U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL

ANNUAL HISTORY

(RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2013 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2013

BY

FIELD ARTILLERY BRANCH HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

ii

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION

The 2013 Annual History captures key training and leader development initiatives

and combat development accomplishments of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School.

During the year, the Field Artillery School continued to meet future requirements

by playing a key role in futures development and integration. Emerging weapons

systems, such as the Paladin Integrated Management, and Field Artillery munitions, such

as the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK), Guided MLRS and the Excalibur, assured

unparalleled precision lethal fires, while the School’s ground work on Army Doctrine

2015 prepared the School and the Field Artillery to move into the future.

The Field Artillery School’s core mission remained training Soldiers and leaders

for Field Artillery units of the operational forces. During the year, the Field Artillery

School provided Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders with world-class training and

instruction. The School furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and

Soldiers for their next or first assignment and worked to introduce Army Learning Model

2015 and to modernize Field Artillery Fires. The School also engaged the Army through

Warfighter Forums, and developed an engagement strategy to encourage West Point and

Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch of

choice and to tell the School’s and the Field Artillery’s story. As part of the Fires Center

of Excellence, the Field Artillery School participated in growing the next generation Fires

force. From equipment modernization to training, the Field Artillery School is providing

a force capable of winning in Unified Land Operations.

Around the world, Redleg Soldiers are the pride of the Nation’s forces. The Field

Artillery School is achieving great things, and we truly are on the glide path to

modernizing the Field Artillery. Artillery Strong!

(Original Signed)

CHRISTOPHER F. BENTLEY

Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Commandant,

United States Army Field Artillery School

iii

PREFACE

The 2013 Annual History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School follows the

decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages,

staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Field

Artillery School Historian’s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Field

Artillery School made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader

development, doctrine, force design, and equipment requirements.

Because the Field Artillery School was involved in many diverse activities during

the year, the Historian’s Office under the direction of the School Commandant selected

only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the

History.

Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian’s work. After

they are collected from the various organizations during the process of researching, they

are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Historian’s Office. All

documents are available for use by School staff, other U.S. governmental agencies, and

private individuals upon request.

Because new documents are often found after research and writing has been

completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are

discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested

changes should be directed to the Historian’s Office.

In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes

indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Field Artillery School

Historian’s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise.

Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

(Original Signed)

BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D.

Field Artillery Branch Historian

U.S. Army Field Artillery School

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION ii

PREFACE iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL

Introduction 1

Field Artillery School Mission Statement 1

Organization 1

Commandant 1

Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell 2

Field Artillery Proponency Office 3

Strategic Communications Office 7

Women in the Army and the Field Artillery 7

Warfighter Forums 9

Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Accreditation 10

Sequestration 12

CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND

EDUCATION Introduction 15

Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy 15

Army Learning Model 2015 16

Modernizing Field Artillery Fires 19

Gaming 23

Leader Decision Exercise, Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two,

and Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course 24

Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 25

Distance Learning 27

Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes 27

Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Noncommissioned

Officer Education System 28

428th Field Artillery Brigade Accreditation 32

Functional Courses 32

Advanced Individual Training 34

Warrant Officer Education System 35

Officer Education System 35

Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 42

Joint Integration Division 43

Precision Fires Program 43

Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage

Estimation and Weaponeering Courses 47

Joint Fires Observer Course 47

v

Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 48

Joint Fires Observer Team 49

Non-lethal Training 50

Electronic Warfare Courses 50

Special Technical Operations Course 53

CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN,

DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 55

Force Design and Doctrine 55

Field Artillery Modernization Strategy: Field Artillery

Force of 2020 55

Grade Plate Review 56

Army 2020 Redesign 57

Fires Command: DIVARTY and Corps Field Artillery

Brigade 58

Army Doctrine 60

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 62

M777 and M119 Composite Battalion and Precision Fires 65

Precision Munitions, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction

Capability and Handheld Devices 66

Electric Fires 69

TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team-Fires 71

Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile 71

Precision Guidance Kit 78

Future Cannon Munitions Suite 82

M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 83

M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 87

Paladin Integrated Management 91

Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G 95

TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell 96

Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble 96

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 98

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle 99

Knight Vehicle 101

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 103

Joint Effects Targeting System 105

Fire Support Sensor System 107

Profiler 107

Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications

Systems 109

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 109

Handheld Command and Control Systems 112

TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Brigade 113

Fires Radar Strategy 113

vi

Enhanced AN/TPQ-36/53 Radar 113

AN/TPQ-37 Radar 115

AN/TPQ-50 Radar 116

Multiple Launcher Rocket System 117

Munitions 117

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System Alternative Warhead 122

Launchers 125

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 127

Army Tactical Missile System 131

CHAPTER FOUR: FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY 132

Glossary 165

Appendix One: Student Production for Fiscal Year 2013 171

Appendix Two: Key FCoE and USAFAS Personnel 172

Appendix Three: Field Artillery School Commandants 173

Appendix Four: Chiefs of Field Artillery 175

Appendix Five: Assistant Commandants 177

Appendix Six: Command Sergeant Majors of USAFAS since 1991 179

Appendix Seven: Command Sergeant Majors of NCOA 180

Appendix Eight: USAFCOEFS Organization Chart as of 8 April 2013 181

Appendix Nine: Field Artillery Commandant’s Office Chart as of 27

March 2014 182

Appendix Ten: List of Documents 183

Index of Names 184

CHAPTER ONE

MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Influenced by the new Field Artillery technology introduced after the Spanish-

American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and the lack of adequately

trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field

Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 15 September 1911. While War Department, General

Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field

artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and

noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911

integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers.

In 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the U.S. Army Air

Defense Artillery School (USAADAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy

(NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade composed the training mission of the U.S.

Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During the year, the Field

Artillery School trained the Field Artillery forces of the United States Army and United

States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders and

Soldiers, helped design and develop fire support tactics and doctrine, participated in

equipment and weapons development and force design updates, and supported unit

training and readiness.1

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL MISSION STATEMENT

The U.S. Army Field Artillery School trains, educates, and develops agile,

adaptive, and decisive Soldiers and leaders; engages, collaborates and partners with other

branches, warfighting function proponents, and sister-Services; and serves as the lead

agent for the development and dissemination of Field Artillery doctrine, concepts, and

knowledge necessary in Decisive Action.2

ORGANIZATION

Commandant

In June 2013 Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley became Commandant of

the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He graduated from the

University of Texas at Austin and was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Field

Artillery through the Reserve Officer Training Corps. He earned a masters degree from

________________________ 12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 7; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr

11, Doc I-1, 2011 USAFAS AH. 2Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 9 May 13, Doc I-1; Email, subj:

USAFAS Mission Statement, 28 Jan 14, Doc I-2.

2

Louisiana State University. His military education included the Field Artillery Officer

Basic Course, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

General Bentley has commanded Field Artillery units at the battery, battalion, and

brigade levels. His service as a staff officer included tours as an operations officer at the

battalion level and on the Joint Staff, aide-de-camp to the Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Command, executive assistant to the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, Chief of

Staff, 82nd Airborne Division, and executive officer to the Under Secretary of the Army

and Forces Command commander. General Bentley has had many unique professional

experiences and opportunities to include tours in the Federal Republic of Germany, the

25th Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division.

His awards and decorations included the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion

of Merit (3 OLC), Bronze Star Medal (2 OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (3 OLC),

Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement

Medal (3 OLC), and Combat Action Badge. He was authorized the Ranger Tab, Master

Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and the Australian Parachutist Badge.3

Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell

Established in 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Fires Cell

served as a link in coordinating activities to support current priorities and emerging

initiatives between the MCoE at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Fires Center of

Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During 2013, the MCoE Fires Cell worked

several command directed and internal initiatives to improve Fires integration at the

MCoE. Such initiatives included maneuver pre-command course support, joint fires

familiarization courses, and maneuver training support.

MCoE Fires personnel in conjunction with the Field Artillery School commandant

supported Maneuver and Aviation Pre-Command Course training by participating in

command briefs, former battalion commander panels, equipment and capabilities

demonstrations, and air-ground operations discussions. These sessions, whether

Maneuver or Aviation Pre-Command Course, informed leadership of Field Artillery force

design updates, fires/joint fires combat training centers’ activities, operational best

practices, and air-ground operations.

With the support of the Director, Joint and Combined Arms Integration (JACI), at

the FCoE, the MCoE Fires Cell began integrating best practices from the FCoE Joint

Fires Observer (JFO) Program into MCoE officer education programs. The JFO

familiarization program was intended to establish Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course

(BOLC), Aviation BOLC, and Maneuver Captain’s Career Course requirements that

would enable company grade maneuver leaders to understand, plan, synchronize, and

integrate joint fires in support of combined arms maneuver. The course was currently

being piloted in Infantry BOLC and would transition to courses across MCoE in 2014.

From a training support perspective, the MCoE Fires cell made great strides in

________________________ 3Official Biography, BG Christopher F. Bentley, Doc I-3; “Artillery School Gets

New Leader,” Lawton Constitution, 28 Jun 13, Doc I-4; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP,

6 Jun 13, Doc I-5.

3

improving Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) capabilities as well as integrating CFFT into

various MCoE programs of instruction (POIs). Based on the initiative of this group,

MCoE CFFT was capable of effectively training precision fires, close combat attack

(CCA)/close air support (CAS), Field Artillery digital fire support training, and mortar

digital training in a distributed manner. The ability to link multiple CFFTs on a network,

running a common scenario with common terrain and a common operational picture,

enhanced the ability to replicate tactical scenarios in CFFT. Latest efforts in conjunction

with the Mortar Leader Course developed a realistic, digital network on which to train

mortar leaders to ensure that mortar crews and leaders understood the entire digital fire

support chain and the requirements to provide effective fires. This was a significant

departure from the current mortar program of instruction (POI) that taught the Mortar

Ballistic Computer and Lightweight Handheld Mortar Computer in a stand-alone

environment. Finally, the Fires Cell continued to work with JACI to gain necessary

imagery permissions to offer Target Mensuration Only (TMO)/Collateral Damage

Estimate (CDE) familiarization and re-certification training for qualified units on Fort

Benning.

In closing, the above narrative provided a snap shot of only a few areas supported

by the MCoE Fires Cell in 2013. The Fires Cell continued to provide access, planning,

coordination, continuity, and the resources necessary to ensure the maximum

collaboration to develop future combined arms leaders that would be capable of

integrating all joint capabilities in support of unified land operations.4

Field Artillery Proponency Office

In 2013 the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) oversaw the maintenance of

a balanced and sustainable branch of officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned

officers, and Soldiers to facilitate the execution of the Field Artillery’s mission.

Throughout the year FAPO also served as the action office for the Field Artillery School

commandant and the Command Sergeant Major of the Field Artillery.5

Merger of Military Occupation Specialties 13D and 13P to Form 13J. During

2013, FAPO worked the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D and 13P merger.

Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon and one

for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field Artillery

and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate MOSs for fire

control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data

Specialist for Cannon) and MOS 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire

Direction Specialist) into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This would build a

better model for professional development, eliminate course redundancy, build a

sustainable MOS for the future, and develop a more diverse Field Artillery

noncommissioned officer.6

MOS 13F Redesign. During 2013, FAPO participated in the Military

________________________ 4Email with atch, subj: MCOE Fires Cell Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual

History, 31 Jan 14, Doc I-6. 5Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course Briefing, 3 Feb 14, Doc I-7.

6Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-8.

4

Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate integrated, sequential, and

progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced individual training to senior

level training using the Army Learning Model and leader development strategy. These

initiatives would culminate under Modernizing Field Artillery Fires for 2020 within the

enlisted ranks.7

Joint Terminal Attack Controller Additional Skill Identifier. Joint Publication

(JP) 309.3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Close Air Support (CAS)

codified joint requirements for a position to direct the actions of combat aircraft engaged

in CAS and other air operations. This position, called a Joint Terminal Attack Controller

(JTAC), was created to standardize the certification and qualification process for terminal

attack controllers to ensure a common capability across the services. The Army needed to

develop Soldiers who, from a forward position, could deliver field artillery fire, attack

helicopter fire, and fixed-wing aircraft CAS, and direct the actions of joint combat

aircraft engaged in operations in close proximity to friendly forces.8

In 2013 FAPO played a key role in establishing a JTAC additional skill identifier

(ASI) that would be primarily associated with Ranger and Special Forces formations.

Creating the ASI provided the opportunity to define position-based training requirements

and furnished the Army with a tool to track and manage JTAC qualified personnel who

would be integral to the Army’s new modular organizations.9

Cadet Engagement Strategy. In 2013 the Field Artillery extended a seven-year

trend of exceptional recruiting of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and U.S.

Military Academy (USMA) cadets by visiting college campuses and service academies to

encourage junior cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch. In the class of 2013,

ROTC branched 187 male cadets and 29 female cadets into the Field Artillery. An

additional 124 male ROTC cadets and 37 female ROTC cadets were branch detailed into

the Field Artillery. This gave the Field Artillery 311 ROTC male cadets and 66 female

cadets. The U.S. Military Academy branched 140 male cadets and 18 female cadets into

the Field Artillery. The sustained excellence in recruiting provided remarkable

encouragement for the future health of the branch.10

Warrant Officer Accessions. During the 2013, FAPO launched a focused

warrant officer accession strategy to get the best Field Artillery noncommissioned

officers to fill the warrant officer ranks. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 the Field Artillery

branch accessioned 24 warrant officers out of 33 noncommissioned officers who applied.

However, the total number of fully qualified noncommissioned officers that applied was

minimal. The new strategy focused on increasing the number of “best qualified” to apply

for warrant officer positions by actively recruiting quality applicants rather than waiting

for potential applicants to approach senior 131A Field Artillery warrant officers for

________________________ 7“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan 14,

pp. 1-2, Doc I-9. 8Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-10.

9Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14.

10Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 5 Dec 13, Doc I-11; Email with atch, subj:

FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-12.

5

information. After identifying quality applicants, leaders had to ensure that they met the

basic requirements outlined by Army Regulation 135-100 by interviewing them with

assistance from a senior 131A warrant officer before sending in the warrant officer

packet.11

Armywide Physical Demands. The Army and the U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) initiated future-based physical demands based upon

Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 611-21, Military Occupational Classification

and Structure. First, FAPO conducted a physical demands review. Beginning in August

2012 and extending through the rest of the year, the Army and FAPO examined all

critical tasks, identified related physical demands to execute the critical tasks in each

military occupational specialty (MOS) and officer and warrant officer cohort, and worked

closely with TRADOC to edit Pamphlet 611-21. This involved rewriting specifications

for each MOS to update the physical demands tables and the supporting physical

demands worksheets (DA Form 5643-R). Early in 2013, FAPO completed its initial

review and rewrite of DA Pamphlet 611-21, staffed its proposals with the Fires Center of

Excellence’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine and Capabilities Development and

Integration Directorate, and then sent its rewrite proposals to TRADOC for further

staffing. Ultimately, the review defined physical demands requirements in each Field

Artillery MOS to create gender-neutral physical standards.12

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. Army G-1 directed all branch

proponents in January 2012 to update their respective branch chapters of DA Pam 600-3,

The Army Personnel Development System that outlined commissioned officer

professional development. Specifically, a chapter in the pamphlet outlined education and

assignments to develop and sustain Field Artillery and Fire Support core competencies

and to develop the knowledge and skills to operate in joint assignments.13

Given the objectives of the pamphlet and recognizing lessons learned during the

past 10 years of combat operations, the update included a number of significant changes

to the Field Artillery chapter. The changes placed a strong emphasis on developing Field

Artillery officers who were experts across the breadth of the branch and increased

emphasis on joint training and assignments. For example, captains would be assigned to

a different weapon system than where they had served as a lieutenant. Where it was

possible, education and assignments outside of typical field artillery or fire support duties

would contribute to the development and broadening of the officer’s core skills. The

changes also pointed out that battery command was the only key development position

for captains, that battalion fire support officer was not a key development position even

though captains should seek to serve in that position, that lieutenants in brigade combat

________________________ 11

“Focused WO Accessions Strategy: 131A – Field Artillery Targeting Warrant

Officer,” RedLeg Update (Extract), 5-13 May 13, pp. 2-3, Doc I-13. 12

Email with atch, subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012

USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-14; Amy L. Robinson,

“TRADOC Leads Review of MOS Standards, Gender Integration,”

www.army.mil/article/106746, 2 Jul 13, Doc I-15. 13

Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course, 3 Feb 14, Doc I-7.

6

teams should serve in company fire support assignments and have at least one firing

battery assignment, and that lieutenants in fires brigades should serve in more than one

duty assignment to ensure professional development. The changes also addressed female

assignments in the Field Artillery, pointed out the roles and functions of targeting warrant

officers that included technical and tactical expertise in target mensuration only and

collateral damage estimate. Warrant officers would be given an opportunity to certify in

both Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimate while attending the

Warrant Officer Basic Course and the Warrant Officer Advance Course.14

Although the Army endorsed the above recommended changes to the pamphlet,

FAPO provided two additional updates to the final draft pamphlet late in 2013. They

included integrating Joint Fires Observer certification into the Field Artillery Basic

Officer Leader Course beginning in July 2014 and the most recent Soldier 2020

initiatives and policy changes pertaining to the assignment of female Field Artillery

officers. FAPO anticipated release of the pamphlet to come in January 2014.15

Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards and Honorary Colonels and Command

Sergeant Majors and Distinguished Members of the Field Artillery. The Field

Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO) stood at the forefront of outreach and engagement

on behalf of the Chief of Field Artillery and the Command Sergeant Major of the Field

Artillery. Notable programs included the Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards and

Honorary Colonels, Command Sergeant Majors, and Distinguished Members of the Field

Artillery. Named after the father of American artillery, Henry A. Knox who served as the

Chief of Artillery in the Continental Army in the American Revolution, the Knox Award

recognized the outstanding Active Army Field Artillery battery of the year. The

Alexander Hamilton Award was named in honor of Alexander Hamilton, an artilleryman

who gallantly fought in the Continental Army during the American Revolution, and

acknowledged the outstanding Army National Guard Field Artillery battery of the year,

and Gruber Award honored the memory of Edmund L. Gruber who wrote “The Caisson

Song” while he was stationed in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th Century by

recognizing an outstanding Field Artillery professional for superior performance during

the year. The Henry A. Knox Award for 2013 was presented to A Battery, 2nd Battalion,

15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort

Drum, New York. For 2013, B Battery, 1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery Regiment of

the Wisconsin Army National Guard received the Hamilton Award as the best Army

National Guard battery. Because of a tie, the 2013 Gruber Award was presented to SFC

Christopher R. Schwerin, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment who served as a

fires advisor to the 3rd Brigade, 205th Corps Security Force Assistance Team and 1LT

Nathaniel Holcomb, B Battery 1-41st Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade

Combat Team, Fort Stewart, Georgia.16

________________________ 14

Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course, 3 Feb 14. 15

Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 28 Mar 13, Doc I-16; Email with

atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc I-17. 16

USAFAS Facebook, 11 Feb 14, Doc I-18; Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command

Course, 3 Feb 14; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-19.

7

During the year, the Field Artillery named four honorary colonels of the Field

Artillery, three honorary command sergeant majors of the Field Artillery, and 39

distinguished members of the Field Artillery.17

Strategic Communications Office

In recent years the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Office in the U.S.

Army Field Artillery School assumed greater importance. During 2013, STRATCOM

drafted themes, messages, and talking points for dissemination throughout the Field

Artillery School and the Field Artillery. These messages were distributed via an optimal

venue or medium to each leader or Soldier. Measures of performance were determined to

prove the effectiveness of the message and the response of the audience that included

Soldiers, both active duty and National Guard, and foreign military allies. Specifically,

STRATCOM informed Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders about the School’s focus on

training, modernization, organization, and readiness of the Field Artillery, reported about

the available assets to the Warfighter, and shared lessons learned. To get the message

out, STRATCOM employed the School’s and Field Artillery’s news and social media,

such as Facebook that increased from 3,754 followers in 2012 to 4,351 followers in 2013,

the Fort Sill Cannoneer, the Fires Bulletin, and RedLeg Update, Army-wide news and

social media, and direct contact through speeches and presentations with leaders and

Soldiers.18

During the year, STRATCOM highlighted many key initiatives. These

emphasized the Field Artillery School commandant’s priority of modernizing Field

Artillery Fires that included the sub-categories of Modernizing Gunnery, revision of

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) training, the merger

of MOS 13D (Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data Systems Specialist) with MOS

13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist), and the

modernization of survey. STRATCOM also stressed the Field Artillery’s priority of

supporting TRADOC’s Soldier 2020 that included recruiting the best and brightest

Soldiers regardless of gender. Additionally, TRADOC’s initiatives of Sexual Harassment

and Rape Prevention Program (SHARP), Strategic Land power, Designing the Future

Army, and Doctrine 2015 were supported as well.19

WOMEN IN THE ARMY AND THE FIELD ARTILLERY

During 2011, the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) worked two separate

but related issues concerning women in the Army. Tasked by the Chief of Staff of the

Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, FAPO refined its officer career path for female

Field Artillery officers already on active duty during the latter months of the year.

________________________ 17

Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14. 18

Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Update to 2013 Annual History, 30 Jan 14,

Doc I-20. 19

Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Update to 2013 Annual History, 30 Jan 14.

8

Concurrently, FAPO provided recommendations for future accession strategies for

female officers.20

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army issued a short suspense to the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in November 2011 to review women in the

Army (WITA). Specifically, General Odierno directed an analysis of modifying the

Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule restriction that was adopted on 1 October 1994

because it did not adequately reflect the current operational environment in Iraq and

Afghanistan where non-linear warfare persisted. As outlined in 1994, the rule explained

that service members were eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they were

qualified. Women would be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade level

whose primary mission would be engaging in direct combat on the ground.21

After careful analysis the Department of the Army announced a significant policy

change in 2012 concerning women in the Army. Army Directive 2012-16 opened three

Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to women (13M, Multiple

Launch Rocket System Crewmember; 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire

Direction Specialist; and 13R, Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator). Until then,

only MOS 13T (Field Artillery Surveyor/Meteorological Crewmember) was open to

women. Effective 14 May 2012, females could serve in units or positions that were

doctrinally required to collocate physically with ground combat units. For females, the

change in policy permitted them to serve in all duties in Multiple Launch Rocket System

(MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalions. This change

allowed the Field Artillery to grow female officers into senior leaders with a firm

understanding of gunnery and delivery. In 2012-2013 greater than 90 percent of the

female officer population in the Field Artillery was second or first lieutenant. Female

officers were serving as platoon leaders in a MLRS or HIMARS unit. Soon, women

would be serving as firing battery commanders, battalion executive officers, and battalion

operation officers, would have the opportunity to compete for tactical battalion and

brigade command in the Field Artillery, and would serve as mentors for those females

that followed them.22

________________________ 20

Email, subj: SITREP 11-17 Nov 11, Doc I-14, 2011 USAFAS AH. 21

Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Direct Ground Combat

Definition and Assignment Rule, 13 Jan 94, Doc I-15, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj:

SITREP 18-23 Nov 11, Doc I-16, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Women

in the Army Assignment Policy, Jul 11, Doc I-17, 2011 USAFAS AH; Congressional

Research Service, Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, 8 Nov 11, p. 5, Doc I-18,

2011 USAFAS AH; 1998 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 83-86. 22

Fires Forward, Jul 2012, Doc I-13, 2012 USAFAS AH; RedLeg Update, Jul

2012, Doc I-14 2012 USAFAS AH; Talking Points for St. Barbara Celebrations, Nov 12,

Doc I-15, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Army Directive

2012-16, 27 Jun 12, Doc I-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Oct 2012, Doc I-17,

2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, Doc I-21; Memorandum for Record

(FOUO), subj: Executive Summary for the Fires Brigade Warfighter Forum, 3 Dec 12,

9

In 2013 the Field Artillery School passed significant milestones. On 15 March

2013 the first females for the newly opened MOSs 13M and P arrived for advanced

individual training (AIT). In May 2013 the first AIT classes of 13M and 13P with female

soldiers graduated. All active duty females were assigned to the 18th Fires Brigade. In

June 2013 another 13P class with females graduated with the active duty females being

assigned to the 214th Fires Brigade. On 11 June 2013 the first class of 13Rs with females

graduated. Sergeant Pamela Steinman became the first MOS 13M noncommissioned

officer upon graduating from advanced individual training. On 13 November 2013 the

Army opened all Field Artillery officer (MOS 13A) positions to female officers.

Officially, all 13A positions would be changed to gender non-specific positions. Also,

the Army permitted the assignment of female Field Artillery officers to brigade combat

teams where they could serve as fire support officers at all levels and announced in

December 2013 that female officers could serve within a direct support field artillery

battalion in a brigade combat team and a cannon battalion in a fires brigade as a fire

direction officer, as a cannon platoon leader, and as an executive officer. Fire support

positions at the company and battalion level were still closed until the Infantry and

Armored MOSs accepted females.23

WARFIGHTER FORUMS

Advanced information technology led to the inception of the Army’s Warfighters’

Forums. Started late in 2005 at Fort Lewis, Washington, the first Warfighters’ Forum,

originally called Stryker University, was developed to communicate and share

information on the new Stryker units being organized. Late in 2006, the Commanding

General of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), General Charles C. Campbell,

and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), General William S. Wallace, witnessed a demonstration of the Stryker

University. Because of the success of the Stryker University concept, they decided that it

would be invaluable to the Army and encouraged adopting it. Following brainstorming

sessions at Fort Lewis, the Army subsequently launched a web-based initiative on the

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) site known as the Warfighters’ Forum to enhance

____________________

Doc I-22, material used is not FOUO. 23

Marie Berberea, “Women Cross More Combat Lines,” 19 Dec 13,

www.army.mil/article/117287, Doc I-23; C. Todd Lopez, “Army to Open 33,000

Positions to Female Soldiers in April,” 27 Jan 14, www.army.mil/article/118930, Doc I-

24; Briefing, subj: Integration of Females into MOS 13M, P, R, 22 May 13, Doc I-25;

Marie Berberea, “Female NCO Makes History,” 9 May 13, http://sill-

www.army.mil/USAFAS/nco_history.html, Doc I-; Caitlin Kenney, “Army Opens More

Jobs to Women,” 19 Jul 12, www.army.mil/article/83951, Doc I-27; Marie Berberea,

“Field Artillery Training Integrates Women into Combat Specialties,”

www.army.mil/article/101378, Doc I-28; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 13

Mar 14, Doc I-29; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Describes Plans for Integrating Women into

Combat,” www.army.mil/article/105814, 18 Jun 13, Doc I-30.

10

training, readiness, and leader development through collaboration and information

sharing among the brigade combat teams and functional and multi-functional brigades.24

Although the concept was away ahead of the technology in 2007, the Army

adopted and employed it to streamline interaction and staff processes between the

operating and generating forces. The initiative recognized the imperative of providing a

proactive means to promote collaboration, to share ideas, and to find solutions to

common problems across the Army and to learn, innovate, decide, and act faster than the

nation’s adversaries.25

The War fighters’ Forum entered its seventh year in 2013. During the year, the

Field Artillery School commandant hosted the Armored Brigade Combat Team, the

Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery

breakout Warfighting Forum sessions and hosted the Fires Brigade and the Combat

Training Center Warfighting Forums. The School also participated in the Armored

Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade

Combat Team Warfighter Forums. All forums facilitated exchanging information across

the Army and shared situational awareness of the current operating environment between

the operating and generating forces. Topics included: doctrine updates, lessons from

fires battalion and brigade exercises, precision fires, Army 2020 transformation, Joint

Fires Observer sustainment, and others. Other fire support related forums in 2013

included the Division and Corps Fire Support Warfighters’ Forum, the Armor Brigade

Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, the Infantry Brigade Combat

Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, and the Stryker’s Brigade Combat

Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum.26

FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL

ACCREDITATION

Every three years, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

conducted accreditation visits to its service schools. The command did this to assure that

quality education and training was taking place across the doctrine, organization, training,

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains and to

promote improvements as required.27

________________________ 24

Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12, Doc I-22, 2012

USAFAS AH. 25

Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12. 26

Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12; Memorandum for

Record, subj: Deputy Assistant Commandant’s Comments on 2012 Annual History, 29

May 2013, Doc I-22a; 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj; Updating Warfighters’

Forum for 2013 Annual History, 17 Dec 13, Doc I-31; Executive Summary, Fires

Brigade War Fighting Forum, 9 Oct 13, Doc I-32; Executive Summary, Infantry Brigade

Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion War Fighting Forum, 16 Oct 13, Doc I-33. 27

Fires Center of Excellence Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation

Team Visit, 21 October -1 November 2013, Doc I-34.

11

In keeping with the three-year cycle with the previous accreditation being

conducted in 2010, TRADOC carried out an accreditation visit to Fort Sill’s Fires Center

of Excellence (FCoE) on 22-31 October 2013. To prepare FCoE developed a

comprehensive plan of action late in 2012 involving all organizations and staff elements

with the Quality Assurance Office serving as the oversight agency as directed by the

Commanding General of the FCoE, Major General James M. McDonald. Charged by the

plan that had an aggressive timeline to ensure that critical actions had taken place and

that established in-progress review dates and briefings to the Commanding General of the

FCoE, each organization and staff element appointed an action officer to monitor and

assist the preparation process to ensure the accurate assessment of accreditation standards

during the self-assessment process. In addition, the plan tasked each organization or unit

to produce written self-assessments and to develop detailed briefings that outlined each

unit’s current status and measures taken to improve so that quality standards were in

place and so that the Army Learning Model 2015 was being implemented. Addressing

accreditation, General McDonald stressed that it was an opportunity to assess the state of

instruction within the FCoE.28

In the midst of preparing for the accreditation visit, Army standards changed. In

December 2012 a General Officer Steering Committee chaired by the TRADOC

Commanding General revised Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards by deleting those

standards and criteria that were more suited for a command inspection program and by

refining those that focused on training and education, the competency of the instructional

staff, and the incorporation of Army Learning Model 2015 strategies and techniques.

This reduced the number of standards from 48 to 28 and permitted the TRADOC Quality

and Assurance Office to concentrate on key functions, programs, and activities of Army

schools. The new standards went into effect on 1 April 2013, forcing the FCoE to adjust

its accreditation plans and timelines.29

The federal government shutdown with attending civilian workforce furloughs

caused by the inability to Congress to pass a budget caused additional adjustments. The

shutdown forced the FCoE and TRADOC to move accreditation events around even more

and even caused both to project pushing the accreditation visit into November 2013 or

December 2013 or even into 2014. To minimize the disruption, both agreed to hold the

accreditation visit as scheduled in October 2013.30

The accreditation team inspected virtually every aspect of the Field Artillery

________________________ 28

Briefing, subj: FCoE 2013 Accreditation Timeline, 18 Dec 12, Doc I-20, 2012

USAFAS AH; FCoE Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit, 21

October-1 November 2013; Memorandum, subj: FCoE Field Artillery School Self-

Assessment Executive Summary, 20 Aug 13, Doc I-35; Briefing, subj: FCoE

Accreditation Plan/Timeline, 14 Dec 12, updated 22 Aug 13, Doc I-36. 29

FCoE Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit, 21 October-l

November 2013; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Revised Army Enterprise

Accreditation Standards, 12 Mar 13, Doc I-37. 30

Briefing, subj: FCoE Accreditation Plan/Timeline, 14 Dec 12, updated 22 Aug

13.

12

School, Air Defense Artillery School, and the FCoE. Thirteen evaluators examined

everything from programs of instruction to student barracks to range conditions to

mentoring to determine adherence to Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards. They

evaluated every standard and rated it as met, not met, or met with comment. If a standard

was not met or met with comment, the FCoE had to provide a “get well” plan with a

timeline. The evaluators found that the Field Artillery School excelled at implementing

the learner-centric Army Learning Model 2015, used instructional technology whenever

possible, and minimized the “sage-on-the-stage” instructional model. In fact, the team

chief noted that the FCoE and the Field Artillery School were head-and-shoulders above

other TRADOC centers and schools in these areas.31

In January 2014 the Commanding General of TRADOC, General Robert W.

Cone, announced the accreditation team’s findings. He wrote, “HQ TRADOC

congratulates your institution [the Field Artillery School] on receiving the designation of

‘Institution of Excellence,’ the highest accreditation level possible.”32

Continuing,

General Cone commended the School for its dedication and hard work to achieve this

level of distinction.33

SEQUESTRATION

In view of a rising budget that seemed to be out of control by many Americans,

including many in Congress, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, signed

the Budget Control Act of 2011, commonly called sequestration, in August 2011 to bring

an end to the debt ceiling crisis of Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. The act established caps on the

amount of money that could be spent through the annual appropriations process for the

next 10 years to reduce the deficit and created a joint select committee, sometimes called

the super committee, on deficit reduction that was instructed to develop a bill by 15

January 2012 to reduce spending by least another $1.5 trillion over the 10-year period

ending with FY 2021. Basically, the Budget Control Act would create across-the-board

cuts to defense and nondefense spending to drive Democrats and Republicans to reach a

budget compromise. If the committee failed to create budget reduction legislation or its

legislation failed to generate the cuts, mandatory cuts would follow with every defense

and nondefense program being cut by a certain percentage beginning on 1 January 2013

(FY 2013). The President and Congress never envisioned implementing the act because

it was a blunt and indiscriminate way to reduce the deficit over 10 years. Under

________________________ 31

Information Paper, subj: FCoE Goes through TRADOC Accreditation, 8 Nov

13, Doc I-37a. 32

Memorandum with Encls thru: MG James M. McDonald, Cdr, FCoE, for BG

Christopher F. Bentley, Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Notification of Accreditation Status for

USAFAS, 10 Jan 14, Doc I-38. 33

Memorandum with Encls thru: MG James M. McDonald, Cdr, FCoE, for BG

Christopher F. Bentley, Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Notification of Accreditation Status for

USAFAS, 10 Jan 14.

13

sequestration the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budget for example would drop by

$472 million in FY 2013 to FY 2007 levels after adjusting for inflation.34

With sequestration looming in the near future, DoD took steps in 2013 to mitigate

consequences. DoD exempted all military personnel funding from sequestration

reductions, fully protected funding for wartime operations, fully protected the Wounded

Warrior program, and reduced civilian workforce costs by releasing temporary and term

employees. DoD also imposed a hiring freeze, authorized voluntary separation incentives

and voluntary early retirements, and considered furloughing civilian employees for 22 to

30 noncontiguous days as a last resort.35

Over the next several months, the Department of the Army (DA) directed Fort Sill

to take additional actions to reduce its budget. Besides terminating term and temporary

employees consistent with mission requirements and implementing a hiring civilian

hiring freeze, Fort Sill decreased its base operating funding by 30 percent, curtailed

temporary duties and professional training that were not mission essential, cut back

professional conferences that were not related to Operation Enduring Freedom, Korea

deployments, Homeland Defense, and Division Ready Brigade, reviewed contracts for

possible savings, and limited administrative expenses and supply purchases, among other

measures. One of these other measures involved furloughing civilian employees in FY

2013 to meet the federal budget target which was reduced significantly from FY 2012.36

On 23 January 2013 the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE), Major General James M. McDonald, explained the severity of the cuts. The

budget reductions would decrease funding for critical combat development efforts to

create delays, would force cancelling 15 Field Artillery advanced individual training

classes, would reduce the number of practical exercises in Basic Officer Leader Courses,

Warrant Officer Basic Courses, and Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses

to erode skill proficiency, and would reduce equipment readiness below the Army

readiness goal of 90 percent, among other critical implications. Also, the civilian hiring

________________________ 34

Fact Sheet, subj: Budget Control Act, 1 Aug 11, Doc I-39; Fact Sheet, subj:

The Budget Control Act and Sequestration, Aug 12, Doc I-40; OMB Report Pursuant to

the Sequestration Transparency Act of 2012 (Extract), p. 1, Doc I-41; Congressional

Research Service, The Budget Control Act of 2011 (Extract), pp. 1-4, Doc I-42. 35

Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: Handling

Budgetary Uncertainty in Fiscal Year 2013, 10 Jan 13, Doc I-43. Note that Congress

pushed the January 2013 deadline back to 1 March 2013. This further hurt the budget

process for federal agencies because they had less time to implement reductions if

Congress failed to pass a budget for FY 2013. 36

Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Risk Mitigation in the Face of Fiscal

Uncertainty, 16 Jan 13, Doc I-44; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Fiscal

Planning Guidance for Budgetary Uncertainty, 16 Jan 13, Doc I-45; Memorandum for

See Distribution, subj: Department of Army Hiring Freeze and Release of Terms and

Temporary Civilian Personnel, 22 Jan 13, Doc I-46.

14

freeze and releasing temporary and term employees would further inhibit meeting

mission requirements.37

Even though DoD and Fort Sill took actions to reduce their budgets and to avoid

civilian furloughs, they had to implement civilian furloughs in the end. On 20 February

2013 the Secretary of Defense announced executing civilian furloughs. Initially, the DoD

envisioned 14 to 22 days that would be spread out over the last three months of the FY

2013 and would influence approximately 700,000 DoD employees. Most of Fort Sill’s

2,800 civilians were furloughed for two days each pay period. This amounted to a pay

cut of 20 percent. The furloughs began in July 2013 with 11 scheduled days for the

remaining months of FY 2013. As DoD found additional money, it reduced the furlough

days from 11 to six.38

________________________ 37

Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, G8, subj:

FY13 Planning for Fiscal Uncertainty, 23 Jan 13, Doc I-47; Memorandum for LTG John

F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, subj: Follow-Up to the

Sequestration ROC Drill, 26 Feb 13, 27 Feb 13, Doc I-48. 38

Email, subj: Sequestration Message from the Secretary of the Army, Chief of

Staff of the Army, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, 4 Mar 13, Doc I-49;

Memorandum for Department of Defense Civilian Employees, 20 Feb 13, Doc I-50; Ltr,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to Mr. William R. Dougan, President,

National Federation of Federal Employees, 20 Feb 13, Doc I-51; Fact Sheet, subj: DoD

Announces 11 Days of Furlough, beginning in July, 15 May 13, Doc I-52; PAO, “Fort

Sill Prepares for Civilian Furloughs,” 16 May 13, Doc I-53; Fact Sheet, subj: DoD

Furlough Timeline, undated, Doc I-54; “Civilian Furloughs to Start 8 Jul,” Fort Sill

Cannoneer, 3 Jul 13, Doc I-55; Email, subj: Furlough Reduction, 8 Aug 13, Doc I-56.

CHAPTER TWO

LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

During 2013, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School trained Army and Marine

Field Artillerymen to meet the needs of the nation’s operational forces. The School

focused on developing Field Artillery core competencies and a closer synchronization

with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Capabilities Development and

Integration Directorate (CDID) in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill and

the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the FCoE. To train Soldiers and

leaders, the School employed institutional training and distance learning and leveraged

training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations and computer applications to enhance

training and developed a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming strategy for operational,

institutional, and self-development training and education. The Army National Guard,

meanwhile, conducted Field Artillery training using Regional Training Institutes located

across the United States as a part of The Army School System.

LIVE, VIRTUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE, AND GAMING TRAINING STRATEGY

In 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School announced a Live, Virtual,

Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy to offset limited funding, time, resources,

expanding urbanization, and increased competition for training areas. The strategy

established a blueprint that focused Field Artillery training and education where

simulations might be leveraged. As Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, Commandant

of the Field Artillery School, explained, computer simulations or virtual reality provided

opportunities to conduct training where live training might be too expensive or dangerous

as the 210th Field Artillery Brigade demonstrated when it employed gaming, virtual, and

constructive training in 2013. Such training offered the brigade realistic training

opportunities, reduced the unit’s training support burden, and helped improve unit

readiness. General McKiernan added that virtual training could be leveraged to train

gunnery skills; reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position; and leadership and

decision making. However, virtual training would never replace live training.1

For the institutional domain, General McKiernan noted the need to leverage

virtual technology and simulations, such as the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) and the

Virtual Battlespace2 Fires (VBS2 Fires), to furnish cost-effective training to improve

Soldier proficiency. For example, the recent joint training conducted by the Maneuver

Center of Excellence, the Aviation Center of Excellence, and the Fires Center of

Excellence took advantage of virtual technology. Student officers from the three centers

employed immersive technologies and emergent technology to conduct virtual combined

________________________ 1McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8-

11, Doc II-1; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update,

4-13 Apr 13, pp. 1, 5, Doc II-2.

16

arms training without leaving their respective centers. Specifically, Field Artillery

second lieutenants provided fire support to maneuver arms captains in a realistic

environment without the expense associated with live training by employing the CFFT

and VBS2 Fires. Another aspect of the exploiting virtual training in the institutional

domain revolved around the School’s modernizing Field Artillery fires strategy that

focused on gaming technologies to augment institutional gunnery and ballistic theory

training. Through mid-2013, the School employed 52 animations to support gunnery

instruction and was building scenarios that would graphically display the principles of

ballistics and provide situations requiring the application of advanced ballistics theory

and troubleshooting.2

In the self-development domain computer simulations, the Fires Knowledge

Network, and compact disks offered the individual soldier opportunities for sustainment

and self-development training and provided the opportunity for life-long learning.3

ARMY LEARNING MODEL 2015

In October 2010 the Army launched the Army Learning Concept (ALC) 2015.

The concept sought to leverage technology without sacrificing standards so that the Army

could provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education by tailoring training

and by stressing a career-long continuum of learning that was not location dependent.

Essentially, ALC 2015 found the existing Army learning model that revolved around the

three domains of institutional, operational, and self-development training to be

inadequate and pointed out the requirement to take immediate action to develop the

capacity for accelerated learning that extended from the organization to the individual

Soldier whose knowledge, skills, and abilities would be tested in the most unforgiving

environment. As a representative of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in

the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) explained, ALC 2015 centered on ensuring good

training and education for all of the Army’s soldiers. Brigadier General Richard C.

Longo, formerly the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School and currently

the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), and Brigadier General Paul E. Funk II, Deputy Commanding General, U.S.

Army Combined Arms Center-Training, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, added in March

2011 that ALC was learner-centric, engaging, adaptive, rigorous and relevant, and

leveraged technologies, such as on-line gaming and the virtual environment, to provide

learning experiences that were not bound by “brick and mortar” so that Soldiers could

learn any place and anytime.4

________________________ 2McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8-

11. 3Ibid.

4“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10,

Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr

11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United

States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS

17

For the Field Artillery School in 2011, the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015,

described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 of January 2011, meant shifting training from

an instructor-centric to a learner-centric paradigm in a few short years in its initial

military training, professional military courses, and functional courses. This meant

reducing instructor-led PowerPoint lectures, incorporating virtual and constructive

simulations, gaming technology, and other technology-delivered instruction, and

converting most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events led by

facilitators who would engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context

of what they had learned. ALM 2015 also would entail more hands-on instruction.5

In 2012 the Field Artillery School made significant progress transitioning to ALM

2015. The School employed the Jared Monti Hall simulation center that provided robust,

scenario-based simulations. Meanwhile, the FCoE leveraged educational technology to

support enlisted and officer education by employing virtual task trainers for the M119A2,

M109A6, and M777A2 weapons systems.6

The Field Artillery School also collaborated closely with FCoE agencies, such as

Quality Assurance Office (QAO), to improve the instructor certification process through

better in-house and private-sector education for instructors and training developers and

better methodologies for the assessment of training effectiveness. The School supported

QAO’s implementation of new ALM 2015-focused training assessment and trending

tools to evaluate ALM 2015 venues and to provide trends back to instructors, training

developers, and chains of command.7 In addition, the Field Artillery School teamed with

FCoE agencies and TRADOC to develop new resourcing models to ensure that the

capabilities required for ALM 2015 implementation would be supported with

programmed resources.8

____________________

AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015,

20 Jan 11, Foreword, Doc II-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al

Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH; BG Richard C. Longo and

BG Paul E. Funk II, “Concept: Developing Adaptable Soldiers, Leaders and Units to

Meet the Challenge of Persistent Conflict,” Army, Mar 11, pp. 45-50, Doc II-3. 5“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10,

Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr

11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United

States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS

AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-19, 2011 USAFAS

AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Commanding Officer, 428th FAB, 23

Jan 12, Doc II-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S.

Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 Jan 11, Foreword, pp. 5-9, Doc II-4; Tatjana

Christian, “Army Learning Model to Begin Fiscal Year 2015,” 8 Jun 12,

www.army.mil/article, Doc II-5. 6Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School

History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-19, 2012 USAFAS AH. 7Ibid.

8Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School

18

Simultaneously, the School leveraged technology to provide credible, rigorous,

and relevant training and education for Soldiers and leaders. As explained by Brigadier

General Brian J. McKiernan, Commandant of the Field Artillery School, the School in

cooperation with the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia, and

Aviation Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama, developed a Leader Development

Exercise and piloted it in late 2011 and early 2012. Captains attending the Maneuver

Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning and the Aviation Captain’s Career

Course (AVC3) at Fort Rucker and second lieutenants attending the Field Artillery Basic

Officer Leader Course (FA BOLC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, employed the Virtual

Battlespace 2 (VBS2) as a gaming platform that had realistic graphics comparable to

state-of-the-art video games and that required the player to see the action through the

eyes of his/her avatar and integrated the Call-for-Fire Trainer Plus. This initiative

developed a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming instructional methodology to learn

maneuver, aviation, and fire support planning and airspace control. Based upon the

successful pilot, the School implemented the exercise in 2012 and maintained it as a

critical part of FA BOLC in 2013.9

Implementing ALM 2015 continued into 2013. During the year, the School

employed simulations, training devices, and gaming technology as effective means to

reduce training costs and to improve institutional, self-development, and reach-back

training and training-on demand and started developing mobile devices for institutional

and self-development training. As the Assistant Commandant for the School, Colonel

Martin C. Clausen, explained in April 2013, the School used over 25 systems and non-

system training aids, devices, simulations, simulators to enhance training. At the same

time the School examined ways to automate Field Artillery fires instruction (gunnery) in

____________________

History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-20, 2012 USAFAS AH. 9COL Mike Cabrey, “Distinguished the Unique Profession of Field Artillerymen,”

Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 8-9, Doc II-27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper,

subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company

Fire Support Officer Training Pilot Program, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-28, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information

Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in

Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, 28 Oct 11, Doc II-29a, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning

Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, undated, Doc II-16, 2012

USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Jan

13, Doc II-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,”

Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc II-18, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: FA CMDT SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-6; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 15

Aug 13, Doc II-7; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Looking Back over 2012: The Legacy of the

‘King of Battle’ Continues,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 13, pp. 6-9, Doc II-8; “U.S. Army

Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support

Officer Training Pilot,” 2012, sill-www.army.mil/USAFAS, Doc II-9; Christian, “Army

Learning Model to Begin Fiscal Year 2015.”

19

the school house with the goal of abandoning analog or manual methods of teaching

gunnery and developed a live, and virtual, gaming, and constructive strategy for

operational, institutional, and self-development training and education.10

In keeping with the need to make BOLC B learner-centric and to ensure

incompliance with the ALM 2015, the School meanwhile started planning and

conducting a resource analysis in mid-2013 to adopt small group instruction (SGI). Even

though SGI was being implemented for mentorship and professional development only

during 2013 and received solid reviews from students and instructors alike, large group

instruction of approximately 60 students per group still dominated the BOLC-B

curriculum at the end of 2013.11

MODERNIZING FIELD ARTILLERY FIRES

In 2013 the Field Artillery School launched critical initiatives to modernize Field

Artillery fires. They included modernizing computational tools; developing the Precision

Fires Warrior ensemble; modernizing gunnery instruction in the School with automated

tools; redesigning Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F, Fire Support Specialist;

merging MOSs 13D, Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist, and 13P Multiple Launch

Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist, to form 13J; and integrating Joint Fires

Observer (JFO) certification training in the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course

(FA BOLC-B).12

Precision Fires Warrior and Modernizing Computational Tools

As of 2013, the Field Artillery depended upon analog and voice communication

tools to locate a target and send the information to the fire direction center. During the

first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided

munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar outpaced the dismounted forward

observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate manner. Weight,

power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of simultaneous voice and

digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward observer at company and

below from exploiting precision munitions. Although Precision Strike Suite-Special

Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for precision strikes, it

generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer. As a result, the

dismounted forward observer did not have the ability to employ precision munitions

________________________ 10

Speaking Notes, Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 26 Apr 13, Doc II-

10. 11

Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-11; Email with

atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 12 Sep 13, Doc II-12; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt

SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-13; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26 Sep 13,

Doc II-14; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13;

Interview, Dastrup with Dooley, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-15; Interview, Dastrup with

Christopher Atkinson, Exec Officer, 428th FAB, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-16. 12

Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, Doc II-16a.

20

because he could not provide a precise target location.13

To eliminate this capability gap, the Training and Doctrine Command (TCM)

Fires Cell at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, launched an initiative to revolutionize the dismounted forward

observer’s capabilities with the Precision Fires Warrior (PFW) ensemble. Conceived in

June 2012, the ensemble included a collection of technology that would be worn by the

forward observer on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest. The heart of the ensemble was

the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized commercial

off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called an End User Device (EUD). While running the

FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the selected

situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate targets

precisely, the dismounted warrior/forward observer would employ the hand-held Joint

Effects Targeting System (JETS) that would be capable of night observation, target

location, and designation and that was under development with fielding scheduled for

2016. Until then, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Lightweight Laser

Designator Rangefinder 2H (LLDR-2H).14

The precision fires warrior ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer

who would also be JFO certified the capability of employing all of the available precision

munitions and ability to locate a target for precision munitions without mensuration.15

Modernizing computational tools paralleled the Precision Fires Warrior ensemble.

In June 2011 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the AFATDS

Increment 2 Capability Development Document. AFATDS Increment II would migrate

all field artillery command and control systems under it around 2018-2025. This would

include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire

Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and Joint Automated Deeps

Operations Coordination System (JADOCS).16

________________________ 13

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45, 2012 USAFAS AH;

“Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-116, 2012

USAFAS AH; MAJ Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next

Forward Observer Generation,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 13, pp. 40-41, Doc II-16b. 14

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior

Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next

Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; Scott McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in

Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc II-16c; Email with atch,

subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc II-16d. 15

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior

Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora

and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-

41; McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” pp. 26-28; Email with

atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery

Modernizaton, 1 May 13. 16

“AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc

21

Modernizing Gunnery Instruction in the School While technical fire direction was conducted in the Fire Direction Center and on

weapon systems using automated systems as both a primary means and as a secondary

independent check, the Field Artillery School continued to employ manual or analog

methods in 2013 to teach gunnery but pushed to abandon them in favor of automated

methods. To satisfy Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015’s key imperative of leveraging

technology for training purposes, the School urged operational units to train employing

its digital devices and to avoid training in a degraded manual mode. Only rarely should a

unit train in a fully degraded manual mode. The School also considered manual gunnery

instruction in the schoolhouse to be degraded operations and recognized the imperative of

modernizing institutional gunnery training by leveraging existing and emerging

technology. The School wanted the bulk of gunnery training to center around

simulations, digital devices, immersive technologies, Field Artillery training aids,

devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS), and emerging technologies. This would

reduce training time on theory and permit more hands-on instruction that was a key ALM

2015 objective. Essentially, the School had to abandon the graphic firing table, the

graphic site table, the chart board, and tabular firing tables to teach gunnery because

operational units did not employ them and because automated technology could teach

gunnery theory faster and better.17

To this end the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) Education

Technology Branch launched an effort in 2013 to develop automated tools as a means of

modernizing gunnery training. This involved collaborating with the Training Brain

Operations Center (TBOC) at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) to develop scenarios that would demonstrate targeting procedures conducted

by forward observers and would require TBOC to create a Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2)

model of the new Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR 2H) to be used by

virtual forward observers in VBS2. Meanwhile, the Education Technology Branch

would create automated storyboards to reinforce the five requirements for accurate fires

and to provide students with opportunities to hone their troubleshooting skills any time

and any place by developing computer applications.18

____________________

III-62, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, II-

16a; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin,

Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” RedLeg

Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc III-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell

2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a. 17

Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Modernization COA Brief, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-17;

“Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” RedLeg Update, Apr 13, p. 2, Doc II-18; BG Brian J.

McKiernan, “The Field Artillery Force of 2020,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 6-9, Doc

II-19; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment

XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14. 18

“Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” RedLeg Update, Apr 13, p. 2; Training the

Field Artillery Force for 2020 Speaker Notes, undated, Doc II-20; Speaker Notes for

Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc II-21; McKiernan, “The Field

22

By the end of 2013, DOTD’s initiative led to the development of a computer-

based troubleshooting application to teach second lieutenants to find and eliminate errors

in technical fire direction and to the development of other computer applications. Other

computer applications included a Paladin Crew Drill Trainer that provided step-by-step

visuals using video and single frame scroll to illustrate each crew members’ required

functions for operational units and an Engagement Options and Precision Fires

Considerations application for assessing engagement options using a quick reaction force,

mortars, air support, traditional field artillery, joint operations attack, or precision

munitions. Additional applications included a Ballistics Concepts Trainer, Manual Fire

Mission Simulator, and a Fires Integration/Application Capabilities.19

Redesigning MOS 13F

During 2013, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Office

participated in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate

integrated, sequential, and progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced

individual training to senior level training using the Army Learning Model 2015 and

leader development strategy. This initiative would culminate under Modernizing Field

Artillery Fires for 2020 within the enlisted ranks.20

Merging MOSs 13D and 13P to form MOS 13J

During 2013, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency

Officer continued working the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D and 13P

merger. Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon

and one for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field

Artillery and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate

MOSs for fire control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D (Field Artillery

Tactical Data Specialist for Cannon) and MOS 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System

Operations/Fire Direction Specialist) into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This

would build a better model for professional development, eliminate course redundancy,

build a sustainable MOS for the future, and develop a more diverse Field Artillery

noncommissioned officer.21

Integrating JFO Certification Training into FA BOLC B

In 2013 the Field Artillery School and the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI)

Directorate in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) initiated integrating Joint Fires

Observer (JFO) certification training in the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course B

(BOLC B) Program of Instruction (POI) as directed by the Field Artillery School

____________________

Artillery Force of 2020,” Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field

Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14. 19

Information Paper, subj: FCoE DOTD Learning and Innovations Division

Product Demonstration Items, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-22; Information Paper, subj: Multimedia

Production Branch, Learning Innovations Division, DOTD, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-23. 20

“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan

14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a; Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Apr 14, Doc II-23b. 21

“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan

14, pp. 1-2; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc II-23c.

23

Commandant, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, who wanted to train and certify

all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps BOLC-B graduates as JFOs and to provide the

operational force and fleet with required JFO officer allocations. Ultimately, this

initiative upon would increase the annual JFO production and would meet General

Bentley’s objective of certifying every second lieutenant as a JFO before graduating from

the Field Artillery BOLC-B course. The training was scheduled to begin with Field

Artillery BOLC-B class 6-14 (July 2014).22

GAMING

In 2012-2013 the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) gaming

initiative played a key role in training and education in the Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE) and the Field Artillery School by bringing live, virtual, and constructive training

and education to the Fires professionals in and beyond the school. Gaming permitted

students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios to broaden their experience base

and intuitive decision making abilities. DOTD played a role by creating training aids

and desktop simulations and applications that could be used as part of the total training

aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) training package. The initiative led to

the development of a computer-based troubleshooting application to teach second

lieutenants to find and eliminate errors in technical fire direction. Other computer

applications included a Paladin Crew Drill Trainer that provided step-by-step visuals

using video and single frame scroll to illustrate each crew members’ required functions, a

Collateral Damage Awareness and Tactical Decision Tool to raise collateral damage

awareness, and Engagement Options and Precision Fires Considerations for assessing

engagement options using a quick reaction force, mortars, air support, traditional field

artillery, joint operations attack, or precision munitions. Additional applications covered

internal/external ballistics samplings to visualize ballistics, a Ballistics Concepts Trainer

and Manual Fire Mission Simulator.23

Given the competition for training areas and resources, the Commandant of the

Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, reinforced in the summer

of 2013 the need to exploit gaming to train the force. From his perspective this involved

employing the Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, the Call-for-Fire Trainer, the Fire

Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer, and other virtual, immersive training systems,

and those applications being developing through the DOTD gaming initiative.24

________________________ 22

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-23d; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Redesign, 8 Oct 13, Doc II-23e. 23

Information Paper, subj: FCoE DOTD Learning and Innovations Division

Product Demonstration Items, 31 Jan 14; Information Paper, subj: Multimedia

Production Branch, Learning Innovations Division, DOTD, 31 Jan 14; Email with atch,

subj: Input to Gaming 2013 Document, 28 Feb 14, Doc II-24. 24

Interview, Dastrup with Dean Keveles, Operations Officer, DOTD, 23 Jan 12,

Doc II-10, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12,

Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Dave Henderson, Dep Dir,

24

LEADER DECISION EXERCISE, VIRTUAL BATTLESPACE SIMULATION

TWO, AND FIELD ARTILLERY BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE

To foster a realistic training environment between future maneuver commanders

and fire support officers and to leverage information technology for instructional

purposes as directed by the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015, the Commandant of the

Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, tasked his subordinates

early in 2011 to develop a suitable exercise for Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader

Course (FA BOLC) second lieutenants. General Vandal wanted to give them a

perspective on integrating fires in a maneuver operation and to establish realism by

working with a maneuver officer attending the Maneuver Captain Career Course

(MCCC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. This led to developing a Leadership Development

Exercise using the Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two (VBS2) as a gaming platform that

had been employed by the U.S. Marine Corps since 2008 and the Field Artillery School

for a couple of years and to integrate it with the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) II Plus

which was the institutional version of the CFFT and was a gaming and virtual training

system to produce immersive training. While the CFFT was a lightweight, rapidly

deployable, observed training system that provided multiple simulated battlefield

environments for fire support training purposes, the VBS2 offered realistic battlefield

simulations and the ability to operate land, sea, and air vehicles and could be used to

teach doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures during squad and platoon offensive,

defensive, and patrolling operations. Also, it was suitable for training small teams in

urban tactics and entire combat teams in combined arms operations or even non-military

usage such as emergency response procedures in lethal and non-lethal environments or

terrain visualization. Together, CFFT and VSB2 provided virtual and immersive training

for maneuver officers and Field Artillery officers.25

During the latter months of 2011, the Field Artillery School conducted its first

Leadership Development Exercise with the MCCC and the Aviation Center employing

VBS2 and CFFT II Plus. The exercise teamed captains from the MCCC and Aviation

Captain Career Course (ACCC) with FA BOLC second lieutenants. The MCCC students

____________________

DOTD, 17 Jan 12, Doc II-12a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army

Field Artillery School Mission, 6 Feb 13, Doc II-14, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J.

McKiernan, “The Field Artillery Force of 2020,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 6-9, Doc

II-25. 25

Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, 11 May 11, Doc II-21, 2011 USAFAS AH;

White Paper, subj: Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, 20 Sep 10, p. 5, Doc II-22, 2011

USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 30 Jun 11, Doc II-23, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email,

subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11, Doc II-24, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 23 Jun 11,

Doc II-25, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Capabilities (Gaming Tools), 21 Mar 12,

Doc II-26, 2011 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and

Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8-11, Doc II-26; BG Brian J.

McKiernan, “Looking Back over 2012: The Legacy of the King of Battle Continues,”

Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 6-9, Doc II-8, 2012 USAFAS AH.

25

assumed the role of company commander, while ACCC captains flew rotary wing aircraft

during the simulation. FA BOLC students meanwhile performed company fire support

officer duties. This collective virtual exercise exposed maneuver captains and Field

Artillery officers to the dynamics of the maneuver commander and fire support officer

relationship in planning and executing an operation. The Field Artillery School

implemented the exercise in the FA BOLC program of instruction in January 2012. In

fact, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J.

McKiernan, noted that the exercise was successful. As a result, the Leadership

Development Exercise remained a critical part of FA BOLC in 2013 and served as an

invaluable training exercise that relied upon virtual and immersive training.26

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS

In the world of constrained budgets and ever-increasing demands on the Soldiers’

duty time in 2013, the Field Artillery School invested in effective and efficient means to

sustain core competencies. To do this, the School leveraged the virtual environment

where soldiers felt that they were actually in the field by aggressively pursuing

simulations/gaming capabilities to enhance the training and educational experience of

individuals and units. 27

Charting a path forward in the virtual world of training, the Field Artillery

Commandant’s Office published a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training strategy

in 2013. The strategy furnished a vision and guidance and the ends, ways, and means for

training and educating Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders to support operational

readiness and individual and collective adaptability and to sustain unit readiness. Equally

________________________ 26

COL Mike Cabrey, “Distinguished the Unique Profession of Field

Artillerymen,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 8-9, Doc II-27, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning

Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot Program, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-28,

2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-29, 2011

USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements

Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, 28 Oct 11, Doc

II-29a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School

Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot,

undated, Doc II-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery

Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Jan 13, Doc II-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J.

McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc II-

18, 2012 USAFAS AH; FA Cmdt SITREP, 7-18 Jan 13, Doc II-27; Email with atch,

subj: FA CMDT SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-28; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP,

15 Aug 13, Doc II-29; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc II-30. 27

Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School

History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-22, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live,

Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8-

11, Doc II-31.

26

important, the strategy advocated employing training aids, devices, simulators, and

simulations (TADSS), such as the Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

(FSCATT), the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT), CATT II and CATT II Plus,

and Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 (VBS2) Fires, to facilitate training.28

Call for Fire Trainer I, Call for Fire Trainer II, Call for Fire Trainer II Plus, and

Call for Fire Trainer III

With the growing importance of the Joint Fires Observer (JFO) and fully trained

fire support specialists, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) recognized the importance

of immersive virtual simulation furnished by the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT). Using the

base CFFT and augmenting software, the FCoE provided an immersive institutional and

exportable training capability to brigade combat teams and their fire support

personnel/JFOs. During 2012, the CFFT contract underwent a “re-compete” with a new

vendor being awarded. In order to differentiate those systems built by the new vendor,

the nomenclature CFFT III was established. Major functions/operations would remain

unchanged from the CFFT I as the initial CFFT was designated. The CFFT I was a

lightweight, rapidly deployable, observed training system that provided simulated

battlefield training for fire support specialists at the institutional and unit levels. It had

the ability to train all artillery, Type II and III close air support, naval gun fire, and mortar

missions. CFFT II represented an improvement over CFFT I with its ability to link with

other simulations, command and control systems, or operational platforms. The CFFT II

Plus, formerly known as the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JETS) that was

developed as an experimental prototype, had special mission modules to include the JFO

variant and the Joint Close Air Support Modification kit and provided an immersive

environment for Army and JFO training that accurately replicated the contemporary

operating environment. In the near future, CFFT III would be fielded that would use high

fidelity generation technology to create virtual battlefields.29

Virtual Battlespace2 Fires

Virtual Battlespace2 (VBS2) Fires was a professional call-for-fire virtual training

system that furnished sophisticated training in 2013. VBS2 Fires allowed the user to

construct a call-for-fire that the trainee could directly enter into a call-for-fire command

and had realistic graphics, comparable to those in video games. Also, the system

simulated exterior and terminal ballistics to high levels of detail, supported a wide array

________________________ 28

Briefing, subj: Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 1 May 13, Doc II-

32; “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, 4-13 Apr 13, pp. 1, 5, Doc II-33;

McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8-11;

Notes, Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 29 May 13, Doc II-34. 29

Information Paper, subj: Nova Technologies Chooses Havok Simulation for

PEO STRI CFFT Program, 4 Dec 13, Doc II-35; Information Paper, subj: CFFT, 12 Nov

12, Doc II-36; Information Paper, subj: CFFT, 17 Dec 13, Doc II-37; Information Paper,

subj; CFFT, 17 Dec 13, Doc II-38; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive,

and Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8-11, Doc II-26;

Memorandum for TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Virtual, subj: CFFT Increment II

Capabilities Update, 10 Nov 11, Doc II-39.

27

of munitions, fuse types, and firing platforms, and could run in several configurations

(stand-alone mode, training mode, and instructor mode).30

DISTANCE LEARNING

In 2013 the Field Artillery School leveraged information technology to train all

Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army

National Guard officers and Soldiers, distance learning permitted them to stay at home

and train to save costs. Basically, the School’s distance learning program leveraged

computers and other information technologies to furnish military occupation specialty

qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses,

reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses,

professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.31

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES

Established in the 1990s by Task Force Future Army Schools 21 (FAST-21), the

Total Army School System (TASS), a school system comprised of Active Component,

Army Reserve, and Army National Guard institutional training systems and renamed The

Army School System (TASS) early in the 2000s, played a key role in training the Field

Artillery in 2013. During the transition to TASS, Army National Guard State Military

Academies converted to Regional Training Institutes (RTI). RTIs furnished standardized

resident training using The Army Training System Courseware (TATS-C). The TATS-C

course structure and media ensured standardization training for all Soldiers, regardless of

component, on course critical tasks to performance standard. This courseware was

developed by the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS).32

Originally, seven regions conducted training in support of units within the

specified region. This concept changed to training being conducted at designated RTIs

where subject matter experts taught only specific courses. In 2013 there were 13 RTIs

consisting of five battalions and their eight academically aligned training batteries that

offered 39 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Additional Skill Identifier (ASI)

courses and graduated 1,582 students in 171 classes. RTIs implemented single and multi-

phase courses to include MOS Training for MOS reclassification and the Advanced

Leader Course and the Senior Leader Course for noncommissioned officers, provided

mobile training teams, and furnished unit training to help the Field Artillery reset mission

as requested. The RTIs did not teach Initial Entry Training (IET). Fort Sill handled all

________________________ 30

McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp.

8-11; SimCentric Technologies, VBS2Fires User Documentation (Extract), Nov 10, Doc

II-40. 31

Information Paper, subj: G3/7 Scheduling Branch, 17 Dec 12, Doc II-41. 32

Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2012 USAFAS AH, 13 Feb 13, Doc II-8,

2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2013 USAFAS AH, 13 Jan

14, Doc II-42.

28

IET for MOS 13 soldiers. All RTIs were accredited by the Quality Assurance Office at

Fort Sill and were collectively prepared to instruct enlisted courses in all Field Artillery

training lanes.33

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY AND NONCOMMISSIONED

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Background On 5 February 1959 Fort Sill established the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer

Academy. The first pilot course began in April 1959 with the first 22 students graduating

in May 1959. The first expansion of the program of instruction came in 1963 with the

development of the two-week Leadership Preparation Course. By 1971 the Academy had

responsibility for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Leadership Preparation

School, the Instructor Training Course, and the Drill Sergeant School. Because of its

diverse missions, the Academy underwent a name change to the Fort Sill Institute. In

March 1973 Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Lewis became the first enlisted

commandant of the Institute. In October 1975 the Institute started the Primary

Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms. In May 1977 the Institute only

taught noncommissioned officer courses, and the Institute’s name changed to the Fort Sill

Noncommissioned Officer Career Development Center.34

Overview for 2013

In 2013 the Fires Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) continued

improving and refining its efforts to produce tactically and technically proficient

noncommissioned officers. Efforts centered on implementing Army Learning Model

(ALM) 2015 as outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, the U.S. Army Learning Concept

2015 (ALC 2015), of 6 June 2011. ALM 2015 met the Army’s need to develop adaptive,

thinking Soldiers and leaders who were capable of meeting the challenges encountered in

an era of persistent conflict. ALM 2015 also described a learning continuum that meshed

together self-development, institutional instruction, and operational experience.35

To this end, NCOA and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) Directorate of

Training and Doctrine (DOTD) collaborated to develop five achievable objectives in

2012 to meet the intended outcomes of the various Army concepts and retained them in

2013. The NCOA derived all objectives from mutually supporting documents: The Army

________________________ 33

Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2013 USAFAS AH, 13 Jan 14; Briefing,

subj: ARNG Update to Commandant, Jun 13, Doc II-43; Briefing, subj: ARNG

Information Brief to FA CCC-RC, 15 Jun 13, Doc II-44. 34

“Sill Begins Leadership Program,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 6 Dec 63, p. 6, Doc II-

27, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: History of Fort Sill Noncommissioned

Officer Academy, 25 Jan 10, Doc II-28, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, sub:

NCOA Input to 2011 Annual History, 14 Feb 12, Doc II-45, 2011 USAFAS AH. 35

Email with etch, sub: NCOA Input to 2013 Annual History, 9 Jan 13, Doc II-

27, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013

Annual History, 14 Jan 14, Doc II-45.

29

Training Concept 2016-2020, The Army Learning Concept 2015, and The Army

Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028.36

Objective one involved producing leaders who were subject matter experts in

their core and functional competencies, were critical thinkers and effective

communicators who embraced leadership attributes outlined in Army Doctrine Reference

Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, the Army Leadership Requirements Model,

and were confident operators in decisive actions.37

Objective two integrated operational environment variables into all Advance

Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC) programs of instruction.

Students had to consider all operational variables, political, military, economic, social,

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables. Students also had

to understand how culture and foreign language application in the region of operation

would influence their and the force’s presence to the local noncombatants.38

Objective three focused on developing rigorous “closed book tests that measured

levels of learning” for all ALC, SLC, and Electronic Warfare (EW) courses. In keeping

with the ALM 2015, Noncommissioned Officer Academy instructors facilitated learning

by using software that was built upon outcomes-based training and education. In

cooperation with the FCoE Quality Assurance Office and DOTD, the Academy

transformed how it presented Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Professional

Military Education and how it assessed student’s knowledge. The Quality Assurance

Office and DOTD developed tests measuring levels of knowledge rather than merely

knowing where to access the information could.39

Objective four centered on Noncommissioned Officer Education System

(NCOES) Professional Military Education (PME). In the face of advancing technologies

across the Fires force, re-developing, maintaining, and retaining hands-on, lock-step

traditional field artillery and air defense artillery skills were more relevant and critical to

know. Knowing when and what button to push was irrelevant when global positioning

systems and power supplies to systems failed. The Academy’s NCOs had to transition

between technologically advancing processes and proven old school doctrine and tactics,

techniques and procedures equally, expertly, effortlessly and comfortably.40

Objective five directed the NCOA to embrace and support the FCoE. Key to the

FCoE was providing a fires curriculum that was the right content and that provided

instruction and training at the right time and the right place to the Army, joint partners,

interagency partners, and international partners. Foundational to the concept was excellence

in training and education and support of life-long learning.41

TRADOC Accreditation Inspection

________________________ 36

Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14

Jan 14. 37

Ibid. 38

Ibid. 39

Ibid. 40

Ibid. 41

Ibid.

30

From 21-31 October 2013, the NCOA along with the 428th Field Artillery

Brigade, 30th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and Fires Center of Excellence underwent

its tri-annual accreditation. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

looked at 11 of 17 Army Enterprise Area Standards (AESA). TRADOC’s Rating of

Record for the NCOA was 100 percent, awarding the Academy its second consecutive,

highest possible “Institution of Excellence” rating.

Noncommissioned Officer Education System

During 2013, the NCOES provided noncommissioned officers with progressive

and sequential leader and technical and tactical training relevant to the duties,

responsibilities, and missions that they would perform in operational units after

graduation. The training and education process began with an initial, branch-immaterial,

leadership development course that was followed by a basic branch-specific course, an

advanced branch-specific course, and a branch-immaterial senior course.42

Supporting lifelong learning, the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

oversaw the Structured Self Development Program (SSD). SSD linked the operational,

self-development, and institutional training domains. SSD participation was mandatory

for all Soldiers. Upon graduation from Advanced Individual Training (AIT), Soldiers

were automatically enrolled in SSD-I and had to complete four modules comprising 34

lessons that focused on team-level leadership to become eligible for the Warrior Leader

Course (WLC). Upon graduation from WLC, Soldiers were automatically enrolled in

SSD-II referred to as Advanced Leader Course-Common Core (ALC-CC) and had to

complete five modules comprising 28 lessons that focused on squad-level leadership and

had to complete ALC-CC to be eligible for selection to attend ALC. ALC graduates were

automatically enrolled in SSD-III and had to complete it to attend the Senior Leader

Course (SLC). SLC graduates were automatically enrolled in SSD-IV and had to

complete it to attend the Sergeants Major Course (SMC). Sergeants Major and

Command Sergeants Major were automatically enrolled in SMC and had to complete

SSD-V upon completing the SMC.43

Warrior Leader Course

The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) of 175 hours served as the first of four

courses in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). It helped

specialists, sergeants, and staff sergeants develop basic leadership skills, knowledge, and

behaviors required to become agile and adaptive leaders. WLC was a branch-immaterial

22-day course that provided basic training in leadership, training, and war fighting. WLC

also furnished Soldiers with the opportunity to acquire the leader skills, knowledge, and

experience necessary to lead team-level (three to five soldiers) units. The scope of tasks

and competencies that WLC addressed furnished both the team and squad-level

perspective, where appropriate, and built upon experience gained in previous training and

operational assignments. Each WLC student had to complete successfully a land

navigation course and was assessed on small unit leadership during a culminating

________________________ 42

Ibid. 43

Ibid., CSM Sam K. Young, “NCOES: Addressing Our Educational

Requirements,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, pp. 2-3, Doc II-46.

31

situational training exercise. WLC focused on establishing self-discipline and instilling

professional ethics and taught leading, disciplining, and developing Soldiers; planning,

executing, and evaluating individual and team training; planning and executing missions

and tasks assigned to team-size units; and caring for Soldiers and their families.44

Advanced Leader Course The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) of varying lengths depending upon the

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) served as the second of four courses in NCOES.

It developed promotable sergeants and staff sergeants to train and lead Soldiers at the

section and platoon levels. ALC curriculum had two essay papers – one essay on branch

history and one essay on cultural awareness. These essays filled the requirements for

military history research and developed a better understanding of culture and foreign

language. Further supporting the Army Culture and Foreign Language Program, ALC

included cultural discussions in the classroom using talking points from the Army 360

Cultural Training Program. ALC fully integrated resiliency training into each of the eight

Fires ALC courses to help Soldiers overcome adversity and furnished demanding,

realistic, and relevant leader and military occupational specialty specific training that

instilled section, squad, and platoon sergeant level leadership competencies so that

section and platoon sergeants could perform their missions. Increasing demands for

accurate targeting and use of tactical precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to

40 hours of precision fires training in the 13F30 Fire Support Sergeant Course. To ease

the strain on limited availability of open storage/open discussion classrooms, the

Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) funded remodeling one classroom into an

open discussion room, soon to be open storage classroom capable of accommodating up

to 40 students. Live fire exercises were the culminating requirement for 13B Cannon

Section Chief, 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data System Specialist, 13M Multiple Launch

Rocket System (MLRS) Section Chief, and 13P MLRS Operations/Fire Direction

Specialist courses. To fulfill live-fire requirements the NCOA possessed two M270A1s

(Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers), two M142A1s (High Mobility Artillery

Rocket System launchers), two M777 towed 155mm. howitzers, two M109A6 self-

propelled 155-mm. howitzers, and two M119A3 towed 105-mm. howitzers, and support

vehicles.45

Senior Leader Course

The Senior Leader Course (SLC) served as the third of four courses in NCOES. It

developed promotable staff sergeants and sergeants first class to serve as a senior

noncommissioned officer in a platoon or battery level leadership team. SLC curriculum

included two essay papers – one essay on battle analysis methodology and one essay on

cultural awareness. Increasing demands for accurate targeting and the use of tactical

precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to 120 hours of precision fires training in

the 13F40 Fire Support Senior Sergeant Course. Supporting various simulations

________________________ 44

Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14

Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13, Doc II-47. 45

Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14

Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13.

32

strategies, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy funded Command Posts of the Future

(CPOF) incorporating the Fires Integrated Application (FIA) and Call-for-Fire Trainer

(CFFT) to introduce rigor to the 13B and 13M Live Fire Exercises in ALC’s 13D, 13F,

13P, 13T and 13R courses. The CPOF would integrate the future Army Common

Operating Scenarios into its capability tactical capability.46

428TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE ACCREDITATION

From 22 October 2013 to 1 November 2013, the U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) evaluated the 428th Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) as a

part of its tri-annual accreditation process. TRADOC evaluated the 428th FAB on 15

Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards (AEAS). The unit met 14 of the 15 with an

“exceeded” or “met with comment” rating which earned the brigade a 97.3 percent on

overall compliance and the title of “institution of excellence.” During the accreditation,

the Field Artillery School identified three resourcing challenges that impacted the ability

of school organizations to implement Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015. First,

TRADOC and the School had to develop realistic and appropriate resourcing models for

instructors, cadre, training developers, and support personnel that would provide the

ability to implement ALM goals and objectives. Second, funding for facility upgrades

was required to ensure quality educational environments in key Field Artillery School

buildings (Burleson Hall, Jared Monti Hall, Snow Hall, and Summerall Hall). Third,

TRADOC had to support military personnel manning as close to 100 percent tables of

authorization levels as possible.47

The Field Artillery School and 428th FAB agreed that the accreditation process

and effort to include the internal self-assessment process was an extremely valuable

evaluation tool and proved very worthwhile which improved the efficiency of their

organizations and the effectiveness of their instruction. The Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE) and TRADOC accreditation efforts played key roles in assisting with the

implementation of the ALM 2015 across the FCoE.48

FUNCTIONAL COURSES

Master Gunner Course

During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted a Master Gunners Course that

was an additional skill identifier A7 producing course consisting of three modules that

were progressively sequenced and interdependent with each other. The course centered

________________________ 46

Email with atch, subj: NCOE and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14

Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13. 47

Email with atchs, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14, Doc

II-48; Memorandum for Dir, Quality Assurance Office, TRADOC, subj: USAFAS

Acceptance Memorandum after Review of FY 14 USAFAS Accreditation Evaluation

Report, 18 Dec 13, Doc II-49. 48

Email with atchs, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14.

33

on an overview of current and future field artillery weapon systems, training

management, artillery tables (TC 3-09.8), maintenance management, Army Battle

Command Systems training and assessing, and developing unit certification programs.

The course consisted of 80 hours/10 days of resident training and was taught to Military

Occupational Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical

Data), 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember), and 13P (Multiple Launch

Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist).49

Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance Course

This course was an additional skill identifier U6 producing course. It covered

shop safety, maintenance publications, the Army maintenance management system,

maintenance of firing components, fire control equipment, and subsystems of the

M119A2 and M777A1 howitzers. The course consisted of 120 hours/15 days of resident

and mobile training team instruction.50

Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course

The Field Artillery School conducted the Paladin Assignment Oriented Training

Course for second lieutenants who had assignments to mechanized units as a platoon

leader, a fire direction officer, and a fire support officer following graduation from the

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC B). The course provided students with a

familiarization of the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and the Bradley

Fire Support Team Vehicle. The course provided specialized technical and tactical

training required to maintain, operate, and deploy the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle

and the Paladin at section, platoon, and battery levels, to perform crew level maintenance,

and to supervise the maintenance and operation of the Automatic Fire Control System

and associated equipment with the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle. Funding cuts

forced the School to cancel the course in 2013 and to integrate the training into BOLC

B.51

Multiple Launch Rocket System Assignment Oriented Training Course

This course trained Field Artillery second lieutenants assigned to a Multiple

Launch Rocket System or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System unit after graduating

from the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC B). It taught the doctrine and tactics of

employing the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket

________________________ 49

Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb

13, Doc II-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Documents from Mtg with Chris

Atkinson, 10 Feb 14, Doc II-50. 50

Email with atch, subj: Functional Courses, 27 Jan 12, Doc II-65, 2011

USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19

Feb 13; Email, subj: Documents from Mtg with Chris Atkinson, 10 Feb 14. 51

Email, subj: Paladin AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11,

2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding

Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-51; Interview, Dastrup with

Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery

Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-52.

34

System. Instruction included missions and intents; delivery of fires; reconnaissance,

selection, and occupation of position; combat service support, safety; use of the safety

data calculator; operation orders; pre-combat checks and inspections; and digital

communications checks. Constrained funding forced the Field Artillery School to cancel

the course in 2013 and to integrate it into the BOLC B for second Lieutenants.52

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator Course

The course trained soldiers on the operation, employment, and maintenance of the

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and the vehicle’s various weapons systems. The course

also provided instruction on safety, tactics, and basic tasks. The Field Artillery School

conducted this course five times during Fiscal Year 2012 and cancelled it in 2013 when it

integrated the training into the Basic Officer Leader Course B for second lieutenants.53

ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted nine advanced individual

training (AIT) courses as a part of its initial military training mission to train soldiers to

be skill level one qualified in Field Artillery core competencies and to provide the

operational Army with combat ready Field Artillery Soldiers. The courses included

Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Fire Control

Systems Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System

[MLRS] Crewmember), 13P (MLRS Automated Tactical Data System Specialist), 13R

(Firefinder Radar Operator), and 13T (Field Artillery Meteorological/Survey

Crewmember). Courses varied in length from the five-week 13B course to the seven-

week 13P course. The School included hands-on and field training and battle drills to

give the graduates the capability of contributing to their new unit of assignment, while

the 13F AIT student received training on precision devices so that they could provide

accurate targeting.54

________________________ 52

Email, subj: MLRS and HIMARS AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-69, 2011 USAFAS

AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS AOT, 3 Feb 12, Doc II-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Interview,

Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commander, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan

14, Doc II-53; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery

Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-54. 53

ATRRS Course Catalog, Information for Course 250-ASID3, Bradley Fire

Support Vehicle Operator, 30 May 13, Doc II-11a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview,

Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery

Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-53. 54

428 FAB Information Paper, subj: AIT, 15 Jan 13, Doc II-24, 2012 USAFAS

AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-25,

2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12, Doc II-

26, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: AIT, 19 Dec 13, Doc II-; Briefing,

subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-56.

35

WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Warrant Officer Basic Course

During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted three 30-week Warrant Officer

Basic Course (WOBC) classes for 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers that trained the

best noncommissioned officers from Military Occupational Specialty 13 (Field Artillery)

and 11C (Indirect Fire Infantryman) and that focused at brigade and below operations but

discussed levels up to the joint task force headquarters. In three phases (common core,

target acquisition and targeting, and precision fires) and a military-decision-making-

process capstone exercise, WOBC training included survey techniques, targeting

methodology, target acquisition systems employment, and principles and application of

fire support to include 120 hours of precision targeting. Designed around a small-group

environment, the course allowed the students to interact during the learning process and

to be certified in target mensuration and collateral damage estimation. Changes to the

course supported Field Artillery fires modernization and the need for targeting warrant

officers to possess the ability to employ precision munitions.55

Warrant Officer Advance Course

During 2013, three 12-week Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) classes

prepared 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers with the advanced concepts of Army and

joint doctrine, familiarized them with the duties of a senior staff officer at division, corps,

echelons above corps, made them proficient with the Army targeting process, and

included a module on precision fires for target mensuration, collateral damage estimation,

and weaponeering, among other things, so that the graduates would know how to request

and employ precision guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface ballistic munitions

during combat. Beginning in October 2013, the Field Artillery School required all

WOAC graduates to be certified in collateral damage estimate and target mensuration

only because of the growth of precision capabilities in the Field Artillery and the

modernization of Field Artillery fires.56

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Basic Officer Leader Courses

________________________ 55

Information Paper, subj: FA WOBC, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-57; Speaker Notes for

Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 29 Apr 13, Doc II-58; “Focused WO Accessions

Strategy,” Redleg Update, 5-13 May 13, pp. 2-3, Doc II-59; Email with atch, subj: FA

Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct 13, Doc II-60; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC

Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-61; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5,

Doc II-62. 56

Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb

13, Doc II-29, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27

Apr 12, Doc II-30, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct

13, Doc II-60; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13,

Doc II-61; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5, Doc II-62.

36

In 2013 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC A) and BOLC B formed a two-tier

training process for newly commissioned second lieutenants. BOLC A involved pre-

commissioning training at the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training

Corps (ROTC) in American colleges and universities, the Officer Candidate School

(OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Army National Guard Officer Candidate Schools.

BOLC A was the fundamental building block for all officers within the Army Officer

Education System. Following graduation from BOLC A, newly commissioned second

lieutenants attended BOLC B to train them in a particular branch.57

Basic Officer Leader Course B

Through the BOLC B program of instruction, the Field Artillery School produced

Field Artillery second lieutenants who were trained in warrior tasks and warrior battle

drills. They were also competent, confident, and adaptable officers who were grounded

in the military occupational specialties, were able to conduct full-spectrum operations,

were capable of contributing immediately to their new units of assignment, and were able

to execute lethal and non-lethal fires.58

During Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the School conducted eight BOLC B classes of 18

weeks and 4 days each. Presented in three blocks of instruction (platoon leader, fire

support, and gunnery) plus common core, BOLC B developed and refined basic skills

needed by second lieutenants with training focused on towed-artillery systems (M777A2

and M119A3) to qualify them as a field artillery platoon leader, a company fire support

officer, and a fire direction officer and included three weeks of common core tasks, such

as basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, small unit operations, leading a tactical

convoy, and resiliency training, among others. Resiliency training centered on

preventing suicide, thriving in adversity, and other topics, while training on precision

devices prepared Field Artillery second lieutenants to furnish accurate targeting for

precision munitions at their first unit of assignment. The four-day Red Leg War served

as the capstone training event and gave second lieutenants the opportunity to serve on a

gun line and in a fire direction center as well as a fire support officer and platoon leader.59

Because of lessons learned from Afghanistan and the requirement for more joint

fires observer qualified officers who were trained to request, control, and adjust surface

fires, such as artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire; to provide close air support

information to a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) or Forward Airborne

________________________ 57

ATRRS Course Catalog, Fiscal Year 2013, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-63; Information

Paper, subj: FA BOLC B, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-63a. 58

Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS History, 19 Feb 13, Doc

II-29, 2012 USAFAS AH. 59

Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup

with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-33, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Army

Training Requirements and Resources System Course Catalog, Fiscal Year 2013, 6 Jan

14, II-63; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th

Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery

Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-65.

37

Controller (FAC); and to talk directly to the pilot if authorized by the JTAC, the

Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal,

introduced an initiative in mid-2011 to add Joint Fires Observer (JFO) familiarization

training in the school. This included developing an online JFO course of 20 hours for all

second lieutenants and integrating an overview of JFO training to BOLC B during fire

support training. Later, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan added a JFO assignment-

oriented training course following graduation from BOLC B for second lieutenants

assigned to brigade combat teams. Assignment-orient training began in January 2012

with BOLC B class 7-11. Constrained by limited resources, only a total of 48 second

lieutenants received JFO assignment-oriented training in 2012 and 2013.60

Influenced by the value of the JFO as a combat multiplier and the need to bolster

fire support capabilities for joint and maneuver commanders, the Field Artillery School

wanted to ensure that all second lieutenants graduating from BOLC B were certified

JFOs. To this end, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley subsequent to his arrival in

June 2013 to serve as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School took steps to

integrate JFO certification training into the BOLC B curriculum by July 2014 so that

every BOLC B graduate beginning with BOLC B class 6-14 would be JFO qualified.

