By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-141-Caliphate- Hybrid Warfare-5

Hybrid war has changed the landscape of conflict. Terrorists, state-run energy cartels, cyberhackers, Internet trolls and '' little green men'' all practice hybrid warfare by using the processes and instruments of open societies to attack, disrupt or weaken them. Hybrid warfare can take many forms.

Russia's actions regarding Ukraine are exemplary: arming foreign insurgents while denying such support; employing inflammatory propaganda; fostering civil unrest among foreign minority communities; cutting off energy supplies; even outright invasion. But Russian hybrid operations extend beyond Ukraine. They include provocative overflights and harassment of air, land and sea traffic of many neighboring countries, including NATO allies; intimidation and covert operations; cyberattacks; financial manipulation; kidnapping and illegal border crossings; snap military exercises and deployments near borders; and casual threats of nuclear weapons.

Nor is Russia alone. Hamas practiced hybrid warfare against Israel by digging illegal tunnels, hiding fighters among the population and utilizing an ongoing media strategy. When al-Qaida destroyed the World Trade Center towers, it is likely that it engaged simultaneously in attacks on the global securities markets through market manipulation. Terrorists understand how interconnected, and vulnerable, the world's collective infrastructures are to attack. Practitioners of hybrid warfare are often less intent on seizing and holding territory than destroying or disrupting the ability of societies to function. Antagonists wishing to inflict harm upon a society look to key nodes where critical infrastructures connect. States and non-state actors alike have established significant offensive cyber capabilities. The electric grids of the United States and other allies and partners have repeatedly been infiltrated and are highly vulnerable.

When war changes, so must defense, June 2015.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

For the past 15 years, Western leaders have focused on projecting stability far from North

Atlantic shores. Following the 9/11 attacks, NATO leaders were right to say that Western security began at the Hindu Kush. But in an age of hybrid warfare, the front line may also run through Frankfurt's airport, Washington's metro, Istanbul's grand bazaar, Narva's dachas or the port of Mariupol.

If NATO is visible in expeditionary missions but invisible when it comes to protecting our own societies, support for the alliance will wane. Its role will be marginalized and our security diminished. NATO's old mantra was ''out of area or out of business.'' Its new focus must include resilience as well as its established tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security.

But just as resilience is not just a job for the military alone, it is also not just a job for

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 1 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

NATO alone. Efforts to combat hybrid warfare must encompass new civil-military mechanisms and more effective U.S.-EU cooperation.

Resiliency is the new challenge of the 21st century. Just as we have traditionally protected our territory, so too must we protect our connectedness – the vital arteries that are the lifeblood of open societies and the transatlantic community.

Hybrid warfare—the term applied to Russia’s particular approach to irregular warfare in Ukraine—is the threat du jour in international security affairs. Unfortunately, by focusing attention on Moscow’s purported deviousness and cunning, and conflating the annexation of Crimea with the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions, it avoids examining the real reasons for the Kremlin’s successes (and failures). Both deserve greater scrutiny.

Beneath the surface of Russia's so-called "hybrid warfare" lies an ugly set of lies, deceit and, effectively, a make-shift approach to deconstruct and reconstruct military units. This method of conducting warfare will certainly not prove popular among either officers or enlisted personnel. Although these accounts provide a glimpse into how Russian units are deployed in Donbas, it is still unclear how the units are reassembled once across the border, whether unit commanders then arrive and reconnect with their units, or precisely how newly assembled units of "volunteers" function in combat.

While Golts highlights the serious implications concerning the link between the AWOL kontraktniki and the results of military reform, there are also important issues revealed as a result of such reporting. Golts notes that the military reform of 2008 to 2012 was aimed at improving combat capabilities and readiness in order to achieve rapid victory in future conflicts; it was not designed to sustain the type of conflict experienced in Donbas.

Golts based his conclusion on the shocking conditions experienced by the deserters and highlighted the fact that this is occurring among contract personnel rather than the conscripts.

