurity and responsible for its eradica tion so far that it becomes very difficult to prioritise crucial areas that may be most effective in ameliorating insecurity. Thus, the concept has been likened to 'carrying a band aid' to deal with humanitarian crises caused by war.8 Yet, at the same time HS recognises the com plexity of security issues, and the breadth of issues and actors who are affected by them . Since their emergence, HS oriented approaches and actors offer a vision of the liberal peace in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and institu tional projects for peace . This effectively legitimates all of the different strands and discourses of the liberal peace project, and increasingly has outweighed the interventionary aspects of this project associated with the victor's peace.]

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AT: EmpiricismThere are no objective interpretations of history Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 12)

Before proceeding to a development of the main argument, however, it is useful to note the specificity of the exercise represented here. This is an exercise in international metatheory. Perhaps the best way to clarify the meaning of metatheory is by analogy. Consider, for example, the discipline's treatment of empirical evidence. Although the discipline is concerned with incorporating facts into explanatory accounts, it has generally not subscribed to what some have labeled the position of "barefoot empiricism." That is to say, international relations scholars have generally not subscribed to the view that facts speak for themselves. On the contrary, it is generally held that facts require interpretation in order to have meaning interpretation that is the product of the application of theory to facts. In short, the meaning of facts is not a factual question, but a theoretical one. Consequently, given that explanation is one's goal, "there is nothing so practical as a good theory."

The underlying assumptions of the aff come first Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 13)

In a very general sense, theoretical reflexivity can be defined a reflection on the process of theorizing. More specifically, reflexivity in terms of international relations theory can be understood to entain three core elements (1) self-awareness regarding underlying premises; (2) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain; and (3) the affirmation that reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language. These three elements are treated in turn. Furthermore, each element is related to the dominant conception of theory and knowledge in the discipline-that of positivism. Being aware of the underlying premises of one's theorizing is the first core element of thoeretical reflexivity. That is, theoretical reflexivity is understood to involve attention to, and disclosure of the too often unstated presuppositions upon which theoretical edifices are erected. If reflexivity were limited to this first element, then the positivist forms of theorizing that have dominated the discipline of international relations would qualify with little difficulty as reflexive forms of thoery; positivist notions of theory require that the sum total of generalizations be derived axiomatically from clearly identified starting assumptions (Olson and Onuf, 1985:1-25). The two additional core elements, however, are incompatible with- and indeed, they emerged from challenges to- positivist forms of theory, and their presence makes reflexivity a virtual antonym of positivism

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AT – Humans Violent

Humans aren’t violent – consensus proves animal nature is inherently peacefulRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 2)

Many hoped that science would, as Hobbes wrote, open the way for peace. Hobbes wrote, in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, Leviathan (often held up to be the epitome of tragic realism in IR) to illustrate that peace was plausible in spite of hatred, scarcity, and violence. Of course, he also developed the notion of the Leviathan as a way to moderate the 'natural state' of war. IR has instead focused on the latter (war as a natural state) rather than the former (peace as a natural state), despite the fact that so much of the ground work has been done in peace and conflict studies, anthropology, sociology, in the arts, in branches of several other disciplines, such as economics or psychology, and via the more critical approaches to the discipline. The supposed Freudian death instinct has seemed to resonate more powerfully through the discipline than notions of peace. Yet, as Fry has argued a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence shows that peace, conflict avoidance and accommodation are the stronger impulses of human culture. War is significant part of Western culture as well as others, but not of all cultures. 1O Indeed, it is notable that in Western settings war memorials are frequent, particularly for the First and Second World War, but peace is rarely represented in civic space unless as a memorial of sacrifice during war. Similarly in art, aspirations for peace are often represented through depictions of war and violence, such as in Picasso's Guernica (1937) or Goya's The Third of May, 1808: The Execution of the Defenders of Madrid (1814). Lorenzetti's The Allegory of Good Government (1338-40) and Rubens' Minerva Protects Pax from Mars (1629-30) are notable exceptions. Further afield one could point to the Ottoman Topkapi Palace's Gate ofPeace in Istanbul, and the Gate of Heavenly Peace leading into the Imperial City in Beijing (though these were, of course, associated with both diplomacy and imperial wars).

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AT – Pluralism Bad

Pluralism isn’t irresponsible but key to make peace sustainable by connecting it with everyday lifeRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 6-7)

The critique developed here is not 'irresponsible pluralism' as some would have it,28 but an attempt to contribute to the ongoing repositioning of a discipline now increasingly concerned with IR's connections with everyday life and agency. In this context,

each chapter of this book interrogates the theoretical debates in IR as well as their theoretical, methodological and epistemological implications for peace. The nature of

international order is heavily contested in theoretical, methodological, ontological and epistemological terms, meaning that the consensus on the contemporary liberal peace represents an anomalous agreement rather than a broad-ranging consensus. Rather than support this

unquestioningly, IR requires a research agenda for peace if its interdisciplinary contribution to knowledge -and speaking truth to power9 -is to be developed. IR needs to engage broadly with interdisciplinary perspectives30 on peace if it is to contribute to the construction of a framework that allows for the breadth and depth required for peace to be accepted by all, from the local to the global, and therefore to be sustainable. Like social anthropology IR needs to have an agenda for peace, not just to deal with war, violence, conflict, terrorism and political order at the domestic and international level, but also incorporating the interdisciplinary work that has been carried out in the areas of transnationalism and globalisation, political economy, development, identity, culture and society, gender, children, and the environment, for example. Yet where social anthropology, for example, has elucidated this agenda clearly, IR has been more reticent, despite the claims about peace made on the founding of the discipline.3l As with anthropology, IR should 'uncover counterhegemonic and silenced voices, and to explore the mechanisms of their silencing'.32 Of course, this happens in the various areas, and especially in the sub-disciplines of IR. Where there have been efforts to develop peace as a concept, this is by far counterbalanced by the efforts focused on war, terrorism ... conflict. Concepts of peace should be a cornerstone of IR interdisciplinary investigation of international politics and everyday life. For the purposes of this study, peace is viewed from a number of perspectives. It can be a specific concept (one among many): it infers an ontological and epistemological position of being at peace, and knowing peace; it infers a methodological approach to accessing knowledge about peace and about constructing it; and it implies a theoretical approach, in which peace is a process and outcome defined by a specific theory.

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AT - Empiricism

Resting on empiricism has been proven ineffective for peace research, it can only formulate understandings of warRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 7-9)

What is peace? This would seem to be an obvious question deserving an obvious answer. Yet, the reluctance to open this debate could be merely an oversight, it could be because the answer is too obvious to waste time upon it, or it could be because once opened up, the debate upon peace offers all kind of possibilities, liberal, illiberal or radical, and possibly subversive. This is not to say that there is a conspiracy of silence when it comes to peace, because two World Wars and the Cold War would seem to have settled this basic question of modernity in favour of the 'liberal peace', made up of a victor's peace at its most basic level, an institutional peace to provide international governance and guarantees, a constitutional peace to ensure democracy and free-trade, and a civil peace to ensure freedom and rights within society.33 This, in Anglo-American terms, places the individual before the state, though in Continental varieties it sees the individual as subordinate to the state (a little noted, but significant point).34 Both variations rest upon a social contract between representatives and citizens. Yet, events since 1989 indicate that peace is not as it seems. There may be a

liberal consensus on peace, but there are many technical, political, social, economic and intellectual issues remaining, and the very universality of the post-Cold War liberal peace is still contested in terms of components, and the methods used to build it (from military intervention to the role of NGOs, international organisations, agencies and international financial institutions). One approach to thinking about peace that is commonly used is to look back at its historical, international, uses. These generally include the following: an Alexandrian peace, which depended upon a string of military conquests loosely linked together; a Pax Romana, which depended upon tight control of a territorial empire, and also included a 'Carthaginian peace' in which the city of Carthage was razed to the ground and strewn with salt to make sure it would not re-emerge; an Augustine peace dependent upon the adoption and protection of a territorial version of Catholicism, and the notion of just war; the Westphalian peace, dependent upon the security of states and the norms of territorial sovereignty; the Pax Britannia, dependent upon British domination of the seas, on trade and loose alliances with colonised peoples; the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919, dependent upon an embryonic international organisation, collective security, the self-determination of some, and democracy; the United Nations system, dependent upon collective security and international cooperation, a social peace entailing social justice, and the liberal peace, including upon democratisation, free markets, human rights and the rule of law, development, and, perhaps most of all, the support both normative and material, of the United States and its allies. Though peace was supposed to be one of IR's key agendas when the discipline was founded in 1919, and certainly was explicitly part of the main institutional frameworks of the modem era, IR as a discipline tends to deal with peace implicitly, through its theoretical readings of international order, of war, and history. The empirical events that mark IR tend to be associated with violence, rather than peace. Even such an attempt as this study, ambitious though it might seem in its attempt to recast IR theory, is indicative of further and perhaps crucial weaknesses in both the discipline and its author's capacity to speak on behalf of anything other than the developed, Eurocentric and enlightened discourse of IR. To attempt to speak on behalf of those from other cultures, religions and so-called underdeveloped regions, would assume the viability of sovereign man's discourse of the liberal peace, which is exactly what is thrown into doubt by a consideration of peace. Most thinkers in a Western, developed context assume that they know peace and would never take on an ontological position that violence is a goal, though it may be an acknowledged side-effect. This adds the sheen of legitimacy, not to say legality, in both a juridical and normative sense to the discipline, despite its very limited engagement with peace. The following dynamics are characteristic of the way in which peace is often thought of and deployed in IR: peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference; 2 it is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms; 3 it is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity and national interests; 4 it is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy; 5 it is related to a certain ideology or political or economic framework (liberalism, neo-liberalism, democracy, communism or socialism, etc.); 6 it is viewed as a temporal phase; 7 it is based upon state or collective security; 8 it is based upon local, regional or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution; 9 it is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom-up civil society-oriented framework; 10 there needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form; 11 most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not on creating a self-sustaining peace. These dynamics have meant that the most important agenda in lR has not been subject to a sustained examination. Even in the realms of peace and conflict studies, the focus has been on preventing violence rather than on a sustained attempt to develop a self-sustaining order. Where attempts have been made to reflect on a viable world order in a number of different quarters, the liberal peace has often emerged as the main blueprint approach. What is most important about this treatment is that as an objective point of reference, it is possible for the diplomat, politician, official of international organisations, regional organisations or international agencies, to judge what is right and wrong in terms of aspirations, processes, institutions and methods, in their particular areas of concern. The liberal peace is the foil by which the world is now judged, in its

multiple dimensions, and there has been little in terms of the theorisation of alternative concepts of peace.

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AT- Experts

“Experts” should not be trusted with policy analysis- they don’t value public opinion and rarely make rational decisionsWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.9-10.

Often, members of the public take idealistic stands that lack solid grounding in a factual understanding of security issues. Consequently, many professionals within the public policy establishment grant rather limited value to public opinion. Robert Bell observes that while those who have spent their lives mastering the various policy alternatives are more sophisticated, policy makers "have to reckon with the limited rationality of public discussion." The issue, for him, is how to respond to a public that may not be "receptive to rational policy analysis." 2' To assume that public policy professionals are more rational, just because they are better informed, is fallacious. Bell reveals how public values are often of peripheral importance to those charged with implementing policies:OMB is in the business of reexamining and reformulating the purposes of government programs. It is the duty of OMB examiners to refuse to take public formulations of needs as given. OMB instead strains toward policy principles that are more abstract than the needs felt by special interests .... To perform these functions, OMB of course makes use of public finance theory, which, in turn, actively resists the way issues are ordinarily discussed in public and substitutes a disciplined apptoaclw characteristic of a particular professional group.2*In his essay "Public and Private Choice," R. Paul Churchill makes several points that are relevant to this discussion. He argues for an approach to public policy that takes into account "public choices that represent the expression of social values which play a central role in the definition, by people, of their community or society, and in the formation of their collective purposes and conceptions of meaningful life.” Churchill argues that the effort to "maximize the preference-satisfaction of individuals," and I would add the aim to follow the "rational policy analysis" of bureaucratic experts, inappropriately relegates the consideration of values to the private sphere. Churchill concludes that in order for public policy to formulate and debate social values, "w need to develop what Jurgen Habermas called our 'communicative-moral rationality' and to remember that the 'instrumental rationality' of policy analysis is only the means by which to attain the ends we ought to seek."30

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AT - Perm

The aff contains multiple implicit assumptions which prevent the alternative from solvingRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 9)

How does international theory develop concepts of peace? This happens only indirectly in most cases. Implicit in thought and practice relating to the

international are multiple perspectives on the nature, scope and plausibility of certain kinds of peace. What is more, in this age of globalisation the deferral of a debate on peace in favour of reductive and expedient debates on war, power, conflict and violence, is dangerously anachronistic if IR theory is to be seen as part of a broader project leading to viable and sustainable forms of peace.

Realism must be abandoned to achieve an effective notion of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 24)

The Kantian 'Perpetual Peace' is perhaps the archetypal version of these agendas, and their influential status in IR and in thinking about world politics and peace more generally. It is indicative of a common impetus, shared by idealist, liberal and pluralist approaches to overcome the negative epistemology and ontology of realism, which at best provides for a domestic and international peace that is subservient to defensive requirements and preparedness against potential threats. In the post-Enlightenment world, however, the major

agenda for a new peace came to be associated with overcoming these 'primitive' notions of peace in IR, through liberal-internationalism, liberal institutionalism and the modernist era, through what were supposed to be more scientific forms of pluralism. Whereas realism presents war as part of the

'fall' of humanity, and a necessary stabilisation mechanism for international order, idealism and liberalism sees 'fallen man' as retrievable through suitable planning and organisation. This involves the rejection of the negative epistemology and ontology in realist IR. Idealists, liberals and pluralists concur on the creation of institutions and safeguards to protect key norms and to provide for individuals, so cementing a social contract which preserves the polity.

Change cannot come from the top down- only our alternative acts as a catalyst to changing attitudes about peaceJerald Richards, Professor of Philosophy at Northern Kentucky University, “Keys to Political Forgiveness,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.169-170.

Remembering the past- remembering history- correctly and honestly, especially when the correctly remembered past involves unjust and evil actions, is an extremely difficult project. Remembering the past always involves selective memory and, if the past is morally questionable, the possibility of an antiseptically engineered past. Collective remembering is especially vulnerable to a selection process. On this point, Raul Hilberg writes, "The complexities of history are buried in books and journals. Collective memories are highly selective and often embrace a partial list in the form of nostalgia."16 First steps to right remembrance of the past are an awareness of the obstacles to coming to terms with the past that were identified by Adorno and a determination not to permit these kinds of attitudes and actions to influence our pursuit of the truth. Assuming that nations can come to a correct understanding of the moral wrongness of past actions, these changes in thinking will never come about from the top down. They will require the actions of thousands of persons working cooperatively to create a moral and intellectual climate in which these constructive changes can take place. The possibility is left open that enlightened leadership could be a catalyst in bringing about a shift in our thinking about ourselves and our nation, its involvement in past wrong actions, and its proper role in making amends for them.

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AT - Perm

Liberal peace cannot be combined with the alternative – it pushes out of the way other notions of peace Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 27-28)

While these phenomena were establishing the roots of future conflict, the idealist dynamic of IR began to form, along with an embryonic liberal 'international community'. This was established within a more sophisticated notion of peace, in which a Grotian discourse on natural law began to emerge, indicating a right of self-preservation and to own property on the part of the individual, which could be extended to states.49 This allowed for a framework of norms and rules to emerge to provide the conditions for a norm of coexistence and non-intervention to be adhered to by states. In extremis this also allowed a secular 'just war' in which war could be used legitimately in order to defend this order.50 It required that a commonly agreed liberal peace between states be negotiated, which in the worst case scenario could then be defended or extended through the use of force. This rested upon universalism, and the belief that a specific liberal order was of more significance than other orders.51 As Guess has argued this was later regarded as a form of liberalism: 'Ex poste, a legitimising prehistory of liberalism is constructed in which Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and others are made to feature prominently as theoretical precursors. '52 As a result both realist and liberal versions of peace coexisted somewhat uncomfortably in a space somewhere between nationalism, liberal imperialism and liberal-internationalism. In practice, nationalism and imperialism were rife, as were economic protectionism, and discriminatory practises in civil society, institutionalised by state and society, especially with respect to issues like identity, gender and class. Concurrently, the balance of power still drove many state relations and geopolitics and economic acquisition drove imperialism. Much of the liberal and idealist thinking of this era revolved around the 'restoration' rather than creation of peace,53 framed in the context of preserving, perfecting and sharing a Western value system.

