THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY AND RELIGION

Shigefumi Kurahashi

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between science-

technology and religion as well as into the fundamental problem of how this can be

done from a sociological point of view. From the very beginning, however, I have to

profess that the considerations concerned are quite broad in scope and that difficult

problems are involved, which do not allow easy conclusions. The reasons for this

situation are the following. It is not clear how science-technology and religion are to

be defined, nor is it clear what the relationships are between these realities.

Moreover, there is no principle or criterion that can be invoked to decide on the

problem of possible relationships or their absence. Again, it is uncertain how actual

relationships can be dealt with in sociology; also, simply contrasting or comparing

existing sociological research of science and technology with that of religion does

not promise any results. A new sociological perspective or point of view is perhaps

needed in order to understand the relationships between these two areas of social

life. In this paper, I hope to clarify a few problems with respect to the subject

matter.

Thus, from the very outset of this research, we see that the difficulties we are con-

fronting are numerous. Yet, there are several reasons to proceed with it. First and

foremost, the relationship between science-technology and religion bears on the

problem of life and death, which, spiritually, is the most crucial problem of modern

society. This problem has been frequently overlooked in sociology. What ap-

proach could one think of? Recently, I have been concerned with the problem of

life and death, and the sociological problems of health care and health insurance; with

respect to these problems I have felt the necessity of inquiring into the matter of the

relationship between science-technology and religions).

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I. The Basic Meaning of Science-Technology and Religion

Life in modern society is impossible without science and technology, but this

appears not to be the case of religion. In other words, science and technology con-

stitute an indispensable culture for modern man's physical life. In contrast, religion

is not indispensable in the same respect. Yet, however well man's physical life is

taken care of, the human heart may suffer from uncertainty and mental pain. Human

life invariably entails suffering, sickness and old age, and death will definitely pay us

a visit some time. Then, there are the existential problems of where we have come

from, what we are doing here, and where we are going. Can one call it 'life' if one

were unable to feel and share pain with others, and if we cannot come to terms with

our existential uncertainty? Moreover, there is what Buddhists call 'the evil pas-

sions.' Looking back on our existence, we see shame and we may fear the future.

But are not all these things life? Happiness and sadness, laughing and weeping, soft-

ness and anger, hope and despair? Religion is the indispensable culture for this life.

Of course, in addition to religion, we have to add other forms of culture such as the

arts, literature, philosophy, ethics, and so on. It is by means of these things that

human life becomes human in the first place. Therefore, trying to understand the

relationship between science-technology and religion is trying to make sense of

human life; its goal is to understand society and culture, which made by man, in turn,

affects his existence.

This relationship, i.e., the profound interconnectedness of human life and death

with science-technology and religion is not merely something abstract. It can be

illustrated archeologically, historically and anthropologically. The forms of science-

technology and religion that we find in the early developmental stages of mankind

may not be the same as the phenomena with the same name today, but they are very

similar culture. The so called hominids Pithecantropus, Sinanthropus, and

Heidelberg man, who lived in the late deluvial age from around one million years to

two hundred thousand years from now, already used fire and stone tools. Neander-

thal man living in the fourth glacial period a hundred thousand years ago learned to

bury his deceased family members. This fact may show that religion was engaged in

later than science and technology2). Of course, one cannot judge the existence of

religion from burial practices alone. It is probably safer to say that religious feelings

and magic consciousness came into existence from wonder and fear with respect to

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

superhuman phenomena and from the experience of their worship. Similarly, par-

ticular feelings or religious interest probably have been aroused in the contact with

dead persons and the burial ceremony itself.

We can imagine that man in the early days of his existence was a play thing of

natural forces, and that in absence of present-day rational, scientific explanations, he

could not but fold his hands and leave everything to the gods or try to protect himself

by means of magico-religious acts. If this is right, it can be said that a religious at-

titude was indispensable to the ancestors of mankind. Also, science and technology

of those days must have been related to the magico-religious practices of that time.

Technology, language, and social relations of those early ages have been called

protoculture, while the religion of the middle of the Paleolithic Age, together with the

arts that developed during the late Paleolithic Age, have been called the Homo

sapiens culture3). However, the analysis and interpretation of this culture is not very

clear; it existed as an amalgam, with several things existing in one and the same

activity. Perhaps, culture existed in the form of subconsciousness, functioning by

way of cultural symbols. As for the relationship between science-technology and

religion, we may have to look for its meaning in the direction of still different aspects

of culture contained in it. For example, fire practically functioned as a means for

cooking, heating, and defense against enemies, but somehow related to these func-

tions, there also existed feelings or considerations of special care in its use, the

danger it entailed, and its purifying function, which further related to its magico-

religious significance. Similar considerations still exist today, as can be seen in fire

festivals, the use of fire in lanterns in religious ceremonies, and the ritual of the `goma' fire of esoteric Buddhism . The latter is the fire of wisdom that burns the evil

passions.

