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Exploring the Scope of Public and Private

Responsibilities for Climate AdaptationHeleen L.P. Mees

a, Peter P.J. Driessen

a& Hens A.C. Runhaar

a

aEnvironmental Governance, Copernicus Institute of Sustainable

Development, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The

Netherlands

Version of record first published: 30 Jul 2012.

To cite this article:Heleen L.P. Mees, Peter P.J. Driessen & Hens A.C. Runhaar (2012): Exploring the Scope oPublic and Private Responsibilities for Climate Adaptation, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 14:3

305-330

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Exploring the Scope of Public and Private Responsibilitiesfor Climate Adaptation

HELEEN L.P. MEES, PETER P.J. DRIESSEN & HENS A.C. RUNHAAR

Environmental Governance, Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Faculty ofGeosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Although in practice the division of responsibilities in adaptation to climatechange is often not explicitly decided upon, governments appear to be primary actors inadaptation planning. However, literature suggests that the governance of adaptationrequires roles for both public and private actors so that responsibilities can be sharedand all of societys resources can be fully exploited. Active involvement of all societalactors might overcome problems of inefficiency and raise the legitimacy of adaptationaction. This article presents a framework that enables the characterization and explanationof existing governance arrangements in terms of responsibility divisions among publicand/or private actors, and that facilitates the search for alternative responsibility divisionsand their associated advantages and disadvantages. The framework is illustrated with anexample of a governance arrangement for green roofs as an adaptation measure for stormwater retention in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The merit of the framework is that it pro-motes the conscious deliberation of considerations in the publicprivate divide, taking into

account some specific challenges to the governance of climate adaptation. It may, therefore,support well-informed decisions on responsibility divisions in climate adaptation by localgovernments.

KEYWORDS: climate adaptation, responsibilities, public private divide

Introduction

Since the late 1990s, adaptation to the impacts of climate change has graduallybeen recognized as a policy objective in addition to mitigation. Adaptation plan-

ning is emerging as a new area of public policy across various geopolitical scales(Biesbroeket al., 2010; Prestonet al., 2011). Nevertheless, a recent study shows thatdemarcations of responsibilities are often lacking in adaptation policy documents(Prestonet al., 2011). This is problematic because vagueness of roles and responsi-bilities is regularly cited as a barrier to the governance of adaptation (Biesbroek

Correspondence Address: Heleen L.P. Mees, Copernicus Institute of SustainableDevelopment, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands.Fax: +31 30 2532746; Tel.: +31 30 2535763; Email: [email protected]

Journal of Environmental Policy & PlanningVol. 14, No. 3, September 2012, 305330

1523-908X Print/1522-7200 Online/12/030305-26# 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2012.707407

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et al., 2010; Carter, 2011; Dovers & Hezri, 2010; Funfgeld, 2010; Storbjork, 2010).However, although, in practice, adaptation planning often appears to be govern-ment-led (Johnson & Priest, 2008; Mees & Driessen, 2011; Storbjork, 2010; Wilson &Termeer, 2011), the involvement of public and private actors in adaptation iswidely endorsed by scientists and policy-makers (Agrawala & Fankhauser,2008; EC 2009; Fussel, 2007). If an explicit allocation of responsibilities facilitates

the governance of adaptation, the question arises as to what kind of sharing ofresponsibilities is feasible and desirable among public and/or private actors foradaptation to climate induced risks.

One could argue that adaptation action can be left with the market, becausethe benefits of adaptation are relatively localized and private, compared to miti-gation efforts that aim to reduce CO2emissions from which all benefit (Agrawala& Fankhauser, 2008; Berkhout, 2005). The theoretical rationale forpublic adap-tation policies and hence the roles of governments is generally related tomarket failure, which leads to non-action, mal-adaptation, under- or over-adap-tation. For instance, the market might not have access to sufficient informationfor adaptation action. Governments can step in to generate and distribute such

knowledge (Aakre & Rubbelke, 2010; Berkhout, 2005; Osberghaus et al., 2010;Stern, 2007). A clear case for government action is related to matters of nationalsecurity, for instance, water safety and coastal protection. The building of dykes isseen as a typical public responsibility, as well as emergency planning and com-pensation for catastrophic losses in case of extreme floods (Aakre & Rubbelke,2010; Aakre et al., 2010; Berkhout, 2005; Brooks & Adger, 2005; Heltberg et al.,2009; Osberghauset al., 2010). Another reason for an active role for the state isthe equitable regulation of the distributional consequences of climate change(Eakin & Lemos, 2006). Governments can decide to compensate those householdsmore vulnerable to or affected by climate impacts or adaptation measures (Berkh-out, 2005; Osberghauset al., 2010; Stern, 2007). Nevertheless, too much govern-

ment dominance could lead to inefficiency of adaptation policies (Berkhout,2005; Driessen & Van Rijswick, 2011; Mendelsohn, 2006; Stern, 2007). Privatesector involvement is often thought to increase the efficiency of environmentalpolicy-making (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Economists have argued that a free,well-functioning market may lead to increased levels of prosperity andmaximum efficiency. Efficiency gain is one of the most cited advantages ofmarket steering. Another advantage of markets is their innovative power: theyencourage investments into new products and production methods (Baarsmaet al., 2010). A further widely proclaimed benefit of private involvement inpublic policy is that it raises societal support for a policy. Participation, delibera-tion and co-determination of those actors which have a stake in the policy issue

tend to increase the legitimacy of public policy (Dryzek, 2000; Smith, 2003).Private involvement in environmental policy-making can take many forms,often resulting in hybrid governance arrangements which cross the publicprivate divide, such as policy networks, co-management, publicprivate partner-ships and privatesocial partnerships (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Weber et al.,2011). According to Lemos and Agrawal (2006, p. 315), climate change is thetypical example of a complex multi-scalar environmental problem, requiring adiversity of actors across the state-society divide. Hybrid forms of governancefor climate mitigation have been emerging for some time (see, e.g. Pattberg &Stripple, 2008), and are entering the field of climate adaptation as well (see, e.g.Juhola & Westerhoff, 2011).

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The above shows that some scientists provide rationales for dominant publicarrangements for climate adaptation, while other scientists provide rationales foralternative governance arrangements in which private actors have some form ofresponsibility. This article attempts to contribute to the governance literature onclimate adaptation, by systematically mapping the considerations in the publicprivate divide relevant for climate adaptation, and exploring the contextual

factors enabling or constraining these considerations. In the Netherlands, the gov-ernment has a primary responsibility for water safety and flood risk management.This might be because it guarantees appropriate safety levels and ensures equalprotection for all citizens. On the other hand, in the USA, the role of the privatesector is more pronounced in line with the neoliberal agenda. Private actorshave a substantial role in providing and taking out insurance against flood risk,although governments, for instance, still determine safety standards and require-ments in building codes (Louckset al., 2008; Meijerink & Dicke, 2008). Here, effi-ciency (assuming market forces will create efficient solutions for insuring orclimate-proofing buildings) might have been the dominant rationale for choosingsuch an arrangement of responsibilities between public and private actors. Hence

different considerations may lead to different governance arrangements forsimilar adaptation issues, and these considerations may be context-dependentas the example above illustrates.