Nato has pledged to counter "hybrid warfare" from Russia. Apr 2015, The alliance said it must adapt to the mixture of conventional military tactics, subversive campaigns and cyber-warfare that Russia was using in Ukraine. Nato says that Russia is backing rebels in Ukraine - a claim denied by Moscow. Three Baltic countries are preparing to ask for a permanent presence of Nato troops on their soil to act as a deterrent to the Russian military.

"Hybrid warfare combines different types of threats, including conventional, subversion and cyber," said Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg.

"When the world has changed, Nato has to adapt," he added. "We will ensure that the strategies we are developing are complementary, so that we

can work together quickly and effectively in the case of a hybrid threat against any of our members," said Mr Stoltenberg.

Paul J. Saunders June 23, 2015 Hybrid warfare—the term applied to Russia’s particular approach to irregular warfare in Ukraine—is the threat du jour in international security affairs. Unfortunately, by focusing attention on Moscow’s purported deviousness and cunning, and conflating the annexation of Crimea with the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions, it avoids examining the real reasons for the Kremlin’s successes (and failures). Both deserve greater scrutiny.Russia’s annexation of Crimea was shockingly effective—and bloodless—and it is appropriate that it should provoke thinking, analysis, debate and even constructing new models (or giving greater attention to existing ones) to explain it. Nevertheless, since we might see more such irregular warfare in the future, we should insist on greater precision and honesty in our conversations.

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 2 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

First, however successful Vladimir Putin’s little green men may have been in seizing Crimea, that particular approach is unlikely to be widely applicable. Crimea was unique, or at least very, very rare, in combining a substantial foreign (Russian) naval base and associated military presence, a major power with well-developed special operations capabilities, a very substantial local majority sympathetic to the government owning the base (including some of the host nation’s military personnel and local officials), and a parliament that had already voted more than once (before current events) to join that country. Where else is this true?In fact, what worked in Crimea demonstrably failed in eastern Ukraine, where Vladimir Putin appears to have fundamentally miscalculated support for the separatists (and reactions even among some Russian-speakers elsewhere in Ukraine). The Kremlin did not swiftly and cheaply establish new Russian provinces (which was probably not Putin’s aim), relatively stable quasi-independent unrecognized regions under Russian protection like Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia (not too likely but a possible objective), or some other enduring arrangement winning long-term Russian influence in Ukraine (most probable). Instead, Russia’s leader has ensnared himself and his country in a costly, long-term insurgency/nation-building quagmire that is difficult to exit and could escalate to something much worse. Fomenting instability for political ends in far off lands is one thing, but doing it on your own border is something else entirely.

Second, why is it exactly that the United States and its NATO allies have had such difficulty responding to what Russia is doing? It is not only because Moscow developed seemingly novel tactics. On the contrary, a degree of self-examination—which can always be a little painful—suggests that in important respects the answer may have less to do with Moscow’s approach than our own. Three factors stand out.

One is that Russia’s seizure of Crimea happened very quickly. U.S. and European decision-making processes just don’t move at that speed, particularly when facing ambiguity. Once a Crimea-style operation has begun, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible for Western decision-makers to be sufficiently confident about the other side’s intent to take consequential action before it’s too late. While we can and should strive to improve our intelligence-collection (to get information more quickly and make better sense of it), this makes deterrence and long-term responses important and limits our options for immediate reaction.Another factor is that widespread feelings of military (and moral) superiority over Russia and even invulnerability to conventional warfare essentially blinded decision-makers to Russia’s perspectives, capabilities and potential actions. In other words, Western leaders have had a hard time formulating a response because they weren’t even thinking in these terms before the spring of 2014. U.S. and European leaders were wholly unprepared for an angry Russia that dared to use force in a region they thought they owned militarily, politically and economically.As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said last year, “we have underestimated, for a long time, the magnitude of the humiliation that Russians felt with the collapse of the Soviet Union because it also involved the collapse of the Russian empire.” This is primarily a result of consolidated conventional wisdom and political correctness in much Western discussion of Russia over an extended period—the same intellectual blinders that prevented