As a matter of fact, culture, following its own way of development, has evolved

through a process of differentiation. Science and technology, too, are different forms

of activity that have followed their own ways of development. It is only recently that

science and technology have been considered in combination. Is it not precisely the

differentiation of these cultural elements which caused the gradual evaporation or the

disappearance of the interrelatedness of that what originally co-existed? Is it not ex-

actly this differentiation that greatly stimulated the tendency to forget the signifi-

cance of culture that in its interrelatedness was full of life? In order to grasp the

force and the energy of culture, it is necessary to see it, not in its parts or parcels, but

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in its totality, as a whole.

II. Science-Technology and Religion in Modern Society

If the middle Ages can be called the period of religion, then we can say that the

present is the period of science and technology. But, as we shall see later, the Middle

Ages were not a period within which the relationship of science-technology with

religion was absent. In the same vain, it cannot be said that religion is without in-

fluence in our age or that people have no interest in religion. We only have to look at

the large book stores, where many books on religion are displayed along side with

many others about science and other subjects. The present, therefore, is not a period

of science plain and simple. Modern man is interested both in science and in religion.

The present, therefore, is an age both of science and religion. However, these two

realities remain vague. On the one hand, we cannot but live surrounded by many

things that are born from science and technology, but we do not, and we cannot know

the real meaning of science and technology. It is quite paradoxical that we cannot

grasp the real significance of that which is very near to us. On the other hand, the

situation of religion is not clear either. The sacred books and doctrine of the

established religions are too difficult for the common people. They feel perplexed

with respect to unfamiliar terms and strange ceremonies, yet people nevertheless

look there for help and salvation. What about the new and newest religions? They

are at the same time magical and occult, sensational and utilitarian. These religions

incorporate something mystical, something demonic even, characteristics that are

unknown to the earlier religions. They have something anarchistic, something

energetically eschatological. The present, then, is an age in which several religious

systems, which are at variance with one another, coexist. It has also been called the

age of 'The Rush Hour of the Gods,' but we do not see these gods. Again, this is

paradoxical. Thus, we find ourselves looking up both to science and religion, but our

eyes are prevented from seeing; while trying to understand, we find ourselves unable

to do so. Nevertheless, we have to make sense of life in modern society.

How, then, shall we see modern society? Very generally, it is a society char-

acterized by a scientific development which is greater than any other development in

earlier periods of history. Stated more concretely, enormous funds have been, and

continue to be used for various scientific research and development, the result of

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

which is rapidly proceeding industrialization, revolutionizing everything from the use

and production of energy, industrial production, the means of communication,

to education, health care, and everyday life itself. This development enabled

unmeasurable benefits in making the conditions of life easier. But on the other hand,

the same development entailed unwanted side effects, to which I shall return later. It

is no small irony that the aim of scientific and technological development is often, not

an aim of satisfying human needs, but rather material gain and not losing in the com-

petition game. The spiritual significance of all this lies in the logic underlying the

scientific and technological development and its high evaluation. This logic is one of

real results, of utilitarianism, and positivism. The core of this logic is what Max

Weber called `Berechenbarkeit,' the quantification of quality. Religion seems to

have been swept away by this all-intruding rationalism, but as has been touched upon

earlier, the force of religion has not been neutralized; its significance is being recogniz-

ed again and again. This trend is a global one. Especial in Japan, which has been

called 'a living museum of religions,' we witness many religions, Shinto, Buddhism,

and Christianity, and many religious groups that derive their origin from these

religions. Still we have to add many others that are unrelated to the established

religions. According to recent statistics, there are 229,548 religious groups in Japan,

183,359 of which are religious juridical persons, having a total of 218,433,832

followers4). The newest religions are said to have more than 6,500,000 believers.

Seen from the preceding considerations, it is no exaggeration to say that the present

period of history is one of coexistence of religion with science and technology.