By exploring the rationales for public private arrangements in adaptation, thisarticle attempts to address the following research questions: Which considerationsmight underlie the divisions of responsibilities among public, private or publicprivate actor constellations; and what explains why and when particular consider-ations become relevant to the division of responsibilities? In doing so, we build a con-ceptual framework to analyse and clarify existing arrangements for climateadaptation. The framework may also assist policy practitioners and other stake-holders in designing new, alternative arrangements. We first elaborate upon the

framework and its analytical elements, and then illustrate how it can be appliedthrough an analysis of the green roof governance arrangement in Rotterdam. Weconclude with a brief discussion on the merits and limitations of the framework,and suggestions for future research.

Conceptual Framework

Responsibility is a fuzzy concept that can be interpreted in many ways. We take aninstrumental approach to responsibility as opposed to more normative con-ceptions (see, e.g. Miller, 2007), by looking at the roles actors can fulfil, simplyput who does what, in different stages of the policy cycle (Birkland, 2011;

Dunn, 1994). The reason for making a distinction in stages is in recognition ofthe fact that responsibilities can vary substantially across these stages; for instance,agenda setting can be undertaken by other actors than those responsible for theimplementation of a policy or the monitoring of progress for that matter. More-over, these stages are quite traceable in policy processes and are familiar termsfor stakeholders. We recognize that linear processes along these stages hardlyexist and that multiple interactions and feedback loops occur among thesestages in todays complex society. However, the stages heuristic offers a moresuitable approach for our purpose of analysing responsibilities, compared toalternative theories of policy processes which mainly aim to explain how apolicy (change) has come about (see Sabatier, 2007 for an elaborate discussion of

Public and private responsibilities for climate adaptation 307

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various theories which attempt to explain initiation and adoption of, and changesin policies).

Inspired by the commonly used PlanDoCheckAct (PDCA) cycle (the so-called Deming cycle), we have distinguished the stages of PLAN, DO, CHECKand MAINTENANCE as presented in Table 1. The Plan phase represents theprocess of policy-making in which one decides what should be achieved. The

Do phase concerns the process of policy instrument selection and implemen-tation. It is about defining the strategy of how certain targets are achieved andthe actual implementation and financing of adaptation measures. The Checkphase is about the evaluation of policies; whether policy targets are being met

Table 1.Instrumental translation of responsibility, based on the Deming PDCAcycle and Dunn (1994)

Policy stage Roles Examples for climate adaptation

Policy-making

(PLAN)

Agenda setting Convincing politicians of the need to do

adaptation planning and/or to integrateadaptation into other policy areasKnowledge creation Acquiring information on climate effects, on their

impacts on various sectors in society, on theimpacts of various adaptation measures andtheir costs

Initiation of policy Bringing together stakeholders to initiatediscussions, including those affected by and/or particularly vulnerable to climate impacts

Target setting Setting targets for acceptable flood securitylevels, for water storage capacities, reductionof heat stress, etc.

Policyimplementation(DO)

Strategy making Developing strategies for mitigating flood risk(e.g. dykes, adaptive building, evacuationplans) and the policy instrument mix tostimulate adaptation action

Information provisionand dissemination

Active sharing of relevant information to thepublic, for instance, about safety levels,evacuation routes, heat refuge centres, etc.

Financing of measures Bearing the cost of adaptation measures,compensating the damages inflicted by climateimpacts or adaptation measures

Physical implementation Implementing adaptation measures, such asbuilding a dyke, digging a canal, installing agreen roof, etc.

Policy evaluation(CHECK)

Monitoring of resultsagainst targets

Monitoring implementation progress ofadaptation measures and their intended

impacts through physical inspections,geographic information system, satelliteimagery, etc.

Enforcement throughsanctions/incentives

Establishing fines for not retrofitting ones homefor storm water retention, or developing feereductions for storm water retention, etc.

Policy adjustment Making relevant changes to the policy based onthe evaluation and/or deciding on thetermination of policy

Policy maintenance(MAINT)

Maintenance afterinstalment

Inspecting dykes and repairing when necessary,regular training of evacuation plans, keeping

buildings waterproof, etc.


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and if not, what kind of enforcement mechanisms are developed to change behav-iour in the desired direction and/or adjustment of policy. The last phase of main-tenance is applicable to the daily management situation after instalment ofmeasures. For each phase in the policy cycle roles are divided according tothree options: (1) public responsibility, assuming a primary role for publicactors, (2) private responsibility, assuming a primary role for private actors, and

(3) publicprivate responsibility, assuming a joint effort with more or less equalresponsibility among public and private actors in the form of policy networks,partnerships, co-management, etc. Thus, a mapping of responsibilities can bemade for each role per stage.

It is likely that each particular set of responsibilities is driven by a rationale, orput differently it is influenced by certain considerations that stakeholders made(consciously or not). Inspired by the JEP triangle of Nelissen (2002), we havederived considerations from three scientific disciplines traditionally involved inthe publicprivate divide, and this results in an analytical approach as visualizedin Figure 1. Thejuridicalperspective takes the influence of laws, regulations, prin-ciples and norms on the publicprivate divide as the focal point. Here, rather,

top-down steering through regulations and policies is emphasized. Two key con-siderations have been derived: Rule of Law and Fairness. Theeconomicperspec-tive takes the balance and distribution of costs and benefits as the main influenceon the public private divide. Coordination and steering occurs preferablythrough market mechanisms of price and competition. Its considerations are Effi-ciency and Securing Adaptation Action. Thepoliticalperspective is based on theinfluence of reciprocity between competing interests and trust on the publicprivate divide. Here the steering strategy is based on deliberative policy networks.

Figure 1. Analytical approach for considerations underlying the publicprivate divide, inspired byNelissen (2002).


