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Limitations/restrictions of governmentLimitations/restrictions of governmentlawyers in the practice of lawlawyers in the practice of law

Problem Areas in Legal EthicsArellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation

2015-2016

Canon 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers inCanon 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers ingovernment services in the discharge of their tasks.government services in the discharge of their tasks.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. Thesuppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.

RRC Rule 138 Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. - No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Correct InterpretationCorrect Interpretation

The term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to includean act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.

Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. - Olazo v. Justice Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]

______________________________________________________________________1 PALE. Arellano University School of Law. Dr. Capule Lec. 9-22. SY 2015-2016 (ETBeltran)

General RuleGeneral Rule

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. - Ramos v. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, A.C. no. 6788 [2007]

Admonition to government lawyersAdmonition to government lawyers

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties.

We previously held that the restriction extends to all governmentlawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. - Olazo v. Justice Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]

“Revolving door” law practice“Revolving door” law practice

“[T]he process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.“ - PCCGv. Sandiganbayan and Tan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12 [April 12, 2005]

These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts.

Special considerations, both for and againstSpecial considerations, both for and againstdisqualification of former government attorneydisqualification of former government attorney

If service with the government will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long a time, or will prevent him from engaging in practice of the very specialty for which the government sought his service — and if that sterilization will spread to the firm with which he becomes associated — the sacrifices of entering government service will be too greatfor most men to make. As for those men willing to make thesesacrifices, not only will they and their firms suffer a restricted practice thereafter, but clients will find it difficult to obtain counsel, particularly in those specialties and suits dealing with the government. - US v.Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370 (1992)


Favors disqualification of former government lawyersFavors disqualification of former government lawyers

On the other hand, policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B)which militate toward disqualification include [t]he treachery of switching sides; the safeguarding of confidential governmental information from future use against the government; the need todiscourage government lawyers from handling particular assignments in such a way as to encourage their own future employment in regard to those particular matters after leaving government service; and the professional benefit derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.- US v.Russell White BROTHERS,Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370 (1992)

Definition of “substantial responsibility”Definition of “substantial responsibility”

With these competing policies in mind, the Court turns to the requirements of Canon 9 which prohibit a former government attorney from accepting private employment in a matter in whichhe had "substantial responsibility" while working for the government. According to the American Bar Association, a "substantial responsibility" is "a responsibility requiring the official to become personally involved to an important, material degree, in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the transactions or facts in question." - US v.Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370 (1992)

Application of C.P.R. on a government lawyerApplication of C.P.R. on a government lawyer

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers“shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. - Ali v. Atty. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018 [2005]


Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplinedas a member of the bar for such misconduct. - Pimentel, Jr. v. Attys. Llorente and Salayon, A.C. no. 4680 [2000]

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer whoholds a responsible public office.

Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye - Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707 [2006]

Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and EmployeesRACode of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and EmployeesRA6713 Rule X6713 Rule X

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; Cont…Cont…

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his professionin connection with any matter before the office he used to


be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

IRR of RA 6713 Rule XIRR of RA 6713 Rule XGrounds for Administrative Disciplinary ActionSection 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative

disciplinary action prescribed under existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not heholds office or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute the grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the, Constitution, law or regulation, providedthat such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions;

Cont…Cont…

These acts shall continue to be prohibited for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of paragraph (c) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, within one year after such resignation, retirement, or separation, provided that any violation hereof shall be a groundfor administrative disciplinary action upon re-entry to the government service.

Correct InterpretationCorrect Interpretation

“[s]uch practice" - refer to practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession.

The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law.“

- Query of Atty. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC [2009]

Purpose of the LawPurpose of the Law

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.


Private practice of lawPrivate practice of law

Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

“x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitualexercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.”- Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003

Various ways a government lawyer leaves governmentVarious ways a government lawyer leaves governmentserviceservice

1. retirement

2. resignation

3. expiration of the term of office

4. dismissal

5. abandonment

Pro se litigantPro se litigant

The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves incourt will not apply when a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court. - Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003

Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants.


The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Herbeing an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. xxx However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.- Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003

Two theories on the disqualification of former governmentTwo theories on the disqualification of former governmentlawyers in representing a clientlawyers in representing a client

“Adverse-interest conflict”

“Congruent-interest representation conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" "Adverse-interest conflicts"

"Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests ofthe current and former are adverse.”- PCCG v. Sandiganbayan and Tan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12 [April 12, 2005]

Adverse-interest conflictAdverse-interest conflict

In the “adverse-interest conflict” a former government lawyer isenjoined from representing a client in private practice when the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and if the interests of the current and former clients are adverse.

It must be observed that the “adverse-interest conflict” applies to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the interests of the former client and the present client are adverseand the matters involved are the same or substantially related.

Congruent-interest conflictCongruent-interest conflict

In “congruent-interest conflict”, the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel. The “congruent-interest representation conflict”, unlikethe “adverse-interest conflict”, is unique to former government lawyers.


Grounds for Disqualification arising from COIGrounds for Disqualification arising from COI

The fatal taint which would require disqualification arises in two types of cases:(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests in violation of [Canons] undermines the court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his client, or more commonly

(2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side through prior representation xxx thus giving his present client an unfair advantage. - US v.Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370 (1992)

PAO to provide free legal assistancePAO to provide free legal assistance

The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.

PAO lawyer should not accept any remuneration for his servicesPAO lawyer should not accept any remuneration for his services

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Acceptance of money by a government lawyerAcceptance of money by a government lawyer

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-clientrelationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. - Ramos v. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, A.C. no. 6788 [2007]

QueryQuery

Why may an incumbent engage in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his


official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7?

Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions.

In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution …

ExceptionException

As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions:

1. the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by thelaw; and

2.the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.

By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of their profession.

InterpretationInterpretation

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee’s resignation,


retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which canalready be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.

Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court PersonnelSection 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court PersonnelOutside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the courtpersonnel to disclose confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

No lawyer in the Judiciary can practice lawNo lawyer in the Judiciary can practice law

No chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so.

Clerk of Court status after separation from governmentClerk of Court status after separation from government

A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713.

The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to


the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year.

The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. Inclusion of name in a business card is “private practice of law”Inclusion of name in a business card is “private practice of law”

"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,

Quezon City

While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office.Thus, while he may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. - Samonte v. Atty. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292 [1999]

Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:

"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."

Preparation of a legal document [Assurance] after separationPreparation of a legal document [Assurance] after separationfrom government servicefrom government service

The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document.

We specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.


In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it.-Olazo v. Justice Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]

Thank you for your attention!!Thank you for your attention!!

Notarial Law ViolationsNotarial Law ViolationsProblem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation2015-2016

Resolution A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC05 July 2004Resolution A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC05 July 2004

Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted by the Sub-Committee for the Study, Drafting and Formulation of the Rules Governing the Appointment of Notaries Public and the Performance and Exercise of Their Official Functions, of the Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on Legal Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications.

Eligibility requirements to become a notary publicEligibility requirements to become a notary public

Rule III SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified person who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year

and maintains a regular place of work or business in the cityor province where the commission is to be issued;

(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Stationary office is requiredStationary office is required

Rule II SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term "regular place of work or business" refers to a stationary office in


the city or province wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial services.

Notice of Summary HearingNotice of Summary Hearing

Rule III SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. - (a) The notice of summary hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where the hearing shall be conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the petitioner. The notice may include more than one petitioner.

What is an oath?What is an oath?

Rule II SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

JuratJurat

Rule II SEC. 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

What is an acknowledgement?What is an acknowledgement?

Acknowledgment refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an

integrally complete instrument or document;


(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declaresthat he has executed the instrument or document as his freeand voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (See Section 1, Rule II of 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice) - Testate Estate of the late Alipio Abada v.Abaja, G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005

Notarized documentNotarized document

Petitioner phrases this issue as to whether the will has to be “notarized.” A notarized document includes one that is subscribed and sworn under oath or one that contains a jurat.– Testate Estate of the late Alipio Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No.147145. January 31, 2005

Purpose of acknowledgement in a notarial willPurpose of acknowledgement in a notarial will

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deedin going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done. Manuel L. Lee v. Atty. Regino B. Tambago,A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008)

Limitation of Notaries public ex-officio Limitation of Notaries public ex-officio

Notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of documents which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. – Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-00-1294, July 31, 2000

Changes of Status of NotaryChanges of Status of Notary

Rule X SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address.Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary

public by court order or by marriage, or after ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or business, the notary public shall submit a signed and dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize until:


(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of thenew name of the notary public and/or change of regular place of work or business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps have been completed, the notary public may continue to use the former name or regular place of work or business in performing notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of the change, which may be extended once for valid and just cause by the Executive Judge for another period not exceeding three (3) months.

Resignation as notary publicResignation as notary public

Rule 10 SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his commission by personally submitting a written, dated and signedformal notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial seal, notarial register and records. Effective from the date indicated in the notice, he shall immediately cease to perform notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to personally appear, the submission of the notice may be performed by his duly authorized representative.

Publication of ResignationPublication of Resignation

SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have resigned their notarial commissions and the effective dates of their resignation.

Notarial CertificateNotarial Certificate

Rule II SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - "Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.

Copy CertificationCopy Certification

Rule II SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - "Copy Certification" refers toa notarial act in which a notary public:

(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor publicly recordable;

(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;

(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and

(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.


Copy certification is required by rule of evidence Copy certification is required by rule of evidence

Rule 132 Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,:

that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.

The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a courthaving a seal, under the seal of such court.

Prima facie evidence of the executionPrima facie evidence of the execution

Rule 132 Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without furtherproof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.

Competent Evidence of IdentityCompetent Evidence of Identity

Rule II SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of anindividual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.

NO current identification document issued by an officialNO current identification document issued by an officialagencyagency

1. the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy tothe instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or

2. the oath or affirmation of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.


The individual has no current identification documentThe individual has no current identification documentissued by an official agency issued by an official agency

A third party can attest in behalf of the individual under the following:

1. The credible witness is not privy to the instrument, document or transaction.

2. The notary public personally knows the credible witness.

3. The credible witness personally knows the individual.

The notary public personally knows the third party.

The notary public does not personally knows the thirdThe notary public does not personally knows the thirdparty [two witnesses]party [two witnesses]

1. The 2 credible witnesses are not privy to the instrument,document or transaction.

2. The 2 credible witnesses each personally knows the individual and

3. Shows to the notary public documentary identification [of their real by showing current identification document issued by an official agency].

“Signature witnessing"“Signature witnessing"

Rule II SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. -The term "signature witnessing" refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents aninstrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public.

Term Term

Rule III SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning courtfor a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.


Rule III SEC. 7 Form of Notarial CommissionRule III SEC. 7 Form of Notarial Commission

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________

This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place ofwork or business) in (city or province) was on this (date) day of (month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first day of December (year).