III. Why the Relationship Should be Questioned

The coexistence of science-technology and religion appears to be an ambiguous

phenomenon. However ambiguous it is, its existence itself is beyond doubt; this

means that there must exist conditions that give rise to it. Which are these condi-

tions? It is relatively easy to describe the existence of science-technology and

religion itself, the conflicts between both or the aspects in which they complement

each other. Again, it is easy to describe the characteristics of both phenomena, and

it is useful to talk about the necessity or the ideal of their coexistence, but it is much

more necessary to grasp the ways of how and why they relate to each other.

First, people who live in a society, which undergoes rapid change, have to reflect

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about how to live. Obviously, this is not a new question. It is a general question that

comes to the fore as something new, when new problems arise. This is the case with

the development of science and technology in our time. As already touched upon

earlier, the recent developments of science and technology have greatly improved the

living conditions in modern society. However, there are also dangers to this develop-

ment; as the saying goes, `Wo viel Licht ist, ist starker Schatten.' The new

technological development has entailed air and water pollution, it is causing acid rain

and damaging the ozone layer of the upper atmosphere; there are other damages to

the environment, accidents in plants of atomic energy, the threat of nuclear arms,

etc. All these facts have caused mistrust for scientific development, and strength-

ened the critique and opposition against it. Also, some people get weary of too many

things and 'gadgets,' of too much money, and of too much information. Mistrust in

this respect induces at least some to look for more spiritual fulfillment and to recon-

sider the meaning of fundamental values. It is only natural that people, who live in

an uncertain and opaque world, look towards the religions, which try to clear up the

modern fog, to overcome uncertainty, and which teach how to live the future.

Secondly, the relationship between science-technology and religion is particularly

modern in that it concerns the beginning and the end of life. In other words, it is

with respect to the problems of life and death that people in modern societies expect

answers from both science and from religion. Several aspects of present health care

and medical treatment were once thought to be mysterious or supernatural, sacred do-

mains which man could not invade. This is different today. As is well known, tech-

niques have been developed to artificially control reproduction (conception in vitro,

transplantation of fertilized eggs, and the like), along with other techniques to

transplant organs and to prolong life in other ways; medical science has progressed to

the point that doctors can pronounce that life has ended, as is the case of brain-

death. All these developments relate directly to human life and its dignity;

therefore, they relate also to religion, which cannot but take them into account. How

are the religions of today going to confront these problems? How are they going to

define life and death? Certainly, these are universal problems, but they are also pro-

blems that originated from science and technology in their relation to present-day

medical treatment. They are problems that cannot find solutions with the interpreta-

tions of life from the past or with explanations of our earlier self-understanding.

How are the religions in this new situation going to find new interpretations or new

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

answers for these problems?

The third problem concerns the fact that the development of science and

technology in connection with biology is transforming the earlier views of life and

death. Molecular biology has greatly advanced ever since the double helix structure

of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) was discovered in 1953. Since then it was known

that all forms of life on earth have this DNA structure and that, therefore, all

phenomena of life are material phenomena. From this it follows that there is no ab-

solute break between life and non-life. Thus, a new view of life was made possible;

life comes into being as a combination of nucleic acids and proteins, elements that by

themselves are lifeless. This was a revolution in the vision of life5). Needless to say,

there have been earlier changes in that respect. For example, there was Descartes

and de la Mettri who argued that the human body, insofar as it resembled the animal

body, was machine-like. Actually, they introduced a separation between body and

spirit, according to which only the body consisted of matter. This view functioned as

an incentive toward to the rise of physics and engineering as the sciences of material

things. Here, we see that this view, too, is closely related to the transformation of

science and technology. The discovery of present molecular biology of the material

nature of life realized the union within science of biology and physics. It strength-

ened the position of technology with respect to the support and control of life.

Here, it is implied that the revolution of the view of life has advanced a solution to

the fundamental and essential problems of what a living cell is like, and what life

itself, its origin and its end are all about. How will modern society confront this

revolution and this new view of life and death? Will it simply be alright to tacitly

acknowledge bio-technology and the new life-science? We can see it as a fact that

many merits will accrue from this scientific development such as new solutions to the

problems of food, of hereditary diseases and thus far incurable diseases; however, it

is necessary to consider at the same time how to confront the negative effects of that

development such as the manipulation of life, the fabrication of human robots, and

the management of society by bio-technocrats. Presently, no one has any practical

ideas or plans. Also, the religions presently have no answers to the new problems

concerning the dignity of man. At best, they are groping about in the dark in order

to discover some light. From all the above, we see how necessary it is to reexamine

the relationship between science-technology and religion, to which I wish to con-

tribute.