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It is represented by the considerations of Legitimacy and Accountability. Thesemultiple perspectives show competing forms of functional rationalities. Thisimplies that there are inherent tensions between the considerations, and thereforeinevitable trade-offs are to be made. The framework may help to make these trade-offs explicit and to make well-informed choices among competing considerations.The extent to which certain considerations dominate is likely to vary from case to

case, depending on the context of the policy issue.In turn, these considerations might be influenced by contextual factors. These

can be macro-level economic, political or cultural factors that influence thepublic private divide. For instance, considerations might be influenced bygeneral governance paradigms of the neoliberal agenda. In recent decades, wehave seen a shift from centralized to decentralized; from public to private respon-sibility; from regulation to deregulation; from a large to a small(er) government(Harvey, 2005). Although these shifts are widespread, the intensity is generallyinfluenced by the political context. Established institutions, policy processes androutines might also influence considerations of the public private divide.In policy sciences, this phenomenon is referred to as process sequencing, . . .a

situation whereby normal policy-making involves fairly common, routine, non-innovative changes at the margin of existing policies utilizing existing policyprocesses, institutions, and regimes (Howlett, 2009, p. 251). A final type of contex-tual factors is discussed separately in the next section. These warrant attentionbecause the adaptation literature stresses their relevance in posing particularchallenges to the publicprivate divide in the governance of adaptation.1

Our conceptual framework of responsibilities as presented in Figure 2 hastwo functions. The explanation-oriented approach takesexisting publicprivatearrangements as a starting point, and helps to clarify how and why responsibil-ities were divided. By applying this framework as an analytical device in empiri-cal studies, we hope it provides insight into patterns of responsibililties for climate

adaptation and the scope for alternative governance arrangements. For instance:which actors tend to have primary responsibility at which stage, and for whichtype of adaptation issue; which considerations tend to dominate in choices ofthe publicprivate divide; which type of contextual factors have most influence

Figure 2. Conceptual framework of responsibilities.


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on these considerations. Alternatively, it could help to depict how certain con-siderations are instrumental in framing adaptation and its key challengingfactors (hence the two-way arrow between contextual factors and considerationsin Figure 2). The design-oriented approach might function as a tool to help localgovernments and stakeholders in developing alternative governance arrange-ments, taking a more conscious note of contextual factors and considerations of

the public private divide.

Challenging Factors for the Governance of Adaptation

Certain issues are often cited in literature to be particularly challenging to the gov-ernance of adaptation; even though some might be quite common issues in publicpolicy. Combined, these factors make the governance of adaptation a challengingcollective problem in which large numbers of actors have a stake.

The first issue ofuncertaintymanifests itself strongly; adaptation might evencontain more uncertainties than mitigation because detailed information is

required at the local level (Van Vuurenet al., 2011). Uncertainty is acknowledgedas a barrier to effective adaptation action (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Fussel, 2007;Urwin & Jordan, 2008). Most referred to in literature are: (i) Uncertainties of theclimate system, its interdependencies and feedback mechanisms; (ii) Uncertaintiesregarding the impacts and their magnitude and distribution in society in time andspace ; (iii) Uncertainties relating to the effectiveness of adaptation action (see, forinstance, Adgeret al., 2005; Biesbroeket al., 2009; Dessaiet al., 2009; Van Vuurenet al., 2011). An obvious strategy to reduce uncertainty is to generate more knowl-edge through climate predictions, scenario building, etc., although this strategy isincreasingly contested for adaptation (Dessai et al., 2009; Van der Sluijs, 2010).Instead, it is argued that we should focus on coping with uncertainties, by design-

ing flexible and reversible adaptation strategies that can accommodate differentfutures and can be quickly adapted as new understanding becomes available(Adger et al., 2009; Biesbroeket al., 2009; Hallegatte, 2009). Interaction among differ-ent actors and stakeholders from science, policy and other backgrounds could beregarded as another strategy to cope with uncertainty since it may raise awareness,foster the sharing of risk perceptions, help understand others perspectives andlead to mutual understandings (Raadgever et al., 2011; Veraart et al., 2010).Uncertainty is aggravated by the long-term character of climate change. Manyclimate impacts are expected to occur far beyond current policy life cycles. Itrequires decisions to be taken now on behalf of future generations, and thinkingabout the trade-offs between taking action now to be on the safe side, and being

prudent so as to avoid over-investment. It is one of the key institutional barriersto the governance of adaptation as expressed by policy-makers, especially inview of the short-termism of politics (Biesbroeket al., 2009; Dovers & Hezri, 2010).

The second issue ofspatial diversity has to do with the variety of climate effectsacross regions, as well as the variety in vulnerability of populations (Aaheimet al.,2010). Local circumstances can exacerbate climate impacts, for example, heavyrainfall is likely to cause a nuisance in cities because of the high impermeabilityof the urban surface. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions to deal with thisdiversity of climate impacts. Tailor-made solutions specific to the localcircumstances of individuals and communities might be needed (Saavreda &Budd, 2009).


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The third issue of controversies relates to the different value systems and dis-courses in society, andthis reflects upon theissue of adaptation; opposing perceptionsof theproblemandits solution mightexist. Forinstance, some policy-makers strive for100 percent climate proof, while others are prepared to accept residual risk; somethink we should act now, others believe we should wait until more evidencebecomes available; some are in favour of more technocratic solutions, while others

are proponents of more reflexive approaches. These examples show that theproblem definitions and adaptation goals are often ambiguous and reflect conflictsof interests and diverging value systems (Adger et al., 2009; Hinkel et al., 2010;Wilson, 2006).

The fourth issue is the social complexityof adaptation. Adaptation touches alllevels of governance; it requires actions from the local to the global scale. Further-more, adaptation touches upon established institutions of water management,spatial planning, public health, environmental policy, nature conservation, etc.(Wilson, 2006). Considering its trans-disciplinary character, it is often arguedthat adaptation should not be dealt with as a stand-alone issue, but main-streamed, i.e. integrated into the programmes and processes of other policy

fields (Adger et al., 2005; Berrang-Fordet al., 2011; Biesbroeket al., 2010; Fussel,2007; Urwin & Jordan, 2008). The institutional ambiguity and fragmentation asa result of this social complexity suggest there are no clear problem owners,and this may easily lead to inaction because the power to act is not assigned. Inthe next section, we demonstrate how these factors might influence considerationsin the publicprivate divide.

Considerations

The conceptual framework supports the analysis of considerations for the divisionof responsibilities across different policy stages (Plan, Do, Check, Maintenance)

and adaptation policy issues (such as, for instance, water safety, water storage,fresh water supply, heat stress, etc.). The three perspectives present an analyticaldistinction; in reality, most governance arrangements are likely to be influenced bymultiple considerations, leading to a mixture of responsibilities. We will now elab-orate upon each consideration, and give examples of how the challenging factorsfor adaptation might influence these considerations.

