The Hindu Editorials 11-15 Nov 2013

8/11/2019 The Hindu Editorials 11-15 Nov 2013

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Hindu editorials

Nov 11,2013

Surrender on CHOGM

Once again, foreign policy objectives have been sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.

After Pakistan and Bangladesh, the surrender by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the

Congress to political opposition and a narrow regional view on Sri Lanka is not surprising, but it

is disappointing all the same. For India, the two main objectives in its dealings with Sri Lanka are

to ensure a just deal for that nation‘s Tamil minority, and to protect its own interests in a region

of strategic importance. The Prime Minister‘s decision not to attend the Commonwealth Heads of

Government Meeting came after weeks of pressure by Tamil Nadu political parties, including a

resolution by the State Assembly. But if the primary reason for staying away is to express

displeasure at Sri Lanka‘s reluctance to address alleged atrocities against Tamil civilians duringthe final battles against the LTTE, it is doubtful if the decision will yield a different, more positive

outcome. More likely is a further erosion of New Delhi's influence on the Rajapaksa regime to

effect a just settlement of the Tamil question. It was thanks to India's prodding (Poke (someone)

with a finger, foot, or pointed object ) that Sri Lanka held elections in September to the Northern

Provincial Council, convincingly won by the Tamil National Alliance. This significant milestone in

ethnic (Of or relating to a population subgroup (within a larger or dominant national or cultural group)

with a common national or cultural tradition) reconciliation(The restoration of friendly relations) has

given Tamil-dominated northern Sri Lanka a popularly elected administration for the first time.

Unfortunately, instead of projecting this as an example of constructive diplomacy (The profession,

activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country's representatives abroad),

the Congress allowed itself to be blackmailed by its present and potential allies in the State.Political parties in Tamil Nadu virtually ignored the NPC election, giving rise to the suspicion that

it is not the interests of Tamils across the Palk Strait that they espouse (Adopt or support (a cause,

belief, or way of life) but their own, as in this election season it is easier to flog the emotional

overtones of the issue than respond to more pressing domestic concerns.

A decision by Dr. Singh to go to CHOGM and include a visit to Jaffna would have been a powerful

reaffirmation of New Delhi's stakes and interests in the region. India must now deal with the

consequences of its decision to stay away, both on the Tamil question and on its own larger

interests. In Sri Lanka, it will affect the task of reconciliation considerably, including India‘s

efforts to ensure the 13th Amendment is not diluted or done away with entirely. It is to be hoped

that both countries will guard against any adverse consequences on people-to-people links, andIndia will have to manage the huge strategic and diplomatic fallout. It is debatable if Sri

Lanka will turn into a Chinese satellite in the Indian Ocean as is commonly

feared, but clearly, the island will be looking for other allies in the region and

beyond. imp



Reprieve, for now

TOPICS : economy (general) recession/slowdown

Policymakers must be heaving a big sigh of relief at the decision of ratings agency Standard &

Poor‘s (S&P), to retain India‘s sovereign rating at ‗BBB –,‘ with a negative outlook. The skidding

rupee, a high current account deficit (CAD), weakening GDP growth and rising inflation had set

off fears of an imminent downgrade of the country‘s sovereign rating. A downgrade would have

taken India to below investment grade, which would have put off prospective investors and also

raised borrowing costs for Indian companies abroad, compounding the existing problems. If this

dire scenario did not play out, it is thanks mainly to the measures initiated by the Reserve Bank

of India and the government to support the rupee and rein in CAD through a tight squeeze on

non-essential imports. A simultaneous pick-up in exports and revival in FII fund flows, following

the decision of the U.S. Federal Reserve to continue with its monthly bond-buying programme,

certainly helped improve the external environment. Interestingly, S&P notes that ―India‘s

external position is an element of strength for the rating,‖ a far cry from the situation just a few

weeks ago. Yet, the fact is that the risk of downgrade has been seen off only temporarily, as the

ratings agency has itself acknowledged in its report.

There still are several adverse economic variables for policymakers to be worried about. With the

CAD now under check, the focus has shifted to the fiscal deficit and the question of whether the

government will be able to stick to the target of 4.8 per cent of GDP for 2013-14 considering that

elections are round the corner. Reining in subsidies on petroleum products and fertilizers is

crucial to meeting the fiscal deficit target, but as we get closer to the elections it is doubtful if the

government will be able to prune either. Added to this is the outlay on food subsidy, which S&P

estimates will be as high as 1.5 per cent of GDP. Funding these subsidies would not have been a

worry in an environment of strong economic growth but that is not the case now; the growth

impulse is weak and both consumption and investment are at a low ebb. Falling demand has

resulted in idling of capacities across a range of industries starting from automobiles to consumer

durables. These problems acquire a different dimension when viewed along with the likelihood of

political instability at the Centre post the general elections. And this is exactly the risk that the

ratings agency is flagging for its negative outlook. A change in the outlook to ‗positive‘ and

warding off a possible downgrade would require a return of the growth impulse, resolute

management of the fisc and stable monetary conditions — a tough ask indeed in an election

season.

Lead A flawed approach to Montreal

ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR TOPICS environmental issues hazardous materials

In rushing to embrace the U.S. proposal to amend the Montreal

Protocol on ozone depletion, New Delhi has neither helped multilateral

efforts to tackle climate change nor ensured that the appliancesindustry gets access to viable alternative refrigerants

It is 1994, and less than a year to Assembly elections in Bihar. The Indian economy is on the

mend but the benefits of liberalisation are yet to reach semi-urban and rural areas. Standing in

the way of government efforts to boost consumer spending is a little known international treatycalled the Montreal Protocol. The Protocol requires India — which ratified it in 1992 — to control

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and phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbons and halons, which are considered Ozone Depleting

Substances (ODS). As a developing country, India has been offered a 10-year window to abide by

its commitments to the Protocol.

‘Refrigerator or tiger?’

Reining in CFCs could possibly dent the consumer goods market in India: they are used as

refrigerants in automobiles, electronic appliances, plastics and pharmaceuticals, among other

applications. Of particular concern is the market for refrigerators, which has witnessed an

unprecedented boom. Having acceded to the Protocol, the government has no option but to hard-

sell it to the public. Maneka Gandhi — who as Environment Minister negotiated India‘s entry into

the Protocol — opts for a novel approach to the issue at an election rally in Bihar, in a

constituency located near a tiger reserve. Ms. Gandhi — she would recall to the late political

scientist Holly Sims — spins the story of ―The Lady, or the Tiger‖ around to ask the crowd: ―Do

you want a refrigerator, or a tiger?‖

Its impact on India‘s consumer-driven growth notwithstanding, the Montreal Protocol was amuch-needed instrument that addressed ozone depletion. The well-being of tigers is not directly

linked to the decreasing volume of ozone in the atmosphere — but by comparing refrigerators to

endangered animals, Ms. Gandhi simply sought to relate the importance of the treaty to

laypersons.

This year, the Montreal Protocol is back in the spotlight. The United States and other developed

countries are leading an effort to bring hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) within the ambit of the treaty.

India, which has scrupulously adhered to its original commitments under the Protocol, is being

arm-twisted into agreement. Cutting down on HFCs will deprive Indian industry of the only

viable alternative to CFCs. Despite its potential impact on the economy, in an election season, the

United Progressive Alliance has made no effort to convince the public why it is tagging along with

the proposal.