When the JFO assignment-oriented training ended with BOLC B class 5-14, certified

JFO training in BOLC B would be the sole means of producing JFOs and would greatly

increase their number in the Field Artillery force.61

________________________ 60

Email, subj: Joint Fires Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer Team, 2 Mar

12, Doc II-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc-

78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Course POI Review, 2011, Doc II-

83, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC/JFO Integration, 2011, Doc II-84, 2011

USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-46, 2012 USAFAS

AH; Sharon McBride, “Joint Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ Training,” Fires

Bulletin, Nov-Oct 11, pp. 20-23, Doc II-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC

Brief to CG, 21 Apr 11, Doc II-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11,

Doc II-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Gary Hisle, Dir, Joint and

Combined Integration Directorate, 12 Jan 12, Doc II-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; MAJ Elijah

M. Ward, CPT Fred A. Janoe, CAPT Thomas F. Hicks, and CAPT Richard W. Heaser,

“Modern Men of Mars: The Evolution of Junior Fire Supporters,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-

Feb 12, pp. 36-41, Doc II-60, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB

Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-32, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Fort Sill

Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 Oct 13,

Doc II-66; JACI Opord, 1 Oct 12, Doc II-67; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery

Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-

30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68. 61

BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun

12, pp. 14-16, Doc II-69; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle,

14 Nov 13, Doc II-70; “Fort Sill Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,”

Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 Oct 13; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13,

Doc II-71; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc II-72; Email with atch,

38

In keeping with the need to make BOLC B learner-centric and in compliance with

the Army Learning Model 2015 and the desire to mentor young second lieutenants, the

School meanwhile started planning and conducting a resource analysis in mid-2013 to

adopt small group instruction (SGI) of 12-16 students per class in the near future. Even

though the resource impact of small group instruction had not been completed, the School

implemented it in one-hour mentorship sessions held twice a week that received solid

reviews from students and instructors alike. Large group instruction of approximately 60

students per class still dominated the curriculum at the end of 2013.62

For several years, the Field Artillery School conducted assignment-oriented

follow-on courses – the Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course and the Multiple

Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System for second lieutenants

that had graduated from BOLC B. The Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course

familiarized second lieutenants assigned to mechanized units as a platoon leader, a fire

direction officer, and a fire support officer. The course provided the officer with

specialized technical and tactical knowledge required to maintain, operate, and deploy the

Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle and the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled howitzer at

section, platoon, and battery levels; to perform crew level maintenance; and to supervise

the maintenance and operation of the Automatic Fire Control System and associated

equipment with the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle. In 2013 funding cuts forced the

School to cancel the course and to integrate the training into BOLC B, but the course was

retained in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System.63

Concurrently, the Multiple Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery

Rocket System Assignment Oriented Course trained second lieutenants assigned to those

systems after graduating from the BOLC B. The course taught the doctrine and tactics of

____________________

subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc II-73; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt

SITREP, 19 Dec 13, Doc II-74; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Redesign COA Decision

Brief to FA Cmdt, 29 Oct 13, Doc II-75; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp.

1, 3-5, Doc II-76; Interview, Dastrup with Dooley, 24 Jan 14; Interview, Dastrup with

Atkinson, 31 Jan 14. 62

Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 22

Feb 14, Doc II-77; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-77a;

Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 12 Sep 13, Doc II-77b; Email with atch, subj:

FA Cmdt SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-77c; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26

Sep 13, Doc II-77d; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5; Briefing,

subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13; Interview, Dastrup with

Dooley, 24 Jan 14; Interview, Dastrup with Atkinson, 31 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FA

BOLC B Redesign COA Decision Brief to FA Cmdt, 29 Oct 13. 63

Email, subj: Paladin AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11,

2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding

Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Interview, Dastrup with

Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery

Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68.

39

employing the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket

System. Instruction included missions and intents; delivery of fires; reconnaissance,

selection, and occupation of position; combat service support; safety; use of the safety

data calculator; operation orders; pre-combat checks and inspections; and digital

communications checks. Influenced by funding reductions, the School stopped teaching

the course in 2013 and integrated the training into BOLC B; but the course remained in

the Army Training Requirements and Resource System.64

Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS)

conducted six two-phased Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) classes

conducted in a small group format of 12-16 students. During the 24-week course, small

group leaders (SGL) from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, or an allied officer

from Australia or Canada conducted all instruction. Captains and senior first lieutenants

went through a rigorous FACCC that afforded them the last branch-specific training in

their career and staff training. The officers received U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) common core instruction and tactical and staff instruction,

including training on the military decision making process from the maneuver battalion

perspective. FACCC instruction also provided situational-based practical exercises on

field artillery core competencies and other learning methodologies to develop agile and

adaptive leaders for the full-spectrum battlefield who were technically proficient to serve

as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion

fire direction officer, and a battalion/brigade/brigade combat team staff officer. FACCC

also trained students to coordinate lethal and non-lethal fires and effects at the battalion

level with an emphasis on lethal effects and included employing precision munitions and

fire support coordinator tasks and responsibilities.65

Tasked by Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 initiated in TRADOC Pamphlet

525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, dated 20 January 2011, the School

of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT) at the U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, meanwhile, developed the Mid-Grade Learning

Continuum (MLC) for the Captain’s Career Course in 2011 to meet the requirements of

an expeditionary force. MLC 2015 revolved around a tailored, student-centered, life-long

learning continuum that established a system of resident and self-development

opportunities, designated a common core of skills, and outlined establishing a culture of

life-long learning among officers. As a critical part of MLC 2015, the Captain’s Career

________________________ 64

Email, subj: MLRS and HIMARS AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-69, 2011 USAFAS

AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS AOT, 3 Feb 12, Doc II-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Interview,

Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding General, 428th Field Artillery

Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th

Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68. 65

Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 22

Feb 14, Doc II-77; Information Paper, subj: FACCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-78; Information

Paper, subj: FACCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-79.

40

Course (CCC) had a common core curriculum of eight weeks that was designed by

SALT and was a multi-branch, small group seminar format designed to facilitate peer-to-

peer learning and to foster critical thinking and competencies required for

company/battery command and battalion or brigade staff positions. The common core

also had a multi-branch battalion-level with brigade-level staff exercise of five to seven

days that required students to collaborate, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate their

activities to accomplish the mission.66

Between 6 November 2012 and 25 January 2013, the U.S. Army Fires Center of

Excellence conducted a multi-branch common core seminar pilot with Field Artillery and

Air Defense Artillery CCC officers.67

While the existing common core portion of the

career course focused on getting the students to a knowledge comprehension level of

learning, the pilot centered on learning information and then applying it in scenarios and

emphasized developing critical thinking skills rather than rote memorization. Based upon

the successful pilot, the Field Artillery School implemented the new common core

instruction in 2013 for CCC using Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery officers as

small group instructors and established the goal of adding Infantry and Armor officers as

small group instructors in the near future for new common core. However, the multi-

branch common core staff exercise, although piloted in 2013, required more work before

implementation.68

Pre-Command Course

In 2013 the Field Artillery School conducted a two-week Pre-Command Course

for Army colonels, lieutenant colonels, promotable majors, and command sergeant

majors. In two blocks of instruction (technical competency and leadership competency)

the course prepared officers for battalion and higher command responsibilities.69

Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component

During the first decade of the 21st Century, the Field Artillery Captain’s Career

________________________ 66

Trip Report, subj: Multi-Branch CCC STAFFEX Initial Planning Conference,

23-25 Oct 12, Doc II-80; Briefing, subj: CCC Multi-Branch STAFFEX Way Ahead, 30

Oct 12, Doc II-81; Briefing, subj: SALT, 26 Mar 13, Doc II-82; COL William A.

Raymond, LTC (Ret) Keith R. Beurskens, and LTC (Ret) Steven M. Carmichael, “The

Criticality of Captains’ Education: Now and in the Future,” Military Review, Nov-Dec

10, pp. 51-57, Doc II-83; “Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, 1-

13 Jan 13, p. 6, Doc II-84; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade Overview, 13

Sep 13, Doc II-85. 67

“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13. 68

“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13; Briefing,

subj: CCC Multi-Branch STAFFEX Way Ahead, 30 Oct 12; Interview, Dastrup with

Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14,

Doc II-86; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery

Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-86a. 69

Information Paper, subj: USAFAS PCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-87; Briefing, subj:

428th Field Artillery Brigade, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-88; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB

Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14, Doc II-89.

41

Course for the Reserve Component (FACCC-RC) went through significant changes.

Prior to 2001, it consisted of a series of Army Correspondence Course Program sub-

courses followed by a two-week resident phase. The Field Artillery School offered the

resident phase approximately three times a year, usually in the summer months, and

conducted it in the standard platform instruction format of two weeks of PowerPoint

presentations and a final examination. In 2001 the School adopted an internet-based

distance learning format for the non-resident phase of FACCC-RC. Twelve computer-

based learning modules replaced the existing correspondence program texts. At the same

time the two-week resident phase was converted to the small group instruction format.

While there had been many updates to the resident portion of the course over the past

eight years, the original computer modules for phase one were still used in 2008.70

Meanwhile, the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) expressed concern that the Officer Education System for captains, including

Reserve Component captains, did not meet the demands of an Army at war and that

Active and Reserve Components’ training had be standardized so that both received the

same training. This prompted the Commanding General of TRADOC to publish

Operations Order 04-176A in May 2004 that called for the Reserve Component to

redesign, develop, pilot, and implement a non-resident version of the Captain’s Career

Course no later than 1 October 2006. This order required an FACCC-RC of two, two-

week active duty training periods of 120 hours each with two inactive duty training

periods between the active duty training periods.71

Upon obtaining the necessary resourcing, the Deputy Assistant Commandant for

the Army National Guard at the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery School

redesigned FACCC-RC in 2008 based upon the 2004 directions and implemented it in

2009. Since 2009 two options for training Reserve Component captains existed. The

captain could attend the resident Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course. In most cases,

reserve captains could not take off six months from their civilian employment to attend

the course, while states also lacked funds to send them to the resident course. This

basically left the second option of taking the four-phase FACCC-RC.72

________________________ 70

Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24

Oct 08, Doc II-66, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 71

Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24

Oct 08; Annex A to Operations Order 04-176A, Doc II-67, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 72

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 45-46; Memorandum for Record, subj: Field

Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component, 5 Mar 10, Doc II-68, 2009 U.S.

Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); COL Robert W. Roshell

and LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” Fires

Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 30-34, Doc II-69, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for

Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Course Redesign Initiative: Field

Artillery Captain-Level Critical Task List, 3 Apr 07, Doc II-70, 2009 USAFAS AH; CPT

Bronson M. Sapp, Battery Executive Officer, FACCC, “The Reserve Component

Captain’s Career Course,” unpublished paper, undated, Doc II-71, 2009 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: FACCC-RC Input to 2010 Annual History, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-56,

42

In 2013 FACCC-RC consisted of four phases for Field Artillery officers in the

U.S. Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserves who were unable to attend the

resident course. The Field Artillery School built the FACCC-RC around the 13-month

model. Once the student started the course, the individual should complete it in 13

months. Phase one (online, self-paced with instructor access) was asynchronous.

Students had five or more months to finish the online modules. Completion was a

prerequisite for moving into phase two. Phase two was a two-week resident session at

Fort Sill that served as a prerequisite to taking phase three. Phase three then followed.

This asynchronous phase was Field Artillery specific. Successful completion of this five

or more month online phase permitted students to move into phase four that was the

second two-week session at Fort Sill.73

Command and General Staff Course: Support of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide

Area Security

In 2013 the Field Artillery School conducted two Fires in Support of Combined

Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security (CAM/WAS) preparation courses at the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) for Field Artillery majors attending

USACGSC. This five-day course prepared fire support officers to be the subject matter

expert (SME) in their staff sections by reviewing the basics of fire support for

CAM/WAS environment and ensured that the officers were prepared for the school, no

matter what positions that they had served in prior to attending. Senior Field Artillery

mentors provided information on recent trends, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and

precision fires; furnished updates and overviews on doctrine; and gave the students the

opportunity to complete a fire support practical exercise. This course was seminar-based

in 2013 with groups of 13 to 15 officers per instructor.74

JOINT AND COMBINED INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE

During 2013, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) continued to

deliver and develop its two-fold role of providing the joint and combined focus for the

Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and individual training. In the former role it routinely

interacted with the Joint Staff, Component Commands, Formation Headquarters,

Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

____________________

2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Captains Career Course, 15

Jan 14, Doc II-90. 73

Information Paper, subj: FACCC-RC, 2013, Doc II-37, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Captains Career Course, 15 Jan 14. 74

Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 30 Jan 14, Doc II-91; Trip Report,

subj: Combined Army Maneuver/Wide Area Security, 21-26 Jul 13, Doc II-92; Trip

Report, subj: Summary Report, 22-25 Jul 13, Doc II-93; Briefing, subj: ILE Fires ISO

CAM/WAS, 14-18 Jan 13, Doc II-94; Trip Report, subj: Combined Arms

Maneuver/Wide Area Support, 21-24 Jan 14, Doc II-95; Email, subj: CGSC Fires

Seminar and ILE, 10 Feb 14, Doc II-96; Email with atch, subj: ILE Input to 2013

USAFAS Annual History, 24 Feb 14, Doc II-97.

43

Command (TRADOC). JACI remained the staff proponent for the Battlefield

Coordination Detachments (BCDs). In the latter role it continued to deliver Joint Fires

Observer (JFO), electronic warfare (EW) and Targeting/Precision Fires individual

training courses, but rising costs caused the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course

(JOFEC) to be discontinued in 2013. Additionally, the responsibility for the Foreign

Liaison Officers was transferred to the Air Defense and Field Artillery Schools.75

Joint Integration Division

The Joint Integration Division represented JACI, FCoE, and the Army at working

groups and forums that collaborated with other services, combat commands (COCOMs),

and partner nations. The division was the Army’s representative to the Joint Fires

Support and Joint Close Air Support Action Officer Working Groups and supported the

JACI Director as the O-6 representative and the Commanding General of FCoE as the

Army Principal to the Joint Fires Executive Steering Committee.

In 2013 the Executive Steering Committee began work to verify and modify as

required the Joint Terminal Attack Controller qualification and certification requirements,

completed a Digitally Aided Close Air Support Tactics Techniques and Procedures paper,

and completed the compilation of airspace and fires coordination measures table and

coordination table matrix of definitions and planning considerations.

The division was the lead for the Army for the introduction and development of

the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC), a staff organization that arranged

current staff from the Division Fires Cell and the Air Force Air Support Operations

Center (ASOC) to more rapidly clear airspace for fires. The Joint Integration Division

also coordinated the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) and Ground Liaison

Detachment issues for the Field Artillery commandant.

During the year, the Joint Integration Division in conjunction with the Air

Combat Command (ACC) continued preparing each Active Component (AC) Army

division for the alignment of one Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The 1st

Calvary Division and the 1st Infantry Division completed their alignment in Fiscal Year

(FY) 2013 with the 9th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) and 10th ASOS

respectively. The 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard also

completed a Warfighter Exercise in June 2013 with support from the 168th ASOS (Army

National Guard) and executed the first divisional JAGIC concept in support of a Mission

Command Training Program (MCTP) warfighter exercise.76

Precision Fires Program

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, the Army acknowledged that it lacked

the ability to mensurate coordinates for the employment of coordinate seeking munitions.

At the time the Army relied upon the Air Force to derive mensurated coordinates.

Generally, it took up to 24 hours from the time that the target information reached the Air

Force until it came back to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turn around-

time, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division developed a process in

________________________ 75

Email with atch, JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-

98. 76

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14.

44

2005-2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rainstorm, a National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency validated tool. This reduced turnaround time to minutes. In the meantime,

Special Operations Forces employed Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Force’s

(PSS-SOF) tool for mensuration. This tool was not validated by the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency until 2009. The 1st Cavalry Division was the first Army unit to

apply the mensuration process in combat without the assistance of outside agencies.77

Precision fires represented a critical requirement in the operating environment of

the 21st Century. With the strategic risk associated with unnecessary or unwarranted

injury and death of non-combatants, precision fires had to be employed effectively. The

accurate employment of ballistic and precision munitions would reduce the risk of

collateral damage, making coordinate mensuration critical.78

However, a capability gap existed. The Army lacked institutional training for

target coordinate mensuration (TCM), weaponeering (the process of determining the

quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapon required to achieve a specific

level of damage to a given target), and collateral damage estimation (CDE). Such

training would reduce target location error for conventional munitions and would be

required for the employment of organic coordinate seeking munitions. With this in mind,

the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate in the U.S. Army Fires Center of

Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill assumed the lead for developing a precision fires program

that would encompass training for TCM, weaponeering, and CDE in 2008.79

After creating a working group in June 2009 that developed a mission essential

task list, among other things, and developing a concept plan and a capability needs

statement over the next several months, the JACI implemented a precision fires program

in September 2010. This program trained fire supporters to conduct TCM,

weaponeering, and CDE through three venues. The first venue provided the training in

primary military education courses for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F fire

support specialists, MOS 131A targeting warrant officers, and 13A fire support officers

to enable operational units to employ indirect fires accurately and effectively while

achieving first-round target effects and mitigating collateral damage. The second venue,

a functional course, trained MOS 13F forward observers and MOS 131A warrant officers

who had not received this training in their primary military education, while mobile

training teams, the third venue, furnished unit training in 2010-2011.80

________________________ 77

Interview, Dastrup with CW3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010

USAFAS Annual History (AH); Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to

2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11, Doc II-64, 2010 USAFAS AH. 78

Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s most versatile and lethal

weapon system, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” undated, Doc II-73,

2011 USAFAS AH. 79

Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS

AH; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010

USAFAS AH. 80

Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Course 2010, Doc II-74, 2011

USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s Most Versatile and

45

The Targeting Division in JACI meanwhile received formal recognition of its

expertise in targeting. First, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accredited the

Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification Program. Second, the Joint Targeting

School accredited the Collateral Damage Estimation Program. With these two

accreditations in place, the Army had the ability to certify its Soldiers to use Army and

joint precision weapons and to conduct CDE.81

The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) subsequently recognized the need to

expand further its efforts in CDE, Target Mensuration Only (TMO), and Weaponeering

and to mainstream precision fires into Professional Military Education (PME). Late in

2011, MG David D. Halverson, FCoE CG, decided to add precision fires to several PME

courses. As a result, the FCoE introduced precision fires courses in the Warrant Officer

Instruction Branch (WOIB) and the Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA). The

WOIB added TMO and Weaponeering to the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) and

TMO to the Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC). Both courses provided CDE

instruction. Meantime, the NCOA integrated TMO into the MOS 13F Advance Leader

Course (ALC) and MOS 13F Senior Leader Course (SLC) and added Weaponeering and

CDE to MOS 13F Senior Leader Course. For Soldiers who did not have the opportunity

to receive precision fires training or certification through their professional military

education, resident and mobile training teams (MTT) trained them.82

In 2013 Precision Fires Resident and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) continued to

bridge the gap for soldiers who did not have the opportunity to receive training or

certification through their PME. Precision Fires Course (PFC) instructors conducted 66

resident and 72 MTT courses and supported 29 NCOA classes for a total of 177 weeks of

precision fires instruction in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Korea. Overall, the

PFC instructors trained/certified over 1,900 in TMO, trained over 700 in Weaponeering,

and certified over 900 soldiers in CDE.83

As the requests for precision fires training continued to grow, the JACI Targeting

Division developed a course of action to increase the number of trained personnel while

____________________

Lethal Weapon System, The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 2011; Briefing,

subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information

Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview,

Dastrup with Taccia, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Courses, 10

Feb 12, Doc II-75, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Precision Fires Courses Input to

2011 Annual History, 28 Feb 12, Doc II-76, 2011 USAFAS AH; CW4 Thomas Taccia,

“The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” Infantry Bulletin, Jun-Aug 11, pp. 9-11,

Doc III-98a; Briefing (Extract), subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2 Jul 12, Doc III-

98b. 81

Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-40, 2012 USAFAS AH. 82

Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; Personal account: CW5 Robert

Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE, Feb, 13, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History,

7 Mar 13. 83

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-99; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Courses, 28 Oct 13, Doc III-99a.

46

still maintaining the ability to support resident training and MTT. After a series of

meetings, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, Field Artillery School Commandant,

decided to give TMO and weaponeering instruction responsibility to WOIB and NCOA.

This would allow precision fires course instructors to maintain the instruction for the

resident and MTT courses.84

JACI Precision Fires course instructors trained and certified

instructors in WOIB and NCOA, allowing them to certify students in TMO and to train

students in weaponeering. Additionally, the Targeting Division sought assistance from

the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office to market the Unit Precision Fires Program

where certain soldiers would have the opportunity to become certified TMO instructors.

This initiative provided operational units with the ability to certify soldiers in TMO while

also providing a certified analyst with a means for maintaining currency. Several units,

including the National Training Center, were developing unit precision fires programs in

2012.85

On 1 February 2013 the 101st Air Assault Division developed the first Unit

Precision Fires Program with the capability to create analysts outside of JACI Precision

Fires courses. This capability allowed the unit and the Army to save training dollars

because it did not require MTTs to train TMO analysts. With the success of the 101st Air

Assault Division’s program, 1st Armored Division, 10th Mountain Division, 82nd

Airborne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry Division followed suit by

establishing their own certified analysts to ensure that the capability to grow and sustain

TMO analysts was maintained.86

With the increase in demand to train Army personnel in these disciplines and the

need to have the capability to track as well as place the correct soldiers in the right

positions, JACI meanwhile identified the requirement to create Additional Skill

Identifiers (ASIs) for TMO and CDE. In August 2013 JACI briefed the Commandant of

the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, about the

requirement. With his approval the Precision Fires team started working with the

Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) and the Field Artillery Proponency Office

(FAPO) to ensure ASI approval by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.87

During 2013, JACI continued providing this certified training through three

venues. The first was Professional Military Education for MOS 13F ALC and MOS 13 F

SLC, MOS 131A WOBC, and MOS 131A WOAC. The second was resident functional

courses that were open to all MOS 13Fs and MOS 131As who had not received the

training in their professional military education courses. The third was MTT for Army

Force Generation support, unit-level training program development, and combatant

command training activities when requested. All three venues led to certification in

________________________ 84

Ibid. 85

Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; “TMO: Maintaining

Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” RedLeg Update, Dec 12, Doc II-42,

2012 USAFAS AH. 86

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-100. 87

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14.

47

TMO, CDE or both.88

Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering

Courses

In an environment where collateral damage might have operational or strategic

implications, the Army required fires delivery with pinpoint accuracy. The development

of precision munitions allowed commanders at all levels to achieve the desired effects on

a target with the minimal number of munitions and minimal collateral damage. As the

precision requirement grew, the necessity for Soldiers with the skills to employ precision

munitions also grew.89

In 2013 the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) served as functional

manager for the Target Mensuration Only (TMO) course and Collateral Damage

Estimation (CDE) and Weaponeering course. Fort Sill conducted resident and mobile

training TMO courses to train and certify personnel assigned to fire support and targeting

cells to conduct target mensuration through a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

accredited training certification program. Those attending the course included staff

personnel who provided support to the targeting process as well as personnel who

delivered coordinate seeking munitions, such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System munition and the Excalibur 155-mm. munition. The program consisted of target

coordinate mensuration certification and program accreditation using Digital Precision

Strike Suite, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces, and Precision Fires Image

software.90

In resident and mobile training team formats, the CDE and Weaponeering Course

trained and certified personnel assigned to fire support and targeting cells to conduct

collateral damage estimation and to support the effective employment of joint and

organic fire support assets.91

Joint Fires Observer Course

Prompted by the 4th Infantry Division’s inability to access joint fires because of

the shortage of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and Army modularization that

exacerbated the shortage, the Air Force and Army created the Joint Fires Observer (JFO).

Although the Air Force planned to increase the number of JTACs in sufficient numbers to

have one at the maneuver company by 2012 by training more at Nellis Air Force Base

(AFB), the Army envisioned using the JFO at the maneuver platoon level as the eyes of

the JTAC. Recognizing that the JFO course conducted by the 57th Operations Group at

Nellis AFB could not produce sufficient numbers of JFOs to satisfy its requirements, the

________________________ 88

COL John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr

13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-101. 89

Fact Sheet, subj: TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision

Munitions, 30 May 13, Doc II-43, 2012 USAFAS AH. 90

Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Target Mensuration Only Course, 30

May 13, Doc II-44, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TMO: Maintaining

Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions, 12 Feb 14, Doc II-102. 91

Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Collateral Damage Estimation Course,

30 May 13, Doc II-45, 2012 USAFAS AH.

48

Army decided to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, Fort Sill

developed a JFO course. Following a successful pilot course conducted by the Joint and

Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resources

from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, the Army and Air

Force signed a memorandum of agreement on 14 November 2005 to support the Fort Sill

course. Thus, two JFO schools existed – one at Nellis AFB and one at Fort Sill – in

2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis AFB stopped its JFO course. This prompted Fort

Sill to increase its capacity to train JFOs employing resident and mobile training and to

become the sole source of JFO training.92

In 2013 instructors from the Army, Air Force Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training

Squadron (CTS) from Nellis AFB, Army and Air Force guest instructors, and contract

instructors from FSCX company who were former JTACS and Military Occupational

Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) taught JFO resident and mobile training

team courses. The courses provided training to integrate joint fires for JFOs who were

key members of the joint fire support team, were the eyes of the JTAC, and resided at the

brigade combat team level.93

Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course The Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) was designed and

delivered in a fiscally unconstrained environment and proved to be a successful and

popular course. In 2013, however, significant financial constraint imposed through

________________________ 92

FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 19, Doc II-67, 2010

USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Governor’s Report 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-68, 2010

USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-69, 2010

USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with LtCol Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Cdr,

138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-70, 2010 USAFAS AH; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; Information Paper, subj: JFO Course Information, 1 Dec 05,

Doc II-100, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFOs, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-101, 2005

USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of

Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations,

and the United States Special Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group

for Joint Fires Observer, 14 Nov 05, Doc II-102, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum

for Deputy Director of Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space

Operations, 13 Oct 05, Doc II-103, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFO

Information, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-103a, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: Number of

JTACs required, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-104, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Cdr,

TRADOC, subj: Commander’s Statement - FY06 TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated,

Doc II-105, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JFO and 138th Flight Input

to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc II-71, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch,

Dastrup with LTC Michael A. Todd, JACI, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-77, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc II-78, 2011 USAFAS AH. 93

COL John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr

13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-103; “The JFO – New JOF MOA Sustainment Guidance,” Redleg

Update, Nov 13, pp. 3-4, Doc II-104.

49

sequestration led to a detailed review of expenditures across all training programs. This

clearly showed that Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) could no longer resource

expensive JOFEC training to the same level that had been possible in 2012. Because

constrained costs meant cutting some training and because the Field Artillery

Commandant ranked JOFEC below the Joint Fires Observer course and precision fires

courses, the FCoE cancelled the course. The last iteration of JOFEC was delivered at Fort

Sill in June 2013.94

Joint Fires Observer Team The Joint Fires Observer Team found 2013 to be another productive and exciting

year. During the year, instructors from the Army, Air National Guard, Detachment 1, 6th

Combat Training Squadron (CTS), JTAC guest instructors, and contract instructors from

FSCX taught 13 Joint Fires Observer (JFO) resident and 15 Basic Officer Leader Course

(BOLC) assignment-oriented (AOT) courses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and 20 JFO mobile

training team (MTT) courses at select Forces Command (FORSCOM) installations.

These courses produced 957 certified JFOs and greatly enhanced the brigade combat

teams’ ability to train with and interoperate with Division Air Support Operations Center

(ASOSs) and their Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). Of note were two MTTs

that trained in locations where training had not been conducted prior to 2013. A MTT

provided JFO training for 2nd Infantry Division in Korea; and a MTT trained JFOs at the

National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin.95

Throughout 2013, the JFO team represented the FCoE and JACI in other

significant ways. Members of the JFO team provided assistance for two Joint Fire

Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS-ECS) support accreditation team visits to the

U.S. Marine Corps JFO School at Fort Sill, and the Expeditionary Warfare Training

Group-Atlantic (EWTGLANT) at the U.S. Marine Corps JFO School. In both instances,

the team reviewed lesson plans, courseware, testing and reference materials, practical

exercises, and simulation devices and recommended the Joint Staff to accredit both

courses. The JFO team also participated in numerous joint fires training exercises that

helped hone their JFO and joint fires skills. These training events took place at Smokey

Hill Bombing Range in Salina, Kansas; Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Gila Bend

Bombing Range, Arizona; and Navy Special Operations, Virginia. During all joint fires

training exercises, JFO and JTAC skill sets were being performed as well as joint tactics,

techniques and procedures. The exercises also built joint partnerships. The JFO team

provided JFO briefs and demonstrations to senior representatives from FCoE, Hungary,

Saudi Arabia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom.96

________________________ 94

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-105; Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Cancellation Background Info, 17 Mar 14,

Doc II-106. 95

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-107; Email with atch, subj: JAC History 2013, 27 Feb 14, Doc II-108. 96

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14;

Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee, subj:

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic Joint fires Observer Course Biennial

50

The JFO noncommissioned officer in charge additionally participated in the Joint

Close Air Support (JCAS) Symposium in May 2013 in which the revision began for the

JFO Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and briefed the Army’s JFO course curriculum

as a best practice for other JFO programs to emulate.

In 2013 the JFO team made numerous improvements to its curriculum that

incorporated Army Learning Model 2015 principles. These improvements included more

simulation rehearsal time, additional small-group instruction, and a field training

exercise. The JFO team also initiated the integration of JFO certification within the Field

Artillery BOLC B Program of Instruction (POI) as directed by the Field Artillery School

Commandant, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, who wanted to train and certify

all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps BOLC B graduates as JFOs and to provide the

operational force and fleet with required JFO officer allocations. Ultimately, this

initiative upon would increase the annual JFO production from an average of 1,100 to an

average of 1,500 (enlisted and officer) and would meet General Bentley’s objective of

certifying every second lieutenant as a JFO before graduating from the Field Artillery

BOLC B course. The training was scheduled to begin with Field Artillery BOLC B class

6-14 (July 2014).97

Another initiative that would carry over from 2013 into 2014 involved working

with the Maneuver Center of Excellence to integrate JFO familiarization classes into the

Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leader Course POIs. This concept would begin in

March 2014 with JFO familiarization classes being taught at the Infantry school and later

at the Armor school.98

As JFO team transitioned from 2013 to 2014, it had the goal of continuing to

conduct world-class training in the JFO course, while simultaneously assisting with

multiple FCoE-directed initiatives that would in the long-run benefit the entire Army in

its knowledge and access to Joint Fires.99

NON-LETHAL TRAINING

Electronic Warfare Courses

Early in the 21st Century, the Army renewed its interest in electronic warfare as a

part of information-age warfare. On 30 October 2003 the Department of Defense

____________________

Accreditation Review, 4 Mar 13, Doc II-109; Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Fire

Support Executive Steering Committee, subj: Marine Corps Artillery Detachment Joint

Fires Observer Course Initial Accreditation Review, 11 Feb 13, Doc II-110. 97

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14;

Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Redesign, 8 Oct 13, Doc II-111. 98

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14;

Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26 Sep 13, Doc II-; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 10

Oct 13, Doc II-113; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct 13, Doc II-114; Email, subj:

FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc II-115. 99

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-107.

51

concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the

application and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational

awareness, to disrupt command and control, and to develop targeting solutions to defeat

weapons while protecting the United States’ electronic capabilities from being

successfully attacked. Initially, the Army’s Military Intelligence branch oversaw

electronic warfare as part of its intelligence collection activities. However, improvised

electronic devices (IED) employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to attack U.S

ground forces prompted the Army to shift electronic warfare from Military Intelligence to

the Field Artillery and to stress its operational capability to jam radio signals that

detonated the IED rather than its collection responsibilities.100

This transfer soon generated action. On 15 May 2004 the Commanding General

of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated the

Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

as the specified proponent for electronic warfare in the Army and tasked CAC to identify

requirements. Later on 23 November 2004, the CAC commander, Lieutenant General

William S. Wallace, directed the Commander of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center

and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

(USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, to take the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack for

brigade, division, and corps and for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. Working with CAC, USAFACFS

developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army, to

establish roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare functions, to update electronic

warfare DOTMLPF, and to design, develop, and execute a course of instruction for

electronic warfare that eventually led to development of the Army Operational Electronic

Warfare Course in 2007.101

Subsequently in May 2006, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W.

Chiarelli, strengthened the Army’s operational electronic warfare capabilities. That

month he directed the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core

warfighting competency within the Army and specifically tasked the G-3 to develop an

electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts to strengthen the Army’s

strategic vision and support the ground force component commander. This would

________________________ 100

Email with atch, subj: FA Vision and Transformation, 4 Apr 06, Doc III-12,

2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command

History (ACH); Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05,

Doc III-13, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One, Doc III-14, 2005

USAFACFS ACH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-

77, 2010 USAFAS AH. 101

Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc II-64,

2006 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic

Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with

LTC James J. Looney, EW-JACI, 19 Jan 12, Doc II-85, 2011 USAFAS AH.

52

enhance the Army’s ability to counter electronic threats proactively, to permit integrating

kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities across the Army, and to mitigate the threat of

electromagnetic spectrum being employed by America’s enemies, such as IEDs that had

been so deadly in the War of Terrorism.102

To meet the immediate requirement for Army electronic warfare personnel and

guidance by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and

School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires Center of Excellence developed two

electronic warfare courses under the direction of CAC. The Intelligence School

developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Practioneers Course that awarded an additional

skill identifier (ASI) 1K and that focused on countering radio-controlled improvised

explosive devices. Meanwhile, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill

conducted a pilot Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (AOEWC) in October

2006 and January 2007 to train electronic warfare officers to plan, integrate, synchronize,

and execute electronic warfare according to the commander’s scheme of maneuver. This

six-week course awarded an ASI 1J and served as a foundation course for electronic

warfare.103

AOEWC also served as a bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force

structure could be stood up and until Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 29 could be

established. In August 2008 CAC directed the FCoE to develop an electronic warfare

officer functional course, an electronic warfare warrant officer integrator course, and an

electronic warfare enlisted personnel integrator course. This would permit the Army to

field its own electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air Force and

________________________ 102

Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II-78, 2010

USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7

Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute

Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J.

Looney, EW-DOTD, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH; “New Career Field:

Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09, Doc II-81, 2010 USAFAS AH;

Shirley Dismuke, “Electronic Warfare: The Newest Military Career Field Choice,” Fires

Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 64-66, Doc II-86, 2011 USAFAS AH. 103

Email, subj: EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area for

Officers, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-67, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Briefing, subj: Army Electronic

Warfare, 4 Jan 07, Doc II-68, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Interview, Dastrup with Alvin W.

Peterson, Jr., Northrup Grumman, EW Course Developer, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-66, 2006

USAFACFS ACH; Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II-

78, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc

II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News

Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electronic

Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-117, 2009 U.S. Army Fires Center of

Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill EW Courses,

2011, Doc II-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to 2011

Annual History, 1 Mar 12, Doc II-88, 2011 USAFAS AH.

53

Navy.104

On 1 March 2009 the MOSs for Noncommissioned Officers and Warrant

Officers were approved awarding MOS 29E (Electronic Warfare Specialist) to graduates

of the Electronic Warfare Specialist Course and MOS 290A (Electronic Warfare

Targeting Technician) to graduates of the Electronic Warfare Targeting Technician Basic

Course (Warrant Officer). Later, FCoE added Functional Area 29 for officers.105

In 2013 the U.S. Army Electronic Warfare School taught two electronic warfare

courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, two courses

to satisfy MOS 290A for warrant officers, five courses to satisfy MOS 29E for enlisted

soldiers, and five courses to satisfy AOEWC requirements. The U.S. Army Electronic

Warfare School also developed and validated two Advanced Professional Military

Education (PME) Courses for Enlisted and Warrant Officer EW personnel. The

Electronic Warfare School conducted two 29E Pilot Senior Leader Courses (SLC) and

two 290A Pilot Warrant Officer Advanced Courses that resulted in the validation of both

PME courses.106

Special Technical Operations Course Based on lessons learned from past and current operations, the Army

acknowledged a need for an enduring capability for Special Technical Operations (STO)

training to train Army personnel how to use special access programs (SAP) that

controlled access to the most sensitive Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities,

information, technologies, and operations so that combatant commanders could use SAP

in their planning processes and mission execution. The Army developed the U.S. Army

Special Technical Operations Course (USASTOPC) in 2005 to fill a critical training gap.

Since its inception in 2006, the USASTOPC continued to see increased attendance. The

Army assessed that the force required additional information to fully leverage STO

capabilities.107

________________________ 104

Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH;

CAC OPORD 08-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 Aug 08, Doc

II-82, 2010 USAFAS AH. 105

MILPER Message 09-088, Title: FY10 Warrant Officer Military Occupational

Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions, 22 Apr 09, Doc

II-50, 2012 USAFAS AH; MILPER Message 09-089, Title: FY 10 Enlisted Military

Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions,

22 Apr 09, Doc II-51, 2012 USAFAS AH. 106

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14,

Doc II-107; Information Paper, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, 7

Jan 14, Doc II-116; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Officers Course, 7 Jan

14, Doc II-117; Information Paper, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare

Specialist course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-118; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare

Technical Warrant Officer Basic Course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-119; COL John T. Smith,

“Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-120;

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107. 107

Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7

Mar 13, Doc II-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Special Technical Operations, 24

54

On 27 July 2010 the Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) to institutionalize STO in order to establish it as an enduring

capability within the Army. In turn, TRADOC directed the Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE) at Fort Sill to provide the facilities and training oversight. The Army further

stipulated that a STO facility would be established at the FCoE. FCoE submitted a

concept plan that received Army approval in April 2012. The concept plan received

Army validation for four Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) requirements for the

FCoE. Key to this effort was effective leader development, TRADOC’s number one

priority. TRADOC would further develop key aspects of training, education, and

experience by establishing a more integrated and functioning STO presence at key

institutions.108

Given that the Joint and Combined Directorate (JACI) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,

trained Army, Joint, and Coalition commanders and staff on the coordination, integration

and synchronization of lethal and non-lethal fires and effects, it was only natural for

TRADOC to charge JACI with the STO mission. The Army provided funding to the

FCoE to build a STO facility in which the resident STO planner’s course would be

conducted.109

In 2013 JACI was authorized to form a Special Activities Division with a STO

facility accredited to conduct operations at the top secret level. A Lieutenant Colonel

from the FA40 (Space Operations Officer) community was appointed in August 2013;

and the program gained traction and has since made significant progress. Authorization

was received to hire three civilian contractors; and work on the facility neared

completion. The Special Activities Division now had its first “certified” instructor and

certifier. On assuming responsibility for training, JACI worked with the Asymmetric

Warfare Group that had the instructor pool to deliver courses. Five mobile training teams

provided the opportunity for 52 personnel to complete the US Army Special Technical

Operations Course in 2013.110

____________________

Mar 14, Doc II-121; DoD Directive (Extract), Number 5205.07, 1 Jul 10, Doc II-122. 108

Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7

Mar 13; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, subj:

Special Technical Operations Concept Plan, 26 Apr 12, Doc II-56, 2012 USAFAS AH.

Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-40, 2012 USAFAS AH. 109

Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 110

Email with atch, subj: JACI Input to USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc

II-107.

CHAPTER THREE

COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS:

FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the 2013, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked in cooperation

with the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Capabilities Development and Integration

Directorate to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to

meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint

forces team. This involved participating in force design and doctrine updates,

introducing new fire support systems, testing new concepts, and modernizing Field

Artillery equipment.

FORCE DESIGN AND DOCTRINE

Field Artillery Modernization Strategy: Field Artillery Force of 2020

Early in 2013, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field

Artillery, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, introduced the Field Artillery

Modernization Strategy. After briefly discussing the continuing need to assess

capabilities of potential adversaries, General Mckiernan explained that the Field Artillery

Modernization Strategy was part of the Fires Force Modernization Strategy and provided

a roadmap to deliver required operational capabilities for the Army of 2020. The strategy

revolved around improving target acquisition capabilities, modernizing delivery systems,

fielding precision munitions, and enhancing mission command.1

Addressing target acquisition systems, General McKiernan noted the movement

from eight different aging and high maintenance 90-degree sensor systems to two, 360-

degree systems with state-of-the-art electronics as being critical. In the near future the

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) mounted AN/TPQ-50

Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR) and the truck-mounted AN/TPQ-53 Quick

Reaction Capability Radar would become the Field Artillery’s primary target acquisition

radars. The AN/TPQ-53 would reduce operational and support costs, would provide 90-

to 360-degree capability to detect and classify targets, would track incoming mortar,

artillery, and rocket projectiles, and would have a minimum range of 500 meters and a

maximum range of 60 kilometers. In comparison, the Q-50 that was scheduled for

fielding in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 would be a short-range radar and complement the Q-53

that was scheduled for fielding in FY 2014. Other targeting devices included the Laser

Designator Rangefinder-Handheld (LLDR-2H) that was fielded in 2013 and the Joint

Effects Targeting System (JETS) under development. Until the JETS could be fielded in

2016, the Field Artillery would employ the Quick Reaction Capability hand-held

precision targeting device that would give the dismounted forward observer the ability to

________________________ 1BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires

Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-1.

56

acquire targets accurately.2

Enhancing delivery systems and munitions played an important role in moving to

the Army of 2020. The Paladin Integrated Management would address obsolescence and

sustainment issues of the current M109A6 Paladin and the M992A2 Field Artillery

Ammunition Supply Vehicle (FAASV), while digitized the M119A3 105-mm. towed

howitzer would leverage software from the M777A2 155-mm. towed howitzer to

maximize commonality in operations and training and to minimize cost. In the

meantime, precision munitions, such as the Excalibur and the Precision Guidance Kit,

and area fire munitions remained a critical aspect of modernization. The M1130 105-

mm. high explosive (HE) pre-formed fragmentation projectile was fielded during

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and provided greater lethality than the M1

HE, M760 HE, M913 HE, and M927 HE projectiles. The M483 Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional Munitions re-use program utilized de-militarized Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional Munitions (DPICM) projectile bodies and other parts for use in the M1122

training projectile, XM1123 extended-range infrared illumination projectile, and

XM1124 extended-range visible illumination projectile.3

For the past 20 years, the Field Artillery employed the Advanced Field Artillery

Tactical Data System (AFATDS) as its primary mission command system. With the

Army’s shift to all mission command software into a single common operating

environment, the Fires Center of Excellence initiated action to converge all fire support

system software/applications into the AFATDS Increment II software system.

Eventually, the Effects Management Tool (EMT), Joint Automated Deep Operations

Coordination System (JADOCS), Forward Observer System (FOS), Pocket-size Forward

Entry Device (PFED), Precision Fires Manager (PFM), Profiler, and CENTAUR would

be migrated to AFATDS Increment II. By FY 2018 the Field Artillery School and Fires

Center of Excellence planned to have AFATDS Increment II fielded. This action would

streamline training, ease training requirements, and save resources. The Joint Air Ground

Integration Cell (JAGIC), meanwhile, would enhance ground and air integration of

airspace at the division.4

Grade Plate Review

During the first decade of the 21st Century, combat and force structure

adjustments to support combat operations and the disapportionate growth in the number

of majors driven in part by modularity and the excessive promotion rates to major

encouraged the Army to conduct a grade plate review. To this end the Army directed

each career military field (CMF) to review and nominate positions to be reduced in grade

and provided the Field Artillery with a significant target to achieve. These targets

included most senior grade positions for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members

of the branch. For officers, grade plate reductions meant reducing colonel positions to

lieutenant colonel positions, lieutenant colonel positions to major positions, and major

positions to captain positions. For enlisted personnel, this involved reducing master

________________________ 2Ibid.

3Ibid.

4Ibid.

57

sergeant positions to sergeant first class positions and sergeant first class positions to staff

sergeant positions.5

In 2012-2013 the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID)

Force Design team at Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School’s Field Artillery

Proponency Office (FAPO) identified field grade officers (O4-O6), senior chief warrant

officers (W3-W4), and senior noncommissioned officers (E6-E9) positions within

Standard Requirements Code (SRC) 06 (Field Artillery Organizations) that could be

rolled down (reduced to a lower position) to enable the Army to achieve a viable,

sustainable, and acceptable grade plate pyramid while maintaining operational force

capabilities within an acceptable level of risk.6

Army 2020 Redesign

Late in 2011, the Army initiated Army 2020 Redesign and directed the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to design Army 2020 with the capabilities

required to support the Joint Force and to posture the Army to succeed in an era of

constrained resources. The design effort reduced Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from 73

to 60 and added a third maneuver battalion to the Armored BCT and the Infantry BCT.

This prompted changes to the Field Artillery force structure by creating a 3x6 composite

fires battalion for the Infantry BCT (two M119A3 batteries and one M777A2 battery), a

third field artillery battalion for the Armored BCT, a firing platoon fire direction cell to

support distributed operations for two-gun pairs in Infantry BCT, and an executive officer

position at the firing battery in all BCTs. The changes also added one 13D40 Field

Artillery Tactical Data fires control noncommissioned officer and one 13D10 Field

Artillery Tactical Data fires control specialist to the battery fire direction cell, a fifth crew

member for all BCT Q-53 Radars, a Chief Warrant Officer Three as a targeting warrant

officer to the Stryker BCT fires cell (eliminated during 2008 BCT holistic review), and a

Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) capability in the all BCT reconnaissance

________________________ 5Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13,

Doc III-1, 2012 USAFAS AH; “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate

Review,” www.army.mil, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-2, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires

Command Force Design Update, History GPR, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-2; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-17

Aug 13, Doc III-3. 6Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13,

Doc III-1, 2012 USAFAS AH; “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate

Review,” www.army.mil, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-2, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires

Command Force Design Update, History GPR, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-17 Aug 13;

Riccio, “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate Review;” Email, subj: Grade

Plate Review, 2 Apr 14, Doc III-5.