Juridical Considerations

Rule of law. This consideration is about abiding by existing (inter)nationalregulations to which the adaptation issue/measure is subject. Responsibilities

might be defined in regulatory institutions such as duties of care in Consti-tutions and rules in European Union (EU) or national environmental, wateror nature conservation directives/laws. For instance, Article 21 of the Dutchconstitution requires the government to ensure the livability of the countryand the protection and enhancement of the environment. According to legalexperts, this could be interpreted to include a duty for developing adaptationpolicy and undertaking adaptation action (Driessen & Van Rijswick, 2011). EUor national regulations might prescribe certain roles for governments in guaran-teeing safety against flooding and sufficient fresh water supply. On the otherhand, new and more flexible local regulations might be developed for adap-tation purposes. The extent to which the consideration of Rule of Law comes


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into play depends on the juridical and political context which determines howexisting regulations should be interpreted, and the extent of desire to developnew regulations to accommodate for the novelty of adaptation measures(such as building in non-embanked areas), new actor constellations, or newvalues related to adaptation goals. A challenging factor that might influencethis consideration is the extent of social complexity. The more this is the case,

the more the need for regulations/policies in which responsibilities are allo-cated as unambiguously as possible.

Fairness. Fairness relates to a reasonable distribution of responsibilities, risks,costs and benefits between and among generations. In the case of adaptation, itis not only about a fair distribution of burdens (who takes action, which dominatesthe mitigation discussions), but also about a fair distribution of benefits (who arethe beneficiaries of adaptation action). The consideration of fairness is subject toseveral (inter)national environmental principles of relevance to adaptationissues (Beder, 2006; Driessen & Van Rijswick, 2011). The so-called precautionaryprinciple, the compensation principle and the principle of common but differ-

entiated responsibilities often translate into responsibilities for governments,either for a fair application of these principles in society or in specific roles inthe governance of adaptation.

The precautionary principle is extremely relevant to adaptation due to theabsence of full scientific knowledge of climate risks. It highlights the inherenttension between preventative governmental intervention and taking onesown responsibility as a citizen; between acting now to be on the safe sideand being prudent so that new knowledge can be used as and when it is avail-able. The factor that activates this principle is the extent ofuncertainty aroundclimate change, combined with the extent to which climate effects are expectedto be felt in the long-term; the further into the future the effects are anticipated,

the higher the level of uncertainty. We hypothesize that the more uncertainand long-term climate impacts are, the more public action is justified for theprotection of the interests of future generations. As long as the costs of takingaction now are expected to be lower than the avoided costs of damages inthe future, governments have a legitimate right to act according to this prin-ciple.

The spatial diversity of climate impacts might influence both the compen-sation principle and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.Regarding the first principle, we hypothesize that the more that specific regions,groups or generations are unevenly affected by climate impacts, the more gov-ernments have a responsibility to arrange compensation. Regarding the second

principle, the diversity of impacts might cause particular groups or regions tobecome more vulnerable to flood or heat stress than others. This vulnerabilitymight be caused by socioeconomic factors (for instance lower-income groupsare less equipped to protect themselves against water or heat stress), healthfactors (for instance elderly and children are less capable of handling extremefluctuations of temperature), or by environmental factors (for instance urbancitizens are more exposed to rainwater flooding). We hypothesize that themore vulnerable specific groups/regions are, the more some form of govern-ment intervention is needed to guarantee a fair division of responsibilitiesaccording to carrying capacities. The extent of government intervention mightstill vary from country to country (Aakre et al., 2010).


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Economic Considerations

Efficiency. Economics focuses on the efficiency of the allocation of scarceresources. Here, efficiency can refer to production of goods against lowest costs(technical efficiency); to an optimum allocation of resources based on societalpreferences (allocative efficiency), or to the innovation of new products,

materials and production methods (dynamic efficiency) (Baarsma et al., 2010).When a set of assumptions holds, policy-makers can leave it to the markets toensure efficiency. Some of these assumptions include that all resources (man-made, but also natural resources including clean air) are privately owned, thatthere are no externalities associated with any activity, that markets are perfectlycompetitive, etc.

Uncertainty and spatial diversityof climate impacts influence the considerationof efficiency. In the case of uncertainty, we hypothesize that the higher the level ofuncertainty, the more the need for adaptation strategies to be flexible and diverse(Guptaet al., 2010), and hence the need for engagement by entrepreneurs willingto risk their time and money to develop new solutions. Regarding spatial diver-

sity, we hypothesize that the more these impacts are localized and diverse, themore the solutions need to be tailor-made, and hence the more efficient it is toinvolve these citizens and firms as important stakeholders in the generation,decision-making and implementation of those customized solutions. It alsodiminishes the need for governments to be paternalistic in prescribing one-size-fits-all solutions.

Securing adaptation action. A second important economic consideration is effec-tiveness (achievement of pre-defined targets). For the purpose of this framework,it has been labelled securing adaptation action, i.e. attainment of optimal levels ofaction to achieve certain adaptation targets. In reality, this often comes down to the

provision of a public good, a typical consideration justifying public action. It con-cerns the provision of goods characterized by market failures (Bator, 1958). Marketfailure presents itself when financial, technological or spatial implications of adap-tation measures constrain private actors, when there is a (perceived) lack ofprivate benefits of adaptation goods, or when there is a considerable time-lagbetween the bearing of costs and the reaping of benefits, for instance, in cases ofadjustments to buildings which require high upfront investments (Stern, 2007).Market failure also occurs in the case of negative externalities of adaptationmeasures for surrounding areas or future generations. Governments cansecure adaptation action either by providing adaptation measures themselvesor by compensating private parties for the costs of adaptation action. Similar tothe considerations of Fairness and Efficiency, the extent ofuncertainty aroundclimate change influences this consideration. We hypothesize that the higher theuncertainty about future benefits/avoided costs, the more it acts as a barrier toprivate action (Adger et al., 2009; Gifford, 2011; Mendelsohn, 2000) and thehigher the risk of not reaching adaptation targets, and hence the need for govern-ments to initiate (and implement) adaptation policies on behalf of society.

Political Considerations

Legitimacy. Societal support raises the legitimacy of adaptation policy, and com-mitment to the implementation of adaptation measures. It is deemed critical to the


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governance of adaptation because of the diversity of climate discourses (Steven-son & Dryzek, 2010), contradicting value systems, ambition levels and adaptationsolutions (Hinkel et al., 2010). Our interpretation of legitimacy is political, andrelates to the approval of an adaptation policy (process) by those directly involvedor affected by an adaptation measure.2 Againuncertaintymay play a role in thisconsideration. We hypothesize that the higher the level of uncertainties around

climate change, the more there is a need to involve all stakeholders, includingscientists and lay experts, in joint fact-finding and the co-creation of knowledgein order to pool brain power and creativity, and to bring vernacular knowledgeinto the process. Furthermore,controversiesmay influence this consideration. Wehypothesize that the more that values are contradictory, the more there is aneed for input legitimacy, i.e. consent of stakeholders to the problem framingof adaptation; the more adaptation goals are conflicting, the more the need forthroughput legitimacy, i.e. consent of stakeholders to the decision-makingprocess; and the more adaptation solutions are conflicting, the more the needfor output legitimacy, i.e. consent of stakeholders to the ultimate decisionsregarding adaptation policies and their implementation (Bekkers & Edwards,

2007). Finally, social complexity may also play a role. We hypothesize that themore adaptation planning touches upon different levels, sectors and actors insociety, the more participatory and inclusive the decision-making processshould be, so that all voices are equally heard (Smith, 2003). Adgeret al. (2009)advocate deliberative processes with a large variety of stakeholders for adaptationaction.