Formulating new understandings of peace requires a prior rejection of current methodologies – only this transition makes possible alternative ways of thinking, the perm can’t solveRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 138-139)

Yet, post-structural approaches are aware of this issue, as indicated by their attempts to avoid just such a meta-narrative that they criticise in other approaches. As Walker has written, IR theory is problematic in terms of: the bankruptcy of established intellectual traditions, the untidy proliferation of research strategies, an unseemly dependence on the interests of specific states and cultures, and the hubris of empirical social science. These qualities are valorised within IR's orthodoxy to support a specific set of historical and spatial claims, in particular related to sovereignty, which is viewed both as a basic building block of peace and the basis for most conflicts. Similarly, orthodox IR theory reflects such a valorisation and has become a mechanism of interest and power, at least in Western policy circles, rather than a discourse of peace. As Walker shows, it is precisely with the recognition of these problems in orthodox theory that the key question of the ethics of IR is given new life.30 But this reaches beyond states and the strategically defined

international, and engages with the nature of peace and its multiple forms as an ethical commitment to others within IR. This means going beyond or building upon the codes, norms, principles and rules upon which 'liberal utilitarian'3l institutions have so far been constructed. Walker is clear that ethics are an 'ongoing historical practice' and institutions and concepts that are constructed with this in mind should be able to respond to this requirement of flexibility if they are to achieve a level of emancipation unconstrained by liberal institutionalism or exclusive claims about a sovereignty that rests upon interpretation and representation rather than modernity's claims of an empirical world. It is ironically in this world that 'idealistic' claims about a universal peace are often refuted by reference to particularistic notions of nationalism and national selfdetermination. Post-structural approaches uncover problems with both sets of claims, and with the associated ethical debates, or lack of, that are linked, especially in the context of the interpretative task of creating 'peaceful change' in a fluid environment in which individuals and

their everyday lives should be a key priority. As Walker points out, the 'great traditions' of IR are unsuited to this sort of project.J2

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AT– Perm

The perm represents a fundamental reluctance to give up old conceptions of peace – this makes it impossible to incorporate the alternative. (need to talk about welfare though)Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 150-151)

Though orthodox IR theory has missed an important opportunity through the evolution of the discipline to speak truth to power about its replicating tendencies in terms of war and conflict, this challenge has been broadly carried forward by critical approaches, which offer a much clearer ontological acceptance of pluralist agendas for peace. This is not to say, as

Jackson has pointed out, that an account of IR should exclude states or 'hard' security issues,6 though acknowledging the self-replicating dangers of such discourses should be part of any discussion of the latter. An acknowledgement of new agendas is necessary, rather than remaining slavishly chained to the old, or to excessively 'rigorous' methods, which are often designed to support particular research

agendas and their implicit ideologies.7 This is necessary to develop a better understanding of IR's implicit perspectives on peace, which have been ensnared by liberal-realist theories and a Western-centric view of the world, in particular elevating governmental elites and institutions over societies and everyday life. Cultural neutrality and a failure of recognition mean that liberal peace is often equated by its recipients as colonial or hegemonic. This indicates

that emancipation is absent, certainly that it fails to achieve any form of empathy or care,8 and that it fails to facilitate an understanding of the ontologies of peace. The liberal peace is unable to communicate across cultures, rests upon a legalistic framework, disassociates law from norms, rests upon preserving the pre-existing liberal order, and claims a problematic universality.9 As a result of this failure, it often fails to provide even the 'thin recognition', let alone mutual consent and recognition that are often claimed, given the paucity of local consent. What is missing here is a discussion of dialogue and communication -indeed a discourse ethic -of notions of emancipation and care, and an understanding of the ontologies of peace. The liberal concept of toleration, and liberalism's link with sovereignty and the state, as well as its homogenising tendencies, and its failure to engage with issues such as culture and welfare, provide obstacles for this broader engagement leading to what Williams has argued is an 'auto-ambivalence',11 which disguises the negative consequences of the liberal peace. 12 Yet, even 'enlightened' debates on the concept of peace which generally tend to draw on approaches such as Galtung's negative/positive framework, the notion of a 'just peace', even an emancipatory approach, or the widely used concept of human security, tend to draw on, either by mimicking, extending or contesting, the liberal-realist paradigm, where peace is theorised as something which is at best institutionally constructed around states to engage with individual needs and emancipation, or in its more limited form a postponement of the tragedy of IR. Even critical and post-structural contributions revolve around the defence or attack of universalist principles and norms of peace.

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AT- Perm

Rejecting liberalism + realism is a pre-requisite – it is impossible to have alternative conceptions of peace while tied to a liberal framework (welfare important, again)Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 152-153)

What are the different possibilities for peace arising from interdisciplinary research? First, if realism's tragic postulation that peace is very limited and narrowly conceived at best is rejected, and liberalism's claim that both institutional regulation and individual agency are required is problematised, and the need for a discursive framework for emancipation, plural ontologies and hybridity, is accepted, then this opens up several different areas of research of peace. Institutional regulation has received much attention already in terms of law, justice, IOs, global governance and

constitutional frameworks. Individual agency has received rather less attention so far, mainly because it involves engagement with a potentially non-Western, non-liberal other. This raises difficult ontological and epistemological questions about institutions and their associated knowledge systems in relation to peace within the liberal framework, and certainly produces a tension with the privilege claimed by the discipline to be able to speak, rationally or otherwise, for the other. The liberal framework claims that individuals attain freedom through institutional regulation. Because Marxist-oriented approaches to class and economic frameworks have been discredited, and because the US projected contemporary neo-liberal approach underpins much of the peacebuilding practice around the world, the liberal peacebuilding project of the contemporary era tends to conceptualise individual freedoms as political freedoms in practice. This means the freedom to vote, rather than economic welfare and access to a decent level of facilities and economic opportunity (though neo-liberalism ironically presents this as free-trade, marketisation and economic freedom). The dominance of US neo-liberalism is hardly surprising, even despite the fact that many major donors practice social forms of democracy in their own states (such as Britain and the Scandinavian donors). This is also coloured by neo-liberal development arguments, which follow similar lines in creating free markets that provide modernisation and opportunities for the labour force. However, liberal approaches are constrained by their universal normative ontology and a methodology that prioritises officialdom and institutions, which make it extremely difficult to move beyond their main focus (which is always on institutions and states) towards the everyday life of individuals. This means that the freedom of the individual is by far a lesser priority in orthodox theorising of peace than international order -at best defined as a narrow peace. Peace between states is the priority; far outweighing any negative impacts this might have on some individuals within states who are sacrificed on the pragmatic and painful alter of 'order'. These are questions that the liberal framework cannot resolve, partly because of the inflexibility of the orthodoxy of IR theory, though it may be able to develop a heightened sensitivity to them by adopting some of the insights of constructivism and Critical theory. Constructivism also tends to rely on states and liberal institutional structures as the vehicles through which individual subjective and objective existences are inscribed.

Method (also a2 perm “multiple perspectives good” e/I multiple perspectives are good, the other cards prove the liberalism/realism doesn’t allow for that. The alt is key to open up multiple perspectives)Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 158-159)

Related methodological issues also arise. This is one of the key problems of IR in that while it tends not to embrace inter-disciplinarity, the sheer scale of the

issues it faces require it to do so, and especially require the ensuing diversity of method. One of the crucial outcomes of the grand experiment in creating peace around the world, from Westphalia to the league, the UN, and post-Cold War peacebuilding is that more depth and breadth is required if the peace created is to be sustainable. Parsimony is not conductive to a sustainable, ontological peace. Yet, the renegotiation of this broader peace means that there is a

certain 'ontological insecurity' in the resulting scale and scope of the peace project. It has become so wide and complex that it cannot be investigated through one discipline, or created by one institutional framework, as the above Tables show. This necessitates the diversification of the discipline, both in inter-disciplinary and methodological terms, as has now occurred. Even where a liberal peacebuilding consensus exists about the range of issues, frameworks and actors involved, it opens up the problem of universal versus pluralist versions of peace: but an engagement with an empathetic, emancipatory peace and its multiple ontologies navigates around the problem of a narrow version of

peace for a majority leading to the tyrannising of the minority. This responds with breadth and equity to the question of whom and what peace is for. But this can only be achieved

through inter-disciplinary work across disciplines where the dynamics of peace have rarely received attention.

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AT– Perm

Alternative understandings must be created – staying attached to current notions of peace dooms the alternative to failureRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 162)

This raises the question of how the voices of IR from outside of the developed world and its institutions and academies can express their understanding of the indigenous or everyday, and contribute (indeed, be heard) on equal terms to this discussion in the context of IR. This requires such alternative methodologies as derived from inter-disciplinarity, but it also requires that local academies and policymakers are enabled to develop approaches to understanding their own predicaments and situations as well as those of the West, or developed world, without these being tainted by Western, liberal and developed world orthodoxies, which cannot be easily transferred without inserting their own agendas and shortcomings. In other words, to gain an understanding of the indigenous factor for the overall IR project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace (which, in knowledge terms -and even in the context of critical theory -has become hegemonic because of the weight of so many actors,

institutions and academies that assume the liberal peace to be potentially universal). This indicates a response to the question of what and whom peace is for, and why. Peace is constructed for the good of all, for 'others', but it normally also favours a specific in-group. In the case of the liberal peace, this is the society of developed liberal democracies. This is hardly surprising given IR theory's mainstream focus on states, officials and

governments, and in the short, medium, and long-term they all benefit the most. An everyday ontology of peace, on the other hand, would enable political, social and economic organisations and institutions that respect the communities they are in a contractual relationship with in its specific circumstances and environment, requiring also the flexibility to respond to any changes. As a consequence, this notion of peace would be locally owned, would be self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically and environmentally, and would provide a via media between different identities and interests. As far as possible, these interlocking and interrelated versions of peace would also provide justice and equity, and avoid violence both direct and structural. There are indications of these requirements in the evolving frameworks of peace in an emerging interdisciplinary version of IR.

Perm fails the state is fundamentally at odds with any types of peace, in fact interdependence and inequality between states s the root cause of violence Carroll 72 - Bernice A. Carroll, department of political science, University of Illinois. Peace Research: The Cult of Power, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 4, Peace Research in Transition: A Symposium (Dec., 1972), pp. 600 Publisher(s): Sage Publications, Inc.

Putting aside the commitment to Marx- ist-Leninist analysis which Boulding attributes to the radical school, but which in fact characterizes only one wing of the radical spectrum in peace research, we need to

consider very seriously the possibility that the radicals are right: that peace-even negative peace-is ultimately not possible in the prevailing nation-state system of international relations and that a commitment to peace requires a commitment to revolutionary social change. We must consider seriously the possibility that war is inherent not in human nature, but in the power system of dominance in human relations which Gal- tung calls the feudal system, Kate Millett calls "sexual politics," Marxist radicals call "corporate capitalism," and peace researchers sometimes call "the threat system." This was the viewpoint adopted by Rous- seau, as Stanley Hoffman has pointed out. It may be useful here to recall that the main lines of his argument, briefly, were that war derives not from man's nature, but from the conflict and insecurity artificially imposed upon men in society by their increasing interdependency and inequality. As Hoff- man summarizes it: The passions bred by inequality, the inflation of desires fostered by society, gradually starve out compassion and submerge amour de soi [self-preservation and satisfaction of basic needs] under I'amour-propre-a concern for oneself which comes not from the natural desire for self-preservation, but from an artificial reaction to other people's judgments, opinions, and actions toward oneself. Thus what makes of man in de facto society so miserable a being is not just the violence to which he is exposed: it is what triggers violence, i.e., an insecurity which did not exist in the state of nature, which stems not from man's nature but from

man's cupidity, which is not so much physical as psychological-the need to compare oneself to others, the fall from etre to paraUtre [1963, p. 319]. Similarly, on the international level, "the unevenness of states is the fuel of world conflict.... The root of interstate war is inequality among nations" (pp. 321, 322). Moreover, conflict and war between states are exacerbated, rather than reduced, by increased interaction and interdependence, and would only be worsened by increased integration in the form of a world federa-

tion or world state: "for Rousseau, interdependence breeds not accommodation and harmony, but suspicion and incompati- bility." For Rousseau, indeed, the solution to the problem of war rests upon an acceptance of values quite the opposite of those associated with conceptions of power and the nation-state today

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AT-Perm

Basis of peacebuliding must be negotiated before conflicts can be solvedRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 110.]

[These various literatures associated with peacebuilding have effec tively concurred on their objective. The coalitions of state and non state actors and agencies have reached a 'peacebuilding consensus' on the nature of the peace to be created - the liberal peace. This reflects an amalgam of constitutional, institutional, and civil society pathways to peace. Peace is conceptualised as an achievable ideal form, the result of top-down and bottom-up actions, resting on liberal social, political, and economic regimes, structures and norms. It can be exported by the agents of the peacebuilding consensus (including lOs, ROs, agencies, IFls, NGOs and donors) and there is a modicum of concurrence about the fact that it is also open to negotiation with its recipients. In this sense, peace has moved away from the notion that it is an ideal form, achievable far into the future or simply utopian. Through the peace building consensus it has come to be seen as achievable if the correct steps are taken. Yet rarely in these literatures is there any explicit refer ence to the liberal peace. Its theorisation remains assumed or absent. But there is a great deal of debate on the various methods that can be applied to construct it, in an ever deepening and ever more complex manner. The evolution and hybridisation of the different strands of thinking about peace and the different methods inherent in the three generations of literature on peace and conflict studies outlined here, have reached the irrevocable conclusion that the devil in dealing with conflict lies in method and effectiveness, rather than in objectives. What lies hidden in these assumptions, however, is that elements of the victor's peace remain, and that the actors involved in peacebuild ing are not just engaged in constructing the liberal peace through insti tutional, constitutional and civil society formulations, but they are also _ involved in minor or major ways in renegotiating the nature of this peace. This renegotiation occurs between major international actors, funders, and liberal states interests, capacities, and objectives, as well as with local recipients of these activities in conflict zones. Peacebuilding, therefore, is not just about implanting the fruits of a broad consensus on peace on the ground in conflict zones; it is also about negotiating and renegotiating the peacebuilding consensus and the different forms of conditionality upon which it rests, or which are used to create the liberal peace, between its sponsors, its different agents, and its recipi ents. Indeed, what transpires from this line of thought is that third generation approaches to dealing with conflict result in a debate about governance within, between, and beyond the different polities that make up an international Society. Peacebuilding approaches imply that peace emanates from liberal forms of governance.]

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AT – Neg peace o/w Pos Peace

Striving for negative peace can only prevent conflict in the short term at the expense of violence later – positive peace is the only way to achieve permanent peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 12-13)

A major criticism of the 'agenda for peace' in IR is that it has been strongly influenced by idealism or utopianism, rather than reflecting a pragmatic engagement with the problems of IR. However, the democratic peace project, and the broader forms of the liberal peace, illustrate that this is not the case. The now dominant concept of liberal peace has practical implications, and can be conceptualised without necessarily entering into the realms of fantasy. Yet this has occurred without much debate about the possible variants of the concept of peace. Because thinking about peace is dominated by a set of key assumptions, most theorists, policymakers and practitioners assume that the concept of peace they deploy is ontologically stable. By extension this means that peace can be engineered in environments where it may not yet be present. As a result peace is constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction.