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IV. Clarification of Relationships

Let us first review some of the interpretations of the subject, as can be found in

sociological literature. To begin with, August Comte argues that the progress of the

human mind occurred in three stages (loi des trois etats): the theological, the

metaphysical, and the positive stage. Comte highly evaluated the development of

the natural sciences of his day. He thinks that these were far superior to theology

and metaphysics. But Comte's thinking reflects his view of culture and civilization

and his own criteria of what is valuable and what is not. In contrast, Max Scheler

argues that the three kinds of knowledge coexist. Scheler tries to avoid the

absolutist view that positivism was bound to resort to by means of its own self-

interpretation. He adopts a more relative view with respect to the evaluation of

science, explaining it with studies of comparative culture. He not only takes

religion, metaphysics and science into account, but also mythological and mystical

knowledge. He analyzed these systems of knowledge from various points of view

such as that of the carriers of knowledge and the way of acquiring knowledge; he also

traces the relationship to social movements, the effects of the social system, and the

social functions of knowledge. In a word, Scheler explaines the social origin of

knowledge.

Herbert Spencer, in turn, provides an interesting view. He divides the world

into the Knowable and the Unknowable, the former being the object of science and

the latter that of religion. He maintains that human knowledge is always relative and

that it cannot grasp absolute being. He sees science and religion as conflicting and

contradictory systems of thought, but he finds both systems questionable. He states

that science looks for progress in the abstract. The most abstract conception, to

which science is slowly approaching, is one that merges into the inconceivable or un-

thinkable by dropping all concrete elements of thought. Science tries to grasp what

is non-science. Something similar happens in religion. Religion has all along pro-

fessed to have some knowledge of that which transcends knowledge, and has to con-

tradict its own teachings—this is the most serious form of irreligion which religion

has displayed, namely, an imperfect belief in that which it especially professes to

believe. Here, we discover irreligion within religion7). Again, Spencer states that it

is impossible for two absolute and infinite truths to exist at the same time. By

suggesting that science and religion should not overlook each other's assertions, he

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

shows a possibility for reconciling and even uniting both systems of thought.

Still another view is that of Robert K. Merton. As we will see later in more

detail, Merton relates how science-technology had close links with religion in 17th

century England, and by so doing he explains the great strength of religion8). A

somewhat different attitude toward religion can be found in Galilei's and Newton's

conception of natural science. Galilei did not doubt the fundamental principles of

theology, nor did Newton lose his belief in the almighty God when he discovered the

laws of gravity. From these examples we see that there are several points of view

concerning the relationship between science-technology and religion. Some stress

the importance of science, while others point to the strength of religion, and still

others show interest in reconciling both.

In order to realize the difficulties of the problem, let us consider the fundamental

ways in which two entities (A and B) can relate to each other. First, there is the

aspect of the direction of a relationship. Entity A may relate to entity B (a unilateral

relationship) and B may also relate to A at the same time (a bilateral relationship).

To this we can add the aspect of reversibility. A relationship may be either reversi-

ble or irreversible. The second point concerns durability. This is a difficult aspect,

because durability is not univocal; different kinds of time may be involved, such as

physical, biological, psychological, or social time9). The third point concerns the

aspect of change within the relationship. This may be either qualitative or quan-

titative. In other words, the relationship may either extend, shrink, or be in a phase

of standstill. The induced change may be either substantial or superficial. We can

add here that these considerations of change complicate the idea of durability. The

fourth and last point concerns the process of relating. It may be either a process of

adjustment, a movement toward more harmony and cohesion, or a movement toward

antagonism, latent or overt conflict. Here, again, we encounter the problem of rever-

sibility; what first was a development toward more cohesion may change to one of con-

flict, or vice versa. There is still another possibility, that of keeping neutrality

towards each other, but neutrality rather points towards the absence of a relations-

hip. Next, then, let us turn to the discussion of the structure of the relationships.

The relationships between science-technology and religion can be seen as

relationships between cultural entities that are products of human action. As men-

tioned earlier, in proto-culture the various systems of culture did not yet different-

iate. Its history shows how these systems were interrelated and how they differ-

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entiated. In the following I wish to consider the relationship between science-

technology and religion in terms of mutual influence or power. This is important and

valid, since both are systems of knowledge that are products of human intellectual

activity. This conception of knowledge, under its aspect of power, can be found in

Bacon and Talcott Parsons. To quote the latter: 'Influence may be thought of as a

medium that links the power aspect of social control with the structure of norms in

societyw. Therefore, a relationship between systems of knowledge can be con-

ceived of as a dynamic process of power relationships or as the situation that results

from such a relationship.