Accountability. Accountability entails that policy-makers of the state, privatesector and civil society are accountable to their stakeholders and the public atlarge, i.e. to those who are affected by the policy (UNESCAP, 2011). Accountabilityrequires clarity of responsibilities among parties involved (Botchway, 2001; Lock-

wood, 2010), while institutional ambiguity is often apparent in the governance ofadaptation due tosocial complexity. It blocks clear mandates for specific adaptationtasks. We hypothesize that the higher the institutional ambiguity, the more theneed for a (public) neutral body to assign and communicate clearly on responsi-bilities. Accountability also requires transparency: one should have access to allrelevant information regarding the content and the process of policy-making, sothat stakeholders and the general public can indeed hold policy-makers accounta-ble. Therefore, networks that share public and private responsibilities might berequired, since these are often cited for their contribution to fostering communi-cation, information and knowledge dissemination (e.g. Bodin & Crona, 2009;Driessenet al., 2001; Glasbergen & Driessen, 2005).

Links Between Challenging Factors and Considerations

Table 2 provides an overview of the hypothesized relationships between thefactors that pose challenges to the governance of adaptation and the consider-ations, based on those relations most prevalent in adaptation literature and as ela-borated upon in the previous section. It demonstrates that several challengingfactors suggest shared responsibilities across a wide range of actors from thepublic and private spheres, although this may vary along the stages of thepolicy process. This is in line with the trend towards the hybridization of environ-mental governance as sketched in the introduction, based on the premise that


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Table 2.Challenges to the governance of adaptation in relation to considerationsof the publicprivate divide

Challenging factors forthe governance ofadaptation

Considerations inpublicprivate

divide influenced bythese factors

Hypothesized relationshipbetween the factor and the

consideration

Responsibilitydivisions in the

policy cycle

Uncertainty: lack ofpredictabilityregarding climatechange, its impacts onsociety and the costsand benefits ofadaptation solutions

This situation is furtheraggravated by thelong-term effects ofclimate change

Fairness: extent towhich theprecautionaryprinciple isapplicable

The more uncertain andlong-term climate impactsare, the fairer it is thatgovernments initiateadaptation policy on

behalf of their citizens, inparticular by representingthe interests of futuregenerations(intergenerational equity)

Publicresponsibility,particularly inPlan and Checkstages

Efficiency: extent towhich dynamicefficiency, i.e.innovation, isneeded

The more uncertainties, themore the need forinnovative entrepreneursin order to bring varietyand creativity, and togenerate flexible andadaptive adaptationstrategies

Privateresponsibility,particularly inDO and MAINTstages

Securing adaptationaction

The more uncertaintiesaround climate change,the less likely householdsand firms adapt;governments may need tostep in to secure sufficientadaptation levels

Publicresponsibility,particularly inPlan and DOstages

Legitimacy (inputand throughput)

The more uncertainties, themore the need to involveall relevant actors,including scientists andlay experts in joint fact-finding and co-creation ofknowledge to supportadaptation policy andaction

Publicprivateresponsibility,particularly inPlan stage

Spatial diversity: theimpacts of climatechange are locationand context specific

Fairness The more certain groups/regions are vulnerable toclimate change orunevenly affected, the

more governmentintervention is needed toguarantee a fair divisionof responsibilities andrisks according to carryingcapacities of actors

Publicresponsibility,particularly inPlan stage

Efficiency: extent towhich customizedand localizedsolutions areneeded

The more the impacts ofclimate change requiretailor-made solutions, themore efficient it is toinvolve individualcitizens/firms

Privateresponsibility,all stages

(Continued )


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hybrid forms of governance might be more suitable to deal with the complexities,interdependencies and controversies of many environmental issues.

Illustration: Green Roof Policy

The application of the framework is illustrated by a study of the governancearrangement for green roofs in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Green roofs helpreduce surface water flooding. They are considered a no-regrets adaptationmeasure because of their societal benefits in terms of eco-system services,thereby contributing to urban sustainability (Oberndorferet al., 2007). They alsoprovide private benefits through prolongation of roof life, insulation from heat,and enhancement of real estate value. The municipality of Rotterdam was thefirst Dutch local authority to recognize the potential of green roofs for retainingincreased rainfall in densely built city districts. This is why green roofs are a

Table 2. Continued

Challenging factors forthe governance ofadaptation

Considerations inpublicprivate

divide influenced bythese factors

Hypothesized relationshipbetween the factor and the

consideration

Responsibilitydivisions in the

policy cycle

Controversy:contradicting valuesystems, goals andadaptation solutions

Legitimacy(throughput andoutput)

The more there arecontradictions, the moresupport is needed fromstakeholders for problemframing, underlyingvalues of adaptationaction, decision-makingprocesses, and theimplementation ofadaptation measures

Publicprivateresponsibility,all stages

Social complexity: multi-sector, multi-level andmulti-actor character,leading to

institutionalambiguity andfragmentation

Legitimacy (input) The more adaptationplanning touches upondifferent sectors, levelsand actors in society, the

more participatory andinclusive the decision-making process needs to

be in order to gain societalsupport

Publicprivateresponsibility,particularly inPlan stage

Rule of law The more there isinstitutional ambiguity,the more the need forregulations in whichresponsibilities areallocated asunambiguously aspossible


Accountability The more there isinstitutional ambiguity,the more the need for a(public) neutral body toassign and communicateclearly on responsibilities



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spearhead of the Rotterdam Adaptation Strategy (RCP, 2010). The city employs aneconomic policy instrument to induce private actors to take on theresponsibility forgreen roof instalments. In 2008, an incentive programme for green roofs was intro-duced which provides a subsidy ofE30 per square metre to commercial and non-commercial property owners covering roughly half of the installation costs.

The framework provided a basis for analysis and clarification of the choices in

responsibilities. A content analysis of official policy documents (see Table A1) andan interview with a legal expert provided insights into formal responsibilities forlocal urban water management. The exploration of considerations underlying thedivision of responsibilities and identification of the main drivers for these con-siderations were extracted via 12 in-depth semi-structured interviews of about1.52 h each with 15 public and private stakeholders, representing different per-spectives and interests (see Table A2). The interviews were recorded and tran-scribed. The analysis of this arrangement is only meant to illustrate how theframework can be applied; the green roof arrangement is all but representativeof the empirical field. An overview of the roles fulfilled by different actors, andthe underlying considerations and factors that influenced this division of respon-

sibilities is provided in Table 3. Here, we will limit ourselves to highlighting themain findings.

