AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT June 14, 2016

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

2

2

3

1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri pledged allegiance (bayat) to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada.

2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges.

3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen despite recent counterterrorism operations.

1

ASSESSMENT:

al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21, 2016, in a 14-minute message released by al Qaeda’s media arm, al Sahab. The statement followed the same template Zawahiri used to pledge bayat to Mullah Mansour in August 2015, but added a call for the Afghan Taliban to fight against the “global aggression” that seeks to eradicate Islam. Zawahiri also implicitly criticized the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by emphasizing the “prophetic method” as the proper way to establish a caliphate and describing the Taliban emir as the leader of the world’s only “legitimate emirate.” Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and draw further distinctions between al Qaeda and ISIS by naming Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, not ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, as “commander of the faithful.”

Al Qaeda affiliates continue to cultivate local ties by disavowing unpopular attacks. Ansar al Islam, the Bangladeshi division of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), released a statement condemning militants for killing the wife of an anti-terror investigator. The attack is considered unjust under al Qaeda’s rules against the targeting of noncombatants.

Outlook: Al Qaeda affiliates will continue to restrict spectacular attacks and distance themselves from ISIS in order to preserve and deepen relationships with local populations.

3

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe motivation to negotiate is diminishing as the Kuwait peace talks yield no significant agreements. Al Houthi representatives warned that they will reject a peace deal that does not account for their interests just one day after the UN Special Envoy for Yemen presented a roadmap for political reconciliation, indicating that core issues remain unresolved.

Outlook: The Kuwait talks will fail to produce a significant agreement, leading combatants to pursue new lines of effort.

SecurityThe perceived failure of peace talks may be incentivizing both the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the Saudi-led coalition to seek to change the frontlines on the ground. Al Houthi forces are intensifying attacks in Lahij near coalition-held al Anad air base, and the coalition has responded with airstrikes on al Houthi positions in the surrounding area of al Qabaytah, Lahij governorate. Government forces continued efforts to advance on northeastern Sana’a governorate in order to pressure the al Houthis, and Taiz remains actively contested. Internal conflict within both al Houthi and popular resistance units likely reflects diminishing cohesion and resource constraints after more than one year of war.

Outlook: Government forces will likely escalate in Sana’a if peace talks deteriorate further.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP remains focused on bolstering its support in local Sunni populations. Reported U.S. airstrikes killed AQAP militants in Ma’rib, Shabwah, and al Bayda governorates but remain unlikely to break the group’s ties with the population, its main source of strength. ISIS did not conduct an explosive attack this week, but its attack cell in Aden remains viable.

Outlook: ISIS will likely conduct a suicide attack on a government or military attack in Aden in the coming weeks. AQAP will continue to forego spectacular attacks in order to preserve its relationships with the population.

4

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

5

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

1

4

3

2

5

1) 08 JUN: Al Houthi militants attacked near al Anad air base in Lahij.2) 08 JUN: Al Houthis arrested Sunni imams for leading a banned prayer in Sana’a.3) 10 JUN: Militants detonated an IED targeting an officer in Buraiqa, Aden.4) 11 JUN: Reported U.S. airstrike targeted AQAP militants in Ma’rib. 5) 12 JUN: Reported U.S. airstrike targeted AQAP militants in Habban, Shabwah.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalEritrea and Ethiopia exchanged artillery fire in a contested border region on June 13 for the first time since a UN intervention prevented the outbreak of war in 2008. Eritrea fought a 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia from 1961 to 1991, and the two fought a border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed approximately 80,000 people.

Outlook: Outright warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea is highly unlikely, but tensions in the border region and support for rival proxies will likely grow, exacerbating disorder in the region and possibly curtailing Ethiopia’s commitment to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) counter-al Shabaab operations.

Security Al Shabaab continues to impede AMISOM, Somali National Army (SNA), and Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) troop movements in the Hiraan region in south-central Somalia, along the Somali-Kenyan border. Al Shabaab remains capable of targeting convoys, checkpoints, and fortified bases despite efforts to clear the group from the region.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to disrupt AMISOM, SNA, and KDF operations and defend its safe havens in rural areas.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab conducted a high-casualty complex attack on an Ethiopian AMISOM base in Halgan, Hiraan region on June 9. This is the first major assault on an AMISOM base since the U.S. began conducting airstrikes to defend AMISOM partners in March 2016. The failure of the U.S. to intervene in this case may generate negative reactions from AMISOM members. It is also possible that al Shabaab has adjusted to U.S. posture and developed tactics to avoid detection before large attacks. Al Shabaab also continued improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and assassinations in Mogadishu, in line with an earlier promise to increase attacks in Mogadishu during the Ramadan season.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely attempt another large-scale base attack or hotel attack during the Ramadan season.

6

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

7

HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

4

2

2

3

1

1) 13 JUN: Ethiopian and Eritrean forces exchanged artillery fire in the contested Tsorona region. 2) 09 JUN: Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on an AMISOM base in Halgan, Hiraan region.3) 09 JUN: Al Shabaab ambushed an SNA convoy near Tiyeglow, Bakool region.4) 11 JUN: Militants detonated an IED near Mandera, Kenya.

