Soviet Direct Fire Artillery

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A STUDYOF SOVIETUSE OF FIELD ARTILLERYWEAPONS IN ADIRECTFIRE ROLE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College Inpartial

fulf i l lmentof the requlrements for thedegree

MASTEROF MILITARYARTAND SCIENCE

by

LARRYW. COKER,JR., MAJ, USAB.A.,Tr in ity Unlverslty, 1974

Fort Leavenworth, KansasI986

Approved for public release; dis trlb utlon is unllrnlted.

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MASTEROF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ La rry W. Coker, Jr.

Tl t l e of Thesls: A Study of Sovlet Use of Fie ld Ar tl ll e ry Weapons in aDirect Fire Role

Approved By:

.

Q J e J-L , Thesis Commlttee Cha lmanMAJ(P) Robert L. Stockwell, MA

, Member, Graduate FacultyLTCbohn T. Banks, MA

/l

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

Chapter 1. IntroductionProblem Statem entLimitation s and Delim itationsSignificance of the StudySurvey of Lit erat ureMethods and ProceduresEndnotes

Chapter 2. Hi sto ric al Background

Direc t Fire i n the Great Pa tri oti c WarThe Use of A rt il le ry in Direct FireAdvantages o f Direct FireVulnerabil i ty of Di rect Fi re Weapons

The Art i l le ry offensiveIncreased Centralizatio n and Concentration of Ar ti ll er ySelf-Propelled Arti l lery

Soviet Art i l l ery f romthe 1950s o 1973Endnotes

Chapter 3. Current Soviet Ta ct ic s and ProceduresDirect Fire in the O ffense

Meeting EngagementAr ti l le ry Preparation of the AttackOther O ffensive Situation s

Direct Fire i n the DefenseSpecial Situatio ns

River CrossingsCombat in Mountainous TerrainCombat i n Bu ilt- up AreasDestruction of Fortif cations

Direct Fire in the Overall Field Ar ti l le ry MissionAdvantages of D ire ct Fi re versus Su rviv abil ity Considerations

The Advantages of D ire ct Fi reSurvivabi1i y Considerations

Endnotes

1223479

111 1

1213151720222630

333434374043

46464749505253535560

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Chapter 4. Dire ct Fi re A rt il le ry Training and EquipmentTraining Techniques

Realistic Trainingindividual and Crew T rainingDirect Fire in Combined Arms Trainlng

Di re ct F ir e GunneryTechnical Preparation of the PieceA rt il le ry Equipment and Ammun itionfor Direct FireEndnotes

636364656974757678

Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations 79

Appendix A. Dir ec t F ir e Gunnery Ca lculations 83

Appendix B. Ar ti ll er y Equipment and Ammunition fo r Di rect Fire 88

Bibliography 95

in i t i a l Dis tr ibu t ion Lis t 102

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CHAPTER I

IMRODUCTION

In my 'upbrlnglng' as a He ld a rt ll le ry offlce r, I have been taught that

Held artlllery weapons are extremely vulnerable when used In a dlrect flre

role. Thls 1s especlally true when a crew employs a fie ld a rt lll er y piece

against a tank. The fl e ld a rt ll le ry plece 1s at a dls tln ct disadvantage

because Its accuracy uslng dlrec t f l r e 1s very Ilmlted beyond 1,000 meters,

wh lle a modern tank 1s capable of engaglng targets w i t h a hlgh probablllty

of a hi t a t several tlmes that range. The dlfterence In effectlve ranges

between the fl e ld a rt il le ry weapon and the tank ce rtalnly glves the tank a

slgnlflcant advantage In an engagement between them.

Current Unlted States Army doctrine conslders the use of dlrect flr eby fle ld a rt lll e ry weapons as st rl ct ly defenslve Innature. It 1s a method t o

provlde a last resort defense of the battery posltlon prlor to maklng a

hasty dlspiacement to an alternate posltlon. Dlrect flre 1s also used t o

provide protec tlon durlng road marches. For the most part, It 1s expected

to be used out of necess lty rather than by cholce.

In sta rk contrast, the Soviets are much more aggressive In employlngfl e ld ar tl ll e ry weapons fo r direc t flre. They trad ltlona lly have used such

f l r e In offensive as we ll as defenslve sltua tlons . The aggressive use of

f le ld ar t l l l e ry In dlrect f ire has a hlstorlcal b as k in the Sovlet method fo r

employment of artlllery agalnst the Germans durlng World War II. These

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methods remain basically unchanged today despite the increased lethality

of newer weapons on the bat tle fie ld .

The purpose of th is study i s t o determine why the Soviets readily use

indirect f ie ld ar ti ll er y weapons fo r direc t f ir e purposes. In studying this

question and dete rmining the reasons, there are severa l other supporting

questions tha t have to be answered.

1 What is the his to ric al basis for Soviet use of f ie ld ar t i l le ryin the

direct f ire role?

2. What are the tactics and procedures used by the Soviets in

employing fie ld a rti lle ryin the dir ec t f ir e role, and how do they provide fo r

survivability?

3. How does the direc t fi re role for Soviet fie ld a rti lle ry relate to

the overall mission in providing dir ec t support to the manewer force?4. What impact do the characteristics of Soviet weapons systems

and ammunition have on the employment and effectiveness of their f ie ld

ar t i l le ry in direct fire ?

5. What can we learn from the methods and procedures used by the

Soviets in training for use of direct fi re by the fi el d artille ry?

The effectiveness of this study i s limited by the availability of

translations of primary source material in Soviet documents. i have been

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dependent on these transla tlons due t o my ln ab lll ty to read Russlan. I do no

think thls has been a significant problem since there Is a tremendous

amount of translated ma terlal available for study.

Thls study Is concerned w lt h the Soviet f ie ld a rtl lle ry systems most

of ten found organic or attached at the Soviet regimental level. These are

the D30 122mm towed howitzer, the 2SI 122mm self propelled howltzer

and the 253 152mm se lf propelled howltzer. These weapons are pr lm ar lly

deslgned and used as lndirect f l re weapons. Although the Sovlets are one

of few modem armed forces s t l l l using speclallzed anti-tank arti llery ,

these weapons w l l l not be addressed speciflcally in th is study.The tlme perlod covered by thls study goes back to the Soviet

partlclpatlon In World War I I (the Great Pa trlot lc War) only for the purpose

of explorlng the hlsto rical context of the problem. The prim ary focus i s to

establish the current methods and reasons for employment of f leld

art i l lery in the dlrec t f lr e role.

This study w i l l serve to bring together fa cts about direct fl re from a

multitude of sources. For that reason It may be a reasonable 'prlmer' for

m il it a ry personnel on how the Sovlets may employ fi e ld ar ti lle ry fo r dlrect

fire. By studylng the Sovlet use of f le ld a r t l l le ry for direct flre, It may

also be possible to assess sig nlf cant vulnerabilities that can pote ntlally

be exploited on the future battlefield. Wlth the vast superiorlty the

Sovlets enloy In the number of fi e ld a rt lll er y tubes avallable to them, any

means to ass ist In the reductlon of that advantage w i l l be helpful.

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There i s considerably more information available on the Soviet use

of f ie ld art i l lery for direct f i re than I had in it ia ll y expected to be able to

find. It can be divided between the historical information, primarily tied

to how the Sovie ts used their art i l lery fo r direct fire in World War II, and

information on current in tent ions fo r employment.

Several sources have provided information for both the historical

basis of Soviet use of field artillery in direct fire, and the current

doctrine. The first i s The Sovi u t o es iwhich is a good bibliographical source for both types of

information. The second i s a translat ion of Jhe A rti lle rv Battal on inCombat2 by Marshal of Ar til le ry G. Ye. Peredel'skiy and published in March,

1984. This i s an excellent source fo r information on how direc t fi re i s

used now, as well as for specific historical examples from the Great

Pa trio tic War. This use of his tor ica l examples i s a significant indication

that the employment methods for ar ti ll er y in direc t f i r e have changed very

l i t t ie . The third is 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice' by J.

Erickson. This is an unpublished defense study done a t the University of

Edinburgh that traces the development of Soviet comblned arms from the

Great Patriotic War t o present. Both The 0 fensw by AA. Sidorenko andAnt i ank Warfare by G. Biryukov and G. Melnikov are books wr it te n in the

1970s by Soviet mi li ta ry o ffi ce rs who are 'candidates of M il it ar y Science.'

Both also provide hist oric al examples for direct fi re use by a rti lle ry and

the indication tha t d irec t f i r e employment remained a va lid technique into

the 1970s.

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Strictly historical sources include a Department of the Army

translation of F.A Samsonov's W x o e r i m e of Arttllerv in the

This Is an excellent source fo r informat ion on how and why

the Soviets utilized direct fire artil lery in the Great Patriotlc War.Another good source i s the serie s of ar ti cl es th at appeared throughout the

Field Art i l le rva uring the years 1942-1944 These were w rl tt e nby Soviet ar til le ry o ffic ers tel ling the American art ill er y communlty what

was working w e ll against the Germans. There are also several articles

from 1946 and 1947, also from the Wd A rt il le ry Journal7&where Erl tish

and Amertcan officers analyze the Soviet artillery experiences of WorldWar 11 Translations are avatlable of the Sovtet UUj.tary His-a8 or Issues slnce 1978 and they have provtded several a rt ic le s tha tdiscussed the Soviet employment of artlllery in the Great Patri oti c War.