Public Responsibilities

The local authorities in Rotterdam have a primary role in agenda setting, knowl-edge creation and initiation of the green roof policy, in other words, they tend todominate in the Plan stage. Their main consideration is that sufficient adaptationaction (i.e. green roof instalments) is secured to increase the water storage capacityin the city. Private actors are faced with uncertainties regarding the benefits ofgreen roofs, while the upfront installation costs are high, leading to uncertain

and potentially long payback times. Therefore, they refrain from taking action,and the local authorities try to overcome this through the subsidy programme.This is in line with the third hypothesis in Table 2. Rule of law is another consider-ation that the local authorities take into account. This is because the Dutch WaterAct assigns a duty of care for rainwater to municipalities (VNG, 2007; WW, 2008);they are responsible for the management of the sewage system and for the preven-tion of water nuisance on public grounds.3 Furthermore, fairness is also con-sidered; given the uncertainties regarding future climate impacts, theprecautionary principle is taken into account in the targets set for the creationof additional water storage capacity in the city by 2030 (Rotterdam, 2007) inorder to make the city climate proof for current and future generations. This cor-

responds with the first hypothesis in Table 2. Together, these three considerationsprovided the rationale for the municipality of Rotterdam to take on responsibilityearly on in the policy process.

In the Do stage, the responsibility of the municipality remains rather domi-nant. It decides on the use of green roofs as a key strategy to make Rotterdamclimate proof. Moreover, the local authorities chose to use an economic instrumentin the form of a subsidy. The main rationale for this is efficiency. In many parts ofRotterdam, the costs of digging extra facilities to store additional water (and toremove existing buildings) would simply be exorbitant (Rotterdam, 2007).Green roofs offer a low-cost and innovative solution to raise water storagecapacity, while achieving many societal co-benefits at the same time; hence they


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Table 3.Responsibilities in the green roof arrangement for Rotterdam

Stage/roleWho and nature of

responsibilityPredominant

considerations

Rationale forconsiderations/

contextual factors

PLAN

Agenda setting Municipality: sellingwater issues asopportunities toincrease theattractiveness of thecity to the public, andgreen roofs as a visibleand feasible solutionto increase the waterretention capacity

Efficiency Economies of scope forgreen roofs: they area quick way tointroduce visiblesustainability

Green roof industry:creating awareness forgreen roofs, lobbyingand advising

architects andmunicipalities

Efficiency Market demand createseconomies of scale

Knowledge creation Municipality:conducting research:costbenefit analysis,stock-taking of foreignpractices (resulting ina leaflet RotterdamGroen van Bovenpublished in 2006)


Unfamiliarity with anduncertainty about thecosts and benefits ofgreen roofs lead toinaction of privateactors

Green roof industry:conducting researchon the properties and

benefits of green roofs,in particular related towater retentioncapacity

Efficiency Green roofs have manyco-benefits, withoutwhich green roofs

would not be cost-effective

Initiation of policy Municipality:Waterplan2 (floodmanagement planissued in 2007) aseparate green roofpolicy is underdevelopment

Rule of law Duty of care forprevention of surfacewater flooding onpublic grounds

Target setting Municipality: mappingof quantities andtarget areas for waterretention inWaterplan2, anddesignation of greenroofs as a waterretention measure fordensely built areas inthe city centre withhigh levels of hardsurface

Fairness Uncertaintyencouraged themunicipality to takethe precautionaryprinciple intoaccount in makingRotterdam climateproof by 2030

(Continued)


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Table 3. Continued



considerations


contextual factors

DOStrategy making Municipality: decision to

use green roofs as oneof the solutions forwater retention; choiceto use an economicincentive to induceaction: subsidyprogramme for greenroofs introduced in2008

Efficiency They are less costly thanhard infrastructuralmeasures; they are aquick way tointroduce visiblesustainability; costsof green roofs can bespread out among thepublic and privatesectors

Information provisionand dissemination

Municipality: passiveinformation provisionon subsidy viatelephone/mail and

via a demo-roof;proactive efforts toraise awareness intarget areas


Unfamiliarity withgreen roofs and thesubsidy programmelead to inaction of

private actors

Green roof industry:provision of technicaldetails, education ongreen roofs (e.g. eco-engineering/Groenweb)

Efficiency Creation of marketdemand to geteconomies of scale

Financing Property owners(housing corporations,investors, individual

house owners)

Efficiency Green roofs have manyco-benefits, withoutwhich green roofs

would not be cost-effectiveMunicipality: subsidy for

private actors in theform ofE30 persquare metre installed


High up-frontinstallation costsdiscourageinstalment by privateactors (long returnon investment)

Physicalimplementation

Municipality:implementation ofgreen roofs on city-owned buildings(outsourced tosuppliers)


Deficit of instalmentson privately owned

buildings

Property owners:implementation ofgreen roofs on privatelyowned buildings(outsourced tosuppliers)

Efficiency Green roofs have manyco-benefits, withoutwhich green roofswould not be cost-effective

CHECKMonitoring Municipality: tracking of

green roofinstallations andchecking of green roofsubsidies throughinvoices

Fairness andaccountability

Monitoring progress ofimplementationagainst targets;checking of grantedsubsidies

(Continued )


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are a quick way to introduce visible sustainability, as one policy officer men-tioned. Secondly, by tempting private actors with a subsidy, part of the installationcosts of green roofs is financed by the private sector. In this stage, the municipalityalso takes responsibility for greening its own public property as a means toincrease adaptation action as well as to set the example.

In the Check stage, the municipalitys responsibility is focused on monitoringactivities: the tracking of green roof installations and checking of granted subsi-dies. The considerations behind these activities are fairness and accountability;to ensure that all private actors receiving a subsidy keep their end of the

bargain without exception, that publicly spent money is traced back to actualgreen roof installations, and that the transparency of public money spent ongreen roofs is guaranteed through subsidy contracts.

Private Responsibilities

In the Plan stage, some private responsibility is shown by the green roof industryin its lobbying and research activities (which are obviously meant to prove andmonetize the benefits of green roofs for its own gain; hence the research outputis not always trusted). Nevertheless, the responsibilities of private actors increase

Table 3. Continued



considerations


contextual factors

Municipality/waterboards: study plannedto monitor effects ofgreen roofs in onedistrict of the city


Overcominginformation deficit,

based on whichprivate actors refrainfrom action

Green roof industry:voluntary norms forproduct attributes,derived form Germanstandards (currentsituation); andcreation of Dutchstandardised normsfor product attributes(currently under

development)

Efficiency Creation of marketdemand

Enforcement Not taken on as aresponsibility

Efficiency Too muchadministrativehassle/manpowerneeded

MAINTMaintenance All property owners

(including themunicipality for city-owned buildings):outsourced to greenroof suppliers

Efficiency Green roof suppliersintegratemaintenancethrough contracts


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in the Do, Check and Maintenance stages. It is the municipalitys policy to leaveknowledge development and innovations with the market (Rotterdam, 2011).Efficiency is a dominant consideration for the municipality to leave these respon-sibilities with the private sector, so that economies of scale and scope arise.Economies of scope exist through the co-benefits of green roofs which makethem cost-effective. They generate multiple public and private benefits, and this

is important for both public and private actors. Economies of scale occurthrough the creation of market demand pushed by the lobby work of the greenroof industry.