This confirms the pragmatism inherent in an agenda for peace, but also the interests that may lurk behind it. For a complex set of reasons, it has become the orthodoxy that attaining peace is a long-term process, which is probably not achievable but is worth working towards. As a result, intellectual energy tends to be focused upon problem-solving from the perspective of achieving a minimalist version of peace in the short-term. This then provides the basis for a longer term refinement of the concept. In the short-term, stopping violence and providing basic security is often the focus, with more sophisticated attempts to provide rights, resources and democratic institutions seen as a longer term process. The hope is that the short-term peace will be superseded in the longer term by a self-sustaining peace according to a universally agreed formula. International theorists, political scientists, diplomats, officials, politicians and citizens rarely question whether they understand these short-term and long-term concepts of peace, but instead take them a predetermined givens, which should simply be implemented when the opportunity arises. Certainly, amongst groups united by common interests, this appears to be a plausible position. What becomes clear when one examines the views of actors that are divided by interests, culture,

conflict, ideology, religion, or other forms of identity, is that these assumptions of peace break down very easily. An assumption of peace tied up in the framework of a group's position on a particular piece of territory, or the superiority of one culture, identity or religion over another, can easily become a source of conflict. One could make a strong argument that IR is actually about conflicting images of peace, as opposed to conflicting interests.

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AT - Utopian

Realism is the most utopian understanding of peace – we reject notions that there is a universal truth that describes everythingRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 21-22)

The terms 'utopian' and 'idealist' are often used from a realist perspective to cast aspersions upon the claims of the thinkers in this broad area.6 Indeed, so called

idealists who called for disarmament, the outlawing of war, adopted a positive view of human nature and international capacity to cooperate, were often accused of being unable to focus on facts, understand power, or see the hegemonic dangers of universal claims7 (despite the fact that realism itself makes a universal claim of being able to expose objective truth). Yet, the idealist tradition is often taken to be the founding tradition of

IR.8 Many thinkers of the day, and some more recently, saw elements of this group's work -such as supporting and developing the League of Nations or other later international organisations, or Mitrany's work on functionalism -as pragmatic rather than utopian,9 and certainly far more so than realism. Idealist thought offered the possibility of a single peace in which all conflict would end. Liberalism, by extension, offered the possibility of linear and ineluctable progress that would lead to the achievement of this peace, eventually.

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AT– Pacifism Bad

N/UQ – Pacifism high nowRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 27-28)

Pacifism is a strong underlying influence of idealist thinking,68 and also plays a moderate role in liberal thinking. In its most basic form pacifism is defined by opposition to war and other forms of violence. Paradoxically, this has done much to discredit pacifism in IR because of its tendency towards an acceptance that violence is endemic. Indeed, it is now noticeably absent from teaching in universities and from academic orthodox and mainstream discourses. In the contemporary, implicit debates about peace moderate forms of pacifism are linked to aspects of the liberal peace and its attempts to restrain violence. Pacifism is

closely associated with idealist notions such as internationalism, anti-war and disarmament sentiments, advocating for international governance (for idealists via the League of Nations) and, more ambitiously, world government. This has now been displaced by liberal approaches which focus on pluralism,

transnationalism, human rights, the rule of law, the possibility of a form of global democracy, and global governance. Indeed, one might make a strong argument now that the liberal-international community has generally accepted a pragmatic form of pacifism as one of its integral norms.

Pacifism is practicalRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 1: Peace and the Idealist tradition, TH, p. 27-28)

Pacifism is believed to be morally desirable, and conducive to human welfare, as opposed to the use of violence which is neither. It is most widely known as an absolutist condemnation of any form of war or violence, but it is rather more complex and nuanced than this.69 It is associated with a moral repugnance of war, killing and other forms of violence. In intellectual terms, pacifism can be divided into principled and pragmatic, or radical versions.7° An overt and principled stance against violence combined with an acknowledgement that it may at times be necessary is very common. It is relatively rare though to find radical pacifism where proponents argue against the use of violence under any conditions, even those associated with an extreme threat. However, an ideal form of peace is generally seen to be plausible by pacifists, given the proper circumstances, and war is seen to be abnormal and unnecessary. Peace is also seen to be universal both in aspiration and in ontology. Generally, pacifism indicates that communication should be used to deal with conflict leading to compromise and that there should be a general 'moral renunciation of war' .71 As Atack argues, this position can also be connected to Kantian or cosmopolitan theory because it envisages the replacement of the Westphalian sovereign system with cosmopolitan democracy and global citizenship,72 and accepts of the use afforce under very specific circumstances.

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AT - Hegemony

Hegemony undermines the ability to shift to a new conceptualization of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 2: A Realist Agenda for Peace, TH, p. 50-51)

In one of the most influential contributions to the realist tradition, though mainly in the North American context, which redefined realism as structural or neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz now

sought to rescue classical realism from its reliance upon the state as the sole actor, to focus upon the international system as a whole and to place it upon a positivist footing -as was the order of the day.57 In this international system of self-help, the core of realist thinking remained intact, the problem of structure and agency was brought to the fore, as well as that of the question of which level of analysis was most influential in understanding IR. Waltz's work marked a resurgent methodological shift from IR as an 'art' (often the 'art of the possible' on the part of statesmen and diplomats) to its claims as a science, therefore carrying the possibility of immutability, prediction and independent facts. Waltz made explicit the privileging of structural constraints determined by a mix of anarchy and state resources within the international system over agents' -mainly sovereign states -strategies and motivations towards survival, as well as the comparison between the free market with its 'hidden hand' and the international system.58 However, the security dilemma still drives the international system and state behaviour within a balance of power. Unsurprisingly, in the Cold War context, a bipolar balance of power was deemed more stable than a multipolar balance. Certain interpretations of the dynamics of the Cold War were influential in validating this view of IR. The approach formulated in George Kennan's identification of the inability of the Soviet Union to respond to anything other than the use of force or expression of power became a foundational assumption legitimating the new phase of realism.59 This absolute priority for IR trivialised many other issues and approaches that were equally, if not more, significant. Yet realist thought persisted, now couched within the framework provided by Westphalian states, though with the advent of the Cold War period its underlying subtext related to an analysis of relations between two alliances (some would also argue that these represented two empires) marked by proxy wars, a nuclear balance of power and the fear of 'mutually assured destruction'. Implicitly, in the state-centrically reproduced world now inscribed upon IR, any peace that was achieved would be underpinned by a dominant

or hegemonic state. Human nature, and the resultant nature of states, still indicated that a better peace could not be achieved (despite the challenge posed by liberal-democratic peace theory and by neo-liberalism, which was discounted by neo-realists on the grounds that democracies loosely defined had fought wars in the past and cooperation was still unlikely). Neo-realism focused upon the present situation, upon balancing multiple states' interests, and pre-empting future violence by constructing a militarised capacity that would make violence between states too costly for anyone state to believe there could be a clear winner. This rested upon a cost-benefit analysis of the utility of force as an expression of interest, and meant that the canon of neo-realist thought ultimately stopped at the point where a balance was achieved, and did not delve into the further possibilities that peace might offer. Neo-realism was not without its critics. Within the sister field of IPE, the notion of 'complex interdependence' offered a more ambitious notion of peace. A connection began to develop here with neo-liberal thinking about the benefits of international trade, which could anchor international cooperation and allow states to transcend their security dilemmas. Yet states only take part in international regimes, organisations and institutions because these conform to their national interests. Limited cooperation effectively occurred only within the parameters defined by state pursuit of national interests. This neo-liberal challenge emphasised the cooperative aspects of state-centric IR. On the issue of hegemony, Keohane and Ruggie argued that cooperation between states is possible without the need for hegemony, implying the development of an 'embedded liberalism' which modifies the basic positions of realism.61 Yet, regimes, norms and principles were affirmed not to be significant in IR by Waltz (though Krasner and Keohane did not agree).62

Hegemony is epistemologically flawed – hegemonic structures are internalized by citizens until it is taken to be inevitable. Liberal systems hide inherent hegemony.Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 127-128)

Gramsci offered the key concept of hegemony which is often used by critical theorists, as provides an important dimension for understanding how peace might be interpreted by different groups in different contexts.34 Hegemony is maintained through an ideology that promotes 'ruling class' interests, which can be disguised in

political, Cultural, social, economic, as well as theoretical and epistemological terms. Ideology could also be used to overthrow these interests and a 'counter-hegemony' would come about through the development of alternative social models. What is important about this approach is that hegemony also rests on a broad level of consent (which might be read by some as cooption) from its subjects. Thus, this provides a critique of the capitalist system,

which favours the few over the many even though the vast bulk of any given population accept it as the only economic system they could operate within. Hegemons retain their position as a result of this logic, meaning that an oppressive social order becomes internalised even by its victims. Neo-liberalism is often taken to provide a good example of this hegemonic project where victims of such an economic framework rarely are in a position to resist it.35 The contemporary liberal peace can be critiqued from this perspective as a postGramscian plural hegemony,36 in which multiple hegemonies coalesce around a single dominant notion of peace. This perspective acknowledges that the liberal peace may have both problem-solving and emancipatory dimensions, according to the multiple agendas of its key participants. These are able to act on behalf of others in order to bring them peace, but may also

disguise their own hegemony and drown out the voices of the marginalised. The liberal peace remains a virtual and aspirational peace, until it begins to engage with the everyday, emancipatory and self-emancipatory,

AT - Constructivism

Constructivism rests upon interstate relations – can’t escape current notions of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 84)

Though these accounts challenge orthodox approaches to IR on ontological and methodological grounds, they also arrive at a problem familiar to the liberal-realist canon. It is more a hybrid based upon rationalism and incorporating some aspects of more critical thinking.81 The state remains the central, dominant, actor, around which the understandings of peace revolve. For this reason the socially constructed peace, offered by constructivism, is conditioned by interstate relations, domestic politics and securitisation, which undermine inter-subjective factors such as identity and indicates a liberal

and progressive ontology of peace, limited by governance, run by state elites and the rationalist bureaucratic and administrative power,

which goes with statehood. Progress towards an emancipatory peace is tempered by the hegemonic, ideational power of its own

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foundational assumptions. However, in the context of the positivist approaches ofI R's orthodoxy, constructivism means that because identities and interests of actors are socially constructed, therefore peace might also follow suit, indicating its positivist epistemology. Because the state is still the key actor, despite its focus on non-material structures, the debate on peace mirrors that of the liberal-realist hybrid. But it also opens up key questions relating to identity, and the ideational and social construction of peace as a positive epistemology resting upon language, meaning, norms, states and institutions. From this, a far more comprehensive and critical engagement with the liberal peace, and beyond, is possible.

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AT – Your offense = inevitable

Liberal peace seems inevitable only within a Western standpoint – re-positioning ourselves through alternative understanding of peace can move awayRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 96)

This requires a form of disciplinary liberalism- peace-as-governance. This indicates the establishment of a failsafe process of governance that regulates and frees at the same time, thus allowing for liberal constraints and freedoms. It is self-preserving and self-legitimating, and is comfortably built upon claims of universal foundations. Consequently, the emergent liberal-democratic peace offers the possibility of peace through its multiple components which in the Western imagination produce stability, an international society and normative framework. It offers a view of modernity in which peace progresses from a negative to a positive form according to a rational methodological and epistemological approach, producing an objective way of knowing peace and its methods. From a Western standpoint, there seems to be no realistic alternative to liberalism. Indeed, the development of Western liberalism (and indeed, neo-liberalism) provides the foundation for

any approach to peacebuilding, as George has pointed out, on the legacy of the canon of classical philosophy, art, culture and science, and Renaissance humanism and post-Enlightenment assumptions about knowledge, power and progress. However, the approaches discussed in these chapters all try in their different ways to address the problems that arise from this.

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AT – We fix liberalism

Even the “ideal” liberal institution still links – its epistemological assumptions means it always marginalizes those who operate within a different knowledge system.Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 137)

In addition, in his work on the 'differend', Lyotard, as previously mentioned, identified the dilemmas of institutions and frameworks that, even when operating with good faith and consensus, still produce injustices for their members or components. 14 For him, even august (liberal) institutions which had broad support and legitimacy (meaning the consensus of those they affect) were problematic. Even where such institutions were used in good faith by all participants, they would inevitably marginalise some participants, depending upon the underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions and frameworks they represent. These would inevitably favour participants with similar assumptions. As a response to such dangers, Feyerabend favoured theoretical pluralism as a way of contending with claims of representation and escaping the monotonous certainties and eternal truths sought by positivism.15 In his letters to Imre Lakatos, and his writings 'Against Method' he addressed the problem of how formalism in method led to methodological rigidity and to ontological and epistemological assumptions that might lead to the failure of science.

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AT - Foucault

The changes necessary to establish new understandings of peace cannot be done from within the Framework in which Foucault operatesRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 146-147)

A post-structural version of peace is rather difficult to define as either a concept or theory. A schism exists between the post-Enlightenment liberal-realist agenda which

blithely assumes it is peace, and these alternative agendas which seek to illustrate how much violence, structural and direct, the liberal peace reproduces, and to address the question of an alternative agenda for peace. This certainly represents emancipation, not just from hegemony, but also from logocentrism, phonocentricism, from meta-narratives, from the Enlightenment project of rational, teleological progress, and from universal claims ontologies of peace through discourse. But, of course, this also means abandoning these frameworks, which also provide the basis from which many poststructuralists, like Foucault, operate. Yet, responding to these challenges extends the notion of peace far beyond what emerges from previous debates, though this also calls into question whether there can ever be a common peace based upon cooperation and a unity of norms, rules and views.

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AT: Neg peace first

Positive peace is they only way achieve real peaceRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformations of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pg 66.]

[ As Chapter 1 and this chapter have endeavoured to show, perhaps the most common analyses of peace and war have come about through the debate about the nature of the international system directly after a major war, or in terms of the contemporary shape of the international system. 76

Clark's study of the shape of the post-Cold War order, and Ikenberry's study about the shape of the international order after the peace settlements of 1648,1713,1815,1919, and 1945 concur in that they both agree that to understand order one must look at the way in which major systemic wars are ended, and what then follows. This implies that peace is constructed mainly as an outcome of war, of course, this being one of the most common approaches, linked to the long-standing concept of the victor's peace, with its binary, geospatial, temporal, and now liberal peace implications. This argument that peace is somehow contingent upon war is a common trope of hard and soft debates about security in the realms of real politics. Peace either occurs after a major war and is constructed upon its ruins or is constructed directly through war or the use of force . Either way, a common occurrence after a major war is the institutionalisation of the new peace by the remaining dominant actors (usually states) in the international system. This is to 'lock in' the new order, and to estab lish restraints on state power including on allies, competitors and one's own state. Thus, in the context of post-WWII, the US occupied Arlee reconstructed Germany and Japan, established the Bretton Woods Institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the US-Japan security treaty.78This conforms to the contemporary argument implicit in liberal and constructivist accounts of IR, that institutions are key guarantors of the normative compliance necessary for the liberal peace to survive. 79 This approach to the establishment of a sustainable peace is reflected in what Cooper has called, a 'post-modern' peace.80 This argument about peace is explicitly linear, and of course, does not use the term 'Post-modern' in a way that many academics would recognise. What this seems to refer to is a peace that has gone beyond what was previ ously known by past configurations, but one which is solidly rooted in the Western liberal development of the international system (rather than as a rejection of that system, which might be more recognisable to most understandings of post-modernism). Thus, Cooper argues that previously order meant empire, which roughly translates into a more specifically, the increasing 'non-place' of empire, progressively blurring distinctions between inside and outside, and supported by a notion of lomni-crisis'.82 Cooper sees the world as divided into the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, in which a new imperialism is quite plausi ble and may be equated with the modern peace effectively.83 Hardt and Negri imply that imperial sovereignty, which Cooper might describe as the post-modern peace (in which transnationalism and supranation alism have taken hold of some regions as in the case of the EU)84 is effectively rooted in hegemony and

domination. However, Cooper would disagree because its components are liberal and therefore uni versal, in his terms. The hybrid notion of the liberal peace is now implicit within both cosmopolitan and constructivist accounts of IR, which essentially function on the basis of universalism and the subsequent legitimation of intervention in the social and political lives and structures of others. ]

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AT-PostmodernismPostmodernist theory is not direct or developedNeufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 31)

There is, however, a problem, for while insisting on the politiconormative content of dominant knowledge discourses in the discipline-for example, neorealism-postmodernists have been strangely reluctant to spell out, or even acknowledge, the politiconormative content of their own approach. In short, it is not at all clear what can be meant by the statement that "poststructuralism [postmodernism] ... is an emphatically political perspective" but one "which refuses to privilege any partisan political line" (George and Campbell, 1990:281). What is politics without partisanship? What is a political perspective that denies having a project (political line)? And if postmodernism accepts that "all theory is for someone and for something," then what and whom is postmodernist theory for? There are hints in recent postmodern contributions-for example, for persons occupying "marginal sites"; for aiding them to proceed in a register of freedom to explore and test institutional limitations in a way that sustains and expands the cultural spaces and resources enabling one to conduct one's labours of self-making in just this register of freedom, further exploring and testing limitations. (Ashley and Walker, 1990:391) However, the designated audience and political-practice implications of postmodern theorizing should be spelled out in a more direct and developed fashion.