_______________

Executive Judge

Use of thumb or other markUse of thumb or other mark

Rule IV SECTION 1. Powers. – xxx(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a

signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument or document presented for notarization if:

(1)the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;

(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;

(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark:"Thumb or other mark affixed by (name of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary public"; and

(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature witnessing.

Prohibited acts of a notary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. –

(a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular place of work or business; provided, however, that on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:

(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be administered;


(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring notarization;

(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is confined for treatment; and

Cont…

(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under detention.

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -

is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public throughcompetent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

When a notary public can sign on behalf of a personWhen a notary public can sign on behalf of a person

SECTION 1. Powers. – xxx(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a

person who is physically unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or document if:

(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;

(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;

(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;(4) the notary public writes below his signature: "Signature

affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses of person and two [2] witnesses)"; and

(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.

Disqualified to perform notarial actDisqualified to perform notarial act

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;


(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.

Prohibition to do a notarial act even if payment isProhibition to do a notarial act even if payment istenderedtendered

Rule IV SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate feespecified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;

(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial act; and

(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will.

Prohibition to do a notarial actProhibition to do a notarial act

Rule IV SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not:

execute a certificate containing information known or believed bythe notary to be false.

(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.

Notary public should not notarize Improper InstrumentsNotary public should not notarize Improper Instrumentsor Documentsor Documents

Rule IV SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary public shall not notarize:

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.


Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial CertificateContents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate

Rule VIII SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate. - The notarial certificate shall include the following:

(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the commission;

(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary public;

(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city where the notary public is commissioned, the expiration date of the commission, the office address of the notary public; and

(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax receipt number and the place and date of issuance thereof, and the IBP membership number.

Schedule of fees Schedule of fees RRC 141 Sec. 12. Notaries. -- No notary public shall charge orreceive for any service rendered by him any fee, remuneration or compensation in excess of those expressly prescribed in the following schedule: (a) For protests of drafts, bills of exchange, or promissory notes

for non-acceptance or non-payment, and for notice thereof, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; chan robles virtual law library

(b) For the registration of such protest and filing or safekeeping of the same, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(c) For authenticating powers of attorney, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(d) For sworn statement concerning correctness of any account or other document, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(e) For each oath of affirmation, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(f) For receiving evidence of indebtedness to be sent outside, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(g) For issuing a certified copy of all or part of his notarial register or notarial records, for each page, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;

(h) For taking depositions, for each page, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and

(i) For acknowledging other documents not enumerated in this section, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS. (11a)

Purpose of physical presencePurpose of physical presence

The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public toverify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging


parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free actand deed. – Angeles, et. al. v. Atty. Ibañez, A.C. No. 7860 January 15, 2009

Interviewing the contracting parties does not make theInterviewing the contracting parties does not make theparties personally known to the notary publicparties personally known to the notary public

That the parties appeared before [notary ex-officio] and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with them. Interviewing thecontracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public. – Tupal v. Judge Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ–14–1842, February 24, 2014

Acknowledgement and personal appearanceAcknowledgement and personal appearance

As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to whether or not the parties to a conveying instrument must be present before the notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due execution. - Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007

Personal knowledge of a false statement or informationPersonal knowledge of a false statement or information

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documentsdiminished. Heirs of the late Sps. Lucas and Francisca Villanuevav. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007)

Personal appearance is requiredPersonal appearance is required

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attestto the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a document:

1. to be personally present,

2. to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.(Pantoja-Mumar v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 5426, April 3, 2007)


Notarization is not a ministerial duty

In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan application were notarized, the proceeds were already released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was merely done on a ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to require the personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications brought to him for signing. – FO Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. no. 7073, September 01, 2015

No need for notary to retain a copy of the willNo need for notary to retain a copy of the will

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary publicby the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause fordisciplinary action. (Lee v. Atty. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008)

A notary public cannot appear before himselfA notary public cannot appear before himself

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word "By" which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with.

“xxx having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.” – Villarin v. Atty. Sabate, Jr.,A.C. No. 3324 February 9, 2000

Thank you for your attention!!

By respondent’s admission, the affidavit was already signed by the purported affiant at the time it was presented to him for notarization. Respondent thus failed to heed his duty as a notarypublic to demand that the document for notarization be signed in


his presence. Traya, Jr. v. Atty.Villamor, A.C. No.4595. February 6, 2004

As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein. - Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no photograph, is no longer a valid form of identification for purposes of Notarization of Legal Documents. No less than the Supreme Court itself, when it revoked the Notarial Commission of a member of the Barin Baylon v. Almo, reiterated this when it said:

“As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of acommunity tax certificate in proving the identity of a person whowishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.”- Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

The lawyer and the moneys orThe lawyer and the moneys orproperties of his clientsproperties of his clients


2015-2016

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.


Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Rule 138 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from hisclient no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. xxx

Rule 138 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Rule 138 Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens. - An attorney shall have a lienupon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.

He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall


have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and securethe payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Lawyer took custody of 2 cars subject of preliminaryLawyer took custody of 2 cars subject of preliminaryattachmentattachment

According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Lo’s counsel.

Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority. - Atty. Salomon Jr. v. Atty. Frial, A.C. No. 7820 [2008]

Lawyer withdraw money deposited to the Branch Clerk ofLawyer withdraw money deposited to the Branch Clerk ofCourt without informing his clientCourt without informing his client

Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the accounting and return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to reply.

Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning suchsum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. Con’t…

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of thetrial court’s approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could havecollected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. Alawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money.

Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter’s demands gives rise to the presumption that


he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. - Almandrez Jr. v. Atty. Langit, A.C. No. 7057 [2006]

Business transaction between lawyer and client isBusiness transaction between lawyer and client isdiscouragediscourage

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is amuch higher standard that is required in business dealings wherethe parties trade at "arms length." Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken bya lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor. - Chua and Hsia v. Atty. Mesina Jr., A.C. No. 4904 [2004]

No services rendered, money must be returnedNo services rendered, money must be returned

It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case, charging P56,000.00 is improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal service, however, the attorney’s fee must be reasonable. Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.

We cannot understand why respondent initially demanded P8,000.00 as filing fee from complainant when he very well knewthat the docket fee for Civil Case No. 00-044 had been paid. If it was intended as a docket fee for another case, why did he not file the corresponding complaint?

Respondent lawyer did not return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure to file the case. - Dalisay v. Atty. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 5655 [2006]

Issuing and keeping of receipts are practices ofIssuing and keeping of receipts are practices ofaccountabilityaccountability

Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountabilitywas by issuing and keeping receipts. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]


When to deliver funds of clientsWhen to deliver funds of clients

Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the course of his professional employment, [a lawyer] had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients

(a) when they became due, or

(b) upon demand.

- Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]Lawyer should not deposit the funds in his personalLawyer should not deposit the funds in his personal

accountaccount

For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upondemand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]

Depositing it in his personal account with the consent of client is ethical?

Lending money to clientLending money to client

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from

his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

Purpose of prohibiting lending of money to clientPurpose of prohibiting lending of money to client

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]


Ill-effects of lending money to clients

If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.

Either of these circumstances may:

a. lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or

b. to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest inthe verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

Rule 16.01 includes money judgment in favor of clientRule 16.01 includes money judgment in favor of client

There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client. - Bayonla v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808 [2011]

Lawyer and client must agree with the amount beforeLawyer and client must agree with the amount beforeretaining lien is validly appliedretaining lien is validly applied

In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a lawyer were allowedto unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his claimed compensation even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be violative of the trust relationship between them but canalso open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than mindful of their fiduciary duty. - J.K. Mercado and Sons v. Atty. De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, A.C. No. 3066 [2001]


Misuse of filing fee violates the rule that lawyers must beMisuse of filing fee violates the rule that lawyers must bescrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to themscrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them

in their professional capacityin their professional capacity

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee. - Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, AC No. 99-634 [2002]

Appropriating the entire award is a violation of Canon 16Appropriating the entire award is a violation of Canon 16and Rule 16.01and Rule 16.01

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. - Rivera v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No. 2519 [2000]Obligation of lawyer once the money or property intendedObligation of lawyer once the money or property intended

for his client is receivedfor his client is received

should be reported and accounted for promptly and

should not under any circumstances be commingled with his ownor

be used by him.

- Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000Misappropriation is not requiredMisappropriation is not required

The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility.

Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

Avoid keeping the money of clientAvoid keeping the money of client

Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must alsoappear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would remain undisturbed. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000


Thank you for your attention!!Acquisition of properties subject of litigationAcquisition of properties subject of litigation


2014-2015

Contingent fee arrangement does not violate Article 1491Contingent fee arrangement does not violate Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code(5) of the Civil Code

Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

Limitations of contingent feeLimitations of contingent fee

As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable. Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

Appearance of impropriety if judge purchase propertyAppearance of impropriety if judge purchase propertyafter litigationafter litigation

Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on thepart of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the


time of such transfer. - Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J [1982]

The property must be the very subject of litigation forThe property must be the very subject of litigation forArticle 1491 to applyArticle 1491 to apply

It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the lawyer from purchasing any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting, and Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code prohibits him from acquiring by purchase or assignment the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. But in those cases where these provisions were applied, the rights or properties purchased by the lawyer were the very subject of the litigation handled by him. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

Levied property in satisfaction of damages can beLevied property in satisfaction of damages can be

properly acquired by lawyerproperly acquired by lawyer

In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights byassignment was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in which he approved (sic) as counsel for Bernabe Flores and others. The said case was purely one for damages and did not involve the lot in question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution after judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Therefore Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did not apply. Consequently, respondent had not violated the said provision of law. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]Con’t…

It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice forthe respondent to acquire the rights and interests of his client to the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrativecharges because the land was not involved in the litigation he was handling. The land was acquired by Bernabe Flores in an execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in the course of Civil Case No. 2171. The case handled by the respondent was for damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

Withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to payWithdrawal of the amount deposited in order to payattorney’s fees violates Article 1491 of the NCCattorney’s fees violates Article 1491 of the NCC

The withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay attorney’s fees to petitioner’s counsel, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers fromacquiring by assignment, property and rights which are the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Canons of


Professional Ethics provides that “the lawyer should not purchaseany interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.” The assailed transaction falls within the prohibition because the Deed assigning the amount of P672,900.00 to Atty. De Guzman, Jr., as part of his attorney’s fees was executed during the pendency of this case with the Court of Appeals. In his Motion to Intervene, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., not only asserted ownership over said amount, but likewise prayed that the same be released to him. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]

Even if litigant voluntarily assigned the amountEven if litigant voluntarily assigned the amount

That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned the subject amount to his counsel did not remove their agreement within the ambit of the prohibitory provisions. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]

Assignment of property violatesArticle 1491Assignment of property violatesArticle 1491

We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that theprohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still thesubject of a pending case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte, A.M. No. 3216 [1992]

Prohibition still applies even if lessee is a separateProhibition still applies even if lessee is a separatejuridical personjuridical person

Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, ineffect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. - Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

Mortgage contract included in the prohibition

To state that mortgages are not included within the prohibition isto open the door to an indirect circumvention of that statutory


injunction, acquisition of the property being merely postponed till eventual foreclosure.