Furthermore, private responsibility is witnessed in cooperation efforts withinthe green roof industry and with horticulturists, in developing quality standardsand maintenance contracts as a form of private regulation.

PublicPrivate Responsibilities

Shared public private responsibilities are absent; none of the roles is fulfilled via atruly joint public private effort. Based on the feedback of respondents, this

appears to be related to the limited influence of the consideration of legitimacy(and to a lesser extent accountability) on the public private divide. Three expla-nations elaborated upon below, are (i) a limited influence of the adaptation chal-lenges of uncertainty, controversy and social complexity on the perceived need forinput and throughput legitimacy; (ii) a stronger influence of existing organiz-ational and policy routines on the publicprivate divide; and (iii) the fact thatlegitimacy and accountability are already implicitly guaranteed through abroad political support for green roofs in Rotterdam. Regarding the first point,these challenges can be considered to be moderate compared to other adaptationissues.4 There is certainly some uncertainty regarding the water retention proper-ties of green roofs under varying circumstances, and their monetized benefits. On

the other hand, the controversies around green roofs as a solution appear to bemodest in light of the fact that they are regarded as no-regrets measures. Never-theless, social complexities appear to be omnipresent due to the involvement ofmany public and private actors with diverging interests, institutional fragmenta-tion (green roofs touch upon existing policy fields of water management, urbanplanning and greening), and the ambivalent nature of responsibilities for urbanwater retention under Dutch water law. Within the private sphere, interestsmay also diverge; the so-called split-incentive barrier means that the costs ofgreen roof instalments are often borne by investors/housing corporations, whilethe benefits accrue to tenants, and there is little possibility for redressing thesecosts (by raising the rent). However, the influence of these adaptation challenges

appears to have been overshadowed by the second point: the considerable influ-ence of organizational and policy routines on the publicprivate divide. Accord-ing to some respondents, the municipality has a certain standard way of working,and differences in organizational cultures tend to constrain the municipality fromclosely collaborating with the private sector. In the interviews, it became ratherclear that, while actors initiated collaboration within their own (public orprivate) spheres, they did not really seek to do so with the other side. Regardingthe third point, there is great political support for the climate adaptation strategy,and the implementation of green roof planning as a spearhead of that strategy(RCP, 2010). This political support is fuelled by the intention of the city to be afrontrunner in climate adaptation and to market its expertise to other delta


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cities in the world (Mees & Driessen, 2011). Moreover, there is a high sense ofurgency in Rotterdam, stemming specifically from a real shortage of water reten-tion capacity, and more generally from the vulnerability attached to a low-lyingdelta city.

Discussion of the Green Roof PolicyThe current green roof arrangement in Rotterdam can be characterized as a com-bination of pure government and pure market-based arrangements across thevarious stages of the policy process, rather than other types of arrangementswhich cross the publicprivate divide. The economic considerations of Securingadaptation action and Efficiency dominate the Rotterdam green roof arrangement.The importance of these considerations versus legitimacy has limited the urge ofactors to seek more participation and deliberation in the policy process. Invitingother actors with diverging interests into the policy process is likely to bring exist-ing policy routines up for discussion, to slow down decision-making and to raisetransaction costs, thereby decreasing effectiveness and efficiency. The dominance

of the efficiency rationale might also result in trade-offs related to fairness. It canbe very efficient to decrease municipal costs for water storage by inducing privatecitizens and businesses to install green roofs. However, the subsidy is borne by alltax payers who thus indirectly contribute to the private benefits of recipients of thegreen roof subsidy. Moreover, disadvantaged districts may still remain relativelyvulnerable to urban flooding because their residents are unable to afford a greenroof despite the subsidy. So, while this arrangement was created for valid reasons,given the current state of early adoption of the green roof technology (predomi-nantly securing adaptation action to reach water retention targets and creatingefficiencies to bring installation costs down and raise benefits), it has potentialtrade-offs in terms ofinputlegitimacy and fairness. Nevertheless, the green roof

arrangement is still perceived as legitimate in terms of throughput and outputbecause the green roof policy has been decided upon and approved by electedofficials in the local council based on broad societal support. The Rotterdamgreen roof case thus suggests that the extent to which considerations are takeninto account is a selective process in everyday practice, embedded in existingorganizational routines. It also suggests that some considerations are taken intoaccount only implicitly, as it appears to be the case with legitimacy.

Conclusion

Climate adaptation is a relatively new policy domain, bringing about issues relat-

ing to responsibility divisions between the public and private sector. Scientific lit-erature on the public private divide in climate adaptation is still ratherfragmented and limited in scope. Many scholars tend to focus on issues ofmarket failure and equity in relation to public responsibility (Aakre & Rubbelke,2010; Adgeret al., 2009; Berkhout, 2005; Eakin & Lemos, 2006; Mendelsohn, 2006;Osberghauset al., 2010), and, for instance, a recent article by Tompkins and Eakin(2012) explores the potential for the private provision of adaptation goods as wellas the institutional mechanisms required for this. With the conceptual frameworkpresented in this article, we present a comprehensive tool to discuss issues ofthe publicprivate divide in climate adaptation. In particular, the frameworkhelps to systematically explore and identify a range of considerations in the


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public private divide based on three competing rationales of public policy, i.e. thejuridical, economic and political perspective. The framework is meant to analyseexisting publicprivate arrangements for climate adaptation at the sub-nationallevel. Such an analysis helps to identify the dominating considerations underlyingcertain divisions of responsibilities, why this might have occurred, and what thepotential positive and negative consequences of these choices could be in the

specific context of an adaptation issue. In applying this so-called explanation-oriented approach of our framework to the case of green roofs as a specific adap-tation measure in Rotterdam, we have revealed that the extent to which variousconsiderations are taken into account is indeed a selective process, leading toinevitable trade-offs in decisions on responsibilities. It also shows that, in practice,responsibilities might be constrained by institutional settings and policy routines,limiting the conscious (re)consideration of responsibility divisions among publicand/or private actors (in line with theories of path dependency as described by,for instance, Howlett, 2009 and Pierson, 2000). Such an analysis might ultimatelyfoster a conscious search for alternative governance arrangements.