HoA Significant Activity 07 JUN-13 JUN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe likelihood of a peaceful political reconciliation is decreasing as the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) fails to extend its authority in eastern Libya. The GNA’s connections to elements of the former Libya Dawn bloc and the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, which supported the Islamist government in Tripoli, is further alienating Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR). Gen. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the HoR opposed Libya Dawn in the civil war and will not cede power to a body that they see as aligned with Islamist interests.

Outlook: GNA-aligned Misratan forces and the HoR-backed Libyan National Army may clash in central Libya in the territorial dispute that will follow ISIS’s defeat in Sirte.

SecurityIslamist militants in both Benghazi and Derna are renewing their resistance to the LNA. ISIS claimed several attacks against the LNA in Benghazi in recent weeks, indicating a possible influx of resources following losses in Sirte. Recent explosive attacks may reflect this re-orientation, or a counterattack by Ansar al Sharia and its allies in response to recent LNA pressure.

Outlook: Both ISIS and Ansar al Sharia will conduct explosive attacks on the LNA in the near term to undermine its efforts to secure Benghazi. The LNA may lose ground in Benghazi if it chooses to position against Misratan forces in central Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely regroup in southern Libya. Misratan forces operating under the GNA advanced into Sirte city center and have blockaded the port. ISIS leaders have reportedly fled the city for the southwestern Libyan desert. The estimated number of ISIS fighters in Sirte halved this month, indicating withdrawal to other parts of Libya.

Outlook: ISIS will continue to fight for Sirte city center in order to facilitate its withdrawal, aided by the dense urban terrain. ISIS will likely withdraw the bulk of its force from Sirte, probably to the southwest, in order to preserve combat power.

8

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

9

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

14

2

5

3

1) 08 JUN - 13 JUN: Misratan forces attacked ISIS in Sirte.2) 12 JUN: Militants, possibly ISIS, detonated a VBIED in Salmani district, Benghazi. 3) 09 JUN: LNA airstrikes killed at least five civilians in Derna.4) 09 JUN: The PFG took control of Harawa after ISIS militants withdrew.5) 11 JUN: ISIS and BRSC detonated IEDs against LNA soldiers and destroyed LNA vehicles in Benghazi.

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM continues to compete with ISIS for relevance in northern Algeria. Algerian security forces killed seven suspected terrorists, arrested four others, and seized weapons caches in Medea, northern Algeria. Medea is home to both AQIM and ISIS militants, and increased movement indicates a possible uptick in activity by either group in an effort to be the dominant Salafi-jihadi group in North Africa. ISIS’s presence may also be growing in Morocco, emphasizing extensive regional competition between the two groups.

Outlook: AQIM will launch a media campaign to recruit and retain militants loyal to al Qaeda while protecting its hideouts from security forces conducting clearing operations in northern Algeria.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)AQIM’s affiliate Uqba Ibn Nafa’a disengaged from militant activity, likely in an effort to consolidate resources and build strength. ISIS is heavily co-opting weakened Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants, and the group’s silence may also be a sign of further defections to ISIS, which is developing long-term ambitions in Tunisia. A lack of significant militant activity may signal that ISIS is preparing for a larger attack intended to undermine the Tunisian state.

Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a may form a resurgent base in western Tunisia; however, spikes in activity will indicate that ISIS is planning to advance its operational capabilities throughout the country, likely assisted by co-opted Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) MINUSMA and French forces are increasing troop numbers in response to increased militant activity in northern Mali. French forces deployed to the Malian-Nigerien border, and the UN called for a quick reaction force and 2,500 additional troops to combat militants. AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun called for Muslims to attack French forces in Mali during Ramadan.

Outlook: AQIM affiliates will likely attempt a complex attack on MINUSMA or French forces in northern Mali during the remaining three weeks of the Ramadan season. An attack on a soft target in the Sahel, like a hotel, is also possible.

10

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

11

MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

2

3 1

4

1) O8 JUN: Tunisian security forces arrested two teachers recruiting for ISIS in Sidi Bouzid.2) 08 JUN-12 JUN: Algerian security forces killed seven suspected terrorists in Medea.3) 12 JUN: Moroccan security forces arrested a suspected pro-ISIS militant at Oujda airport.4) 13 JUN: Algerian security forces killed two suspected terrorists in Jijel.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

12

SAHELWEST AFRICA

3

2

1

4

1) 10 JUN: Suspected AQIM militants kidnapped an MNLA member in Bir, Timbuktu region.2) 10 JUN: About 40 French troops deployed along the Malian-Nigerien border.3) 12 JUN: Gunmen, possibly Ansar al Din, attacked the CMA in Gao region.4) 13 JUN: Militants from pro-government militia GATIA clashed with the insurgent Ganda Izo group in Timbuktu.

ACRONYMS

13

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569

14