Respondent asserts further that Article 1491[5] does not apply to judgment creditors of which, he claims, he was one. Under ordinary circumstances, the argument of respondent could be considered plausible. Unfortunately, however, as heretofore explained, the mortgage was executed in violation of Article 1491[5] so that this Article has a direct bearing on this case and respondent cannot escape its provision. Having violatedthe same, he cannot be considered in the general run of a judgment creditor. - Fornilda, et. al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No.L-72306 [1989]

Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property doesMere demand for delivery of the litigated property doesnot violate the rulenot violate the rule

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210 [2004]Certiorari proceeding still bars purchase of property underCertiorari proceeding still bars purchase of property under

Article 1491Article 1491

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there wasstill a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomessubject to the judicial action of the judge. - Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, A.M. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 [1991]


Criticisms against the courts andCriticisms against the courts andjudgesjudges


2014-2015

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THERESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERSAND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.


Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensiveor menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge tothe proper authorities only.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HISCAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDSTO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING

THE COURT.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

Duty of LawyersDuty of Lawyers

As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public’s trustin, the judicial system. – Fudot v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008 October 24, 2008

Requirements when raising grievances against judgesRequirements when raising grievances against judges

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty. Bagabuyo A.C. No. 7006 [2007]

A scurrilous attack A scurrilous attack

We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. – Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Offensive languageOffensive language

They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a “court of technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition.

They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, “an incompetent judge.”


The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the case shows its“impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity” and such dismissal“smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court.”- Asean Pacific Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al., G.R. No. 162525 [2008]

Intemperate languageIntemperate language

His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused — with that confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class.

- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

Foul languageFoul language

The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in Robe," "corrupt justices who were only sowing ‘judicial terrorism,’" as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior. – Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

Proscribed languageProscribed language

Proscribed then are, inter alia:1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high

esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or

2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people inthe integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court of offensive and abusive language or

3. abrasive and offensive language or 4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious

statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judgeor

5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.


- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

Not disrespectful, abusive or slanderousNot disrespectful, abusive or slanderous

We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. – Francisco, Jr.v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et. al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October 18, 2007

Constitutional provision on parliamentary immunityConstitutional provision on parliamentary immunity

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in alloffenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other placefor any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”- Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution

Purpose of parliamentary immunityPurpose of parliamentary immunity

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for“it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom theexercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”

Defensor-Santiago caseDefensor-Santiago case

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for


nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect dueto the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissedCase against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

Statements of an accused lawyerStatements of an accused lawyer

Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked because of his failure to appear for a criminal trial wherein he was charged as a defendant with driving while intoxicated. Upon his release from jail Polk issued to the news media from his law office the following written statement:

I consider this one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical district attorney and a perverse judge to assure me an unfair trial.

Questionable conduct on the part of those charged with administration of justice does little to foster respect for the law.

- Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]


Statements were made as a citizenStatements were made as a citizen

The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response to the manner in which he was treated as a citizen and not as an attorney. At no time was Polk an attorney of record or in any way acting in his capacity as an attorney in the criminal proceedings against him, nor do the remarks purport to be made in his capacity as an attorney. - Polk v. StateBar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

There is no dichotomy of a lawyer’s personalityThere is no dichotomy of a lawyer’s personality

There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so asto be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. – Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004

Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11 Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11

Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then cite me!”. Judge cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you! Judge ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroomand cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time. Con’t…

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenlythreatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. –


Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September 28, 2011

Intention and disclaimer not a defenseIntention and disclaimer not a defense

Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is that he acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to defend the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is not a ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must haveunderstood them to mean. – Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-39253 November 24, 1978

Making threatsMaking threats

In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11 of Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his motions were not granted, respondent judge would be administratively charged. To be sure, the threat made againstrespondent judge was not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it was a threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations, or intemperate words tending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. –Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1528, March 28, 2000

Threat of ImpeachmentThreat of Impeachment

It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the members of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice with investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him inthe regular exercise of official duty subverts and undermines the independence of the judiciary.

- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

Offensive language against complainant proscribedOffensive language against complainant proscribed

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and inkeeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to bothcourt and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the


sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. – N.H. Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004

Statements in form of questions still proscribedStatements in form of questions still proscribed

While most of her statements were in the form of questions instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignityof the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.

She posed the query, "Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is justice?)," implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in her case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009

Direct contempt if submitted in the same courtDirect contempt if submitted in the same court

In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containingderogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent asit is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily. - Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

Post litigation criticismsPost litigation criticisms

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. – PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

Contempt and Disciplinary proceeding are not the sameContempt and Disciplinary proceeding are not the same

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the


exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penaltyin a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannotbe considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

The test of allowable criticisms of a judge’s decision The test of allowable criticisms of a judge’s decision

Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. – Lorenzo Shipping Corp., et. al. v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011

Degree of lawyers’ remark or commentDegree of lawyers’ remark or comment

Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remarkor comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase. – In re: Complaint against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263, October 28, 1958

Is the judiciary onion-skinned?Is the judiciary onion-skinned?

“The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of …. public opinion. For it is a prized …. privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.”- Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941)

Admonition to judgesAdmonition to judges

More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judgesnot to be onion-skinned when confronted by dissatisfied


lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the purpose of exacting silent submission to their rulings and orders however questionable or unjust they may be. - Sesbreño v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990

Free speech in democratic governmentFree speech in democratic government

"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.“ - Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)

Limited freedom of expression?Limited freedom of expression?

“It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders his right to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed attorney in this state. The Supreme Court has built a substantial line of cases where the Constitution has been read to limit and restrain the state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for attorneys.” - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

Extrajudicial activities of judgesExtrajudicial activities of judges/justices/justices


2014-2015

The previous “Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code ofJudicial Conduct is a supplement to the new Code

“Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct”, promulgated on 5 September 1989, shall take effect on 20 October 1989

This “New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary” shall take effect on the first day of June 2004

This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code: Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character.

CANON 4PROPRIETYNew Code of Judicial Conduct [2004]

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.


SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensomeby the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family represents a litigant oris associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member oftheir family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.


SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or relatedmatters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or herin connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connectionwith their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

Private practice of law prohibited

Rule 138 RRC Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. - No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private


practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: Ajudge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in thepractice of any other profession provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

Why a judge cannot practice law

These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge.

It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.

These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. - Ziga v. Judge Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003

Drafting complainant’s affidavit is practice of law

Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant and her father-in-law when he drafted complainant’s affidavit which became the basis of a complaint for estafa filed against Heidi Navarra.

By acting as counsel for complainant and the latter’s father-in-law in a case filed in his court, respondent compromised his neutrality and independence. How could he then be expected to decide with objectivity and fairness the cases in which he has acted as a lawyer for the plaintiff or complainant?

Respondent’s misconduct in this case is further compounded by the fact that he rendered the legal services in question using government facilities during office hours. - Biboso v. Judge Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356. April 16, 2001

Instances when a judge canserving as executor,administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor,administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The only exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will


not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.

The Code has defined who may be considered as members of hisimmediate family and they are the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. – Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999

“Judge’s family” “Judge’s family”

Includes a judge’s:

1. spouse,

2. son,

3. daughter,

4. son-in-law,

5. daughter-in-law, and

6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixthcivil degree, or

7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.

Rendering legal opinion proscribed

To escape our disciplining wrath, respondent judge argues that the "resolution" he issued was a mere expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment or order "which adjudicates and settles rights and obligations of the parties." He said that the petition for declaratory relief, earlier quoted, is not a pleading, but a mere letter-request for a legal opinion. Hence, complainant Gozun was not entitled to notice and hearing.Besides, even assuming arguendo that the resolution was a mere legal opinion, still respondent must know that rendering of "legal opinions" is not the function of a judge. The function of the court is limited to adjudication of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable. Unlike lawyers, judges cannot render legal advice. Judges are expressly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law or from giving professional advice to clients. – Gozun v. Judge Liangco A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. August 30, 2000

A judge who violates the judicial code of conduct alsoviolates the lawyer’s oath

We ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyer’s oath. - OCA v. Atty. Liangco, A. C. No. 5355 [2011]


As attorney-in-fact in actual litigations

Except for the initiatory pleading, respondent Judge signed the pleadings relative to the civil case and participated in some of the hearings held relative thereto.

The proscription against the private practice of law, or just givingprofessional advice to clients, by Judges is based on public policy.

The prohibition applies equally well to the appointment of and acceptance by judges to the post of attorney-in-fact in actual litigations, a fact which is also, by and large, incompatible with the high office, functions, prestige and privileges of a judge. It is of no moment, albeit worse, that the case where he accepts such designation as attorney-in-fact is one that pends before his own court. - Sps. Gragera v. Judge Francisco, A. M. No. RTJ-02-1670. June 26, 2003

A.M. NO. 13-05-05-SC RE: REVISION OFRESTRICTIONSON TEACHING HOURS OFJUSTICES, JUDGES AND

PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARYEN BANC RESOLUTIONDATED 01 APRIL 2014

Teaching shall be allowed for not more than ten (10) hours a week. On regular working days (Monday through Friday), teaching shall not be conducted earlier than 5:30 p.m.

2. An application for permission to teach if filed by a judge shall be accompanied by a certification of the Clerk of Court concerned regarding the condition of the court docket showing:

(a) the number of pending cases; and

(b) the number of cases disposed of within a three-month period prior to the start of the semester in his or her respective sala.

An application for permission to teach filed by ajudge orjustice shall require approval as follows:

If filed by a judge from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the executive judge concerned;

b. If filed by an executive judge, it shall be subject to the approval of the Court Administrator;

c. If filed by an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice concerned;


d. If filed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.

An application for permission to teach filed bycourtpersonnel shall require approval as follows

a. If filed by court personnel from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the executive judge concerned;

b. If filed by court personnel from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the executive justice concerned, as the case may be;

c. If filed by Supreme Court personnel belonging to a chamber ofan Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, it shall be subject to the approval of the Associate Justice concerned, who will notify the Chief Justice and the Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court, of this approval;

d. If filed by other Supreme Court personnel, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.

Disposition of applications

5. The approving authority may deny the application or allow less than ten (10) hours of teaching a week, depending on the applicant’s performance record.

6. At the end of every year, an approving authority shall submit to the Chief Justice a report on the applications submitted for the year and the respective status of, or action taken on,each application.

Failure to secure permit to teach

To justify his failure to obtain a permit from the Supreme Court, he said that the University of the East did not require him to submit one.