In this respect, then, three different situations can be envisioned in the rela-

tionship between science-technology and religion. One, the situation in which a

power relationship is not yet established; two, the situation in which the power of

both is neutral; and three, the situation of dynamic relationships. Let us consider

these three cases. The first case, characterized by the absence of relationship, seems

to be theoretically contradictory at first sight, but the fact that later differentiation

starts here is important. As touched upon earlier, in the early stages of proto-

culture, what exists is an amalgam of culture wherein various systems of culture are

contained in undifferentiated form. Here we notice the common matrix of culture.

Then, in the second case, that of neutral relationships, three similar situations are

possible: a) the situation in which mutual influence cannot be ascertained; b) the situa-

tion of a mutually balanced relationship; and c) the situation in which mutual relation-

ships neutralize each other. Finally, in the third case, that of dynamic, mutual rela-

tionships, four different situations may arise as is shown in Fig. 1.

science-technology

religionstrong weak

strong I II

weak III IV

Fig. 1. Relationships of mutual influence between science-technology and religion

Cell I is the case in which both entities are strong in influence. They may be in a

situation of either a) peaceful coexistence, competition, cooperation, or affiliation, or

b) mutual opposition, confrontation, hostility, or open conflict. These situations, of

course, are often partial. Next, cell II represents the case in which the influence of

science and technology is weaker than that of religion. It is the case in which science

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

and technology did not yet emerge or did not yet emerge fully. The supremacy of

theology versus science in Europe during the Middle Ages is a case in point. Fur-

ther, cell III represents the opposite case in which science and technology are domi-

nant. The reason for this situation may be found in the initial weakness of religion or

in its relative weakened situation due to the development of science and technology.

To a certain extent, the latter is the case in the present period of modernization in

which science and technology appear to suppress religion. Finally, cell IV is the case

in which both entities are weak. This resembles our case of neutral relationships,

but the basic difference is that, here, they exert at least some weak but overt in-

fluence on each other. Thus, cell IV is the opposite of cell I. The former is impor-

tant in that its situation may change to the situations that are represented by the other

cells.

Thus, after having pointed out the formal relationships between science-

technology and religion and the patterns of change, we now turn to the investigation

of the importance of mutual influence. How can mutual influence be understood?

The influence in question can be grasped when we know, for example, how many

people are engaged in scientific research, how much funds are used, and how much

results have been gained. Similarly, we can comprehend the strength of religion

when we know the numbers of priests, faithful, temples or churches. However, this

method is of very limited use, since numbers do not express mutual influence. This

can be better grasped through evaluation, that is, through evaluation by persons con-

cerned and through in-depth evaluation.

As for the former evaluation, we could consider the evaluation by professionals

and persons of the general public. First, professionals in both science-technology

and religion would be inclined to stress the supremacy of the domain they belong to,

entailing non-objective evaluation. Second, non-professionals are usually unable to

provide valid evaluation. Again, it would not be very meaningful if specialists of one

field were to pronounce judgment on the field they are not fully familiar with. Fur-

ther, the existence of a particular public opinion and certain social trends could be con-

sidered as an evaluation concerning the situation of science and religion.

Before preceeding, a word is in order about the meaning of evaluation itself. We

have to see that this problem can be discussed only in the case one believes that objec-

tive and universal evaluations are possible and are called for. This is not so sure.

Further, if evaluations are possible, they are possible from different points of view.

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The fact that certain social situations enable or stimulate particular evaluations is

significant in itself. This means that we need in-depth evaluations with respect to

the circumstances that affect the evaluation.

Concerning the evaluation of science-technology and religion four different pat-

terns can be envisioned. 1) A positive evaluation of science-technology; 2) a negative

evaluation of science-technology; 3) a positive evaluation of religion; and 4) a negative

evaluation of religion. A fifth one could be added, that is, withholding evaluation of

both phenomena, but it will suffice to consider the former four in combination, which

gives us the following patterns: A) A positive evaluation of both science-technology and religion (1+ 3); B) a positive evaluation of religion and a negative evaluation of

science (2 + 3); C) a positive evaluation of science and a negative evaluation of religion

(1+ 4); and D) a negative evaluation of both phenomena (2 + 4). These four patterns of evaluation correspond closely with the four phases of influence discussed earlier.