58

squadrons. Also, the Infantry BCT reconnaissance squadron platoon forward observer

would be equipped with M1200 COLT equipment package. The platoon forward

observer could be re-missioned to perform COLT functions when required. In addition,

the dual mission company Fire Support Team (FIST) in Heavy BCT and Stryker BCT

could perform COLT functions when required.7

The redesign also standardized BCTs target acquisition platoons with two Q-53

radar systems and four Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (Q-50) sections, reorganized

BCTs fire support personnel into the fires battalion, and retained the current Air Defense

Airspace Management (ADAM) cell capability in all formations.8

As a part of the Army 2020 effort, a new Sustainment Concept of Support was

developed to address known capability gaps based on Army 2020 initiatives to better

support the BCT, maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), fires brigade (FiB), and other

functional/multi-functional units operating in the Division Area of Operation and not

simply focusing on a resourcing solution. As a result, the Fires Brigade’s Brigade

Support Battalion was reduced from 248 to 136 positions thereby placing a greater

reliance on habitually aligned Division Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) to

provide support to the Fires Brigade and Echelons above Brigade (EAB) battalions. All

Army 2020 decisions were approved and would be implemented in Total Army Analysis

(TAA) 15-19. Unit conversions would begin in 2014 and would be completed by 2016.9

Fires Command: DIVARTY and Corps Field Artillery Brigade

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Army introduced the modular brigade

combat team (BCT) and functional brigade concept to provide the capability to deliver

responsive fires to maneuver commanders by placing fires battalions within the BCT and

furnishing fires brigades to support BCTs, divisions, corps, or joint task forces. This

eliminated senior Field Artillery command headquarters at the division and corps levels

for the integration of fires and training and readiness oversight and left the force with an

inadequate number of force Field Artillery headquarters to support divisions and corps.

Specifically, six (going to seven) active component Fires Brigades supported 14 divisions

and corps headquarters as well as the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. The modular

organization assumed that BCTs could provide sufficient training, readiness, and

administrative oversight to their organic fires battalions and that a small number of fires

brigades could function as a Force Field Artillery headquarters for divisions, corps, or

joint task forces. Operational experience demonstrated the assumptions to be invalid.10

________________________ 7Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13,

Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH. 8Ibid.

9Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13;

Email with atch, subj: Grade Plate Review, Army 2020 Design, and Army Doctrine, 1

Apr 14, Doc III-6. 10

LTC Sean Bateman and MAJ Steven Hady, “King of Battle Once Again: An

Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate Fires in Support of Tactical, Operational

and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 23-25, Doc III-7; Shirley Dismuke,

“The 2013 State of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 14-15, Doc III-8; Email with

59

As the Army projected returning to combined arms operations and executing

regionally aligned force missions, the modular design created several capability gaps.

The echelon above brigade mission command Field Artillery force structure and

organizational design did not sufficiently meet the combatant commander requirements

as part of the Joint Force; and it lacked the ability to integrate and synchronize fires

effectively at the division and the corps in support of unified land operations. The

organization also lacked the ability to provide training and readiness oversight of Fires

battalions in the brigade combat teams and could not provide consistent fire support

certifications and leader development. Soon after becoming the Commanding General of

the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Major General James M. McDonald, submitted a

force design update in December 2012 to the Army to re-establish Field Artillery

command headquarters in echelons above brigade at division and corps levels.11

The proposal established a division artillery (DIVARTY) without organic firing

units for each active component division. The DIVARTY would be assigned to each

active component division, would be stationed with the division, and would coordinate,

integrate, and synchronize fires to achieve the division commander’s objectives, while

the DIVARTY commander would serve as the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) for

the division. Moreover, the DIVARTY could be tailored with a variety of fires battalions

(rocket and cannon), unmanned aerial systems, and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar

(CRAM)/indirect fire protection capability units, could integrate and deliver fires, and

would furnish mission command for training management and certification of BCT fires

battalions and fires cell.12

Also, the proposal provided for a Field Artillery brigade to be assigned to each

active component corps and one with the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. While the Field

Artillery brigade would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires, would provide long-

range precision fires to the corps, and would give the corps/U.S. Eighth Army

commander a headquarters that would plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support

of operations, and would provide the capability for counterstrike throughout the corps

area of operations, the Field Artillery brigade commander would serve as the FSCOORD

for the corps. In addition, the corps Field Artillery brigade would train and certify its

____________________

atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14, Doc III-9; Email with atch, subj: Dr.

Dastrup History, 28 Mar 14, Doc III-10; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14,

Doc III-11. 11

Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of

Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email

with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr.

Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14; Interview, Dastrup with James McClary, Concepts

Development Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, 18 Mar 14,

Doc III-12. 12

Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of

Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email

with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr.

Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14.

60

subordinate Field Artillery battalions and allocate them to the division as required to

provide reinforcing fires.13

In October 2013 the Army approved the echelon above brigade force design

update. It created 10 DIVARTYS that would be assigned to the 10 active component

divisions and retained four active component fires brigades that would be assigned to

each corps and the Eighth Army. Later, the Army authorized redesignating fires

battalions in the BCT and echelons above BCTs as field artillery battalions. To

standardize naming convention within Field Artillery units, General McDonald also

changed the Fires Brigade to the Field Artillery Brigade.14

FCoE’s force design update modified the existing Field Artillery brigade in the

Army National Guard with the same organizational design as the Active Component.

The existing Army National Guard Field Artillery brigades would provide flexibility to

the Total Army and would perform the same functions as the active component Field

Artillery brigades. However, they would be aligned with Army National Guard divisions

for training affiliation, would be capable of serving as a DIVARTY to support Army

National Guard divisions during deployment, or would provide reinforcing and

counterfire capability to active component corps and joint task forces.15

Army Doctrine

On 23 August 2011 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Robert W. Cone, issued Doctrine 2015

guidance. Once completed, Doctrine 2015 would give the Army well-defined enduring

principles, tactics, and standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all

doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new categories. Even though

resources would be constrained, General Cone added, TRADOC had to produce quality

doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded, “In summary, we need to make the

development and implementation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the

initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war our Army has fought. We

have too many hard earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across

our force to ensure the next fight we find our Army in we can win upon arrival.”16

In his guidance General Cone established key priorities. First, he wanted Army

Doctrine Publications (ADP)/Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) to be

completed by August 2012. Second, he directed field manuals to be finished by

________________________ 13

Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Email with atch,

subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14. 14

Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Memorandum for CG, TRADOC,

subj: Renaming all Fires Battalions and Fires Brigades, 3 Jan 14, Doc III-13; Email with

atchs, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-13a; Army Staffing Form, 19 Sep 13, Doc III-

14; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14, Doc III-15. 15

Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Email with atch, subj: Another

DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14. 16

Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11,

Doc III-6, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-7,

2011 USAFAS AH.

61

December 2013. Third, he wanted technique publications to be written by December

2015. To accomplish these goals, service schools, such as the Field Artillery School,

could increase their manning levels commensurate with the workload and fill the

positions with the best qualified personnel who would be competitive for battalion

command and beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter expertise,

and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.17

Besides increasing the number of people required to write the publications, the

Field Artillery School started writing its ADP, ADRP, Field Manuals, and Army

Techniques Publications during 2011. On 6 January 2012 the School submitted the initial

draft of ADP 3-09 that explained the fundamental principles of fire support and the initial

draft of ADRP 3-09 that provided detailed information on fire support fundamentals to

the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and meanwhile initiated work on Field

Manual (FM) 3-09, Field Artillery Operations that would focus on fire support tactics and

procedures.18

In August 2012 the Army published and distributed ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09,

both written by a team from Forces Command (FORCSOM), the Air Defense, and the

Field Artillery. A Department of Army publication, an ADP contained the fundamental

principles that guided military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces

could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. ADP 3-09 incorporated air and missile

defense and electronic attack in the Army fires warfighting function, included fires from

other services, and provided fires doctrine that would enable the development of

interoperable, networked, and integrated systems that were capable of executing multiple

missions throughout unified action. ADRP 3-09, meanwhile, served as a doctrinal

manual for commanders, leaders, and staffs of the fires warfighting function and

furnished a detailed explanation of all doctrinal principles in support of offensive and

defensive tasks.19

Subsequently late in 2013, a writing team distributed drafts of FM 3-09, Field

Artillery Operations, and FM 3-01, Air and Missile Defense, for staffing and eventual

publication. With an intended audience of maneuver commanders and their staffs, this

revised version of the 2011 FM 3-09, released in December 2013, consisted of four

________________________ 17

Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11;

Interview, Dastrup with Bo Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, 15 Feb 12, Doc

III-8, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 18

Interview, Dastrup with Bielinski, 15 Feb 12; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery

Doctrine Update, 20 Jan 12, Doc III-9, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine

2015, 7 Mar 12. 19

“Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, Aug 12, p. 2, Doc III-4, 2012 USAFAS

AH; Briefing, subj: Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing, undated, Doc II-5, 2012

USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin,

May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc III-6, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Revised FM 3-09 is in the

Works,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-7, 2012 USAFAS AH; ADRP 3-09

(Extract), Fires, Aug 12, Preface, Doc III-16; ADP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, Introduction,

Doc III-17.

62

chapters that covered Field Artillery operations, fire support, fire support and the

operations process, and fire support coordination and other control measures. Essentially,

the 2013 FM 3-09 gave the maneuver arms a single field manual on how the Field

Artillery supported the maneuver missions during unified land operations.20

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies

Late in 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

directed the Sustainment Center of Excellence at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Centers of

Excellence to conduct an analysis to support the Department of the Army’s development

of a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy and implementation plan. As the lead, the

Sustainment Center of Excellence/Combined Arms Support Center set out to examine the

operational impact and risk of reducing the brigade’s objective table of organization and

equipment (TOE) tactical wheeled vehicles by 10, 20, and 40 percent respectively within

each phase of the Army Force Regeneration cycle. Essentially, the study, later called

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) Study I, aimed to determine if the Army had too many

trucks, to develop approaches to optimize the number of tactical wheeled vehicles across

the Army, and to analyze the risk of reducing tactical wheeled vehicles.21

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study I examined the operational impact and risk of

reducing the number of brigade tactical wheeled vehicles. Started in 2008 and

completed in 2009, the study reduced the size of the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle

fleet in the eight brigade types (infantry brigade combat team, heavy brigade combat

team, Stryker brigade combat team, battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat

aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and sustainment brigade) and replaced

smaller capacity vehicles with larger capacity vehicles.22

Prompted by budget considerations to reduce the number of wheeled vehicles

even more, the Army initiated the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies II and III. Study II

looked at echelons above brigade for more reductions. Influenced by budget

considerations, the Army launched Tactical Wheeled Study III to refine the number of

tactical wheeled vehicles further. At a conference on 9-10 September 2010, the Study III

team reviewed several courses of action and selected its objective course of action. It

________________________ 20

“Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works;” Sharon McBride, “FM 3-09 Field Artillery

Operations and the Fire Support is the ‘Go To’ Document for Maneuver and Fires

Commanders,” Redleg Update, Nov 13, p. 6, Doc III-18; BG Christopher F. Bentley,

“2013 Year in Review,” Redleg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1-5, Doc III-19. 21

2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), p. 65; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5

Apr 11, Doc III-8, 2010 USAFAS, AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical

Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12, Doc III-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. 22

Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3rd Quarter 2009, p. 7, Doc III-23,

2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 5 Apr 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter

(Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 11, Doc III-9, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical

Wheeled Vehicle Reduction Study III, 15 Sep 10, Doc III-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE

CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 12, Doc III-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11, Doc III-12, 2010 USAFAS AH.

63

could (1) reduce Army Force Generation tactical wheeled vehicle equipping, (2) create

two-level TOEs across all phases of Army Force Generation with units in the available

phase having their full TOE requirements, (3) further reduce TOE requirements and keep

constant tactical wheeled vehicle fill levels through all phases of Army Force Generation,

(4) create installation-based pooling where units in the available phase could fill their

TOE requirements from pooled assets, or (5) make further reductions to TOE

requirements. Of the five courses of action, the team selected options two, three, and five

for further analysis. Even before the options could be evaluated, funding constraints

required an additional cut in the number of tactical wheeled vehicles. This led to

reducing the number of vehicles in the tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) Army

in 2011 as a part of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study III. Together, the three studies

of 2008-2011 reduced the tactical wheeled fleet by 20,000 vehicles.23

Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) asked what does a 170,000-

vehicle Army look like, prompting the Army to take more aggressive action to reduce its

tactical wheeled vehicle fleet even more. Although Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study IV

that was developed to examine further tactical wheeled vehicle reductions to meet the

170,000 goal and the Army 2020 Study that was designed to scrutinize future force

structure had been initiated as separate studies, the Army merged them in 2011 because it

could not discuss the number of tactical wheeled vehicles required without knowing the

future force structure that would be created by Army 2020.24

Early 2012, the Army therefore directed TRADOC to identify the impact and risk

of reducing the TWV fleet from 233,000 to 170,000 vehicles as part of the TWV Study

IV. Led by Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the Army’s initial plan

reduced TWV fleet in three parts. First, the plan had to identify minimum quantity and

vehicle types for offensive and defensive operations, assessment and re-baseline. This

would become the new requirement. Second, it had to identify vehicles for pooling and

divestment, while retaining the minimum essential equipment required for training.

Third, it had to identify vehicles (mainly MRAPs) required to augment units for stability

operations. These reductions were based on the Army 2020 TWV strategy that the Army

did not use 100 percent of its vehicles, 100 percent of the time. ARCIC asked the Centers

of Excellence (CoE) to begin by assessing the impact of a target 20 percent reduction to

each Standard Requirement Code (SRC). Upon completion of the 20 percent reduction,

analysis planners realized that TWV reductions created a significant impact and

________________________ 23

FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 28, Doc III-13, 2010

USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 28 Feb 12, Doc III-21, 2011

USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy

Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011,

13 Mar 12, Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle

Reductions and Pooling Recommendations, undated, Doc III-8, 2012 USAFAS AH. 24

Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 28 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj:

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011, 13 Mar 12; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled

Vehicles Reduction and Pooling Recommendations, undated.

64

unacceptable risk to combined arms maneuver (CAM). All CoE recommended reductions

had to be based on acceptable levels of risk. The acceptable levels of risk across

proponents turned out to be an average reduction of eight percent. Field Artillery and Air

Defense Artillery averaged between 8-10 percent across all formations for a loss of over

600 vehicles in their formations.25

To identify the effect that these reductions would have on mobility and the unit’s

ability to perform it mission, the Army directed the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle

Requirements Management Office (TWVRMO) and Combined Arms Support Command

(CASCOM) to conduct a mobility study utilizing the proponents’ recommended TWV

reductions to analyze the unit’s ability to transport personnel and equipment in one lift.

This analysis provided the SRC with the actual mobility rating and identified the residual

amount of personnel and equipment which could not be transported in one lift. The SRCs

that exceeded their doctrine mobility requirement would be required to take additional

reductions.26

In February 2013 the Chief of Staff of the Army approved all TWV IV 13,363

reductions for documentation and directed TWV Study V to identify additional

reductions. Basically, the Chief of Staff voiced concern that the TWV Study IV

reduction was not enough and did not view the availability of TWVs as more crucial than

keeping BCT force structure intact. TWV V identified three lines of effort (LOE). Line

of effort one centered on further TWV requirement reductions. Line of effort two called

for substituting non-tactical vehicles for tactical wheeled vehicles, and line of effort three

revolved around vehicle pooling at regional or installation level. ARCIC did not support

line of effort three because HQ DA G-8 was pursuing a similar effort. Of the three lines

of effort, only line of effort one – TWV requirement reductions – was completely

analyzed and studied.27

In support of the TWV Study V effort the Army officially tasked TRADOC

Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Lee, Virginia, in August 2013 with support from the

Centers of Excellence to conduct modeling of a division taskforce using SRC with

reduced TWVs as a risk and operational assessment, leading to five courses of action in

line of one effort. TRAC selected three for further analysis. Course of action one

________________________ 25

Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13,

Doc III-9, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star

In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13, Doc III-10, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj:

TWV Study V, Jan 14, Doc III-20. 26

Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13;

Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan

13; Email with atchs, subj: Addition TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14, Doc III-20a. 27

Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13;

Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan

13; Briefing (Extract), subj: TWV Study V, Jan 14; Email with atchs, subj: Additional

TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14, Doc III-21; Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and

M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2

Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13; Briefing (Extract), subj: TWV Study V, Jan 14.

65

(some/balanced mobility) balanced mobility reduction in requirements that would reduce

excess mobility within those SRCs having a mobility rating that exceeded at least 10

percent of their documented mobility requirement. Course of action three (more)

represented a proponent identified level of reduction in TWV requirements (without the

use of non-tactical vehicle substitution) and an acceptable level of reductions in TWV.

Course of action five (most) represented at least a 20 percent reduction from the course of

action one and did not make use of non-tactical vehicle substitution. Upon the

completion of the risk and operational assessment, ARCIC selected course of action one

and sent it to the Chief of Staff of the Army for a decision.28

In February 2014 the Chief of Staff of the Army reluctantly approved course of

action one with additional 575 reductions for documentation, but he was not pleased with

the overall reduction effort. The Commanding General of TRADOC emphasized that a

great amount of work and risk analysis had been done from the SRC view/bottom-up

approach, but it was now necessary to look at it from a strategic view using the Army

2025 study. The CSA agreed with the recommendation.29

M777 and M119 Composite Battalion and Precision Fires

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commissioned a

Precision Effects Analysis (PEA) to determine a solution to mitigate the Infantry Brigade

Combat Team’s (IBCT) capability gap in indirect fire precision effects. As of 2010-

2011, the IBCT employed the M119A2 towed 105-mm. howitzer that did not have digital

capabilities. The PEA determined that fielding the digitized M777A2 155-mm. towed

howitzer system as an organic weapon system to the IBCT was a viable solution to give it

precision capabilities. A subsequent PEA, known as PEA II, examined what the force

structure and proper mix of cannons for the IBCT should look like, such as a composite

battalion of M119A2s and M777A2s. This led to a TRADOC decision in 2011 to

organize a composite battalion of one or two batteries of M119A2s and a battery

M777A2s to give the IBCT precision capabilities, greater flexibility, mobility, range, and

lethality. As of the end of 2011, the Army Capabilities Integration Directorate (ARCIC)

had approved the composite battalion, and the Field Artillery awaited the Army’s

decision on its force structure. In 2012 the Army settled on two M119A2 batteries and

one M777A2 battery in the battalion because this mix was less expensive than two

M777A2 batteries and one M119A2 battery. One year later in 2013, the composite

battalion was a mix of the two digitized M119A3 towed 105-mm. howitzer batteries and

one digitized M777A2 battery. The Army had not yet decided on the exact mix because

of ongoing budget constraints. It could be two M119A3 batteries and one M777A2

battery for a three maneuver battalion IBCT or one M119A3 battery and one M777A2

battery for a two maneuver battalion IBCT. In 2013 the Army chose the two M119A3

batteries and one M777A2 battery composite battalion force structure and started fielding

the battalion to the three-battalion IBCT.30

________________________ 28

Email with atchs, subj: Additional TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14. 29

Ibid. 30

Interview with atch, Dastrup with Veach, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS

AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and

66

Precision Munitions, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction Capability, and

Handheld Devices

In recent years the Field Artillery experienced a revolution in precision. Through

most of its history, the Field Artillery was a weapon of mass destruction and area fire,

especially beginning in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s and continuing through

Operation Desert Storm of 1991. It relied upon massed fires to destroy and neutralize

enemy formations. This started changing in the 1970s with the fielding of the

Copperhead 155-mm. projectile in the Army. A precision munition that used a laser

designator to guide it to the target, Copperhead introduced the American Field Artillery

to precision. Over the next couple of decades, the Army adopted other precision

munitions – the cannon-launched Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munitions (SADARM) that

employed infrared seekers to locate the target, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System (GMLRS) Unitary, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Unitary, and

the Excalibur Unitary, a 155-mm. cannon projectile. Guided to the target using

sophisticated inertial navigation systems and/or global positioning system (GPS)

capabilities, GMLRS Unitary, ATACMS Unitary, and Excalibur Unitary offered

unparalleled precision, minimized collateral damage, and were therefore especially

valuable for employment in complex, built-up, urban terrain. For precision munitions to

be successful, however, the Field Artillery had to locate the targets precisely by using a

common reference point and datum to locate precisely a point on the earth in three

dimensions – latitude, longitude, and altitude.31

For precision munitions to be effective, the Field Artillery therefore required

precise target location – one of the five requirements (accurate delivery system location,

____________________

Technology), subj: M777A2 Authorized Acquisition Objective Increase, 25 May 10,

Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Army Acquisition Objective

Increase, 22 Dec 10, Doc III-23, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PEA, 25 Feb 11, Doc

III-24, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16

Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 Annual History; Email, subj: M777, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-45,

2011 USAFAS AH; COL Gene Meredith and COL Richard M. Cabrey, “Meeting the

Fire Support Challenge,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 20-23, Doc III-46, 2011

USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Thomas L. Hills, CDID, 2 Apr 12, Doc III-47,

2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: IBCT PEA Portion of the 2011 Annual

History, 3 Apr 12, Doc III-48, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Tactical

Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires Command Force

Design Update, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field

Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-22; Briefing, subj: Fires Battalion

Composite 3x6 IBCT Fielding Schedule, 22 Jan 14, Doc III-23; Speaker Notes for Field

Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-24. 31

Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Anthony Daskevich, Dir, TCM RAMS,

23 Feb 10, Doc III-28, 2009 USAFAS AH; Message to Observer, Jul 2009, Doc III-29,

2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, 21 Mar 10, Doc III-30,

2009 USAFAS AH.

67

timely and accurate meteorological data, accurate computational procedures, accurate

weapon and ammunition information, and accurate target location and size) for accurate,

predicted fires. As the Global War on Terror demonstrated, the Field Artillery delivered

responsive, effective fires with GMLRS Unitary employing deliberate targeting methods,

while the Air Force employed Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) effectively for

deliberate targeting. Essentially, deliberate targeting involved attacking targets that were

detected, identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions in a tasking

cycle. In contrast, dynamic targeting at the Army battalion and below proved to be

challenging because it concerned attacking time-sensitive, fleeting targets that required a

quick response. Often, forward observers could not provide the precise location of the

targets; and this minimized the effectiveness of Excalibur Unitary that was employed

frequently in deliberate and dynamic targeting missions. Some dismounted forward

observers even preferred maps, binoculars, and compasses as opposed to automated

targeting systems; and this further restricted obtaining a precise location.32

The Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) introduced in 2010-2011

further highlighted the need for precise target location as would the Precision Guidance

Kit (PGK) for field artillery rounds upon being fielded in the near future. As a

representative from the Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, explained, APMI was a GPS-

guided mortar with a 10 meter circular error probable that gave the infantry commander

precision-strike capabilities. APMI provided first-round, fire-for-effect capability and

could be employed in restricted urban areas where collateral damage was a consideration.

It also reduced the logistical burden of ammunition resupply. Until the introduction of

this mortar, the infantry commander relied upon mortar volleys against an area target

because the mortar was inherently inaccurate. This minimized employing mortars in

urban areas. As such, the inability to provide a precise target location for precision

munitions created a critical capabilities gap, especially at the platoon, company, and

battalion levels, for dynamic targeting. In fact, dismounted observers lacked the ability to

locate ground targets rapidly with sufficient accuracy to use precision munitions.33

To eliminate this target location error gap that the Field Artillery School

considered to be the number one gap in the Field Artillery, the Army took action. The

Project Manager, Soldier Precision Targeting Devices (PM SPTD) developed the

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder-2H (LLDR-2H) for dismounted soldiers that

________________________ 32

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with COL Craig M. Newman, Doug Brown, and

Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-25, 2011 USAFAS AH. 33

Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12, Doc

III-26, 2011 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “Picatinny Fields First Precision-Guided

Mortars to Troops in Afghanistan,” Public Affairs Picatinny Arsenal, 29 Mar 11, Doc III-

27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location

Error, 22 Mar 12, Doc III-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with

Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated, Doc

III-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements

to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10, Doc III-30, 2011

USAFAS AH.

68

was fielded beginning in 2013. After changes were made to the target location module

(TLM), the LLDR-2H could provide precision targeting capability by integrating a

celestial navigation system with a digital magnetic compass in the target locator module

to furnish highly accurate target coordinates. The target locator module could be used as

a stand-alone device or in conjunction with the laser designator module (LDM). During

daytime operations, the LLDR-2H could detect a target at more than 10 kilometers, could

recognize it at seven kilometers, and could designate a stationary target at five kilometers

and a moving target at three kilometers. At night the LLDR-2H could detect a target at

three kilometers, could recognize it at two kilometers, and designate it at almost two

kilometers. Because the LLDR-2H represented a significant improvement over earlier

versions of the LLDR, the Army started retrofitting them as LLDR-2Hs in 201334

The Army and the Field Artillery also envisioned the Joint Effects Targeting

System (JETS) as a means to minimize target location error. The handheld JETS would

provide the dismounted observer and joint terminal attack controller with the ability to

acquire, locate, mark, and designate for precision GPS-guided and laser-guided munitions

without target mensuration but would not be fielded until Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. 35

Given this and the pressing requirement to eliminate target location error, the

Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General David D.

Halverson, directed the Capabilities Development Integration Directorate (CDID) to hold

a handheld precision optical targeting demonstration and assessment at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma, to develop a quick reaction capability that would be fielded before JETS

could be introduced. Held in December 2011, the demonstration provided industry with

the opportunity to demonstrate its target location systems. Based on this demonstration

and the state of technology, CDID submitted the desired capabilities for a future target

location system to the Rapid Equipping Force for the development of a limited number of

handheld and tripod-held systems for experimentation with the goal of fielding an

objective system at the same time that the PGK was fielded and before JETS could be

fielded.36

________________________ 34

Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12;

Interview with atch, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information

Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements

to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10; Email, subj: CDID

Input to 2011 Annual History, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-31, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information

Paper, subj: LLDR, 23 Sep 13, Doc III-25; Scott McClellan, “Get A Grid: Excellence in

Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc III-26; BG Brian J.

McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-

9, Doc III-27. 35

Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12;

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12;

Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept

Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10;

Information Paper, PEO Soldier, 27 Feb 13, Doc III-12, 2012 USAFAS AH. 36

Interview, Dastrup with Josh A. Dexter and John H. Deel, CDID, 27 Mar 12,

69

The Army started fielding the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) hand-held

targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted forward observer with the

ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and within the standards required to

employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC hand-held targeting device would

bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the

objective capability of JETS.37

Electric Fires

In August 2010 the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence

(FCoE), Major General David D. Halverson, hosted a panel of senior leaders and retired

general officers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to discuss the Army’s vulnerability to electric

fires (high power microwaves, directed energy, electromagnetic kinetic weapons, plasma,

and electronic attack weapons). The panel concurred that the Army had some

vulnerabilities to electric fires and recommended that the Space and Missile Defense

Command (SMDC) provide an initial assessment to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,

General Peter N. Chiarelli, along with its own findings.38

On 16 June 2011 SMDC briefed General Chiarelli about the panel’s initial

findings and its own assessment of the status of electric fires efforts in the Army.

General Chiarelli then tasked the Commanding General of SMDC/Army Strategic

Command (ARSTRAT) to conduct a comprehensive electric fires assessment to identify

current and emerging threat capabilities and to make recommendations on filling the gaps

in electric fires capabilities. General Chiarelli also tasked FCoE to support the effort as a

user representative. Subsequently, FCOE assigned the Fires Battle Laboratory in its

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) to lead its effort.39

Over the following months, multiple general officer steering committee meetings

and briefings that included the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army discussed electric fires.

On 17 January 2012 the SMDC and the FCoE provided General Chiarelli with a final

assessment briefing on their electric fires work. Based upon the briefing that pointed out

the imperative for additional work, General Chiarelli tasked the SMDC and the FCoE to

assess the U.S. Navy’s electric fires program, to include the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) in the process, and to provide the incoming Vice Chief of

____________________

Doc III-32, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target

Location Error, 22 Mar 12. 37

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-13, 2012 USAFAS AH;

McClellan, “Get A Grid,” pp. 26-28; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization

Strategy,” pp. 6-9. 38

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Susan Walker, Dep Dir, Fires Battle

Laboratory, 28 Mar 12, Doc III-12 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FBL

History 2011, 6 Mar 12, Doc III-13, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electric

Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr 12, Doc III-14, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Electric Fires Request for Information, 27 Jun 12, Doc III-28. 39

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Susan Walker, Dep Dir, Fires Battle

Laboratory, 28 Mar 12; Email with atch, subj: FBL History 2011, 6 Mar 12; Email with

atch, subj: Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr 12.

70

Staff of the Army, General Lloyd J. Austin III, with an overview of the electric fires

threat as it existed.40

Based upon the adversaries’ development of directed energy and electromagnetic

powered weapons and systems that posed a threat to the Army and General Chiarelli’s

guidance, the FCoE briefed General Austin on 22 August 2012 about electric fires and its

recommendation for creating an Electric Fires Office under the Fires Battle Laboratory.

General Austin concurred with SMDC/FCoE forming an Electric Fires Working Group

under the Fires Integrated Capabilities Development Team Charter, dated 22 April 2010,

and creating an Electric Fires Office. In view of this, the FCoE subsequently chartered

the Electric Fires Office in November 2012 to work with the Fires Battle Laboratory and

the SMDC to lead the Electric Fires Working Group, to provide subject matter expertise,

and to coordinate and conduct electric fires efforts across the Army. As a team, SMDC

and the Electric Fires Office would lay the groundwork for long-term efforts for

offensive and defensive electric fires capabilities based upon emerging concepts,

capability gaps, and the operational environment and would initiate a series of

vulnerability assessments and facility assessments. Without this effort the potential

operational and technical risk to the Army would increase while the Army’s capabilities

to address the threats would remain unknown and untested. Equally as important, the

nation had to invest in “game-changing technologies” to counter enemy threats.41

To carry out its mission as a coordinator, the Electric Fires Office conducted the

Army’s first Electric Fires Seminar, an Army-wide gathering to identify and discuss the

potential impact of electric fires on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P), on 28 February 2013. Besides providing

an open forum to discuss electric fires capabilities, planning, and coordination measures,

the seminar supplied a greater understanding of how electric fires could be integrated into

future planning, synchronization, and execution of missions; identified mission command

and targeting and intelligence requirements; and coordinated input into the Electric Fires

white paper that was being written as a roadmap to the future.42

Work on electric fires continued through the rest of 2013. In June 2013 the Vice

Chief of the Army, General John F. Campbell who replaced General Austin in March

2013, tasked the Army G3/5/7 to conduct a review of threat-related testing and evaluation

programs to identify gaps related to directed energy and electrodynamics kinetic energy

weapons, to prioritize testing requirements, and to identify funding requirements. Out of

this emerged a five-phase effort. By late 2013 the Electric Fires Office and the Fires

________________________ 40

Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr

12; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14, Doc III-29; J.D. Leipold,

“Campbell Takes Oath as Army’s Vice Chief of Staff,” 11 Mar 13,

www.army.mil/article/98124, Doc III-30. 41

Memorandum for Record, subj: Establishment of the FCoE Electric Fires

Office, 21 Nov 12, Doc III-31; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14. 42

Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013, Doc III-31a; Email with atchs, subj:

Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS

Annual History, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-31b.

71

Battle Laboratory had completed the first phase by identifying the threat, had established

agreements between the Army and industry, called cooperative research and development

agreements (CRADA), to establish the roles and responsibilities for sharing technologies

and resources, and moved into phase two where equipment and facility gaps would be

identified.43

Meanwhile on 26 August 2013, the Commanding General of FCoE, Major

General James M. McDonald, directed the center to establish a directed energy range on

Fort Sill that would facilitate developing electric fires and electronic attack. Several

months later on 6 November 2013, the Fires Battle Laboratory briefed Fort Sill’s

Directorate of Public Works (DPW) on the modifications required for creating a directed

energy range out of an existing range. These modifications would enhance the range not

only for electric fires purposes but also for any other organizations that would use it.

Critical work included access road improvement, buried electric cable, and gravel, among

other things. Later on 13 November 2013, the Fires Battle Laboratory conducted a

kickoff meeting with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at Fort Sill and their contract

representatives to explain the requirements for the directed energy range and to initiate

work. On 3 March 2014, the United States Corps of Engineers started the environmental

assessment necessary to allow non-program of record demonstrations on Fort Sill. Once

completed, the range would allow government, industry, and academia to demonstrate

electric fires capabilities and emerging technologies to combat developers, concept

developers, requirement developers, and training developers, would be completed by the

summer of 2015, and would furnish a convenient facility for observing electric fires

capabilities and technologies. As of 2013, non-program of record systems, such as

electric fires, had to be tested at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, or Dugway

Proving Ground, Utah.44

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES

Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile

Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing

accuracy, the U.S. Army explored adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range

Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational

Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-

forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial

measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended

ranges (50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would

be able it to detonate within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design

would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for

________________________ 43

Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14; Fires Battle Laboratory

History 2013. 44

Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12

Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 13

Mar 14.

72

area targets, the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against

self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets – soft or

hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire

support; would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6

(Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer

(XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under

development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded with DPICM in Fiscal Year

(FY) 2006, with SADARM in FY 2007, and Unitary in FY 2010.45

Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the

Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program

early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development to DPICM.

However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the

Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the

Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), caused another shift in priorities. In December

2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney

Stricklin, signed a school decision paper recommending switching Excalibur’s initial

development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program

Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January

2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets

upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead

because it produced low collateral damage. This caused the Unitary warhead to become

more important after being a low priority for years.46

In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999

Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory

Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being

developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using GPS and an inertial measurement unit,

Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a

significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the

Field Artillery’s digitized cannon range from 27 to 35 kilometers with the XM777 and

the Paladin and 50 plus kilometers with the Crusader. Equally important, TCM would

significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a

second long-range, precision-guided munition.47

Raytheon’s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the

inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various

developmental options. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund

Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur’s airframe was untested

whereas TCM’s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the

Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a

contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the

________________________ 45

2004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75. 46

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 47

2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79.

73

Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration

the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two

developmental programs that essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a

low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each.

While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile

design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive

experience with guidance electronics and software development.48

The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded

requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance

of developing the projectile, the United States and Sweden signed a memorandum of

agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of Excalibur with the

Sweden providing $57 million.49

Meanwhile, Excalibur passed key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of

Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field

Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in FY 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on

Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer later. When the

Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army

restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System

(FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.50

Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in

view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense

subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate

fielding by employing “spiral development.”51

Basically, this approach would deliver

sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document

threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army

Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the program to deliver the Unitary

Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first

version (Block/Increment I) would be the least capable and would be fielded to the

Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. Block/Increment II with more

capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. Block/Increment III would

meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and would be

fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002

and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for

Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally

approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes

brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief

________________________ 48

2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 49

2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 50

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S.

Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49. 51

Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002

USAFACFS ACH.

74

of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were

essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for

precision fires.52

Meanwhile, development moved forward. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems

completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) with the Excalibur at

the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented

ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery

Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the

projectile’s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003,

the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the

contract for the system development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program.

Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint

Program Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency.

One year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and

guidance system design.53

Studies conducted in 2002 and 2003, in the meantime, validated Excalibur

development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur

facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended

ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would

fill an existing deficiency – the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to

minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in

Afghanistan and Iraq and the need to minimize collateral damage, such capabilities

would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.54

As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The

Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the

firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with

the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and the Guided Multiple Launch

Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect

Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider

variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current

target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement

the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive

to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions.

Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 noted that Excalibur

Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the

need for the munition. Ultimately, according to these studies and others, Excalibur and

other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the

Crusader to reaffirm the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision

________________________ 52

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, p. 62. 53

2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 54

2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78.

75

munition.55

Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by

the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the

requirement to accelerate fielding the munition. In response to the urgent need statement,

the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition’s

development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the

requirement and decide the fate of accelerating development. Although the product of the

accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially

approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a

parallel development program for Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement

required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia-1 would provide

the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less capability, Increment

Ia-2 would be the objective program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would

continue development, would have improved reliability, and improved countermeasures,

and would be fielded to M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer and Paladin units.56

In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent

needs statement of August 2004 from Central Command’s Combined Forces Land

Component Command for a precision guided cannon artillery munition and designated

Excalibur as the materiel solution. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq

by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing

little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany

Excalibur.57

Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground. On 1

September 2005 the contractor fired two urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles from a

Paladin using MACS. Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the GPS signal, and

completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15

September 2005, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting

within seven meters of the target to bring the program a step closer to filling the urgent

requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry

Division, and 1st Armor Division.58

More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July

2006 fired 22 rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the

munition’s reliability and lethality when 23 out of 25 rounds hit within an average six

meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually

________________________ 55

2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 56

2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 69; COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant,

“Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger Brigade Combat Team Fires: The

One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III-

32. 57

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51. 58

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56.

76

surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to

permit fielding the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July

2007. The Limited User Test results also satisfied the urgent release requirement and

permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the

Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground

with the M777A2, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy

when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of 10 meters, allowing

material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability

Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and testing beginning in 2008.59

Excalibur quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment

training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of

the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagdad. Elements from the 1st

Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery

Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007,

American operational units had fired the urgent requirement Excalibur Ia-1 in Operation

Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had fired the munition in Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In February 2008 American forces also began firing

Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan.

Through late 2010, Army and Marine field artillery units had fired 370 urgent need

Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles in OIF and OEF.60

Concurrently in 2008-2009, the Field Artillery School educated commanders of

deploying units using New Equipment Training Teams (NETT). The NETTs explained

that the munition had to be fired at a high angle to achieve the maximum range and

optimal flight path to perform the terminal maneuver to achieve a near vertical angle of

attack. As it neared the target, the projectile oriented itself to a near-perpendicular angle

of fall to optimize the lethal effects on the intended target. This characteristic made the

urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 an ideal solution for engagements in complex and urban

settings because it created a minimal amount of collateral damage. Also, the munition

had roughly the same explosive power as an M107 high-explosive projectile. Because of

its near-perpendicular angle of descent, it furnished more lethality and more uniform

detonation pattern. The urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 had the ability to penetrate four

inches of reinforced concrete which was the thickness of the typical load-bearing roof

and could penetrate and detonate with devastating lethality.61

Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School participated in developing Excalibur Ia-2

and Ib. Representing the baseline program outlined in the ORD of 2004, Excalibur Ia-2

________________________ 59

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72. 60

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009

USAFAS AH, p. 70; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-33, 2011

USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13,

material is not FOUO, Doc III-33; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29

Aug 13, Doc III-34. 61

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 70-71.

77

would have increased range, improved reliability, improved countermeasures (anti-jam

capabilities), and went through an initial operational test in January 2010. At that time

Excalibur Ia-2 demonstrated high reliability with charges three and four but was less

reliable at charge five. It received full material release in April 2011 with fielding

beginning in August 2011 and continuing into 2012 to complement the urgent need

Excalibur Ia-1 that completed its fielding and production run in 2012. The Army

concluded fielding Excalibur Ia-2 in 2012 and awarded Raytheon the contract to produce

Ib and scheduled testing for 2012 and fielding in FY 2014.62

However, technical difficulties set back the demonstration of the Raytheon and

Alliant Tech Systems designs of Excalibur Ib from March 2010 until August 2010;

Raytheon won the shoot off the contract for Excalibur Ib. The munition achieved ORD

requirements during testing and provided more range, increased reliability, and lower

cost than the Excalibur Ia-2. A critical design review in April 2011 revealed that the fins

were being destroyed upon firing the projectile. As a result, the Army decided in

February 2012 to use the Ia-2’s base assembly as opposed to the Ib’s base assembly.

This approach would lower the developmental risk and use a base that had demonstrated

reliability. Subsequently, testing in October 2012 validated the Excalibur Ib and led to a

milestone c decision in December 2012 that permitted moving it into low-rate initial

production. Excalibur Ib successfully passed the initial operational test and evaluation in

February 2014 at the Yuma Proving Ground with a majority of the rounds landing within

two meters of the target. Although funding constraints reduced the number to be

produced, the munition was on schedule to receive full material release by June 2014.63

________________________ 62

2009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT-

Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant,

TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc

III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions

systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon

Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur

A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE

Information Paper, Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement Projectiles, undated, Doc

III-14a; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 10, Doc III-15; Interview, Dastrup

with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-16,

2012 USAFAS AH; DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager

Brigade Combat Team Fires,” pp., 35-39; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association

Excalibur Overview, 2012, Doc III-35; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade

Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO); Briefing (Extract), subj:

FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13; Interview, Dastrup with Mark Belcher, TCM BCT

Fires, 25 Feb 14, Doc III-36. 63

2009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT-

Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant,

TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc

III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions

Systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM

78

Meanwhile, the Excalibur Ib passed other significant milestones. In June 2012

the Army fired two Excalibur Ib rounds at Fort Bliss, Texas. This marked a significant

development. For the first time, an Army unit fired the Excalibur Ib in the continental

United States outside of Twenty-Nine Palms, California; the National Training Center,

California; Yuma Proving Ground; or White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico; all of

which were testing facilities where units trained before deploying. The Fort Bliss firings

presaged the Army’s authorization to fire the munition at other installations because units

wanted to fire it even if they were not deploying. The following year of 2013, the 212th

Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Armored Division fired Excalibur Ib at home station at

Fort Bliss. This demonstrated that home-stationing training of the Excalibur was not only

achievable but also valuable because the units gained experience that could be applied to

combat operations while the maneuver commander acquired information about the

munition’s unique capabilities.64

Precision Guidance Kit

Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since

the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types, such as the Sense-and-

____________________

Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter

(Extract), Oct 11, p. 26; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires,

22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, COL

Michael Hartig, 6 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC

Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 12 Feb 13; Raytheon Information

Paper, subj: Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Accuracy during Flight Tests, 24 Oct

12, Doc III-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of the

Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document, 18 Dec

12, Doc III-18, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer,

Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production

of Increment Ib Excalibur M982E1, 13 Dec 12, Doc III-19, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13,

Doc III-20, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: US Army Awards Raytheon

$54 million for Excalibur Ib, 10 Sep 13, Doc III-37; “Raytheon Completes Excalibur IB

Projectile’s Qualification Flight Testing,” www.army-technology.com, 21 Oct 13, Doc

III-38; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur and Munitions Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual

History, 28 Feb 14, Doc III-39; Interview, Dastrup with Belcher, 25 Feb 14. 64

Interview, Dastrup with Pack and Belcher, 11 Feb 13. See COL Gene Meredith,

MAJ David Moser, CPT Andrew Zikowitz, and Daniel Hallagin, “A Current Assessment

of Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 12, pp. 27-32, Doc

III-21, 2012 USAFAS AH; MG (Ret) Toney Stricklin, “Employment of the M982in

Afghanistan: US Army and Marine Corps Differences,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp.

16-19, Doc III-22, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and

Future Cannon Munitions Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13, LTC Gary C. Leroux, MAJ Aaron Van

Alstine, and SFC Clifton Blowe, “Excalibur Home-Station Live Fire Training,” RedLeg

Update, Sep-Oct 13, pp. 3-6, Doc III-40.

79

Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

highlighted the need for precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve

accuracy. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking

targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By

dispersing their forces and often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy

forces limited the Americans’ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to

increase its dependence upon precision munitions.65

The Army initiated a search for a less expensive precision munition than

SADARM. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and

Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and

industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study, to determine the current or near-current

precision engagement solutions, and to select those that would yield the best payoff for

field artillery and mortar assets within 24 to 36 months.66

Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor

System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of

South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting

fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise.

Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS

concluded that PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm.

projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required

for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral

development PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and

by FY 2010 with the second increment that would be the full-performance fuse.67

In 2005 USAFACFS explained that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, intended

to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm.

projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System

(GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would

reduce the amount of ammunition required for a mission. Basically, the PGK would

transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS

completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would

leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work,

forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing and approval which

came on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.68

________________________ 65

2004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10,

Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 66

Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009

USAFAS AH. 67

2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59. 68

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52.