Respondent judge’s failure to accomplish the Request for Permission to Teach form prescribed in Circular No. 50-97, datedJuly 18, 1997 is inexcusable. It is a clear violation of the judiciary rules and regulations, indicating respondent judge’s disregard of the authority of the Supreme Court. For no matter how insignificant or inconsequential the circular may seem to respondent judge, he should have complied with it. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]


Proper for judges to attend meetings of members of theProper for judges to attend meetings of members of thebarbar

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar.

A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigationbefore him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.’”- Abundo v. Judge Manio, Jr.,A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416. August 6, 1999

Judge eating lunch with counsel

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrongper se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possiblehe should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in “determining his judicial course.”

Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. – Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003

Political activities of judges

Allowed : A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.

Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship:

1. a judge shall not make political speeches, 2. a judge shallnot contribute to party funds

3. a judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities. - Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Engaging in partisan political activityimproper under CivilService Law

Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states:


Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectlyin any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall be use his official authority or influenceto coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the namesof candidates for public office whom he supports: ...

Engaging in political activityEngaging in political activity

Respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.

For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. -Vistan v. Judge Nicolas A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 [1991]

Filing of a certificate of candidacy

When he was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without givingup his judicial post, Judge Limbona violated not only the law, butthe constitutional mandate that “no officer or employee in thecivil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”

The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan politicalactivity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electoratefor an elective post. - Limbona v. Judge Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4 March 22, 2011

Limit of judge’s journalistic writing

Complainant alleged that respondent used his newspaper columnto ventilate his biases or personal anger at people or institutions.

Complainant believes that respondent judge should not engage in active, sensational, and free-for-all journalistic writing because such act degrades the judicial system and compromises his impartiality as an administrator of justice. Con’t…

Respondent’s writing of active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration


of justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers that he challenges.

Not only does he act as its contributor or columnist, he is alsoits publisher, editor and legal adviser. Although the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge to engage in certain lawful activities, they should not interfere with the performance of judicial duties nor detract from the dignity of the court. - Galang v. Judge Santos G.R. No. MTJ-99-1197 [1999]

Judge cannot be appointed to executive position in anyenterprise

Circular No. 6 dated April 10, 1987 strictly enjoins all Judges, Clerks of Court and Sheriffs not to accept the position of director or any other position in any electric cooperative or other enterprises, or to resign immediately from such position if they are already holding the same so as not to prejudice the expeditious and proper administration of justice.

In violation of this circular, Judge Estrada, who was appointed tothe judiciary on May 17, 1994, did not resign from the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Labrador until May 31, 1997. - Re: Inhibition of Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada A.M. No. 98-1-32-RTC July 29, 1998

Judge should not accept any position in any businessenterprise

RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere with the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:

xxx

(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.

RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any business except as director of a family business of the judge. - Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct

Not good for judges to engage in business

Indeed, it is not good for judges to engage in business except only to the extent allowed by Rule 5.03 of the Code of JudicialConduct which provides:


Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may holdand manage investments but should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business except as director of a family business of the judge.

- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443.July 31, 2002

Limits of financial and business dealings

Refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to:

reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality,

interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or

increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.

- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443. July 31, 2002 citing Rule 5.02 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct

Act of writing a letter to opposing counsel and defendingAct of writing a letter to opposing counsel and defendinga right amounts to private practice of law a right amounts to private practice of law

We also find merit in complainant's contention that respondent's act of writing to Atty. Cargullo and defending the right of Andres Bo to possess the lot in dispute amounts to private practice of law.

The tenor of the letter shows that respondent, as representative of Andres Bo, was defending the latter's rights over the disputed property. Respondent's act of representing and defending the interest of a private individual in the disputed property constitutes private practice of law. It has been ruled that "the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. - Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999

As agent in the sale of the subject property

By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subjectproperty, respondent judge has increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the


event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale arises.

Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might pleadbefore his court is not remote and his business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge’s integrity. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006

Financial and business dealings

Judge can engage in financial and business dealings provide:

1. such will not reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality.

2. will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities.

3. will not increase involvement with lawyers or persons likelyto come before the court.

A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. - Catbagan v. Judge Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April 06, 2005

Sheer presence - as a member of the Judiciary - would besufficient suggestion of persuasion and influence

As a member of the bench, the respondent judge should realize that his presence, opinion and participation in any proceeding could slant the evaluation and resolution of the casein favor of (the) party he identifies himself with. A judge need not utter any word for his sheer presence - as a member of the Judiciary - would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and influence.

In this case, the respondent judge's presence and participation in the proceedings were to the advantage of his relatives, the heirs of Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr. That his efforts failed to influence the DARAB, for the motion filed by the Valdez heirs in DARAB Case No. 282-T-93 for contempt was dismissed, has no relevance. - Garcia, et. al. v. Judge Valdez, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156 [1998]Giving moral support to a family member by attending the

hearing is improper


Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentionedhearings but explained that he did not sit beside his brother’s lawyer but in the area reserved for the public; and that the main reason why he was there was to observehow election protests are conducted as he has never conducted one. His other reason was to give moral support to his brother. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591 [2005]

Objection from complainant or counsel is immaterial

Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary.

The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel objected to the presence of respondent during the hearing is immaterial.- Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591 [2005]

Use of letterhead by a judge

In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. - Ladignon v. Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]

Hence, respondent judge’s use of the court heading outside of judicial business warrants disciplinary action for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly Section 1, Canon 4.

Use of ordinary bond papers and placing his officialstation as return address

The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary bond papers and placed thereon his official station as return address is not totally without merit.

For, indeed, this is not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary. For example, some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with the letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their station within the judicial hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names, designation and station. - Ladignon v. Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]


Use of court’s stationery

The Court also finds respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code in using official stationery for his correspondence with complainant and the latter’s counsel regarding Lot No. 1470. A court’s stationery, with its official letterhead, should only be used for official correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guererro (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.0322 of the Code. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006

Respondent Judge should know that a court’s letterhead should be used only for official correspondence. - Oktubre v. Judge Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004

Judge required tenants to pay at MTC

Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he further required them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler building.

By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule2.03, clearly intended to “use the prestige of his judicial office” to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs. – Oktubre v. Judge Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004


Doctrine of privilege communications in pleadings andDoctrine of privilege communications in pleadings andjudicial proceedingsjudicial proceedings


2014-2015

Concept of “privileged communication [speech]”Concept of “privileged communication [speech]”

1. Privileged communication as rule of evidence

2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential the secrets or confidences of client

3. Privileged speech in congress

4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions


1. Privileged Communication as rule of evidence1. Privileged Communication as rule of evidence

Rule 130 Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

(b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, orhis advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;

xxx Essential factors to establish the existence of theEssential factors to establish the existence of the

attorney-client privilege communicationattorney-client privilege communication

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought

(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,

(3) the communications relating to that purpose,

(4) made in confidence

(5) by the client,

(6) are at his instance permanently protected

(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,

(8) except the protection be waived.

- Ma. Luisa Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 20072. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential

the secrets or confidences of clientthe secrets or confidences of client

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;

(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

(b) When required by law;

(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.


Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.

Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by theclient.

Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.

Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his family. Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

RPC Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, orreveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity. The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client.


Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.

Limit of privileged communication between client andLimit of privileged communication between client andlawyerlawyer

It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.“ – PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

3. Privileged speech in congress 3. Privileged speech in congress

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in alloffenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debatein the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

Defensor-Santiago caseDefensor-Santiago case

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]


The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect dueto the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissedCase against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

Purpose of Privilege Speech Purpose of Privilege Speech

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be


protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”- Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridicalproceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and

motions

Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American jurisprudence is the rule that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions are absolutely privileged when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false or malicious such utterances may be. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

CPRCPR

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Certificate of meritorious caseCertificate of meritorious case

Rue 7 Section 3. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

“Honest belief”is a claim of “good faith.”- Alfonso C. Choa vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. August 9, 1996

Pleadings in judicial proceedings are consideredPleadings in judicial proceedings are consideredprivilegedprivileged

Pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also due to the undeniable fact that said...

Pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the


disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern.

Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under the scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. – Cuencov. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976Counsel, parties or witnesses are exempted from liabilityCounsel, parties or witnesses are exempted from liability

in libel or slander in libel or slander

It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties or witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with,or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry.

For as aptly observed in one case, while the doctrine of privileged communication is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

Effect of privileged mattersEffect of privileged matters

For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualifiedPrivileged matters may be absolute or qualified

Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless ofthe existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege,in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs"private communications" and "fair and true report without any


comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptionsin Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

Importance of doctrine of privileged communications

The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancyAll doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy

In order the matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings.

All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court willassume the alleged slanderous charges to be true, howeverfalse they may have been in fact. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

There is “no” absolute privilege in pleadingsThere is “no” absolute privilege in pleadings

Absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an attorney ina pleading filed with the court, as long as the statements allegedto be defamatory were relevant and pertinent to the issues in the case. We relied heavily on our earlier decision xxx, in which we recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to make statements in pleadings regardless of their truth or the existence of actual malice on the part of the attorney so long as the statements were relevant and pertinent to the pleadings. – Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)

All forms of communications are privilegedAll forms of communications are privileged

The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communicationsmade by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. - PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41July 16, 1997

Professional discipline may still applyProfessional discipline may still apply

Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we consider itto be a privilege narrowed closely by the "relevancy" and "pertinency" requirements, and we note that while the privilege will prohibit an attorney from being subject to litigation it will not make him immune from professional discipline,


when it is appropriate. – Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)

...makes a lawyer liable for false allegations in a pleading since the rule states that a lawyer's signature on a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that to the best of his knowledge,there is good ground to support the pleading. – Pogue v. Cooper, et. al., 680 S.W.2d 698 (1984)

Restriction to the privilege Restriction to the privilege

The Court defined the restriction to the privilege enjoyed by pleadings thus:

The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. ...

If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.

The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified. - Gutierrezv. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

Example of slanderous matters in a pleadingExample of slanderous matters in a pleading

Repeated litigations between the same parties might indeed be tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is not sufficient cause for calling another "dirty-minded", and of a "limited mind", "twisted mind" or to characterize his act as a "devise of wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's traits.”It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the entire dimension of the defendants' answer, with almost every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainlyachieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and ill-will.The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of


inquiry and have no place in a pleading. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

Admonition to lawyersAdmonition to lawyers

While indeed lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety. Besides, the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. – Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

Partners who signed the pleadings are liable

In view of the derogatory implications of that observation, which was couched in intemperate indecorous and vicious language and which was baseless, since it was belied by the resolution itself that stated the reason for requiring the Solicitor General to proceed with the investigation of the disbarment case, the Court in that aforementioned October 1 resolution required Attys. Salandanan and Zosimo G. Linato, who signed the motion under the firm name of "E. M. Salandanan, Aguilar, Linato & Associates" to show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt of court. – Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347. November 12, 1975

Libelous remarks?

Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a motion seeking reconsideration with a counter-motion for contempt against the appellant for reneging on his commitment to reimburse appellee's clients and for resorting to dilatory tactics. To that, Atty. Ceniza, filed his "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Etc." charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication, and "telling a barefaced and documented lie." Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then filed his "REPLY" – Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is “an irresponsible person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster.”- subject matter of Ceniza's libel suit.

Balancing actBalancing act

While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead togreat hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise to greater hardships.

Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold,and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449July 16, 1984


Test to be appliedTest to be applied

A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Metes and bounds of relevancy or pertinency

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal.

The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety.

In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of thetrial. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Legitimate answers to accusations are privileged

Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense of his own and of his client's interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Unprofessional conductUnprofessional conduct

Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Proper conduct of lawyersProper conduct of lawyers

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case.

All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the


personal history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies of counsel on the other side.

Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided. Lawyers owe respect not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members of the Bar. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno,G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

Using abrasive and offensive language not proper inpleadings

Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in the preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of practising attorneys. – PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984Privileged

When pleadings are published in newspaperWhen pleadings are published in newspaper

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered bythe privilege.

This Court ruled before that:

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions belong to the class of communication that are absolutely privileged. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

Issue No. 182, Volume X of "The Republic Daily", bearingdate of August 3, 1958, an article fully reproduced as

follows

Rep. Cuenco SuedRep. Miguel Cuenco was yesterday sued by the Bisaya Land Transportation Company, Inc., for alleged illegal and unlawful collections made by him on the company, amounting to thousands of pesos. Part of these collections was allegedly obtained by the defendant in violation of a constitutional inhibition. Congressman Cuenco, according to the complaint, hadillegally collected a total of P18,700 from the plaintiff, of which he was formerly assistant manager in charge of the shipping department. In the same suit, the transportation firm asked the court to order the defendant to pay it an additional sum of P5,600 representing attorney's fees which the plaintiff said it hadobligated to pay its counsel. xxx


US jurisprudenceStatements made to the media Statements made to the media

Appellant sued respondent's companies for wrongful termination,making a number of allegations in the complaint against respondent personally. After respondent published a response to the allegations in the media, appellant sued himfor defamation.

Whether or not statements made to the media regarding ongoing or contemplated litigation are covered by absolute privilege. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Whether or not the absolute privilege applies when theWhether or not the absolute privilege applies when themedia is the recipient of the statementmedia is the recipient of the statement

These courts have concluded that the policy considerations underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to statements made to the media. Statements made to the media "do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding processin a judicial proceeding.... [They] do not generally encourage open and honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just the opposite.“

"Communications made to newspapers and during press conferences have been almost universally found to be excluded from the protection of absolute privilege.”- Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Not related to judicial proceedingsNot related to judicial proceedings

We have, however, recognized that communications are not sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when they are made tosomeone without an interest in the outcome.

We conclude that assessing the significant interest of the recipient requires review of the recipient's legal legal relationship tothe litigation, not their interest as an observer.

Moreover, the nature of the recipient's interest in or connection to the litigation is a "case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry" that must focus on and balance the underlying principles of the privilege.

We conclude that the newspaper does not have a direct interest in, or connection to, the outcome of the proceedings, other than as a spectator. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)


A few jurisdictions have held that, under certainA few jurisdictions have held that, under certaincircumstances, an attorney's statements to the media arecircumstances, an attorney's statements to the media are

absolutely privilegedabsolutely privileged

Extending the privilege to statements made by an attorney to a reporter after the dismissal of the first lawsuit. Other jurisdictions have found exceptions to the majority rule based onunique circumstances. , Applying absolute privilege to a statement to a newspaper when all signs pointed to emerging litigation and the newspaper was a potential party); , Applying absolute privilege to a lawyer's statements to the press denying allegations and questioning the plaintiff's motives, where the plaintiff publicly solicited a response; , Holding that an attorney's prelitigation statements to the press are absolutely privileged if a class action lawsuit is contemplated. – Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Communications made to the mediaCommunications made to the media

We adopt the majority view that communications made to the media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely privileged, at least when the media holds no more significant interest in the litigation than the general public.

In order for the absolute privilege to apply to defamatory statements made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, "(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the communication must be related to the litigation.“

The privilege applies to communications made by either an attorney or a non-attorney that are related to ongoing litigation or future litigation contemplated in good faith. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Defamatory statements not privileged when made onDefamatory statements not privileged when made onradio and television programsradio and television programs

Stating the judicial proceedings privilege protects statements by parties and their attorneys related to litigation but does not extend to protect allegedly defamatory statements made on radio and television programs. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (2003)

A privileged statement, such as one made in a judicial proceeding, is not privileged for all subsequent publicationsby virtue of initially being spoken in a privileged proceeding.

Even an "absolute" privilege does not permit an individual to categorically republish possibly defamatory statements without consequence. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (2003)


Statements to third partyStatements to third party

But we have also recognized that "[a]n attorney's statements to someone who is not directly involved with the actual or anticipated judicial proceeding will be covered by the absolute privilege only if the recipient of the communication is “significantly interested” in the proceeding." - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Thank you for your attention!!Terminating and Establishing attorney-client relationshipTerminating and Establishing attorney-client relationship

Problem Areas in Legal EthicsProblem Areas in Legal EthicsArellano University School of Law – Arellano Law FoundationArellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation

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Nature of attorney-client relationship Nature of attorney-client relationship An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.

It is not essential that the client should have employed thelawyer on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received in matters pertinent to his profession. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

Can trigger a lawyer-client relationshipCan trigger a lawyer-client relationship

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.- Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

Verbal agreementVerbal agreement

There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. - Urban Bank Inc. vs.Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]

Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists


The relationship of complainant and [counsel] is mainly personal or business in nature, and that whatever legal services may havebeen rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for free were only incidental to said relationship. Noteworthy also is the fact that complainant was not able to specify any act or transaction in which [counsel] acted as her or her husband's counsel. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

There are instances, however, when the Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists between the parties, such as when the relationship stemmed from a personal transaction between them rather than the practice of law of respondent or when the legal acts done were only incidental to their personal transaction. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

Duty once a lawyer-client relationship existDuty once a lawyer-client relationship exist

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, that “a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.”

Non-payment of fees does not diminish a lawyer’s duty Non-payment of fees does not diminish a lawyer’s duty

Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her. - Somosot v. Atty. Lara A.C. No. 7024 [2009]

Remedy for deliberate refusal to payRemedy for deliberate refusal to pay

It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to institute an action before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein did not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct. - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]

Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

Implied duty to finish the caseImplied duty to finish the case

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes finaland executory. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly


stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.- Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

Terminating the attorney-client relationTerminating the attorney-client relation

CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause.

ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICESCANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES

ONLY FOR ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSEGOOD CAUSE AND AND UPON NOTICE UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATEAPPROPRIATEIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of

conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; [see Rule 19.02]

(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively;

(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;

(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office [see Rule 3.03]; and

(g) Other similar cases.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.


Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. Changing lawyer does not need the approval of the CourtChanging lawyer does not need the approval of the Court

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or withoutcause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enterhis appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

Termination of services without the written consent ofTermination of services without the written consent ofclientclient

A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

A lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is recordedA lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is recordedbefore terminating his servicesbefore terminating his services

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

Cessation of law practice is not a “good cause” toCessation of law practice is not a “good cause” towithdrawwithdraw

Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for hisfailure to file the required brief. Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignorethe directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawnhis appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is expected to comply with all its orders and directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C. No. 5486. August 15, 2001]


The only way to be relieved as counselThe only way to be relieved as counsel

Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007

Duty of lawyer once he is discharged as counselDuty of lawyer once he is discharged as counsel

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name of the new counsel is properly recorded and the records properly handed over. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666 [2007]

A simple turnover of the records does not end a lawyer’sA simple turnover of the records does not end a lawyer’sdutyduty

Contrary to respondent’s contention, his professional relations asa lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to his clients. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

xxx and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. - Rule 22.02

Client refusal to give his consent is still subject to Court’sClient refusal to give his consent is still subject to Court’sdiscretiondiscretion

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought tobe allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

Consent to withdraw must be given by the litigantConsent to withdraw must be given by the litigant

Respondent’s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said


case from respondent or to terminate the latter’s services. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

Pendency of petition for withdrawal does not relievePendency of petition for withdrawal does not relievelawyer of his dutylawyer of his duty

The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

A valid cause to withdraw must still be subject toA valid cause to withdraw must still be subject toformalities of withdrawing as counselformalities of withdrawing as counsel

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

Verbal substitution of counsel not allowedVerbal substitution of counsel not allowed

A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly granted by respondent judge, contravenes Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the requirements for change of attorneys. Said provision requires that the written consent of the client should be filed in court and the adverse party shouldbe given written notice of the substitution. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, if her intention was to obviate delay, then she should have ordered the counsel of record, Atty. Nueva, who waspresent during the hearing, to file the required comment or opposition. - Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427. November 27, 2000

Death of a partnerDeath of a partner

Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should havere-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new


lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 [1992]

Grounds to withdraw from a case before its finalGrounds to withdraw from a case before its finaladjudicationadjudication

A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

Written contract is not essential in establishing lawyer-Written contract is not essential in establishing lawyer-client relationshipclient relationship

A written contract is not an essential element in the employmentof an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

Perceived insufficiency of remuneration not a ground toPerceived insufficiency of remuneration not a ground todiminish professional zealdiminish professional zeal

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the casehe undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

Close personal relationship will not bar a lawyer-clientClose personal relationship will not bar a lawyer-clientrelationship relationship

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. - Hadjulav. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

Heavy workloadHeavy workload

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. - Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166 [2009]

Lost of confidenceLost of confidence

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there nolonger exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to themanner of private prosecution.”- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997


“Hurt feelings” is not a valid ground to automatically withdraw“Hurt feelings” is not a valid ground to automatically withdraw

Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.“ - Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

Withdrawal must be granted by the courtWithdrawal must be granted by the court

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on thedate of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

Lawyer’s responsibilityLawyer’s responsibility

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

x x x x

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shallrender him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed ofthe status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Client should not file the Notice to WithdrawClient should not file the Notice to Withdraw

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily meanHaving an additional lawyer did not necessarily meanconformityconformity

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s desire to


withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.

That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza’s professionalengagement on her behalf despite respondent’s withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303 [2006]

Grounds for disciplinary proceedingsGrounds for disciplinary proceedingsagainst lawyersagainst lawyers


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Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBPSupreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same asa matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members ofboth bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof ratherthan that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation and report. – Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-law”after disbarmentlaw”after disbarment

Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a signboard hanging outside the respondent's office display the title "Attorney-at-Law“ under respondent's name.

Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares for cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

Resolution Resolution

On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty." preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, andthe signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince this Court that respondent continues in the practice of


law, in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that ordered his disbarment. Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations of respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports."Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without evidentiary value.Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the signboard outside his office showing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an orderGuidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an ordersuspending a lawyer from the practice of lawsuspending a lawyer from the practice of law

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the LocalChapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010


Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic

The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period isnecessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBPSupreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBP

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that are prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed bythe parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation. They may be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit.

The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Considering, however, that the question being raised is simple and that no further factual determination is necessary, the Court resolves to dispense with such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings already on record, which all show the lack ofmerit of the Complaint. - Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4700 [2000]

Confidentiality Confidentiality

Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedingsagainst attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. – Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES [took effect on October 1, 2001]

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTCSuspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or


Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, asSection 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, asamended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,

19921992

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarredor suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for: 1. any deceit, 2. malpractice, 3. other gross misconduct in such office, 4. grossly immoral conduct, 5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, 6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take

before admission to practice, 7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to

a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdictionDisbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated [Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006


Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidenceJudgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any ofThe basis of the foreign court's action must include any ofthe grounds for disbarment or suspension in thisthe grounds for disbarment or suspension in this

jurisdiction Ijurisdiction I

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarmentin the Philippines.

Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]


jurisdiction IIjurisdiction II

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in thePhilippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.

Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmuteinto a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Defenses Defenses

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:


Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:x x x x

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right asbetween the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Ex parte investigation valid Ex parte investigation valid

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

Misconduct pertaining to another professionMisconduct pertaining to another profession

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,


probity or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040 [1998]

Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veilRespondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him bycomplainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction. - Cordon v. Atty. Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002

Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigationJudgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]

Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoralMarrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000

Anonymous complaintsAnonymous complaints

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed outright, however, where their averments may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent


evidence. - Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008

Forum shoppingForum shopping

Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. - Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty.Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006

Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a barAcquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a barto administrative proceedingsto administrative proceedings. .

The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)

Administrative complaint against a member of the barAdministrative complaint against a member of the bardoes not prescribedoes not prescribe

Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)

Indefinite suspensionIndefinite suspension

This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to [respondent] to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. - (In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970)


The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such


misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.

Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

Censure or reprimandCensure or reprimand

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoralKissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s actsare not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrantdisbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Non-injured party can file a complaintNon-injured party can file a complaint

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommendedsanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998


Alternative penalty not allowedAlternative penalty not allowed

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that:x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received fromthe petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)nhis DISBARMENT.

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, not can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

Misconduct as a government officialMisconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a governmentofficial. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. – Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. Noveernment officialmber 27,1996

Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceedingRes judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996


While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. - Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVEA finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVECASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocenceCASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocence

of the respondent in a criminal proceedingof the respondent in a criminal proceeding

The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay v. Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12,1986

Definition of Unprofessional conduct Definition of Unprofessional conduct

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitudeIndirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude

The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality. - In re:Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003

No final judgment yetNo final judgment yet

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California,he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end.

We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,


the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaintaffects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor. –In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003

Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consentingSexual relations between two unmmaried and consentingadultsadults

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, toa certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, 2011

Estrada v. Escritor caseEstrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes that [the court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct“. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. Butas a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.

Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal


arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinctcircumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] arePenalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] areimmediately executoryimmediately executory

We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension should commence on the day respondent judge receives noticeof the decision suspending him from office.

While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order. – Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. February 4, 2002

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]are NOT immediately executoryare NOT immediately executory

Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediatelyexecutory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

“Res Judicata” applies“Res Judicata” applies

The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed the complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it


appearing that it involves the same incident and the samecause of action as Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it appears that on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court dismissed a similar complaint filed in Administrative Case No. 3835. – Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825. February 1, 1996

Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative CasesAutomatic Conversion of Some Administrative CasesAgainst Justices of the Court of Appeals and theAgainst Justices of the Court of Appeals and the

Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special CourtsSandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts

AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials andas Members of the Philippine Bar.Cont…Cont…Under the same rule, a respondent “may forthwith be required tocomment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar.” xxx In other words, an orderto comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administrativelyliable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar.

This is the fair and reasonable meaning of “automatic conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. – Campos, et. al. v. Atty.Campos, A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014

Definition of Unbecoming conductDefinition of Unbecoming conduct

Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”- ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011

Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarmentUnlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,


honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of the bar. -Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008

To ensure competence after reinstatement To ensure competence after reinstatement

Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school. - In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review theSC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review thetrial court’s decisiontrial court’s decision

At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court’s decision. – Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9, 2000

Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanctionBreached of promise to marry not subject to sanction

Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.– Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigationDesistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation

The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.- Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court

Reconciliation of parties or amicable settlement

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or


settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP.

The complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. – Sps. Amatorio v. Atty. F. Yap & Atty. W. Yap, A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015

Ex-parte investigation allowedEx-parte investigation allowed

An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. – Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 2000

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, theInvestigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimonyAffidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony

As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is ofno moment. Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainant’s evidence. – Liwanag v. Judge Lustre,A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

Disciplinary authority v. Judicial actionDisciplinary authority v. Judicial action

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary


authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549,December 02, 2013

WON the money should be returned to complainantWON the money should be returned to complainant

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether thematter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry intothe moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

Sui generis principleSui generis principle

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. - Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999

“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual and“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual andcustomary in naturecustomary in nature

Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in


nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. – Atty. Aquino v. Justice Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

Quantum of evidence ]judges]Quantum of evidence ]judges]

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.”- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996

Quantum of evidence [judges]Quantum of evidence [judges]

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

“Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”- Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

Quantum of evidence [lawyers]Quantum of evidence [lawyers]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independentlyof civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminalcase, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. – Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999


Absolute pardonAbsolute pardon

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground that the respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M.No. 126 December 29, 1980

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrineApplication of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. – Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375 October 16, 1997

Preventive suspension for erring lawyerPreventive suspension for erring lawyer

Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

Preventive suspension not applicable to judgesPreventive suspension not applicable to judges

Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente litependente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventivethe rules on preventivesuspension of judges, not having been expressly included suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Courtin the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – , are amorphous at best. – Re: Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008January 31, 2008


CA or RTC may suspend an attorneyCA or RTC may suspend an attorney

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.


Judicial clemency and reinstatementJudicial clemency and reinstatementProblem Areas in Legal EthicsProblem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law FoundationArellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation2014-20152014-2015

Forms of clemencyForms of clemency

Reinstatement

Commutation

Lifting of disqualificationReinstatements to the legal profession were allowed under the

following criteria 1. the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and

he has assured the Court that he now possesses the requisiteprobity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law

2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement,

3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment,

4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations

5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of his community.

6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future ofhis family. – Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989

Cont…Cont…

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled toreinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence.


The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral character‘. – In re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982 Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests forCourt lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for

judicial clemencyjudicial clemency

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty1 to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. – Re: Letter of Judge Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC September 19, 2007

Absolute and unconditional pardonAbsolute and unconditional pardon

Thereafter, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961.

On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines grantedpetitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights.

True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.- In re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982


Effects of pardonEffects of pardon

"When proceedings to strike on attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it hasbeen held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted.“ In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent asif he had never committed the offense.

Effect of conditional pardonEffect of conditional pardon

The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penalconsequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on theground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. In re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967

Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself. - In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

Pardon granted Pardon granted beforebefore conviction conviction

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent asif he had never committed the offense.

If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching;

If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and


capacity.”- In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962


Grounds for voluntary inhibition andGrounds for voluntary inhibition anddisqualification of judgesdisqualification of judges


2014-2015

“Judge’s family” “Judge’s family”

Includes a judge’s:

1. spouse,

2. son,

3. daughter,

4. son-in-law,

5. daughter-in-law, and

6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixthcivil degree, or

7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.

Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree ofconsanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other thanthose mentioned above.

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as


above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwithmade in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibitionRules contemplate two kinds of inhibition

1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.

2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.

- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality wasProof that a specific act of bias or partiality wascommittedcommitted

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this pointof law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derivedor appreciated. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Evidence requiredEvidence required

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in additionto palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]


Proof of clear and convincing evidenceProof of clear and convincing evidence

The bare allegations of the judge’s partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence toovercome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in whichhe, or his wife or child, is he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interestedpecuniarily interested as heir, as heir,

legatee, creditor or otherwise...." legatee, creditor or otherwise...."

The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

A summary of judicial obligationsA summary of judicial obligations

3.1 A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.”- Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Meaning of“ruling in a lower court is the subject ofMeaning of“ruling in a lower court is the subject ofreview” or “in which he has presided in any inferior courtreview” or “in which he has presided in any inferior court

when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.” when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.”

Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held


that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a “just or valid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibitionAutomatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibitionimproperimproper

Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judgemore sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical tothe speedy and fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543 [2010]

“Utang na loob” per se not a ground for inhibition“Utang na loob” per se not a ground for inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang naloob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such valuein Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as judge. – Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney ofIntimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney ofrecord is no ground for disqualificationrecord is no ground for disqualification

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. xxx We held that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of said judge.” To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred.

Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of hisformer classmates (and he could have many) appeared." - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987


Personally approaching the judge to disqualify himself notPersonally approaching the judge to disqualify himself notcontemptcontempt

We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, andanother thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. - Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Former associate in practice of lawFormer associate in practice of law

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Judge was the former public prosecutor who handled theJudge was the former public prosecutor who handled thesame casesame case

The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge of thissala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein undersigned discovered and remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his previous participation in the above-cited criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor conducted any full-blown trial in the same. Besides the private prosecutor did not interpose any objection.

WON respondent judge should be administratively sanctioned.The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the


like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in CriminalCase No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. - In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC [1998]

Justice of CA had acted as counsel for respondent but noJustice of CA had acted as counsel for respondent but nosanctionsanction

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the National Power Corporation in CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really begged off from any participation in the decision process by, indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate court.

In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained such failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere inadvertence and oversight on his part, and when reminded that he, in fact, had acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith disengaged himself from further involvement in the disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R. No. 112884 August 30, 1994

Should a judge whose decision was reversed by theappellate court voluntarily inhibit herself when the case is

remanded to her sala

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason,absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was biased and partial against petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, theremedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify


judges who err, for we all err. - Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583 [2009]

Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in theIs a former assistant or associate of the judge in thepractice of law a ground for automatic disqualificationpractice of law a ground for automatic disqualification

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge maynot be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party inthe case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Is being a former classmate of the judge a ground forIs being a former classmate of the judge a ground forinhibition or disqualification?inhibition or disqualification?

Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared. – Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendshipbetween a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October26, 1987Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against theWho shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against thedecision of a judge, after he had voluntarily inhibited himselfdecision of a judge, after he had voluntarily inhibited himself

from further sitting in the case? from further sitting in the case?

The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions involving a judge's disqualification here, a judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that hecontinue with the case.


However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is transferred should not resist too much the order of recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Judge attempted to make complainant and the accusedsettle their dispute amicably considering that they arebrothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin

Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent's counsel, thelatter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity.