The reasons are fairly clear: India‘s negotiating position has not been borne out of some sense of

responsibility to the environment. It has its genesis in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s

promise to U.S. President Barack Obama — made both at the G20 meeting at St. Petersburg and

during his visit to the White House in September 2013 — that New Delhi will not object to the

West‘s initiative.

The Montreal Protocol was negotiated in the aftermath of a stunning discovery by British

scientists of a giant hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica. This discovery in 1985 lent urgency to

treaty deliberations. The Protocol owes its success to a sharply defined objective — to stem

further ozone depletion. To this end, the treaty identifies the class and category of halons and

CFCs that need to be regulated.

The West‘s current proposal to sweep HFCs under the Montreal Protocol runs contrary to

established principles of international law. In fact, it defeats the very purpose of the Protocol.

HFCs do not harm the ozone layer. However, they contribute substantially to greenhouse gas

emissions and thus, climate change. Since HFCs gained currency as an alternative to CFCs and

other ozone-depleting substances, the West has argued, they too should be regulated under the

Protocol. A treaty may have unintended consequences, but to amend it to tackle them all is

neither feasible nor desirable. If it is found that conventional warfare has been on the rise on



account of the absolute ban on nuclear weapons, should the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty be

amended to impose limits on defence budgets of countries?

Bringing HFCs under the Montreal Protocol, some have argued, serves the larger goal of tackling

climate change. But regulating the only commercially viable alternative to ODS is likely to

encourage non-compliance from the Protocol. In any event, history suggests the West‘s proposalis not solely driven by noble intentions.

In return for its consent, India has been promised financial and technical assistance to phase out

HFCs. The U.S. offered exactly the same carrot when the Protocol was negotiated two decades

ago. Although a Multilateral Fund was set up to provide support for developing countries, its

quantum was subject to much dispute. While India sought $1 billion for the Fund, the West

offered merely $240 million in the interim period between 1991-93, with additional pledges to

follow. As of 2010, $2.7 billion had been pledged. Here is a figure to put that amount in

perspective: the refrigerator market in India alone is valued at $1.8 billion.

While negotiating the Protocol, India was sceptical about claims of technology transfer, so theEnvironment Ministry sought to make it ―mandatory.‖ Alternative technology was concentrated

in the hands of private players in the West, India argued, and the treaty had to compel them into

sharing it with developing countries. Industrialised nations, as the then chief U.S. negotiator

Richard Benedick recalls in his memoir Ozone Diplomacy, saw this demand as ―environmental

blackmail.‖ The ―mandatory transfer‖ provision failed to materialise after China softened its

stance. India was projected as a holdout to the Protocol, which increased pressure on the

government to ratify it.

The result? Companies like DuPont — which influenced the U.S. position on the Protocol — and

Daikin made windfall profits by tapping into emerging markets with their patented substitutes to

CFCs. Similarly, western companies stand to gain most if HFCs are to be phased out under the

Protocol. The U.S. holds most of the patents for alternative hydrocarbon and magnetic

refrigerants. These technologies, which have not seen wide commercial usage in developing

countries, could be prohibitively expensive.

Meanwhile, India has once again been called out for ―stalling‖ the proposal to amend the

Protocol. The Hindu has reported how, at the Bangkok conference to review the working of the

Protocol recently, the Indian delegation objected to the setting up of a ―contact group‖ on HFCs.

The Ministry of Environment and Forests is keen to address HFCs within the U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change. But setting a target to reduce HFCs under the Framework will

lead to similar demands for other greenhouse gases, something the U.S. steadfastly opposes.

HFCs are potent compounds but their contribution to climate change is currently minuscule

compared to that of CO2 emissions. Tweaking the Montreal Protocol not only frees the U.S. from

any commitment on other greenhouse gas emissions, but also works to favour its companies.

Phasing down HFCs

The Ministry has been thrown under the bus after the Prime Minister agreed — during his U.S.

visit — to set up an Indo-U.S. Task Force to discuss ―phasing down‖ HFCs under the Protocol.

India‘s negotiating position at climate talks have, regrettably, been held hostage to the PrimeMinister‘s foreign policy legacy.



If the Montreal Protocol is amended to include HFCs within its scope, India and other developing

countries have no option but to import expensive and largely untested technology from the West.

The government has proposed to allow for compulsory licensing to make it accessible to domestic

players. Two wrongs, however, do not make a right. For starters, New Delhi will find it difficult to

justify granting compulsory licences — regarded as an emergency measure — for green

technology under the TRIPS regime. Second, compulsory licences are only going to serve theinterests of big Indian companies which have the wherewithal to manufacture alternative

refrigerants cheaply and on an industrial scale.

India‘s accession to the Montreal Protocol offers a few lessons for this government. While it

negotiated the terms of the Protocol during the late 1980s, it did not join as an original signatory.

India adopted a negotiation strategy aimed at securing financial assistance in addition to a ―grace

period‖ to phase out CFCs. With the wisdom of hindsight it is clear that developed countries are

not going to pay for the damage they have caused to the ozone layer. This does not dilute the

imperative of tackling climate change — rather than rushing to embrace the U.S. position on the

Montreal Protocol, India should stick to its original demand to address all greenhouse gas

emissions through the UNFCC. At the U.N. climate talks, India‘s commitment to stringentemission norms must doubtless be coupled with a legally binding assurance of technology

transfer.

Nov 12,2013

Lead:

Opinion polls: the way forward

Opinion polls should be regulated, not banned. Ideally, it should be self-

regulation by pollsters and media organisations.

The debate around the latest proposal to ban opinion polls is an opportunity in disguise. Beneath

the familiar acrimony of partisan debates, a much-needed middle ground has emerged quietly.

All we need is a group of stakeholders — pollsters, researchers, media heads and political leaders

— to come together to turn this possibility into a reality. The time is now.

On the face of it, the debate was anything but rational. This was a familiar parade of tired and

untested arguments for and against opinion polls, depending on who hoped to benefit from them

in the next few weeks or months. Yet this political posturing and opportunism have had a positive

outcome. They have ensured that a flat-footed ban on pre-election opinion polls is unlikely to

happen soon. There is thus a window of opportunity for a saner policy intervention.

Systematic collection of views

This new intervention has to begin by recognising three basics. First of all, we must recognise

that systematic collection of public opinion is a must in modern democracies. Since elections are

not a private act, citizens wish to, and need to, know how others are making up their mind.

Survey based tracking of the mood of the electorate performs that crucial role. In an unequal

country like India, where a tiny but voluble elite is used to passing off its voice as public interest,scientific sample surveys of public opinions are one of the few ways in which the voice of the poor



and the disadvantaged gets registered. All things considered, this is a better method to monitor

the popular mood than anything else that exists. This creates a widespread need for this

information among politicians, the media and people at large. That is why opinion polls and their

use to track the electoral race are here to stay.

Second, it is precisely because opinion polls are the least inaccurate way of assessing the electoralrace, making this information public affects the race itself. Of course, you do not win elections by

leading in opinion polls; nor does a negative election forecast seal your electoral fate. But it does

influence the race in small and, possibly, crucial ways. We do not have conclusive research on this

point but the available evidence suggests that there is a small degree of ‗bandwagon effect‘ of

opinion polls. A party that is seen to be leading in the polls gets some additional support from

fence-sitters. This small difference could be decisive in a close contest. More than the voters,

opinion poll-based forecasts do affect the morale of party workers and supporters. This makes a

big difference during the campaign. The shrill denunciation of opinion polls by political parties is

often an illegitimate expression of this legitimate anxiety.