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 3 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

hard questions from receiving serious attention in Washington prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A similar problem is that many Western analysts, politicians, commentators and even leaders have not been honest with themselves about their real commitment to Ukraine, much less wider public interest. Russia’s actions have exposed the fact that talk is cheap and that no small number of Ukraine’s Western supporters are cheapskates. It has also uncovered the degree to which elite-level aspirations for Ukraine moved far beyond what voters are prepared to back. A recent Pew Research Center survey illustrates this by demonstrating tepid Western support not only for Ukraine, but even for fighting to defend other NATO members.

In Feb 2015, Are We Prepared for 'Hybrid Warfare'?From Russia in Ukraine to China in the East China Sea, it is worth assessing how the world may respond. the Institute of International and Security Studies, a leading British think tank, released the 2015 version of The Military Balance – an annual assessment of global military trends and capabilities. The report has long served as a useful weather vane for those who follow defense and security trends closely.The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ – broadly, situations where the adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular warfare – features prominently in the editor’s introduction. That is no surprise, as the term has gained renewed prominence following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting of instability in Eastern Ukraine. Just last July, the then NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen publicly accused Russia of waging hybrid warfare. And in a key indication of how the term has caught on among the chattering classes of late, this year’s Munich Security Conference – an annual gathering of bigwigs which just wrapped up a few days ago – specifically included the concept in one of its panel discussions.

What’s so new about ‘hybrid warfare’? Those who read widely on the evolution of warfare will know that the concept is hardly novel. The term itself at least a decade old and is often traced back to the U.S. Marine Corps, although one can easily find references to similar conceptions in other countries including Russia and China. But the general practice of blending conventional state-on-state conflict with irregular warfare has been around for centuries. Even if one were to avoid the rather quotidian reference to Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, it has arguably played out recently in the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Hezbollah’s attack on Israel in 2006 to cite just a few examples.Of course, this is hardly the first time that old concepts on warfare have gained new significance due to current developments. In this case, that development is clearly the nature of the Russian threat which is playing out most clearly in Ukraine, and the discussion is centered on whether the world – particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – is ready to counter such a threat. As The Military Balance notes, it is pretty clear that Russian involvement in Crimea last year showed the integrated use of capabilities including rapid deployment, electronic warfare, information operations, special-forces capabilities and cyberspace communications, targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences.But the conversation that is occurring is not just about what tactics to use, but how to think about the concept strategically as well. To cite just one example, Frank Hoffman has written previously over at War on the Rocks about how we ought to pay attention not only to the mix of conventional weapons as well as irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior, but also non-violent actions. These include not just information operations, but also economic, financial and subversive political acts. As Hoffman correctly notes, this is not just merely a definitional debate. Choosing how broadly we define something has effects on the extent to which various government agencies are involved and integrated in responding to hybrid warfare and, more broadly, how we prepare for contingencies. The Military Balance adopts a similar expansive conception and argues that adapting to the threat of ‘hybrid warfare’ will

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 4 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

