AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

January 10, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the U.S. and reiterated his rejection of ISIS’s ideology.

2. Saudi-led coalition-backed Yemeni forces began an offensive to capture key sites in Taiz and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces.

3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda central leadership continues to prioritize targeting the U.S. and its allies. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri identified conducting jihad against the U.S. and its allies as al Qaeda’s “top priority” on January 5 in his first speech since September 2016. Zawahiri argued that targeting the U.S. is practical because the U.S. is the present-day manifestation of evil. Al Qaeda leadership seeks to frame the organization as a more moderate alternative to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) while maintaining its role as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. Zawahiri rebuked ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and reiterated his denial of accusations levied against al Qaeda by ISIS. Zawahiri also emphasized the need for Muslims to join together against a “Zionist, Crusader, secular, Safavid [Iranian], Chinese, and Hindu” conspiracy, highlighting al Qaeda’s global aims and unifying mission. Al Qaeda rhetoric prior to Zawahiri’s speech focused on using the fall of Aleppo, Syria, as a global call for Muslims to join jihad.

The U.S. Department of State designated Hamza bin Laden, son of deceased al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The younger bin Laden advocated for lone-wolf attacks targeting the West in May 2016 and called for Muslims to travel to Yemen to fight with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against the Saudi-led coalition in August 2016.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will not attempt a directed attack against the U.S. homeland in the near term, but will instead target American interests abroad and continue to infiltrate local conflicts throughout the Muslim world in order to develop a strong Salafi-jihadi base.

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GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

PoliticalRussia is seeking to increase its influence in Yemen. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s Foreign Minister announced that 200 billion Russian-printed Yemeni riyals arrived in Aden on January 6. The Hadi government will use the money to pay government salaries in an attempt to quell anti-government sentiment in southern Yemen. Emirati involvement in southern Yemen’s security sparked backlash in Hadramawt governorate. Civilians protested Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces’ alleged arbitrary detention of Hadhrami men at al Mukalla airport on January 9.

Outlook: Russia will attempt to leverage its assistance to the Hadi government to expand its role in the peace process.

SecurityHadi government forces launched “Operation Golden Spear,” an operation to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The forces receive support from the Saudi-led coalition. They are gaining momentum after success in Dhubab district and now intend to extend the offensive to Mokha city and al Wazi’iyah district. The offensive is likely intended to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait, increase military pressure on the al Houthi-Saleh faction, and change the terms of the political process in Yemen.

Outlook: Hadi government forces will consolidate gains in southern Taiz governorate but will face strong resistance at Mokha and Taiz city.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP operations are rolling back gains made by security forces in southern Yemen in mid-2016. AQAP militants repelled Emirati-backed al Hizam security forces attempting to secure Shaqra area, a strategic crossroads in southern Abyan governorate. Al Hizam security forces withdrew from several checkpoints in Abyan, citing insufficient resources due to a high rate of AQAP attacks.

Outlook: Counter-AQAP operations will not advance while Yemeni actors prioritize resources for the Yemeni civil war.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 04 JAN: AQAP militants ambushed al Hizam forces in Shaqra, Abyan.2) 05 JAN: Al Hizam forces interdicted ISIS militants entering Aden city.3) 05 JAN: AQAP militants attacked an al Houthi-Saleh training camp in central al Bayda.4) 05 JAN: Al Houthi-Saleh missiles targeted Hadi government forces near the Bab al Mandeb strait. 5) 09 JAN: Hadi government forces began Operation Golden Spear in Taiz. 2

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PoliticalThe semi-autonomous region of Puntland and Galmudug State signed a fragile ceasefire agreement that is unlikely to hold in the long term. The agreement strives to end violence stemming from contested control over Galkayo city in Mudug region, which is divided between the northern Puntland zone and southern Galmudug zone. Al Shabaab has capitalized on the conflict by conducting attacks in Galkayo and expanding operational capabilities into Puntland. The Galmudug regional parliament impeached Galmudug Administration President Abdikarim Hussein Guled on January 10, exacerbating tensions.

Outlook: The ceasefire will likely collapse in Galkayo in the coming months.

Security African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and Somali security forces are failing to consolidate gains in southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM troops and Jubbaland troops captured two villages from al Shabaab near Kismayo in Lower Jubba region on January 7. AMISOM and Jubbaland forces withdrew the next day, however. Al Shabaab then returned to the towns. The U.S. conducted an airstrike to defend AMISOM and Somali forces from an al Shabaab attack.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will exploit AMISOM’s tactical weaknesses to maintain territorial control in the Lower Jubba region.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is maintaining a high operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to undermine the Somali federal government, Somali security forces, and international actors. Al Shabaab detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) inside a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) compound on January 4. Al Shabaab militants also attacked a government militia barracks in the Almada area on the outskirts of Mogadishu on January 6. Al Shabaab’s spokesman emphasized the tactical value of targeting hotels in the Waberi district in Mogadishu, which is frequented by Somali government and military officials.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will escalate targeted attacks on international organizations and military installations in Mogadishu.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 04 JAN: Al Shabaab detonated a VBIED at a UNDP compound in Mogadishu.2) 07 JAN: Somali Special Forces arrested a senior al Shabaab commander in Wanlaweyn, Lower Shabelle region.3) 07 JAN: A U.S. airstrike targeted al Shabaab militants in Lower Jubba region.4) 07 JAN: Alleged pro-ISIS militants conducted a grenade attack in Mogadishu.5) 08 JAN: Al Shabaab recaptured two towns in Lower Jubba region.