There are many other sources that provlde some historical

perspective on Soviet w e of f leld ar t l l lery for direct f l re including B.H

Lid del l Hart's Red Army9 and Raymond Garthoff's B v i e t M ili ta ry

The latter also glves good Information on the development of

self propelled artillery related to a direct f l r e role for it. The role of

self-propelled artillery Is also discussed in an art icle, 'The Postwar

Development of Tank Forces' by P A Rotmts t rw InSelected Sovlet Mllltarym 1 ompiled by the U.S. A i r Force. Another art ic le in this samebook is by I.N. Vorobyev enti tle d 'Fire, Assault, Manewer' and provides a

good historical example of offensive use of direct flre artillery. Othersources that provide analysis of Soviet artlllery development are I

War M W 9 17- I9* l 2 edited by S.L. Mayer and 'An Analysis ofS oviet A r tl ll er y D e ~ e l o p m e n t ' ~ ~y Kurt Hoffman In

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Revfew.There are numerous sources which provide inform atio n fo r my study

on current Soviet use of f ie ld ar ti lle ry fo r direc t fire. The best sources

are the numerous articles found in the Soviet tlilitary HerplQl4.

Translations are available for this monthly publication and each edition

generally has several art ic les on ar till er y. Frequently the ar tic les make

some reference to the dir ec t fi r e use of fi e ld ar ti lle ry weapons. The

ma jorit y of current informationi s to be found in periodicals. 'The Wind o f

Change in Soviet Artillery,' l ntern tl on l Defense Reviekl5 by CON.Donnelly provides some good background information as does 'Destruction

by Fire Soviet Artillery In the 1980s and Beyond,' Field Artm

,h?umll6 y Christopher Bellamy. The article by Bellamy is excellent for

providing information on the contribution of direct fire in accomplishing

the 'fire destruction' mission of Soviet artillery. The Field Artillerv

and -I8 magazine provide numerous articles on current

Soviet a rt ill e ry equipment and tactics.l9 edited by David R. Jones

provides some background mater ia l on a rt il le ry developments. Volume 8

(1983-4) discusses the apparent Soviet move to eight guns per battery in

the a rt ill er y b attalions organic t o maneuver regiments which w i l l have

implications on the quantity of artillery assets potentially available for

direct fire. Two recent books by Richard Simpkin20, Antitank and J .drm also provide information on he antitank role of Soviet artille ry.

There are several references available to provide lim ited technical

information on Soviet artillery equipment and i t s capabilities. These

include Weaoonsof the FZQQern oviet G ound Force321 edited by Ray Bonds

The Soviet Armed For= Review

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and 3poes Arr[lpyCpDdArtill= 22. The translatlonof the Fleld A r t l l l a

QfficersHandbook23by Valentin Lebedev provldes Informationon artlllery

ammunitionand direct f Ire procedures.

The prlmary method for conducting th i s study Is by making an

extensive searchof available literature concerning the subject.Although

several books are avallable to answer questionson the historical aspectof

Sovlet use of direct flre artillery, access to the vast malority of theInformation on how Soviets currently vlew thedirect flre role Is through

periodlcals.The Sovlet Army Studles Offlce (SASO) provlded nwnemus leads

onto resources avallable. Through S SO I have been able to get several

unpublished resources and also some access to the research data base at

the Sovlet Studies Research Centera t Sandhurst, England.

Another resource usedwas a discussion wlth MAJ Brian McQulstlon,

a fellow student In CGSC whose previous asslgnmentwas at DefenseIntelligence gencywhen, he followed Sovlet artlllery developments. He

read the study in Its flnal draftand provided several helpful observatlonsand comments.

The data collectedfrom these sources was organlzed Into chapters

generally along the linesof the supporting research questions addressedearlier In this chapter. Chapter 2 is an assessment of the historical

background that gave rlseto the Sovlets useof field artillery In a routlne

dlrect fire mode. The thlrd chapter discusses the current (SlnCe1975

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tact ic s and procedures used by the Sovlets In the employment of their f leld

artillery. Chapter 4 discusses current Sovlet trainlng for direct flre and

comments on current Sovlet artlllery and ammunltion for direct flre.

Finally, chapter 5 contalns the conclusions that can be drawn from thls

study and the recommendations for fu ture study.

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Endnotes for Chapter 1

1

-1982).MyronJ. Smith, Jhe Soviet Army. 1939-1980: A Guide to Sour-

2 G. Ye. Peredel'skiy, lhflArtillerv - C o m b a t 1 98 5 ).

3 A A Sidorenko, JheOffenstre(l970).

4 G. Biryukov and G. Melnlkov,Antitank Wa r f m ( 1972).

5 F. A Sarnsonov, of Artillervin the Great Patriotic( 1952).

6 The followingarticles are from the Field A r t i l l e r v J o ~AKarelsky, 'Sovlet ArtilleryFlre, 32 (July 1942): 51 1; Walter Kerr,'Death orInsanity,' 33 (October 1943): 814-6; Parapov, 'Ambushing w ith Artlllery,' 34(November 1944): 786; P. Slesanw, 'Self-Propelled Artilleryv m anks,' 34(November 1944): 787-8; L. Vysokrntrovsky, 'k'tillt?fy V~C.SWTiger andFerdinand; 33 (October 1943): 8 10- 1; , Dlrect Art il le ry Fire,'33 (September 1942): 694

7 W.R Young, 'Artillery Offensive. An Exarnlnatlon of Russian Practlce,'Fleld ArtillervJ o m 36 (January 1946): 26-9; HG. eWateviIle, 'RusslanArtillery- 1941-1945,'Field Artillery-37 (May-June 1947).

Years,' MilitarvHis tor ica l June 1978): 46-53; A Tsynkalov, 'TheGreat Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," &Uitan, Hlstorlcal J m Jul1979): 18-23; G. Peredel'skly, 'Combat Employment of Artilleryin ArmyDefenslve Operatlons; (November 1979): 16-21.

8 V. Kiselev, 'The Development of the Antltank Defense in the Postwar

9 B.H. LiddellHart, The Red rray ( 1956).

10 RaymondL. Garthoff,SPviet Militp rvDo ctr ina( l95 3) .

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1 I I.N. Vorobyev, "Fire, Assault, Manewer,' and P.A Rostmistrov, 'ThePostwar Development of Tank Forces,' from U.S. Air Force edited Selected

as 1970-1975. ASoviet Vlew(1976).12 S . L M a y e r J e d i t o r , J n Wa r ~ 1 9 1 7 -1 9 6 1977).13 KurtHofmann, 'An Analysis of Soviet Art i l le ryDevelopment,'

R ~ i w 5 ( 1982): 135-9.

14 The articles from the Soviet mite Heraldare too numerous to l i s there. They can be referenced in the bibliography.

15 C.N. Donnelly, 'The Wlnd of Change InSoviet Artillery,' i ntern ti on lQ&QS&&W 6 1 982): 737-44.

16 Christopher Bellarny, 'Destruction by Fire: Soviet Arti l lery in the1980s and Beyond," Fie ld A r t i l l e pJournal 53 (September-October 1985):40-5.

17 George R. Patrick, 'Soviet SP Doctrine.' Field Art ill eryJpytapl(July-August 1978): 27-29, Wil l iamP. Baxter, 'Soviet 122-mm Self-PropelledHowitzer,' U8LQArtillervJournal (January-February 1980): 35-7; KeithW.Dayton, 'Field Arti l lerySu rvivab ility TheSoviet Perspective,' Field ArtilmJownal (Septemberdctober 198 1): 4-50.

18 Larry W. Williams, 'Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery,' & ~ Q C(September-October 1978): 18-20; John Erickson, 'Soviet Combined ArmsOperations.' A ~ Q Q CMay-June 1980): 16-2 1,

19 DavidR Jones, Soviet Review m a l . Volymk&

20 Richard E. Simpkin, AU,W ( 1982) and ( 1984).

J983-1984 (1985).

21 Ray Bonds, editor, -e G m d F o r n( 198 .

22 -,Jane's A r m u and Artlllerv 1985-1986 ( 1985).23 Valentin Y. Lebedev, Fie ld Arti ll ery Officer's Hao&Q ?k ( 1984)

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CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It i s appropriate to look at the historical background in order to

make an assessment of why the Soviets embrace the use of direct flre by

the ir fie ld artil lery . Presented in th is chapter are the developments that

led to the routine use of direct fire in the Great Patriotic War and the

continuation of these techniques af ter the war and Into the early 1970s.

Fire in -c War

According to Raymond Garthoff, the use of f le ld a rt il le ry by the

Soviets In the Great Patriotlc War underwent five ma lo r changes. One of

those was the tendency f o r wid e use of ar till ery pieces in direct fire. The

others were the introduction of the 'Artillery Offensive,' the increase in

centralization of ar t i l le ry command and control, the increase in

concentration of artillery weapons and the increase in use of

self-propelled weapons.' This study w i l l examine these changes and theeffect they had on use of artillery in a direct fire role during the Great

Patr iot ic War.