The former underlie the latter.

Let us describe the patterns of evaluation concretely. Pattern A represents the

case in which the function and significance of science-technology and religion is

recognized separately. They are either positively evaluated, or they coexist har-

moniously. Pattern B is the case in which science-technology is not positively

evaluated. Its influence or the results that are yielded are not esteemed but rather

criticized; the development of science is negatively evaluated. But their negative

image is overcome by religion. This is the case when an anti-science stance is taken

and when salvation is sought in religion. Pattern C is the opposite of pattern B.

Science-technology is being evaluated positively, but religion is not. A negative

image is attributed to religion and its influence is being criticized. The anti-scientific

attitude in pattern B corresponds to the anti-religious attitude in pattern C. This

latter attitude is taken on as a defense against possible dangers from religion. The

anti-religious attitude means, reversily, that science itself is treated with great

optimism and confidence. One can imagine that an affluent and easy life based on

rational values such as practicality and efficiency does not necessitate salvation from

spiritual or mental uncertainty. Lastly, pattern D is the case in which neither

science-technology nor religion are positively evaluated, or when both are treated

with suspicion and become an object of criticism. In pattern D, it is also possible that

other systems of culture are positively evaluated or sought after.

Another consideration concerns the fact that evaluation is subject to social

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

change and that the four patterns of evaluation may change in relation with one

another. Mainly, there are two different situations. One, in which there is change

from a virtual unconscious evaluation of science and religion to one in which the rela-

tionship is consciously evaluated; and two, the case in which the evaluation of both

phenomena themselves changes (change within the patterns). The first case con-

cerns the period in history in which science-technology and religion were not yet

differentated, which changed to a period of differentiation; it may also concern a

period in which they were differentiated and in which change occurred from a situa-

tion of absence of evaluation to one of evaluation. As for the factors that bring about

change, they differ over time and according to the social situation. Generally stated,

the influence exercised by science-technology and religion becomes conscious, and

the conditions that make it necessary to be conscious of influence come into being.

Also, the development of science-technology and religion itself contribute to the new

consciousness and the new attitudes. The second case in which there are subsequent

interrelationships among the four patterns of evaluation can be further developed

along similar lines, but for present purposes, it is not necessary to do so.

How, then, can we interpret sociologically the relationship between science-

technology and religion in the light of the foregoing discussion? One way of inter-

pretation is considering the phenomena in question as human action. Generally, we

can say that science is action directed towards the understanding of man and things , while technology is action through which things are made, transported, accumulated,

consumed or put into disuse. In the above, science and technology are considered in

combination, but they are quite different as action, as is very clear from their

history. Religion, too, is action constituted by expressions of reverence, fear, love,

and trust towards the supernatural. This action concerns the attribution of meaning

to the sacred and the attitudes towards it that are expressed in the form of prayers, in

other ritual, and even in possession by spirits.

When considering science-technology and religion as action, we can say that the

former orients man to empirical and cognitive values, while the latter orients him

towards non-empirical and evaluative values. But as for the orientation people

actually tend to take, this depends also on the situation they are in (e.g., the occupa-

tion they are engaged in); moreover, it depends on the situation of society at large, its

processes of modernization, its degree of industrialization and urbanization as well as

the process of secularization, which is a function of the former phenomena. To some

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a

people it will not be contradictory to have access to activity related to both science-

technology and religion; to other people it may be ambivalent. In other words, scien-

tific and religious values may be adhered to by the same person, for example, as is the

case of a scientist, who acts scientifically in his profession, attributing real value to

that kind of behavior, but who may be a believer of a religion at the same time taking

part in religious activities, praying devotedly, and so on. The coexistence of these

two different kinds of values within individual behavior as well as the differing rela-

tionship of these values (weak-strong) can be understood in function of the environ-

ment, as touched upon in the foregoing, but it is important to stress here that the

relationship between science-technology and religion can be grasped at best within

action.

A necessary step in our present discussion is the consideration of the various con-

ditions that are responsible for making one kind of action dominant. There are three

kinds of conditions pertaining to the individual, group life and to society as a whole.

