2015 03-03 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT

March 3, 2015

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Former Yemeni President Hadi is attempting to establish a rival government in Aden.2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December

call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations.3. Violent clashes erupt between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a militias.

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ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its

followers in the West. Al Shabaab recently called for supporters to target shopping centers in the West, copying its 2013

Westgate Mall attack in Kenya. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct resources to the

Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations.

Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making

of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes

in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and Pakistani airstrikes target

TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border

Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan

border. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks,

possibly in conjunction with TTP.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalPresident Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who resigned as Yemen’s President on January 22, appears to be forming a rival

government in Aden. Hadi escaped from house arrest in Sana’a and fled to Aden on February 21. In the week since, he has

met with both international and local Yemeni leaders. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE all reopened embassies to Yemen in

Aden, indicating their support for Hadi. The al Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Council rejected Hadi’s authority as president and

issued a statement accusing Hadi and all those who cooperate with him of treason.

Outlook: Hadi’s escape to Aden and subsequent establishment of a secondary government in Yemen greatly divides Yemen

politically. UN-led negotiations between the al Houthis and other Yemeni political groups will likely cease, as demands to move

talks outside of Sana’a are unilaterally rejected by the al Houthi movement and the General People’s Congress.

SecurityAl Houthi militants seized Special Security Force (SSF) camps in Sana’a and al Hudaydah governorates on February 25.

Forces loyal to Hadi expelled SSF troops from Aden city on February 24. Ansar al Sharia carried out attacks on security forces

in Lahij and Hadramawt throughout the week.

Outlook: AQAP’s insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, will likely take advantage of the political unrest and anti-al Houthi sentiments

to build local support in southern and eastern governorates.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)Ansar al Sharia held a forum in Bayhan, Shabwah on February 24, reportedly attended by hundreds of Yemeni citizens. Ansar

al Sharia posted videos and pictures of the event on Twitter, which featured lectures on Islamic law and tried to raise local

Sunni support for AQAP in their fight against the al Houthis and the U.S.

Outlook: AQAP is beginning to openly interact with the Yemeni population on a larger scale. Openly hosting this event in

Bayhan strongly indicates that there is a level of cooperation between AQAP and some tribes in Shabwah.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 24-25 FEB: Al Houthi militants seized a Special Forces camp in al Sabahah, Sana’a.2) 24 FEB: Forces loyal to former President Hadiexpelled Special Forces troops from Aden city, Aden. 3) 26 FEB: Ansar al Sharia militants attacked a military patrol in al Hawtacity, Lahij.4) 23 FEB: Ansar al Sharia militants detonate an IED in al Qatan, Hadramawt.

*This slide has been corrected to state that Special Forces, not Special Security Forces were expelled from Aden on February 24.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalPresident Barack Obama nominated Katherine Simonds Dhanani on February 24 to be the first U.S. Ambassador to Somalia since its collapse in 1991 as a form of U.S. support for the country. Separately, the UN Security Council acted to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces for one year.

Outlook: The appointment of an ambassador to Somalia signals the U.S. will continue to support the Somali Federal Government and its campaign against al Shabaab. The extension of AMISOM’s mandate will allow its forces to continue to play an important role in the campaign against al Shabaab.

Security Tensions remain high in Guriel, Galgadud region after a February 24 clash between Somali government forces and Ahlu Sunna

wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias. There have been multiple calls for mediation from both domestic and international actors. While

there have been reports that both sides are willing to enter into mediation, no new agreement has yet been reached.

Outlook: The collapse of the previous ceasefire in Guriel threatens the fight against al Shabaab as Somali forces may be

drawn into a prolonged conflict with ASWJ militias.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab released a video on February 21 discussing the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack and ending with a call for similar attacks on malls in Western countries. Separately, al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a mortar attack on the SomalianPresidential Palace in Mogadishu on February 26.

Outlook: Al Shabaab likely does not have the capabilities to carry out an attack outside of the Horn of Africa region. The call for attacks in the video was likely an attempt to generate publicity and attract recruits to the group. Al Shabaab also continues to demonstrate an ability to operate in Mogadishu with relatively little interference from security forces.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:1) 24 FEB: Somali government forces and ASWJ broke a ceasefire in Guriel, Galgudud region.2) 22, 23 FEB: Puntland Security forces clashed with al Shabaab militants in the Galgala Mountains, Sanaagregion. 3) 24 FEB: Suspected al Shabaab militants carried out IED attack in Mogadishu.4) 26 FEB: Al Shabaab carried out mortar attack on Somali Presidential Palace in Mogadishu.

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ASSESSMENT:

AQIMAlgeria continued its counter-smuggling operations against AQIM near Algeria’s southern border. Algeria reportedly arrested some 300 smugglers in January and February of 2015.

Outlook: Unrest in Libya will continue to contribute to AQIM’s overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel. AQIM may seek to support Ansar al Din and associated movements in Mali and will likely continue its relationships with Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia.

Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)Tunisian security forces arrested 21 militants linked to the Ubqa ibn Nafaa Brigade during multiple security operations in the Kasserine region, near the Algerian border. Some of the militants are allegedly linked to the February 17 attack that killed four National Guard members in the Kasserine region. In Libya, Ansar al Sharia and allied militants continued to lose ground to Libyan military and Operation Dignity forces in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia, meanwhile, withdrew from the Shura Council of Derna, an umbrella Islamist group, over a dispute with the Abu Salim Martyrs' Brigade.

Outlook: Militant activity targeting Tunisian security forces and retaliatory counter-terrorism operations will likely increase, particularly in the Kasserine region. Unrest in Libya will continue to fuel unrest throughout North Africa and the Sahel.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)The Malian government signed a ceasefire agreement with six armed groups, agreeing to immediately halt hostilities on the ground. Despite the signing of the ceasefire agreement, violence has continued to plague northern Mali, most notably with pro-government GATIA forces seizing three towns in the Kidal region. The Coordination of the Movements of Azawad (CMA), a branch of the MNLA, threatened to respond to GATIA forces with violence if the situation continued to deteriorate. Moreover, Iyad ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar al Din, has been suspected of influencing the current peace talks in Algiers.

Outlook: It is likely that the inter-Malian peace talks will be negatively affected by the violence that continues to persist in northern Mali. Now that a ceasefire has been signed, the peace talks will turn towards difficult questions regarding identity and autonomy, which is likely to result in deadlock. Western governments will continue to push for peace, fearing that Islamist militants will capitalize on northern Mali’s chaos.

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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA


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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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1) 23-27 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrested 21 militants linked to Ubqa Ibn NafaaBrigade. 2) 24 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrested four militants in possession of explosives and a picture of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in the Nabeul region. 3) 25-27 FEB: Libyan military forces advanced against Ansar al Sharia and allied militants in central Benghazi.


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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 23 FEB: Pro-government GATIA forces seized three towns in the Kidal region. 2) 24 FEB: A landmine detonated beneath a vehicle escorting a MINUSMA convoy, injuring one French solider.

ASSESSMENT:

Military and Security

The IRGC’s Great Prophet 9 military exercises included speedboat maneuverers against a mock U.S. carrier on day one, defensive

operations employing mobility and counter-mobility movements on day two, and a combined air-naval-ground exercise on day three. The

IRGC tested its latest cruise missiles, sea mines, drones, helicopters, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, which reinforced the

Supreme Leader’s recent call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations.

Outlook: The operational framework of the IRGC military exercises suggest that they were aimed at deterring a potential attack, while

serving as a stark reminder that the regime continues to see the US as a threat to its security.

Domestic Politics

President Hassan Rouhani met with several scholars, clerics, and scientists during his visit to Qom last week, including Grand Ayatollah

Naser Makarem Shirazi. Rouhani emphasized that his stance on the nuclear negotiations was “to take the weapons of sanctions away

from the enemy,” and to continue negotiations so that Iran “will not miss the path of its scientific development.” Several leading clerics

responded positively to Rouhani’s visit; Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Hojjat al-Eslam Kazem Sadeghi thanked Rouhani for his

promising position on the nuclear issue. Rouhani’s trip represents his concerted effort to gain political support for the nuclear talks among

scholars and clerics, ahead of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s meeting with Iran’s Assembly of Experts next week.

Outlook: President Rouhani and his administration will work to gain further support for the nuclear talks as the March 31 P5+1 deadline to

reach a political framework for a deal looms.

Nuclear Talks

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry attended bilateral U.S.-Iran talks in Geneva last week..

Another round of P5+1 negotiations is scheduled for March 5 in Montreaux, Switzerland. Administration officials continued to push for

complete removal of sanctions as a necessary requirement for reaching a final nuclear deal.

Outlook: Iran will continue to push hard for complete removal of sanctions as a criterion of a nuclear deal.

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IRAN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

1221 FEB – 27 FEB 2015

22 FEB: Tehran condemned an ISIS attack in front of the Iranian Ambassador’s residence in Tripoli, Libya.

22 FEB: First day of U.S.-Iran bilateral nuclear talks held in Geneva..

23 FEB: International and Legal Affairs Deputy to the Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran would

leave the P5+1 negotiations if talks undermined national interests.

23 FEB: Moscow offered Tehran Antey-2500 air defense missile systems in lieu of older S-300s.

23 FEB: Artesh Air Force announced that it plans to install advanced radars in the F-14 fighter jet.

24 FEB: The IRGC announces that its Cyber Defense Command will undergo restructuring, including a

change of command.

24 FEB: Parliament approved a bill allocating $1.2 billion for defense funding.

25 FEB: The first day of the three-day IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises were conducted in the

Persian Gulf. The drills incorporated naval and air force units that simulated an attack against a replica

U.S. carrier.

27 FEB: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned the Southern Movement against plots to

disintegrate Yemen.

27 FEB: The IRGC tested a “new strategic” naval weapon on the final day of the Great Prophet 9 exercises.

27 FEB: A two-day Bushehr nuclear site emergency preparedness drill commenced.

27 FEB: The 33rd Artesh Navy Fleet docked in Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta.

ACRONYMS

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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State (IS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6570

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran [email protected](202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,visit www.criticalthreats.org.

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2015 03-03 CTP Update and Assessment