require governments to invest in a wider array of capabilities and facilitate coordination between them.In that respect, the recent Munich Security Conference panel held on February 6 – rather directly titled “Who is Ready for Hybrid Warfare?” offered an interesting window into the ongoing conversation at both the strategic and tactical levels. During the panel, NATO’s military commander General Philip Breedlove honestly admitted that the organization can only be “a part” of the solution, and there was discussion about focusing a response on other non-military dimensions as well such as information. “We need to put the truth out there,” Breedlove said with respect to that dimension, which would involve the use of broadcasting in order to reconfigure the narrative.But as The Military Balance correctly points out, ‘hybrid warfare’ has implications for other regions as well. This includes not just the ISIS threat in the Middle East, but Asia as well, where it says defense budgets have been rising by an estimated 27 percent between 2010 and 2014 amid growing awareness that the West’s military-technological edge could be increasingly eroded. With respect to hybrid warfare concerns in the region itself, the report makes specific reference to Japanese concerns about ‘grey-zone’ contingencies – ones just shy of actual conflict and not involving militaries – with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as one concern.Another clear example of this in Asia which I have expanded on here is of course the South China Sea, where similar worries about hybrid contingencies also exist given China’s growing assertiveness there as well as the mix of responses from other claimants as well. With China’s share of total Asian defense spending rising from 28 percent to 38 percent in just the last five years, and other countries investing largely in maritime and aerial capabilities, it is little wonder that strategists and governments alike have begun thinking seriously about how this might play out amidst the region’s “growing militarization,” as the head of IISS John Chipman said in a press statement.

13 Jul, Authorities in Kosovo have cut off water supplies to tens of thousands of people in the capital Pristina after an alleged plot by supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group to poison supplies. Officials from the city's water board said supply was cut early on Saturday "because of security issues" and that supplies had been tested for suspicious substances. Al Jazeera Balkans reported that the tests carried out by the Kosovo Institute for National Health had detected no sign of toxic content. The move follows the arrest of five people linked to ISIL, who were accused of planning to poison a reservoir, according to the Reuters news agency. 

July 20, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 135 On July 10, the Russian occupation forces in the separatist territory of South Ossetia (Tskhinvali region) moved the occupation line deeper into Georgia, thus effectively slicing off additional lands in the Georgian villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani. (Tskhinvali region) moved the occupation line deeper into Georgia, thus effectively slicing off additional lands in the Georgian villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani. Russian troops erected new signs, marking what they call a “state border” between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia. As a result of these activities, a small portion of the 520-mile (830-kilometer) Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, which daily transports 100,000 barrels of Azerbaijani oil to Georgia’s Black Sea cost, fell under Russian control (Channel 1 TV, Rustavi 2, July 11). Moreover, all these developments took place in striking proximity to the highly strategic East-West highway, the key transportation artery connecting the eastern part of Georgia to its western regions. Russians came to within just over a half mile (about 1,000 yards) from the highway—so close, in fact, that from these new Russian positions, one can actually see with the naked eye individual vehicles moving along the road

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 5 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