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PoliticalInternal divisions are weakening the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). GNA PM Fayez al Serraj is losing political capital as other GNA members resign or blatantly disregard his authority. Tunisia- and Algeria-led peace efforts aim to reconcile the GNA and the rival House of Representatives (HoR) by amending the Libyan Political Agreement. The HoR, supported by Libyan National Army (LNA) strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, continues to resist amendment efforts. The HoR has turned to Russia instead for support.

Outlook: Regional and international actors will push for a revised peace process that empowers Field Marshal Haftar.

SecurityRising tensions between Libya’s most powerful armed actors, the LNA and the Misratan militias, are diverting security resources away from counterterrorism operations. Misratan militias, including some units that fought ISIS with U.S. support, are aligning with al Qaeda-linked groups against the LNA in central Libya. Misratan forces have also complained of inadequate support from the GNA, the current U.S. counterterrorism partner in Libya. The LNA declared a no-fly zone in the contested region between Sirte, Sebha, and Brega cities in central Libya.

Outlook: The LNA and Misratan forces may escalate from airstrikes to direct clashes over strategic sites in central Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaSalafi-jihadi militants are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict to reset conditions in Libya. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi on January 6 after clashes with the LNA. ISIS militants from Benghazi may be moving toward western Libya, where ISIS is massing forces in preparation for future operations. Islamist coalitions with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia reaffirmed their support for Libyan Grand Mufti Sadiq al Ghariani, likely indicating preparation for coordinated efforts against the LNA.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks in population centers or raids on oil or water infrastructure to disrupt security.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 04 JAN: LNA airstrikes struck an airbase occupied by Misratan forces in Hun, al Jufra. 2) 04 JAN: LNA airstrikes targeted militants in al Zahir al Hamr, Derna district.3) 05 JAN: Suspected ISIS militants attacked a water infrastructure site in Souf al Jin.4) 05 JAN: ISIS militants escaped besieged areas in Benghazi and attacked LNA reinforcements in Saunnu.5) 06 JAN: The LNA seized ISIS vehicles near Ajdabiya.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebReturning foreign fighters from Libya, Iraq, and Syria may threaten stability in the Maghreb. Protesters demonstrated against the return of Tunisian militants on January 8. Tunisia’s president said in late 2016 that the government cannot ban returning Tunisian foreign fighters from the country, sparking a month of protests in the capital. Algeria declared a state of emergency near the Tunisian border on January 6, citing the risk of Tunisia-based militants infiltrating domestic protests.

Outlook: Returning foreign fighters will strengthen existing Salafi-jihadi networks in the Maghreb.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)Abu Walid al Sahrawi, a former AQIM militant leader who pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, may have renounced his pledge. If confirmed, al Sahrawi’s turn would reinforce AQIM’s position as the dominant militant group in West Africa.

Peace accords remain intact in Gao city, central Mali. Local militias and the Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg separatist group, reached an agreement to allow the CMA to re-enter the city following a standoff. Gao remains a vulnerable target for Salafi-jihadi militants. Gunmen shot and killed an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) work in Gao on January 4, less than two weeks after suspected Salafi-jihadi militants kidnapped a French aid worker in the city.

The two main Boko Haram factions are pursuing different strategies to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic state in northeastern Nigeria. Abu Bakr Shekau’s Boko Haram faction seeks to discredit the Nigerian government’s ability to protect its citizens by targeting civilians in population centers with female suicide bombers. The ISIS-recognized faction led by Abu Musab Barnawi prioritizes attacking the Nigerian state directly. It conducts small-arms attacks targeting Nigerian troops in remote military outposts and may be conducting an assassination campaign against Nigerian Army officers.

Outlook: Joint patrols will resume in Gao, but tensions will remain high. Shekau’s faction will prioritize explosive attacks in northern Nigerian population centers, while Barnawi’s faction will attack military targets near Lake Chad.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 03 JAN: Tunisian security forces arrested 13 people linked to the Uqba ibn Nafa’a Brigade in Hergla, Sousse governorate, Tunisia. 2) 04 JAN: Moroccan police dispersed an anti-police sit-in in al Hoceima, Morocco.3) 06 JAN: Algeria declared a state of emergency in the al Maa al Abyad and al Koweef districts, Tebessa governorate. 4) 08 JAN: Demonstrators protested against the return of Tunisian foreign fighters in Tunis.

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1) 04 JAN: Militants shot and killed an ICRC worker in Gao city, Mali. 2) 06 JAN: Gunmen attacked a checkpoint in Ansongo, Gao region, Mali. 3) 07 JAN: Boko Haram conducted a multi-pronged attack targeting several neighborhoods in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.4) 08 JAN: Boko Haram militants killed a Nigerian military officer in a raid on a base near Buni Yadi, Yobe State, Nigeria.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569