Postmodernist theory is arbitrary Neufeld 1994 (Mark, Department of Political Studies at Trent University, “Critical Reflections on International Relations”, Beyond Positivsm: Critical Reflections on International Relations, 1994, page 31-32)

Demonstrating that postmodernism satisfies the third requirement of reflexivity-that it affirms that reasoned judgments are possible even in the face of incommensurability-is also difficult. Some commentators have concluded that postmodernism's claim that "knowledge is essentially narrative, provisional and 'groundless'" should be taken to imply that "it is meaningless to seek the one 'best interpretation' (to establish the superiority of one interpretation over another)" (P. Rosenau, 1990:86); that postmodernism maintains that each paradigm "creates its own categories and none are superior to any other"; that "classification, because it involves judgement, is arbitrary" (P. Rosenau, 1990:85). If this is an accurate assessment of postmodernism, then it would have to be concluded that in spite of all of its criticism of logocentric modes of thought, postmodern international relations will remain trapped within the positivist derived stance of incommensurable and thus incomparable, and that as a consequence its contribution to the development of reflexivity in the discipline will remain minimal. Establishing the accuracy of this negative assessment of postmodernism is not a simple matter. On the one hand, there are a number of recent interventions by those associated with the tradition that lend some credence to the idea that this assessment of postmodernism is more the result of the hold of positivist categories regarding the nature of reason on postmodernist international relations' critics than in the approach itself. It is significant, for example, that George and Campbell (1990), authors of one of the central contributions to a special issue on postmodernist international relations, have attempted to demarcate their work from those that remain entrapped within Bernstein's notion of the "Cartesian anxiety": "the modernist proposition ... asserts that either we have some sort of ultimate 'foundation' for our knowledge or we are plunged into the void of the relative, the irrational, the arbitrary, the nihilistic" (George and Campbell, 1990:289)-a demarcation that would place postmodern international relations firmly on the path to the reflexive stance of incommensurable yet still comparable. In a similar fashion, Ashley and Walker's defense of a postmodern "ethics of freedom" against the charge that it sanctions "a sort of licentious activity whose credo might be 'Anything goes!'" can be read as an affirmation of the possibility of the reasoned adjudication of rival politico-normative claims, which is central to comparing the incommensurable (Ashley and Walker, 1990:389). On the other hand, simple assertions are not sufficient on their own to establish postmodernism's suitability for conducting reasoned discourse about incommensurable projects and knowledge frameworks. For even if postmodernists do not make the mistake of equating reason with episteme, it is still difficult to see how they can reconcile their proclaimed desire to contribute to reasoned debates with the totalizing critique of reason that has marked much postmodernist work. Indeed, in light of the latter, one might reasonably conclude that postmodernism is better suited to undermining the role of reason in toto than to expanding the notion of reason beyond the confines of positivist episteme in a way consistent with reflexivity.

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AT- Gilligan/Structural Violence

The state is responsible for structural violence- it should not be the actor against itNancy Nyquist Potter, “Part 2: The State and its Apparatus: World Views in Practice: Introduction”, Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.53.

In Preventing Violence, James Gilligan, a psychiatrist who works with lethally violent prison inmates, argues that we cannot curb violence until we understand its causes and its workings. When we study violent criminals, we find that the backdrop for their violence is, in fact, another form of violence: structural violence. Structural violence, according to Gilligan, is the existence of· "increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society.' The solution, he argues, is to create policies that address issues of poverty and suffering. But this direction may not be as fruitful as we might wish. Pierre Mertens writes that violence permeates governance even in the most democratic societies. On Mertens's view, law, economics, and culture are founded on inequalities that perpetuate injustices. Thus, we cannot count on the state to protect us from violence, because the state is implicated in violence at every turn.

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A2: No Difference between personal/structural violence

There is a clear distinction between structural and personal violence- their argument relies on subjectivity

Johan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 170-72

Let us start with the first question. It may be argued that this distinction is not clear at all: it disregards slights of the structural element in personal violence and the personal element in structural violence. These important perspectives are regained if a person is seen as making his decision to act violently not only on the basis of individual deliber- ations but (also) on the basis of expectations impinging on him as norms contained in roles contained in statuses through which he enacts his social self; and, if one sees a violent structure as something that is a mere abstraction unless upheld by the actions, expected from the social environment or not, of individuals. But then: does not this mean that there is no real distinction at all? Cannot a person engaging in personal violence always use expectations from the structure as an excuse, and does not a person upholding an exploitative social structure have responsibility for this?The distinction that nevertheless remains is between violence that hits human beings as a direct result of Figure 4 type actions of others, and violence that hits them indirectly because repressive structures (as analyzed in preceding section) are upheld by the summated and concerted action of human beings. The qualitative difference between these actions is the answer. The question of guilt is certainly not a metaphysical question; guilt is as real as any other feeling, but a less interesting one. The question is rather whether violence is structured in such a way that it constitutes a direct, personal link between a subject and an object, or an indirect structural one, not how this link is perceived by the persons at either end of the violence channel. The objective consequences, not the subjective intentions are the primary concern.But are personal and structural violence empirically, not only logically, independent of each other? Granted that there may be a correlation so that structures richly endowed with structural violence often may also display above average incidence of personal violence, it is possible to have them in pure forms, to have one without the other? are there structures where violence is person-invariant in the sense that structural violence persists regardless of changes in persons? And conversely, are there persons where violence is structure-invariant in the sense that personal violence persists regardless of changes in structural context? The answer seems to be yes in either case. The typical feudal structure, with a succession of incapsulating hierarchies of metropole-satellite relationships is clearly structurally violent regardless of who staffs it and regardless of the level of awareness of the participants: the violence is built into the structures. No personal violence or threat of personal violence are needed. And there are persons who seem to be violent in (almost) any setting - often referred to as 'bullies'. Characteristic of them is precisely that they carry their violent propensity with them far outside any structural context deemed reasonable by society at large, for which reason they will often be institutionalized (in prison or mental hospital, depending on which basic norms they infract first and most clearly). Hence, we may conclude that the two forms of violence are empirically independent: the one does not presuppose the other.

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A2: Structural Violence Inevitable

Structural violence is not inevitable- it only seems that way because nations have not taken steps to prevent itJohan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 179

Far from denying that these may be fruitful perspectives both for research into the past and the etiology of violence as well as for search into the future and therapy for violence we would tend to reject the position that violence presupposes a pre-history of violence of the same or opposite kinds. This view is a breeding theory, and like all breeding theories it fails to answer two questions: how did the process come into being at all? and is spontaneous generation of violence impossible, or are all cases of violence the legitimate offspring of other cases of violence - handed down through some kind of apostolic succession, the content being more like 'original sin' though? Take the case of structural violence first. Here it may be argued we will never get the perfect test-case. Imagine we based our thinking on something like this: people, when left to themselves in isolation (in a discussion group, stranded on an isolated island, etc.) will tend to form systems where rank, or differential evaluation of relatively stable interaction patterns referred to as status, will emerge; high ranks tend to cluster on persons who already have some high ranks, and interaction tends to flow in their direction - hence the net result is sooner or later a feudal structure. One might then object: yes, because these persons are already socialized into such structures, and all they do is to project their experiences and their habits so as to give life to an embryonic structure. And there is no way around it: human beings, to be human, have to be rated by humans, hence there will always be an element of succession. Maybe, but, we also suspect that the reasoning above holds true even under tabula rasa conditions because it probably is connected with the fact (1) that individuals are different and (2) that these differences somehow are relevant for their interaction behavior. Hence, special measures are needed to prevent the formation of feudal structures: structural violence seems to be more 'natural' than structural peace. And similarly with personal violence: it is difficult to see how even the most egalitarian structure would be sufficient to prevent cases of violence, whether they result from conflicts or not. Personal violence is perhaps more 'natural' than personal peace. It could also be argued that an inegalitarian structure is a built-in mechanism of conflict control, precisely because it is hierarchical, and that an egalitarian structure would bring out in the open many new conflicts that are kept latent in a feudal structure.

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A2 – Reps Ks bad/ = Paralysis

1. The alternative is a pre-requisite to successful political action – solutions created without first reconceptualizing how we view peace are doomed to futilityDunn, Research Fellow in International Relations, Keele University, UK., 1983, (David J., January, “Peace Research: Is a Distinction between 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Useful?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969, TH, p. 74)In a real sense, yes. Why peace research anyway? Why not peace action impelled by an evangelic spirit, because the initial stress was laid on the accumulation of knowledge, embodied in the research process, with peace as its guiding goal. Recall the comment of Singer, for whom rhetoric is not enough. Put by another pioneer in peace research, Herbert Kelman, the issue is one of rigour versus vigour in social research, more specifically the quality of research. 'The real issue in the evaluation of social research revolves, in short,

around the quality of the thinking and the imagination it represents. There is no substitute for good thinking and good imagination, no matter what methods we use. And no method automatically ensures us of either one of these.'9 To stress peace research meant to try to ensure, in a field

potentially so nebulous as the study of peace, that work that did take place would be of particular quality. And the better the quality of that work, the more seriously it would be taken by a wider constituency of policy makers, amongst others. Such a process is not entirely implausible. Moreover, it does not necessarily imply that peace research logically entails peace action. The issue is a difficult one, but it is amenable to analysis. Here Kenneth Boulding's approach is useful. In her study of his life and thought, Cynthia Kennan says of his view of knowledge: 'For him, knowledge is the key to breaking out of the chain of necessity, to having an accurate enough image of the world and of possible futures so that man can make a viable choice among alternatives.'10 On his own account, Boulding argued long ago for the power of knowledge: 'Freedom, if I may be pardoned for parodying the Holy Writ, is power, law and understanding and the greatest of these is understanding.'11

2. You link to your offense but don’t solve ours – liberal/realist notions of peace rely on discursive frameworks but don’t allow for the necessary changes to successfully reconceptualize peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 7: Post-structuralist contributions to peace, TH, p. 140)From this perspective much of IR's orthodoxy is anti-peace. Even liberal or idealist accounts effectively favour a discursive and hegemonic framework derived from Western/developed ontologies and interests. Its isolated reduction and abstraction of human life within 'international relations', instead made up of 'actors, anarchy, interdependencies, threats, rationality', power and interests leads to dangerous rational calculations that ultimately sacrifice human, everyday life and the chance of peace.36 IR represents its knowledge systems as universal, when in fact they are local to the west/north.37 Such representational habits38 and knowledge systems are prone to isolating themselves in order to maintain their belief in universality.39 For example, Sylvester has shown

how Waltzian neo-realism led to a form of IR in which 'parsimonious explanatory power traded off the gender, class, race, language, diversity, and cultural multiplicities of life' .40 Similarly, Watson has shown how a large percentage of the world's population -children -are surprisingly absent from IR for similar reasons.

3. The alternative is political action – representation of peace is a crucial and central part of policy formationRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 82-83)Constructivism is mainly concerned with the role of states as central to the moderation of anarchy and the process of socialisation. As constructivist approaches argue that state behaviour is determined by their identities and interests, this implies that their construction of peace is also determined by their interests and their identities. Of course, there is an important proviso here -that anarchy and interests may also change. This represents a picture of an identity and interest-based peace deployed for others, on a normative and interest basis, which may well fluctuate over time. The problem here, of course, is that normative change should be very different to interest-based change, and because constructivist approaches ascribe states as agents and actors IR, it is very difficult to imagine them changing the peace they project. From this perspective, as socially constructed states create or control international anarchy they also create and control peace, and they do this according to their own values and interests. Often values are dressed up as interests and vice versa. Socially constructed states therefore socially construct a broader peace in their image, according to their own identity, and within the broader international structure, which of course acts as a constraining factor on their own agency. Their agency consequently depends upon their resources, and in these terms constructivism bridges both realist and liberal debates about peace. While constructivism emphasises the role of identity in the politics of peace, it also endorses the role of the state as both a provider and controller of peace. This means that constructivism envisages a hegemonic actor, probably a state, which dominates both the identity of peace and so its discussion and formation. This actor will probably form, drive, materially support and dominate any peace, clearly connecting a constructivist peace with a liberal-realist hybrid peace. Adler and Barnett have worked on questions relating to peace and security derived from constructivism. They have developed the idea of 'security communities' in which states act in groups to establish a community with its own institutions aimed at providing a stable peace.72 In a pluralistic, transnational, security community, states retain their own sense of identity while at the same time sharing a 'meta-identity' across the security community.73 This raises the question of how the norms and institutions of a security community influence their member states and how states become socialised into a security community in the first place. As a consequence, constructivism has implicitly also become involved in the debate over increasing the breadth of IR's understanding of security, though of course the focus is still on the state. Here the work of Waever and Buzan, and the 'Copenhagen School' on 'securitisation' has made the key contribution. This has effectively defined securitisation as a discursive process dependent upon societal and historical contexts leading to an existential threat to a particular community.74 This means that peace in these terms moves far from the pragmatic questions related to battle deaths and a status quo, ceasefire and 'Cold War', towards a discussion of the qualitative conditions of peace for those who actually experience them. This is an important step forward in IR's engagement with the concept of peace, though it does not go as far as more critical approaches imply is possible in constructing a type of peace that would be acceptable to all-as Aradau's work connecting emancipation with 'de-securitisation' illustrates.75

4. Even if we are only an incremental change that’s OK – changing the complexion of the struggle through epistemological shifts is the most important political action we can take.Dunn, Research Fellow in International Relations, Keele University, UK., 1983, (David J., January, “Peace Research: Is a Distinction between 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Useful?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969, TH, p. 72-73)The size of the radical input to peace research cannot be overlooked. That it changed peace research is undeniable. What is at issue is the nature of its impact. Was the radical input for good or ill? Resolution of this issue depends on value commitment. In a post-colonialist age, radicals stressed neo-colonialism; as colonies gave way to new states, the stress moved to

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the whole spectrum of dominance relationships, usually discussed in terms of 'positive peace', contrasted with a narrower 'negative peace', and linked with issue of structural violence. In retrospect, radicalism stressed a broader view of conflict and peace, not least in terms of architectonics of peace that were not susceptible to analysis only in state-centric terms. If this was a positive gain, what were the costs? No less an eminent peace researcher than David Singer is in no doubt at all: 'in sum, the radical wing has not only, by my criteria, given peace research a bad name, but it has corrupted the communication channels, sown conceptual confusion and discredited the scientific mode'.5 In a separate assessment, Singer amplifies his clear commitment to the scientific element in peace research, for he argues: 'In my judgement, moral concern and skilful rhetoric will not suffice. But if we can couple our

concern with competence, and our rhetoric with knowledge, we may yet turn the world away from disaster. All too many peace researchers

and peace activists do not understand that the most important revolution we can make is an epistemological revolution.'6 This is clearly the view of a

'committed' scholar, but one whose commitment is linked to a particular strategy of advance. 'Not only does it seem to me that we are more likely to get irreversible transformation in the desired directions via incremental reform, but it also seems that by explicitly eschewing violence we may begin to change the complexion of the struggle itself.'7 Such statements are eloquent on their own account and need no further comment, except to say that they stand as one strand of a careful, committed and scientific scholarship.