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he Soviets were not prepared for the attack by Nazi Germany on 22

June 1941. With the combination of the surprise of the attack and thepower of the German armor formations, the Soviets fought the first months

of the war at a great disadvantage. In this situation the Soviet troops had

to delay and defend against the tanks by any means possible.2 One of the

primary means was to engage the tanks with direct artillery fire. The

Supreme High Command required a l l a rt il le ry un its to be prepared for the

use of direct f ire w it h at tention t o the likely tank approaches. This was

not a new tact ic, but a renewed emphasis on the tac tic s discussed in the

existing Soviet f ie ld regulation^.^The renewed emphasis on direct fire techniques is confirmed in an

account by Walter Kerr who was the Moscow correspondent for the

York Herald T r bune a t the beginning of the war. He was taken on a tour of

art i l lery uni ts north of Moscow in early 1942 by Soviet Lieutenant General

Vik to r Tikhonov. There he was told by the general that since the outbreak

of the war the Red Army had issued instructions that a l l ar t i l l e ry gun

crews would train f o r antitank fi re . Enemy tanks had broken through the

lines too many times in the early weeks of the war and caught Russian

ar ti ll er y unprepared. While they were vi si tin g the arti lle ry regiment the

gunners were practicing dire ct f ir e procedures a t 600 yards4

Marshal of Art i l le ry P. Kuleshov wrote an article about the Sovietar t i l le ry in the Great Patriotic War on the occasion of the 600th

anniversary of the Russian Art ill er y in 1982. In the artic le he sa id

The high combat qualities of Soviet a r t i l l e ry . . . . .were revealedclearly a t the very beginning of the war under the extremely unfavorable

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conditions fo r our Army. Ar til le ry 's chief and most important missionin the in it ia l period of the war consisted of combating enemy tanks andaircraft. . . .It was necessary to le t the tanks come to wit h in close rangeand f i r e on them pointblank, and that i s ju s t what our artillery men

did."5

The large losses of Soviet tanks and ai rc ra ft a t the beginning of the

war made the need for artillery to fill the direct fire role even greater.

Thus, as a necessity in 1941, the Soviet artillery was routinely employed

from direct fire positions on the main defensive line at ranges from

200-900 yards in order to defeat the advancing German armor.

of D ire ct Fire. Many advantages of using direct f i r e were

discovered as a res ul t of the need to use i t defensively. These advantages

have to do w i th command and control, ammunition savings and

effectiveness.

In the early part o f the war, the Soviets had an insu ffic ient amount

of communications equipment available to allow artillery units to

communicate w i t h forwa rd observers fo r the adjustment of indire ct fire.6

In order to communicate, the maneuver commanders moved the guns

forward in to th eir formations. The ar til le ry could have the targe ts

iden tified t o them and then engage them with direct fire. It appears that

this effective method for command and control of the close support

ar till er y was used in appropriate situation s even af te r the communicationsequipment situation improved.

Another majo r advantage to the Soviets in utiliz ing direct fire was

the savings in ammunition expenditures. One or two rounds from a direc t

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fire gun could do the work of twenty rounds fired from indirect f i r e

position^. These ammunition savings were pa rtic ula rly sign ifican t a t the

beginning of the Great Pat rio tic Wa r when the Soviets were hard pressed t oput up an ef fect ive defense. Art il le ry ammunition was los t in large

quantities with the German advance and i t was necessary to make each

round count.

Finally, there was a marked advantage in the effectiveness of the

arti lle ry f ir e from direc t fi re positions. Soviet indirect fi re procedures

were not well developed and were significantly less effective than the

American capabilities in the Second World War in both accuracy and

timeliness. This was part icu lar ly applicable to engagement of targets of

opportunity where the target was called in to the arti lle ry for immediate

engagement. It did not apply to the delivery of fi re onto preplanned targets

where tim eliness was no t such a cr iti ca l factor.

A good historical example that demonstrates the effectiveness o f

the dire ct fi re techniques of the Soviet ar ti ll e ry i s an account of the actionof a towed a r t i l l e ry battery in March of 1943 in the 16th Army Sector,

possibly as pa rt of the action in the Demyansk pocket. The Soviet battery

posit ion was attacked three tim es by German tanks and infantry . Over the

course of the battle the battery was almost totally destroyed, but

successfully held i t s position. Through direc t fi re the batte ry destroyed

thirty -one tanks and ki ll ed over four hundred enemy soldiers.8 Six German

tanks were destroyed for every Soviet artillery piece lost (one artillery

piece survived the engagement). I t i s no wonder that the Soviets found i t

advantageous to use artillery, even towed artillery, in direct fire

engagements against tanks. This i s almost certain ly an exceptional case14


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regarding the number of losses in fl ic te d on the Germans by a single battery .

However, it does show how effective the Soviet artillery could be against

German tanks and infantry.

The effectiveness of using direc t f ire art i l lery was also applicable t o

offensive situations as described in this quote from Major General F.A.

Samsonov:

'Practice has shown that artillery preparation is most effectivewhen a section of the guns (of all calibers up to 203mm) are broughtforward t o fi r e over open sights a t the embrasures of the enemy's fortsand Other strong ly f o rt if ie d positions. This method reduces the tim enecessary for destroying the defense works and enables the infantry toapproach the object o f attack without loss. I t has also been found f a rmore effective and economical than spreading the fire over wholeareas.9

When providing this type of offensive support to the infantry, i t

was by no means unusual f o r the a r t i l l e r y t o move out in front of the

combat formations of the infantry.I0 The direct fire a r t i l l e ry wouldusually try to flank these fortifications, then destroy them t o allow the

infan try t o pass through and continue the attack. This flanking movement

was obviously important to the survivability of the artillery weapon and

Indications are that even when flanking a position was not

possible, the a rt il le ry moved up and did i t s job, accepting whatever losses

were required.

Vulnerabi1i t v of Direct Fir e W e a o m The ma jor disadvantage of

using artil lery in a direct f ir e role was i t s vulnerability t o enemy fire,


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particularly when considering towed a rt il le ry weapons and thei r c rew s as

in the example above. The opinion has often been voiced that the Soviets

"never shrank from hazarding losses in men and material which anAnglo-American commander would have hesitated to incur." * Sovietcommanders were more interested in results and the benefits of using

direct f i r e ju st ifi ed the costs. Direct fire was simpler for command and

control and the dramatic increase in effectiveness justified the losses.

Even a ra t io of one tank kill to each artillery piece lost may have been

considered a fair trade, especially at the beginning of the war. It i sinteresting to note here that both the f i r s t a rti lle ry soldier and the fi r s t

ar t i l lery officer decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union in the Great

Patr iot ic War received their award fo r valor by engaging German tanks at

close range by direc t fire.

The Soviets were perhaps somewhat more concerned with the

vulnerabilities of artillery pieces used in direct f i re than we give them

credit for. An artic le from the Field A rt ill er v Journal in September I942

contained a deta iled explanation by the Soviets of th ei r development of the

tactics to use artil l ery in a dire ct f i r e role.14 Emphasis was provided on

several su rv ivab ili ty techniques. These included the need for engineer

preparation of firing positions prior to occupation of them and

establishment of defilade positions to the rear of firing positions for

ar t i l le ry t o 's i t and wait ' until t ime f o r execution of the fire missions.

Just prior t o dusk the guns would be quickly ro ll ed by hand from defilade t o

the firing positions and engagement o f targets would commence.

Withdrawal of the a rt il le ry upon completion o f the missions was by echelon

and was accomplished under the cover o f darkness. Str ic t camouflage16


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discipline was also mentioned as cr it ic a l to the success of operating w i th

guns so close to the enemy lines. Another source indicated tha t

immediately upon successful destruc tion of assigned targets the individual

ar ti ll er y pieces would march order and move to the rear.15 This amount of

preparation indicates distinct efforts by the Soviets to limit the

vulnerab ilities o f the a rt il le ry when required to use direct fire.

The e ff o rt s to camouflage the a rt il le ry weapons used in direct fire

is also confirmed in an account of preparations f o r the Soviet

counterattack from Leningrad in January, 1943. 'Great accuracy and

concealment was required in carrying out the measures directed todistribution of the direct lay ing weapons.'16 The account goes on t o

discuss that these weapons were emplaced for direct fire a t 400 to 800

meters fro m the German front lines.

The Soviets initially used their artillery in a direct f i r e role

because of the need to use all available resources to stop the German

invasion. Certain advantages became apparent w it h the use of the a r t i l l e r y

f o r direct fire, pa rtic ula rly the increased accuracy and timeliness and the

significant decrease in ammunition requirements. Although the Soviets

were very aggressive in the employment of their artillery for direct fire,

they were concerned with developing tact ic s tha t increased the chances fo r

survivability.