80

As of late 2006, the Army planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I

would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control

surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point-detonating and

proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of 50 meters or less, and

would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism

with fielding in FY 2010. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming,

would improve delivery accuracy to 30 meters, would add delay and GPS time-fuse

functions, would address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and

propellants, and would be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm.

family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.69

In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005

the Program Executive Officer, Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently,

the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to

joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development

Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with

developing the kit, the Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile

solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term

solution, awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to

Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development, and scheduled a shoot off at Yuma Proving

Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for

development of Increment I with an accuracy of 50 meters circular error probable.

Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off by meeting the accuracy requirements of less than

or equal to 50 meter circular error probable. Eighteen of their rounds impacted within 30

meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer, Ammo approved and

signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit

PGK to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition.

Subsequently, Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant

Techsystems an 18-month System Development and Demonstration contract on 18 May

2007 to develop PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive shell and to test it in 2009.

However, technical difficulties pushed testing PGK Increment I back into 2010 and

developing PGK Increment II.70

In August 2010 testing to move PGK Increment I into the next phase of

development did not go well. In response, the Program Manager for Combat

Ammunitions Systems put together a team to review the test and to determine the causes

________________________ 69

2006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58; Briefing,

subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH; Capability Development

Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 Jul 12, Executive Summary, Doc III-23, 2012

USAFAS AH. 70

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview

with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009

USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike

Capability, 12 Jan 2011, Doc III-18, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: PGK,

undated, Doc III-37, 2011 USAFAS AH.

81

of the failures. A few months later, the team’s findings indicated that design problems

had led to the failures and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so that

fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010 the Army Systems

Acquisition Review Board approved a plan by the Program Manager for Combat

Ammunition Systems to restructure the engineering and manufacturing development

program to allow the program to slip 25 months in order to make minor design changes

and to field PGK Increment I in 2014 rather than 2011. Subsequently on 21 January

2011, the Army Acquisition Executive authorized moving forward with the restructured

plan for PGK Increment I and directed the Program Manager for Combat Ammunitions

System to provide PGK Increment I acquisition program baseline for approval within 120

days. The Army Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition program baseline

restructure on 16 July 2011.71

Almost two years later on 18 March 2013, the program of

record release program passed its milestone c decision with approval to move into Low-

Rate Initial Production and continued development.72

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent material release

on 17 May 2011 for PGK. This would accelerate fielding of PGK Increment I with

reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan based

upon successful testing in August 2011. Subsequently, the contractor conducted a PGK

Increment I guided flight test in August-September 2011 where it collected sufficient data

for entrance into the next engineering, manufacturing, and development phase as well as

considering the accelerated fielding to OEF. In March 2012 the Army approved

accelerated fielding of PGK to OEF in 2013. This gave PGK two tracks – the program of

record PGK and the urgent material release program. Fielding the urgent material release

PGK began in March 2013 and concluded at the end of June 2013.73

________________________ 71

Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16,

2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires,

22 Feb 12, Doc III-34, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer

for Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the XM1156 Precision

Guidance Kit Increment I, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-38, 2011 USAFAS AH. 72

“Update on the Precision Guidance Kit,” Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4,

Doc III-41; Audra Calloway, “PGK Arrives in Afghanistan Ahead of Fighting Season,”

Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-41. 73

Interview with atch, Dastrup with Worth, 22 Feb 11; Memorandum for Assistant

Secretary of the Army, subj: Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156

Precision Guidance Kit, 17 May 11, Doc III-39, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup

with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-;

DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2012, Doc III-24, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra

Calloway, Picatinny Arsenal, “Fort Bliss soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near-

precision Artillery Rounds,” www.army.mil, Doc III-25, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval

of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production Document for

the Precision Guidance Kit, 11 Jul 12, Doc III-26, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract,

FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO.

82

Future Cannon Munitions Suite

To upgrade existing 105/155-mm. munitions to meet the Army’s transformation

objectives and to modernize the U.S. Army’s stockpile of cannon munitions, the Army

continued developmental efforts with the Future Cannon Munitions Suite (FCMS),

formerly called the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program (ACAAP), which

would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles, would be

capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as non-lethal, multi-spectral

smoke under development, would be less toxic and incendiary, and would include

infrared illumination. Late in 2005, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill

(USAFACFS), renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

(USAFCOEFS), developed a capabilities production development document for a 105-

mm. IM High-Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (Pff) round (M1130) for staffing. The

Department of the Army approved the document on 18 July 2007. A top priority for the

Commanding General of Fort Sill in 2013, the M1130 Pff round would be an insensitive

munition, meaning that it would not detonate unexpectedly by a spark or rough handling,

would be embedded with 9,300 3-mm. tungsten balls, and would be used against soft and

light-skinned targets. Following successful testing in 2010, the Army granted full

materiel release in 2012 for the M1130 with some rounds being accepted for

prepositioning in theater (Afghanistan).74

Concurrently, the Army developed other initiatives to modernize Field Artillery

munitions. In 2011 it developed a plan to re-use the M483 Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional Munition (DPICM) by demilitarizing it to save money. The Army planned

to demilitarize the M483 and to use it as a replacement for aging or less capable

munitions. The first munition using this re-use concept was the M1122 training round.

The M1122 (155-mm.) replaced the M804 Low-cost Indirect Fire Training Round (LITR)

and eventually the M107 for training purposes. Full material release for the munition

came on 22 June 2012, meaning that it was reliable, operationally sustainable, and

effective. As of 2013, the Army planned to produce approximately 280,000 M1122

training rounds through 2018. Other munitions using the demilitarized M483 included

the XM1123 Infrared Illuminating Projectile and XM1124 Visible Light Illuminating

Projectile for use by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. Both were undergoing

________________________ 74

2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort

Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM

Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fires Center of Excellence CSM

Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 7, Doc III-45, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj:

TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with

LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: PM Update,

24 Feb 12; General Dynamics Information Paper, subj: 105-mm. M1130 HE-Pff,

undated, Doc III-40, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input

to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO),

subj: Smart Book, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO, Doc III-42.

83

testing in 2013 with full material release scheduled for 2014. A third re-use round

included the M110A3 White Phosphorous Smoke Projectile.75

M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer

When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward-

deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States

(CONUS) at the end of the Cold War early in the 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted

the Army’s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons offered greater strategic and

tactical deployability than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world

order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an

Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm.

howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent

need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm.

howitzer, the Marine Corps concurrently planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm.

howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed

lightweight 155-mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational

Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm.

howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint

Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program

Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the

Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777.

Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one

without digital enhancements and to add them later, while the Army chose introducing a

digitized LW155 that would take longer to field.76

After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the

engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and

2001. Unveiled at Picatinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held

________________________ 75

Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc

III-41a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22

Feb 12, Doc III-41b, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir,

TCM BCT-Fires, 7 Feb 12, Doc III-42, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM

BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack

and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-27, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, Picatinny Arsenal, subj: Recycling Produces Cheaper, Safer, Realistic

Artillery Rounds, 5 Oct 12, Doc III-28, 2012 USAFAS AH; “TCM BCT Fires Update,”

RedLeg Update, Jul 12, Doc III-29, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug

Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-30, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Picatinny

Recycles Artillery Shells to Create Cheaper, Safer, more Reliable Training Rounds,”

Army Material Command, 8 Jan 13, Doc III-43; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: Smart

Book, 22 Feb 13, material uses is not FOUO, Doc III-44; Interview, Dastrup with Mark

Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 25 Feb 14. 76

2003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001

USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

84

out great promise. The howitzer’s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same

prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft

for strategic deployability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three

minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or

less, and had a range of 30 kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six

XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.77

Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production

representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army

and Marine Corps.78

This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding

an operational assessment test or a limited user’s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers

passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of

performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be

permitted.79

In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold

weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to

function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps

conducted an operational assessment test from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty-

Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval

Amphibious Base, California; to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in

the JORD of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately 4,000 rounds, towing,

and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability,

and maximum rate of fire requirements and minor equipment problems, it achieved its

key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate

accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the

successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June

2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program

was making satisfactory progress.80

Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of

May-June 2002, the Navy held a milestone c decision meeting on 8 November 2002.

Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and

reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and

Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of 94

howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine

Corps permission to move forward with development.81

More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that

was scheduled to be added to the Army’s LW155 distinguished the Army’s howitzer

from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard

________________________ 77

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65. 78

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 79

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 80

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 81

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84.

85

advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the

Paladin M109A6 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm.

self-propelled howitzer under development, and would eliminate the need for external

survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating

and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital

communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of

the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released

a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000 for TAD. After analyzing six

proposals, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of

Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD

for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army’s LW155 with TAD from the

basic LW155 for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated the Army’s

LW155 as the XM777E1 and made the Army the lead agency. With the emergence of the

XM777E1, two LW155 programs existed – the XM777 (M777) with onboard

conventional optical fire control capabilities for the Marine Corps and the XM777E1

(M777E1) with digital capabilities for the Army.82

Fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in the Marine

Corps. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first M777 live

fire and received 55 of the planned 94 M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd

Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty-Nine Palms and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at

Camp Pendleton. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander

of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial

operational capability with the M777.83

Work on the software for the TAD and hardware meanwhile progressed. In

September-October 2006, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the

Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer (TAD equipped) at

the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Together, the successful software testing and the

successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 with TAD

capabilities on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding

General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.84

Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated testing and fielding the M777A2 that

would have software upgrades to fire the Excalibur precision munition and other

upgrades. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired

the first Excalibur from the M777A2 (TAD equipped and Excalibur capable). This led to

full material release for the M777A2 system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S.

Marine Corps on 7 September 2007 and fielding that began in July 2007 and continued

________________________ 82

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.

72. 83

2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 84

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66.

86

into 2010. At same time the Army upgraded the M777 to a M777A2 and upgraded all

M777A1s to M777A2s.85

Other crucial developments concurrently occurred. C Battery, 3rd Battalion,

321st Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation

Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and

later the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the

howitzer in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 26 April 2008.86

Subsequently to these operational firings, emerging force structure issues

influenced M777A2 fielding decisions. In August 2009 the Army decided to convert the

1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and the 3rd

Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SBCT) in 2011

and 2012 respectively to shift focus towards the middle of the spectrum of conflict. This

action would require equipping the SBCTs with M777A2s and associated equipment and

furnishing new equipment training. Additionally, the Army forced a 10 percent

manpower reduction across all branches and proponencies; and the Field Artillery

community decided to take this hit in all field artillery organizations except for brigade

combat teams. The biggest “hit” on structure from force design studies required the

echelons above brigade cannon battalions to convert from a 3x6 to a 3x4 force structure.

In 2010 the Army decided to phase the conversion over a period of five years.87

Upgrade actions also influenced the M777A2 during 2010-2011. In August 2010

a limited user assessment held at Fort Bragg demonstrated the Hydraulic Power Assist

Kit (HyPAK). It used hydraulic power to lift the weapon off the ground to minimize

crew fatigue because the crew would no longer have to pump the wheels down manually.

The HyPAK would also free up one soldier to do other tasks. This successful

demonstration led to fielding HyPAK in FY 2012. Also, the Di-pulse Laser Ignition

System (LIS) live-fire demonstration at Fort Sill on 1 December 2010 illustrated the

ability to replace the primer as a propellant ignition source, offering the potential of

eliminating the difficulties that arose in 2009 with M232A1 zone 5 charge. As long as a

restriction for use of this charge continued, the weapon would be unable to reach

maximum range, losing about 6,000 meters of range. The LIS was still in development at

the close of the 2011, but all indicators were positive.88

________________________ 85

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 87-88;

Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20,

2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); M777 155-mm.

Ultralightweight Field Howitzer, United Kingdom, www.army-technology.com, 30 Jan

14, Doc III-45. 86

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 87; Email with atch,

subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 87

2009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM

BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155

Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 88

Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing,

subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12, Doc III-43, 2011 USAFAS AH;

87

As a result, the Army directed that engineering and development efforts continue

in 2012-2013, hoping to start fielding a LIS by FY 2014. Other upgrade actions in 2012

included the muzzle velocity sensor system, the electronic thermal warning device to

warn of excessively high temperatures in the tube, an improved power conditioning and

control module, improved batteries to the automated equipment can run longer before

recharging, among other initiatives. Early in 2013, the Army announced its plans to field

the objective M777 with on-board ballistic computation capabilities, integrated muzzle

velocimeter, and other upgrades in the near future.89

M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer

Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd

Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement

Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 towed 105-mm. howitzer

to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the

LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements that included a cold weather

recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First

applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new

rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a

roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not

radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by LASIP Block I

and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was

towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army

designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February

2005.90

With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their

organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm.

howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering

committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm.

____________________

Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-44,

2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr

12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb

13, Doc III-31, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM

BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-32, 2012 USAFAS AH. 89

Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing,

subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael

Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to

2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj:

Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13; Interview, Dastrup with Brown, 5 Feb 13; Briefing

(Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is

unclassified. 90

2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65.

2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p.

66.

88

howitzers. Pressured by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the GOSC reevaluated the

decision in August 2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the

shortages. Shortly after, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102

howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.91

Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel

release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and fielding began. Because of modularity

conversions and aging M102 howitzer fleets, the Army National Guard agreed to accept

initial half-battalion fieldings for 2008 and 2009, allowing Army National Guard

battalions to field their new equipment sooner.92

Fielding M119A2 howitzers continued into 2011. By the end of 2010, 20 active

component IBCTs and 18 of the 20 Army National Guard IBCTs had been fully fielded

with M119A2s. One year later, the Army completed fielding the M119A2s. Twenty

active component brigade combat teams and 20 Army National Guard brigade combat

teams had M119A2s.93

Force structure changes meanwhile altered the number of M119A2s to be fielded.

On 6 April 2009 the Secretary of Defense Bill Gates directed the Army to stop the growth

of active component brigade combat teams at 45 rather than the 48 initially planned.

Along with fewer howitzers required in preposition stocks, this action reduced the buy of

M119A2s from 893 Army Acquisition Objective to 823 Army Program Objective.

Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army Peter Geren halted the Army’s plan to organize

the last three active component brigade combat teams at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Carson,

Colorado, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, and authorized an end strength in the Army of

547,000 to ensure better-manned units, to end the routine use of stop loss for deployment

manning, and to reduce the risk of hollowing the force.94

Meanwhile, another critical issue arose with the M119A2 in 2006. With the

fielding of the digitized M777A1 towed 155-mm. howitzer and the phasing out of the

M102 towed 105-mm. howitzer, the M109A5 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, and the

M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army’s

inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap

between the IBCTs and Heavy Stryker Brigade Combat Team because the latter would

________________________ 91

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 92

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89-90; 2099 U.S. Army Field Artillery School

(USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 90-91. 93

Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc

III-49, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 91; Interview with atch, Dastrup with

MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-25, 2009 USAFAS AH;

SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09, Doc III-26, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS

LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10, Doc III-27, 2009 USAFAS AH. 94

Execution Order (FOUO), undated, material used is unclassified, Doc III-71,

2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: M119A2 Howitzer AAO Reduction, 9 Nov 09, Doc III-

72, 2010 USAFAS AH.

89

have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also

prevent the howitzer from using near-precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit

that would convert dumb munitions into near-precision munitions. The lack of precision

in turn would lead to less accuracy, would make dispersed operations more difficult to

perform, and would decrease the survivability of the IBCT. Influenced by these reasons,

the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G-8 (Programming and Materiel

Integration) developed the requirement for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the

M777A1. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) signed on 15 June 2007, the

Field Artillery School and the Army developed a strategy for digitizing the M119A2.

One year later in January 2008, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems

and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

approved digitizing the M119A2 to give it the same capabilities of self-locating, self-

orienting, and digital communications as the M777A1 and M109A6 (Paladin) self-

propelled 155-mm. howitzer. Upon completion of the digital modifications, the M119A2

would become the M119A3.95

Over the next two years, digitizing the M119A2 moved forward. Major General

Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence

and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground

Combat Systems, and the Army G-8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager

for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin digitizing the

M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of

digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a

subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks – Block

One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery

Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment

commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle

velocity management) and noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware had caused the

initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012.96

Meanwhile, the Army conducted a preliminary design review on 10 June 2008

and another one in December 2008, while the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery

Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment participated in Early

User Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and

November 2008. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased

attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding of operational considerations to the

engineers. Subsequently, on 30 June 2009, the program manager for the M119A2

________________________ 95

2006 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; Information Paper, subj: M119A2, 27 Oct 10, Doc III-50,

2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information

Paper/Airdrop Certification, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-51, 2011 USAFAS AH; Joseph Lipinski,

“Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army AL&T, Jul-Sep

10, pp. 21-24, Doc III-32a, 2012 USAFAS AH. 96

2008 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS

LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10, Doc III-28, 2010 USAFAS AH.

90

released a request for proposal to industry for an inertial navigation device for the

M119A2. Bid sample testing began in August 2009 and ended with a Global Positioning

System (GPS) inertial navigation unit contract awarded to Honeywell Inc., Clearwater,

Florida, in March 2010. Testing ended in December 2010 with digitizing remaining on

track to retrofit 200 of 603 M119A2s starting in FY 2013 as M119A3s and to type

classify the digitized howitzer as the M119A3. This would be followed by a

Modification Work Order starting in FY 2014 for the remaining 403 howitzers to be

digitized. By FY 2017 at the conclusion of the fielding, the Army would have a total of

823 M119 howitzers (603 M119A3s and 220 M119A2s). Meanwhile, the M119A2 was

being upgraded with a titanium firing base plate to reduce weight and base plate crack, an

improved muzzle velocity sensor system, an updated wheel assembly (valve stem

protection), and a suspension lockout system to absorb the shock when the weapon was

fired at top zone.97

Work on the M119A2 moved forward in 2012-2013. In March 2012 a new

howitzer production line was completed. The production line was originally scheduled to

be completed in August 2011, but delays and contractor issues caused the program to

miss the original date and to be finished in March 2012. Between July 2012 and

September 2012, the Program Office conducted a Follow-on Test and Evaluation on the

digitized M119A2 (M119A3) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, using soldiers from B Battery, 2nd

Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Sill. Taking place over a nine-week period,

testing included the Fires Directorate (FTD), Program Manager-Towed Artillery Systems

(PM-TAS), and TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (TCM-

IBCT) and consisted of three 96-hour vignettes in which B Battery fired over 12,000

rounds. Testing went well. At the end of December 2012, the Program Executive

Officer Brigadier General John McGuiness signed the milestone c type classification

standard for the M119A2 as the digitized M119A3. Fielding began in 2013 when the 3rd

Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 1st Battalion,

320th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 1st Battalion, 78th

Field Artillery Regiment, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, received their howitzers

as part of a six-year fielding plan. Meanwhile, the Army conducted sling load testing to

develop procedures for sling loading the M119A3 under a helicopter.98

________________________ 97

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS

LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 20 Nov 10; Email with

atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11, Doc III-29, 2010 USAFAS

AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Audra

Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Gives Quicker Firepower,” Army News Service,

undated, Doc III-52, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: Digitized M119A2

Information Paper, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-53, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj:

M119 Tow 105 2011, 9 Mar 12, Doc III-54, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lipinski, “Commonality

of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” pp. 21-24. 98

Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-33, 2012

USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb

13, Doc III-34, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Historical M119A2, 14 Feb 13, Doc III-

91

Paladin Integrated Management

In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of

understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army’s

M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) – the M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer

(Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the

Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) – through the Paladin Integrated

Management (PIM) and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the

PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army separately approved the capabilities

production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109

FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms,

and initiated testing in 2008.99

The Army intended PIM to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence,

and increase sustainability of the M109 platforms to mitigate size, weight and power gaps

required to support heavy brigade combat teams through 2037. Operationally, PIM

upgrades would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more sustainable, and

more lethal and would reduce the logistics footprint and operation and support costs. To

achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat

System’s Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the heavy brigade combat team’s

(HBCT) Bradley fighting vehicle. For example the PIM would use the Bradley’s engine

and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the

NLOS-C including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern

electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and

azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field, the

PIM M109 FOV would give the HBCT upgraded capabilities including more

maneuverability, a higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of

accurate and timely fires.100

The M109 FOV successfully completed the Preliminary and Critical Design

Reviews, among other milestones, in 2008. Upon successful completion of these

____________________

34a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Provides

Quicker Firepower,” www.army.mil, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the

Digitized M119A3 Program,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-36, 2012 USAFAS AH;

COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager

Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires

Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III-46; “Fort Bragg First to Receive upgraded

M119 Howitzers,” Army Material Command, 6 May 13, Doc III-47; Interview, Dastrup

with Cpt Dusty Gray, TCM BCT-Fires, 27 Feb 14, Doc III-48. 99

2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 91. 100

Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,”

www.army.mil/article, 6 Sep 11, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; 2007 U.S. Army Fires

Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp.

70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School

(USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 93-94.

92

reviews, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of FY

2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the milestone

c decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of the milestone

c decision, the program would move forward into low-rate initial production (LRIP) to

produce a limited number of the vehicles.101

In 2009 key developments took place. In January 2009 the program manager

approached the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development and Engineering

Center about approving the capabilities documents, but the center did not approve it.

However, the cancellation of the NLOS-C in April 2009 by the Secretary of Defense

caused PIM to become the Army’s number one modernization effort and led to the

approval of the capabilities production document on 9 August 2009 that scheduled a

milestone c decision in 2011. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) stripped the POCV from PIM and tied it to a command and

control vehicle to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August 2009

the Army awarded BAE the contract to produce seven PIM vehicles – five self-propelled

howitzers and two carrier ammunition tracked (CAT) vehicles. Five months later on 20

January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 PIM prototype.102

Later in 2010, Lieutenant General Michael M. Vane, the Director of the Army

Capabilities Integration Center, TRADOC, made a significant change to the PIM. He

increased force protection and survivability, but the changes were not added to the

capabilities production document. This created confusion with the program since some

government agencies and some contractors did not have the changes and consequently

increased the cost of PIM.103

PIM costs generated concern. In March 2010 the Secretary of the Army and the

Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army received a PIM cost briefing that was based upon

contractor estimates so that they could determine how many PIMs could be purchased.

The briefing also indicated an aggressive acquisition schedule, causing them to request

acquisition changes, because they believed that the schedule was too aggressive and

created a high-risk program. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive adopted the

low-risk schedule rather than the moderate-risk schedule or the low- to moderate-risk

schedule alternatives. The low-risk schedule slowed down the program, included all test

events, slipped the milestone c decision where the Army had to decide about going into

LRIP or not from 2011 to 2013, and established full-rate production in 2017.104

Using the contractor estimates that had been briefed in March 2010, the Army G-

3 subsequently determined in April 2010 how many PIM sets (howitzers and ammunition

________________________ 101

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 92; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 94. 102

2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 94-95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey

R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-30, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-56, 2011 USAFAS AH 103

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj:

PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 104

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj:

PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12.

93

and resupply vehicles) that the Army could purchase. At that time the G-3 opted to buy

440 sets that was a reduction from the previous number of 718. This would modernize

about one half of the M109 fleet in the active and reserve components. Shortly after in

May 2010, the Army realized that the cost of the 440 sets was based upon contractor

estimates and not the actual cost of the PIM set. Purchasing the PIM would cost

considerably more, forcing the Army and the Field Artillery to rejustify PIM program

continually.105

In October 2010 rising costs influenced the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to

question if the program was justifiable and why the costs had changed so frequently

during the year. To answer the questions the Army held a cost briefing on 17 November

2010 because the costs had risen from $3.6 million per set to $5.4 million to $9.4 million.

The last cost turned PIM into an acquisition category one. This meant that the Office of

the Secretary of Defense would now make the decision about PIM’s future and all major

program decisions and not the Army. Because the $9.4 million was considered too

expensive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense chose to replace all M109 Paladins with

PIM. This would reduce the cost to $7.2 million per set. Subsequently in May 2011, the

Army decided to field 580 PIMs to have a pure PIM fleet.106

Meanwhile, the Army conducted a two-part de-scoping effort using the Army

Oversight Council (AROC) in January-February 2011 to review the status and

requirements of the program in the face of rising costs and funding shortfalls. The

AROC approved the capability production document with revisions and a classified

annex E. The AROC reduced the reliability requirement to permit flexibility with the

testing schedule and acceptance of the PIM and added Office of the Secretary of Defense

directed force protection and survivability requirements with add-on armor kits for

operational flexibility that would permit the commander to choose the right configuration

for the mission.107

Several months after the AROC in June 2011, the Army began developmental

testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, for firing and at the Aberdeen Test Center,

Maryland, for automotive performance. Test events were designed to achieve system

________________________ 105

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj:

PIM Input for Ft Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 106

Briefing, subj: Update for Secretary of Army and Chief of Staff of the Army,

14 Mar 12, Doc III-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 4 Feb 11,

Doc III-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM

BCT Fires, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, subj: M109 Family of

Vehicles Army Acquisition Objective, 24 May 11, Doc III-60, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Information Paper, subj: How the

PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 107

Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12;

Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT-Fires, 13 Mar 12; Email,

subj: PIM AROC Update, 3 Feb 11, Doc III-62, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj:

Paladin PIM AROC, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-63, 2011 USAFAS AH.

94

requirements. Successful test results permitted development and testing to continue that

laid the groundwork for a milestone c decision in June 2013 and award of a low-rate

initial production contract.108

The Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) approved the requirements

listed in the M109 FOV capability production document on 16 December 2011 as an

acquisition category ID program. Concerns continued about the increasing costs and

government risk generated by a poor contract structure choice. Following the JROC, a

Defense Acquisition Board in December 2011 approved a modification to the contract

from a cost plus fixed-fee type to a cost plus incentive-fee type. This would reduce

overall costs and incentivize the contractor with additional money to deliver a quality

product on time. The new contract modification also extended the period of performance

for developmental testing through 2015.109

Subsequently, the Army conducted several key events in 2012. From May to

November 2012, it conducted a logistics demonstration. During the demonstration,

soldiers performed field level operations and maintenance to demonstrate the PIM’s

suitability for maintenance in the field and the requirement to update procedures in the

draft technical manuals. Running from October to November 2012, the limited users test

gave soldiers the first opportunity to employ the PIM in an operational environment.

Following individual and collective training, soldiers from the 4-27th Field Artillery

Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, ran two

72-hour scenarios with the PIM and CAT, firing 1,255 rounds and driving 882 miles.

The soldiers demonstrated the PIM’s ability to deliver accurate and timely fires in an

operational environment. Essentially, the limited user test helped prove how soldiers

would be able to operate the system and provided additional data showing that the system

could continue development testing and move into low-rate initial production in 2013.110

More good news followed in 2013. A site coordination meeting with BAE, the

________________________ 108

Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12;

Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army

Acquisition Support Center Information Paper, subj: Army Developing New Self-

Propelled Howitzer,” live.usaac.info, 27 Oct 11, Doc III-64, 2011 USAFAS AH; Kris

Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 1 Sep

11, Doc III-65, 2011 USAFAS AH. 109

Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: EXSUM

CCM, 9 Jan 12, Doc III-66, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: DRM EXSUM, 5 Dec 11,

Doc III-67, 2011 USAFAS AH; CPD, 21 Dec 11, Doc III-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email

with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 110

Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, 8 Feb 13, Doc III-

37, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 Jan 13, Doc III-

38, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management Program,”

RedLeg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-39, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM Input to

2012 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-39a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with

atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup Article, 9 Apr 13, Doc III-39b, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing,

subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-49.

95

Product Manager, Self-propelled Howitzer System, and Fort Sill concerning the Elgin

PIM production facility reaffirmed the significant of PIM and the suitability of the

facility. In October 2013 Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems announced

that PIM passed a major hurdle when it received milestone c approval from the Defense

Acquisition Executive. This allowed PIM to move into low-rate initial production of 19

howitzers and 19 carrier ammunition tracked vehicles. The Army scheduled low-rate

initial production to begin in 2014 with the first vehicles coming of the production during

the first quarter of FY 2015 and full-rate production in 2017 with first unit equipped in

FY 2017.111

Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G

The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining

System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly

and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the

original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS

in 1981.112

Because of age and escalating maintenance costs with PADS, the Army acted. In

June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a

continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on

12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a

replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Positioning and Azimuth Determining

System (IPADS). Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground,

Arizona, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the Army decided in June 2004 to field the system

and awarded a contract to L3 Communications of New Jersey in September 2004 to

produce the system. Fielding began in August 2005 under a conditional material release

until 2007 and was completed in mid-2009.113

In 2006 and early 2007 Fort Sill began working to incorporate a SAASM Global

Positioning System (GPS) Card into IPADS which would almost eliminate zero velocity

updates (ZUPs) and extend its area of coverage. The GPS-augmented IPADS would be

________________________ 111

PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin

Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision, 24 Oct 13,

Doc III-50; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; “Paladin

Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 Nov 13, Doc III-51; Fires Forward, Nov 13,

Doc III-52; Email with atch, subj: M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation, 6

Mar 14, Doc III-53. 112

2002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 85. 113

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires

Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97; L-3 Information

Paper, subj: L-3 Communications Space and Navigation Awarded Major Indirect Fire

Support Contract in Support of U.S. Army TACOM, 13 Sep 04, Doc III-40, 2012

USAFAS AH.

96

called IPADS-G.114

In February 2008 an IPADS-G prototype was successfully tested

over a distance of 230 kilometers for 60 minutes without stopping for a ZUP. This

capability increased artillery timeliness, availability of fires, lethality, survivability, and

force protection on extended convoys or artillery missions. The contractor began

developmental work on IPADS-G in 2010.115

Fielding for IPAD-G began in September 2012 and was later put on hold because

of a manufacture error with the GPS card. In January 2013 fielding started again

beginning with the 5-25th Fires Battalion of the 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Combat

Team, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Currently, the Army planned to field eight IPAD-G units per

month until all Field Artillery brigades and battalions had the system. Each brigade

combat team would have two IPAD-Gs, while each fires brigade would have three IPAD-

Gs.116

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES CELL

Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble During the first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning

System (GPS) aided munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Guided Multiple

Launch Rocket System Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar outpaced the

dismounted forward observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate

manner. Weight, power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of

simultaneous voice and digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward

observer at company and below from exploiting precision munitions. Although Precision

Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for

precision strikes, it generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer.

As a result, the dismounted forward observer did not have the ability to employ precision

munitions because he could not provide precise target location. As one Field

________________________ 114

2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

(USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97. 115

2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 124-25; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School

Annual History, pp. 129-30; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir,

TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2001 USAFAS AH; L-3 Communications

Information Paper, subj: L-3 Awarded Contract to Add GPS Capabilities to U.S. Army’s

IPADS Equipment, 16 Sep 10, Doc III-41, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with

Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-42, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, subj: Products and Services, 21 Jan 14, Doc III-54. 116

Email with atch, subj: IPADS Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 8 Feb

13, Doc III-43, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Improved Position and Azimuth

Determining System-GPS Aided ECP, New Material Introduction, undated, Doc III-44,

2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj; TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires,

22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO, Doc III-55.

97

Artilleryman indicated, the munitions would fly precisely to the assigned coordinates, but

those coordinate would be incorrect.117

With this in mind, the Training and Doctrine Command (TCM) Fires Cell at Fort

Sill, Oklahoma, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at Fort Belvoir,

Virginia, launched an initiative to revolutionize the dismounted forward observer’s

capabilities with the Precision Fires Warrior (PFW) ensemble that addressed the Fires

Center of Excellence’s number one capability gap – the inability of the dismounted

forward observer to locate ground targets rapidly with better than 10-meter accuracy in

all conditions without target mensuration to prevent engagement with precision indirect

fire systems.118

Conceived in June 2012, the ensemble included a collection of technology that

would be worn by the Soldier on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest. The heart of the

ensemble was the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called an End User Device (EUD). While

running the FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the

selected situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate

targets precisely, the dismounted precise warrior would employ the hand-held Joint

Effects Targeting System (JETS) that would be capable of night observation, target

location, and designation and that was under development with fielding scheduled for

2016. Until then, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Lightweight Laser

Designator Rangefinder 2H (LLDR-2H).119

The precision fires warrior ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer

the capability of employing all of the available precision munitions and ability to locate a

target for precision munitions without mensuration. As planned in 2012-2013, the Army

would field the ensemble initially to the Fire Supporters in the Infantry Brigade Combat

Team followed by the Armored Brigade Combat Team and the Stryker brigade combat

team.120

________________________ 117

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45, 2012 USAFAS AH;

“Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS

AH; MAJ Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward

Observer Generation,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 13, pp. 40-41, Doc III-56. 118

Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer

Generation: Precision Fires Warrior,” pp. 40-41. 119

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior

Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next

Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; Scott McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in

Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc III-57; Email with atch,

subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-58. 120

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior

Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch,

subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next

Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in

98

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical

In 2013 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) leveraged the networked

battlefield more than ever with the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)

that was a multi-year program to improve communications. In 1982 the Army acquired

the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system to fill the communications requirements

from division down to battalion. Adopted before the widespread availability of satellite

communications technology, the MSE required installation and maintenance of relay

towers, was designed primarily for voice communications, and had limited beyond-line-

of-sight capabilities. Military operations during Operation Desert Storm (OIF) in Iraq of

1991, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2001, and Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) of 2003 revealed the inability of MSE systems to keep with highly mobile

and dispersed forces in a digital environment and the need for beyond-the-line-of-sight

communication capabilities.121

To meet an urgent requirement to satisfy this need and to communicate on the

move, the Army conceived the Joint Network Node (JNN) in 2002. Work began that

year on JNN with fielding coming in 2004. However, the formal program of record for

the JNN was designated as WIN-T Increment 1 (completed fielding in 2012) in June

2007 to bridge the gap between MSE and full WIN-T on-the-move capabilities. WIN-T

Increment I provided beyond-line-of-sight communications and enabled units to operate

autonomously. It also provided the battalion and above with the ability to connect to the

Army’s digitized voice, data, and video systems via satellite Internet connection at the

quick-halt. Subsequently, the Army upgraded WIN-T Increment I to Increment Ia to give

access to the Ka-band defense Wideband Global Satellite and to reduce reliance upon

commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, while Increment 1b added the Net Centric

Waveform that optimized bandwidth and satellite utilization and improved information

input and colorless core technology that satisfied Global Information Assurance security

compliance requirements.122

As the Army fielded WIN-T Increment 1a and 1b, it conducted developmental

tests with WIN-T Increment 2 in May 2012, started limited fielding in September 2012,

conducted additional successful tests in May 2013 to reassess its ability to satisfy Army

____________________

Precision Targeting,” pp. 26-28; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24

Mar 14. 121

Email with atch, subj; Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-47, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward,” Signal Online, www.afcea.org, Jul 12,

Doc III-48, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon, 15

Oct 13, Doc III-59. 122

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches

Forward;” PEO Command, Control, and Communications, subj: WIN-T Increment I, 18

Dec 13, Doc III-60; WIN-T Commander’s Handbook (Extract), undated, Doc III-61;

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Report (Extract), Feb 12, Doc

III-; Executive Summary, Selected Acquisition Report, Defense Acquisition

Management, 31 Dec 11, Doc III-62; Information Paper, Lockheed Martin, subj: WIN-T,

undated, Doc III-63; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon, 15 Oct 13.

99

reliability and maintainability standards and to validate continued fielding, and initiated

full-rate production in 2013. Increment 2 provided a single integrated tactical network

program by leveraging proven commercial and government technology and furnished on-

the-move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It also enabled network mobility by

employing military and commercial satellite connectivity and line-of-sight terrestrial

radios operating on the Joint Tactical Radio System and antennas to achieve end-to-end

connectivity and dynamic networking operations. Equally important, Increment 2

extended the network to company/battery level within the brigade combat team.123

In 2012-2013 the Army scheduled two more increments for fielding in the near

future. Undergoing engineering, manufacturing, and development in 2013 to deliver full

networking on the move, WIN-T Increment 3 would provide fully mobile, flexibly

dynamic tactical networking capability needed to support highly dispersed forces over

isolated areas with fielding coming in 2019-2024, while Increment 4, the

Transformational Satellite Communications System would furnish the Department of

Defense with a high data rate Military Satellite Communications and Internet-like

services.124

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle

In 2013 the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) fielded as a replacement to the

M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV) served as the Field Artillery’s fire support vehicle

for the heavy forces, such as the heavy brigade combat team. Late in the 1970s, a U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study

Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides

reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the

mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the

group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure

communications.125

________________________ 123

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches

Forward;” Information Papers, PEO Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, subj:

WIN-T, undated, Doc III-49, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PEO Command,

Control, and Communications, subj: WIN-T Increment 2, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-64;

Director of Test and Evaluations Report (DOTE) (Extract), subj: WIN-T, 2012, pp. 123-

25, Doc III-65; WIN-T Commander’s Handbook (Extract), undated; Press Release, 16

Sep 13, Doc III-66; “Army Approved to Continue Fielding WIN-T Increment 2,” Army

News Service, 8 Oct 13, Doc III-67; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon,

15 Oct 13. 124

“Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches

Forward;” Information Paper, PEO, Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, subj:

WIN-T, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-; DOTE Report (Extract), 2012, pp. 123-25; Information

Paper, subj: WIN-T Increment 3, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-68; Office of the Unfer Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller), Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System (Extract), Feb 12,

Doc III-69. 125

2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39.

100

After funding had become available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver

arms had received their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the

BFIST became a reality. As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned

two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The

M7 BFIST would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2

ODS chassis. The M7A1 would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3

chassis with the fire support mission package.126

After several years of developmental work, the project manager modified the

acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by initiating an engineering change proposal to

the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This

meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially planned. The M3A3 BFIST (A3

BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7

fire support mission package, and would be fielded beginning in 2004 to counterattack

units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST

existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support

missions as of 2003-2004.127

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit A3

BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location system for

underarmor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the A3 BFIST

with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available. The FS3 would allow the fire

support team to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater

ranges while remaining buttoned up (protected by the vehicle’s armor) and would give

the A3 BFIST the same capability as the Stryker fire support platform and the M1200

Armored Knight. The critical design was approved on 18 June 2008; and an integrated

development test with soldiers was completed in February 2010. The 2nd Brigade, 3rd

Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, was the first unit equipped; and this came in

June 2011.128

Meanwhile, the Army awarded BAE a contract in 2010 to upgrade Bradley

M2A2, M2A3, and M7 to the Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness (SA)

configuration. This program would bring these vehicles, approximately 353 for select

Army National Guard units, close to those of the A3 by integrating the latest digitized

________________________ 126

2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 127

2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95. 128

2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009

U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 131; FCOE CSM

Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj:

BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS

AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb

11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30, Doc

III-69; FCOS CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-70, 2011 USAFAS AH;

“Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-71, 2011 USAFAS AH.

101

electronics to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and enhanced

communications hardware with the 81st Brigade Combat Team of the Washington Army

National Guard receiving their modernization Bradley Operation Deseret Storm SA

vehicles in October 2010. As the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems

explained in 2013, the modernization effort would fully digitize the entire force when the

last Bradley Operation Desert Storm SA vehicles were fielded during FY 2015.129

Knight Vehicle

The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) employed the M981 fire support

vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored

and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used the High

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) as their scout vehicles. In response

to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of

April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle

technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements

Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and

recommended developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by

integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known

as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility,

and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common

signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support

teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the

Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle,

as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver

brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid

Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for

rapid development.130

Over the next several years, several critical developments with Striker occurred.

Early in 1999, the Army type classified the system as the M707 Striker (mounted on the

M1025 HMMWV) and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to

be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through

successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division

that would be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the

________________________ 129

2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to

2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11;

FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 10; FCOE CSM Newsletter

(Extract), Mar 11, p. 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; “Ground

Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 12, Doc III-50,

2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Col Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and

Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-51, 2012 USAFAS AH; PEO Ground

Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, Doc III-

70; Army, Oct 13, pp. 322-24, Doc III-71. 130

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144.

102

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard

units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. In addition, the Army fielded the

Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002 and to additional active component units

and Army National Guard units in 2003-2004. To avoid confusion with the Stryker

Brigade Combat Team, meanwhile, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.131

In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the M1025

version of the HMMWV and the planned replacement the M1114 would no longer be

able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the

Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because increased

vehicle weight would create excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures

Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program

Manager agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement.

Subsequently on 17 April 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 validated

Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with

five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two

concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to

change the platform of the M707 Knight system from the M1114 HMMWV based

system to a M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system.132

Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and

designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight for employment by the COLT.

Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007.

In October 2007 the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200 Armored Knights.

The 101st Division received its first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007 with regular

fielding beginning in February 2008 and continuing into 2013 with production ending in

the first quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. Through the end of FY 2013, the Army had

fielded 465 M1200 Armored Knights to COLTS in armored brigade combat teams,

infantry brigade combat teams, Stryker brigade combat teams, and battlefield surveillance

brigades, and Fire Support Teams in infantry brigade combat teams.133

________________________ 131

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.

96. 132

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128. 133

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11,

pp. 338-40, Doc III-72, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: M1200

Armored Knight, 11 Mar 13, Doc III-52, 2012 USAFAS AH; Army, Oct 13, p. 324, Doc

III-72; Information Paper, subj: Armored Knight, undated, Doc III-73.

103

In October 2013, meanwhile, the Armored Knight M1200 entered sustainment.

Force structuring designated the elimination of the COLT requirement at the company

level and replaced it with the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition

(RSTA) squadron requirement and moved the Armored Knight into this role. This

reduced the number of Knights required by 153.134

Subsequently, the Army began working Armored Knight M1200 obsolescence

issues in January 2014. Recognizing the obsolescence of the Knight’s targeting station

control panel and mission processing unit, the Army decided to replace them with the

Mounted Family of Computer Systems over the next several years to improve planning,

monitoring, and executing missions. In addition, efforts by the Maneuver Center of

Excellence drove the need for netted sensor capability to facilitate the RSTA role to

provide target handoff capability for joint munitions precision targeting.

Communications improvements, in the meantime, envisioned upgrading beyond-line-of

sight capability with the replacement of SINCGARS communications suite with the

maneuver network vehicular radio communications suite, while platform discussions

recognized the Knight platform had met its essential useful life cycle and proposed

replacing it with the joint light tactical vehicle.135

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator

Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision munitions. The system

weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support team, did not meet its

needs, and was not man-portable. In response to this situation and the lack of a man-

portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an

Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

(LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in

February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained

unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquisition. Combining

technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning

System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight,

compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides

determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to

perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and

more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its

modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location

configuration the LLDR weighed about 20 pounds and had the ability of locating targets

accurately out to 10 kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather

capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous

day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If

needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to

________________________ 134

Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-74. 135

Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances Standardized Tactical Computer,”

www.army.mil/article/109748, 27 Aug 14, Doc III-75; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires

Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14.

104

designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration

would increase the system’s weight to 35 pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be

used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.136

Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing

revealed some deficiencies. As a result, the Army developed a corrective action plan;

and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army decided to move into it

low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive

the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models;

but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York

City and the Pentagon caused the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special

Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne

Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade

Combat Team, shared 66 LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded 15 test LLDRs to the

82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system’s

weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in

2004.137

In December 2003 the Army made the LLDR full-rate production decision with

contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted fielding priorities at the same time.

LRIP fielding priority shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry

Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it

received 21 LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s

combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received 20 LLDRs in conjunction with M707

Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery

School for enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units

deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in

Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry

Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.138

In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved

accelerating LLDR production and increased funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2113

Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per

month, doubling every six months until a full-rate production of 40 per month would be

achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the total

force. In fact, the Army completed fielding LLDR, also called LLDR-1, in 2011.139

Meanwhile in October 2006, the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year

performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated the effort as the

LLDR-2. Product improvements included improved day-and-night imaging performance,

________________________ 136

2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46. 137

2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003

USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 138

2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 139

2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-

1, 2012, Doc III-74, 2011 USAFAS AH.

105

solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability, and a five-pound

overall weight reduction to the system. The improvements would be available in FY 2010

without an increase in unit cost. Fielding began in FY 2011 to units supporting OEF.140

Meanwhile on 21 September 2010, the Army G-3 acknowledged the LLDR’s

need for better accuracy to support current and future precision munitions. As a result, it

began development on the LLDR-2H, initiated testing in 2010, and awarded a contract to

retrofit the LLDR-1 and the LLDR-2 as the high-accuracy LLDR-2H. Fielded in 2012-

2013, the new system incorporated the High Accuracy Azimuth Device that would not be

subject to the magnet interference issues that had plagued existing target locator systems.