Finally, opinion polls in India have not lived up to the highest standards of professional, rigorousand non-partisan polling. The problem is not that opinion poll-based forecast has been

inaccurate. On balance, the record of Indian polls has been quite impressive. While exit polls and

post-poll survey based projections have done better than pre-election polls, all forms of polls

have proven to be a better guide to electoral prospects than any drawing room or news room

gossip.

The real problem with Indian opinion polls, barring some honourable exceptions, lies with their

non-transparency and non-professionalism. Unfortunately, there is very little understanding

among the common people or even mediapersons of what the polls can and cannot deliver.

Pollsters make matters worse by making excessive claims, nothing short of black magic. A general

unwillingness on the part of polling agencies and the media to share even basic methodologicaldetails about their polls compounds the problem. Most polls get away by announcing the most

perfunctory methodological information and making vague claims about the representative

nature of the survey. There is thus no way of telling a rogue poll from a professional effort. In the

last few years, the proportion of rogue polls has increased. At least some of these, thankfully still

a minority, appear to have been cooked inside a room or a studio.

Appropriate intervention

Thus, whatever the motives of the Congress and the BSP, there is some point in demanding an

intervention in the business of opinion polls. The real question is: what would be the most

appropriate and efficacious intervention? Unfortunately, most of the reformers have little

patience and understanding to address this question. A call for a complete ban on pre-election

polls, or a ban beginning the day of notification that amounts to the same thing, reflects the knee-

jerk response that has come to dominate much of our policymaking. Unfortunately, many well-

meaning democratic reform activists and the Election Commission itself have lent their weight to

this ill-considered proposition. Banning pre-election opinion polls is a remedy worse than the

disease it seeks to cure. There already exists a ban on publishing the findings of polls beginning

48 hours before polling and till the last voter has cast her vote. This is a reasonable restriction,

enough to safeguard against manipulations. A full ban for the entire duration of campaign may

not stand judicial scrutiny. It is hard to see how such a ban could be presented as a ―reasonable

restriction‖ of freedom of expression guaranteed under the Constitution. Besides, it would be

very hard to implement. It could either exist only on paper, like the ban on smoking in public

places. Or, worse, it could drive all the credible and law-abiding agencies out and leave the field



open for rogue polls of fly-by-night operators. In all likelihood, it would open a black market of

information where confidential polls and rumours will replace transparent and accountable

polling.

Besides, a ban is only a measure of last resort, when all other methods have been tried and found

wanting. The amazing thing about the Indian debate on opinion polls is that there has been littleeffort to explore alternatives to a ban, alternatives that have been successfully used all over the

world. The present juncture offers us an opportunity to explore this mature and intelligent

response, rather than the ill-informed and knee-jerk demand for a ban. What we need is a

regulatory framework for election-related opinion poll — comprising a code of conduct,

mandatory disclosures and independent inquiry — to be enforced by an independent agency.

Such a framework exists in most of the older democracies and has worked reasonably well.

Disclosures

Here is a suggestion, then, about regulating rather than banning opinion polls. Every election-

related poll, or any opinion poll for that matter, must be required to make the followingdisclosures: the ownership and track record of the organisation carrying out the survey, details of

the sponsor; sampling frame, sample size and the exact technique used to draw the sample; the

social profile of the achieved sample; where, when and how were the interviews conducted; the

exact wording of the question and sequence of questions asked; raw vote shares reported in the

survey and how they were converted into vote estimates and seats forecast.

Besides this proactive disclosure, the polling organisation should be required to supply some

additional information on demand. This second-order disclosure could include providing basic

tables for some key variables. Finally, in case of dispute or challenge, the polling organisation

should be required to open its unit level data (raw data file) for in-camera examination by a

committee of experts. There could be a provision for strictures and sanctions against those who

violate these norms.

Who would formulate these regulations and implement them? Ideally, it should be self-

regulation by pollsters and media organisations. An organisation like the News Broadcasters

Association or the Press Council of India can take the initiative in this respect. Failing this, the

Election Commission could take up this responsibility. What matters is the existence of a regime

of mandatory disclosures rather than an agency in charge of implementing it. Once in place, such

a mechanism would help the public tell the difference between a genuine and rogue poll and

incentivise transparent practices. That would be a significant step forward in democratic public

culture. After all, public opinion polling is too valuable and consequential to be left to politicians,

or pollsters.

(Yogendra Yadav is a psephologist and a member of the Aam Aadmi Party)

Editorial: An opportunity to free CBI

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court described the Central Bureau of Investigation as a ‗caged

parrot‘. Far from setting it free, the Gauhati High Court sought to exterminate it. The court‘s

judgment holding that the CBI is not a legally constituted police force has been stayed by the

Supreme Court for now. The absence of a clear legal link between the establishment of the CBI

and the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the law under which the agency has beenfunctioning for half a century, is indeed an irresistible point of law that was bound to be raised by



someone some day. However, the moot question is whether the High Court ought to have taken

such a hyper-technical view and struck down the Union Home Ministry Resolution of April 1,

1963, by which the agency was formed. While there could be some merit in the contention that

the CBI‘s legal basis was somewhat unclear, the High Court could have highlighted any legal

infirmity it found and sought the government‘s views on how it could be cured — instead of

invalidating the CBI‘s very existence. The Supreme Court will have to decide whether to acceptthe CBI‘s legality as a fact established by five decades of existence and functioning with judicial

recognition, and how any infirmity, if that exists, is curable.

The Special Police Establishment (SPE), formed in 1941 under the War Department to curb

corruption, got statutory status under the Delhi SPE Act, 1946. Its work was transferred to the

CBI as soon as it was formed in 1963 by a Resolution. The High Court has now said it was a mere

executive instruction with no sanction from the Cabinet or assent from the President. It has been

generally assumed that the CBI is synonymous with the SPE, and the High Courts and the

Supreme Court have passed orders from time to time transferring to it sensitive investigations

from out of the hands of State police departments. The constitutional basis for the CBI‘s

formation is traceable to Entry 8 in the Union List, ‗Central Bureau of Investigation andIntelligence‘, but the High Court did not find it good enough. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

has promised to do everything necessary to establish the agency ‘s legality and protect its past and

future work. It may be an opportune moment to provide a firmer statutory framework for the

CBI, one that grants it the functional autonomy that the Supreme Court mandated in the Vineet

Narain case in 1997. The Lokpal Bill, stalled due to political bickering despite being passed in the

Lok Sabha, also provides for measures to insulate graft investigation from interference and

envisages an independent role for the CBI under the Lokpal‘s supervision. Strengthening this bill

and ensuring its early adoption would be the right course.