The Artill ervOf- e

The f i r s t months of fig ht ing against the Germans, to include the first

offensive operations of the Soviet forces in December, 1941, showed some

serious shortcomings in a rt il le ry operations. One remedy t o these17


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problems was a directive on 10 January 1942 from the Supreme High

Command to in st itut e the a rt il le ry 0ffensive.l'

The three princip les of the ar till er y offensive were t o concentrateart i l lery in the area of the main effort, to conduct 'unintermittent' fire

through the depth of the defenses and to enforce close inte rac tion between

the infantry, tanks and artil lery. The second of these principles, providing

'unintermittent' fires, had tw o reqirements. The fi r s t was to have the

battalion and regimental artillery closely accompany the manewer force

w i t h f ir e u n ti l success was achieved. The p rincipal method to achieve th is

was by 'direct laying from exposed positions.'18 Secondly, the heavier

batteries were to concentrate their fire on massed enemy troops and

arti llery . This was of course accomplished w it h ind irect fire.

The effectiveness of the 'artillery offensive' increased throughout

the war. In the later stages, with the tremendous amount of art i l lery

available, the preparation would usually close w i th one tremendous salvo

delivered by a l l guns and morta rs directed against every enemy capabilityto resi st the attack. The res ults were that 50% o 70% of the enemy troops

were put out of action even before the Soviet maneuver assault began.I9

This capability for massive destruction earned the Soviet artillery the

t i t l e of 'The God of War.'

One factor that demonstrates the effectiveness of the direct fire

technique i s that when fi re plans were drawn up to execute an art i l lerypreparation, the highest priority targets were the first t o be singled out

for destruction by direc t fire. It was only in cases where di rec t f ir e was

infeasible for a specific target that heavy concentrations of indirect fire

were used instead.2018


24/106

There was s t i l l considerable defensive figh ting to do even af te r the

new doctrine of the ar ti ll er y offensive was implemented. The a rt il le ry

continued to play an important role in the destruction of enemy tanks bydirec t f i r e from the front line s of defensive resistance,*l The Soviets

gained proficiency in combining direct and indirect artillery fire t o break

up German armor advances.

Indirect f ir e of ar ti ll er y engaged an attacking tank formation at the

maximum range possible. Damage to tanks by indirec t fi re was not

extensive because a direct or near hit was required to destroy o r

demobilize a tank. However, i t did serve to separate the supporting

infantry and generate confusion in the attacking forces. As the tanks

approached the main line of resistance, the antitank and close support

a rt il le ry engaged the tanks a t close range. This i s where the major ity of

tank k i l l s occurred. Those tanks tha t successfully broke through were then

me t by the direc t fi re s of the ar ti ll er y tha t had been providing the indirect

fire support. This effectively insured that the tanks were subjected toar t i l le ryf i r e over the e nt ire avenue o f their attack on Soviet positions.22

Even the ar ti ll er y in indirect f i r e pos itions had a secondary antitank

role in defense in the event of an enemy penetration. Ba tterie s were

required to select direct fire positions near the ir fi ri ng positions. The

field artillery was usually massed along the second most likely armor

avenue of approach, with the bulk of the antitank artillery covering the

most l ikely route.23

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1 u t . y

The control of the Soviet artillery underwent some changes during

the Great Pa trio tic War. A rt il le ry assets were in it ia ll y distributed

re la tive ly evenly across the fro nt and employed as individual units. The

Soviets found i t necessary to centralize some ar ti ll er y in organizations a t

higher levels so that they could be rapidly moved en masse to whatever

area was being threatened and concentrate the required numbers t o create a

successful defense. This technique was enforced by the pr inciple of the

a r t i l l e ry offensive that required concentration of artillery in the area of

the main effo rt.

As the number of ar ti ll e ry weapons increased during 1942, regiments

were formed to create the beginnings of the Reserve of the Supreme High

Command (RGVK). As the size of the RGVK grew, these regiments were

further organized into artillery divisions and even a r t i l l e r y corps.

Eventually, almost 50% of all artil lery assets were in the RGVK. The

specific purpose of the RGVK was to centralize the artillery assets andprovide the capability to mass great quantities of ar t i l le ry on the main

axes o f troop operations.*"

The maneuver un its s t i l l retained their own ar ti lle ry units t o create

a dual level a r t i l l e r y organization; the centralized ar ti ll e ry described

above and a decentralized artillery. The decentralized artillery provided

support at the lowest maneuver levels and was called the close support

ar t i l le ry or the accompanying art ille ry. This close support ar ti ll er y i s

defined in the Soviet m t a r y Encvclooedic Dict ionary as:

'subunits (guns) of battations o r regiments, as well as specialself-propelled artillery, deployed in the Great Patriotic War in infantry

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and tank dispositions, to deliver fire on enemy forces impeding their

The close support a rt il le ry was able t o reso rt to direc t fi re because the

centralized art il le ry assets were available t o provide indire ct f ir e support.

The centralization of artillery assets and the increasing numbers of

artillery weapons produced by the Soviets allowed for massive

concentration of artillery. The 1941-42 norm for the density of artillery

pieces and mortars in the area of the main effort was 70-80 guns per

kilometer. That had increased to 130-200 per kilometer by 1943, 150-250

per kilometer by 1944 and 250-300 per kilome ter by 194S26 The extremewas during the final offensive against Berlin where the Sovlets massed

670 guns per kilo me ter (22,000 a rt il le ry pieces) against the Germans. An

unusually large proportion of these guns, by Western standards, were

advance. For the most pa rt delivered direct fire. -25

employed in a direct f i r e role on the front line.=27

In the sectors of greatest importance for the Leningrad

counterattack in January 1943 there were at least 40 dire ct fi re guns per

kilomete r of front. In the main attack by 2nd Army, th ir ty seven per cent

of the small caliber artillery pieces (mostly 76mm) were in direct f i re

positions, and about ten percent of the larger caliber artillery pieces

(mostly 122mrn. but some 152mm) were in direct f i r e positions. The

supporting attack by 8th Army showed about fifteen per cent less use of

direct f i re artillery.28 The weighting of the main attack w i t h direct f i re

weapons re fle ct s the importance attribute d t o the effectiveness of direct

f ire.

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- oelled Ar til le rvWhen the Soviets conducted offensive operations they discovered

quickly that the towed art i l lery in the front l ines was unable to keep upw i t h the tanks during battle, pa rticu larly those providing dir ec t f ire

support. The Soviets solved this major problem of providing continuous

fire support to mechanized formations by increasing the use of

self-propelled artillery. This use of self-propelled artillery is considered

another one of the major changes in artillery development by the Soviets.

The major role of self-propelled ar til le ry was t o use direct fi re to assist

armor forces in defea ting German tanks.

The Soviets had some experience w i t h self-pro pelled gun designs in

the 1930s, however, the indu stria l capacity p ri o r it y was t o production of

tanks u nt il the late r part of 1942. Light tank production then shifted t,o

providing self-propelled artillery. The s 1 ~ - 7 6 ~ as the f i rs t

self-propelled gun produced, but i t was not sufficiently armored or

ef fe ct iv e enough against newer German tanks. It was eventually employedpr im ar ily as an infan try support assault gun. The SU-122 entered

production shortly aft er the SU-76, and, due to i t s larg er caliber, was more

effective in the antitank role. The SU-152, the largest callber of

self-propelled artillery, appeared in early 1943 and was a very effective

antitank weapon. I t s ma jor shortcoming was a carrying capacity for only

twenty rounds of ammunition, requiring continual replenishment during

battle.30

The first self-propelled gun regiments were formed in December

1942 w ith a mixture of SU-76s and SU- 122s. By the beginning o f I944 the

22


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r i f l e divisions included their own self-propelled a rt ill er y and the combined

arms team of infantry, tanks and self-propelled a rt il le ry was employed.31

wrote in 1945 on the Great Patriotic War experience:

Soviet Marshal P. A Rotmistrov, Chief Marshal of Armored Forces,

The rapid pace of offen sive operations presented new requiremen tsregarding maneuverability of artillery, and practice showed that i f theattacking troops did not: have artillery support a t the right moment, i tlos t it s significance at once. There i s where self-propelled artillerycomes in. By i t s firepower and mobility i t supplements fi el d artil ler y,ass ists tanks in battle , and aids in the development of the bat tle . 32

Rotmistrov especially stressed the antitank role of such weapons

and emphatically st at ed fi el d a rti lle ry [indirect fire1 Is almost useless

against modem tanks. 33 In writ ings in the early 1970s, Rotmistrov

provided the rationale for development of self-propelled artillery during

the Great Pa tr io tic War. He re late d tha t the decision t o produce

self-propelled artillery with guns of a caliber and lethality exceeding

those of Nazi tanks was a direc t re sult o f the introduc tion of po werful new

weapons fielded by the Germans beginning at the Battle of Kursk (the 60

ton Tiger tank and 70 ton Ferdinand self-propelled gun). Soviet

self-propelled a r t i l l e ry was specifically expected t o deal with these

enemy armored vehicles.34

The use of s elf-propelled ar til le ry almost exclusively in a direct f i re

ro le r aised some controversy as t o who owned the new a r tl ll e ry weapons,

the armor commanders or the fie ld ar ti lle ry commanders. Initi ally , the

new self-propelled artillery was in fa ct subordinated t o the tank forces. I t

was determined that under the conditions of manewer warfare,

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self-propelled a rt il le ry di re ct ly accompanying the tanks provided the best

form of ar till er y s u p p 0 r t3 ~ This close maneuver un it support further

enhanced the concept of two artilleries: a centralized one capable ofmassing its assets to provide indirect fire support and another in direct

accompaniment of the maneuver forces.