The device had three cameras, one day and two nights, that could map the location of the

sun and stars and could compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate

direction and angular deviation to permit the soldier to call for fire with precision-

munitions. A limited number of hardened prototype LLDR-2Hs had been produced as of

2012. In February 2014, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division was the first unit to be

fielded the new precision targeting device. Current funding supported the fielding of four

brigade combat teams per year.141

Joint Effects Targeting System

In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) directed the services to

develop a common laser-targeting device requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps,

Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began developing the Joint Effects

Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System

(TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, they would

enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special

operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available

effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire) and

to designate stationary targets out to five kilometers and moving targets out to three

kilometers. A forward observer equipped with JETS with TLDS capabilities would be

capable of target recognition out to ranges of 3,000 meters during the day and 1,300

meters during the night with sufficient accuracy for the employment of precision

munitions without mensuration. TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness

(BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers. On 19 September 2005 the

________________________ 140

2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS),

ACH, p. 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-

99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information

Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, 2012 USAFAS AH. 141

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17

Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010

Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj:

LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53, 2012

USAFAS AH; PEO Soldier Information Paper, subj: LLDR, 12 Dec 12, Doc III-76; BG

Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr

13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-77; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14,

Doc III-77a.

106

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the initial capabilities

documents (ICD).142

In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead

component for JETS. The Army made Program Executive Office Soldier the material

developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development

of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the

capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being

conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS was

released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the

TECS capability development document.143

In July 2010 a meeting held at the Pentagon with milestone decision authority led

to a successful milestone a decision for the JETS TLDS. This moved JETS from the

material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase where

technology demonstrator prototypes would be developed and where the draft Capabilities

Development Document would be completed for final staffing. Two years later in 2012,

the Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, awarded the

contract to design, develop, fabricate, test, and deliver prototypes for engineering and

manufacturing development of the system with fielding scheduled for 2016.144

Until JETS could be fielded, the Army planned to field the Quick Reaction

Capability (QRC) hand-held targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted

forward observer with the ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and

within the standards required to employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC would

bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the

objective JETS. The QRC capability was awarded to two industry partners to create

celestial-based precision targeting devices under a Rapid Equipping Force (REF)

initiative. Both vendors had technical challenges with the integration of the celestial

cameras to determine direction, causing the Army to consider a limited fielding of the

QRC to Special Forces approximately one year late. Fielding of this capability was

originally April 2013. The QRC effort has been invaluable in informing JETS

________________________ 142

2004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 97; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization

Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78. 143

2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH,

p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26; Email with atch, subj:

TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery

School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 144

Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17

Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010

Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj:

Joint Effects Targeting System, 12 Jun 12, Doc III-54, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information

Paper, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation

System, undated, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7

Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012 USAFAS AH.

107

requirements and mitigating the technical challenges associated with celestial cameras.145

Fire Support Sensor System

The Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) was an engineer change proposal to the

Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The engineer change

proposal integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator

Rangefinder (LLDR) onto the LRAS3 that in turn could be mounted on the Knight and

Striker fire support vehicle and potentially BFIST in the future. The FS3 would be

complemented by the platform’s mission equipment package, providing very accurate

self-location and accurate target location. The FS3 would be the most capable

observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.146

Fielding the FS3 began in 2006. The 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)

at Fort Lewis, Washington, was retrofitted with the FS3 in February-April 2006. The 4th

SBCT received its FS3s in July-September 2006 while the 3rd SBCT, currently deployed,

was retrofitted upon returning from its overseas deployment. Integrating the FS3 onto the

M3A3 BFIST began in 2007 and continued into 2011. In 2013 the FS3 gave the Field

Artillery a capable target location and designation sensor.147

Profiler

In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the

existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS) with the MMS-Profiler. The MMS

produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde

instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given

the current state of operational numerical weather prediction systems, the single local

balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in

capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried high

operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational

Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System

(TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a

system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended

battle space out to 500 kilometers. The system would provide vital target area

meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that

acquired information from weather satellites and other MET sensors for use in the

________________________ 145

Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; McKiernan, “Field Artillery

Modernization Strategy,” pp. 6-9; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History,

24 Mar 14, Doc III-79. 146

2004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 96. 147

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 129; Email with atch, subj: TPSO History for 2010, 22

Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Annual History

(AH); “Ground Combat System,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-75, 2011 USAFAS AH;

“Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 09, p. 355, Doc III-76, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Raytheon Information Paper, subj: FS3, 2011, Doc III-77, 2011 USAFAS AH.

108

employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming.

The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather

conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army

issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler

system. The initial program schedule called for operational testing in Fiscal Year (FY)

2003 and low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter

of FY 2003. Production of 83 systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first

quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be equipped in the second quarter

of FY 2005.148

Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army

changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during

the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision

after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range,

New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Following

these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and

fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. The Profiler program

began full-rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Office for

Intelligence, Electronic Warfare granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM)

Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted an initial five FRP

Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent

material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the

Army approved full material release and fielded the MMS-Profiler, also known as MMS-

Profiler I, from 2008 through 2010.149

Meanwhile, Fort Sill began developmental work on the Block II Profiler system

(AN/TMQ-42B). Block II would reduce the system’s footprint, leverage technology and

software advancements to achieve improved accuracy, and eliminate the balloon and

radiosonde subsystem. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires

Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, approved

eliminating the use of the balloon and the radiosonde. Basically, obtaining

meteorological data was no longer dependent upon a balloon borne radiosonde and was

no longer based upon the modeling of the atmosphere. With the elimination of the

balloon and radiosonde came some logistical savings. The Army was able to reduce the

________________________ 148

2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and

Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc

III-53, 2013 USAFAS AH 149

2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS)

Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov

09, p. 10, Doc III-102, 2010 USAFCOEFS ACH; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH,

p. 87; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), pp. 123-24; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler I, 28 Jan

09, Doc III-36, 2010 USAFAS AH.

109

size of the Profiler crew from six to two and the number of vehicles from three to one.

Equally important, the Army achieved all Block II requirements (eliminating the balloon

and radiosonde) in Block I that completed fielding in November 2011.150

The next step in the evolution of the Profiler system involved moving to the Block

III configuration that the Army authorized in September 2010. Block III Profiler

(Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler) would further reduce the footprint by limiting

the equipment to a laptop computer, would reduce the number of soldiers from two to

zero, and would be embedded in the tactical operations center via a local area network

and eventual integration within the Fire Support Command and Control software. Block

III would provide meteorological data to target acquisition radars, cannons, rockets,

missiles, and mortars to improve first round hits, to conserve ammunition, to achieve

surprise, and to reduce the chances of fratricide. The Army completed developmental

testing in 2011-2012 and approved development of the system in 2012 with fielding

starting in 2013 and continuing into 2014.151

Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Systems

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. For the past 20 years, the

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) served as the Field Artillery’s

primary fire support and mission command system. In 2013 AFATDS processed,

analyzed, and exchanged combat information and furnished fully automated support for

planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fires and effects. It supported mortars,

field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles, close air support, attack aviation, and navel

________________________ 150

2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires

Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p.

95; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 127-29; Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09;

Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010, Doc III-37, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE

CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-38, 2010 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, subj: MMS-P I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-39, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview

with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-40,

2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-78, 2011

USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Field Artillery, 21 Sep 11, Doc III-

79, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012

USAFAS AH. 151

Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter

(Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-80, 2011

USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data-

Profiler, undated, Doc III-57, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PEO IEW&S, 18

May 10, Doc III-58, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13,

Doc III-59, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P/Computer

Meteorological Data-Profiler, undated, Doc III-80; Information Paper, subj; ARL

Scientists Assist the Army and Marine to Retain Artillery MET Capability, 18 Apr 13,

Doc III-80a.

110

surface fire support systems.152

Fielding began in 1996 with the original AFATDS version 96 (also version one)

with planned updates to improve the software over a period of years. To accommodate

growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding

schedule in 1996. The Army fielded three variations of AFATDS version two software

as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and AFATDS software

version three in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version 7 in 2000 to match

Army Battlefield Command System numbering). Fielded in 1998, AFATDS 97 furnished

corps and echelons-above-corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to

plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. Later in 2000,

the Army fielded AFATDS 98 which was the first AFATDS software version to address

specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.153

Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS

99 (A99), renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Command System

(ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced

AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. It reorganized and

simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts,

created shortcuts, and incorporated technical fire direction. Equally important, the new

capabilities of Version 6.3 eliminated the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon

field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple Launch Rocket System

(MLRS). Also, Version 6 had improved interoperability with other ABCS computers,

underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems,

including the French Automation des tires et liaison de l-Artillery sol-so (ATLAS), the

German Artillerie Daten, Lage und Einsatz-Rechnerverbund (ADLER), the Italian

Sistema Informatico di Reggimento (SIR), and the United Kingdom Battlefield Artillery

Target Engagement System (BATES), and was a part of the Artillery Systems

Cooperative Activity (ASCA). ASCA was created to provide guidance for establishing

interface among the five nations’ automated field artillery systems.154

As the fielding of AFATDS 6.3.1 that replaced Version 6.3 in 2003 moved

forward, meanwhile, the Army proceeded with the development of AFATDS 6.4 which

was formerly AFATDS Version 7 (AFATDS version 3/AFATDS 00). Pushing to

automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum

standard and directed that Version 7 would not be developed. To ensure full integration

with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working the training development for

________________________ 152

Information Paper, Program Executive Office Command, Control, and

Communications, subj: FSC2, 16 Apr 14, Doc III-81. 153

2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 148-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90. 154

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2005

USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

(USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 102-03; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; Artillery Systems

Cooperation Activities Operator’s Notebook (Extract), 11 Oct 06, pp. 1-3, Doc III-101,

2009 USAFAS AH.

111

ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 in 2003-2004. The ABCS Operational Test for AFATDS 6.4 was

conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, involving the 4th Infantry Division and elements of the

III Corps Artillery, from March 2004 to April 2004. Early in 2005, a general officer

steering committee approved universal fielding and training on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4.

Individual military occupational specialty (MOS) training was initiated in the Field

Artillery School in October 2005; and the Army began fielding ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 to

the Total Force. In addition to this, AFATDS Version 6.4.0.1, supporting Excalibur, was

fielded in 2007, while AFATDS Version 6.4.0.2 was released in September 2008.

Priority fielding went to units deploying or deployed in support of Operation Iraqi

Freedom; and AFATDS Version 6.5 (Windows version) was granted full materiel release

in December 2008, while AFATDS Version 6.5.0.1 (Windows version) was achieved in

June 2010.155

Meanwhile, the Army initiated work on AFATDS Version 6.6 (Windows

version), started fielding it in 2010, and completed it in 2012. This version modernized

fire planning and scheduling by permitting drag and drop and time scheduling, among

other improvements. For this version, the entire human interface moved to Java, the Fire

Planning/Target Scheduling Worksheet was completely redesigned; and a web portal was

created to access AFATDS data through a web browser using the Nonsecure Internet

Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

(SIPRNET) network. Air support features were improved to include a digital link to the

U.S. Marine Corps’s TLDHS (strikelink); and digital threads were now able to be

processed from initial request through aircraft control and mission complete.156

Released in early 2011, AFATDS Version 6.7.0 replaced AFATDS Version 6.6.

Capabilities included multiple precision aim point missions, expanded AFATDS interface

to Centaur, and a digital link to U.S. Air Force’s Terminal Air Control Party (TACP) for

close air support (CAS) management. Basically, Version 6.7 automated fire support

planning and coordination for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and automated

planning, coordinating, and controlling of all fire support assets in the joint battlespace

(field artillery, mortars, close air support, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and offensive

electronic warfare). Because of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring

Freedom in Afghanistan, the contractor added precision fires capabilities and other

capabilities, such as automatic conduct of unit fratricide avoidance checks and collateral

damage avoidance.157

________________________ 155

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 134-35; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 140; Information Paper, subj:

PM Battle Command, undated, Doc III-57, 2010 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item

Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-60, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj:

TCM Fires Cell 2013 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-79. 156

Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11, Doc III-59, 2010

USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11; Email with atch,

subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14. 157

Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11; RDT&E Budget

Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11;

112

Needing improved capabilities, the Army signed a contract with Raytheon for the

development of AFATDS 6.8x (Bridging Effort) to replace AFATDS Version 6.7.0.2

around 2015. This version would focus on improving and simplifying the user interface

while enhancing speed and capabilities. It would introduce more robust airspace control

measures (ACM) processing as well as a new and revised airspace request conforming to

the Department of Defense Form 1970, Motor Equipment Utilization Record. In June

2011 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the AFATDS

Increment II Capability Development Document. AFATDS Increment II would migrate

all field artillery command and control systems under it around 2018-2025. This would

include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire

Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and Joint Automated Deeps

Operations Coordination System (JADOCS).158

Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility for the Field

Artillery, the Army adopted hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that

the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the

capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the

Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) to transmit and receive fire support messages

and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur) to provide technical fire

support capability as a backup for AFATDS for fielding.159

A lightweight, portable, low-power Rugged Personal Digital Assistant designed

for the dismounted forward observer, the PFED with an integrated Global Positioning

System capability utilized a laser ranger finder and a precision fire imagery application to

generate a grid coordinate and sent the grid coordinate to the Advanced Field Artillery

Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Basically, the PFED was a handheld tactical device.

The forward observer used it to compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display

messages, process data, and monitor status employed in the conduct, planning, and

execution of fire support missions. With the Precision Fire Imagery software PFED gave

the dismounted observer the capability to mensurate the target and provide a precision

grid in his call for fire.160

During 2013, Field Artillerymen also used the Centaur. It was a rugged personal

____________________

USMC Systems Command Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated, Doc III-

61. 158

USMC Systems Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated;

“AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc III-62,

2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13; BG Brian

J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp.

6-9, Doc III-78; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; BG

Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc

III-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a. 159

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105. 160

Kathryn Bailey, “Handheld Fires App Lightens the Load for Forward

Observers,” 20 Dec 13, www.army.mil/article/117413, Doc III-83.

113

digital assistant that computed a technical firing solution for cannon units. It was used as

a backup to AFATDS, performed a mandatory check for AFATDS firing data, and

computed range safety data in an operational environment. Additionally, it provided

immediate and early entry automated fire direction capabilities and auxiliary technical

fire control for Light/Heavy Fire Direction Centers and the Cannon Firing Platoon

Leaders. It computed automated safety, displayed safety-T, checked computed firing

solutions against safety-T, and identified violations.161

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES BRIGADE

Fires Radar Strategy

As of 2013, the Field Artillery had five target acquisition radars – AN/TPQ-36,

AN/TPQ-37, AN/TPQ-48, AN/TPQ-49, and AN/TPQ-53 target acquisition radars – in its

inventory and a modernization plan for each. However, the Field Artillery required a

strategy to guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained resources that would reduce

the number of radars and that would provide a way forward to accomplish the Fires core

mission of detecting, tracking, classifying, and identifying aerial objects, including

manned and unmanned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, cannon artillery

projectiles, and mortar projectiles. In the near term (Fiscal Years 2015-2019) the Army

planned to merge the short-range field artillery radar Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar

(AN/TPQ-48 and AN/TPQ-49) that were not programs of record, leaving just the

AN/TPQ-50, and to retire the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37, leaving only the AN/TPQ-

53. The Q-53 and Q-50 would provide the Field Artillery force with 360-degree target

acquisition capability, improved range, improved mobility, and decreased maintenance

requirements over the Q-36 and Q-37.162

Enhanced AN/TPQ-36/53 Radar

In view of the operational environment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the need to replace the AN/TPQ-

36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars with their limited scan capabilities, the Army

decided in 2002 to field a new radar with the ability to locate medium range indirect fire

systems in a 360-degree radius. Based on this, the Futures Development and Integration

Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar

to make it the Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar that would incorporate new technology into

the existing radar, would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and

accuracy in a 90-degree mode, would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree

capability against only mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and

rockets, and would replace the aging Q-36 and Q-37 radars that had originated in the

1970s. Developmental work by Lockheed Martin started in January 2007.163

________________________ 161

Information Paper, Program Executive Office Command, Control, and

Communications, subj: FSC2, 19 Dec 13, Doc III-83a. 162

Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 45-

47, Doc III-84; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, Doc III-85. 163

Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition

114

Shortly afterwards, an urgent material release prompted the Army to develop and

field a Quick Response Capability (QRC) EQ-36 radar to support OIF. In Fiscal Year

(FY) 2008 the Army approved developing 12 QRC EQ-36 radars. Later, the Army

authorized procuring 38 QRC EQ-36 radars to meet combat operation requirements. Of

these, Lockheed Martin would produce 36 based upon an initial production contract of

July 2008 while another company would provide the rest. As of 2013, the Army directed

the purchase of 45 QRC radars.164

Meanwhile, a production capabilities document in September 2010 outlined the

requirements for a system of record with comparable capabilities as the QRC EQ-36

radar and initiated the program of record QRC EQ-36 as the AN/TPQ-53. In August

2011 the Army released a proposal contract to industry for low-rate initial production

with the intention of selecting a contractor in FY 2012 to produce 33 program of record

Q-53 radars with increased range over the Q-37, the capability to perform continuous

____________________

Radar, undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper,

subj: Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-91,

2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13,

Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH. 164

Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13

Apr 12, Doc III-92, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: Q-37,

undated, Doc III-93, 2011 USAFAS AH; U.S. Army Information Paper, subj: Enhanced

Q-36, undated, Doc III-94, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Matt

Merrick, Dir, CDID, 25 Jan 12, Doc III-95, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj:

EQ-36 Radar System, 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; “First U.S. Army EQ-36

Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 9 Sep 10, Doc III-97, 2011 USAFAS AH;

Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar,

undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, FY 2010, Doc III-98,

2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-99, 2011

USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-

96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-73,

2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires

Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, DOTE, subj;

EQ-36, undated, Doc III-74, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13

Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26,

Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System,

FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch,

19 May 11, Doc III-67, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost,

Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-68, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup

with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on AN/TPQ-53,

AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-68a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum

for Record with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-68b, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability

Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-86; Briefing,

subj: Fires Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-87.

115

360-degree coverage, and solid state components to reduce maintenance requirements.

The Q-53 would also reduce operational and support costs, would have a minimum range

of 500 meters and a maximum range of 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes,

displaced in two minutes, would be equipped with an auto-leveling system, could be

operated by a crew of four, and would be linked by digital tactical radios to the Advanced

Field Artillery Tactical Digital System (AFATDS) for mission processing. Once these

Q-53 radars had been fielded, the Army planned to retrofit the QRC EQ-36 radars to

make them Q-53 radars and completed a limited users test for the Q-53 in October 2012.

The Army also planned to conduct an initial operational test and evaluation in 2014, to

make a full-rate production decision in 2015, and to hold a follow-on test and evaluation

in 2015. The Army outlined fielding the Q-53 to the brigade combat teams and fires

brigades and intended to replace the Q-36 and Q-37 radars with the Q-53.165

AN/TPQ-37 Radar

Although the Army planned to replace the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 radar which

was first fielded in the 1970s and underwent several modernization programs over the

next several decades, the Army acknowledged that it would be around for several more

years. Based on this, the Army decided to upgrade it for the heavy and Stryker brigade

combat teams and the fires brigades. Thales Raytheon Systems developed reliability and

maintainability initiative kits in 2011-2012 to incorporate into the Q-37 to reduce

sustainment costs and increase the life span of the radar system beyond its scheduled

retirement date of Fiscal Year 2019.166

________________________ 165

Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS

AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH;

DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011

USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, III-73 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing

(Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-69, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-

70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, III-66, 2012

USAFAS AH; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, III-68a,

2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command

Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,”

Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, p. 3, Doc III-88; Briefing, subj: Fire Modernization

Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14,

Doc III-89. 166

Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13

Apr 12, Doc III-89, 2011 AH; Information Paper, ThalesRaytheonSystems, 2010, Doc

III-71, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc

III-72, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires

Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Radar

AN/TPQ-37(V)8, 2013, Doc III-74, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4

Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13 Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and

CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-Fires

116

AN/TPQ-50 Radar Over the past several years, the Army worked to introduce the Lightweight

Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar,

the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special

Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars

lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light and

early entry forces, Special Operations Forces had a critical need for lightweight

countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of

short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the Quick

Response Capability (QRC) LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) that was specially designed to support

the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a

maximum range of 7,000 meters and a minimum range of 1,000 meters, the LCMR had

the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities

would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including

those in urban area.167

Subsequently, the Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to

develop and produce the radar. Requirements documentation was written and approved.

Syracuse Research Corporation adopted the Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM)

requirements as a baseline and planned to utilize a spiral development strategy using

increments/versions to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. An operational

needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range would

increase while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR

concept.168

In 2004 the Army started fielding the QRC Q-48 to Special Operations Forces in

Iraq and Afghanistan. With a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100

plus meters, the radar met the immediate needs of deployed forces of the United States

Special Operations Command, while future spirals would satisfy the capability gaps

identified in the operational and organizational concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006,

____________________

Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-90; Email with atch, subj: TCM

Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-91. 167

2004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort

Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, Doc III-52, 2010

USAFAS AH; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine,

Apr 02, Doc III-53, 2010 USAFAS AH; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense

Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil,

Winter 02, Doc III-54, 2010 USAFAS AH; AN/TPQ-48 was the initial designation of the

LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” Army, Feb 11, pp. 63-66, Doc III-

102, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS

AH. 168

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011

USAFAS AH.

117

Increment II/Version II (QRC AN/TPQ-49) provided more rugged hardware and better

software and supported the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (CRAM) system of

systems.169

In 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Office

Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the program of record

LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce LCMR

(AN/TPQ-50) or Increment III/Version III to serve in conjunction with the AN/TPQ-53

radar to track artillery and rockets and friendly fire without having to switch modes.170

After conducting a successful initial operational test and evaluation early in February and

March 2012 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, the Army started fielding the Q-50 in

the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. As of 2013, two Q-50 programs existed: the

ORC and the program of record. The Army planned to remove the QRC AN/TPQ-

48/48A/49 from service by 31 March 2015.171

Multiple Launch Rocket System

Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple Launch Rocket System

(MLRS) in 2013 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and

precision. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in

________________________ 169

2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History,

15 Mar 11, Doc III-55, 2010 USAFAS AH; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” pp. 63-66;

Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper,

Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information

Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-76, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-

70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13,

Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH. 170

Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11; FCoE CSM

Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup

with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011

USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 171

FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS

AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: LCMR, undated, Doc III-105, 2011 USAFAS

AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army Equipment, undated, Doc III-77, 2012 USAFAS AH;

Information Paper, PM Radars, 16 Jan 13, Doc III-78, 2012 USAFAS AH; Presolicitation

Synopsis for LCMR, 15 May 12, Doc III-79, 2012 USAFAS AH; DAC for ARNG

SITREP, Apr 12, Doc III-80, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the

Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-81, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC

Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview,

Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-82, 2012

USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS

AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command

Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-92;

“Update on AN/TPQ 53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, p. 3; Email with

atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-93.

118

1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many

Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including the MLRS

M26 Dual-Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) rocket. Also, the high dud rate of

the M26 rocket, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the safety of

soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with

greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate of the M26 led to the

requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket (M26A2) with a range of 45

kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until

a Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A 45-kilometer range would

increase the commander’s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across

boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews.

However, the Field Artillery required greater accuracy to accompany the increased

range.172

After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS M26A2 rocket in limited

quantities to meet the range requirements identified in ODS, it turned its efforts to the

GMLRS rocket that was already under development and that could be fired from the

M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket

System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free-

flight MLRS M26 or M26A2 rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the

guided rocket’s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would

provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a

maximum of 60-70 kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant,

to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to

conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target,

and would give the MLRS an additional 15 plus kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS.

Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more

survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the

rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November

1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the

United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon

successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit

equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to

slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.173

As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In

May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests for 2001-2002. During

the last one, a rocket flew more than 70 kilometers to the target area and dispensed its

________________________ 172

2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Jeff Froysland and

CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires

Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-92. 173

2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72; Memorandum with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13,

Doc III-63a, 2012 USAFAS AH.

119

submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the

launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and

navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to

permit moving to the next stage of testing.174

Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico,

followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and

ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between

15-70 kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some

technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket’s maturity and accuracy

and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP)

for GMLRS with the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions M30 rocket. Later

on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff

approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding that began in 2003, GMLRS M30 rocket

enhanced the Army’s and Marine Corps’s ability to conduct precision strikes, reduced the

number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extended the range of MLRS 15

kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket was not be well suited for target

engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris

caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral

damage.175

Subsequent to the JROC decision, additional testing occurred. During September

2004 and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They

fired more than 24 GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142

launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GMLRS

with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005. Because of

restrictions imposed by the Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and

Unintended Harm to Civilians implemented in 2008, GMLRS M30, later designated as

GMLRS Increment I, the Army stopped procuring the munition.176

Concurrently, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket,

later designated as GMLRS Increment II (Unitary). Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the

need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of civilian lives during combat

operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army

required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and

investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS

motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a

point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The

proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating

________________________ 174

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73. 175

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89; Froysland

and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,”

pp. 40-44. 176

2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68; Froysland and

Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-

44.

120

fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst,

while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures

or targets and then detonate the rocket.177

After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the GMLRS Unitary rocket

warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 GMLRS Unitary

passed milestone b in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and

demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability scheduled for

2007. The initial GMLRS Unitary rocket would have only a point detonating and a delay

fuse, while the objective rocket would incorporate the third mode (proximity) of the tri-

mode fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse

capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition’s effects to the mission

requirements.178

Even before operational testing could be done on the GMLRS Unitary Increment

II, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the

Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army

denied the request on 13 September 2004, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs

statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a

precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint

fires in an urban environment, to attack high pay-off targets, and to provide large area

coverage at the same time; and the initial GMLRS Unitary met those requirements.179

On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz’s request and accelerated

work on the GMLRS Unitary Increment II to provide it sooner than planned and

subdivided GMLRS Unitary Increment II into IIa and IIb. In May 2005 the contractor,

Lockheed Martin, delivered 72 Increment IIa rockets with the point detonating and delay

dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496

GMLRS Increment IIa Unitary rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest

would be used for further development and testing.180

Combat operations corroborated the GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa development.

On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six-

rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at 53 kilometers

and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in

the same area, killing more insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th

Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances,

collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to

________________________ 177

2000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002

USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires

Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training

and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 178

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73. 179

2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 180

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95.

121

participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired

over 1,000 GMLRS Unitary IIa rockets. The following year of 2009, American and

British field artillery units shot approximately, 1,500. Of these, the U.S. Army and U.S.

Marine Corps engaged the enemy with 830 Increment IIa rockets and employed them in

pre-planned missions against precisely located targets in urban or counterinsurgency

operations where collateral damage was of concern. The GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa

rockets with point detonating and delay fuse capabilities requested by General Metz

performed well and generated a paradigm shift that permitted using MLRS rockets in

close proximity (200 meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had

a minimum of 2,000 meters as the safe distance from friendly forces. Even though it

went out of production and was the only GMLRS munition, GMLRS Unitary Increment

IIa continued to be used in theater in 2012 and 2013.181

Work on the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket with software upgrades, new

trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse meanwhile

continued as GMLRS Unitary Increment IIb (the objective rocket). Phase two

engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated

the maturity of the objective GMLRS Unitary IIb rocket. This permitted moving to

milestone c decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective

rocket. Successful completion of the operational testing resulted in full-rate production

decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay) rocket

configuration. Over 2,500 GMLRS Unitary Increment IIbs were employed in OIF and

OEF.182

In 2012-2013 the Army also commenced developing the next-generation GMLRS

designated as GMLRS Increment IV. To mitigate the eventual loss of the Army Tactical

Missile System (ATACMS) with its Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster

________________________ 181

2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH,

p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; Interview

with atchs, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 U.S.

Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM

Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH;

Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH;

Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 History, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-81,

2011 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command

Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 182

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 95-96; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10,

Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd

Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: HIMARS Takes the

High Ground, 5 Jan 10, Doc III-89, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS

Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64, 2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires

Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-94;

Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires

Brigade,” pp. 40-44.

122

munitions that were banned by the cluster munitions convention with a proven missile,

the Army wanted the GMLRS Unitary Increment IV, designated as the Long Range

Precision Fires Munition in October 2013, to have a 250-300 kilometer range, a warhead

with a tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay), and effectiveness to

achieve required target effects, among other requirements. The Army completed the

updated Increment IV capabilities development document for worldwide staffing in

2013.183

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead. Over the

years, cluster munitions generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War II,

and at least 21 countries have employed them since. For example, the United States used

them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the Soviets utilized them in

Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland

Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States dropped cluster bombs in

Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st Century. Basically, cluster munitions

dispensed large numbers of submunitions over an extended area. The submunitions

generally lacked self-destruct capability and had the potential of remaining hazardous for

decades.184

Frustrated with attempts to prohibit or restrict the use of cluster munitions, a

group of nations led by Norway reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. In

December 2008, 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prohibited

their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The United States,

Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks

that led to the agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had

signed the convention.185

Meanwhile, the United States resisted banning cluster munitions. In May 2008

just prior to the signing of Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Acting Assistant

Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, Stephen Mull, said that United States relied upon

cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing

technological fixes to ensure that the weapons would not be viable once the conflict was

over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, more money would be spent on

new weapon systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. The United States further

stated that most militaries would increase their employment of massed field artillery and

rockets barrages which would increase the destruction of key infrastructure if cluster

________________________ 183

Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64,

2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command

Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery

Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-95; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fire Brigade

MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-96. 184

Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and

Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, Doc III-31,

2010 USAFAS AH. 185

Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4.

123

munitions were banned.186

On 19 June 2008 the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a new policy on cluster

munitions although it still recognized them as legitimate weapons with clear military

utility and did not support the convention. Acknowledging the unintended harm that

unexploded cluster munitions could cause to civilians and civilian infrastructure and

worldwide opposition to the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM)

which was a cluster munition, the DoD replaced its previous policy with a new one. As

soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, the military and combatant

commands would begin removing all cluster munitions that exceeded operational

planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements

from the active inventory All excess cluster munitions would be demilitarized as soon as

practicable. After 2018 United States military departments and combatant commands

could only employ cluster munitions that would not result in more than one percent

unexploded ordnance. Until then, the employment of cluster munitions that exceeded the

one percent threshold had to be approved by the combatant commander. Prior to 2018,

DoD could seek to transfer cluster munitions that did not exceed the one percent

threshold to a foreign government if that government agreed not to use them. The old

policy required the military to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99 percent

reliability rate but did address the use and removal of current munitions.187

Because the dud rate for GMLRS DPICM did not meet DoD and international

agreements on the reduction of dud munitions, the Army pressed forward to develop an

alternative to engage area and inaccurately located targets, recognizing the need to

minimize collateral effects in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the

Army acknowledged the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did

not provide the same capability and effects, the DoD officially announced a moratorium

on the production and use of DPICM on 18 June 2008 that would leave more than one

percent duds after arming and subsequently approved an effort on 22 October 2008 to

develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM with an initial operational capability in

Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. Subsequently, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7,

Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army’s desire to transition to an

alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible.

Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitary rockets in-lieu of

future planned DPICM procurement and to develop a GMLRS Alternative Warhead that

was designated as GMLRS Increment III with fielding scheduled for FY 2015.188

________________________ 186

Ibid. 187

Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD

Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-32,

2010 USAFAS AH; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08,

Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to

Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-34, 2010

USAFAS AH. 188

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96; Briefing

(Extract), subj: Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Review, 24 Apr 07, Doc

124

Work on the alternative warhead moved forward over the next several years.

During the 2009, the Army contracted with three vendors to produce a warhead that was

equal or greater than DPICM in destructive capabilities. The Army wanted each to

produce four prototypes for testing and planned to enter engineering, manufacturing, and

developing. In August-October 2010 the three vendors successfully fired their prototypes

(warhead designs). Based upon this, the Project Office conducted a three-part system

preliminary design review of each alternative warhead in January 2011. Six months later

in July 2011, the Army Missile Command Source Selection Authority completed

evaluating the three competing alternative warhead designs and selected Alliant Tech

Systems to develop the alternative warhead. Subsequently, the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council (JROC) approved the GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS

Increment III) capability development document and validated the key performance

parameters for the system on 8 November 2011. Later on 19 November 2012, the Army

approved production of the warhead as a replacement for the GMLRS DPICM.

In 2013 work continued on GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS Increment

III). During the year, flight testing in May 2013 and engineering and developmental

testing conducted between April 2013 and September 2013 paved the way for production

qualification testing in October 2013. Production qualification testing confirmed the

missile’s compliance with the Army requirements. Four rockets fired from a M270A1

launcher destroyed their respective targets 17 kilometers away.189

____________________

III-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd

Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of

Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training

and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 189

Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr

12, Doc III-83, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc

III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires, Rockets and Missiles, 21 Apr

11, Doc III-85, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb

10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract),

3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Secretary of the

Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10, Doc III-

41, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15

Feb 11, Doc III-42, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-

3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to

Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing,

subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated, Doc III-44, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See

Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10,

Doc III-45, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions,

8 Mar 13, Doc III-65, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and

Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; Briefing, subj: Fires

Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-97; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires

Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-98; Lockheed Martin

Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Successful Production

125

Launchers. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm of

1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher that had been introduced in 1983

required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and

improvements to its fire control system and launcher drive system. To combat the

launcher’s growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System

(IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth

potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved

Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by

decreasing the time required to aim, displace, and reload the launcher. For several years

the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System

modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program

initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two

modernization efforts produced the M270A1 launcher early in the 21st Century.190

After the fielding began in 2002, the Army upgraded the M270A1 over the next

decade. During 2005, 13 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma, received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was

required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional

Munitions (DPICM) and Unitary. Meanwhile, the Army completed other significant

M270A1 modification projects – machine gun mount and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)

and Environmental Control Unit (ECU) in 2005. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) after

action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad

Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1’s launcher

chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a

challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while

standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units

were equipped with this machine gun mount.191

Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet

Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing

and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic

equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army had to find a way to improve conditions in

the cab. It installed the ECU to control adverse climate conditions and to permit the

maximum use of radios and computer systems and the APU to reduce maintenance time

and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The APU was a

diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity and permitted the launcher to

remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off; and the ECU was

an 18,000 BTU unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was

subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in Operation Iraqi Freedom.192

____________________

Qualification Flight Test of GMLRS Alternative Warhead, 3 Feb 14, Doc III-99. 190

2000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-76; 2002 USAFACFS

ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92. 191

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 192

2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007

126

With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the

Army, meanwhile, initiated development of the Modular Launcher Communication

System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications

between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range

radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a

display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher

were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via

a SINCGARS radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node

to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the

distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to

this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-

sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment

required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and

transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with

different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high

frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.193

MLCS addressed a communications capability gap in MLRS M270A1 and

HIMARS M142 launchers. In the near-term the Army planned to use the Harris 150

High Frequency Radio to satisfy long-range communications requirements. For the long-

term (2011-2017) the Army foresaw migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio

System when it became available and integrating limited tactical fire control, among

other capability improvements. For the present, the Army outlined using Blue Force

Tracker for situational awareness. Additional situational awareness would be met by the

acquisition of the Driver’s Vision Enhancement for both launchers that would provide the

driver with the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking

infrared sensor and display control module. Beyond 2017, the plan identified

incorporating tactical fire control functions managed at the battery and/or platoon

command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and

adding the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery

sensor platforms, among others.194

In 2012-2013 the Army continued the modernization effort above, commonly

known as the “Big Three,” and two other modernization efforts. The first modernization

effort added Drivers Vision Enhancement, Blue Force Tracker, and Long-Range

Communications to each launcher. Because the original M270 launcher was designed to

be employed behind front line troops by utilizing the extended reach of the rockets and

missiles, the cab had minimal armor to protect the launcher crew. Operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan demonstrated that the threat had changed, requiring greater protection. The

second modernization effort, the Improved Armored Cab, started in 2012 and continued

____________________

USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78. 193

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104. 194

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 101; 2009

USAFAS AH, p. 104; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc

III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH.

127

into 2013 and would provide increased protection for the crew against mines, improvised

explosive devices, fragmentation from enemy artillery, and direct attack from small arms

upon completion. The third modernization effort, the Fire Control System Upgrade,

would upgrade the obsolete Fire Control System and would provide fire control system

software and hardware commonality between the M142 and M270A1 by taking

advantage of the latest technology and better processors that would enhance mission

processing and make the Fire Control System more user friendly. Fielding was scheduled

to begin in 2016. These modernization efforts would make the M270A1 more modern,

survivable, and sustainable.195

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

In 2013 the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 launcher

provided the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry

forces and furnished field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile

fires as part of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fleet of launchers. A

wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in

the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On

26 October 1990 the operational and organizational plan for HIMARS established an

urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range,

rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range,

accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The plan stated

that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform

battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish

supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and MLRS M270 launchers, these systems’ lack

of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater

in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift

than an equivalent MLRS unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms

to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once

forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes

alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable

launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units

also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.196

________________________ 195

Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a,

2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper,

subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-100; Briefing, subj: PFRMS Launcher and

Munitions System Overview, 2012, Doc III-101; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott

Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires

Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-102; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and

Munition System Overviews, 2012; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-

Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-103; MAJ Matt Anderson, “Proven

Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” www.theredstonerocket.com/tech, 17 Jul 13,

Doc III-104. 196

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 U.S.

Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p.

128

Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In

December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine

the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the

future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal

punch for the light forces and would be as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled

chassis and C-130 deployability would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater

employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 155-

mm. towed howitzer, the MLRS launcher, and the HIMARS launcher revealed that the

HIMARS was approximately 20 percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and

approximately 70 percent more effective than the M198 alternative.197

In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS operational

requirements document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two

battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development

because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a

new start.198

In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for

two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion

each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile

system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high-

payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an

increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force

field artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army decided to fund HIMARS.199

Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort

sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle

Laboratory, conducted an advanced concepts technology demonstration (ACTD) in 1998

using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be C-130 deployable and would be used by the

first-to-fight forces. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes. In

August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a

lightweight MLRS system. RFPI’s assessment cited the advantage of increased

firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270

launcher’s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS.200

Over one year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of

Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS operational requirements

document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to

enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition

and also identified the requirement for 16 HIMARS battalions – two in the active force

____________________

102. 197

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 198

Ibid. 199

Ibid. 200

2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97.

129

and 14 in the Army National Guard.201

After five years of development and testing, the

Army fielded HIMARS beginning in 2005 and carried it on for several years.202

Meanwhile, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement of 20

October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne

Corps for increased crew protection for the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even

with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while

achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006 to meet an

operational need statement from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the near-term armor solution

involved using a modified design of the low signature armored cab (LSAC) developed

for use with the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or

“appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C-

130. This modified cab design was designated the low signature armored cab-HIMARS

(LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on

the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine

gun mount was also developed because of after action reviews and lessons learned from

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).203

To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew

protection, the Army initiated work on the increased crew protection (ICP) cab late in

2006. During 2007, the ICP Cab went through a series of tests including a live-fire test

and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing. The cab would incorporate

enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in

2010. The ICP Cab would protect the crew from ballistic attack, mine blast, foreign

object debris, and fumes from the rocket launch and would be retrofitted to HIMARS

M142 launchers without armored cabs and HIMARS M142 launchers with LSAC-H

capabilities.204

Testing the ICP Cab continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and the

contractor completed the final test that consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate

the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ICP Cab configured HIMARS to

ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational

requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. Test

results indicated that the ICP Cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational

criteria and demonstrated that the launcher’s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to

make it survivable in a hostile threat environment. As a result in 2009, the Army

awarded BAE Systems the contract for 64 ICP Cab up-armor kits. Retrofitting all

________________________ 201

2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 202

2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 84; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 106-07; Precision Fires

Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-

105. 203

2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 110-11. 204

2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007

USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111.

130

HIMARS M142 launchers with the ICP cab was completed in 2012 along with the

universal fire control system to mitigate obsolescence of critical fire control

components.205

With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the

Army meanwhile initiated acquisition action for development of the modular launcher

communication system (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would

integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire

direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of

2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field

Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This

message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control

node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each

command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications

flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by

taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to

complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range

digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different

communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high

frequency radios at Fort Bragg, another test in 2008, and one in 2009.206

Concurrently, TCM Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) which was rechartered as part

of TCM Fires Brigade in 2010 that was responsible for the capability development and

user requirements for the Fires Brigade sought to improve command and control and

address a capability gap with the integration of prototype long-range high frequency and

satellite communications kits and outlined plans to improve battle space awareness by

integrating blue forces tracking into the HIMARS M142 launcher. In 2011 the Army

implemented the Hot Panel capability for the HIMARS. This capability allowed the

launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight aboard a C-130 or C-17

aircraft to give the HIMARS a true roll off and fire capability allowing for greater

flexibility in projecting the force on the battlefield. Further efforts in implementing long-

range communications led to the AN/PRC 150 being fielded to the 5-3rd Field Artillery

Regiment and the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment. This radio gave true beyond-line-of-

sight communications capability. Plans were also underway for the installation of the

blue force tracker and drivers vision enhancement. In 2012-2013 the Army outlined using

blue force tracker for situational awareness. Additional situational awareness would be

met by the acquisition of the driver’s vision enhancement that would provide the driver

with the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared

sensor and display control module.207

________________________ 205

2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111; Precision Fires

Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb 14. 206

2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009

USAFAS AH, pp. 111-12. 207

2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 101, 109; 2009

USAFAS AH, pp. 104, 112; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr

131

Army Tactical Missile System

In 2013 the Army had three variants of the Army Tactical Missile System

(ATACMS) – the ATACMS I, ATACMS Ia, and ATACMS Unitary – that possessed

long-range, all-weather capabilities and provided the joint task force and corps

commander with precision engagement throughout the depths of the battlefield. The

ATACMS I (range of 35-165 kilometers) and Ia (range of 70 to 300 kilometers) were

semi-ballistic missiles with Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster munitions.

While they were employed extensively early in the major combat portion of Operation

Iraqi Freedom, ATACM I and Ia did not comply with the 2008 Department of Defense

Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians that would preclude using

them after 2018 and would force employing ATACMS Unitary (M48/M57) that had been

used with great effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and that had the precision to attack high-payoff targets at

extended ranges as well as troops in contact with minimal collateral damage employing

the Global Positioning System for accuracy. With a range of 70 to 270 kilometers,

ATACMS Unitary delivered single 500-pound high-explosive warhead up to 270

kilometers.208

____________________

12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 28, Doc

III-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 25; Email with

atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-88, 2011 USAFAS

AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a,

2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine

Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44,

Doc III-105; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012,

Doc III-101; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013,

13 Mar 14, Doc III-106; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future;”

Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb

14; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 11, Doc III-107; Briefing, subj:

PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview, 2012. 208

Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr

12, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Interview, Dastrup with

Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47, 2010 USAFAS AH.

See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105-

10; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, Doc III-108; Precision Fires Rocket and

Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-109; Briefing

(Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-110.

CHAPTER FOUR

FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY

In 1992 Fort Sill became an active participant in the Army’s new Battle Lab

program. Designed to prepare the Army better for warfighting in the post Cold War era,

the Battle Lab program took root in six of the US Army Training and Doctrine

Command’s (TRADOC) key service schools to coordinate ideas about technology and

warfighting in future battlefield effectiveness. At Fort Sill, the Depth and Simultaneous

Attack Battle Lab (now called the Fires Battle Lab [FBL]) was created to fulfill one of

the six major components in the program.

The FBL concept represented a significant break with Cold War era threat driven

decision making. As General Frederick M. Franks, the former TRADOC commander,

explained it, the FBL focused on tailoring post-Cold War Army force projections into the

21st Century.