Editorial: The challenge in Maldives

In ordering a stay on the run-off round of polls to choose a new President, the Maldivian

Supreme Court has unwittingly precipitated a constitutional crisis which will have far-reaching

implications. A new President had to be sworn in by November 11 according to the Constitution,

and, as Speaker of the People‘s Majlis, Abdulla Shahid, has correctly pointed out, Article 107 of

the Constitution stipulates that a presidential term is for five years. There is no provision to

extend it. President Mohamed Waheed‘s term — he was anointed in controversial circumstances

on February 7, 2012 — ended on the night of November 10. The Supreme Court, which earlier

had taken inordinately long to decide on the fairness of the first round of polls held on September

7 (which it finally annulled), went even further on November 9, and, in direct conflict with the

Constitution, extended the term of the President till a new President is sworn in. Again, as the

Speaker, who belongs to the aggrieved Maldivian Democratic Party, the largest party in thecountry, points out, according to Article 262, to amend the term of office of the President Article

107 would need to be revised and approved by a three-fourths majority of Parliament, and prior

to being ratified by the President must receive majority support in a public referendum. On his

part, Dr. Waheed, a former international civil servant conversant with legalities that are involved

in his decision to stay on till November 16 (without pay), has contended that the Constitution is

silent on a way forward. Hence to avoid a constitutional void, he submitted the issue to

Parliament for a constitutional solution.

The plea that disrupted the second round of polls on Sunday has its merits — that one political

party will not have enough time to be able to tell its supporters which way to vote. This was

known earlier too, but was not brought up by any candidate in the several meetings theyattended. From the sequence of events since September 7, it is clear that coalition partners in the



Waheed government, which includes the party founded by former President Maumoon Abdul

Gayoom after he returned to the country, the Progressive Party of Maldives, are not keen on

holding the second round of polls. And, from the polling pattern it is very clear that the deeply

divided country will vote to elect the MDP‘s Mohamed Nasheed President as and when a second

round is held. Surely, that is no reason to subvert the entire process. Elections must be held on

November 16. The process of healing and rebuilding the fractured democracy cannot wait anylonger.

November 13, 2013 01:53 IST

The rupee’s continuing troubles

The rupee is in trouble, yet again. The currency has been sliding in the last five trading sessions,

to close at Rs.63.71 versus the dollar on Tuesday. A convergence of unfavourable factors appearsto be behind the renewed fall in the currency after the relative stability of the last few weeks. The

immediate trigger was the positive news emerging from the U.S. The global economic engine last

week reported a better-than-expected 2.8 per cent growth in the third quarter ended September.

This was immediately followed by encouraging non-farm payrolls data which showed that more

jobs were added in October than expected. These data have set off fears that the Federal Reserve

might start the tapering of its $85 billion monthly bond-buying programme as early as in

December or January. Foreign institutional investors have turned net sellers in the domestic

market in the last few trading sessions. It is not coincidental that since November 6, the day the

rupee lurched into its latest turbulence, FIIs have sold $438.50 million in the debt market. The

return of fears over tapering is strengthening the dollar against other Asian currencies as well, as

global fund flows head back to the U.S. in anticipation of rising bond yields.

There are a couple of domestic factors too that seem to be working against the rupee. The most

important of these is the partial closure of the special window that was opened by the Reserve

Bank of India (RBI) for oil companies to buy their dollars directly from the central bank. With

apparent stability prevailing over the last few weeks, the RBI pushed back into the market almost

half of the oil companies‘ dollar requirements, causing demand for the greenback to rise. Also, a

couple of special measures initiated by the central bank at the peak of the crisis to support the

rupee by attracting dollar inflows, such as the swap window for foreign currency deposits, are

supposed to close by the end of this month. These factors, along with the possibility of the

Federal Reserve starting the tapering process, point to a period of weakness ahead for the rupee.

The RBI may well find itself forced to extend some of the supportive measures put in placeearlier. What is heartening though is that there has been a perceptible improvement in the

external account since the last round of volatility a couple of months ago. Trade data for October,

the latest available, show acceleration in exports and a significant fall in imports; if these trends

sustain, the current account deficit, which was acting as a drag on the rupee during the last spell

of volatility, could be around $60 billion or 3-3.2 per cent of GDP. Yet, this may not be enough to

support the rupee if FIIs decide to take their money back to the U.S.


A crucial Milestone



The 19th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (CoP

19), which began on Monday in Poland, marks a crucial milestone towards negotiating an

effective global warming treaty. At CoP 19, the fault lines remain the same: industrialised

countries would like to see a significant cut in global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), while

developing nations are prepared to reduce their carbon footprint only with financial and

technical assistance from the West. Negotiators have given themselves two years to connect the

dots on a comprehensive agreement when they meet in Paris in 2015. Predictably, this deadline

has proven tough to meet. Most countries agree that it would be unrealistic to have the treaty

prescribe the quantum of emission cuts. There seems to be broad support for the ―bottom-up‖

approach, which would involve countries submitting voluntary commitments assessed and

monitored for compliance by the treaty‘s guardians. Even so, the devil is in the detail: the EU, for

instance, will push for legally binding commitments to halve GHG emissions by 2050 in

comparison to 1990 levels. The U.S. wants a mix of ―legally and non-legally binding

commitments.‖ The Obama administration has said it has no plans to ratify the Kyoto Protocol

which imposes a binding emissions cut on developed countries.

For its part, India wants to retain the Kyoto Protocol‘s preferential treatment of developing

countries. Along with BASIC group members Brazil, China and South Africa, India has based its

negotiating position on the principle of equity. New Delhi has made its climate commitments

contingent on ―mitigation actions‖ which would entail assistance to it in the form of ―finance,

technology transfer and capacity building measures‖. The challenge for Indian negotiators at CoP

19 will be to secure these demands without being billed as a holdout to the treaty. India has

already faced flak, rather unfairly, for its objection to bringing hydrofluorocarbons under the

Montreal Protocol, as opposed to the UNFCCC. Meanwhile, fissures have shown up in the

BASIC‘s negotiating line as a whole. Last month, South Africa suggested the new treaty must

include binding carbon cuts for all parties. The imperative of climate change — what with several

natural disasters this year, and the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide having crossed

400 parts per million — is no doubt lending urgency to negotiations. India‘s climate diplomacy

must be aimed at dispelling the notion that it is reluctant to tackle global warming. Meanwhile, it

must ensure Indian industry affordable access to western technology to meet our commitments

effectively.


Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 12 years on

JAYANT PRASAD

The picture in Afghanistan today is bleak: worsening security,ubiquitous Taliban presence, poor coordination between donors andthe government, and a slowing economy

Exactly 12 years ago, on November 13, 2001 — just two months after the assassination of Ahmad

Shah Massoud and the al Qaeda strikes in New York and Washington D.C. — Massoud‘s forces

entered Kabul after Taliban fighters fled the city the previous night. This came on the heels of



desperate diplomatic efforts to prevent the Northern Alliance from occupying Kabul and taking

over the reins of government.

Why did the United States and its allies go to Afghanistan? U.S. troops went there to get rid of the

al Qaeda leadership, and combat terrorists with a global reach. Operation Enduring Freedom was

launched against terrorist entities and the states that harboured them. That was the reason fortargeting the Taliban regime.

Intense operations

The United Nations Security Council mandated an International Security Assistance Force for the

security of Kabul and its environs on December 20, 2001. ISAF has since been supported by 49

U.S. allies and partners. At its high point in 2011, there were 1,40,000 ISAF troops in

Afghanistan, including 1,01,000 Americans, not counting contracted private security personnel.