Alternative governance arrangements might be developed by applying the

so-called design-oriented approach of our conceptual framework. It facilitatesa conscious deliberation process of alternative responsibility divisions and thushelps overcome institutional lock-ins. It is certainly not meant to create anideal governance arrangement by suggesting that all six considerations shouldbe equally weighted. The framework is only meant to give explicit attention toeach consideration, thereby fostering well-informed choices in the publicprivate divide. Such an alternative to the green roof arrangement discussed inthe previous section could entail a more pronounced role for governments byintroducing a performance target for rainwater retention through the nationalbuilding code/local by-law. The government consequently monitors the extentto which these targets are met, and might opt for a penalty system in case of

non-compliance. Here, considerations of fairness (each developer is subject tothe same regulation), accountability (responsibility divisions are clear; bothpublic and private actors can be held accountable) and efficiency (it stimulatesinnovation and variety in adaptation solutions; developers decide which waterretention measure best suits their circumstances) could underlie such an arrange-ment of responsibilities. It is apparent that the extent to which certain consider-ations matter in a governance arrangement may differ from case to case,depending on the context of the adaptation issue. These considerations mayalso change over time, as the context of the governance issue alters. Thus, the fra-mework might assist policy practitioners in discussing and designing novel gov-ernance arrangements for novel adaptation issues, such as, for instance, the

development of adaptive flood risk measures in un-embanked areas. We arguethat the more controversial and complex an adaptation issue, the more desirableit is to make well-informed choices in the public private divide.

On the continuum from government to governance, every type of governancearrangement has its advantages and disadvantages, and this affects its effective-ness (does it work?) and its fairness and legitimacy (what are the normativeconsequences?). In providing a tool to systematically explore the scope of arrange-ments for specific adaptation issues, our framework could be a useful startingpoint for future empirical research on governance arrangements for climate adap-tation as a relatively new environmental policy domain. Attention shouldbe paid to exploring arrangements in different macroeconomic, political and


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cultural contexts, as each context might trigger specific considerations and hencemight require its own appropriate mix of responsibilities. Therefore, internationalresearch comparing governance arrangements in various countries/regions isencouraged. Empirical research can also help unravel the inherent tensionsamong considerations, and in particular how these are resolved in practice. Andfinally further research may help widen the applicability of the framework to

the analysis of multi-level governance issues (the division of responsibilitiesamong different levels of public actors), as well as to the evaluation of the per-formance of governance arrangements (in which case, the considerations act asassessment criteria).

Acknowledgements

This research is funded by the Dutch Knowledge for Climate Research Program(http://knowledgeforclimate.climateresearchnetherlands.nl). The authors thankClare Barnes and Tina Newstead for the English language check, and the refereesfor their helpful comments.

Notes

1. Literature suggests there are many other factors of relevance to adaptation such as sense of urgency,availability of resources, political will, etc. (for an overview, see Runhaaret al., in press). However,these are cited to act as stimulus or barrier to agenda setting and adaptation action rather thandirectly influencing the publicprivate divide.

2. According to Peter (2010) consent is one source of political legitimacy. Another source of legitimacyis obtained through traditional interest representation by democratically elected people. A morelegal interpretation resembles the rule of the law, one of our juridical considerations. An overviewof the various interpretations of legitimacy is given by Bekkers and Edwards (2007).

3. The same law also places responsibilities on property owners for the adequate processing of rain-water on their property, as long as this can be reasonably expectedfrom them. Since this version ofthe law is relatively new, jurisprudence still needs to be built on how these responsibilities of muni-cipalities and property owners translate into practice.

4. Flood safety issues stemming from sea level rise and increased river discharge levels face equaluncertainties, but the risks in terms of material and immaterial damage are substantially higher.In this case controversies might be high, for instance regarding the levels of residual flood risk sta-keholders are willing to accept.

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Appendix

Table A1.Overview of policy documents used for the document analysis

Document name Issue date By whom

GeneralCoalitieakkoord Rotterdam 20102014Ruimte voor Talent en Ondernemen

2010 (April) Gemeente Rotterdam

Spatial planningProvinciale Structuurvisie.

Samenvattingsdocument &Uitvoeringsagenda

2010 (July) Provincie Zuid-Holland

Ruimtelijk Plan Regio Rotterdam 2020:Regio in Uitvoering & Tienpuntenplan

2005 (December) Stadsregio Rotterdam

Stadsvisie Rotterdam. RuimtelijkeOntwikkelingsstrategie 2030

2007 (November) Gemeente Rotterdam

Verbonden Stad. Visie openbare ruimtebinnenstad. Ruimtelijkeontwikkelingsstrategie 2030

2007 (September) Gemeente Rotterdam

Climate changeMaak Ruimte voor Klimaat! Nationale

Adaptatiestrategie, beleidsnotitie &interbestuurlijke notitie

2007 Ministerie van VROM andothers

Actieprogramma Klimaat & Ruimte20092011

not dated Provincie Zuid-Holland

RotterdamClimate Proof: The Rotterdamchallenge on water and climateadaptation

2008 (May) Gemeente Rotterdam

Rotterdam Climate Proof: AdaptationProgramme 2010

2010 (February) Gemeente Rotterdam

OtherGroene Daken Rotterdam.

Uitvoeringsprogramma 20112025

2011 (December) Gemeente Rotterdam

Rotterdam Groen van Boven: Toepassingvan groene daken in Rotterdam

2006 Gemeente Rotterdam

Waterplan2. Werken aan eenaantrekkelijke stad.

2007 Gemeente Rotterdam enaantal waterschappen

Droge voeten, gezonde stad.Gemeentelijk RioleringsplanRotterdam 20112015

2011 (June) Gemeente Rotterdam

Consultatiedocument. ProgrammaDuurzaamheid Rotterdam t/m 2014

2010 (November) Gemeente Rotterdam


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Table A2.Overview of respondents selected for the interviews

Representatives of Domain Function

Rotterdam Municipal Works Public Advisor Water managementRotterdam Municipal Works Public Project managerRotterdam Development Corporation Public Team coordinator Building maintenance

Rotterdam Urban Planning Department Public Advisor Landscape and greeningRotterdam Sustainability Office Public Staff member helpdesk green roofsWater Board Hollandse Delta Public Advisor Sewage systemsEnvironmental Protection Agency Rijnmond Public Policy officerReal Estate Company Private Head of Corporate SustainabilityReal Estate Company Private Technical Manager BuildingsHousing Corporation Private Head of Corporate SustainabilityEnvironmental NGO Rotterdam Private Project leaderArchitectural Firm Private ArchitectGreen roof supplier Private DirectorHorticulture industry association Private PresidentHorticulture industry association Private SecretaryCommission of Advise on Water Law Expert Secretary


Documents

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