First, the conditions that pertain directly to the individual himself include his per-

sonality, his experiences, education, occupation, and his social relations. For exam-

ple, there are people who like physics but dislike mathematics. It is questionable

whether people are born with an inclination towards the analogical thinking of

literature or with a slant toward digital thinking as in physics. Also, classifying such

behavior is difficult, but it is a fact that individuals develop different types of attitudes

that show in their behavior. Secondly, group or organizational conditions are those

that pertain to the family, schools, the work place, and the like. When the family

of orientation is religious, the attitudes of individuals belonging to that type of

family mostly tend to be religious, but we cannot exclude the opposite case.

Higher education is not necessarily a factor in losing one's faith or becoming anti-

religious12). When individuals or families belong to a religious organization, which is

critical of science, the influence of that religion tends to be more pronounced, as is

illustrated by the sanctions of the Inquisition against Giordano Bruno, Galilei and the

persecution of witches. Even today, there are religious groups that refuse blood-

transfusion. Thirdly, there are the conditions that pertain to society as a whole, the

state, a people or race, and the international society. Here, we find problems with

respect to the degree of interest in science and technology, which differ, e.g., in

highly advanced countries and less developed ones. At the same level, we also find

problems that derive from prohibiting religion or from adopting and imposing a

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

particular religion on the people.

There are still many other problems that may manifest themselves at the level of

society as a whole. These concern the relationships of politics and economics with

science-technology and religion. In Weber's terminology, economics and science-

technology concern everyday life, while politics and religion do not concern everyday

life12). We could discuss the phenomena with respect to the category they belong; in

addition, we could discuss the relationships of the phenomena that do not belong in

the same category such as the economy and religion on the one hand and politics and

religion on the other; both these relationships may be either in harmony or in conflict

with each other.

Lastly, I will give some examples of sociological problems from the history of

science-technology and religion, together with some examples that illustrate the

characteristics of the cases mentioned. From a bird's eye view of the history of

mankind, we see that in every period, from ancient time to the present, there have

been situations of coexistence, of mutual cooperation, and of conflict between scien-

tific, technological, and religious matters, even when these were still largely un-

differentiated. For example, in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Japan

there were people who specialized in curing illnessess by religious or magic means.

During the Middle Ages religion usually is thought to be strong and conservative, but

as the historian of technology R. J. Forbes notes, it was Christianity that abolished

the slave system and that stimulated the development of machinery and the use of

inorganic energy. Also, A. de Candoll notes that the Academy of Sciences of Paris in

the same period nominated 92 foreigners as its members, of whom 72 were protes-

tant, 16 catholic, and five others, who were either Jewish or did not have any religious

conviction13). Robert M. Merton also elaborated this case. He maintained that

Puritanism was greatly instrumental in the rise of modern rationalism and the

development of science. For example, he states that 'the chief motive forces of the

new science for the members of the Royal Society of London were the comfort of

Mankind and the Glory of the Great Author of Nature'14). Even for Galilei, Newton,

and Descartes in the 17th century, nature, as the object of science, was not nature as

it is scientifically thought of today but rather nature as the handicraft of God. They,

therefore, viewed natural science in relation to theology. This kind of thinking

changed in the 18th century with the advent of the period of enlightenment. Natural

science comes to be conceived of as a means to dominate nature. Bacon's theory that

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knowledge is power gains credit and becomes all-pervasive. This is the secular

revolution. Secularization was firmly on its way ever since the forces of industriali-

zation were set in motion and greatly increased in strength during the 20th century.

The domain of the sacred had to retreat to marginal areas. To quote Peter Berger's

definition of secularization: 'By- secularization we mean the process by which sectors

of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and

symbols'15). Berger finds the core of secularization in the economic sphere, in the

mechanism of capitalism. This, indeed, appears to be the general view of seculariza-

tion, but does this mean that this phenomenon did not occur in places or countries

where capitalism did not develop? In a certain sense, religion always confronts the

forces of secularization, and the history of religion is the history of fight against

secularization whthin religion itself. Therefore, the concept of secularization has to

be clarified from within and from without religion.

Concluding Note

To return to the relationship between science-technology and religion, the plight

of religion is related to the process of institutionalization of science. That science

has been institutionalized means that scientific research has become socially and offi-

cially recognized. Concretely, it means that scientific research has become a profes-

sion, which, in turn, means that scientific development has reached high levels. This

is very clear from the systematization of knowledge, the liberalization of scientific

reporting, the establishment of institutes for the education of researchers and various

specialists, the establishment of the community of scientific researchers, and so on.

In earlier periods of history we can observe the professionalization of technology, but

engineering as a profession and the systematization of knowledge are relatively new

phenomena. In contrast, the institutionalization of religion occurred quite early in

history. This happened because there was an earlier need for it, and because earlier

societies had different systems for evaluating and sanctioning social institutions.