Judge is reprimanded. – Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998

Would mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge toWould mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge toproceed with hearing the caseproceed with hearing the case

On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an order denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibited himself and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition.

As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature. – Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 124760July 8, 1998

Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not properVerbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not proper

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of theOrder; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file therequired motion for inhibition, an omission which was


interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. – Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERSRule 137

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwithmade in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

No appeal or stay shall be allowed until after finaljudgment in the case is not an absolute rule

Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay ofthe proceedings where the trial judge rules in favor of her competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil cases, and has not precluded a resort in appropriate cases to the special civil action of certiorari before the higher courts for determination.

This will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion for inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the trial court’s judgment on the merits and there is a clear showing that the case is an exceptional one. This is not true in the case of the present petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R. No. 167899 August 6, 2008

Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules ofCourt against appeal or stay of the proceedings when thetrial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules

in favor of his own competency

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such disqualification is sought by the prosecution or offended party. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969


When the accused seeks inhibition or disqualification

Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own competency would apply, as it does in civil cases.

In such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could raise the correctness of the judge's ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal from the decision on the merits; and were he to be acquitted, he would have no cause for complaint against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of non-disqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering such verdict. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

Rule on restriction against appeal or stay of theproceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to

disqualify himself and rules in favor of his owncompetency

When it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction would apply – meaning no appeal until final judgment.

When it is the prosecution or offended party in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings does not apply. – otherwise the rule on double jeopardy will apply against the prosecution or offended party.

In civil and [administrative] cases, no appeal or stay shall beallowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects hisjurisdiction

This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners' contention, holds that the disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the part of a party, to timely interpose such an objection of disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969


When to file a motion for disqualification?

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that should be timely raised in the first instance, so that it may properly be raised and considered on appeal. At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, supra, if this Court were of the opinion upon a review of the case that the litigant had not had a fair trial, it would grant a new trial, although the judge may not have been disqualified under Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the best interests of justice. This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that: "Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was notgiven a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias orprejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

“Remittal of Disqualification”

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings. - CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY New Code of Judicial Conduct

Written consent of all the parties is required in “Remittalof Disqualification”

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law.The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record. - Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988

“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the


modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him. – PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Presumption of regularity

Mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, speculations or hearsay cannot overcome the presumption that the respondent [judge] has regularly performed his or her duties. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006

"Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome thepresumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor." - Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171526, September 1, 2010Presumption of regularity

Duty not to recuse

Judges should not recuse themselves merely because an unfounded claim of bias or prejudice has been lodged against them. xxx . [A] judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse when the circumstances do not require recusal. - Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar Association, page 187, 2004

Improper purpose for filing motion to inhibit/disqualify

The rule [on inhibition or disqualification] should “not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant’s personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice.”

It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, would seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a plea of bias, hostility, or prejudgment.

It further held that it did not approve of some litigants’ tactic of filing baseless motions for disqualification as a means of delaying the case or of forum-shopping for a more friendlyjudge. - People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171, 186-87, October 28,1991, cited by Justice Panganiban in his Extended Explanation for Inhibition in the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001



Grounds for disciplinary proceedingsGrounds for disciplinary proceedingsagainst judges and justicesagainst judges and justices


2014-2015

Resolution to protect members of judiciary from baselessResolution to protect members of judiciary from baselesscomplaintscomplaints

First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3, 2003.

Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciaryfor purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:Cont…

2. If the complaint is filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year

before such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the

respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of therespondent, or, if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Power of the Supreme Court

Article 8 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrativesupervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. – Philippine Constitution 1987


By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with alllaws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. – Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993Competence to review a judicial order or decision belongs

to the Court

“No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not anyfunctionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.”- De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281(2000)

Powers, functions, and duties of the Office of theOmbudsman

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

xxxOmbudsman Act of 1989 [R.A. 6770]

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayanand, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,


at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.” xxx xxx “Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

When criminal complaint against a Judge or other courtemployee arises from their administrative duties

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judgeor court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. - Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain acriminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's

certification submitted to the Supreme Court, andassuming that it can, whether a referral should be made

first to the Supreme Court.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination.

The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow itspersonnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. - Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigationover the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official

functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative

charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against


petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the SupremeCourt, for appropriate action. - Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001

Whether the MTC can take cognizance of a complaint ofreckless imprudence against an incumbent judge pendingthe resolution of an administrative complaint arising from

the same facts

On January 31, 2003, complainant filed a letter complaint beforethe Ombudsman-Vizayas, charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, thenPresiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental with the crime of murder and the administrative offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.The complaint arose from the death of complaianant’s husband, on November 12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Judge Garcia and the motorcycle driven by the deceased.The Graft Investigation Officer found the existence of probable cause for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and recommended the filing of the corresponding charges against Judge Garcia.

Judge Garcia filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:xxx; (2) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person; and,xxx.

Petitioner [judge] argues that respondents violated this Court’s pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, directing the Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court; and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the government, but also other official and functionary thereof in initiating or investigating judges and court personnel.

Held

In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his duties as a judge.

From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above circumstances.

To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain


jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts. – Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009

When to file administrative case against judges

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry ofjudgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

Prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice orbad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of thejudge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. – Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

Anonymous complaintAnonymous complaint

First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the letter-complaint should not be given due course because it is only anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Courtprovides that the disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices may be instituted under either of three ways:

1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio;

2. upon a verified complaint; or

3. upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007


Lack of verification is only a formal defectLack of verification is only a formal defect

As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, §1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint. "The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct — the court maysimply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served." (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394, December 02, 2002)

Effect of retirement of respondent judgeEffect of retirement of respondent judge

Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August 2, 2007)

Death of respondent judgeDeath of respondent judge

The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to imposeany administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared theadministrative complaint against the respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. - RE: Application for retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008

Judge also liable if court employee fraternized withJudge also liable if court employee fraternized withlitigantlitigant

Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent Judge Alagar in this case having tolerated unknowingly his employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending before his sala.

Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his part in failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court employee for the latter’s improper use of his vehicle, to the


detriment of the court’s image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449. January 18, 2002

Having lunch with counselHaving lunch with counsel

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicionthat his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in “determining his judicial course.” Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. - Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003

Effect of reconciliation of the partiesEffect of reconciliation of the parties

The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service. (Flores v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)

Conviction in a criminal caseConviction in a criminal case

Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case.

Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it.In other words, the disposition in the first two will not necessarily govern the third, and vice versa. (Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15, 2007)

Effect of resignation from officeEffect of resignation from office

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance – without prejudice –


by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant withdreadful and dangerous implications. (Non-disclosure before the JBC of the administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC no. 013, August 22, 2007)

Grounds for outright dismissal Grounds for outright dismissal

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;

(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year beforesuch filing; and

(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)

Warning is not a penaltyWarning is not a penalty

A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. - Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001

Gross ignorance of the law

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege thatthe erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. - Sps.Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

Rendering an unjust judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are:

(a) the offender is a judge;

(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;

(c) the judgment is unjust; and


(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.

The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

There is no liability at all for a mere error

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all fora mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith.

Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

When good faith will not be appliedWhen good faith will not be applied

We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate respondent’s argument which in effect posits that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment.

Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. – Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is impermissibleComplaint for gross ignorance of the law is impermissibleif case is appealed if case is appealed

The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing respondent judge’s decision and his order of execution.


In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative case against respondent judge while their appeal and petitionfor certiorari challenging his decision and order were still pending with the RTC. Following our settled pronouncements cited above, the instant complaint is impermissible. – Camacho v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17, 2002

Period to decide or resolve the case submitted forPeriod to decide or resolve the case submitted fordecisiondecision

The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted for decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory requirement. Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court may deem appropriate.

It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues or when the judge is burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer period to decide may be allowed but only upon proper application made with the Supreme Court by the concerned judge.- Dr. Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 November 22, 2000

Judge attended the hearing of his brotherJudge attended the hearing of his brother

Judge Dojillo “sat beside the counsel of his brother” and “activelycoached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now and then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court,and other similar acts.”

Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of his brother’s election protest case just to give moral support and, in the process, also observe how election protest proceedings are conducted. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

Judge is a heckler

The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory remarks and


insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of this case.

All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down by the complainants and the latter’s witnesses. He justified hisbehavior though as the fulminations of a righteously outraged citizen which according to him should be segregated from his function as a judge.

Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageousbehavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. – Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14,2004

No dichotomy of personality

Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaon’s suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge.

In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took on a greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the authority attendant to the office. -Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14, 2004

Comment on Certiorari filed by public respondent judgeComment on Certiorari filed by public respondent judgein behalf of private respondent in behalf of private respondent

Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the court on behalf of one of the parties, engaged in the private practice of law. Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the Revised Rules of Court which provides:“Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where

the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. - Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]


Can the members of the Supreme Court be removed fromCan the members of the Supreme Court be removed fromoffice only by impeachment?office only by impeachment?

Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment. Since removal from office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering thatthe power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, the Court is without authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member. He added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is not one of the impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009Cont…

When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and, consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no moment, as he was then not yet a respondent in an administrative matter against him. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

Res ipsa loquitor

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997]

Res ipsa loquitorRes ipsa loquitor

In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability. – Query of Atty.


Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009

Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct. - In re: Complaint against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987

A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re: Complaint against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987

Quantum of evidenceQuantum of evidence

It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that theburden of proving the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]Quantum of evidence required for removal of judge fromQuantum of evidence required for removal of judge from

officeoffice

Jurisprudence dictates –

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general rules with regard to admissibilityof evidence in criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]

Acts of a collegial courtActs of a collegial court

It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010


“Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not apply to“Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not apply toa collegial courta collegial court

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 ofthe Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjustjudgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court withjurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Judge's conviction by the RTC does not necessarilywarrant her suspension

The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.

By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. - Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of theExistence of a presumption indicating the guilt of theaccused does not in itself destroy the constitutionalaccused does not in itself destroy the constitutional

presumption of innocencepresumption of innocence

It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this


manner, the presumption of innocence continues. - Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

Preventive suspension not applicable to judgesPreventive suspension not applicable to judges

Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventivesuspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008


Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

Collegial court needs to act as one bodyCollegial court needs to act as one body

Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of one another.

The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and everyone of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates theequal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. - ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010



Affinity and consanguinity as a basisAffinity and consanguinity as a basisfor disqualification under Canon 3for disqualification under Canon 3

section 5(f) section 5(f) Problem Areas in Legal EthicsProblem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law FoundationArellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation2014-20152014-2015

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERSRRC Rule 137 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERSRRC Rule 137

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, withoutthe written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Cont…Cont…

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the groundstherefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwithmade in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

CANON 3A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIESHONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE

RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;


(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

Definition of affinityDefinition of affinity

Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa. – PP v. Raul Berana, G.R. No. 123544 July 29, 1999

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like. - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse." It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

NCC SUBSECTION 1. - Relationship

Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.