After such impressive marshalling of forces and intensified military operations, Afghanistan

continues to remain among the greatest security challenges of our times. What happened?

A 2009 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report blamed the 2001 Pentagon leadership for the

―lost opportunity‖ of preventing Osama bin Laden‘s flight from Tora Bora to Pakistan. Centcom

Commander General Tommy Franks turned down a CIA request for a battalion of Army Rangers

to assist a rag-tag force tracking bin Laden. Concurrently, in late November 2001, Pakistani

planes were allowed to airlift from Kunduz hundreds of Islamabad‘s advisers and troops,

presumably along with some of the Taliban‘s and al Qaeda‘s leading cadres. A year or so later, the

U.S. shifted its attention to Iraq, leaving the Afghan and Pakistan tasks unfinished.

The U.S. and NATO initially believed that a strong Afghan Army was not required, since the

Taliban and al Qaeda fighters had dispersed without a fight — as for those who fled, Pakistan

would take care of them. Afghans are still reaping the consequences of this initial neglect. The

blunder of sub-contracting to Pakistan the management of the Taliban resulted in the outfit‘s

fighters being nursed, nurtured and re-infiltrated into Afghanistan from 2005.

Since then, Afghanistan has become an arena for experimentation in social and political

engineering. The military campaign was first cast as a war against terror, then as a counter-

insurgency operation. The advantages gained by the surging American troops and more muscular

military action were defeated by the announcement of the exit strategy.

Opportunity lost

As for building Afghan capacity, little was done for several years. U.N. representatives on the

ground advocated a ‗light‘ international footprint. Rich countries were initially parsimonious in

their commitments. In early 2002, Afghanistan was a relatively clean slate on which anything

could be written, so long as the country‘s well-wishers took account of its regional strategic space.

But that was not to be.

Paradoxically, after the Taliban recovered, regrouped and re-equipped itself in its safe havens

and brought violence back to Afghanistan, a stepped-up civilian effort followed. The Afghanistan

Compact, put together in London in January 2006, made nation-building the main focus of the

future international effort. Its conceptual flaw was the vision to transform Afghanistan into theimage of its benefactors.



The instruments used to achieve this, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, bypassed

Afghan institutions and indigenous impulses. Afghan political leaders complained that the

parallel structures created by the PRTs undermined their government. Between 2001 and 2009,

the Afghan government incurred an expenditure of $5.7 billion through its own budget and

institutions, compared to $41 billion committed for assistance to Afghanistan during the same

period.

Extent of fraud

Audits point to the fact that contractor profits and consultant fees absorbed a substantial part of

the international assistance. The 2008 U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting reported that

fraud alone could account for as much as $12 billion spent in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of this

actually funded terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. ―Every year, nearly $500 million flow

into the Taliban kitty from western sources,‖ the former ISI Chief, Asad Durrani w rote recently.

This was mainly by way of protection money.

Moreover, all three pillars of Afghanistan‘s transformation — security, governance anddevelopment — were undermined by the growing security deficit. Increasing Taliban attacks

immobilised the fledgling state structures at all levels and undermined Afghan growth and

development. As Asadullah Khaled, former Kandahar Governor and former head of the National

Directorate of Security, told me on my first visit to Kandahar in February 2008: ―It is not that the

Taliban is strong; it is that we are very weak.‖

The picture in Afghanistan today is bleak: worsening security, ubiquitous Taliban presence, poor

coordination between donors and the government, a slowing economy, and increasing insecurity.

A complete exit of ISAF would be a catastrophe for the country, the region and the world. Such an

exit would dampen the ongoing development effort, undermine the impressive social and

economic gains achieved with so much effort and sacrifice, embolden the enemies of progressive

change in Afghanistan, and possibly even lead to a reversal to the ancien regime of 2001, with

serious security implications worldwide.

So, where do we, the world community, go from here on Afghanistan?

The international community should not abandon Afghanistan. It should not encourage the

country‘s partition or leave it to the mercy of those who are not accountable to the Afghan people.

It should avoid acquiescing on exclusive rights over Afghanistan of any single power, or group of

outside powers. The global community should abjure extra-territorial demands, defined in terms

of a veto over decisions that Afghans themselves must make. Afghanistan‘s neighbours should

guarantee its independence and sovereignty rather than engage in acts that subvert them.

A return to status quo ante should be avoided. Terrorist networks in the region, with their cult of

suicide bombings, are ever more closely tied to al Qaeda and its associates. Their membership is

more dispersed, diverse, and numerous than it was in 2001. Their restitution in Afghanistan

might well lead to the unravelling of the state system in Pakistan, creating for India and the world

an even bigger security challenge than the one we face today.

We must strive to make Afghan security sustainable by supporting its security apparatus and

dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism, both within the country and its border regions.

Terrorism and insurgency have never ceased anywhere in the world where support, sustenance,and safe havens for terrorists and insurgents have been available in the contiguity.



On development, the world should abandon the idea that it can come from outside. An

environment should be created in which Afghanistan can develop itself. Afghan voices should be

heard and space allowed for national leadership. We must work towards desirable outcomes,

without tangling in processes internal to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan will be economically sustainable when it becomes a trade, transportation, energy,and minerals hub in the region. The Afghan leadership had hoped to join SAARC six years ago,

and that Afghanistan would soon become a land bridge linking Iran and Central Asia to China

and the Indian subcontinent. The templates and action agendas for dismantling trade and transit

barriers, and encouraging freer movement of goods, services, investments, peoples, and ideas,

are already in place. It is the inability to operationalise them that prevents Afghanistan‘s

sustained stabilisation.

Hard task

In spite of multiple international back channels and the efforts of the Afghan High Peace Council,

talks with the Taliban have not made much headway. Key players within the Taliban andPakistan‘s state structures are yet to be convinced that they should abandon their campaign to

seize power by violence. It is a hard act to fight and talk simultaneously. While a lasting and

permanent solution with them on board will be difficult, without them it will be impossible.

Efforts for peace, re-integration, and reconciliation with the reconcilable must, therefore,

continue.

Afghanistan‘s fragmented polity needs to look at reconciliation — between and among ethnicities,

between Afghanistan and its neighbours, and between the government and those elements of the

armed opposition ready to embrace democracy and the Afghan Constitution, respect human

rights, and end ideological and organisational links with al Qaeda and its associates. As Rumi, the

great Afghan Sufi sage said in his Masnawi 800 years ago: ―Believe in God, yet tie the camel‘s

leg.‖

(The author has served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria, Nepal and

the U.N. Conference on Disarmament.)

Updated: November 14, 2013 02:05 IST

The garb of policy-making TOPICS politics government

Facing a series of corruption charges, some of them borne out by audit reports and police probes,

the last thing that the United Progressive Alliance regime would want is to reinforce in the public

mind the image of being a government that seeks to restrain independent agencies from going

behind its policies and decisions to look for evidence of wrong-doing. Remarks by Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh and Union Finance Minister P. Chidambaram at a conference organised by the

Central Bureau of Investigation are likely to create such an impression. When Dr. Singh said it

would not be appropriate for a police agency to sit in judgment over policy formulation without

any evidence of mala fides, he may have been voicing serious concern that treating an

administrative decision that goes wrong as criminal misconduct may lead to policy paralysis.However, with Union Finance Minister P. Chidambaram taking the cue from him and cautioning










the CBI and other authorities like the Comptroller and Auditor-General against ―overstepping

their limits,‖ it is difficult not to see a pattern. The government is clearly uneasy with recent

developments: the CBI wishes to be seen as being independent and wants to scrutinise decisions

such as those relating to allocation of coal blocks, and there is greater public and judicial support

for granting it functional autonomy.