(Channel1 TV, Imedi TV, Rustavi 2, July 11). If needed, Russian forces stationed along the current occupation line could capture and block that section of the East-West highway within fifteen minutes. Needless to say, were Tbilisi to lose control over the highway, it would split Georgia into two parts, causing a major political as well as humanitarian catastrophe in the country. After Russia’s latest actions, such a scenario no longer seems improbable for Georgia. It may well be a real possibility sometime in the not-too-distant future. Moving the occupation line deeper into Georgia has been a regular occurrence since Georgia’s devastating military defeat in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the subsequent Russian occupation of South Ossetia. After the war’s conclusion, Russia repeatedly sliced off hundreds of acres of additional Georgian lands along the occupation line, leaving multiple Georgian communities cut off from one another on opposite sides of a barbed wire fence (see EDM, September 23, 2013). In fact, Moscow uses the tactic of a “creeping annexation,” as it was dubbed by Georgians, as a noose that it gradually tightens over Georgia every time Tbilisi does something that Moscow finds unacceptable.Russia’s latest shifts of the occupation line may have been sparked by a number of recent developments. First, based on the July 3, 2014, ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Georgia requested that Russia pay over 70 million euros ($76 million) in compensation for damages incurred by the deportations of Georgian nationals from Russia during the 2006 Georgian-Russian spy war (Civil Georgia, July 3, 2015). Second, on July 8, Georgia launched a military exercise named Agile Spirit 2015 alongside five North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries: The United States, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (Channel 1TV, July 8). Therefore, in light of those events, Russia’s recent actions should be seen as a retaliatory action to inflict physical losses on Georgia and punish it in order to discourage this small country from similar actions in the future. Georgia’s capacity to stop Russia’s “creeping annexation” is extremely limited. First of all, Tbilisi cannot expect foreign military help under any circumstances. Even political and diplomatic backing from the West seems to be limited. On July 15, the European Union issued a somewhat timid statement, which generally urged all sides to avoid “steps that could be perceived as provocative” (Civil Georgia, July 15). Such a statement will hardly serve as a deterrent, especially against Russia’s modern-day revanchist regime. Georgia’s own military capabilities are in a dire state, too. The Georgian military never fully recovered from the colossal losses in military hardware and ammunition that it incurred during the 2008 war. Subsequently, the country is entirely unprepared for a conflict not only with Russia, but even against any hypothetical less powerful opponent.The Georgian government’s ineffectiveness and its lack of strategy for dealing with this problem further complicate matters. Certainly, Tbilisi’s options are limited because of the severity of the situation and the overall weakness of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia. However, Georgia’s ruling team has, so far, chosen to ignore the problem altogether, hoping that Russia would stop its aggressive actions and that the situation would calm down. Georgian authorities issued several statements, expressing protests and condemning Moscow’s actions (Channel 1 TV, Imedi TV, July 11–19), but certainly, these have not worked. Russia has denied any involvement in the recent land grab and advised the Georgian government to talk directly to the Ossetians (Radio Abkhazetis Khma, July 15). Some sporadic protest rallies along the occupation line and in the capital Tbilisi did not make much difference either (Liberali.ge, July 18). Russians now firmly occupy territory closely adjacent to Georgia’s highly strategic East-West Highway.How can Moscow’s “creeping annexation” be stopped, and what will happen if Russia decides to eventually annex a section of the East-West highway? So far, neither the Georgian

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 6 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

government nor Georgia’s western partners and allies seem to have a ready answer to this question. But a viable strategy to this problem may be needed much sooner than many policymakers inside and outside of Georgia can imagine at his stage. Russian Military Reform: The Ukraine Conflict and Its Impact on Morale July 21, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 136 Evidence has emerged in Russia's Southern Military District (MD) that the conflict in Ukraine is not popular among Russian contract personnel (kontraktniki). Reportedly "dozens" of kontraktniki have absconded from or deserted their units on grounds of their opposition to being sent to fight in Donbas. After more than a year of the Kremlin-spun official line that there are no Russian troops fighting in southeastern Ukraine, paradoxically the most striking evidence to the contrary is from a garrison tribunal in Maykop, in which Russian soldiers are being prosecuted for absconding from their unit or for desertion. These men face penalties of up to five to ten years in prison (Gazeta.ru, July 10).The cases involve military personnel accused of absconding or desertion from military unit 22179 of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in Maykop. The personnel, all kontraktniki, were taken to the Kadamovskiy training ground in Rostov Region in Southern MD, from where they refused to be sent to the conflict in Ukraine. As one of the accused stated, "I did not want to participate in combat operations on Ukrainian territory." According to official statistics from the Maykop Garrison Tribunal, in the first half of 2015 there were 62 rulings issued under Section 4 of Article 337 of the Russian Criminal code (absconding from a unit), compared with a total of 35 cases in the period 2010-2014 (Gazeta.ru, July 10). These cases revolve around the unpopularity of being sent to fight in Donbas and the conditions of service and treatment experienced at the training ground in Rostov Region.Aleksandr Golts assessed the implications of the kontraktniki desertions in Yezhednevny Zhurnal, concluding that the Serdyukov-era reforms (2008-2012, initiated by former Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov) are rapidly disintegrating. Golts based his conclusion on the shocking conditions experienced by the deserters and highlighted the fact that this is occurring among contract personnel rather than the conscripts. He noted that after years of reform, the quality of contract servicemen has not advanced much, and their terms and benefits of service appear exaggerated. Golts also noted the mistreatment or lack of care for subordinates on the part of Russian officers and left no doubt that the conflict in Ukraine is taking its toll on the Russian Army (Yezhednevny Zhurnal, July 13).According to the accused and some accounts by those convicted through the garrison tribunal, the kontraktniki experienced harsh conditions at Kadamovskiy training ground, with bedding in the form of a blanket thrown on the ground; at least one soldier returned from Kadamovskiy suffering from pneumonia. Aleksandr Yenenko, a 22-year-old junior sergeant described his experience of the training ground, saying that personnel spent days "pointlessly digging pits and immediately filling them in again. They [officers] told them [kontraktniki] that they wanted to send them to Ukraine, and they waited about a week for the order to cross the border, but at the last moment they canceled it." Yenenko says that he also saw "some guys in camouflage gear without identification badges exhorting people to fight in Donbas for money." Another contract soldier added, "It was late October, there were frosts at night, and everybody had a terrible cough. We would buy firewood at our own expense and light a bonfire by what passed for a tent. The hardest thing was the lack of water; they would bring in one truck for the kitchen and allow only one cup of tea a day. Locals would come and sell us a bottle of mineral water for 100 rubles each [in October 2014, approximately $2.40]" (Gazeta.ru, July 10).While Golts highlights the serious implications concerning the link between the AWOL