The concept of employment of tanks and self-propelled artillery

together was an importan t one. The self-propelled a rt il le ry relieved the

tanks o f tasks rel atin g to the dir ec t engagement of enemy tanks allowing

the tanks to perform maneuver while the ar t i l lery provided f i r e p ~ w e r . ~ ~

This concept i s confirmed by another quote from Ro tmistrov:

.. . in case of a counterattack by enemy tanks, self-propelled gunscan draw this strike on themselves and open fire against attackers onthe spot, giving friendly tanks an opportunity to maneuver and attackthe enemy in the flank and rear. -37

Frequently self-propelled guns found themselves compelled t o r epe l

tank attacks on their own. An historical example of this shows how

effe ctiv e they were against German tanks. This is an account of action by a

Soviet self-propelled artillery unit in the Orel-Kunk sector in July of

1943. Intelligence reported the movement of a German unit of twenty Tiger

tanks and four Ferdinand self-propelled guns. A Soviet unit of twelve

self-propelled howitze rs was sent to defend against the attack. They took

up concealed positions in depth. When the German un it arrived, the Soviet

artillery opened up from defilade positions at a maximum range of 500

meters . Engagements were a t 250-300 meters at the height o f the battle.

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The Soviet unit destroyed eight of the Tigers and al l fou r of the Ferdinands,

eff ec tiv ely repulsing the attack.38

Experiences like these showedthat

self-propelled ar til le ry of alarge caliber was an extremely effective weapon against even the heavies t

German armored vehicles. It i s stressed though, that the guns had to be

properly employed from concealed pos ition s and at close ranges.

When the nature of the terraln allowed it, the self-propelled

artil lery util izing direct fire were unrivalled in effectiveness fo r tank

ambushes. Another example of this capability i s an instance lat er in the

war where the Soviets sent t wo a rt il le ry regiments to ambush an expected

German armored counterattack. The terrain was analyzed and the most

likely route for the Germans was covered by the artillery positioned in

concealed positions in depth on the route. The German countera ttack came

in the expected direction w it h a to tal o f si xt y medium and Tiger tanks and

Ferdinand heavy se lf-propelled guns. When the engagement was over the

Soviet a rt il le ry had destroyed fo rty -fiv e of the German armored vehiclesand successfully turned back the German c~u nt e ra tt ack .~ '

Self-propelled artillery played an ever increasing part in Soviet

offensive operations. As la te r models were produced they tended to have

stronger armor and increased mob ility. This made them more flexib le and

more effec tive in operations against tanks.

To conclude the lessons learned from the Great Pat rio tic War, Soviet

employment of direct fire became prominent out of the sheer need t o

defend against German armor with any means available. It had the

additional advantages of ammunition savings and overcoming the obs tacles25


31/106

of a relatively poor indirect fire capability when engaging targets of

opportunity. It was a significant contributor to the effectiveness of the

'artillery offensive' so important to the Soviet successes against theGermans. The major disadvantage of vulnerability was an acceptable

tradeoff for the results achieved and was greatly overcome by the

development of self-propelled ar t i l le ry that could hold its own against

German armor when properly employed. The Soviets came out of the Great

Patriotic War w it h a tradition of direct f ir e a rtil le ry tactics that worked

extremely we ll fo r them.

Soviet Art l l e r vfrom the 1950s to 1973

Immediately after the war and into the mid 1950s. the tactlcal

employment of ar t i l l e ry as a major factor in antitank defense operations

remained essen tially unchanged. Direct fir e ar ti ll e ry and pa rtic ula rly

self-propelled a r t i l l e ry was expected to engage enemy armor at theforward edge of the b at tle fie ld and In to the depth of the enemy

posi io ns .4

The majo r fac tor t o subsequently affe ct a rt il le ry development in the

mid 1950s was tied to the arrival of the Nuclear Age. The cannon

artillery's pre-eminence as the prime means of mass destruction was

replaced by the mis si le and atomic weapons. The stra teg ic rocket forces

became the important service in the mi li ta ry a t the expense o f the others.

The cannon artillery faded into the background during this period and

received l i t t l e emphasis. The ult im ate means f o r carrying out direct fi re

artillery tactics, the self-propelled weapon, received only minor26


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developmental attention and no further production. The prevailing opinion

was that conventional warfare was unlikely because i t was impossible to

maintain front lines and achieve major thrusts in an era of nuclear

weapons.41

The artillery weapons that were developed were improvements of

towed artillery to further enhance its range and generally update i t from

the Great Patriotic War vintage equipment on hand. In 1955, a 203mm

towed gun-howitzer was produced tha t was capable of fi ri ng a nuclear

projectile. All the weapons tha t were produced continued to have a direct

fire capability in deference to the lessons learned early in the Great

Pat rio tic War.

By the mid 1960 the Soviets had resolved that future war would

not automatically involve the immediate massive use of nuclear weapons,

and at least the init ialstages of war could be fought conventionally. US.

studies of the Soviet use of direct fire artillery determined their

employment would be based on experience from the Great P at rio tic War. Itwas understood that the Soviets would continue to use dire ct fi re ar ti ll e ry

in both defensive and offe nsive operations. The use of di rect f i r e was

based on a conviction of i t s tact ica l usefulness from the Great P atriotic

War and the advantages derived from 'defeating targets in less t ime w ith

less ammunition using dire ct fire"42 A r t i l l e r y weapon emplacement for

direct fire was expected to be from 1,000 to 1,500 meters which is a

ref lect ion of the increased capability of the newer towed weapons that the

Soviets had developed. Studies of that t im e concluded that all Soviet fiel d

artillery weapons were capable of direct fire up to and including the

nuclear capable 203mm g u n /h o w it ~ e r4 ~ he ta ct ic s of moving towed guns27


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up in to camouflaged pos itions near the f ront lin e under cover of darkness to

accomplish dir ec t r e missions was also retained.#

Soviet sources in the early 1970s indicate that the use of dir ect fire

by artillery was indeed s t i l l a viable concept. Soviet Chief Marshal of

Armored Forces P. k Rotmistrov wrote during this period that the use of

hollow-charge shells had insured that even low i n it ia l shell veloc ity

weapons could successfully perform ant itank missions. He sta ted

specific ally: Thus, in modern offensive battle too, self-propelled ar ti ll er y. . . w i l l carry a large share of the f ig ht against enemy tanks. 45

Major General of Ar t i l l e ryG. Biryukov in his book, Ant ita nk Wa rfare ,published in 1972 s ta ted

The usual ground art i l lery (excluding the antitank art ille ry) i s st i l lan important antitank weapon in modem combat. At the same time therole of ar t i l le ry f ire in combatting tanks with usual ammunition fromcovered pos itions [i nd ire ct fire1 has considerably decreased. . . 46

He goes on to say that the problem with indirect f ire is the largeammunition expenditure and large number of guns required, and even with

this the effects on a tank form ation are minimal. It is the a r t i l l e ry placed

in covered positions which engage tanks w i t h direc t fi re that are effective.

This i s particularly important in the defense of a breakthrough by enemy

armor when ar til le ry moves from i t s indirect fi re positions to positions

allowing direct f i r e engagement. With special armor piercing and shaped

charge ammunition the artillery can destroy any modern tank. The use of

ar t i l le ry in direct fire, supplementing a powerful artillery barrage is an

eff ec tive means t o repe l massive enemy armored attacks.47

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Colonel k A. Sidorenko in his book, The Offen sive published in 1970,

stated

'Very important significance i s had during the period of the f ir epreparatlon by dlr ec t f ir e as the most ef fec tive method of destroyingobserved enemy weapons as well as destroying defensive works on theforw ard edge of the ba tt le area and in the Immediate depth. In the lastwar, guns of various calibers were used for direct fire. . . . Undercontemporary conditions artillery guns. . . . may be widely used for theconduct of d ire ct I ire.-40

W e see that even into the early 1970s. the Great Patriotic War

experience w it h direc t f i r e was carried over and considered an effective

means of employing a slgnit'icant percentage of a rt il le ry weapons.

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Endnotes fo r Chapter 2

1 Raymond L. Garthoff, Sov e t Militan/ Doctrine(1953): 303.

2 V. Pogonin, "Organizing the P lan of Fir e and Engineer Obstacles,'mtarl, HeralQ (March 1983): 101.

3 U.S.S.R. Com mis sa riat o f Defense, F ie ld S ervice Re S ov ie tArmv. 193 6 ( 1937 : 125.

4 Walter Kerr, "Death or Insanity,'Field Art l l e rvJouma 1,33 (October1943): 815.

5 P. Kuleskov, 'In the Great Pa tr io ti c War," Mil it ar v Herald (January1982): 112.

6 S.L. Mayer, editor, The Russian War Machine 19 17- 1945 1977 : 190.

7 B.H. Lid del l Hart, editor. The Red Army ( 1956): 357.

8 F.A. Samsonov, edito r, Combat Exaerience of Ar t i l l e rv in the

Pat ri ot ic War (November 1952): 85-6.

9 W.R. Young, "Art il le ry Offensive.An Examination of Russian Practice,"nal 36 (January 1946): 27.

I0 Samsonov, m t xoe ience 60.