The UPA government is perhaps not wrong in highlighting the complexities involved in decision-

making in the era of economic liberalisation. Also, it has sought to place in perspective the issue

of granting autonomy to the CBI: its operational freedom should be distinguished from the need

for accountability and executive oversight. If all it wants is that errors of judgment during

decision-making should not be misconstrued by an investigating officer as crimes, there should

be no quarrel. However, the government itself administers the safeguards available in law and

the judicial system that can protect honest policy decisions and honest officials against vexatious

enquiries. The requirement that prior sanction is needed before prosecution is launched is

intended to filter out misconceived charges. Experience shows that corrupt deals do take place in

the garb of overtly proper administrative decisions, while policies and norms ostensibly serving

the public interest are on many occasions framed in such a way as to suit vested interests. Greatcaution is required while seeking amendments to provisions that currently criminalise actions

that procure pecuniary advantage to any person without any public interest. Protecting the

honest civil servant who makes risky judgment calls is one thing; sweeping dishonest decisions

under the carpet of policy-making is quite another.


Appropriate support TOPICS politics government

The government announced recently minimum support prices (MSP) for wheat and a few other

rabi (winter) crops. What distinguishes the latest announcement from previous ones are, first, it

has come well in time, and secondly, the government, on this occasion, has not followed the usual

course of bowing to populist pressure and raising the support prices beyond what was warranted

by any economic logic. Because of delayed announcements in earlier years, farmers had been

unable to derive the benefits of the signals that the MSP mechanism sends out. This year,

however, the announcement was made right at the start of the sowing season for the winter crops

— usually end-October. Therefore farmers can look at the MSP to decide on matters such as crop

selection, whether diversification is feasible, and so on. The government too stands to benefit.

The MSP mechanism can be calibrated to encourage farmers to diversify away from water-

intensive crops to pulses and oilseeds. It is a moot point whether those objectives will be achievedthis time, but the government cannot be accused of not trying.

The striking feature of the latest MSP announcement relates to wheat, the most important winter

crop. In a sharp departure from the past, the MSP of wheat has been raised by just Rs.50 a

quintal to Rs.1,400. The increase is the second lowest over the entire two terms of the UPA-I and

UPA-II governments and is particularly noteworthy because it comes on the eve of elections in

important States and general elections next year. Election-eve compulsions would normally have

influenced the government to substantially increase the minimum support prices. Hikes in the

MSPs of other winter crops such as barley and rapeseed-mustard are on the low side. The fact

that high food prices are behind the persistently high headline as well as retail inflation has

weighed with the government. The time has come to look at the MSP mechanism in its entirety.Over the years it has become the procurement price, thereby setting high floor prices for private










trade which will continue to have a prominent role alongside the public distribution system even

when the National Food Security Act becomes fully operational. The ―bonus‖ awarded by some

State governments over and above the MSPs, however, complicates the picture as it will drive the

procurement prices even higher and leave very little for private trade. The fact that government

godowns are overflowing with food stocks when cereal inflation is high is proof that all is not well

with the government‘s farm sector intervention, of which the MSP is an important component.

LEAD

November 14, 2013


Long walk to normalcy

KANAK MANI DIXIT TOPICS World Nepal politics election

Nepal is making another try at Constitution-writing, hoping that a free

and fair election exercise this time will give deliverance

Thirteen-year old Suraj Thapa works as a kitchen boy at a highway dhaba on Jalandhar Bypass,

well cared for by his Sikh employers. But why is Suraj here in the first place, rather than

attending school in his home district of Pyuthan in western Nepal?

Since the unification of Nepal two-and-a-half centuries ago, the state has failed to provide for its

citizenry, pauperising it through expansionary wars, hereditary autocracies and royal

dictatorships. The poorest have had to migrate for survival, reaching back to when Gorkhalis

turned up at the gates of Ranjit Singh in Lahore.

Opportunity for growth

When the 1990 People‘s Movement ushered in democracy, the opportunity for economic growth

and equity seemed finally at hand, a time to shed Kathmandu-centricism and the historical

marginalisation of whole communities. Nepal would now be able to parlay its size, sovereignty

and abundant natural resources for material wealth, to emerge as an exemplary nation-state of

South Asia.

Before five years were over, however, the Maoists had picked up the gun against the embryonic

parliamentary system. Evolution of the polity was derailed and the economy stunted; the process

of ‗de-employment‘ has been ongoing now for 17 years, a decade of conflict and seven years of

chaotic ‗transition.‘

The poorest from hill and plains cross the open border to the south, swelling the ranks of the

labouring Nepali underclass, from the wheat fields of Punjab to the apple orchards

of kalapahad (Himachal) and the bylanes of Bangalore. The less-poor go to the Gulf and

Malaysia. At least six million of Nepal‘s 27.5 million able-bodied are outside today, also severely

depleting the voter rolls for the upcoming elections of November 19.

Crows in a fog

The so-called transitional period has become almost as long as the conflict itself, with theeconomy held hostage and the state directionless like a crow in a mountain fog. The Maoists

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/














http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/



came above ground following the massive and peaceful People‘s Movement of 2006, but they

cheated on the peace process by holding on to their combatants for six years instead of the

promised six months. The historical monarchy was abolished by political consensus, but the

Republic of Nepal was weakened from the start by its progenitors.

An electoral farce was enacted in April 2008, with aggression and reckless propaganda makingthe Maoists the largest party by far in the Constituent Assembly (CA). The electorate was trapped

by the hurried announcement by Jimmy Carter (as a parachutist election observer) that the polls

were just fine; and by the Chief Election Commissioner of the day who declared that the polls

were to be seen as part of the peace process. Given the sullied elections, the Assembly was robbed

of gravitas and credibility; after extending its two-year term by a further two years, the CA

collapsed in May 2012 without delivering a document.

Throughout the period of the CA‘s life, the Maoists continued to consolidate their grip on society,

weakening the bureaucracy, police, the army and, finally, the judiciary. Ignoring the pain among

the victims of conflict, they developed a tacit understanding with the Nepal Army, the former

enemy, to scuttle the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Their goal of blanketamnesty for perpetrators sowed the seeds of long-term social discord.

Micromanaged quagmire

Perhaps the most dangerous development during the CA‘s term was the calibrated manufacture

of inter-community polarisation, in the context of defining federalism. Cross-cutting divisions

were activated between hill and plains communities, between castes and ethnicities, with the

sizeable Dalit population losing out at every step.

The Maoists prepared the stage for crony capitalism, with all-out corruption whose scale went

from lakh to crore to arab in a handful of years. Deftly, the comrades transformed from

revolutionaries to casino operators, real estate mafiosi , and kickback merchants swimming in

telecom, hydropower and other honey pots. Steadfastly stonewalling district and village-level

elections, they helped extend the culture of graft to the grassroots.

The Interim Constitution‘s stricture on governance-by-consensus proved a bane, and over time

the polity came under the grip of the ―four-party syndicate‖ steered by the UCPN-MaoistChairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (‗Prachanda‘). It was this political cartel which, in early 2013,

decided to hand over the reins of the government to the sitting Chief Justice, compromising

Nepal‘s tradition of separation of powers.