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AT- Plan Good- Outweighs Negative Reps (1/2)

1. Representations come first- their call for violence is rooted in a belief in violence-makes the impact inevitable [card]2. Discourse focused only on negative peace emboldens societal power relationships and moots out the possibility of positive peace

William C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.5.

Can peace be an issue for public policy? For democratic societies, this question may seem rhetorical, since contemporary democratic states stipulate that citizens, or at least their representatives, give consent before war is waged. As far back as 1795, Immanuel Kant contended that whenever the consent of citizens is not necessary for waging war, genuine peace is not possible and, for this reason, supported constitutional, representational government.1 However, because debate on whether to wage war is an issue for public policy in a constitutional, representative government does not mean that discussion of whether to pursue genuine peace will be an issue for public policy. Moreover, the structure of public policy discourse may itself thwart pursuit of genuine peace. While I believe that genuine peace, what many call "positive peace," can be pursued within the public policy forum, I also believe that discourse is generally distorted.Public policy occurs as a specific form of discourse, one forged within the political sphere. Public policy discourse comprises a distinct type of discourse that is governed by specific norms. Some philosophers, building on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, see such discourse as a distinct language game. Going further, sociolinguist Pierre Bourdieu has shown that discourse is inseparable from the distribution of power in society. (This insight is becoming common in treatments of language and politics.) In my work, I stress how the dimension of power within discourse is manifest in various forms of linguistic alienation and linguistic violence. In this chapter, I focus more narrowly on public policy discourse. My thesis is that relations of power, even within democracies, structure public policy discourse in ways that disadvantage peace activists.

3. The alternative is a prerequisite to solve- the supposed threats to the affirmative are only constructions of their imagination- non-violence forces us to stop viewing other nations and groups as threats- we will thus not retaliate or anger the supposed enemy and de-escalate conflict

4. Positive peace is a prerequisite for negative peace- society will not cooperate with the government’s plans if they feel that they are not included

Beth J. Singer, “Nationalism and Dehostilization,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.160.

Such norms cannot be externally imposed; ordinarily they evolve in the effort of people working together toward a common goal and having to regulate their interaction and communication. They are likely to retain their force only among those who feel they have had a voice in their establishment, and this would have to be the case among those who were to participate in the planning process. In order to attain the level of trust that would allow them to cooperate in devising a set of principles that they would all be willing to implement, all the participants in the talks would have had to be assured that their integrity would be respected and remain inviolate. This would be the primary and most challenging task for the proposed Transitional Authority.

a2: Plan Good- Outweighs Negative Reps (1/2)

Representations of violence are the root cause of violence- the media’s portrayals of violence serve to infuriate the viewer- The aff’s call for violence reflects this cultural representation.

Melissa Burchard, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC- Asheville, “The Power of Entertainment: Violence in the Stories of our Times,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.30.

A frequently heard argument contends that the media, especially in its entertainmentforms, fosters an increase in violence in our culture through its ubiquitous representations of violence. W. James Potter, for example, in his book On Media Violence, reviews a broad range of studies done over the last thirty years. He concludes that they support findings including that "[e]xposure to violent portrayals in the media can lead to subsequent viewer aggression through disinhibition" and that "[m]edia violence is related to subsequent violence in society.”2 I agree with Potter that the weight of evidence supports this claim. But one question that may not have been raised adequately as yet is, whether or not this increase in violence is an expression of the media per se, or an expression of something more broadly cultural, but which is currently manifested more strongly in certain of our media formats than in other places.

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A2 Militarism Good

1. Non-responsive, the problem is not security itself, but rather its deployment. Resturucing the way policymakers think about war as well as how they frame issues solely in the basis of preventing warfare is crucial to averting conflict.

2. Ignoring structural violence in order to proceed with militarism masks the underlying problem and makes extinction inevitable, that’s Kim

3. The affirmative fails to address the root cause of war; even if they win that they can solve one instance of conflict, it doesn’t matter, 2 reasons: a) Militarism fails in the context of framing policies, or in addressing structural violence, it ensures the constant extermination of

the poor and the 100 years of conflict leading up to the 1ac, that’s Gilmanb) Band-aid approaches that solve 1 instance miss 100 others, extinction is inevitable in the status quo, weapons development has put us

on the brink of collapse now, it’s try or die for the negative

4. Negative representations of war as a temporal event in the 1ac doom solvency as well as create a self-fulfilling prophecy where the band-aid solutions of the affirmative only further the harms they claim to solve

5. Their epistemology is flawed, years of violence have conditioned their authors to dogmatically accept war, preventing them from viewing alternate sources of conflict resolution or structural factors in conflict

Kim 76 - The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique, Samuel S. Kim, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1976), p. 254-5, Sage Publications, Ltd.If accepted without critical scrutiny, the application of the Lorenzian theory to the social sciences in general and to peace research in particular can be misleading and even dangerous . This paper challenges the Lorenzian theory on conceptual, methodological, and substantive grounds and draws up some broad policy implications for peace research. However, a few caveats are in order at the outset. The present critique should not be regarded as an apology for anti- evolutionary approaches in the social sciences. Nor should it be regarded as an instance of parochial resistance to cross-disciplinary approaches in peace research or as a traditional opposition to 'scientific' method in political science. Rather, it is predicated on the belief that indiscriminate cross- fertilization can be of little heuristic value to the advancement of peace research as a value-oriented policy science.3 The Lorenzian Theory The core of the Lorenzian theory of human and animal behavior is the assertion that 'aggression' - defined as 'the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species (Lorenz, 1966: ix) - is phylogenetically programmed and, therefore, ineradicably instinctive behavior. Aggression is not a learned reaction to social cues or environmental stimuli but a species-specific instinct man has inherited from his anthropoid ancestors in the service of evolutionary adaptation and survival. All the amazing paradoxes of human history would somehow fall into place, Lorenz would have us believe, 'like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, if one assumes that human behavior, and particularly human social behavior, far from being determined by reason and cultural tradition alone, is still subject to all the laws prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted instinctive behavior' (1966: 237; see also 1970: xii). In his enthusiasm for the popularization of ethology, Lorenz (1966: 29) conveys the impression that this conceptual net can stretch so far and wide as to cover 'the alarming progression of aggressive actions ranging from cocks fighting in the barnyard to dogs biting each other, boys thrashing each other, young men 'throwing beer mugs at each other's heads, and so on to bar-room brawls about politics, and finally to wars and atom bombs'. In order to make the ambiguous concept of 'instinct' integral to his theory of human and animal behavior, Lorenz ha's reified it. Closely following the formulation of Tin- bergen (1951), Lorenz views instinctive acts as rigidly stereotyped innate movements ('fixed action patterns') which are coordinated in the central nervous system. Lorenz flatly asserts that 'the motor co-ordination patterns of the instinctive behaviour pattern are hereditarily determined down to the finest detail' (1970: 313). Instinctive acts are thus neurophysiologically motivated and re- leased in t'he internal system of the organism - 'a virtually close system' in Lorenz's (1970: 323) own words - quite independently of the animal's experience and environment.4 Ano'ther salient feature of the Lorenzian theory is its insistence on the spontaneity of aggression…CONT…From the standpoint

of peace research, however, the most troubling aspect of the Lorenzian definition of human aggression is its weakness in dealing with institutionalized aggression - the injury, harm, and violence indirectly inflicted upon one group of individuals by another group of individuals through institutions and structures of society, or what Galtung (1969) terms 'structural violence' . The irony is that the greater the capability an actor possesses in terms of such coercive weapons as position, wealth, persuasive skills, and the like, the greater the probability that his 'aggression' will be expressed in an indirect institutional or structural form rather than in a direct personal/physical form. Even the widely accepted (non-Lorenzian) definition of aggression as 'any behavior whose goal is the injury of some person or thing' (Berkowitz, 1968a: 168) raises the conceptual problem of attribution of intent. Strictly speaking, intent is not a behavioral attribute but a circumstantial inference de- duced from any behavioral pattern which is, or appears to be, nonaccidental. This raises an interesting conceptual problem. Is an actor who attempts to injure some person or object seriously, but fails, as 'aggressive' as an actor who unintentionally injures some person or thing? Clearly, lack of consensus on the extent of attribution of intent remains a major obstacle in operationalizing the concept of aggression. Independent of its conceptual difficulties and substantive weaknesses, the Lorenzian approach to aggression and war is flawed on methodological grounds alone. This is due to Lorenz's recurrent tendency to stray be-yond the boundary of well-established scientific standards and procedures. Instead of the formulation of operational hypotheses that can be empirically verified, or the development of theses based on evidence, one finds an unrestrained mixture of metaphorical reasoning and dogmatic conviction , a pervasive confusion of analogy and homol. gy, and an unabashed exercise in cross-species extrapolation and long inductive leaps. Most important, Lorenz fails to construct a relevant or testable paradigm for the study of war .

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A2: Moral Imperialism

The alternative allows for more moral independence- it forces decisions to be made only when consensus existsRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.124-125.

What is right about moral relativism is its skepticism about claims to the universal and objective validity of the moral principles of particular individuals or groups. The lack of universality and objectivity can be at least partly alleviated by substantial global consensus. If we remain skeptical about the objective validity of moral claims, then no other option is available than morals by agreement (with discussion)—we have no other option than global consensus and democratic decision-making. (Within the United Nations, this may require the elimination of Security Council vetoes or possibly two-thirds instead of simple majorities; it certainly would require a more representative Security Council.) Iris Marion Young argues that democratic decision-making is most likely to result in justice. In the absence of a philosopher-king with access to transcendent normative verities, the only ground for a claim that a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a public which has truly promoted the free expression of all needs and points of view .... With such participation, people will persuade, ideally, only if they phrase their proposals as appeals to justice, because others will call them to account if they believe their own interests endangered… Democratic decisionmaking tends to promote just outcomes, then, because it is most likely to introduce standards of justice into decisionmaking processes and because it maximizes the social knowledge and perspectives that contribute to reasoning about policy.18 Looking at domestic violence can help us. Virtually no responsible person thinks that prosecuting abusers is morally imperialistic. No responsible person thinks a relativity of values is present. Problems of moral imperialism can be minimized when substantial consensus on an issue is achieved within the context of public debate open to all parties, with the right of demonstration and access to media for those outside the consensus. When the consensus operates through a system of law, with democratically elected legislatures, with disputes adjudicated in courts in which both parties to disputes have confidence, problems of moral imperialism are also reduced.

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***Aff Answers***

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Aff - PermThe perm is the perfect way to create alternative understandings of peace – the key is not the resolution of alternative understandings, IE voting neg, but rather the understanding that there are different notions of peace. There is no “correct” conclusion that should be drawn about peace, voting for the alternative only reinscribes a new dominant version of peace.Dunn, Research Fellow in International Relations, Keele University, UK., 1983, (David J., January, “Peace Research: Is a Distinction between 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Useful?,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096969, TH, p. 75-76)

Peace education, any education, is not about replacing one dominant view with a counter-view. In peace education stress is laid on consciousness raising, not consciousness pushing or construction. Education about peace, since peace is a value-laden concept at best and a downright confusing one at worst, fits into the 'jolt' theory of education and not 'push' theory of education. This is a crude but useful distinction. The point of departure is a comment from Kerman, who, in discussing Boulding's theory of images, says '.. . the most fundamental learning takes place when something jolts our expectations and forces us to re-examine our image'.12 What, then, is so useful about a distinction between a jolt and a push? In some areas of education there is wide agreement on what constitutes a right and wrong answer. Anybody who believes that two and two make five is mistaken. Here education is about pushing towards an acceptance of right answers, on the ground, presumably, that manifestly wrong answers leave pupils ill-equipped for life. However, in social studies there are few universally agreed criteria of what constitute 'right answers'. There may reasonably be widespread disagreement over whether Earl Haig was a good general or whether going to the moon justifies the expense involved. What we tend to assume is that exposure to different views leads to a balanced understanding in the end. We try to widen horizons, to draw attention to different sorts of evidence and contrary opinions

in order to 'jolt'. But rethinking does not necessarily mean new thinking. After a course in peace research or peace education some students may be convinced that deterrence is a means to peaceful relations. (In conventional peace research terms, they may adopt a narrow view of peace.) One may or may not agree with this conclusion, but one is not in a position to say that it is wrong. Peace education is a joker, a challenge, a provocation in the best sense, based on a reasonably sound approach: here is some information about peace that is new, challenging and in contrast to prevailing attitudes, make of it what you can. The onus on the peace educator is to achieve completeness as far as possible; it is not to replace one dominant view with another.

Redeveloping IR is critical – otherwise we re-entrench current narrow representations of realityRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 3-4)

This study does not claim to cover or explain IR theory comprehensively -it is already perhaps over-ambitious -or to move beyond its Western corpus (as it probably should) but it endeavours to be particularly sensitive to the claims of IR theory about the pros and cons of even having a debate about peace. It is inevitable in a study such as this that much emphasis is on 'great texts' and key concepts and theoretical categories (though this is a syndrome that the author would prefer to refute). Later chapters do try to avoid this, in the context of the critical ground established to make this move in earlier chapters. What is important here is the attempt not to reject IR as a discipline, as some critical thinkers do in the

extremes of their frustration with its limitations, but to redevelop it to reflect the everyday world, its problems, and opportunities for a wider peace in everyday life. This endeavour is a crucial part of the attempt to escape mainstream IR's rigid and narrow, post-Enlightenment

representation of specific reductionist discourses as reality, rather then exploring contextual and contingent interpretations. Theory indicates the possibility for human action

and ethical and practical potential,12 meaning that the study of peace must be a vital component of engagement with any theory. The focus on peace and its different

conceptualisations proposed in this study allows for the discipline to redevelop a claim to legitimacy which has long since been lost by its orthodoxy's often slavish assumptions about war, strategy, and conflict and their origins. It seeks to go beyond the objectivist and linear display of knowledge about who and what is important in IR (international elites, states, policymakers and officials (normally male), the rich, the West) and reintroduce the discourses of peace, and its methods, as a central research area, specifically in terms of understanding the everyday individual, social and even international responsibilities, that orthodox IR has generally abrogated.

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Aff - Perm

Engaging multiple concepts of peace is critical to optimal udnerstandingRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 17)

To counter this universal and hegemonic discourse, peace might instead be contextualised more subtly, geographically, culturally, in terms of

identity, and the evolution of the previous socioeconomic polity. This means that one should be wary of a theoretical approach, or an empirical analysis, or a policy,

which suggests that the institutions, norms, regimes and constitutions associated with peace can be applied equally across the world. There needs to be a differentiation between international order and peace in a global context, as well as local order and peace in a local or indigenous context. This means that peace as a concept can subjected to very specific interpretations, determined by politics, society, economy, demography, culture, religion and language. It should not merely be a legitimating trope applied to bolster a specific theory, policy or form or organisation, but conceptually and theoretically, should represent a detailed engagement with the multiple dynamics of conflict, war and disorder as well as the social, political and economic expectations, practices and identities of its participants. Engaging with the multiple concepts of peace forms the heartland of IR's quest to contribute to an understanding of stability and order and the 'good life'.