A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who

descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two fromthe grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father and the same mother.

Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.

2 legal theories

1. The terminated affinity view holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensiveand coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration isindispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by


affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives. The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when thereis a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.

2.The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.

Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.

This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intentto benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “tie of affinity” between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. – Intestate Estate of Gonzales vda. De Carungcong v. PP, G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

“Blood relatives”“Blood relatives”

Relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed the following:

(1) an ascendant;

(2) a descendant;

(3) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

No affinityNo affinity

Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is relatedby affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband andthe blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife andthe blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of

one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created suchrelationship by affinity?

If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of


marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him. – PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Case 1Case 1

Judge is respondent’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s [judge] aunt is married to an uncle of respondent. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge did not inhibit himself from hearing said electoral case.

Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of the judge is married to the uncle of respondent.

WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.Judge not disqualifiedJudge not disqualified

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Being“magbalaes” is not a ground for automaticBeing“magbalaes” is not a ground for automaticdisqualificationdisqualification

Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty of impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself from the case despite the fact that one of the accused, Lope Panti, Sr., is the father-in-law of respondent judge’s daughter.

To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti, Sr. are not, strictly speaking, relatives within the meaning of Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court.


Nevertheless, the close personal relations between them as parents of their respective children, being in our culture known as “magbalaes,” should have cautioned respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case, lest his impartiality be placed in doubt. – Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1236. November 25, 1999

Complainant is the judge’s wifeComplainant is the judge’s wife

Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant, knowing that the private complainant therein was his wife, Atty. Ester Flor. – Tenenan v. Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995 September 25, 2007

Judge’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counselJudge’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counselfor the accusedfor the accused

It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited himself from Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled “People v. Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Manuel M. Villasor, SG Fernando Tagle, and SG Ronan Guerrero” because respondent’s nephew, Atty. Cris Pascua Zafra, is married to the daughter of Atty. P. M. Castillo, complainants’ defense counsel in that case. Complainants’ claim that although respondent’s relationship is tothe husband of the daughter of their counsel, they did not want respondent to try their case because they wanted “to [avoid] anystigma and/or cloud of doubt on any order/decision” which respondent may render on the case.Cont..Cont..

In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the loss of trust on the part of the complainant as to his impartiality.When a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence areeroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. Ajudge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest actuation and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. - Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563 [2001]Cont…Cont…

In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants to support their motion, i.e., that respondent’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel for the accused;


that they lacked confidence in respondent’s impartiality xxx have no merit.

The first is not a ground for mandatory disqualification of judges under Rule 137, par. 1 since respondent is not even related to counsel for the accused. - Yalung v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1342 [2001]

Father-in-law of the judge present in the proceedingFather-in-law of the judge present in the proceeding

The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in the proceedings during which timehe gave consultation to the complainant who was reportedly his political leader and protégée.

In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to recuse himself from cases in which his relatives were either involved or interested, the record shows he did so to favor or protect the parties. – Siawan v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May 21, 2001

Discussing the pending case with a brother

By allowing his brother to discuss with him the merits of one party’s position, Justice Sabio gave his brother the opportunity to influence him. Any reasonable person would tend to doubt Justice Sabio’s independence and objectivity after such a conversation with a close family member who also happens to hold a high government position. As a magistrate, Justice Sabio has the duty to prevent any circumstance that would cast doubt on his ability to decide a case without interference or pressure from litigants, counsels or their surrogates. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, October 15, 2008)

A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

- Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the

record of birth, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010Thank you for your attention!!Thank you for your attention!!


Grounds for disciplinary proceedingsGrounds for disciplinary proceedingsagainst lawyersagainst lawyers


2015-20162015-2016

Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBPSupreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same asa matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members ofboth bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof ratherthan that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation and report. – Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-law”after disbarmentlaw”after disbarment

Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a signboard hanging outside the respondent's office display the title "Attorney-at-Law“ under respondent's name.

Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares for cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

Resolution Resolution

On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty." preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, andthe signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince this Court that respondent continues in the practice of law, in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that ordered his disbarment. Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations of respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports."Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without evidentiary value.Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the signboard outside his office showing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014


Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an orderGuidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an ordersuspending a lawyer from the practice of lawsuspending a lawyer from the practice of law

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the LocalChapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic

The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period isnecessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010


Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBPSupreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBP

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that are prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed bythe parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation. They may be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit.

The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Considering, however, that the question being raised is simple and that no further factual determination is necessary, the Court resolves to dispense with such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings already on record, which all show the lack ofmerit of the Complaint. - Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4700 [2000]

Confidentiality Confidentiality

Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedingsagainst attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. – Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES [took effect on October 1, 2001]

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTCSuspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified


copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, asSection 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, asamended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,

19921992

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarredor suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for: 1. any deceit, 2. malpractice, 3. other gross misconduct in such office, 4. grossly immoral conduct, 5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, 6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take

before admission to practice, 7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to

a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidenceJudgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]


jurisdiction Ijurisdiction I


It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarmentin the Philippines.

Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]


jurisdiction IIjurisdiction II

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in thePhilippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.

Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer Grounds Grounds for disciplinary proceedings against for disciplinary proceedings against lawyerslawyersmay transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Defenses Defenses

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. -

The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:x x x x

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right asbetween the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006


Ex parte investigation valid Ex parte investigation valid

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

Misconduct pertaining to another professionMisconduct pertaining to another profession

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040 [1998]

Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veilRespondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him bycomplainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction. - Cordon v. Atty. Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002


Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigationJudgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]

Private phone call to litigant prohibitedPrivate phone call to litigant prohibited

If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of judicial indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly made a private phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in the chambers.

It need not be overemphasized that making private phone calls to, sending for and talking to the complainant in the judge’s chambers, as in this case, undermines even more the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoralMarrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000

A single member of a collegial court cannot be charged forA single member of a collegial court cannot be charged forrendering unjust judgmentrendering unjust judgment

Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is “unjust” cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing ofcharges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice


Hakim S. Abdulwahid, Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006

Anonymous complaintsAnonymous complaints

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed outright, however, where their averments may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. - Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008

Forum shoppingForum shopping

Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. - Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty.Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006

Retirement from officeRetirement from office

The Court emphasizes at this point that respondent’s retirement from office does not render the present administrative case moot and academic; neither does it freehim from liability. Since complainant filed the case when respondent was still in the service, the Court retains the authority to investigate and resolve the administrative complaintagainst him. - City of Cebu v. Judge Gako Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111, May 7, 2008

Infraction committed by judge before appointmentInfraction committed by judge before appointment

This step finds support in Heck v. Santos where the Court held that while the infraction was committed before the respondent’s appointment as judge, the Court may still discipline him therefore. RE: Application for retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008

Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a barAcquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a barto administrative proceedingsto administrative proceedings. .

The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)


Administrative complaint against a member of the barAdministrative complaint against a member of the bardoes not prescribedoes not prescribe

Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)


This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to [respondent] to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. - (In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970)

Censure or reprimandCensure or reprimand

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoralKissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s actsare not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrantdisbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]


Non-injured party can file a complaintNon-injured party can file a complaint

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommendedsanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998

Alternative penalty not allowedAlternative penalty not allowed

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that:x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received fromthe petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)nhis DISBARMENT.

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, not can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

Misconduct as a government officialMisconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a governmentofficial. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such groun


d. – Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. Noveernment officialmber 27, 1996

Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdictionDisbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated [Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceedingRes judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. - Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVEA finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVECASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocenceCASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocence

of the respondent in a criminal proceedingof the respondent in a criminal proceeding

The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay v. Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12,1986

Definition of Unprofessional conduct Definition of Unprofessional conduct

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitudeIndirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude

The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently,


there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality. - In re:Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003

No final judgment yetNo final judgment yet

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California,he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof.It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor. – In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consentingSexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting

adultsadults

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, toa certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, 2011

Estrada v. Escritor caseEstrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes that [the court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct“. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003


She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. Butas a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.

Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Cont…Cont…

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinctcircumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] arePenalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] areimmediately executoryimmediately executory

We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension should commence on the day respondent judge receives noticeof the decision suspending him from office.

While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order. – Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. February 4, 2002


Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]are NOT immediately executoryare NOT immediately executory

Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediatelyexecutory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

“Res Judicata” applies“Res Judicata” applies

The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed the complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it appearing that it involves the same incident and the samecause of action as Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it appears that on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court dismissed a similar complaint filed in Administrative Case No. 3835. – Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825. February 1, 1996

Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative CasesAutomatic Conversion of Some Administrative CasesAgainst Justices of the Court of Appeals and theAgainst Justices of the Court of Appeals and the

Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special CourtsSandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts

AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials andas Members of the Philippine Bar.Cont…Cont…Under the same rule, a respondent “may forthwith be required tocomment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar.” xxx In other words, an orderto comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administrativelyliable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar.

This is the fair and reasonable meaning of “automatic conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. – Campos, et. al. v. Atty.Campos, A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014

Definition of Unbecoming conductDefinition of Unbecoming conduct


Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”- ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011

Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarmentUnlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of the bar. -Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008

To ensure competence after reinstatement To ensure competence after reinstatement

Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school. - In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review theSC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the

trial court’s decisiontrial court’s decision

At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court’s decision. – Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9, 2000

Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanctionBreached of promise to marry not subject to sanction

Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.– Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigationDesistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation


The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.- Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court

Ex-parte investigation allowedEx-parte investigation allowed

An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. – Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 2000

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, theInvestigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimonyAffidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony

As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is ofno moment. Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainant’s evidence. – Liwanag v. Judge Lustre,A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999

Disciplinary authority v. Judicial actionDisciplinary authority v. Judicial action

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549,December 02, 2013

WON the money should be returned to complainantWON the money should be returned to complainant

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether thematter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012


Cont…Cont…

If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry intothe moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

Sui generis principleSui generis principle

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. - Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999


The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.

Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000


“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual and“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual andcustomary in naturecustomary in nature

Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. – Atty. Aquino v. Justice Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002


“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.”- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996


Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independentlyof civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminalcase, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. – Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999


As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

“Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”- Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999


Absolute pardonAbsolute pardon

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground that the respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M.No. 126 December 29, 1980

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrineApplication of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. – Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375 October 16, 1997


Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propriomotu proprio, or , or at the instance of at the instance of the IBP Board of Governorsthe IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the upon the recommendation of the Investigator, Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of may suspend an attorney from the practice of his professionhis profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Courtsuch suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court. .

CA or RTC may suspend an attorneyCA or RTC may suspend an attorney

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causesfor any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case. further action of the Supreme Court in the case.


To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has


promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. – Sps. Amatorio v. Sps. Atty. Whelma and Francisco Yap, A.C. no. 5914, March 11, 2015.