With the political leadership divided between the opportunists (Maoists) and the inept (the

‗democratic‘ flank), the international community had a field day with Nepal‘s internal affairs.

Overseas donors provided ample funding for constitutional debates, but managed mainly to

divert political activists into workshops and seminars. Beijing, nervous about its Tibet underbelly

but also seeking to create new geopolitical realities, sought to increase its influence on the Home

Ministry. Astoundingly, New Delhi seemed to outsource its Nepal policy to unaccountable

‗agencies‘ and obnoxious individuals and, as a result, got caught in a quagmire ofmicromanagement.



Country without jurists

One more try at writing the Constitution was needed, hence the polls next week for Constituent

Assembly-II. Unfortunately, the ‗syndicate‘ has ensured that the foundations are weak. There is

no threshold percentage, so the forthcoming House will likely be hugely fragmented. The size of

the Assembly at 601 members is unwieldy, and the nature of the ‗proportional list‘ allows partyleaders to play favourites. The plains Dalit, in particular, have been abandoned in the various

compromises made. The unkindest cut was to discard the very concept of vetting, allowing war-

crime accused to become candidates.

Given such flaws, the meaningfulness (saarthakata) of the CA-II can only be ensured by

guaranteeing clean elections. Even if Constitution-writing takes time, in this country without

jurists, there will be a Parliament for the next four years. Representative government will provide

a buffer for the economy and give continuity and direction to the state. The polls will also help

separate the judiciary from the executive, and salvage a modicum of dignity in the international

arena — including assigning an ambassador to India, a seat that has been vacant for more than

two years.

The elections are also crucial to impede the growth in tandem of the radical left and the

Hindutva-right, the former led by Chairman Dahal and the latter manned by those energised by

the prospects of Narendra Modi in India. The road to socio-political stability is ideally along the

lines spelled out by the late Biswheswor Prasad Koirala half-a-century ago, a social democratic

state where fundamental freedoms will help reverse the injustices of the past and present.

Electoral accessory

Nepal‘s normalisation is dependent at this stage on representative government built on the basis

of kosher elections, reversing the momentum towards money and muscle in politics. The dangers

emanate from the UCPN-Maoist of Dahal and the breakaway faction of Mohan Baidya. The

leaders of the Nepali Congress, the CPN (UML) and Madhesbadi parties are unable to block the

elections even if they want to.

What would Chairman Dahal (and Vice-Chairman Baburam Bhattarai) do if they perceive the

UCPN-Maoist party faring considerably worse than in 2008? This is a critical question, for the

temptation would be to try and hijack the outcome through booth capture, stuffing of ballots and

threatening voters and candidates alike with the Young Communist League — as was done the

last time. The UCPN-Maoist is also far ahead of the other parties in the ability to buy votes, and

the spending would be upped sharply in the final days.

The other critical question is whether Mr. Baidya and his party will seek to disrupt the polls as a

whole, or help fight Mr. Dahal on the issues. It is a fact that Mr. Baidya was unfairly treated by

the ‗syndicate‘ in talks on participating in the elections, but he does the people an injustice with

the run of bandhs and bombings of the past month. In the penultimate days, he is emerging as a

spoiler and, in that sense, acting as a Dahal accessory.

In the days before the ballot, Mr. Baidya has managed to divert the attention of the electorate

from the issues that are vital for the upcoming elections — responsibility for the weakened sense

of national sovereignty, heightened impoverishment, squelching of local government, loot of the

exchequer, communal polarisations, and candidacies of accused perpetrators.



The upcoming election is one more attempt to end the run of debacles that has dogged the people

of Nepal through history, and to reach for normalcy, in democracy and in peace. That journey

begins, once again, by trying to keep money and muscle from influencing the ballot box on

November 19.

(The writer is a civil rights activist and journalist based in Kathmandu.)


Tightrope walking TOPICS politics government

Policymaking on the basis of a sound economic rationale, overriding practical political realities

and social concerns, would be particularly difficult in an election season. The controversy that

has broken out over the Finance Ministry‘s proposal to slash budgetary support for social sector

schemes and the opposition that it is generating from within the government and the coalitionexemplifies the problem. The Finance Ministry‘s hand is forced by the need to keep the fiscal

deficit under check in an environment of slowing economic growth, low tax revenues and rising

subsidies. About three-quarters of the budgeted fiscal deficit for the whole of 2013-14 was already

reached in the April-August period, which means that the Finance Ministry has little choice but

to go for ―savage‖ cuts in the remaining months of this fiscal year. Falling tax revenue growth —

direct tax collections grew by 11.58 per cent in the April-October period as against the targeted 19

per cent — leaves the government little room for manoeuvre. A breach of the fiscal deficit target

will most likely attract a downgrade of the country‘s sovereign rating, which will push up

borrowing costs for Indian companies abroad and put off prospective foreign investors.

The across-the-board cut in expenditure has obviously affected flagship welfare schemes of theUPA such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and the

Indira Awas Yojana, sparking protests from within the government. Rural Development Minister

Jairam Ramesh has asked what is so ―sacrosanct‖ about the fiscal deficit target. A close look at

the numbers, however, shows that the Rs.2,000-crore cut in allocation to MGNREGS, for

instance, accounts for just over 6 per cent of the budget allocation of Rs.33,000 crore for 2013-14.

Second, the general elections will be a vote on the performance of the government over its entire

term, not just on what happens in the final six months. Still, the pressure on Finance Minister P.

Chidambaram to loosen the purse strings will be tremendous. Mr. Chidambaram will have to

balance between pleasing fellow ministers and partymen and ensuring that there is no harm

caused to the economy in the process. This is easier said than done in the current environment

when most, if not all, the economic indicators are flashing red. In the short run, there are onlytwo ways of freeing up resources to increase welfare spending. Prune subsidies further on

petroleum products such as diesel and cooking gas and push hard to increase non-tax revenues

from disinvestment and the sale of spectrum. If the first will alienate urban voters, the second

might not yield substantial amounts in the present environment. Clearly, there is a lot of

tightrope walking to be done in the months ahead.

The talks must go on TOPICS World Iran politics nuclear policy

The talks in Geneva between Iran and the five permanent members of the United NationsSecurity Council plus Germany (the G6) between November 6 and 9 ended, unsurprisingly,























without a decisive outcome, but that is not a major problem. The European Union‘s High

Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, described the meeting

as ―intensive and constructive‖; Iranian Foreign Minister and delegation leader Mohammad

Javad Zarif concurred, calling the discussions ―very good‖ and citing the fact that they went on

late into the night of an unscheduled third day. The parties will meet again in Geneva, for talks

between senior diplomats, on November 20. The key point for Iran is relief from westerneconomic sanctions, and the G6‘s concerns have to do with Iran‘s work on a nuclear reactor at

Arak, south-east of Tehran, which could potentially produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel, as well

as the country‘s existing stockpile of enriched uranium. Yet the inconclusive Geneva outcome

stems mainly from disagreements among the G6. France rejected what seemed to be a draft

agreement apparently devised by Iran and the U.S., saying it was a fait accompli ; the draft would

have meant Tehran‘s delaying or temporarily ceasing work on its nuclear programme, in return

for removal of some sanctions.