Combining idealism with our notion of peace is good enough – this still achieves a positive epistemology and ontology of peace which solves the KRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Introduction, TH, p. 37-39)

Given that idealism made such grand ontological claims, it was relatively easy to denounce, given the failure of the idealist-influenced Versailles settlement in 1919 and the outbreak of the Second World War -a war it was supposed to prevent. This catastrophic event decisively put an end to the first great debate of IR, which was effectively over whether peace rested upon a negative or positive epistemology, in favour of realism. This was determined by the context of the day -the advent of the Second World War -rather than a far-reaching intellectual victory. Yet, idealism and liberalism were gradually to come together to form a hybrid, which also incorporated elements of pragmatic forms of pacifism Idealism provided the foundation for this move, which came to be enshrined in the liberal-international system that was emerging after the Congress of Vienna at an institutional level and influenced the emergence of international law and human rights. Idealism offered the intellectual ideal of a form of peace, which liberalism enshrined in a Lockean social contract and a Kantian international system of peace. After the First World War, idealism's legacy continued in the form of the more moderate approach of variants of liberalism, which is generally associated with

individualism, liberty and generally agreed restraints, defined and policed by benevolent hegemons in a hierarchical system. These elements coexist in liberalism's IR guise where, like realism, it depends upon the state as the organising unit of the international system and as a shell for the government of a specific territory in a consensual contract with its peoples. These agendas have contributed to the liberal peace agenda -a grand narrative which offers a self-governing form of peace within and between states. Idealism leads to liberal readings of international politics, and liberalism's vision of peace claims to approximate the utopianism inherent in idealist understandings of peace, while recognising the dangers of war and aggression. Indeed, this mode of thinking also addresses some of the dynamics and issues derived from Marxist themes and in particular the problem of social, political and economic systems and their relationship with power, knowledge, rationality and justice. From this emerging synthesis, as later chapters attest, critical approaches drawing on social theory emerged in IR theory. The ontology offered by these debates indicated that there was a human and social potential for a more sophisticated peace though, of course, Kantian derived approaches also indicated an often violent tension with non-liberal states and systems that implies a liberal imperialism. An epistemology of this peace was required which could be engineered in a pragmatic manner, resting on the normative foundations offered by liberalism. This can be found in the literatures that emerged on international organisation, internationalism and functionalism, as well as on norms, regimes and global governance. This fertile ground for thinking about peace has been one of IR's strongest influences, despite the common focus on realpolitik. This infers an ontology in which governance and international organisation can be used to develop peace as a common good for all, through which a specific epistemology and methods can be practically deployed to create progress towards an ideal of peace. This process depends upon a peace that can be created by those with specialised capacities suitable both for themselves and for others. Peace is represented as both process and outcome defined by a grand theory resting upon territorial sovereignty and international governance, which every theoretical and conceptual stage should work towards in a linear and rational fashion, offering the liberal claim of a 'peace dividend'. All of this is strongly influenced by a mixture of Western cultural and historical normative frameworks, which claim some degree of universality. Its normative underpinnings dictate inclusivity, equality and pluralism, while at the same time recognising difference, within the confines of an imagined ideal state of IR, a standard which automatically delineates the limits of its pluralism. Yet, it is clear that the hybrid of idealism, pacifism and liberalism has offered a formidable, progressive framework for peace. This unashamedly aspires to offer a positive epistemology of peace -even if there is an internal tension over the plausibility of an ontology of peace -which has been adopted, in ideological, methodological and epistemological terms, by many contemporary states (particularly in the West), donors, international organisations, agencies (such as the much of the UN family, the EU and the World Bank), and officials. It is able to see beyond the tragedy of a state of nature, and has been able to engage with context and the need for planning and practical solutions to the problems of IR. This account of peace offers a practical and ontologically positive version. However, this is not been unproblematic, as later

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Perm Negative and Positive peace are fundamentally flawed concepts – they aren’t directly opposed, perm solvesBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 78-79

Another quarrel, partly one of semantics but also going a little deeper than that, is that Galtung seems to me to have a certain carelessness in the definition of positive and negative terms. The expression 'negative peace' of which he is very fond seems to me a complete misnomer. What he is talking about is negative war. I am not sure indeed that the terms positive and negative are very useful here. What we perceive in the international system is a phase system with two fairly well defined phases of war and peace, which constantly succeed each other, just as water freezes into ice and ice remelts into water as the temperature falls and rises again. Peace is a phase of a system of war-ring groups. It is not just 'not-war' any more than water is 'not ice'. Both peace and war are complex phases of the system, each with its own characteristiics. The term 'positive peace', by which Galt-

ung seems to mean any state of affairs which gets high marks on his scale of goodness, is also most unfortunate. It is not in 'any sense the opposite of negative peace. In fact it may have very little 'to do with peace. Peace in the phase sense is almost certainly a part of it, though even this

would not be true in everybody's estimation. There are people who have loved war and thought it was better than peace, and while this is not part of my own values as a normative scientist, I have to admit that it has been part of some people's values in the past and may even continue to be so. It is much more important to clarify the distinction between the negative and the positive in the social sci-ences than it is in physics, where the principles of simple algebra hold and minus minus is always plus. In social systems minus minus is not the same as plus. Refraining from producing a bad, that is, from doing harm, is a very different thing from producing a good, and threats, a proposed exchange of negative goods, is extraordinarily different from the exchange of positive goods.

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Aff – Alt Bad

Peace research can’t solve necessary difficult policy choices.Quester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 100)

When asked how they would choose between preventing nuclear war and preventing conventional war, many people who style themselves peace researchers will thus simply refuse to comment, re-garding it as a moral betrayal even to acknowledge that such a choice

might ever have to be made, arguing that there must somehow be a solution that never would require giving up on either gain. Similarly, if asked to choose between eliminating poverty and eliminating war, the same researchers will again run away from the question, as if it were some kind of trap. Yet

there are tough choices to be made in this world. The same nuclear weapons that, by being deployed in Western Europe, might produce an escalation to an all-out thermonuclear World War III may also have contributed to keeping Europe from engaging in another conventional war for more than four decades, an unusually long time for that continent. The arms-control perspective recognizes such tough choices, in effect, by stressing a yardstick of at least three out-puts, phrased most aptly by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin some three decades ago:4 reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the destruction in war if it actually occurs, and reducing the economic and other burdens of peacetime readiness for the possibility of war. These outputs are each important, but in case after case, they get in each other's way, may conflict with each other, and may force us to make difficult and unpleasant choices.

Some military based actions have empirically been successful in reducing war – ignore their blanket claimsQuester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 100-101)

The peace researchers are thus some-how convinced that there are no good weapons, and they regard any talk of arms control as merely a trick,

intended to persuade them to relax their opposition to every form of preparation for war. When the case is made that submarine-based nuclear missiles have actually been desirable for the world, since 1960 markedly reducing the tensions of each side's fearing an attack by the other, perhaps even thereby reducing the total of resources that would otherwise have been wasted on military programs, the peace researcher makes him-self or herself intellectually blind to such arguments. If someone from the international-security research community were to suggest, perhaps facetiously, perhaps more seriously, that the Nobel Peace Prize is overdue for the developers of the Polaris missile program, the peace researcher would react with anger and dismay, rather than having his or her curiosity aroused by the suggestion.' There are indeed many bad weapons, weapons that make war more likely and more destructive, and weapons that waste a great deal of

money. But not every choice in this field of life is thus what the economists would call Pareto optimal, whereby an improvement can be made by all measures and no difficult choices have to be made. Rather, we quickly enough run out of the simpler choices and then reach the hard decisions, where disarmament might make wars more likely, or where making war less likely in one theater would make it more likely in another, and so forth.

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AFF: Alt Bad Positive peace’s refusal of all hierarchies is an impossible demand and ultimately results in more oppressive structures. Only reform from within hierarchies can solve.Boulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 80-81)

Closely related to Galtung's horror of in-equality is his horror of dominance, and therefore of hierarchy. He cannot stand any-body's being top dog in spite of the fact that he is a distinctly top dog himself be-cause of his high quality. This leads to an almost total rejection of 'hierarchy as

a principle of social organization. Yet one suspects he has never really examined the price of this rejection. Hierarchy is the price that we pay for any organization beyond the small group in which everybody can communicate with everyone else. It is a device for economizing communication which is absolutely necessary in organizations 'beyond a handful of people. Even with a hundred people, there are 9,900 possible pairs, and communication between all the pairs is impossible. Hierarchy, of course, has its costs in terms of 'corruption of information and in terms of concentration of power, and it is a fairly general proposition that the more powerful a

decision-maker, the more likely are the decisions to be 'bad ones. That there are in-efficiencies and pathologies of hierarchy no-body can doubt. These must be dealt with, however, within the structure of hierarchy itself and cannot be dealt with by abolishing it. To try to solve human problems by dismembering hierarchy and creating the 'social entropy of disorganization seems to me wholly illusory. Galtung's recognition of the pathologies of hierarchy is probably what saves him 'from Marxism (as he has repeatedly stated, he is not a Marxist), for Marx completely failed to come to grips with the problems of hierarchy, and for this reason I think has almost certainly done more harm than

good. It is one of the great ironies of history that the socialist movement, based on a very legitimate demand for greater equality and participation, has resulted in enormous concentrations of power and extremely pathological hierarchies. To deny all validity to dominance is to me to deny a human problem of very high priority, which is the development of non-pathological 'forms of dominance which are legitimated and part of a legitimate social contract. The social contract after all is a dominance to which the dominated agree because it is worth 'the price. Galtung's hatred of dominance prevents him from ever formulating this problem.

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Aff – A2 Structural Violence

Solving structural violence doesn’t solve war – solving war solves structural violence.Quester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 101)

More broadly, the peace researcher is convinced that the elimination of social ills will almost always tend to reduce the risks of war as well. No one in the more realistic international-securities community is op-posed to the spread of literacy or to the eradication of disease and starvation and poverty. Yet

what are we to make of the fact that the Mediterranean country with the highest per capita income has been Cyprus? There is, unhappily, no real evidence that the conflicts that cause a nation to be ready to go to violent warfare disappear when other problems disappear; the link-age often seems to be the reverse.

A2 Structural violenceQuester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 103)

A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al-ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op-position to violence must include an opposition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any organizational or power relationships that violate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told

that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some-how simultaneously, rather than being content with a

"negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that consciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important, as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of poverty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to-one link in causal relationships and if motivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to

be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictator-ship and poverty is to weaken our motivation or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possible then to define violent attacks as peaceful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and violence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less duplicitous level, we simply have some need-less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people

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AT: Structural Violence

Positive peace’s drive for equality is ultimately harmful and doesn’t solve their impacts – achieving positive peace causes a massive loss of libertyBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 79-80)

Galtung's misunderstandings about entropy derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the overwhelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished without believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in-deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it after all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings. This does

mean that he tends to under-estimate the costs of equality, which to my mind at least, can be very high, first in terms of a lack of quality, second in terms of a lack of liberty. Quality is a peak achievement, not average achievement, and an egalitarian society would have to forego the peaks. A thoroughly egalitarian society could never have produced the peaks of art or literature 'or science. It is a curious paradox here that Galtung himself is a distinctly high-quality person and violates his own canons of equality. He is of the mountains, not the plains. His real income is far above the world average. He travels extensively around the world. Like myself he belongs to the intellectual jet set, and, while I would have no difficulty in justifying this in terms of his productivity, it is ironic that an egalitarian

society could never conceivably have produced Galtung himself. Furthermore, Galtung never really faces the possibility that equality involves a loss of liberty. There are several passages in his work which suggest that unlike the more extreme egalitarians, he does put a high value on

liberty. Liberty, however, involves property, for property is that within which we have liberty, and property always involves a dynamic which 'destroys equality, for some people use it well and some ill, some accumulate and some decumulate. The famous 'Matthew principle' from the Gospel of Matthew - to him that hath shall be given - ensures that once an equality of property is destroyed, even by random forces, then if there is liberty it is easier for those with more, and harder for those with less, to get more, until some kind of equilibrium of in-equality is achieved. While there is a strong case for restrictive definitions of private property and for the establishment of many kinds of social property in the interests of greater

equality, a throughgoing egalitarian-ism inevitably implies restrictions on individual liberty which are unacceptable to me and which I suspect would really be unacceptable to Galtung.

Poverty is not the result of oppressive structures – alt doesn’t solveBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 81)

Closely related to his hatred of dominance is the view that poverty and inequality are mainly the result of oppression, that is, the dominance of the dominant, and the way to get rid of it is to remove the dominant from their positions. While

no one can deny that dominance and oppression are real problems in the world, 'it seems to me a gross misunderstanding to attribute the mass of

human misery to them. Our differences here illustrate very well I think the difference between the structural and the evolutionary approach. The structuralist looks at the world and sees that some people are rich and some people are poor because of the structures of property

and power, and argues that if only the rich were poorer and less powerful the poor would be richer and more powerful. The view is attractive in its simplicity. Unfortunately, it is probably an illusion. The rich are not rich and powerful because the poor

are poor and impotent, but because the rich and the poor have participated in different dynamic processes which are not closely related. This is the principle of 'differential development.' In the extreme model we might postulate two islands totally unconnected, and starting off at an equal level, one of which got rich because its culture encouraged innovation and thrift and the other stayed poor because its culture did not cultivate the behavior which would lead 'to riches. Here there is no exploitation, no oppression because there is no contact, but the differential dynamics of the system produces in-equality. At the other extreme we have the Marxist model in which the poor, or at least the working class, produce everything and the rich take it all away from them except the barest subsistence. The real world is a mixture of both these models. It 'is a paradox that 'the Marxist model is much more applicable to pre-capitalist societies; it breaks down as we move into capitalism, especially as we move into developed capitalism, simply because the differential development model really takes over.

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AT: Structural Violence Turn – an emphasis on structural violence increases povertyBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 81-82

Closely related to 'the above is the over-emphasis on redistribution rather than pro-duction. This also rises out of structural thinking. Structuralists are particularly fond of the metaphor of the 'pie', which is the total product, which is then divided among the claimants. In the real world

there is no pie, but a vast proliferation of little tarts, some growing faster than others. Neither of the metaphors is really adequate. In the case of the public sector there is a 'pie' and re-distributions are possible, but this is limited, and redistributions which destroy productivity can easily make the poor worse off than they were before. An emphasis on production, however, is an emphasis on evolu-tion. The great Marxist fallacy is that the product comes from labor; in fact it comes from the social genetic structure of society - the knowledge, the know-how, and the organizations which facilitate the ability of this know-how to direct energy into the transportation and transformation of mate-rials into the forms of phenotypes or pro-ducts. The overall productivity of a society is much more a function of its knowledge and know-how structure, lincluding organi-zational know-how, than it is of natural re-sources or even of the labor force. Economic development, like evolution, of which it is an example, is a process essentially in ge-netic

structures. In the social case, of course, this is human knowledge and know-how. Capital is merely human knowledge imposed on the material world. Thus, the poverty of the poor historically has been relieved very little by redistribution. The poor have gotten richer mainly by getting into the evolutionary mainstream of increasing know-how and so increasing their 'own productivity.

Positive peace misconceptualizes structural violence and diverts attention from solutionsBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 83-84

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'posi-tive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models,

and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and meta-phors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be

the preserve of the specialist. But when a meta-phor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of

structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condi-tion in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in

the modern world at least there is not very much. Vio-lence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenome-non from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to every-thing else.

There is a very real problem of the struc-tures which lead to violence, but unfortu-nately Galitung's metaphor of structural vio-lence as he has used it has diverted atten-tion from this problem. Violence in the be-havioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which un-derlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science

in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them.