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 7 of 8 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

kontraktniki and the results of military reform, there are also important issues revealed as a result of such reporting. Golts notes that the military reform of 2008 to 2012 was aimed at improving combat capabilities and readiness in order to achieve rapid victory in future conflicts; it was not designed to sustain the type of conflict experienced in Donbas. Yet, it is equally crucial to note the unpopularity of the conflict among Russian contract personnel. The mother of Ivan Shevkunov, a 20-year-old contract soldierin the Maykop brigade, told Ekho Moskvy that her son submitted a resignation letter three times as he did not want to fight in Ukraine, but his applications were denied (Ekho Moskvy, July 11). Moreover, the reporting of the cases offers insight into how "volunteers" are "recruited" from Russian Army units and sent across the border to fight alongside separatist forces. It shows exactly how units are broken up and prepared for deployment in Ukraine in addition to the role of Russian officers in this process (Novaya Gazeta, July 14). The movement of troops from the base in Maykop to the training ground in Rostov Region may serve as a model for how the Russian Army moves and prepares troops for deployment in southeastern Ukraine. According to the various accounts offered by these kontraktniki, the following pattern emerges: First, troops receive legitimate orders to move out of their base and go to Kadamovskiy training ground. Sometime after arrival, "agitators" appear at the training ground tasked with recruiting volunteers to fight in Ukraine. These agitators are described as anonymous, dressed in camouflage with no insignia, only shoulder boards, thus identifying them as officers. Since they are unknown to the soldiers, it is clear they are not unit commanders. They make no appeal to Russian patriotism or nationalism. Rather, they appear to use bullying methods and offer near-ludicrous incentives to those persuaded to volunteer. The offer is 8,000 rubles ($142) per day plus veteran status on their return to Russia; according to some of those who accepted the offer, the money is never paid. Surprisingly, the kontraktniki say there are also separatists billeted at the Rostov training ground, which may indicate an early effort to mix such forces (Gazeta.ru, July 10. Beneath the surface of Russia's so-called "hybrid warfare" lies an ugly set of lies, deceit and, effectively, a make-shift approach to deconstruct and reconstruct military units. This method of conducting warfare will certainly not prove popular among either officers or enlisted personnel. Although these accounts provide a glimpse into how Russian units are deployed in Donbas, it is still unclear how the units are reassembled once across the border, whether unit commanders then arrive and reconnect with their units, or precisely how newly assembled units of "volunteers" function in combat.

** Regards Cees

see A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War” By Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky Wilson Center. Kennan Cable 7 Apr 2015. Timeline of the operation by David B. Miller, Cartographer, EMC. www.wilsoncenter.org/

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 8 of 8 15/04/2023