The wider context, however, shows how far the western G6 members have still to go. President

Barack Obama can only offer to lift sanctions imposed by the White House and not by Congress,

which has been unremittingly hostile towards Iran for decades. Secondly, the U.S. imposessanctions on third countries which trade with Iran; even India, which is exempted from those,

has cut imports of Iranian oil by 23 per cent, possibly under pressure from Washington. Thirdly,

France‘s claim that the draft deal did not do enough to restrict Iran‘s nuclear programme is

hollow. The Arak reactor will take at least another year even to complete, and Iran continues to

deny any intention to produce nuclear weapons.Tehran appears ready to delay the Arak work as

part of a deal, and Mr. Zarif was magnanimous about differences within the G6. He restated

Iran‘s willingness to reach an agreement, and the positive attitude taken by President Hassan

Rouhani as he assumed office has made it harder for U.S. hawks to keep demonising Iran.

Moreover, the U.S. public does not want to send troops to war again, and even Congress would

probably hesitate to alienate them over that. The Geneva talks, therefore, is not only a welcome

development, but one which means all parties concerned must do all they can to reachagreement.

Lead:

A question of accountability

S. NARAYAN

TOPICS crime, law and justice corruption & bribery politics government
















While it is apparent that due process has been subverted to the

advantage of a few by the political executive, it is equally true thatthere has been some politicisation of the civil service

Two recent events have focussed attention on the relationship between the political executive and

public servants. At the international conference on corruption organised by the Central Bureau ofInvestigation on November 11, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urged that if there was no

evidence of wrong-doing, there should not be any presumption of criminality. He also said that

Section 13 d (3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, introduced when P. Chidambaram was the

Minister for Personnel two decades ago, would be removed. This Section extends the concept of

corruption to any loss to the government by the action of public servants.

On October 30, the Supreme Court of India, on a public interest litigation plea by several retired

senior civil servants, ruled in favour of greater order and transparency in transfers and posting. It

directed the formation of a Civil Services Board of senior civil servants to decide on transfers and

postings and a fixed tenure for postings. It also directed civil servants not to accept oral orders

from their superior officers or Ministers, and to ensure that the orders are reduced in writing before they are carried out.

The judgment has been welcomed by the media, the bureaucracy and those who deal with the

government and its institutions. The reaction from the political executive has been muted and,

from some quarters, negative, with one spokesman saying the power of transfers and postings

should continue with the political executive. There have also been comments from think tanks

that the judgment would be difficult to implement, given that the Central as well as State

governments would be involved, and that the Supreme Court should not have ventured so deep

into the realm of executive jurisdiction.

Behind these two events is the recognition of the development of a malaise that is affectinggovernance and the way the business of government is transacted. Even more deeply, there

appears to be a debate between what is right and who is right.

Pre-Independence legacy

The permanent civil services are a pre-Independence legacy. There was always to be a gap

between administrators/implementers and politicians. The former were professionals who were

expected to advise on policy, and implement the government‘s programmes and projects. The

relationship was one based on mutual trust and respect of one another‘s role. Those of us who

joined the services in the 1960s took this relationship for granted, and were able to function

freely, with respect and close coordination with Ministers. This has changed since the 1980s. Thegrowth of regional parties and the fragmentation of the national polity brought to power groups

which had the short-term objective of retaining power, and lesser respect for established rules

and regulations. There was increasing pressure on civil servants to do as they were told, under

threat of transfer and administrative action. In some States, there was little respect for office or

tenure, and officers lived in constant anxiety over the next transfer. The recent case of the

suspension of a young officer in Uttar Pradesh, and actions against an officer in Haryana are

visible examples of political highhandedness. Officers were given oral orders that were often not

backed by rules. In the event of an investigation, the officers had to face culpability. In the last

decade, the excesses have extended to several sectors that are now facing investigation and

criminal action.



The Supreme Court judgment is a welcome reprieve that attempts to set the boundaries for

political intervention in administration. The directions on written orders, fixity of tenure and the

establishment of a Civil Services Board are based on the earlier recommendations of the Hota

committee and the Administrative Reforms Commission reports of 2009. These

recommendations were not implemented by the government, and the Supreme Court verdict

draws upon them and directs implementation. However, it is not going to be easy to implementthe instructions, for several reasons.

Disjoint in governance

First, there is a serious disjoint in governance between the political hierarchy and the

administrative machinery. The 2G case, coal and mining scandals, the Commonwealth Games

and other incidents have clearly demonstrated that there has been considerable erosion of fair

processes in the last decade. Criminal investigations will determine where the malaise lies: but it

is quite apparent that the subversion of due process to the advantage of a select few has

originated at the level of the political executive. Only investigations will reveal whether the civil

service participated in the wrong-doing. It is also clear that in several instances, rules have beenflouted, earlier norms overturned, and protests marked on files ignored. There is now lack of

trust and fear among senior bureaucrats, who feel they have no safety net against illegal action,

and that they are victimised if they do not toe the political line.

The Prime Minister‘s assertion at the anti-corruption seminar on November 11 that in effect, a

loss to the government and the country does not necessarily constitute wrong-doing indicates the

direction of future political decision-making. If this is the mindset, there is no way the Supreme

Court judgment will change the behaviour or attitude of those in power. It is no surprise that a

Congress spokesperson has reacted strongly to the judgment, and declared that transfers are a

tool to control the bureaucracy.

Second, it is equally true that there has been some politicisation of the civil service. In several

States, officers close to a regime are unwanted during the next regime. Such close political

proximity is possible only through compromises in decision-making as well as in ethical

standards. The politician may well turn to these instances to justify his position. There is also

considerable corruption at the operating levels. Fixity of tenure in lucrative jobs, as promised by

the court, is but a guarantee to continue to exploit the benefits of the position. It will become a

double-edged sword. If there is collusion between the interests of the political executive and the

civil service, the Supreme Court judgment will result in an increase in wrong-doing, not a curb on

it. There is enough evidence at the lower levels of administration that this is true.

Third, there is the ultimate question of accountability. As long as wrong-doing goes unpunished,

the politician will continue to believe that getting voted back to power is sufficient proof of

innocence, and that the civil service should not be a bottleneck. Recent Supreme Court judgments

on the Representation of the People Act as well as the close monitoring of 2G and other cases

have shifted the focus to courts, and no political party is comfortable with that. We are faced with

the ultimate question of whether, in a democracy, the rule of law can be interpreted in favour of

those in power at a particular time. If yes, the Supreme Court judgment will have no effect.

The time is now ripe for a much more fundamental debate, on whether the rules of business that

applied to a colonial regime are any longer relevant. Even in the United Kingdom, where these

rules originated, they have been given up in favour of a joint decision-making process that makes

the Minister in charge solely responsible for the actions. Watchdogs are effective and retribution

is swift and deterrent. The vertical hierarchy of notes and orders prevalent in India shifts



responsibility in a manner that makes accountability difficult — it is time to change that. If not, as

predicted by Hamza Alawi two decades ago, the state would be under the control of the political

and industrial class, aided, to some extent, by the bureaucracy, and all to the detriment of the

nation and the citizens.

(S. Narayan is former Finance Secretary, Government of India.)

Documents

The Hindu Editorials 11-15 Nov 2013