1 1 Samsonov, &&at Fxaer ence 33.

12 H.G. dewatevi lle, "Russian Art il le ry 1941-1945,'Field A r t i ll e ry

Journal. 37 (May-June 1947): 196.

13 Kuleskov, "In the Great Pat ri ot ic War": 112-3.

14 , Direct Ar ti ll er y Fire," F ield Ar ti ll er v Journal. 3 2(September 1942): 694.

30


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15 Hart, Red Ar m r 358-9.

16 Samsonov, m a t x o e r i m 47.

17 L. Sapkov, "Evolutiono f A rti ll e ry Tactics and Combat Employment,'MilitaryHerald (April 1982): 120.

18 Karelsky, 'Soviet A rt il le ry Fire,' Field Art iller y Journ a32 (July1942): 5 1 .

19 J. Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice'(September 1979): 43.

20 Liddell Hart, 355.2 I Samsonov, -er iencq: 84-5.

22 Samsonov, Gombat ExDerienca 96-7.

23 Liddell Hart, Red 36 1-2.

24 Kuleskov, 'In the Great Patriotic War': 1 15.

25 N.V. Ogarkov, editor, M-UDedC Dictionary ( 1983):VOl I,175.

26 Sapkov, 'Evolution of Artillery': 121.

27 Garthoff, Soviet Doctr nc 123.

28 Samsonov, Combat EXDWence 47.

29 The numbers in designation of models of self-propelled ar t i l l e ryreferred t o the caliber of the gun (i.e. SU-76 i s a 76mm gun).

30 Mayer, yar Machine: 190.

3 Erickson, 'Soviet Combined Arms": 28.

32 Garthoff, Soviet Doctring 305-6.31


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CHAPTER 3

CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS AND PROCEDURES

The number of articles available from Soviet sources1 that discuss

the direct fi re use of arti llery make it clear that the use of direct f ir e i sstill seen as a viable means of employing artillery in the offense, the

defense and in special situations. The purpose of t h is chapter i s to explain

the current Soviet ta ct ic s and employment procedures fo r dlre ct fire.

The organization of Soviet ar ti lle ry is an important factor in how i t

is tact ica lly employed. The Soviets can be considered to have two a rt il le ry

forces2 The first force is decentralized and is the one we are concerned

w i t h in this study. It is a f ie ld a rt ill er y battalion organic to the Motorized

Rifle Regiment and Tank Regiment. It provides the close support artillery

assets to the manew er force and is ofte n used in a direct f lre role. This

force i s also known as organic or accompanying ar til le ry . The quan tity and

features of the organlc a rt il le ry are discussed inChapter 4.

The second artillery force is the centralized artillery that is

con trolled a t div islon and higher levels. Some of thls art i l lery is passeddown to the regiments in organizing the force for combat. The a rt il le ry

that ends up at regimental level may also find itself performing an

occasional direct fire mission, but the usual method of employment is33


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indirect fi r e 3 The centralized artil le ry retained at division and higher

levels would only rar ely be employed fo r d ire ct fire . They are, however, a l l

capable of using di re ct fire in self defense.

There are tw o primaty occasions in offensive operations where the

Soviets w i l luse their f ie ld ar t i l le ry in a dire ct fi r e role. The first is by

the art i l lery unit assigned to the advanced guard during a march inan tic ipat ion of a meeting engagement. Second, is by port ions of the organic

regimental ar till er y as part of a fire plan during the a rt ill er y preparation

of the attack. Although these a re certa inly not the only occasions where

direct fire w i l l be used, they are the mos t prevalent in current Soviet

mi i ary I erature.

he advanced guard of a Soviet regiment conducting a march is a

battalion size maneuver force. It usually has an artillery battalion

attached t o it. Ahead of the advanced guard is a forward security element

made up of a maneuver company w i t h an ar ti ll e ry batte ry attached to it.

The artillery moves in the forward elements of these formations. A

platoon size reconnaisance patrol operates far enough in front of theforw ard se curity element (5 to 10 kilometers) to provide enough reaction

time and space for the security element to move into combat formations

pr io r t o contact wt th an enemy force.

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Upon a warning o f enemy forces ahead, the m ost li ke ly deployment

fo r the a rti lle ry battery from the security element i s t o take positions that

provlde fo r dlre ct f lre engagement of the en'm y force. The batte ry locatloni s quickly selected based on the securi ty element commander's plan fo r

maneuver. Specific gun positions are dlrected upon arr lva l at the posltton.

The battery is deployed by platoon wlth several hundred meters between

them and as much as a hundred meters between guns of a platoon. The

artlllery battallon commander traveling wlth the advanced guard is

Informed of the sttuatio n and approves the c o m e of action. The battalion

commander w i l l then direc t the other tw o batteries of the battalion to

deploy Into Indirect fire positions t o provide support for the inltial

engagement as i t develops. When the enemy c o m a into the ki l l ing zone of

the direct fire battery i t opens fire and the maneuver elements o f the

securi ty element attack. The bat tery commander cont rols the flre of one

platoon and the senior batte ry o ff ic er c ontro ls the other platoon. By the

completion of this engagement the maneuver forces of the advanced guard

have also arrived and they continue to develop the s1 tu at im 4

The requlrements t o insure success in these situations are to train

for deployment from the march, achieve proficiency in preparing the guns

for firing , understand and properly react t o Control signals, and sk il lf u ll y

use the te rra in In deploying the f ir in g platoons for th ei r p r o t e c t i ~ n . ~his

las t point i s stressed in every dlscusslon 1 have read of movlng in to dire ctf i re posit ions from the march. One of the few hlStOrlCal examples from the

Great Patriotic War that tells about a Soviet defeat i s one that relates a

situa tion where the terraln was used incorrectly. The battery tri ed t o

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move in to a direct f i r e posit ion in sight of the enemy and lo st fi ve o f t he ir

six guns t o tank fire.6 The best use of the terrain i s to cover the approach

of the guns to th ei r firingpos ition s and to use i t to select positions withmaximum observation and fields of fire. i t is preferable to position the

guns t o form a 'f ir e pocket' fo r the enemy vehicles to move into. This

allows most of the guns to f i r e a t the more vulnerable sides of enemy

vehicles. Another advantageous use of t er ra in is t o emplace on the reverse

slopes of hi l ls and open close range f i re at tanks as they appear on the

crest. This effec tive ly takes away the tank's range advantage.

It seems to be a frequent requirement for both towed and

self-propelled artillery units to train in repelling a tank attack during a

meeting engagement. It is standard practice fo r the b attery operating in

the security element to deploy into direct fire positions at the report of

enemy units by the reconnaisance patrol. The ba tte ry commander of a

self-propelled artillery unit was berated in the Herald for reacting

improperly during a training excercise as part of the security element

conducting a meeting engagement.' The situati on was the same as

mentioned above, and his ta ct ic al blunder was that he put his battery in an

ind ire ct f i r e position. The evaluator mentioned several reasons f o r why the

choice should have been di re ct f i r e positions instead. The first point was

that direc t f i r e would have provided for more eff ec tiv e accomplishment o f

the miss ion w i t h less ammunition expenditure. Secondly, there were tw omore batteries fo llowing with the advanced guard that were available to

provide indirect fire support. The third point was that the side that fires

first in a meeting engagement i s the one tha t wins it, and he had lost that

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opportunity. Finally, he fai led to use the ta ct ica l features of h is

self-propelled howitzers . These were ll st ed as 'high maneuverability,

con tro lla bili ty and survivability." The bottom linein the evaluation of th isunit was tha t 'those of fi ce rs who exclude an opportunity to use today's

self-propelled artillery in dir ect f i r e are acting incorrectly.'

he second occasion where direct fire i s likely to be used in

offensive operations i s as part of the fi r e plan developed for the art il le ry

preparation of the attack. It i s routine to use some designated artillery

weapons to fire from direct fire positions to complement the traditional

heavy volume of tndlrect fires of the preparation. i t has been suggested

that this may have even more significance today than it did during the

Great Pa trio ttc War because of the current need t o reduce the t im e of the

preparation due t o improved enemy coun terfir e cap abi liti es9

The artillery preparation of the attack is intended as a powerful

surprise fir e assault by all art il le ry units against preplanned targets of

personnel and weapons on the forw ard edge of the b a tt le fi el d and through

the depths of the enemy defense to include ar t il le ry uni ts and command and

control targets. The weapons assigned di rect f i r e missions destroy

pinpoint t argets such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, antitank guided

mis si le launchers and emplacements on the forward edge.1 With the highlevel o f mechanization of Soviet forces, the primary focus Is on

destruction of the enemy antiarmor capability to enhance the odds of the

success of Soviet mechanized formations in the attack.

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Extensive and detailed reconnaisance i s performed of the enemy

positions t o determine the targeting requirements for the preparation.

Reconnaissance detachments, combined arms commanders and commandersof organic and attached artillery perform this reconnaisance and pass

information on targets t o higher levels. The f i r e plan i s prepared at the

highest level involved in the operation and then passed down fo r execution.