In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing combinations

between technology and warfighting, the FBL envisioned giving the Army a

technological edge on future battlefields as well as streamlining the technological

modernization process. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the

Battle labs tested them through computer simulations and virtual prototyping. General

Franks established the first of six battle labs in early April 1992 at the Armor Center at

Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the remaining five selected by the end of the month. The six

were: (1) Early Entry Battle Lab at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, (2)

Mounted Battle Space Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky, (3) Dismounted Battle space

Battle Laboratory, Fort Benning, Georgia, (4) Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab,

Fort Sill, Oklahoma, (5) Battle Command Leavenworth, Kansas, and (6) Combat Service

Support, Fort Lee, Virginia. Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack battle lab began

operating on August 1992 with a mission to identify depth and simultaneous needs and

then initiate action to resolve these needs using analysis, simulation, experimentation,

evaluation, and integration of materiel and non-materiel solutions.

The FBL was the first to identify a need to develop an interface that translated

simulations messages into tactical messages to stimulate Advanced Field Artillery

Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for training. This led to the development of the

Enhanced Protocol Interface Unit that enabled field artillery staffs to train in a “free play”

simulated environment on a large scale. This first step into “doing the impossible”

provided immeasurable benefits to the Army and Department of Defense. In 2012, the

Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) was leading simulations development on many fronts

and was on the cutting edge of providing enhanced training capabilities. The FBL

continues to provide support to Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, TRADOC schools,

Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), and other Battle Labs

experiments.1

________________________ 1Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab History 2013, 25 Feb 14, Doc IV-1.

Everything that follows comes from this email.

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THE FIRES BATTLE LAB MISSION

The Fires Battle Laboratory mission used live, virtual and/or constructive

simulations to gain insights, impacts, and recommended changes to Doctrine,

Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities

(DOTMLPF), based on inputs from Soldiers and their leaders, as well as emerging

technologies and materiel initiatives to support current and future forces.

FIRES BATTLE LAB CHARTER

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command chartered the Battle Laboratory

to provide the means to develop, refine, and integrate future operational capabilities and

architectures in support of Joint and Army concepts and to focus on developing and

refining tactical and some operational concepts for the Future Force. The Battle Lab

integrated DOTMLPF imperatives to support the task and purpose of mission concepts

and employed experimentation/wargaming and analysis, utilizing modeling and

simulation to produce the underpinnings for concepts and requirements validation.

The Fires Battle Lab has two major contributors to the History of this

organization and these are: Modeling and Simulation Branch, Experiment and

Wargaming Branch, and Electric Fires

Modeling and Simulation Branch

Name of event: Directed Energy Warfare Event (HPM)

Event Start Date: 23 Sept 2013

Event End Date: 4 Oct 2013

Description of event: There is a gap in counter UAS Class I-II and Command and

Control of directed energy systems. The CRADA investigated the Command and Control

of directed energy and solutions to defeat Class I and II UAS platforms. The CRADA

investigated Raytheon’s capability to detect, identify and destroy class I-II unmanned

aircraft systems (UAS). The High Powered Microwave investigated the effects of RF

energy on electronics. The event was held at Engineer Lake firing point, Fort Sill,

Oklahoma.

Results: Engaged and prevented the completion of Class 1 and Class 2 UAS

missions.

Event POC: Maj Gonzales, 580 442-4645, saul.gonzalez1.mil@mail.mil

Name of event: CRADA FY13 Simulation Event Integration and Execution

Event Start Date: 4 MAR 2013

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Event End Date: 15 MAR 2013

Description of event: Integration week occurred 4MAR - 8MAR 2013. These

events were to stimulate the ADSI and the FAAD with simulated UAV air tracks within

FireSimXXI in order to replicate the actual connections for field event. We would then

engage the enemy air track using the FAAD and process the mission using a simulated

high powered microwave (HPM) to disable and destroy the UAV.

Results: Integration and tests were successful.

Event POC: Maj Gonzales, 580 442-4645, saul.gonzalez1.mil@mail.mil

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I

Simulation Integration Exercise (SIE) #1

Event Start Date: 24 JUN 2013

Event End Date: 28 JUN 2013

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I

Simulation Integration Exercise (SIE) #3

Event Start Date: 15 OCT 2013

Event End Date: 18 OCT 2013

Description of events: Integration activities focused on implementing the Fires

architecture to enable Fire Mission threads from the MAFIA device through AFTADS to

FireSimXXI. Fire Missions generated from the AFATDS and the MAFIA device were

processed from the live environment down through the simulated Fire Units being played

in FireSimXXI.

Results: All valid mission test threads were successful. The results of these

exercises are for debugging the MAFIA device software. FireSimXXI software behaved

as expected.

Event POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, brian.s.carney.civ@mail.mil

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I

Network Integration Event

Event Start Date: 3 DEC 2013

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Event End Date: 12 DEC 2013

Description of event: With the support of two personnel (Matt McLaughlin and

Mike Perdieu), FireSimXXI, ExCIS, and the AFATDS were integrated into the AEWE

architecture.

Results: FireSimXXI, ExCIS, and AFATDS were ready to support MAFIA, Fires

Warrior testing throughout the integration and exercise in JAN 2014.

Event POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, brian.s.carney.civ@mail.mil

Name of Event: AEWE Spiral H

Event Start Date: Jan 2014

Event End Date: Feb 2014

Description of Event: The Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, conducted

by the Maneuver Battle Lab. The Fires Battle Lab supports AEWE with Fires capability

using FireSim integrating with OneSAF, ExCIS and the AFATDS to support the unit in

the experiment.

Results: successful experiment for the development community to get necessary

feedback on technologies progress from soldiers in battlefield.

POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, brian.s.carney.civ@mail.mil

Name of event: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint (FST-J)

Event Start Date: 12 Feb 13

Event End Date: 28 Feb 13

Description of event:

Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J) are constructive Joint National Training Capability

(JNTC) events. The primary Navy training audience is one Carrier Strike Group (CSG)

in an in-port distributed environment. The synthetic joint/coalition players (AWACS,

CRC, JSTARS, UAS, PATRIOT, THAAD, Battlefield Coordination Detachment,

USA/USMC Fire Effects Cells, and when available, Navy Expeditionary Combat

Command units) will focus training on Joint Interoperability Training Requirements,

Battlespace Maneuver and Firepower, Joint Fires & Strike, Integrated Air and Missile

Defense, and Time Sensitive Targeting. We participated with RTOS THAAD.

Results:

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The FBL supported the event with a RTOS THAAD model. The event was executed as

planned. During this event the FBL worked with the Navy’s Atlantic Command (TTGL)

in support of their Aegis Ships BMD Certifications. Some other units that supported the

event were the 1-1 ADA BN in Japan. They supported with Patriot participation and the

Japanese supported with their BMD ships. During this event we also participated with

the 94th

AAMDC ADAFCO & UCTE. This was the first event from the 94th

AAMDC

and the UCTE to create and test new Missile Defense Upper Tier Coordination with

THAAD, Patriot and Aegis. This was used to create some of the first TTP’s for Upper

Tier Ballistic Missile Defense.

Event POC: Sam Saiz, 580 442-2916, samuel.l.saiz.ctr@mail.mil

LCDR Golding, 619 767-4864,micaela.golding@navy.mil

Name of event: Global Defender Exercise (GDEx-04e)

Event Start Date: 8 Jul 13

Event End Date: 13 Jul 13

Description of event:

The objective is to provide Joint Leadership with an overview of what level of protection

current Joint Air & Missile Defense (AMD) Systems can or can’t provide. It’s needs to

be determined if current day TTP’s have prepared our defense appropriately, or if

changes needs to be made in order to address new capabilities and a full assessment of

the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities

(DOTMLPF) Integration. We supported with RTOS Patriot.

Results: The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) participated in the Global Defender Exercise

04e (GDEx-04e) event from 8 – 12 Jul 13. The FBL supported the event with four RTOS

Patriot Battalions. During this event the FBL worked with the Missile Defense

Integration & Operations Center (MDIOC), Navy Aegis Missile Defense Systems, Live

Patriot Weapon Systems located in Rhine Ordinance Barracks (ROB), Germany and the

Israeli Test Battalion (ITB) using the Arrow System. The event was planned & executed

to standard. We were able to see the required level of Air & Missile Defense Systems

(AMD) needed to support the required mission for our COCOM. The added benefit of

using all available AMD Systems gave us the potential to utilize Deconfliction and use

our system to their fullest capabilities without sacrificing the level of protections we were

able to provide for our defended assets. The simulation had no issues during the entire

week which allowed the FBL the ability to support every scenario throughout the week.

We have submitted our AAR Comments to the Exercise Control Team and will

participate in the Final AAR on 12 Jul.

Event POC:

Sam Saiz, 580 442-2916, samuel.l.saiz.ctr@mail.mil

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LCDR Steven Jones

Name of event: 2013 Army Modeling and Simulation Award

Event Start Date: 1 Jan 2013

Event End Date: 5 Dec 2013

Description of event: The Army’s Modeling and Simulation award is presented to the top

Battle Lab Team and Individuals for outstanding contributions to the Models and

Simulations Community.

Results: The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) received both the Team and Individual

awards for the top Army wide experimentation team. Their hard work in the design and

implementation of cutting edge capabilities into experimentation Army and Joint

simulation federations. The fiscal year 2013 Counter Unmanned Aerial System

Experiment integrated unique cyber and electronic warfare models generating simulated

effects. This cutting edge development supported the attainment of all experiment

objectives, while informing the development and review of multiple gaps in the areas of

detection, classification, discrimination, identification, tracking and defeat of Unmanned

Aerial Systems. The results of the experiment are informing the development of Army

2020 and are leading directly to immediate changes in operational TTP’s for UAS threats.

Event POC: Burt Montague (580) 442-5647, chesley.b.montague.civ@mail.mil

Experiment and Wargaming Branch

Event Name: Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment

Event Start Date: 28 Jan 13

Event End Date: 22 Feb 13

Event Description: The AEWE Campaign is the live component of U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) live, virtual and constructive

experimentation strategy. AEWE provides a credible and repetitive opportunity to

experiment with small unit concepts and capabilities, to examine emerging technologies

of promise and to accelerate capabilities development. AEWE is chartered to challenge

current thought and constructs, to look outside programs of record and to provide Soldier

feedback. This venue allows Soldiers to have input on concepts and technologies early in

their development cycle. The spiral development concept creates an opportunity to reduce

development time and costs in an environment which is focused on experiment and

develop rather than test. AEWE examines emerging concepts and capabilities for the

current and future force across all warfighting functions. AEWE provides TRADOC

capability developers, the science and technology research community and the defense

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industry a repeatable, credible, rigorous and validated operational experiment. The

outcomes sought are operational in nature. "Working together, TRADOC and the Army's

science and technology community leverage the AEWE Campaign to get technology into

the hands of soldiers earlier and more frequently. AEWE also provides an opportunity to

evaluate improved capabilities for fielded systems. AEWE Spiral H will examine

network and mission command solutions, enablers for precision fires, new technologies

for power and energy generation, immersive training systems, solutions for enhanced

lethality and force protection and innovative basing and sustainment systems. The

experiment is organized around a live Infantry platoon, two simulated Infantry platoons

and a company headquarters equipped with a company intelligence support team and a

robotics section. The robotics section includes a section leader, unmanned ground vehicle

team, unattended ground sensor team and an unmanned aircraft system team, and a

battalion equipped with a live Scout platoon, performing the function of higher

headquarters. AEWE experiments are conducted by the Maneuver Battle Lab of the

Maneuver Center of Excellence. As an ongoing annual campaign, AEWE has yearly

projects with predefined objectives. Spiral H is the eighth annual campaign.

Results:

1. UGS need to be integrated into the COP network, whatever that network may be.

Independent base stations require additional personnel to monitor them and input

their information manually into the COP network. The most common and

significant limitation of the various demonstrated sensors was not their

individual capabilities to observe the environment, but their inability to plug into

a hypothetical system-integrated unit command post sensor control suite and

therefore “report” across the tactical network.

2. UAS limitations reduce the ability to detect, identify, or provide targetable

imagery of potential enemy under foliage or in urban terrain, day or night.

3. Unmanned systems need equivalent capabilities to reach out and touch the target

whether that be through sight (camera), sound (sensor), movement (sensor), or

maneuverability.

4. Sensor UGS technology needs to be able to reach out and identify the target with

sufficient early warning to effectively engage targets.

5. Retrieval of “lost” small UAS by the infantry company increases risk and

exposes friendly forces to unnecessary danger. As a result, small UAS may not

be utilized to their full potential.

6. UGSs show promise in increasing force protection around fixed/temporary bases

and improve upon early threat warning to the commander, if they can operate in

visual dead space and beyond small arms fire while maintaining communication

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with the Company Command Post/Base Defense Operating System

(CoCP)/(BDOC). UGS must be self reporting and self sustaining.

Event POC: Mr. Anthony Evans, anthony.evans1.civ@mail.mil (580)442-3235

Event Name: Army 2020 Sustainment Experiment

Event Start Date: 11 Mar 2013

Event End Date: 6 Jun 2013

Event Description: The Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCoE) conducts an

experiment as part of the Army 2020 Experiment. This experiment is focused on

identifying, examining, and analyzing, how will the Army sustainment community gain

efficiencies with joint and strategic providers by providing effective sustainment

operations in the Army of 2020? An additional focus the SCoE is identifying, examining,

and analyzing how would the sustainment community support the Army of 2020 in a

theater of operations? This effort informs proposed operational techniques for Combat

Service Support (CSS) at echelons above division, and Corps to Brigade; as they pertain

to sustaining the fighting forces in Major Combat Operations (MCO) or in Stability

Operations (SO).

Results:

The Sustainment community does not understand the aspects of support

relationships. Commanders and staffs need to understand the responsibilities of

support relationships to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. Renew focus on

mission command and support relationships. Define the home station roles of the

Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). Study potential integration of

Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) functions into the ESC. Revise doctrine to

articulate Sustainment Area Support (SAS).

Migrating water production and fuel storage from the Brigade Support Battalion

(BSB) to Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Sustainment enhances the flexibility

and mobility of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) maneuver commander. Water

production and fuel storage at EAB enables the BSB to maneuver with supported

units and maintain operational momentum.

Due to the loss of their BSB, the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) staff

lost the capability to plan, coordinate, synchronize supply, conduct mortuary

affairs, handle distribution and provide Sustainment Automated Support

Management Office (SASMO) support. Rebuilding a more robust MEB S4

section may now be necessary.

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The Reconnaissance & Surveillance Brigade Combat Team (RSBCT) could be

supported by other EAB Sustainment organizations, not exclusively by the

division aligned or corps aligned CSSB. Task organized in experimentation, the

RSBCT was able to execute its mission and Sustainment will be able to provide

required support. The sustainment command must determine how best to support

the RSBCT through the Military Decision Making (MDMP) process.

There is a lack of understanding between SOF and CF logisticians concerning

their respective logistics operations and capabilities. Confusion and frustration

with regards to support operations. Synergies may occur with improved leader

education and training.

Event POC: Wallace McLoyd, Jr., wallace.mcloyd.ctr@mail.mil, 580 442-2935

Name of event: Army Integrating Experiment

Event Start Date: 15 July 2013

Event End Date: 2 August 2013

Description of event: The Phase II/III Wargame continued the efforts from the January

MDMP experiment and the December Army 2020 Capability Seminar. Corps, Division,

and Brigade staff representatives executed the Ph II (Seize the Initiative) and Ph III

(Dominate) wargame to refine the experiment force structure, identify unified action

partner (UAP) interdependencies, gain a mutual understanding of the Army's role in

Phase II/III operations, and determine the July Simulation Exercise (SIMEX) STARTEX

conditions.

The intent behind this Army Integrating Experiment (AIE) is to provide initial insights to

refine the A2020 operational and organizational (O&O) plan supporting the MCTP/8th

Army War fighter Exercise.

Event Results:

Finding #1: A2020 FDUs increase the combat power of the Brigade Combat Team

(BCT). The addition of the third maneuver battalion to the BCT and third firing

battery to the BCT fires battalion significantly increased the BCT Commander’s

(CDRs) ability to generate and apply combat power and array forces. The BCT CDR

has greater ability to adapt his forces to required mission requirements (based on

METT-TC) and conduct simultaneous operations within a larger area of operations.

Insight #1: The third Maneuver BN increased agility and allowed for a significant

reserve, which providing the BCT commander with increased lethality, flexibility and

ability to exploit success. The addition of the third maneuver battalion gave BCT

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Commanders more flexibility in arraying forces and planning the fight and provided for a

significant reserve to exploit success on the attack.

Insight #2: The additional firing battery increased the fires available to BCTs w/ varied

munitions and range requirements. The additional Firing Battery and standardized Target

Acquisition Platoon provided fires in large non-contiguous areas and increased the

combat power of the BCTs. This was clearly seen in the Ph II-III Wargame as the R&S

BCT had sufficient fires available in the organic Fires BN to provide Joint enabled

integrated fires to each maneuver battalion. The organic FA BN staff was sufficient to

plan and execute Joint Fires and perform limited airspace integration while operating in a

large area of responsibility (AOR). The A2020 R&S BCT design allows greater

flexibility to conduct seamless fires for Reconnaissance and Security operations and

provides increased access to deep and shaping fires.

Insight #3: The R&S BCT enhanced the Corps’ ability to detect and identify threats and

opportunities in its operating environment. The R&S BCT provided the Corps with a

capability to fight for information that the BfSB did not provide. However, to

accomplish this mission, the R&S BCT was heavily augmented with an Aviation Task

Force (Sqdn), Expeditionary MI Bn (E-MIB), and a Logistics Task Force. The R&S

BCT was able to provide timely information back to the Corps G2 through the ACE, to

help develop the threat picture in advance of the Corps’ movement to its objectives. This

enabled Blue forces to process data and develops situational awareness before being

decisively engaged.

Recommendation: As the army continues to update the FDU for the future keep

the third Maneuver BN, third firing battery, and the R&S BCT in the force design.

CAC develop doctrine for R&S BCT operations.

MCTP include R&S BCT Ops in all Corps and Division exercises.

Station BCTs and enablers assigned to the R&S BCT mission together to allow

them to be habitually and regionally aligned.

Finding #2: A2020 FDUs and legacy systems limit Corps and Division

commander’s ability to control operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and limit flexibility of

assigning missions to subordinate units. Removal of lift assets from the IBCT

significantly limits the mobility of the IBCT and makes it dependent upon the CSSB to

rapidly move forces around the battlefield. The limited firepower and protection of the

Stryker and the weight limit restrictions of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS)

assigned to the SBCT create operational challenges for commanders. SBCTs must be

backed up with heavier forces to counter armored adversaries and these heavier armored

systems are unable to cross the REBS.

Insight #1: IBCTs do not have the organic capability to transport all of their companies

in a single movement. This affects operational tempo by reducing the ability to mass or

exploit the initiative, reduces the ability to secure main support routes and quickly seize

key facilities, and requires additional staff training, integration and synchronization to

plan and execute unit movements. The Divisionally aligned CSSB has assets to lift 600

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soldiers in single lift without augmentation. In order to lift an entire A2020 IBCT in a

single lift, additional LT truck platoons from within the Sustainment Brigade must

augment the CSSB.

Insight #2: Stryker platforms lack sufficient lethality and survivability during major

combat operations. During the SIMEX, the momentum of the attack was lost when the

SBCT (main effort for the Division) encountered enemy armored forces on the objective,

requiring the SBCT to conduct a passage of lines so that an ABCT could conduct the

attack on the objective.

Recommendation: Stryker mission sets and capabilities need to be further analyzed:

armament and hull modifications must be weighed against power requirements,

suspension/drive train upgrades, overall weight, and tactical air deployment

transportability when developing mitigation strategies.

Insight #3: The SBCT lacks the gap crossing capability to support attached, OPCON and

follow-on ABCT platforms. The Rapidly Emplaced Bridge Systems (REBS) organic in

the SBCT will not support follow-on ABCT platforms (M1A1 Tank, M109A6 Paladin).

This will delay the advance if bridging assets are not properly coordinated and

positioned. Units will need to reposition appropriate bridging assets to accommodate

weight differences or find alternate passages for heavier equipment. Both actions could

delay the advance and leave units vulnerable to attack. The MDMP process must

consider attached, OPCON, and follow-on unit movements when assigning gap-crossing

missions. This planning must take into consideration the 100,000 lbs (50 tons) limitation

of the REBS. If a command element assigns a gap-crossing task to an SBCT, with the

intent of also passing ABCT platforms along the same route, the unit will require gap-

crossing augmentation capable of supporting the weight of all follow-on units.

Recommendation: Develop Study and S&T plan to address most critical mobility and

survivability issue for A2020

Conduct a study to evaluate the IBCT transportation plant and develop solution to

move the IBCT without increasing vehicles in the IBCT.

Develop an S&T plan to increase survivability and lethality for the SBCT.

Develop an S&T plan to increase bridging capacity carried by the SBCT that can

support an ABCT.

Finding #3: A2020 FDUs result in critical shortfalls in the number of ISR, MP,

AMD (radar and weapons), Intel assets available at Division and below. A2020 FDUs

removed some capabilities from BCTs and functional brigades and aggregated these

capabilities at Echelons above Division, moved them into the Reserve Components, or

simply removed them from the force structure. This result in shortages of these

capabilities, requiring commanders prioritize distribution of these assets based on METT-

TC. While prioritization of assets is nothing new to Army commanders, during FY13

experiments we found that there simply were not enough of some of these assets to meet

unit requirements, resulting in units lacking critical capabilities (Trojan Spirit, AMD

radars and systems, and UAVs for ISR).

Insight #1: The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) requires ISR and MI

augmentation to perform its assigned mission. Although not a maneuver brigade, it can

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be assigned an AO and control terrain, and is frequently assigned the mission of

providing Mission Command of the Corps and Division Support area. In order to do so,

the MEB requires a robust ISR capability (Shadow), radar to detect rocket, artillery and

mortar attacks, and intelligence personnel to augment the brigade’s S-2 section, which

contains two MI officers and five enlisted Soldiers.

Insight #2: The Army of 2020 force structure lacks sufficient military police capabilities

during major combat operations. Under modular design, each brigade had an MP platoon

organic to the BCT. Under the A2020 FDUs, these MPs have been removed from the

BCT and actually removed from the Army force structure. The mission analysis

conducted for FY13 experimentation indicated that each BCT and the R&S BCT needed

an entire company to conduct detainee operations, handle Internally Displaced Persons

(IDPs) and maintain route control within the BCT’s AO. Failure to provide the necessary

MP support will require BCT commanders to re-purpose combat forces to handle these

tasks, for which they are not properly trained.

Insight #3: The E-MIB design does not have the necessary capacity to support the entire

Corps. Using the same task organization as developed in the Maneuver Center of

Excellence (MCoE) How-to-Fight Seminar, 50% of the E-MIB was task organized to

support the R&S BCT advance guard mission. This left one battalion to support three

Divisions, the Corps headquarters, and numerous other organizations. This was

especially critical with respect to the inability of the E-MIB to provide Trojan Spirit and

multi-function team support to the MEBs, the Division Fires Command (now DIVARTY)

and the Combat Aviation Brigade.

Insight #4: There are insufficient numbers of Gray Eagles and High Altitude platforms to

meet both ISR and communications relay missions. Future Aerial Network Layer

communications continues to be a critical enabler for beyond line of sight Mission

Command on-the-move operations, especially over complex terrain. R&S BCT

communications over extended distances in highly compartmentalized terrain required

continuous presence of aerial/space based communications relay packages. High

Altitude - Heavier than Air (HA-HTA) systems are complementary to the aerial layer as

an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient

communications.

Insight #5: Functional units (MP, EN and CBRN) lack similar communications and

network capabilities found in maneuver units they support. Based on the Signal CoE’s

force modernization plan, BCTs, Division headquarters and staffs, Corps headquarters

and staffs, and Fires units have (or will have) robust, redundant capabilities over multiple

waveforms, but the units supporting them will not. For example, EAB enablers lack on-

the-move capability and rely solely on line-of-sight FM capability. WIN-T fielding plans

are BCT/maneuver centric; they hinder enablers' ability to conduct operations at the DIV,

Corps, and Theater echelons in a 2020 environment. Additionally, MP units that are

tasked organized to maneuver BDE’s at the PLT level and above lack the current

digitized TOE on hand to fully and effectively communicate with their supported

maneuver CDRs to include such systems such as CPOF, BFT, JNN/CPN/SNAP systems.

Furthermore, BCT fires battalion Fire Direction Center and maneuver battalion Forward

Support Elements lack organic on-the-move network capabilities, limiting the ability to

integrate fires in offensive maneuver operations.

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Insight #6: The Army lacks sufficient quantities of mobile, survivable air and missile

defense assets to adequately protect the force and assets on the critical assets list: bridges,

railheads, ATHPs, mobile refueling sites, APODs, and SPODs. During the Phase III

SIMEX, Red forces conducted multiple simultaneous attacks using theater ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles, and manned/unmanned aerial systems to overwhelm limited

defensive capabilities of critical defended assets. The Indirect Fires Protection Capability

(IFPC) – Avenger Battalion provides the force with limited counter-rocket, artillery, and

mortar (C-RAM), and counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities. However,

the BCTs lack sufficient ADA weapons systems and Avengers to assign to all BCTs and

other organizations, and to support operations across the Division.

Recommendation: Relook the current FDU design and adjust the force size of the critical

enablers to fit the mission requirement that is expected to be given to a Corp and

Division.

Identify position(s) within BCT/BDE HQs to designate a 3Y space additional skill

identifier.

Review the BEB organic capacity and adjust to support engineer tasks required

during phase IV operations.

Review the organic chemical capability and adjust to support CBRN task required

during Phase III.

Review the E-MIB force structure. There are not enough MI assets to fulfill the

needs of a Corps, three divisions, subordinate BCTs, and functional BDEs during

Phase III or Phase IV. Expand the number of Trojan Spirits in the E-MIB.

Review the MP force structure. During Phase III each BCT required a military

police company to support the BCT during decisive operations.

Determine the DivArty, FiB, and Fires BN requirements for on-platform On the

Move network capabilities.

Determine the On the Move requirements for MI units to collection, analysis, and

communications.

Resource Enables with the similar communications and network capabilities

found in maneuver units they support to allow them to effectively communicate.

Finding #4: The vulnerability of Low-Density, High-Value Assets create risk to

the mission and the force. Significant warfighting capability depends on low density,

high value assets. Many of these assets are thin skinned and highly susceptible to

artillery, RPG, and even small arms fires. These systems lack organic protection

capability and are frequently pushed forward to support other organizations and are not

provided the necessary security to ensure their survivability. Additionally, separation

from their parent organizations means they have limited access repair parts at the point of

need, resulting in longer down-times when repairs are needed. The lack of operational

readiness floats for many of these systems means that when systems are lost or damaged,

replacements either do not exist or are not readily available to meet mission requirements,

placing the mission and/or the force at risk.

Insight #1: The lightly protected vehicles and equipment of the E-MIB and MICO are

extremely vulnerable when traveling with BCTs in Phase III operations. The MI Soldier

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casualties and damaged low-density equipment adversely impacted collection and

analysis efforts. Several critical components of both the Trojan SPIRIT and Prophet are

not stocked as spares and there are no “floats”, thus necessitating shipment from depot or

the manufacturer, which would result in nonoperational equipment for several days to

weeks.

Insight #2: Air and Missile Defense radars and multiple launch rocket system/high

mobility artillery rocket system (MLRS/HIMARS) lack organic protection capabilities in

a high threat environment. These low density, highly vulnerable vehicles were primary

targets for Red rockets, artillery, and unmanned aerial systems during FY13 experiments.

Loss of these assets in the forward units resulted in radars being detached from rear

echelon units and being pushed forward to replace destroyed assets, placing rear echelon

units at higher risk.

Insight #3: Communication assets employed in remote locations lack organic force

protection capability. In order to expand the range of the network, units can place

network retrans capabilities throughout the area of operations. However, in an

asymmetric environment, these sites become prime targets for indigenous forces, so use

of this method requires significant force protection planning.

Recommendation: Provide force protection and armored vehicles capable of

protecting crew and equipment from artillery, RPG, and small arms fires for critical low

density assets.

Assess operational risk to low-density equipment when performing mission analysis

Procure vehicles with better survivability for tactical MI, communications, and radar

systems.

Conduct study to determine what and where critical MI components should be

stocked to reduce down time.

Develop procurement plan to increase retrans capabilities from Space, high altitude,

and UAV platforms to mitigate ground based retrans vulnerabilities.

The Army should consider using decoys or decoy emitters to protect these low

density assets from anti-radiation munitions.

Finding #5: Basic skills required for the conduct of Major Combat Operations

have atrophied or are non-resident. Over the past 10+ years Army units have focused

their unit level training on the environment in which they were expected to operate. Most

training has focused on Counter Insurgency and urban operations executed from a

Forward Operating Base. Because of this, tasks such as Assembly Area Operations,

maneuvering Command Posts, Mission Command of Division/Corps support areas,

Forward Passage of Lines, Deliberate Gap Crossings, and sustainment of offensive

operations have been neglected. When present, these skills now reside primarily at the

senior officer/NCO level and have atrophied; many of these skills are non-resident at the

junior officer/NCO level.

Insight #1: The Army is untrained in conducting deliberate gap crossings as a combined

arms team. The Army will likely be required to execute deliberate gap crossings during

Decisive Action. However, the Army has not trained on this complex, multi-discipline

task as a combined arms team since before 2004, if not earlier. Future MCO with plug

and play units that range from Strykers to heavy tracked vehicles will require in depth

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analysis, planning, and rehearsal to be effective.

Insight #2: Based on the size and complexity of Division and Corps Support areas of

operation in major operations, there is a lack of understanding of the most effective

mission command of the support area. Terrain management, movement, protection,

subordinate unit responsibilities, use of the MEB vs. other EAB unit mission command

capabilities need additional study to determine the best way to maintain effective

sustainment momentum to the fight. As many of the issues raised in this area are directly

related to the implementation of A2020 concepts, Doctrine does not exist to address these

gaps.

Insight #3: Forward Passage of Lines/Battle Handover (FPOL/BHO) collective

capabilities have atrophied. A passage of lines is a complex operation integrating many

of the WfFs in a constrained area of operations, usually in contact. There are multiple

moving parts of the operation that require deep doctrinal understanding, common SOPs

and detailed mission command processes. During the wargame, the division conducted a

forward passage of lines “rock drill” through the Reconnaissance and Security Brigade

Combat Team to educate the experiment participants on this operation because so few of

the uniformed personnel had ever conducted one at the CTCs or during current

operations. Graphic control measures, mission command requirements and

responsibilities of the stationery and moving units were discussed in detail. While

doctrine exists to address this need, as evidenced in the experiment, units no longer

possess the institutional knowledge to plan and conduct these operations. This skill set

will likely require externally supported unit-level training to address these deficiencies.

Insight #4: Army is not sufficiently trained to conduct decontamination operations; unit-

level collective CBRNE decontamination tasks have atrophied and need more

training/emphasis. CBRNE effects could be more prevalent during MCO base don

METT-TC and its effect on combat power and enablers must be considered and properly

prepared for at the individual soldier, crew, squad and unit level.

Insight #5: Sustainment community has lost the art of sustainment in offensive

operations (sustainment on the move). Due to ten years of phase IV (FOB centric)

operations, logistician skill-sets have atrophied on mobile operational capabilities of the

sustainment force. Displacing sustainment operations (jumping and refuel on the move)

have not been used in the latter parts of OIE/OEF. In order to operate, sustainment units

(CSSB, BSB, BSMC and FSC’s) must be static to issue/receive supplies, conduct

maintenance, and provide Role 2 Med Spt. Sustainment units cannot provide support

when they are displacing from one location to another because the reduction in tactical

wheeled vehicles places increased demand on CSSB transportation assets.

Recommendation: Focus future training and evaluation to regain the required

skills in the force.

Finding #6: Commanders must take into account the additional time, training and

integration required by the A2020 force designs. Consolidation of critical enablers at

EAB results in units which must be augmented to perform their required missions. While

the concept of task organizing units is not new, it does result in a requirement for units to

become familiar with the standard operating procedures and the nuances of the

organizations/commanders they are supporting. If these units do not get the opportunity

to train with each other prior to deployment, it increases the opportunities for

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misunderstanding/miscommunication and increases risk to force and mission

accomplishment.

Insight #1: Corps and R&S BCT staffs will require significant training to effectively plan

and conduct security missions. There are inherent training tasks associated with

transitioning an ABCT or SBCT into the R&S BCT. It will take more time for an ABCT

or SBCT to become proficient in their organic tasks along with their R&S training tasks.

In the PH II-III Wargame, the Corps and R&S BCT staff needed further training in

conducting screen, guard and LRS missions. Along with the training required at the

BCT level, staffs at EAB need to be trained on deploying and utilizing the R&S BCT.

Insight #2: Functional Battalions (MP, CBRN, CM) when task organized into Task

Forces lack sufficient training, leader development and staff capability to meet mission

requirements. Experimentation displayed the importance of task organizing the MEB’s

assigned functional battalions into Task Forces to conduct the complex maneuver support

and protection tasks required in a Division’s or Corps’ support area or along movement

corridors to secure, clear, and maintain MSRs. However, the staff expertise for the

functional battalions is limited to only their respective function (e.g., CBRN battalion

only has CBRN expertise).

Insight #3: The Expeditionary Military Brigade (E-MIB) is required to augment a variety

of units at all echelons from the Corps headquarters (HQ) down to a maneuver company.

Because each unit’s mission and organic capabilities are different, the training required to

integrate intel units with and support these units’ present unique training challenges for

MI unit commanders. The critical task lists (CTLs) for MI Soldiers contains a mix of

tasks that are trained at the schoolhouse and at the unit. Unit level tactics, techniques,

and procedures (TTPs) and standard operating procedure (SOP) requirements with which

the augmenting MI unit is unfamiliar will hamper rapid and complete integration of MI

assets. The limited number and geographic distribution of the E-MIBs will exacerbate

this problem as many supported/supporting units will rarely have the opportunity to train

together.

Insight #4: Army forces are not fully trained to operate in a disrupted and degraded space

operational environment. The enemy has the ability to degrade and disrupt space-reliant

mission command, surveillance, and navigation capabilities. Throughout the FY13

Campaign of Learning the enemy employed an extensive navigational warfare (NavWar)

campaign, which introduced new Precision, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) problem sets

to the force, and attempted to employ an extensive SATCOM jamming campaign. Space

Support Elements (SSE) reactions to these efforts included: coordination of Joint &

National assets to locate and target jammers; requested PNT augmentation; GPS II-Flex

Power, GPS III-Max Power, and High Altitude augmentation. These efforts were critical

to the navigation, communications, and Fires of the Division and R&S BCT. The Corps

Cdr emphasized the importance of PNT in synchronizing operations by planning critical

events when the GPS constellation was most resistant to disruption.

Recommendation: Review current ARFORGEN cycle and plan to determine if it

is still valid with the new force design and AC/RC mix.

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Conduct study to determine how long it would take to fully mobilize and prepare the

Army (AC/RC) for large scale MCO operations.

Align supporting enablers ARFORGEN cycle, to include RC, with their supported

units to allow units to habitually train together.

Finding # 7: The increase of air-ground interactions (fixed wing, rotary wing,

UAV, ADA, rockets, artillery, mortar, missiles, and high altitude aerostats) has created a

complex airspace coordination problem. The exponential increase in the number of

UAVs and the use of rocket artillery requiring higher trajectories in recent years has

created a highly complex airspace deconfliction problem which current doctrine does not

sufficiently address. To further exacerbate the problem, no single integrated air ground

picture exists and there is no single Mission Command system capable of correlating,

validating, or verifying trajectories and tracks of Rocket/Artillery fires, Army Aviation,

coalition Air Forces, and the myriad of UAVs on the battlefield. Staffs currently track

multiple sources of information (INTEL, Space, Fires, and AMD sensors) to get clear air

picture, but large quantities of data gleaned from multiple sources do not equate to a clear

operational picture. During FY13 experimentation, many fire missions were not fired

due to the inability of units to clear fires.

Insight #1: Division Staffs were challenged to integrate high volume of artillery fires,

joint fires, and Close Air Support during the high tempo MCO Joint/combined arms

operation. The Division staff could not quickly communicate changes to the

Coordinating Altitude and Coordinating level required to optimize the use of Close Air

Support, joint fires, and artillery fires.

Insight #2: The use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the increase in

range/altitude of rocket munitions which has occurred over the past ten years has

significantly changed the dynamics of employing and synchronizing Joint and Army

fires. Joint Fires can be executed seamlessly with clear direction from commanders and

staff coordination to turn kill boxes on and off. This will require significant training and

education to allow the joint fires community to work through a complex environment of

aerial maneuver and surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires.

Insight #3: Lack of a single air-ground picture at all operational level limits fires and

airspace integration and the use of Joint Fires enablers in a timely and effective manner,

due to inability to clear fires. The Joint force requires the capability to dynamically

execute air/fire support coordination measures (ACM/FSCM) in order to ensure timely

fires and flight safety in extremely congested airspace, in support of unified land

operations (ULO) in 2020.

Insight #4: The Army and Air Force are working together to address many of these

issues and the JAGIC has been effective at integrating joint fires and airspace during

experiments over the last several years. The Air Force is pushing their ASOCs from

Corps down to Division level to become part of the JAGIC and is creating a new Corps

Air Liaison Element (CALE) to replace the ASOC at the Corps. The Army and Air

Force are currently staffing their Joint Air Ground Integration Center publications (ATP

3-91.1 and AFTP 3-2.86) and several Joint Pubs are either under final revision or ready to

be published.

Recommendation: Rewrite Air/Ground doctrine to address the complexity that

now requires integration (vice deconfliction).

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Develop and implement consolidated air-ground picture to facilitate joint fires, joint

targeting, deep attack, AMD and counterfire.

Train TTPs for employment of AMD assets to ensure coverage of tactical units.

Finding #8: A2020 FDUs increase command and control challenges and require a

greater understanding of battlefield systems. The A2020 FDUs consolidate capabilities at

EAB, create the need for significant enabler augmentation to Divisions and BCTs and

increase reliance on area support for logistics and medical support. These changes will

increase frequency of units encountering span of control issues and will create

interoperability challenges between units with different battlefield networks. The

increased reliance on digital data and communications creates complex challenges in

network planning (bandwidth must now be planned, resourced and managed as a

commodity) and communications between units operating with different increments of

WIN-T and creates difficulties with units using mission command systems (MI COP and

ABCS) which are not compatible.

Insight #1: The command and control relationship between the Division, CSSB, and

medical units needs to be more clearly defined. The maneuver community does not

understand or is not comfortable with all aspects of area support relationships.

Throughout the FY13 experiments, there were concerns on how sustainment and medical

unit priorities would be synchronized with Corps and Division priorities.

Insight #2: Throughout FY13 experiments, LNOs were utilized to provide coordination

between augmenting and supported units. Unfortunately, TO&Es and MTO&Es for

most tactical units lack LNO positions, which forces staffs to send much needed

personnel to liaison with supported/supporting units.

Insight #3: Individual warfighting functions have created systems that meet their

numerous information requirements but do not integrate well, or at all, with other

command and control systems. There are intelligence systems that are not interoperable

with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). Experiment participants gravitated

toward the most understood and interoperable elements of the Army Battle Command

System (ABCS). To produce a common product, staffs and analysts must convert or

transcribe products from a stovepipe into a common medium, which introduces lag,

inaccuracy, and inefficiency. This process denies the command timely information that

facilitates decision making.

Insight #4: Network-enabled Mission Command increases the requirement for multiple

means of communications and increases the complexity of network planning. Staffs face

challenges in determining commander’s bandwidth requirements, managing bandwidth

and planning Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and High Altitude platforms to support critical

communication. Slow processing of network database updates result in Mission

Command systems which do not provide rapid, accurate depiction of task organized units

and prevent immediate network connectivity between supported/supporting units as task

organizations change.

Recommendation: Train and equip leaders and staff with the capabilities to Command

and Control the A2020.

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Update leaders POI’s to address the re-designed BCT concept

Update Maneuver and Maneuver Support leader POIs to education leaders that

bandwidth is finite capability and must be managed like other commodities.

Create LNO positions within HQ units to mitigate issues from large scale task-

organization of units.

Integrate the different C2 systems.

Ensure all enablers communications and network capabilities are similar to those

of the supported unit. This will require fielding plan analysis and ARFORGEN

management.

Define area support in FM 5.0 in accordance with the definition provided in Army

Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1.02 Nov 2012.

Finding #9: A2020 FDUs require doctrine updates and in some cases require new

doctrine to be written. Most of the FDU changes relating to the A2020 create new types

of units or significantly change the capabilities of existing units. All of these

organizations will require updates to or entirely new doctrine. The draft O & O created

for the 8th

Army/2ID WFX and the revisions made to that document following the

operational assessment will be a good start for these new/revised doctrinal products.

Recommendation: Use the Army experimentation produce draft O&O Revision 3

as a baseline to review and update doctrine for all units affected by the A2020 FDU

changes.

Finding #10: A2020 increases the capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize

assets at EAB. Centralizing capabilities at EAB gives the commander flexibility to task

organize, allows integration of combat power at decisive points on the battlefield, and

prioritizes efforts for efficient distribution.

Insight #1: Use of an Information Related Capabilities (IRC) coordinator on the Division

staff improved the focus, responsiveness, and visibility of IRC efforts, and ensured IRCs

were synchronized, de-conflicted, and mutually supported the operation. This approach

was more effective than current doctrine for the integration of the IRCs. While

establishing a central focal point on the staff for IRC integration was shown to have

merit, it is unclear if it is also necessary to create a large IRC Coordination Element

within the Staff to support this integration effort.

Insight #2: The JAGIC successfully integrated joint fires and airspace and should be

institutionalized in the Army and Air Force and coordinated with USMC. Five years of

experimentation have shown that airspace control, risk mitigation, and fires integration

have become increasing more complex as a result of the introduction of both hostile and

friendly unmanned aerial systems, space and near space based ISR and communications

systems, and enhanced indirect fires weapons and munitions. The JAGIC and the

ADAM/BAE are the enabling organizations that will facilitate rapid deconfliction of

airspace.

Insight #3: The Expeditionary MI Brigade (E-MIB) provides mission command

for lower level intelligence organizations and assists Corps, Div, and BCT staffs to

priorities intelligence efforts. The E-MIB provides an Intel mission command capability

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that is lacking at echelons above the BCT. BCT S2s and MICO commanders are

experienced MI officers but lack a higher Intel headquarters to provide training oversight,

experience, and mentorship. The E-MIB and subordinate battalions provide the

experience necessary to help the Corps and Division G2s and BCT S2s prioritize their

intelligence efforts. However, FY13 experimentation identified that the two battalion E-

MIBs did not have enough resources (personnel and equipment) to simultaneously

provide necessary support to the R&S BCT, the Corps G2, and the associated Divisions.

Recommendation: As the army continues to update the FDU and refine the EAB design

keep the Information Related Capabilities (IRC) coordinator on the Division staff, the

JAGIC and the ADAM/BAE, and the MI Brigade (E-MIB). Maintain the Expeditionary

MI Brigade (E-MIB), but increase to a three Battalions per E-MIB.

Event POCs:

Dr. Frank Myers, 580 442-2930, frank.t.myers2.ctr@mail.mil

Digital File Location: S:\FBL\FY13 Experimentation

Name of event: Black Dart and Joint Counter Low and Slow Unmanned (JCLU)

Joint Test

Event Start Date: 29 July 2013

Event End Date: 11 August 2013

Description of event: Black Dart is a Joint Integrated Air Missile Defense Organization

(JIAMDO) sponsors an annual demonstration designed to examine emerging

technologies to meet current and near-term counter-UAS requirements. In conjunction

with BD13, the Joint Counter Low- Slow-Small UAS (JCLU) team from Nellis AFB

conducted Field Test #1 (FT1), to test draft JTTPs for detection, tracking, and

identification. JCLU FT1 utilized joint POR and future (by 2016) POR systems,

examined current service TTPs, and identified potential changes/revisions for the joint

environment.

This year’s demonstration at Naval Base Ventura County – Point Mugu.