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AT: Structural Violence

Structural violence is a flawed concept – it’s not universally applicable and ignores the decay of equality promoting institutions absent interventionBoulding, Direct of the International Peace Research Institute, 1977, (Kenneth E., “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, TH, p. 84-85

However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one un-kind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however

unintentionally and unknowingly, by some-body else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, desti-tution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action,

but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures which produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all

cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in

calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer. With all the richness and imaginative originality of these essays one feels that something fundamental is missing. This is something which Malthus perceived as early as 1798, which Lewis Richardson perceived in his theory of arms races, which Anatol Rapoport perceived in hi's study of the prisoner's dilemma, and which Garrett Hardin perceived in the

tragedy of the commons - that there are in society perverse dynamic processes by which social systems go from bad to worse rather than from bad to better, in spite of the great principle of decision that everybody does what he thinks is best at the time. The analysis of these processes of perverse dynamics is the key to successful intervention in human betterment. And intervention there must be. Things left merely to themselves follow the law of entropy, that is, 'the law of 'the exhaustion of potential, whether of thermodynamic potential in equalizing 'temperatures, of biological potential in aging, or

of social potential in the corruption and decline of societies and organizations. The generalized second law says all things go naturally from bad to worse unless there is re-creation of potential. The understanding of how things go from 'bad to worse 'and how intervention can reverse this involves models, not just metaphors. This is the great business of what I would call 'normative science', and I share with Galtung the feeling that this is one of the most urgent 'tasks of the human race. The relation of normative science to peace research is an important question, partly s mantic, but it has some substance. What Galtung has tried to do with the concepts of structural violence and positive peace has been to expand the concept of peace research into a general normative science. In principle this seems to me a very important contribution and it could well be that one of the most important fruits of the peace re-search movement would be precisely to have it expand into a general movement for normative science, which would concern it-self not merely with peace and war, or even with violence, but with all the ills that afflict the human race, and would involve an orderly way of thinking aibout these things in the hope of more successful normative intervention. So much harm is done with the motivation of doing good that it is clear that a good normative science is a very high priority. Within this, 'the study of peace and war in the international sys-tem, and of the larger problem of personal and group violence, form important subsets. Other subsets would include medicine, criminology, psychiatry, family studies, religious studies, poverty studies, and so on, which would cover between them the whole field of the social systems and indeed beyond this into the biological and physical systems which so profoundly affect the fate of the human race. Ultimately, normative science would have to 'include 'the study 'of the earth, or any other human habitation, as a total system from the point of view of human interven-tion for human betterment. Normative sci-ence does not have to

produce a universal agreement as to the defini'tion of human betterment. The study of various images of it will be part of its field. Galtung's mistake it seems

'to me was to take the concept and theoretical structures which were appropriate to part of normative science, namely peace research, and try and apply these to the whole, which cannot really be done. This is an error, however, which can easily be corrected and it should not be allowed to detract from his major achievement, the magnitude of which perhaps he did not even realize himself, of seeing that a normative science was a serious human endeavor. A further principle which the Galtung ex-perience suggests is the extraordinary diffi-culty of being really interdisciplinary. Part of the

failures of the Galtung system arise one suspects from the fact that he is primarily a sociologist and that he really does not understand the contribution of economics. As a good many economists do not seem to understand it either, this perhaps can be forgiven! As an intellectual Galtung dislikes business and the commonplaceness of the marketplace, and the apparently vulgar and dissociative character of commercial life. This leads him to underestimate the moral value of exchange as a social organizer, implying as it does equality of status, even as it may lead to inequality in wealth. Galtung's deep ambivalence towards socialism reflects perhaps an inability to choose between what is perceived as the tyranny of the market and the tyranny of the state. If we reject exchange and the property institution on which it rests we are all too likely to get not love 'but threat as a major organizing factor of society, as the history of the communist states abundantly demonstrates. Here again, we come back to the need for a mix of 'the associative and dissociative elements in social life 'if we are really 'to move from bad to 'better instead of from bad to worse.

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Aff – A2 Epistemology

Their epistemological attacks are wrong – the disagreement is not in values but analysis. Our authors have no incentive to misrepresent or perpetuate the current system – they simply face the hard questions your authors ignore.Quester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 102-103)

The peace studies approach seems to be on the verge of blaming our problems on an insufficient aversion to war among government officials and the establishment, and it extends this accusation to the people who work on national security, international security, or arms control. If this accusation is unfair, it may indeed be a major barrier to any serious communication here. Do people who disagree with the peace researchers-

for example, on whether an elimination of poverty is necessary or sufficient for an elimination of war-actually like war? Most of us would indeed admit that our subject areas have a certain fascination, but this hardly means that we are reluctant to terminate the evils we are watching. Cancer researchers are often fascinated by the disease; are they therefore deliberately stalling in finding a cure, so as not to end their entertainment? It was not a Prussian general but the beloved and gentlemanly Robert E. Lee who said that "it's good that war is so horrible, for otherwise we would enjoy it too much"; but would anyone argue that he was prolonging the Civil War merely to amuse himself? Speaking for the international-security research community, I propose that it would be easy to claim that we all have had more than enough wars in history to nourish our intellectual appetites, so that we hardly need any more. The peace studies approach, in its frequent allusions to consciousness and "paradigms,"

tends to question the values and the priorities and the sincerities of those who do not accept its assumptions about what is possible. The international-security community would normally counter that the disagreement is not about values or awareness or paradigms but about analysis. Are the questions so easy? Are the answers presented to students in peace studies curricula so sure? For example, would the total nuclear disarmament of the Soviet Union and the United States make it less likely that a Qaddafi would seek nuclear weapons of his own,

or would it make it more likely? And what are we then to do about vertical and horizontal nuclear pro-liferation if there is no preordained linkage that all of these threats to peace recede in the same move?

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Aff – A2 Root cause

Their root cause arguments are flawed – ending the means/ability to wage nuclear war can still solve war – calling this a “negative peace” makes war more likelyQuester, Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, PhD from Harvard, 1989 (George H., July, “International-Security Criticisms of Peace Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 504, Peace Studies: Past and Future, TH, p. 103-104)

Advocates of peace research sometimes justify their approach by asserting that they alone are addressing the ultimate or root causes of conflict. Unless one eliminates injustice or racism or prejudice or tyranny, they contend, there can never be a real peace or positive peace. This argument runs the risk, however, of becoming a play on words. Real peace can mean that we approve of every step of the causal chain, going back as far as it can be traced, which might indeed be ideal; but this might hardly be so essential for some-one caught in the crossfire of Beirut, some-one who is merely pleading and praying that the shooting might stop. To imply that a termination of conventional war and an avoidance of nuclear war and an abatement of terrorism are not somehow real would be to blur our understanding of a great deal of what most men and women indeed care about. Similarly, to refer to such an absence of warfare as "negative peace"-as compared with something more positive in "positive peace"-is to use these words of our English language in a manner that substantially underrates the human

priority of eliminating warfare, whatever its causes and whatever the remedy. Critics of peace studies would thus come back to argue that these ultimate and genuine reforms of human arrangements for which peace researchers claim such priority are all well and good, but that these may not be capable of being attained in anything less than several centuries. Rather than eliminating all ideological suspicions between Marxists and non-Marxists or eliminating all ethnic dislikes between Greeks and Turks, would it not be a major accomplishment in the meantime to eliminate those kinds of weapons that tend to make wars between such contending factions more likely, and to stress instead the defensive types that discourage military forces from launching attacks? Peace researchers then often reply that any such resignation to intermediate and proximate improvements implies a welcoming of permanent conflict or even a relishing of it or at least an assumption that conflict and hostility are in the natural order of things. But the real issue is surely much more one of whether certain kinds of improvements can be made over certain ranges of time.

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Aff – State Key

State key to critical peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 132)

The notion that a Leviathan looms even in critical theory, in a benevolent form, focusing on communicative ethics and social justice, is perhaps an unfair criticism: critical theory attempts to establish a via media and modus operandi for debate about an emancipatory politics of consensus, which in particular includes the voices of individuals who are not part of officialdom or state institutions. However, what this means is that emancipation in critical theory still often depends upon the agency of others, normally elites or institutions, to provide the communicative systems through which individuals can then be empowered, despite its aim to provide the means of self-emancipation. Peace depends upon the development and

implementation of those systems, and their adoption by societies. This reflects the liberal model, but in a far more sensitised form.

Different understandings of peace do not preclude the state – there are positive alternative that rest within state structures – this is critical to grounding the alternative’s changesRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Conclusion, TH, p. 162-163)

In order to capitalise on the emerging pluralist debate on peace some preliminary assertions can be made. Ontologies, epistemologies, theories, concepts and methods should be broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and aged, and of multiple identities. Its identities should be clearly understood and any claimed boundaries, rules, rights, freedoms and norms must be generally recognised and consented to by all including the most marginalised. This means also considering the endeavour of gaining the consent of those who are willing to use violence. Bottom-up, social ontologies developing an empathetic account on emancipation based upon mutual ontologies and methods of peace should shape institutions. This does not preclude peace being legitimate and formalised in governmental, institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, or a social contract, but these must rest on consent and an engagement with difference and hybridity. It should provide social, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local constituencies and an international community of which it should be a stakeholder. Any viable concept of peace that conforms to the above conditions must not displace indigenous legitimacy with preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually obscure the indigenous. Interdisciplinary and crosscutting coalitions of scholars, policymakers, individuals and civil society actors can develop discursive understandings of peace and its construction in this context. By placing the study of multiple concepts of peace at the centre of IR: a research agenda is implied to develop multiple conceptions of peace, focused upon the everyday life of their constituents in the context of an institutional framework and social contract, together with; 2a via media between them. Recognition of these requirements are crucial to counter the inherent tendency of any utopian, liberal critical, and emancipatory institutional attempts to create a single and universal blueprint for peace, which recent experience from Cambodia to East Timor shows rarely succeeds. As Schmid claimed research aimed at facilitating peace: 'should formulate its problems, not in terms meaningful to international and supranational institutions, but in terms meaningful to suppressed and exploited groups and nations. '30 This opens up claims to emancipate the subaltern from structures of oppression, be they state, military, or derived from social, economic or class structures. It allows for a negotiation of a discursive practice of peace in which hegemony, domination and oppression can be identified and resolved. This pluralist approach to peace may be more sensitive to the changing pattern of grassroots needs and objectives, in the context of institutions and hierarchy, and ultimately open up a concern with the selfsustaining nature of any attempt to create a process or dynamic of peace. Peace should not become a differend, it should not be utopian, and therefore unobtainable, but it also should not be dystopian, and therefore lack legitimacy amongst those who are subject to it. Furthermore, it must be able to mediate across its own boundaries, without dominating, but at the same time upholding its own internal logic, norms, legitimacy and standards for all to see and understand.

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Aff - Structuralism Bad

Structuralism is a negative understanding of peace which empirically recreates structural violenceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 3: Marxist Agendas for Peace, TH, p. 71-72)

Because structuralist approaches point to the enormous inequality created by an essentially imperial international system, peace would be attained by dismantling the imperial international system, and the global capitalist system, resulting in equality and an equitable distribution of resources. Marginalisation and domination would be replaced by social justice. At a methodological level the imbalance between agency and structure which produces such injustices would finally be resolved. Yet, inevitably, the question of who would be charged with overseeing such revolutions within states and reform in the international system meant that structuralism did not provide an alternative from an elite dominated social system in the interim at least. A reliance on the creation of foolproof structures that took agency out the hands of the supposedly emancipated working classes and provided equality and economic and social justice simply ignored the fact that power and resources would be placed in the hands of centralised authorities which might only act upon their own interests, coloured by their own biases. Peace, from this point of

view, proved to be a chimera, and perhaps even more negative than a realist peace, especially in terms of the way it was actually experienced by the millions of people who lived in systems influenced by socialism and Marxism (though not in the context of the West's 'social democracies'). While structuralist approaches identified the existence of hidden, structural violence, existing furtively in the very assumptions, institutions, norms and frameworks of IR, in practice Marxism merely perpetuated structural violence through its reforms, its new elites and its attempts to redistribute resources. Because of their determinism, orthodox structuralist approaches seem to undermine the very impulse underlying an emancipatory form of peace. Because actors are effectively determined by the structures in which they live, like realism, structuralism assumes that these structures are such that, left unchecked, life would be ‘nasty, brutish and short’ for its actors. Thus, while it underlines the need for agency for actors to overcome such violent structures, this high level of determinism, like realism, undermines how difficult resistance and emancipation would be. Thus, the project of peace is subject to key ontological and methodological tensions that interfere with its overall goal of emancipation.

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Aff - Liberal Humanitarianism Good

Liberal humanitarianism is successful and able to focus on human agency and individual needsRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 78-79)

These debates are also reflected in English School thinking about humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War environment, and in particular examining the differing normative underpinnings of so-called pluralist and solidarist forms,43 determined partly by a liberal understanding of distributive justice and human rights. It has been the cosmopolitan aspect of this debate which has captured the imagination of those intent on constructing an international society in which a broader responsibility guided by universal norms of care and duty to others are expressed internationally. In addition, concepts relating to normative theory include transnational civil society, cosmopolitan law enforcement (including international standing forces), and global institutions for governance. Yet, this discourse also reflect a liberal-realist hybrid balance, via its communitarian foil and debates on just war; states are still seen to the crucial actor, albeit divided between good and bad states, with those conforming to universal cosmopolitan claims enforcing ethical standards and acting on their universal responsibility to do so. Indeed, this view has become so prevalent that it has become part of policy discourse. This conforms very closely to the liberal version of peace though of course also crosses into more critical approaches IR theory. In particular it sees peace as derived from the creation and identification of a universal moral community, whether defined as a state or internationally. It offers the possibility that this may actually transcend state sovereignty and its Cartesian epistemic basis, instead focusing on development of a justice and peaceful global comrnunity.45 Normative approaches infer state-building even if they do contest how far shared values reach beyond the state. This implies an emphasis on the liberal institutions required for stability, order and justice within and between societies. The response has been to construct these frameworks within the context of the liberal state, which is anchored in a system of global liberal governance, and emphasises the shared norms of a liberal domestic, transnational and international milieu heavily weighted towards 'embedded liberalism' .46 Cosmopolitan versions of normative theory also provide a context for the concept of human security. The notion that the security of the individual comes before that of states, broadly defined as security from fear and want, reflects two main conceptual strands of human security thinking in the liberal peace context -institutional and emancipatory.47 Liberal state-building processes tend to focus on the provision of human security through the creation of top-down institutional structures from above. The concept of human security has the potential to focus far more on the agency and emancipation of individuals beyond states as its priority -and indeed it was intended to do just that.48 The reopening of normative debates reinforced the return to a positive epistemology of peace after the crudities of neo-realism, and after the end of the Cold War. By dealing with the problem of the extent of political communities, the ethical basis for the use of force, and the question of responsibilities to assist others (including through the use of force), from an ethical perspective it reiterated the need for concept of peace that extended far further than the negative, victor's peace that had dominated the post-Second World War disciplinary environment. It this sense, it has been extremely influential, providing firm foundations for both the liberal peace framework, and for more critical approaches.

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Aff - Liberalism > Democracy

Liberalism prevents war more than democracyRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 4: Beyond idealist, realist or Marxist peace, TH, p. 92)

Debates on a democratic peace have been strongly criticised on the grounds that it also contains illiberal tendencies: majoritarianism leads to the marginalisation of small minorities and individuals; it undermines distinctiveness; and is susceptible to demagogues and entrepreneurs rather than rational calculation by constituents.129 Fischer has illustrated how liberalism and democracy contain important imbalances, whereby liberalism implies democracy, but democracy provides only limited liberal rights. 130 Thus, the democratic peace is more strongly influenced by liberalism than democracy, and illustrates the other routes that liberalism opens up, including imperial benevolence, and a self-righteous belief that

liberalism is rational and enforceable.131 From this perspective, the post-war European peace is based upon the utilitarian value of prosperity over military glory, which

leads to a rejection of violence in favour of trade and a respect for human rights. Liberalism adds the dimension of institutionalism to this argument, in that institutions form a sum greater than its parts, allowing for the creation, observation and enforcement of common rules.

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AT: Discourse Shapes Reality

The notion that discourse shapes reality is ludicrous-it’s like telling a gazelle the lion chasing it is only in its mindBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.34. 3-18-06.]