This can include direc tion fo r which spe cific targ ets w i l l be engaged w it h

di re ct fire . The most important targets on the forwa rd edge of the

bat tle fi el d are the ones tha t w i l l be engaged by direc t f i r e weapons. Theregimental artillery chief coordinates the artillery preparation for the

atta ck fo r the manewer regiment commander. He analyzes the m iss ion and

the assets available to him, and then designates which weapons w i l l be

involved in the dire ct f i r e missions. This includes the tanks and antitank

guided mis slle s of supported manewer un its as we ll as ar ti lle ry pieces.

the arti llery units on their direct fir e missions1

The regimental ar til le ry chief provides very detailed informa tion t o

1. Spec ific fi r e missions w it h primary and alternate targe ts fo r each

weapon. In many cases more than one weapon w i l l be assigned for

the destruction o f a single target.

2. The sequence fo r execution.

3. The general locations fo r fi ri ng positions.

4. The t im e f o r pos ition occupation and tim e t o be ready to open fire.5. The signals fo r commencing and ceasing fire.

6. The allow ed ammunition consumption fo r each target.

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The regimental ar ti ll er y chief prepares a f ir e chart of the weapons

used in direc t f i r e to include tanks, antitank guided missiles, and ar ti ll er y

guns. This i s considered to be the most important document of the fireplan.I2 It shows the po sltion of the weapons and the designation of their

targets.

The battery commander whose guns are t o be employed in the direct

fi re role selects the spe cific f ir in g position locations fo r each gun based

on the informat ion from the f i re plan. The positlons are chosen based on

the ab il ity to observe the target, a t a range wi th in the l im it s of direct f i re

and w i th approach routes that fa c il it a te movement into the positions. The

art il le ry commander must know the maneuver plan to Insure the dire ct f i re

Positions do not hlnder forward movement of friendly attacking forces and

the positlon i s chosen no closer than 400 meters from enemy positions to

keep it out of small arms range.I3 The ba tte ry commander also designates

the rendezvous location where the guns wl l l reassemble fol low ing

completion of the direc t fi re missions.The weapon commanders study the approach to their designated

firing position in detail. They w i l l most likely physically occupy the

position during the night preceding the preparation. They check the

technical condition of the sighting devices, prepare the ammunition for

flring and camouflage the weapon from observation. They are also

responsible fo r establishing wir e communications t o adjacent guns becauseof the wide dispersal between guns.14

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Firing from direct fire positions i s usually conducted at the

beginning of the ar til le ry preparation. This i s t o insure that the targe ts

are clearly observable pr io r t o the enemy's forwa rd edge of the ba ttle fie ldbecoming covered with dust and smoke from the shell bursts of the

ar ti lle ry preparation. The need to destroy the targets w it h a f i r s t round hit

i s greatly emphasized since la te r observation and correction of f i r e may be

extremely di ff ic u lt o r impossible. The tim e available for completion of

direct f ir e missions i s estimated to be 5-8 minutes.'

It i s tremendously importan t for the ar ti ll e ry t o defeat the enemy's

antitank cap ability during the preparation. This point i s grea tly

emphasized in current Soviet articles on the artillery preparation. It i s

considered that an ar til le ry preparation by only indire ct f ir e s would leave

enough weapons undamaged on the forward edge t o slow the attacking un its

and possibly prevent the success o f the attack. The employment o f direct

f i r e weapons and the detailed planning process fo r direc t f ir e i s done t o

insure the defeat of this antitank capab ility and to fa ci lit at e the success

of the Soviet maneuver force s in the attack.

lthough this study has discussed the two situations most often

mentioned by the Sov lets on employment of their field artil lery assets in a

dire ct fi r e role, they are not the only situations. There are many othertactical situations where direct fire employment of the supporting

ar t i l le ry is feasible. Thls is particularly the case in pursuit operations

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where the tactical situation can become very similar to the meeting

engagement already discussed.

The phase of artillery support following the preparation is the

support of the attack.I6 This phase begins immediately upon the

completion of the preparation fires and continues until the Soviet forces

have overrun the front line battalions of the enemy. The tra ns ition from

the preparatlon to support of the attack Is supposed to be lmperceptlble.

The artil le ry units in place from the preparation are capable of supporting

this phase without movement from positions because of the range

capabilities of th e ir weapons. Accompanying a rt il le ry moves forward tofo llow the advance of the manewer units and i s capable of providing direc t

fir e support The ma jori ty of the artillery remains in indirect fire

positions and continues to foll ow the f ir e plan fo r support of the attack.

The fi re plan usually cal ls fo r successive concentrations of artillery fire

on enemy positions. The concentration i s fired on the enemy position until

the fr iend ly maneuver forces reach it The concentration i s then shifted tothe next enemy position. There are additional on ca ll targ ets available i f

requested by manewer commanders. The extensive In dire ct fir es are

supplemented by the ar ti lle ry moving w i t h the manewer formations which

i s available for conduct of direct f i re i f needed. Di rect fi re use of ar t i l le ry

is probably m inima l during thls phase since it i s rarely discussed.

Despite the extensive fire planning there are indications that fire

support coordinatlon during thls period does not always meet expectatlons.

It i s a common theme in current lite ratu re that the manewer and ar t i l le ry

commanders must know each others needs better In Order to effectively

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fi gh t the combined arms battle . The emphasis fo r Soviet artil lerym en i s t o

understand maneuver, think like a maneuver commander, anticipate their

needs and provide the required fire support in a ti mel y manner.In a recent ar tic le in the Soviet pl il it ar y HeralQ,it was recommended

that the ar ti ll e ry designated t o accompany the maneuver forces in support

of the attack be completely held back from part icip ation in the preparation

so that they could be prepared t o immediately move forward. The prima ry

function of the artillery was to h i t a l l "surv iving and suddenly appearing

targets' dangerous t o the tanks. This indica tes a t le ast some requirementfor ar t i l le ry in a dire ct fi r e role. The fin al statement of the ar tic le is an

assessment that ar ti ll er y Officers 'must be imbued w l t h a tank sp ir it ' to

deploy rapidly and support tanks in a dynamic batt1e.l'

Another source re fe rs t o the accompanying a rt il le ry spe cif ica lly as a

f i r e support asset that f i l l s a void between the tank gun of the maneuver

force and the indirect artillery available from the division and army

ar ti ll er y groups. The presence of th is additional link in the fire support

chain would be very beneficial for providing a guarantee of ar t i l le ry

support in an intensive electronic warfare environment where

communication with indirect f i r e sources was lim ited or eliminated.

The final phase o f ftre support i s f i r e accompaniment in the depth of

the enemy defenses. A rt il le ry u ni ts that have provided ind irect f i r e

support displace forw ard by echelon in order t o provide continued support.The situation becomes more fluid and the advancing maneuver units may

find themselves attacking enemy defenses from the march, fighting

meeting engagements and conducting pursuit operations. As the situation

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continues to develop the likelihood of ut ili zi ng ar til le ry in a direct fire

role increases. The conduct of the leading artillery battery in a meeting

engagement w i l lbe the same here as discussed ea rl ie r in the chapter. The

accompanying ar til le ry i s also l ike ly t o deploy to direct fi re positions in

reaction to enemy counterattacks.

The Soviet use of fie ld arti l le ry fo r direct f ir e in the offense i s most

prevalent in the meeting engagement and in the art ill er y preparation for a

deliberate attack. The accompanying a rt il le ry w i l lalso have opportunity to

employ direct f i r e as i t fo ll ow s im mediately behind the maneuver forces in

the attack. As the attack succeeds against the enemy forces and the

battlefield becomes more fluid, the incidence of direct fire use of f ie ld

ar til le ry assets w i l l increase.

some of the foundations for the use of direct fire emanated from the

desperate need for the Soviets to stop the German tanks in the early part of

the Great Patr iot ic war. The soviets are extremely fond of ustng historical

situations as examples of how contemporary requtrements mu st also be

met and a large portion of the historical examples that are used for direct

fire relate t o i t s value in defending against tanks. There is no question

that an ar t i l le ry untt i s expected t o stand and flg ht and win in a defensive

engagement w i t h tanks.

There are very few references to f le ld artillery pleces being

integrated into the front line defenses of Soviet maneuver units. I have

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seen no examples of this type o f deployment in current l ite rat ure and i t i s

likely that it occurs only rarely.