Representatives from DoD, Inter-Agency, Industry, and Academia and National

Laboratory Programs of Record (PORs) demonstrated near-term capabilities and

technologies to support Warfighter’s counter UAS requirements. Seven of the seventeen

FCoE nominated technologies for inclusion into BD13 participated. The seven

technologies and outcomes are:

Lockheed Martin Company – AN/TPQ-53: Successful demonstration of

developmental UAS tracking software

Air Vigilance: successful (classified)

GT Aeronautics – Bandito: successful tracking but near miss during engagement

SAAB Sensis Corp – Giraffe: successful integration and information inject into

the Multi-Source Correlation Tracker (MSCT)

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SRC, Inc. – Vigilant Falcon: 3 successful demonstrations

Miltec Corp – Fencepost: successful collection of data and test results

EWA Government Systems – EWA Nemesis: 2 successful demonstrations

Of the ten technologies that did not participate seven did not participate due to

funding, two completed successful demonstrations at other venues or previous Black

Darts and one could not participate due to range safety issues.

Results:

Observations from the JCLU FT1:

1. FT1 was a success. They collected a large amount of data and will now

switch to the analytics mode to review it.

2. Lack of USAF personnel in the division TOC prevented full

functionality of the JAGIC. Future JAGIC integration exercises must ensure full

integration of USAF to support complete information flow in the JAGIC.

ADAM, ADAFCO and CRC personnel developed work-arounds to replicate

missing information from the JAGIC.

3. Need to “shield” UAS as they are taking off to keep ID unknown. The

UAS could be seen taking off, and many systems already knew what was to be

flying and shared that information.

Event POC: CW2 Travis Craig, (580)442-7624, travis.j.craig.mil@mail.mil

Event Name: Counter Unmanned Aerial System Simulation Experiment (SIMEX)

Event Start Date: 3 September 2013

Event End Date: 20 September 2013

Event Description: The SIMEX utilized with minor modification the efforts from

the April Phase II/III Wargame, the January Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

experiment, and the December Army 2020 Capability Seminar. The SIMEX was

distributed using the Battle Laboratory Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE)

across key locations to include Fort Benning, Fort Huachuca, Fort Leavenworth, Fort

Lee, Fort Eustis, Fort Rucker, Hurlburt Field, and Fort Sill. Friendly and threat forces

were stimulated by the M&S Federation and master scenario event list (MSEL) injects to

ensure experimental objectives were met.

Event Results:

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1. Decision Point 1 (DP 1): Design of the Future BCT. The objective for DP 1 is to:

Maximize the capabilities within the BCTs to achieve a decisive defeat of potential

adversaries in Major Combat Operations and across a broad range of foundational

activities. Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an

integrated perspective to determine the FY13 DP 1 implications across warfighting

functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages

were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

Advantages:

The third maneuver battalion increased the combat power and flexibility of

the force.

Direct access to Cyber systems in support of CUAS or tasking of full range

Cyber capability provides opportunities heretofore unattainable.

The third firing battery increased fires available to BCTs.

The Sentinel Radar at the BCT increases capability to detect threats and to

manage airspace.

IFPC missile variant and Directed Energy (laser) provided enhanced CUAS

capability and flexibility

The Division Fires Command (DFC) and Corps Fires Brigade provided

senior level fires guidance integration through reallocation of assets to

support close combat operations with additional fires or counterfire and

target acquisition capabilities.

Disadvantages:

BCT’s or support Brigades do not have capability or skilled personnel to

control Cyber equipment or direct their usage thus limiting the full range of

possibilities.

There are increased training requirements for the Fires and ADAM/BAE

personnel during airspace control and fires integration operations.

BCTs lack air defense capability and there are insufficient quantities of

Avengers or IFPCs to assign to all BCTs and other organizations to provide

fully integrated security and CUAS operations.

Access to Division’s and Corps' Space Support Element and enabling assets

is impaired by lack of or junior trained personal.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

The Division and Brigade CPs/TOC must organized to facilitate the rapid

integration of fires and airspace. (O)

With the increased threat of BM/CM/UAS, A2020 needs to revisit the

Army’s Air Missile defense organizational structure to counter the threat

and protect the force. (O, M)

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The Army needs to further examine maneuver support, security and

protection roles and responsibilities in the 2020 Corps, Division, and BCTs

to fix responsibility and requirements for force protection.

Identify position(s) within BCT/BDE HQs to be designated for a 3Y like

space additional skill identifier. (O, T, P)

2. Decision Point 3 (DP 3): Design R&S Capabilities. The objective for DP 3 is

to ensure the Army of 2020 can meet the Corps and Division Commanders' requirements

for reconnaissance and security in current and future conflicts. R&S capabilities were not

examined during this event

3. Milestone 9 (MS 9): SOF-CF Interdependencies. The objective for MS 9 is to:

Improve SOF-CF interdependence by defining responsibilities and organizing SOF-CF

functional capabilities IOT create a clear and synergistic effort to assess, shape and

influence foreign security environments, promote trust with allies, and build partner-

nation capacity. SOF—CF capabilities were not examined during this event.

4. Decision Point 15 (DP 15): Sustainment 2020. The objective for DP 15 is to

develop a responsive, agile, and adaptable organization and strategy that provides

tactical-level sustainment to Army 2020 units while sustainment capabilities migrate out

of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Echelons above Brigade (EAB). Observations

and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine

the FY13 DP 15 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF

considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages

were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

Advantages:

The modular structures allow the div aligned CSSB to have additional units

attached for METT-TC.

Additional FSCs in the SBCT standardizes the sustainment operations for

the A/I/S BCTs.

Forward Support Companies, linked to each FA battalion, increase

flexibility during sustainment operations.

Aviation provided alternative means of delivery for Class V supply over

congested LOCs and canalized terrain.

Disadvantages:

(DPI) Moves troop transport from BSB to EAB- competing demands for

transportation assets.

FiB's redesigned and greatly reduced BSB has challenges; however, it is

enabled to synchronize Sustainment operations.

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DFCs S4 organizational design. The S4's ability to plan and coordinate

support from the CSSB to the FA BN FSCs, especially Class V (rocket and

cannon), is limited.

The FSC CSSB fires resupply activities will be challenged to maintain

OPTEMPO during transitions between phased tactical operations.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

Recommend the Army review transportation augmentation and coordination

procedures that existed prior to Modularization. (D)

Relook mobility requirements for all types of units during the conduct of

MCO. (MTOE and TOE). (O)

Recommend a thorough review of the prioritization process for the

allocation of limited transportation resources to include criteria and location

of approval authority within the organization. (D)

DFC needs a larger S4 section to properly plan and coordinate sustainment.

(D, O)

The Division aligned CSSB needs to be able to support the DFC and its

attached subordinate Fires BNs.

5. Milestone 18 (MS 18): Intelligence 2020. The objective for MS 18 is to:

Develop an incremental, personnel and grade neutral, low cost approach to synchronize

the Intelligence WfF with Army 2020 decisions and initiatives. Observations and results

from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13

MS 18 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages

were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

Advantages:

High Altitude systems are required and complementary to the aerial layer as an

integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient

communications and surveillance gaps.

Cyber assets at Division enabled CUAS activities for targeting and holistic

intelligence gathering.

Disadvantages:

Task organized MI assets may not be able to quickly meet unfamiliar unit

specific intelligence requirements.

Insufficient number of Gray Eagle (GE) platforms for all GE requirements.

Gray Eagle (GE) multi-mission and dynamic tasking capabilities highlight

the need for refined SOP/TTPs for G2/G3/G6 integrated planning.

156

Protecting corps and division support areas will require significant ISR

capability/capacity - how Intel 2020 apportions ISR capabilities to the

support areas is lacking sufficient detail and discussion.

Increased reliance on Army space support to the Corps.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

Develop institutional, collective and crew training TTPs for dynamic tasking in

support of multi-payload operations. (T)

Pre-configure aircraft for better coordination and synchronized deliberate

mission planning to improve dynamic re-tasking of multi-purpose payloads.(T)

Increase aircraft and ground control station (GCS) allocation per company. (M)

Continue HA CONOPs development in follow on experiments and war games,

engage all CoEs in the development and integration of HA payloads. (D, M)

Establish an Army high altitude force structure that supports Army 2020/A2025

requirements. (O)

Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and

demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)

Explore HA capability to provide the MEB and CSSB with surveillance and

long range COTM enabling protection measures as well as Corps and Division

support operations. (D, O, T)

Fires require direct access to EAB/EAD sensors during MCO. (D, pol)

Develop reconnaissance and security requirements for the Division and Corps

(D)

6. Milestone 19 (MS 19): Signal 2020. The objective for MS 19 is to: Develop

an incremental approach in synch with Army 2020, which closes Mission Command

Warfighter Functional Gaps due to increased network management and complexity to

support BCT operations. Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from

an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 MS 19 implications across warfighting

functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages

were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

Advantages:

Direct HA sensor shooter linkage provides enhanced target for Fires and

CUAS activities.

High Altitude systems are required and complementary to the aerial layer as

an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient

communications and surveillance gaps.

Other MILSATCOM capabilities can compliment current warfighter beyond

line of site (BLOS) Communications On-the-Move (COTM) requirements in

support of tactical operations.

157

Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB) network support to functional and

multifunctional Brigades is currently projected to be at-the-halt (ATH)

transit case capability.

Network extension is a requirement — the Aerial layer is critical.

Intelligence enterprise systems require priority of network access based on

the Commanders PIR. G6/S6 planning staffs need to ensure adequate tactical

bandwidth is made a priority for this system.

Disadvantages:

The current signal architecture does not support the requirement for assured

timely responsive fires for FA and AMD assets.

Fires BN FDCs and maneuver BN FSEs lack organic on-platform OTM

network capabilities that limit their ability to integrate fires in offensive

maneuver operations.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

Study the OTM requirements (collection, analysis, and communications) for

FA. (D, O, M, L)

Review management of TAC, Main, and Rear CPs during offensive

operations.(T)

Increase senior leaders education as to the capabilities and limitations of

these resources, bandwidth is finite like ammunition and fuel. (L)

Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and

demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)

Develop mitigation strategies for Degraded Network (LandWarNet)

Operations (D, T, L)

Currently planned NetOps capabilities may not support delivery of timely

responsive of fires and targeting data; mission command system must

provide a single, integrated air ground picture to decision makers and their

staffs. (D, M)

Determine the DFC, FiB, and Fires BN requirements for on-platform OTM

network capabilities. (D, O)

7. Decision Point 20 (DP 20): Review EAB. The objective for DP 20 is to:

Develop recommendations on Mission Command at echelons above brigade to increase

Army responsiveness and operational effectiveness in support of the Ground Component

Commander (GCC). Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an

integrated perspective to determine the FY13 DP 20 implications across warfighting

functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages

were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

158

– Advantages:

High Altitude systems are required and complementary to the aerial layer as

an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient

communications and surveillance gaps.

Division Fire Command and Fires Brigade helped focus fires in support of

close, deep, and counter firefights.

Creation of Fires Command achieves unity of effort above brigade and

training, readiness, authority (TRA) of BCT Fires BNs.

JAGIC and ADAM/BAE linkage provides responsive integration of fires

and airspace.

– Disadvantages:

During high tempo MCO combined arms operations, full airspace

integration, clearing joint Fires, Close Air Support (CAS) and integrating a

high volume of artillery fire within close proximity to aircraft can remain a

significant challenge for fires and airspace staff integration teams.

Joint Fires Integration was challenging with the introduction of EUAS and

swarming tactics for the Division and BCT. Current procedures may be

inadequate or soldier skills have atrophied.

AMD assets lack required mobility, survivability, and flexibility to support

tactical maneuver operations.

Theater Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Manned/Unmanned Aerial

Systems used in multiple simultaneous attacks overwhelmed limited

defensive capabilities of critical defended assets.

Low-density critical assets (weapons and sensors) are not manned or

equipped to provide self-defense.

Use of new rocket munitions to replace cannon and rocket DPICM in

support of the close fight created Joint fires integration and danger close

concerns.

Further analysis and refinement of support area operations in support of

Class V is needed. The complexity of this effort is not fully understood. The

roles and activities in relation to Class V resupply at DIV, Corps, and

Theater are not clear to the non-logistician.

Future requirements for space and high altitude support may exceed

capability/capacity.

c. DOTMLPF Considerations.

Review management of TAC, Main, and Rear CPs during offensive

operations.(T)

Consider small-scale studies and/or experiments to verify the insight that

Commanders and staffs are not utilizing their ABCS systems (Intelligence

and Mission Command systems) in favor of slower but more

159

interoperable software tools, in order to determine the best balance between

warfighter functionality, interoperability, and ease of use.(D, M, L)

Review and refine Airspace and Joint Fires doctrine as processes and

material solutions dictate. (D)

Continue development of DFC/FiB as force artillery headquarters further

refine roles, functions, missions, and tasks. (D)

Current graphic control measures, Joint networked fires integration

processes and procedures are not synchronized with future manned and

unmanned weapon systems and munitions. They require adaptation. (D)

To support ground maneuver and close combat operations the Army needs

sufficient quantities of air missile defense assets that are mobile, survivable,

and flexible enough to adapt ever changing tactical operations. (M)

There are insufficient quantities of assets to counter complex and saturation

attacks by hostile forces throughout an area of operation. (D, M)

Units must have sensors and armament to provide limited self-defense to

stay in the fight. CROWS systems or robotics could provide necessary

protection. Decoys, decoy emitters and updated camouflage equipment

should be investigated. (D, M)

There is need for an area munitions that can provide timely responsive close

support fires without requiring Joint coordination as result of violations to

coordinating altitude. (D, M)

Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and

demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)

Conclusions/Recommendations. The CUAS SIMEX achieved the following conclusions

and recommendations:

1. Conclusions. The Phase III SIMEX concluded the following:

The MEB/DFC/FiB dependent on CSSB for sustainment support but have no

control other than coordination.

Low density, high value assets (Trojan Spirit, Prophet, radars, Avenger, IFPC,

WIN-T nodes) need similar mobility and protection as the maneuver force.

The Army lacks sufficient assets to protect the force from missiles and UAS

threat.

There was a significant reliance on Gray Eagle for both ISR &

Communications. Gray Eagle requires the capability to carry mixed payloads to

execute multiple missions simultaneously.

High Altitude/space capabilities provided essential redundancy for

communications and surveillance.

Division lacks the ability to integrate fires. At division RADC/SADC

authorities are need to fully integrate Joint assets.

At BCT the ADAM/BAE cells not designed for AMD/CUAS and does not have

engagement authority or fully control air assets.

160

After 10+ years of COIN focus, specific skills may be atrophied or non-

resident.

2. Recommendations.

Army should train JAGIC personnel and grant RADC/SADC authorities to it just as

Navy and Marine Corps have done.

Investigate the network requirements for the DFC/FiB/AMD systems operating over

extended distances during major combat operations to provide multi-dimensional

single integrated air-ground picture in support of timely integrated fires.

Conduct a Network experiment in FY14 that accurately depicts the communications

needs and architecture.

Conduct experiments in FY14 that are enabled by realistic and feasible technology

advances such as robotics for next decade.

Provide BCTs, Support Brigades and Multi-functional Brigades with organic limited

range CUAS capable systems to attack Group 1-3 systems.

Advance needs and requirements pertaining to elect fires, cyber and electronic warfare

activities in support of CUAS operations during FY14 experimentation.

Event POCs:

Mr. Anthony Evans, 580 442-3235, anthony.evans1.civ@mail.mil

Dr. Frank Myers, 580 442-2930, frank.t.myers2.ctr@mail.mil

Digital File location: S:\FBL\FY13 Experimentation\CUAS Experiment

Electric Fires

Name of event: HQDA EXORD 174-13 Electric Fires Roles and Responsibilities

Requirements

Event Start Date: 11 June 2013

Event End Date: 01 October each year until relieved of responsibility

Description of event: US ARMY reviews threat-related testing and evaluation programs

in order to identify testing and evaluation gaps related to Electric Fires (EF) and

Electronic Attack (EA) testing; prioritize testing requirements and identifies funding

requirements for such testing and evaluation.

The Army completes this assessment in five phases:

Phase 1: Compare EF to DE EA threats in order to identify threats to

USASMDC/ARSTRAT and FCoE identified systems and facilities. Provide a scope to

the problem and the difference between EF and EA DE capabilities along with additional

threats identified. HQDA will endorse/not endorse the definition of EF.

Start date was 01 August 13 with an end date of 01 October 13.

161

Leads: TRADOC; SMDC/ARSTRAT; HQDA G3/5/7 (DAMO-ODE)

[Electronic Warfare Section]

Phase 2: Compare EF to DE EA threats to identified Systems Threat Assessment

Report (STAR) for equipment and to the Army Prioritized Protection List (APPL) for

facilities. Identify gaps in the STAR and APPL and update. US Army confirms/denies

that existing STAR and APPL are sufficient.

Start date was 01 October 13 with an end date of 01 October 14.

Leads: Army G2/HQDA G3/5/7

Phase 3: Combat developers and facilities engineers review updated STAR and

APPL to determine if requirements documents require corresponding update. Update

requirements documents and proponents confirm/deny requirements documents are

updated based on Phase 2 results

Start date is 01 April 14 with an end date of 01 October 14.

Leads: TRADOC/IMCOM/HQDA G3/5/7

Phase 4: Identify additional testing requirements. Ensure gaps in testing are

identified and closed as required. Army identifies additional testing of vulnerabilities for

systems and facilities.

Start date is 01 October 14 with an end date of 01 October 15.

Leads: TRADOC/IMCOM/HQDA 3/5/7

Phase 5: Conduct EF or DE Vulnerability Assessments. : Identify and mitigate

risks to equipment and facilities. Army identifies additional testing of vulnerabilities for

systems and facilities.

Start date is TBD/NLT 1 October every year until relieved of responsibility.

Leads: AMC/ASA(ALT)/IMCOM

Results: The TRADOC part of Phase 1 was completed as of 19 September 13 in a

G3/5/7 led Counsel of Colonels. The General Officer Steering Committee was canceled

and never rescheduled.

G3/5/7 determined they would no longer recognize the term Electric Fires

but they had no issue if we continued to use it.

MG McDonald made the decision FCoE would continue using the term.

Transitioned from Phase 1 to 2, however still waiting on

SMDC/ARSTRAT Phase 1 completion.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, Shannon.d.judnic.mil@mail.mil, 580-442-

3636

Name of event: Electric Fires Seminar

Event Start Date: 26 February 2013

162

Event End Date: 28 February 2013

Description of event: This is the 1st Annual Electric Fires Seminar. The purpose is to

identify and discuss potential impacts to include Doctrine, Organization, Training,

Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) of Electric Fires

(EF) capabilities across the Army. The seminar provided an open forum to discuss EF

capabilities, planning and coordination measures, Centers of Excellence vulnerability

assessment recommendations and input into the development of an EF White Paper. To

attain cross warfighting (WfX) functional area input to EF coordination, integration and

potential DOTMLPF-P input. Develop an EF White Paper to inform A2020 concept and

gap analysis processes, provide a way ahead for military decision makers on how to

employ and/or react to electromagnetic capabilities. This is a government-only seminar in

which participants include the Centers of Excellence, Sister Services, RDECOM

elements, additional government organizations and National Labs.

Results: This seminar provided a greater understanding of how EF could be integrated

into the future planning, synchronization and the execution of missions; see what

RDECOM is focused on in the EF arena ; identified mission command, targeting and

intelligence requirements; identified concerns across the CoEs with implementation of

EF; updated Vulnerability Assessment – Systems and coordinated for input into the EF

White Paper.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, Shannon.d.judnic.mil@mail.mil, 580-442-

3636

Name of event: Electric Fires Range

Event Start Date: 26 August 2013

Event End Date: TBD

Description of event: During the CDID Future's Board on 26 August 2013, MG

McDonald directed the staff to establish a Directed Energy Range on Fort Sill. FCoE is

dedicated to the facilitation of future demonstrations in order to better shape and inform

the concepts and requirements within CDID.

In 2013 Fort Sill received “one-time” categorical exclusion waiver to conduct a High

Power Microwave (HPM) system live fire event. Since this was a one-time waiver all

future prototype experiments require a complete Environmental Assessment as defined in

32 Code of Federal Regulations, which governs environmental considerations and issues

and is further defined in Part 651 – Environmental Analysis of Army Actions. The Fires

Battle Lab (FBL) in coordination with the Environmental Quality Division (EQD) is

working to complete an EA as required by the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA).

163

On 06 Nov 13 the FBL presented a briefing to the Department of Public Works

(DPW) on potential modifications to a range on Fort Sill. These modifications would

enhance the range not only for EF purposes but for any other organizations that use the

range. Critical work includes: access road improvement, bury electric cable, and emplace

gravel parking area. Additional work includes: add one concrete firing pad with two

grounding rods, remove two unused telephone poles, emplace junction box, provide

telephone & fiber connections, construct latrine & range building, provide target boards,

and warning signs with holders.

On 13 Nov 13, the FBL conducted a kickoff meeting with the US Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) and their contract representatives to gain a better understanding of

the requirements for the EA. As a result of the meeting the Electric Fires Office is

drafting the Description of Proposed Action and Alternatives (DOPAA). The DOPAA is

essentially Chapter 1 & 2 of the EA and provides the USACE the parameters of the

environmental study from which a contract and cost estimate is completed.

On 14 Jan 14, the scope of the range along with recommended modifications was

presented to the Training Enabler Working Group (TEWG). This quarterly meeting

allows for organizations across post to present on-going projects and concur/nonconcur

with the project. The TEWG is headed by Director/ Directorate of Plans, Training,

Mobilization and Security and the G3.

On 5 Feb 14, the AMO packet requesting funding for the EA was sent to the G8 on

Fort Sill. Once funding is secured the EW will take 6-12 months to complete.

Milestones/Timeline:

17 Oct 13: Kick off meeting with organizations across post

29 Oct 13: EQD Discussion

06 Nov 13: DPW Quad presentation

13 Nov 13: Kickoff Meeting with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

20 Nov 13: Meeting with FCoE Staff Judge Advocate

05 Dec13: In Progress Review with General Atomics (railgun)

19 Dec 13: Scoping and DOPAA complete

14 Jan 14: Training Enabler Working Group (DPTMS)

(T) FY15: Establishment of Electric Fires Range

(T) FY15: Electric Fires Demonstrations

Results: Progress is being made to establish an EF Range on Fort Sill. This task requires

continual communication, coordination and synchronization with both internal and

external organizations. Ongoing.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, Shannon.d.judnic.mil@mail.mil, 580-442-

3636

Name of event: Electric Fires White Paper

Event Start Date: 11 April 2012

164

Event End Date: FY14

Description of event: The Electric Fires (EF) paper is an ongoing effort. It is at the

General Officer Staffing level, followed by officially being published. This WP provides

information on vision and a roadmap for follow-on force development activities. Electric

Fires embodies rapidly emerging technologies that are likely to be operational Game

Changers. The current pace of development and deployment of EF capabilities by

foreign nations and the commercial markets are likely to challenge the US Army’s

capabilities. US Army CONOPS, personnel, material and facilities vulnerability to EF is

untested and unknown.

Results: Ongoing effort. Published document Army wide.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, Shannon.d.judnic.mil@mail.mil, 580-442-

3636

165

GLOSSARY

AAR, After Action Review

ABCS, Army Battlefield Command System

AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant

ACAAP, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program

ACAT, Acquisition Category

ACCC, Aviation Captain’s Career Course

ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

ADP, Army Doctrine Publication

ADRP, Army Doctrine Reference Publication

AESA, Army Enterprise Area Standards

AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AIT, Advanced Individual Training

AKO, Army Knowledge Online

ALC, Advanced Leader Course, Army Learning Concept

ALM, Army Learning Model

AMCB, Army/Marine Corps Board

AMRDEC, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center

AOT, Assignment-Oriented Course

AOEWC, Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course

APMI, Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative

APU, Auxiliary Power Unit

ARNG, Army National Guard

ARCIC, Army Capabilities Integration Center

AROC, Army Oversight Council

ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council

ASI, Additional Skill Identifier

ASOC, Air Support Operations Center

ASOS, Air Support Operations Squadron

ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System

AVC3, Aviation Captain’s Career Course

BCT, Brigade Combat Team

BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle

BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course

BOLC, Basic Officer Leader Course

C2, Command and Control

C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

CAC, Combat Arms Center

CAM/WAS, Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security

CAS, Close Air Support

CATT, Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

CBRNE, Chemical, Biological, radiological, and Nuclear Explosive

166

CCC, Captains Career Course

CCF, Course-correcting Fuse

CDD, Capability Development Document

CDE, Collateral Damage Estimate

CDID, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command

CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer

CFLCC, Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CG, Commanding General

CGSC, Command and General Staff College

CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force

COE, Center of Excellence

COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team

CONOPS, Concept of Operations

CONUS, Continental United States

COTS, Commercial off the Shelf

CPD, Capabilities Production Document

CPOF, Command Posts of the Future

CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement

C-RAM, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortars

CTS, Combat Training Squadron

DA, Department of the Army

DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard

DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian

DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCG, Deputy Commanding General

DFCS, Digital Flight Control System

DIVARTY, Division Artillery

DL, Distance Learning/Distributive Learning

DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine

DOTMLPF, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and

Facilities

DOTMLPF-P, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,

Facilities, and Policy

DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition

DPW, Directorate of Public Works

DSABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory

ECU, Environmental Control Unit

EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing

EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development

ER, Extended Range

EW, Electronic Warfare

EWTGLANT, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic

FA, Field Artillery

FAASV, Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle

167

FA BOLC, Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course

FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course

FACCC-RC, Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component

FAPO, Field Artillery Proponency Office

FAS, Field Artillery School

FAST-21, Task Force Future Army Schools 21

FCoE, Fires Center of Excellence

FCMS, Future Cannon Munitions Suite

FCS, Future Combat System

FDC, Fire Direction Center

FIST, Fire Support Team

FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle

FM, Field Manual

FMTV, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command

FOS, Forward Observer System

FRP, Full-rate Production

FS3, Fire Support Sensor System

FSC, Fire Support Center

FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications

FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed

FSO, Fire Support Officer

FY, Fiscal Year

GOSC, General Officer Steering Committee

GPS, Global Positioning System

GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Location Designator

HBCT, Heavy Brigade Combat Team

HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer

HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HQ, Headquarters

HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army

HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit

HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

HyPAK, Hydraulic Power Assist Kit

IBCT, Infantry Brigade Combat Team

ICD, Initial Capabilities Document

IED, Improvised Explosive Device

IET, Initial Entry Training

IFCS, Improved Fire Control System

ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System

IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System

JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate

168

JADOCS, Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JAGIC, Joint Air Ground Integration Center

JCAS, Joint Close Air Support

JDAM, Joint Direct Attack Munition

JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System

JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System

JFO, Joint Fires Observer

JNN, Joint Network Node

JOFEC, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course

JROC, Joint Requirement Oversight Council

LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program

LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar

LDM, Laser Designator Module

LED, Light Emitting Diode

LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder

LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production

LSAC, Low Signature Armored Cab

LSAC-H, Low Signature Armored Cab HIMARS

LRAS3, Long-range Advanced Scout Surveillance System

MACS, Modular Artillery Charge System

MANPRINT, Manpower Personnel Integration

MCCC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course

MCoE, Maneuver Center of Excellence

MEP, Mission Equipment Package

MET, Meteorological

MLCS, Modular Launcher Communication System

MLRS, Multiple Launch Rocket System

MMS, Meteorological Measuring Set

MOS, Military Occupational Specialty

MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment

MTT, Mobile Training Team

NCO, Noncommissioned Officer

NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy

NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System

O&O, Organizational and Operational

OCONUS, Outside Continental United States

OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom

OES, Officer Education System

OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom

ORD, Operational Requirements Document

PEO STRI, Program Executive Officer for Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation

PEO, Program Executive Officer

PERSCOM, Personnel Command

PFC, Precision Fires Course

169

PFED, Palm Forward Entry Device

Pff, Preformed Fragmentation Round

PFRMS, Precision Fires, Rockets, and Missile System

PGK, Precision Guidance Kit

PIM, Paladin Integrated Management

PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course

PM, Program Manager

POCV, Paladin Operations Center Vehicle

POI, Program of Instruction

POM, Program Objective Memorandum

POV, Privately Owned Vehicle

PQT, Production Qualification Test

PSS-SOF, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces

QAO, Quality Assurance Office

QRC, Quick Response Capability

ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps

RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

RTI, Regional Training Institute

SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition

SAP, Special Access Programs

SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SBL, Soldier Battle Laboratory

SDD, System Development and Demonstration

SSD, Structured Self-Development

SGI, Small Group Instruction

SHARP, Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program

SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SLC, Senior Leader Course

SMC, Sergeant Major Course

SMDC, Space and Missile Defense Command

SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment

SOCOM, Special Operations Command

SPTD, Soldier Precision Targeting Device

SRC, Standard Requirement Code

STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office

TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System

TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization

TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations

TAMMS, Target Area Meteorological Measuring System

TASS, Total Army School System/The Army School System

TATS, The Army Training System

TATS-C, The Army Training System Courseware

TBOC, Training Brain Operations Center

TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition/TRADOC Capabilities Manager

TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances

170

TDY, Temporary Duty

TECS, Target Effects Coordination System

TLDS, Target Location Designation System

TLM, Target Location Module

TMO, Target Mensuration Only

TRAC, TRADOC Analysis Center

TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSM, TRADOC System Manager

TSP, Training Support Package

TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

TWV, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle

USAADAS, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School

USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School

USAFCOE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence

USAFCOEFS, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

USAIC, U.S. Army Infantry Center

USMA, U.S. Military Academy

USMC, U.S. Marine Corps

VBS2, Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2

VCSA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

WITA, Women in the Army

WLC, Warrior Leadership Course

WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course

WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course

WOES, Warrant Officer Education System

ZUP, Zero Velocity Updates

171

APPENDIX ONE

STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

428th Field Artillery Brigade

Course Initial Inputs Graduates

FACCC 358 349

FACCC DL 29 95

FACCC-RC ADT 138 138

BOLC B 969 936

WOAC 49 49

WOBC 37 36

NCOA 2,101 1,996

USMC 1,364 1,321

Other Courses 6,086 6,018

Total 11,392 10.938

Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Production Figures for Fiscal Year 2013,

3 Feb 14, Doc I-57.

172

APPENDIX TWO

KEY FCoE AND USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commanding General, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill

MG James M. McDonald, 4 May 2012-present

USAFAS Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery

BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 12-Apr 13

(Interim) COL Martin C. Clausen, Apr 13-Jun 2013

BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present

USAFAS Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School

COL Martin C. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present

Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment

COL Gene D. Meredith, 29 Jun 2012-present

173

APPENDIX THREE

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, 19 Jul 1911-l5 Sep 1914

LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep 19l4-26 Jun 1916

School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917.

COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul 1917-26 Sep 1917

BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-11 May 1918

BG Laurin L. Lawson, 11 May 1918-18 Dec 1918

BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec 1918-l0 Jun 1919

BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun 1919-9 Jul 1919

MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct 1919-l Jul 1923

MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul 1923-l Apr 1928

BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr 1928-l2 Dec 1929

BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb 1930-3l Jul 1934

MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep 1934-10 May 1936

BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun 1936-31 Jul 1940

BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug 1940-22 Dec 1940

BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun 1942

BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan 1944

MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944

MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945

MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946

MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun 1946-9 Apr 1949

MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun 1949-3l Mar 1950

MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-l6 Nov 1953

MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954

MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956

MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959

MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l

MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964

MG Harry H. Critz, 1 Apr 1964-15 May 1967

MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970

MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973

MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976

MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977

MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980

MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982

MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985

MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987

MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991

MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993

MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995

MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997

MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

174

MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001

MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003

MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005

MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007

MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009

BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010

BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011

BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013

BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present

175

APPENDIX FOUR

CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927

*MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930

*MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934

*MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938

*MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942

BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942

BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan l944

MG Orlando Ward, 12 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944

MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945

MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946

MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun 1946-15 Apr 1949

MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr 1949-31 Mar 1950

MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-16 Nov 1953

MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954

MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956

MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959

MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l

MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 1961-31 Mar 1964

MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-15 May 1967

MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970

MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973

MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976

MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977

MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980

MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982

*MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985

*MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987

*MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991

*MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993

*MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995

*MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997

*MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

*MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001

*MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003

*MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005

*MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007

*MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 Jun 2009

*BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 June 2009-1 Oct 2010

*BG Thomas S. Vandal, 20 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011

*BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013

*BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present

176

Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the

Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War

Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to

supervise the Field Artillery during World War One. On 9 March 1942 the War

Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of a World War

Two reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When

the War Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General

Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the

unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery

and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942.

In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to

oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and

training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not

recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants

of the Field Artillery School considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See

TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122.

Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115,

lists Snow’s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19

December 1927. USAFAS’s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The

same article lists Austin’s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930.

USAFAS’s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

177

APPENDIX FIVE

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918

LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918

COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919

MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919

MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920

COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924

COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925

LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929

LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jun 1933

COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937

COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938

COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938

BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941

COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941

COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942

COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942

COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943

COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944

COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947

BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949

BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952

BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953

BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955

MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956

BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957

BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959

BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962

BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964

BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965

BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967

BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968

BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972

BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974

BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975

BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978

BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980

BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981

BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983

BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984

BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986

BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987

BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

178

BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990

COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991

BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992

BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994

BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995

BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997

BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998

BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999

BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001

BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003

BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004

BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005

BG James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006

COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006

COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007

COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008

BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-4 Jun 2009

COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-Jul 2011

COL Richard M. Cabrey, Sep 2011-4 Apr 2012

COL Martin D. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present

179

APPENDIX SIX

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF USAFAS SINCE 1991

CSM Joseph J. McFadden, Jan 1991-Aug 1995

CSM Gary R. Green, Sep 1995-Aug 1998

CSM Perry L. Roberts, Aug 1998-Jun 2000

CSM Ricky Hatcher, Jul 2000-Mar 2002

CSM Dennis M. King, May 2002-May 2004

CSM Armando Ramirez, Jul 2004-Jul 2006

CSM Gary J. Bronson, Aug 2006-Aug 2008

CSM Daniel R. Willey, Jul 2009-Aug 2011

CSM Sam K. Young, Aug 2011-Sep 2013

CSM Daniel S. Moriarty, Sep 2013-present

180

APPENDIX SEVEN

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF

NCOA

CSM Clifford L. Lewis, Mar 1973-Sep 1974

CSM Ralph Pitcher, Aug 1974-Jun 1975

CSM Coyle C. Bohn, Jul 1975-Apr 1976

CSM Tommy Morgan, Apr 1976-May 1977

CSM Nick Mastrovito, May 1977-Jun 1978

CSM James Kennedy, Jun 1978-May 1980

CSM George Phillips, Aug 1980-May 1983

CSM Pat Fowler, May 1983-Nov 1984

CSM John A. Pierce, Nov 1984-Jan 1986

CSM Kenneth E. Mills, Jan 1986-Aug 1988

CSM Jerry M. Laws, Aug 1988-Feb 1990

CSM William J. Kermode, Feb 1990-Jun 1991

CSM Mal Causby, Jun 1991-Oct 1991

CSM Harold F. Shrewsberry, Oct 1991-Oct 1993

CSM Karl L. Purdy, Oct 1993-May 1995

CSM Jerry L. Wood, May 1995-Oct 1997

CSM Gene Odom, Oct 1997-Jun 1999

CSM Rickey Hatcher, Jun 1999-Jun 2000

CSM Joseph Stanley, Jun 2000-Dec 2001

CSM Carl B. McPherson, Jan 2002-Jan 2004

CSM Allie R. Ousley, Jan 2004-May 2006

CSM Robert L. White , May 2006-Jul 2007

CSM Dean J. Keveles, Nov 2007-Jun 2011

CSM Bryan A. Pinkney, Jun 2011-present

181

APPENDIX EIGHT

U.S. ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 8 APRIL 2013

Personal Staff

Aide

CPT Valton King

(580)-917-9444Valton.l.king.mil@mail.mil

Coordinating Staff

Special Staff

IG

LTC James Mattox

(580) 442-3224James.a.mattox2.mil@mail.mil

SJA

COL Mark Seitsinger

(580)-442-2685Mark.w.seitsinger.mil@mail.mil

Chief of Staff

COL Brian Dunn

(580)-442-3005

Brian.p.dunn2.mil@mail.mil

US ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURECommanding General

USAFCoEFS

MG James M. McDonald

(580)-442-3006

James.m.mcdonald26.mil@mail.mil

Deputy to the CG

USAFCoEFS

Mr. Joe E. Gallagher

(580)-442-2604

Joe.e.gallagher.civ@mail.mil

Command Sergeant Major

USAFCoEFS

CSM Dwight Morrisey

(580)-442-3205

Dwight.l.morrisey.mil@mail.mil

Deputy Chief of Staff

Mr. Jimmy Dailey

(580)-442-8300Jimmy.d.dailey.civ@mail.mil

SGS

MAJ Sheriff Olalekan

(580)-558-0599Sheriff.a.olalekan.mil@mail.mil

G2

Ms. Pamela-Jackson-Williams

(580)-442-5207Pamela.s.jackson-

williams.civ@mail.mil

G6

Mr. Eddie Henderson

(580)-442-2318Eddie.c.henderson.civ@mail.mil

G1/G4

LTC James Speegle

(580)-442-0314James.d.speegle.mil@mail.mil

G3/5/7

COL Steven Parker

(580)-558-0504Steven.l.parker18.mil@mail.mil

G5

LTC Noah Villanueva

(580)-442-4603Noah.villanueva.mil@mail.mil

G8 (DRM)

Ms. Young, Julie

(580)-442-2044Julie.s.young2.civ@mail.mil

Deputy SGS

CPT Sarah Savageau

(580)-442-8313Sarah.e.savageau.mil@mail.mil

Protocol

Mr. Mike Kunz

(580)-442-4237Michael.c.kunz.civ@mail.mil

STRATCOM

LTC Brian Adams

(580)-442-3944

Brian.w.adams5.mil@mail.mil

PAO

Mr. Darrell Ames

(580)-442-4500Darrell.d.ames.civ@mail.mil

QAO

Mr. James Connolly

(580)-442-2002James.p.connolly4.civ@mail.mil

Retention

SGM Daniel Hilton

(580)-442-4707Daniel.o.hilton2.mil@mail.mil

Equal Opportunity

MSG Wendell Huddleston

(580)-442-6968Wendell.m.huddleston.mil@

mail.mil

Director of Museums

Mr. Frank Siltman

(580)-558-0384Frank.j.siltman.civ@mail.mil

CDID

COL David Hill

(580)-442-6230

david.c.hill30.mil@mail.mil

JACI

COL John T. Smith

(580)-442-1701

John.t.smith25.mil@mail.mil

DOTD

COL Thomas Quintero

(580)-442-2301

Thomas.w.quintero.mil@mail.mil

Directorates

Commandant

US Army FA School

VACANT

Commandant

US Army ADA School

COL(P) Donald Fryc

(580)-442-8994

Donald.g.fryc2.mil@mail.mil

AC

COL Martin Clausen

(580) 442-6606

Martin.c.clausen.mil@mail.mil

428th FA BDE

COL Gene Meredith

(580)-442-4704

Gene.d.meredith.mil@mail.mil

USMC Detachment

Col. Douglas P. Thomas

(580)-442-6311Douglas.p.thomas2.mil@mail.mil

FAPO

COL Kelly Ivanoff

(580)-442-3820

Kelly.m.ivanoff.mil@mail.mil

30th ADA BDE

COL Michael Simley

(580)-442-0779Michael.d.simley.mil@mail.mil

Office, Chief ADA

VACANT

(580)-442-0617

AC

COL Christopher Spillman

(580)-442-5421Christopher.l.spillman.mil@mail.mil

NCO Academy

CSM Bryan Pinkney

(580)-442-3141bryan.a.pinkney.mil@mail.mil

434th FA BDE

COL Michael Dvoracek

(580)-442-1261Michael.j.dvoracek.mil@mail.mil

FORSCOM UNITS

TENANT UNITS75thth Fires BDE

COL Alfredo Najera

(580)-442-4501

Alfredo.najera.mil@mail.milUS Army Garrison

COL Paul Hossenlopp

(580)-442-3106Paul.s.hossenlopp.mil@mail.mil

MEDDAC

COL Jennifer Bedick

(580)-558-3000Jennifer.l.bedick.mil@mail.mil

DENTAC

COL Michael Roberts

(580)-442-4111Michael.l.roberts98.mil@mail.mil

USAOTC FSTD

COL Steven Scioneaux

(580)-442-8400Steven.a.scioneaux.mil@

mail.mil

EOC

(580)-442-3241

214th Fires BDE

COL Tim Daugherty

(580)-442-4919Timothy.j.daugherty.mil@mail.mil

31st ADA BDE

COL Michael Morrissey

(580)-442-0421Michael.t.morrissey3.mil@mail.mil

TCM Fires Brigade

COL David Brost

580-442-8754David.j.brost.mil@mail.mil

TCM BCT Fires

COL Michael Hartig

580-442-1995 Michael.j.hartig.mil@mail.mil

TCM Fires Cells

COL Scott Patton

(580) 442-6836michael.s.patton6.mil@mail.mil

TCM ADA Brigade

LTC Matthew Tedesco

580-442-2419Matthew.t.tedesco.mil@mail.mil

In Accordance with Title 5, U.S.C. 552a (Privacy Act of 1974) as implemented by the Federal Register, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, 32

CFR Part 505, The Army Privacy Program; Final Rule, protected personal information (home address and home telephone numbers) will not be disclosed

from this roster to anyone outside the Department of Defense. This alert roster will be kept in a secure place at all times. When updated, obsolete copies will

be destroyed as required by paragraph 4-501, AR 25-55, The Department of the Army Freedom of information Act Program.

As of 4/8/2013

G 3/3

LTC Anthony Behrens

(580)-442-4603Anthony.j.behrens2.mil@mail.mil

TCM Deputy Chief

Concepts/Development

VACANT

580-442-6980

TCM AAMDC

COL Edward J. O’Neill

580-442-8947Edward.j.oneill12.mil@mail.mil

Senior Guard Advisor

COL Paul Caviness

(580)-442-6770

Lloyd.p.caviness.mil@mail.mil

Ft Sill Band

WO1 Matthew David

(580)-442-2208Matthew.m.david.mil@mail.mil

TCM Fires Integration

COL Toby Brooks

580-558-0731William.t.brooks8.mil@mail.mil

G7

LTC John l. Rainville

(580)-442-1778John.l.rainville.mil@mail.mil

Briefing, subj: FCoE Organization from FCoE Home page, 3 June 2013, Doc I-24, 2012

USAFAS AH.

182

APPENDIX NINE

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANT OFFICE CHART AS OF 27

MARCH 2014

Source: Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt Organizational Chart, 27 Mar 14, Doc I-58.

183

APPENDIX TEN

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

See Footnotes

184

INDEX OF NAMES

A

Austin, Gen Lloyd J. III, 70

B

Bentley, BG Christopher F., 1, 2, 23, 46, 50

C

Campbell, Gen Charles C., 9

Campbell, Gen John F., 70

Chiarelli, Gen Peter W., 51, 69

Cone, Gen Robert W., 12, 60, 61

F

Fahey, Kevin M., 89

Funk, BG Paul E. II, 16

G

Gates, Bill, 88

Geren, Peter, 88

Gruber, Edmund L., 6

H

Halverson, MG David D., 45, 68, 69

Hamilton, Alexander, 6

K

Knox, Henry A., 6

L

Lenaer, MG William M. 85

Longo, BG Richard C., 16

M

Maple, MG Michael D., 73

185

McDonald, MG James M., 11, 13, 59, 60, 71

McGuiness, BG John, 90

McKiernan, BG Brian J., 15, 18, 23, 25, 37, 55

Metz, LTG Thomas F., 120

Mull, Stephen, 122

O

Odierno, Gen Raymond T., 7, 8

S

Shinseki, Gen Eric K., 73

Stricklin, MG Toney, 72

T

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 74

Thurman, LTG James D., 123

V

Vandal, BG Thomas S., 24, 37

Vangjel, MG Peter M., 89, 108

Vane, LTC Michael M., 92

W

Wallace, Gen William S., 9, 51