The distinction between subject and object, or explorer and territory, is commonsensical. This distinction is enshrined in naïve realism, the tacit epistemology of nearly everyone. Moreover, that distinction would seem to be essential to animal life: just think of the chances a gazelle would stand if did not instinctively acknowledge the real existence of lions in the outer world. Yet, a famous Harvard philosopher (Putnam 1990:122) once announced that “he idea of discourse-independent objects…has crumbled under philosophical critique.”-in particular that of Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. So, don’t worry gazelle, the lion is only in your mind; go see a shrink. (To his credit, shortly thereafter Putnam [1994] abandoned realism.)

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Interventionism Good

Interventionism is good- it’s the only moral choiceRobert H. Kimball, Professor of Philosophy @ University of Louisville, “Is ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ an Oxymoron?” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.114-115.

Unfortunately, widely-known mass murder unopposed by those powerful enough to stop it is hardly unique to Rwanda. Mass murder in Pol Pot's Cambodia, genocide in ex-Yugoslavia, and the Nazi Holocaust all cried out for humanitarian intervention—and these are only the beginning of examples. The moral revulsion that anyone with any moral sensitivity feels when confronted with such cases of genocide and mass murder includes a strong element of moral disgust that so few tried to stop these atrocities, although they knew about them and could have intervened before these horrible events reached such unimaginable proportions. Here the case for the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention seems overwhelming. Elie Wiesel claims that humanitarian intervention is almost always justified. He asserts that the Second World War might have been prevented had France intervened in Germany in the 1930s; "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia could have been prevented had NATO intervened in 1989; and the Rwanda genocide could have been prevented by timely international intervention in 1994.2While Wiesel's counterfactual assertions about what would have happened had timely interventions occurred are controversial, I find their fundamental intuition to be immensely powerful. This intuition can be expressed in the general "humanitarian principle" that: if a person or state has the power to prevent a great evil at little cost to itself relative to the enormity of the evil prevented, then that person or state should intervene to prevent that evil.This is a weaker version of Peter Singer's well-known principle that entails aid by the affluent toward the alleviation of world hunger: "it it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it**5 Singer suggests the following application: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child _would presumably be a very bad thing. Similarly, the humanitarian principle seems to entail the moral requirement of humanitarian intervention. Part of the appeal of the humanitarian principle is that it seems so philosophically easy to endorse. In the face of an unfathomable atrocity, we readily grasp at a solution that we want to believe, could have prevented it entirely in the first place. We can easily believe that an evil is so great that an action that would have prevented it must thereby be morally good. The humanitarian principle seems so powerful that it may lead us to forget the existence of a contradictory-principle, which upholds the sovereignty of nation states and on which international law is founded. This "sovereignty principle" holds that nation states have the right to autonomy and consequently the right to freedom from external intervention. The humanitarian principle and the sovereignty principle can be "practical" contradictories, because situations may arise in which the humanitarian principle requires intervention and the sovereignty principle forbids it. In cases of genocide the humanitarian principle would enjoin intervention, but if the intervention were opposed by the "legitimate" government of a nation state, then the sovereignty principle would forbid such intervention. Nevertheless the humanitarian principle is so strong that it trumps the sovereignty principle: when fundamental human rights are violated, especially in the form of genocidal mass murder, whether because the government cannot or will not prevent it or is in fact perpetrating genocide itself, then the right to non-intervention inherent in sovereignty is abrogated.

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Positive Peace FailsPacifism paralyzes all political action which would lead to extinctionRichmond 07. [Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews. The Transformation of Peace. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.]

[Perhaps most famously in the context of theorising about the international system, E.H. Carr, who was a British delegate at the con ference, presented the argument that 'utopianism' ignored the realities of practices and events in international politics .92 In particular, he believed that the League of Nations put a dangerous over-emphasis on a notion of the international as being a society of states, rather than an environment in which states pursued their own political and economic interests with relatively little regard for the well-being of each other . Carr did not accept the logic of the argument that economic co operation between states would lead to interdependence and a disin centive for conflict. Clearly, he was not alone in his criticisms of the conference. Many saw the new peace as temporary, unjust, and the basis of a future war, and many of the concepts associated with Wilson's vision of a new world order, such as self-determination, along with the League of Nations, were essentially untested.93

Subsequently, in view of the plethora of problems with the conduct and objectives of the conference, it was, and perhaps should have been, unsurprising that this new world order unravelled so quickly . Furthermore, as Williams has shown, war and peace were thought about at the highest levels in terms of a simple racial binary which was repeated often in official documents and treaties, as well as in general pubic discourse that of 'warlike' and 'peaceloving' peoples.94 Warlike peoples were thought to be susceptible to militarism and peaceloving people were susceptible to pacifism. Both ends of the spectrum were seen to be problematic. Militarism led to arms races and large-scale war whereas pacifism created the problem of free-riders and trust, because of which pacifists might be unable to respond to the threat of war or extinction . ]

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AT: Social Construction

The idea that social constructivism exists is false-it denies facts and reasonBunge 06 Frothingham Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Mcgill University in Montreal [Mario Augusto. “Chasing reality: Strife over realism.” Pg.66. 3-18-06.]

There is of course some truth to social constructivism, namely, the tautology that all human social facts, from greeting and trading to child rearing and warring, are social facts. But nobody starts from scratch, and nobody constructs social reality by himself. To be sure, humans make themselves, and invent, maintain, and repair social systems; but, as Marx famously added, they do so starting from a pre-existing social reality and with the help of others. Only philosophers and inmates in a lunatic asylum think that someone can create reality rather than just alter it. Correction: a senior adviser to President George W. Bush told a veteran journalist that guys like him were “in what we call the reality-based community…that’s not the way the world really works anymore…We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality…we’re history’s actors…and we, all of we, will be left to just study what we do” (Suskind 2004). The claims of social constructivists are just as grandiose. For example, according to Fleck, syphilis was constructed by the medical community; In short, social constructivism is blatantly false; the overwhelming majority of facts are independent of any minds, and ideas occur only in individual brains. This is not to deny that all thinkers, however individual, are indebted to other people.

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Censorship = BadCensorship only masks prejudice- this leads to outbursts of linguistic and physical violence

William C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.13-14.

Many times the first step in reducing linguistic violence is to refrain from the use of offensive and oppressive terms. Just because linguistic violence is not being used, a genuinely pacific discourse is not necessarily present. The pacific discourse that is analogous to negative peace can perpetuate injustice.45 For instance, broadcasters in local and national news may altogether avoid using terms like "dyke" or "fag" or even "homosexual," but they and their audiences can remain homophobic even when the language of lesbian and gay pride is used in broadcasting and other public forums. Governmental officials may cease referring to a rival nation as "a rogue slate," but public and private attitudes may continue to foster prejudice toward this nation and its inhabitants. When prejudices remain unspoken, at least in public forums, their detection and eradication are made even more difficult. The merely public or merely formal repression of language and behavior that express these attitudes builds up pressure that can erupt in subsequent outbursts of linguistic violence and physical violence.

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Aff: Reject Alt- No Solvency

Simply rejecting current discourse doesn’t solve- it masks the problemWilliam C. Gay, Professor of Philosophy @ UNC-Charlotte, “Public Policy Discourse on Peace,” Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Global and Local Levels, Edited by: Nancy Nyquist Potter, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. p.9.

The elimination of the language of war may do little to advance the cause of peace. For example, a government and its media may cease referring to a particular nation as “the enemy” or “the devil,” but private and even public attitudes may continue to foster the same, though now unspoken, prejudice. Just as legal or social sanctions against hate speech may be needed to stop linguistic attacks in the public arena in order to stop current armed conflict, there may be a need for an official peace treaty and a cessation in hostile name calling directed against an adversary of the state. Just as arms that have been laid down can readily be taken up again, even so those who bit their tongues to comply with the demands of political correctness are often ready to lash out vitriolic epithets when these constraints are removed. In the language of negative peace, the absence of verbal assaults about “the enemy” merely mask the lull in reliance on warist discourse.

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Aff- No Alt Solvency

Stopping structural violence does not translate into stopping personal violence- they are not intimately linkedJohan Galtung, Professor of Sociology @ Colombia & Oslo, founder of the discipline of Peace and conflict studies, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 181

Structural violence is sufficient to abolish personal violence. This thesis seems to have a certain limited and short-term validity. If all the methods mentioned above for sustaining structural violence are implemented, then it seems quite possible that personal violence between the groups segregated by the structure is abolished. The underdogs are too isolated and too awed by the topdogs, the topdogs have nothing to fear. But this only holds between those groups; within the groups the feudal structure is not practised. And although the structure probably is among the most stable social structures imaginable, it is not stable in perpetuity. There are many ways in which it may be upset, and result in tremendous outbursts of personal violence. Hence, it may perhaps be said to be a structure that serves to compartmentalize personal violence in time, leading to successions of periods of absence and presence of personal violence. 2. Structural violence is necessary to abolish personal violence. This is obviously not true, since personal violence will cease the moment the decision not to practise it is taken. But this is of course begging the question: under what condition is that decision made and really sustained? That structural violence represents an alternative in the sense that much of the 'order' obtained by means of (the threat of) personal violence can also be obtained by (the threat of) structural violence is clear enough. But to state a relation of necessity is to go far outside our limited empirical experience.

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A2: We solve Negative and Positive Peace

Attempts to prevent violence directly trade off with civil liberties- the War on Terror proves


Philosophers, theologians, political theorists, and clinicians have long sought ways to prevent or inhibit violence, and the need to address violence is especially pressing as the George W. Bush Administration has set a precedent for pre-emptive strikes. As part of the "war on terrorism," public policies have been seen as the primary method by which the violence of terrorists can be inhibited. These policies infringe upon the freedoms of U.S. citizens, who are apparently willing to cede some of their civil liberties in the interest of curbing terrorism. For example. U.S. citizens following the terrorist attacks supported giving broader authority to law enforcement to wiretap telephones (69 percent), intercept e-mail (72 percent), examine people's Internet activity (82 percent), and detain suspects for a week without charging them (58 percent.) Yet 65 percent of those polled also said that they were concerned that, if granted greater power, that power could be used against innocent people.2 Similar policies and laws have been used to justify the United States' declaration of war on Iraq. Some people do not view such policies themselves as violent. Is an act of violence committed when it is argued to be in the interest of an assumed greater good? These questions illustrate one of the myriad of ways that policies and practices intersect with conceptual issues regarding violence and moral justification.

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A2: Just War

“Just war” is a flawed doctrine- it legitimizes killing the innocent


Political leaders in the United States often claim that the United States has a practice of following just war doctrine whereby, among other things, a war is just only if it targets combatants and minimizes injury to civilians. But consider these facts: throughout the twentieth century, taboo on targeting and killing civilians has boon increasingly ignored. "In World War I, only 5 percent of the casualties were civilians. In World War II the figure went up to 50 percent and in the Vietnam War it was 90 percent."1 Clearly, if just war doctrine is indeed still considered a valuable moral guide to just war, this theory is not shaping actual decision-making and action. Furthermore, as John Paul Lederaeh argues, since the cold war, most wars have been fought on the lands of poorer, developing countries. Something is wrong in the theory, or the practice, or in social ideas about whose lives are valuable and why, and we need to engage in critical examination from a philosophical perspective in order to locate or create constructive new directions.

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FW- Policy Key

Criticizing violence here is the best forum- it’s key to effective policy


That we analyze and evaluate policies and practices in light of their effectiveness, their aims, and their scope is crucial. Putting policies into place can promote peaceful and democratic social interactions. Consider civil rights laws which set out expectations for the conduct of white people such that they were discouraged from discriminating against minorities. Thinkers from a ' wide range of disciplines, such as. philosopher Martha Nussbaum, human rights activist Charlotte Bunch, and psychiatrist James Gilligan, advocate the implementation of public policies that will address issues of violence in peaceable and equitable ways. Gilligan, for example, argues that violence is a kind of germ that is spread by shame and that the solution is to create economic and social policies that reduce the shame of poverty or of being unloved or deeply disrespected."

Critiques should focus on the assumptions of public policy- it is a prior question


Policies cannot do all the work of socializing and policing that a society may need. Once in place, institutions and organizations tend to justify their actions by pointing to the policies. That presupposes that the policies themselves are right about ethical issues, and that assumption may be wrong. Policies are often flawed, and to justify decisions and conduct on the basis of them may turn out to be no justification al all. As John Rawls argues, even policies are subjected to a higher court of appeal, and that higher court is one where principles of justice reign.''

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Framework-Critical Theory Bad

Critical theory has many problematic notions – it still relies upon liberal and realist understandings of peaceRichmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 132)

The common understanding of peace that is offered through critical theory is not therefore unproblematic, given its reliance on a specific and claimed universal set of human norms and discourse ethics, but these have brought a much richer set of issues and dynamics to the debate.67 As Barkawi and Laffey

have argued, even critical security studies, an attempt to move beyond Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian frames of reference by focusing on emancipation, actually rely on underlying liberal-realist discourses,68 often replicating their Western-centric ordering claims about international relations. Thus, critical theory is in danger of falling back into the familiar territory of liberal thinking about peace and its dependence upon rational states and institutions which progressively provide emancipation from above, with only limited engagement with those being emancipated. This critique indicates that peace is close to a 'messianic' liberal ideal form (redeemed only in the future), or what the utopians or idealists of the early part of the twentieth century might have imagined, but more thoroughly negotiated through discursive strategies that arrive at consensus rather than an implicit hegemony of liberal norms. Indeed, it is these latter qualities that prevents critical theory from following the liberal urge toward colonialism and imperialism as way the liberal peace might be consolidated. It certainly claims to offer an attractive framework for the creation of an everyday, emancipatory peace, though from this perspective, even critical theory is in effect a search for rationalisable form of peace, given a universal identity. This is also at risk of representing critical IR as a white, male, Euro-centric, possibly racist, and interventionary endeavour, even if it is aimed at achieving an emancipatory peace;69 raising the question of who is peace for, who creates it, and why. For Hobson, for example, Western hegemony has been the unfortunate starting point by which history, and by implication, peace, has been understood, even within critical theory.

Critical theory is hegemonic, it rests upon flawed western epistemological foundations and discriminates against those who haven’t adopted it, while not achieving true emancipation.Richmond, Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2008, (Oliver P., “Peace in International Relations,” Ch 6: Critical contributions to peace, TH, p. 133)

Herein lies its weakness according to some critics. For post-structuralists, this very vision makes it susceptible to hegemony and domination, and it does not fully interrogate the flawed notions of universality it rests upon, nor does it offer an acceptance of difference and otherness except with a set of assumed confines which reflect the norms of liberal thought. Indeed, for post-structuralists, the very attempt to establish law-like scientific statements about human society70 is inevitably tinged with hegemonic interests, even if they are unselfconscious, umealised, and held with the best of intentions. Indeed, George calls this a 'site of discursive primitivism' based upon the 'scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian theology, and post-Renaissance Europe'.7l In its liberal-realist form, this discourse is packaged within Anglo-American interests, epistemological and ontological approaches, though in its more critical forms, this is extended by the tradition of scepticism and the search for a universal form of justice and emancipation. For post-structuralists, even this is tinged by vested, foundationalist interests and a myopia towards claimed representation, identity, ethnicity, religion, language, class, gender,

the environment, resources, and other related issues. Many post-structuralist or post-colonial thinkers would argue that a cosmopolitan ethic, for example, would inevitably involve discrimination against those who have not yet acquired or attained this higher order or ethic. For some thinkers this smacks of subtle colonialism; and instead critical theorists should embrace diversity rather than attempt a social engineering project by way of universal homogenisation based on shared norms and values. Indeed, as Jabri has argued, there needs to be a 'politics of peace' which are indicative of solidarity and a struggle for a just social order comprising individuals as agents in themselves, rather than merely subjects of governance frameworks, and who express solidarity over their rights and needs.72

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