The artillery prepares defensive fire plans in the same detail as inoffensive situa tions . Again, tanks, antitank guided mis si le s and antitank

ar ti ll er y are par t of the overall fi r e plan, not just fie ld ar til le ry units. The

most li ke ly enemy course of action i s targeted in the fi re plan with on ca ll

targe ts and shi ft s prepared for other situations. Ar til le ry f i r e i s conducted

by Indirect fire means and starts a t i t s maximum range t o break up enemy

formations approaching friendly positions. As the enemy approaches the

forw ard edge of the defense, maneuver unit weapons assigned to specific

sectors engage the enemy at t he ir maximum eff ect ive range. Indirect

artillery fire continues to move in closer as the enemy approaches to

maximize dest ruction and confusion. Maximum fire pow er is brought t o bear

a t the for wa rd edge of the battlefield.i9 The defense i s organized in depth

and as the enemy forces penetrate or bypass friendly positions the direct

fi re capability of the arti l ler yis brought in to action.The dir ect f i r e capa bilities of fi el d art il le ry weapons are considered

by the Soviets when they organtze thei r defense in depth. Artillery f l r ing

positions in a defensive situ ation are deliberately selected on primary tank

avenues of approach. This i s t o allow the ar ti ll e ry batte ries the

opportunity to destroy enemy tanks in the event they break Into the

defensive depth2O

The specific firing positions of the field artillery units are also

selected wi th the antitank role in mind. The battery is positioned for i t sprimary Indirect fi re rol e w i t h consideration fo r survlvabiltty from enemy

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a rt il le ry fl re. Spec lfic posltlons are also selected fo r each weapon to be

employed fo r dlr ect fl re In the case of an enemy armor at ta ck . The terra ln

should favor safe movement t o the dlrect fl re posltlon and It must allow

fo r good observation out to the maxlmum eff ec tlv e dlrect fi re range of the

weapon. The poslt lo n needs to provlde for the concealment of the art ll le ry

plece to allow the tank to move within range wlthout detectlon of the

a rt ll le ry weapon. At the pos ltlo n reference poln ts are deslgnated, ranges

are predetermined to fa cl ll ta te accurate engagement of tanks and spec lflc

zones of f lr e are allocated. The zones of f l r e Interlock and overlap to allo w

more than one a r ti ll e ry plece t o engage a target at the same time.*'

Fleld ar t i l lery unlts, particularly self-propelled howitzers, may be

deslgnated as part of the manewer unlt's antltank reserve. This reserve

would be called t o reln force manewer un lts a t threatened sectors.

When actlng as part of an antltank reserve in a planned defenslve

movement, i t Is likely that the effectiveness of the direct fire will be

enhanced by combat englneer work. The most common englneer obstacle i sthe mlnefleld. The advantage of havlng advancing tanks distracted by a

mlnefleld at the same t h e that an ar t l l lery unlt i s engaging I t In dlrect

f i r e Is significant22 It makes the tanks more vulnerable by restrlctlng

mo blll ty and enhances the surv lvab lllty of the dlrect fl re a rtill ery .

Although antitank capabllltles of a rt ll le ry In dlrect fi re positions is

by fa r the maJor subJect dlscussed, the Sovlets traln to employ dlrect fl re

agalnst personnel targets as well. The Sovlet a rt il le ry has several

ammunltlon rounds deslgned spec lflcally fo r antltank missions. For

antipersonnel mlsslons though, they sim ply use a hlgh explosive round w i t h

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a time fuze on a short setting. The major problem in effectiveness i s an

accurate determination of the range t o the target and setting the proper

fuze time relative t o the range. In an article from the mtary Heral4 theranges used t o work out optimum fuze settings were between 300 and 500

meters for a 122mm how itzer ~ n i t . 2 ~

The Soviets can be expected t o use their art i l lery for direct f i re

missions when defending in the depth of their positions. Artille ry w i l l

aggressively move out t o meet tank attacks from prepared positions on

primary tank avenues of approach. Although, the primary concern i s an

antitank capability, the Soviets have developed methods t o insure an

effe ctive antipersonnel capability in defense of battery positions as well.

There are several special combat situations discussed by the Soviets

tha t lend themselves t o the use of their field artillery ina direct fi re role.The situations I w i l l discuss here are river crossings, combat in

mountainous terrain, combat in built-up areas and the destruction of

fortifications.

Ju=Q=wThe artil lery support provided for a river crossing is likely t o

involve use of field ar t i l lery in a direct fire role. Organic artillery

weaponsare frequently moved up t o a position where they can engage

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targets on the opposite bank at the crossing sites and support the

establishment of the brldgehead.

In the case of a deliberate river crossing an ar tl ll er y preparatlon Is

planned the same as in any other deliberate attack. The dir ec t fi r e targe ts

are destroyed early In the preparation Wen the preparation flres are then

shifted to the depths of the enemy defense with the crosslng of the

attacking troops, the direct fire artillery weapons stay in place and

continue t o provide a cover of close-In fire as the bridgehead is

established. The pr io ri ty ta rge ts are tanks and antltank weapons which can

cause the most damage to crossing vehlcles. When the arti l ler y battertes

cross the river to support continuation of the attack, they occupy pos itions

on the primary avenue of approach for annor In order to repulse any

counterattack e ff o rt by dire ct f i r e to protect the bridgehead.24

An assault ri ve r crossing w i l lbe characterized in a similar nature t o

a meeting engagement. The ar ti ll e ry batte ry of the forward detachment

w i l l often be employed to provide direct f i r e support at the crossing s it eas the situation Is developed fo r the advanced guard to secure the bridge or

crossing si te fo r the main body.

ombat actions in mountainous terrain have their special

characteristics. Most action i s along valleys but the t ac tic al edge Is to the

force with the advantage of the commandlng helghts. Un its rout ine ly have

exposed flanks and a considerable distance to the next adjacent unit.

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Art i l le ryunits likew ise have disti nc t characteristics f or mountain

warfare. Each battery w i l l most often be performing i t s mission

independently. The l ike lihood fo r using guns in direct f i re i s s ignificantly

increased. The advantage of the effectiveness of di re ct f i r e i s even more

obvious w i t h the increased d i l l cul ty of conducting accurate indire ct f i r e

due t o the tremendous differences in elevation between weapon and target.

The reduced ammunition expediture that results from direct fire i s also

significant because ammunition resupply is more di ff ic u lt to accomplish in

mountainous terrain.25Another problem in the conduct of indirect artil lery lire in the

mountains i s the large dead spaces that cannot be fired into because of

trajectory limitations. A recent ar tic le from the M i l l t a r v Herald

discusses the advantages of using direct fire t o long ranges in the

mountains because of the di ff ic u lt y of indire ct fire.26 Direct fi r e to long

ranges i s conducted by semidirect laying. Wi t h semidirect laying the

direction of the tube (in the horizontal plane) is determined by direct

aiming on the targe t it se lf . The elevation of the tube ( in the vert ica l plane)

i s determined by a calculation of trajectory based on the range to the

targe t and leve ling of the indire ct fi r e sight. Although fi r s t round accuracy

is diminished at the longer ranges, i t can evidently be adjusted t o the

target more quickly than with indirect fire methods under the same

conditions. Although there i s not a specif ic e ffe ctiv e range li m i t discussedfo r using semidirect laying in the mountains, the insinuation i s tha t i f you

can see the target, use it. The comment i s made that v is ib il it y at up t o 10

kilometers is not unusual in the mountains.

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it i s inte res ting t o note the increased frequency o f dlscussions on

the nature of combat in the mountains since the Soviets have gotten

involved in Afghanistan. Some of the discussions of trainin g excercises inthe mountains make the reader wonder i f the action described is real ly jus t

an excercise.

-Combat in built-up areas i s another speclal situation that has

routine application fo r direct f ir e use of artl llery . Although It i s desirable

to avoid and bypass bu ilt-up areas wherever possible, there are sltwtions

when i t cannot be done. The tac tical employment of organic art i l lery in

large built-up area is characterized by decentralizatlon. Batteries w i l l

llkeiy operate as part of an assault group with platoons and indivldual

a rt il le ry pieces given separate and distinc t dlrect fi re missions in varlous

parts of the area of action. ind lrect fi r e cap abilities are at a disadvantage

because of the limited fields of view and difficulties of observing and

adjusting artillery rounds In a ci ty . Because of the sturdiness of large

buildings, requirements are increased f o r heavler caliber artlllery (from

152mm and up) to pe rform di rec t f ir e as well.

The range for direct fire is likely to be very short because of the

limited space available between bulldings for the artlllery to set up.

Moving in so close to a target requires increased consideration of how toprovide fo r surv iva bility of the a rt il le ry plece. One technique i s to place

the target under heavy fire from small arms, machine guns and tanks, i f

possible, wh ile the a rt il le ry piece moves int o positio n and opens fire. In

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many cases i t does not take a great number of hits from a large caliber

weapon fo r the defenders to realiz e th e ir fate. Engineer prepara tion can be

used in some situa tio ns and some cover can be gained from exis ting rubbleo r buildings. It i s not uncommon to move in to the dir ec t f i r e position under

cover of darkness2

The antitank mission fo r a rt ill er y i s also common in the city with

guns placed in covered and concealed dire ct f i r e pos itions to prote ct flanks

and approaches to frie nd ly positions from tank attacks or counterattacks.

situation that i s si mi lar t o the destruction of buildings in a c i ty i s

the requirement fo r destruction of fortifica tions . This situa tion i s easier

from the standpoint of emplacement options for the guns performing the

mis sio n However, the strength of the fo rtif ic at io n w i l lbe greater than a

c it y building. The existence of ar tic les in current Soviet military

literature discussing the techniques for destruction of fortifications

indicates that this is a va lid requirement for use of d ire ct f ir e

The use of heavy caliber weapons (152mm and 203mm) i s directed

fo r effec tive destruction of fo rtificatio ns. Concrete piercing shells w it h

delayed action fuzes are used as the ammunition. The 203mm ar t i l le ry is

considered most ef fe cti ve in the de struction of concrete structures w it h a

w al l thlckness

Documents

Soviet Direct Fire Artillery