However, once institutionalized, there is no reason why a particular institution should

remain unchangeable. As a matter of fact, many institutions tend to become a goal in

themselves and to subsist as incarnations of tradition. As a consequence, they lose

vitality and their functions tend to become formal and fixed. Then, is it not

necessary, as the saying goes, to put new wine in new skins? Should institutions not

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The Relationship between Science-Technology and Religion

fit the times and the social situation they are embedded in and velate to?

The present period of history precisely appears to be a time to reconsider science-

technology and religion. The institutionalization of science is a much more recent

event than that of religion. As for science and technology, we witness two contradic-

tory trends. One is evident from destruction of the environment and the manipula-

tion of the phenomena of life; science and technology are becoming self-aggrandizing

and self-generating mechanisms, transcending the limits of their insitutionalization.

This entails what William F. Ogburn called a cultural lag, a lack of adjustment be-

tween systems of culture16). As a result, the significance of science and technology

are being questioned today. This is the other trend. Doubts are being expressed

concerning the possibilities of scientific consciousness and the view of man in service

of technology; criticism is directed against Cartesian mechanistic methodology and

its reductionism of the whole to its elements. These contradictory trends suggest

that it becomes necessary to prevent the dislocation and disruption of science-

technology and other systems of culture. As for the institutionalization of religion,

though evidently many problems derive from its long history, its relation to science-

technology must be positively reconsidered from the point of view of religion itself

and concrete plans for the implementation of these reconsiderations must be put

forward. The ultimate reason for this is the relation to the most crucial problem of

man in modern society, that of life and death.

Notes

1) See Shigefumi Kurahashi "Ein Einleitung in die Sociologie des Lebens and des Todes," Bulletin of Sociological Studies, No. 11, March, 1990, Bukkyo Daigaku, and "An Esay on the Sociology of Health

and Medicine," The Annals of the Nara Medical Association, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990. 2) See L. D. Holmes, Anthropology, The Ronald Press, 1990, pp. 57-90.

3) Ryuichi Izumi, `Bunka no jinruigakuteki sokumen no tenkai' (The development of anthropological aspects of culture). Shis6, No. 488, p. 143.

4) See Bunkacho, Nenkan, 1988.

5) See Mitsubishi kasei seimei kagaku kenkyusho, `Gijutsu kara no seitai hyoka' (Evaluation of forms of life from technology), Series of Life Sciences, No. 3, 1971.

6) I have elaborated this point in my book Kagaku Shakaigaku (Sociology of Science), KW shobo, 1983, Ch. II.

7) See H. Spencer, First Principles (A System of Synthetic Philosophy, Vol. 1) Insbrueck: Otto Zeller, 1966, pp. 74-77.

8) See R. K. Merton, Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England, Harper Torch Books, 1970, Ch. IV ansd V. As for Merton's thesis, several opinions have been brought forward in

favor of it as well as against it. Concerning these opinions, see Kurahashi, 1983, op. cit. pp. 65-67.

9) P. A. Sorokin, Socio-cultural Causality, Space, Time, Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 215.

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10)

11) 12) 13)

14) 15)

16)

T. Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, The Free Press, p. 284.

See F. Baali & C. D. Bryant (Eds.), Introductory Sociology, Rand Mcnally, 1970, pp. 253-277. M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriff, S. 29 (Wirtshaft and Gesellschaft) A. de Candolle, Histoire des sciences des savants, Geneve-Basel, 1885, p. 329.

See R. K. Merton, op. cit. , Ch. V. P. L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, Anchor Books, 1969, p. 107.

See W. F. Ogburn, Social Change, Gloucester, Mass, Peter Smith 1960, pp. 200-201.

Bibliography

Argyle M., Religious Behavior, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. Barnes J. A., Who should Know What? Cambridge University Press, 1979. Dobraszczyc U., Sickness, Health, and Medicine, Longman, 1989.

Jackson M. J., The Sociology of Religion, B. T. Batsford, 1974. Lumningham S., Burlyey (eds.), Readings in Medical Sociology, Tavistock-Routledge, 1990. Mulkay M., Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, George Allen & Unwin, 1979.

Newton-Smith W. H., The Rationality of Science, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Towler R., Homo Religiosus, Constable, 1974.

Woolgar S., Science: The Very Idea, Tavistock Publications, 1988.

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