AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

February 14, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Drought and famine in East Africa may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to prevent the resurgence of al Shabaab.

2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia to counter losses in the Red Sea region.

3. Conditions are set for an escalation of hostilities in Libya that would undermine the country’s economic recovery and reduce pressure on ISIS and al Qaeda.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda deploys senior operatives to Syrian opposition groups in order to transform the movement from within and advance al Qaeda’s goal of consolidating the armed Syrian opposition under its leadership. The Pentagon confirmed a February 4 airstrike that killed Abu Hani al Masri, a longtime al Qaeda member and a commander of Syrian Salafi-jihadi group Ahrar al Sham. Al Masri managed a number of al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and had connections to al Qaeda emirs Ayman al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. The al Qaeda network in Syria extends beyond its de facto Syrian affiliate, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will consolidate the armed Syrian opposition under its leadership.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesJamatul Ahrar, a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group, may expand its targeting of secular civil society organizations in Pakistan. A Jamatul Ahrar militant conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack that reportedly targeted healthcare professionals in Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan on February 13. Prior Jamatul Ahrar attacks have targeted Pakistan’s legal system. The attacker used a motorcycle SVBIED, a tactic commonly used by Jamatul Ahrar to maximize casualties in large crowds. Jamatul Ahrar released a video promising more attacks, which are intended to punish the Pakistani state for operations targeting militants near the Afghan border.

Outlook: Jamatul Ahrar will increase its operational tempo against soft targets.

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PoliticalInternal divisions persist in President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction. A shipment of Ukrainian weapons intended for allies of Yemeni Vice President Ali Mohsen al Ahmar sparked a standoff between Hadi government forces and forces loyal to the head of security at Aden International Airport. This standoff reflects a larger power struggle within the anti-al Houthi bloc. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi warned supporters to beware attempts by outsiders to divide the al Houthi-Saleh coalition, signaling concerns of an internal rift.

Outlook: Power struggles on both sides of Yemen’s war will impede efforts to achieve a ceasefire or power-sharing deal.

SecurityHadi government forces face significant resistance as they attempt to advance northward to al Hudaydah city, the last major Red Sea port controlled by the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Hadi government forces are targeting al Houthi-Saleh missile launch sites in western Yemen in order to weaken al Houthi-Saleh defenses. UNHCR accused al Houthi-Saleh forces of using civilians as human shields in Mokha city, Taiz governorate. Hadi government forces seized Mokha port, another key Red Sea port, from al Houthi-Saleh forces in late January 2017 and are attempting to secure Mokha city.

Outlook: The frontline will stall in southern al Hudaydah governorate.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP continues to prioritize its tribal relationships over seizing or holding territory. AQAP media emphasized its fight alongside tribal militias against al Houthi-Saleh forces in central Yemen over the past week. AQAP has not claimed any attacks in northern Abyan since local tribal militias took responsibility for security following the withdrawal of Emirati-backed al Hizam counterterrorism forces on February 2. Al Hizam forces are preparing for an operation to clear AQAP from Abyan, although the projected force size is likely too small to achieve this objective.

Outlook: AQAP will resume a high operational tempo in northern Abyan when al Hizam forces return.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 08 FEB: Al Houthi-Saleh forces attacked border guards in southern Saudi Arabia.

2) 08 FEB: AQAP militants detonated an IED targeting al Hizam forces in Zinjibar city, Abyan.

3) 11 FEB: Hadi government forces clashed with security at Aden’s airport.

4) 13 FEB: AQAP detonated an IED targeting al Houthi-Saleh officers in Ibb.

5) 14 FEB: ISIS militants detonated a SVBIED targeting al Houthi-Saleh forces in Rada’a city.

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PoliticalSomali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia. President Farmajo assumes office with broad popular support from the general public, the Somali military, Somali parliamentarians, and the international community. Farmajo is a Somali nationalist who gained popular support for his stance against foreign influence in the country’s politics.

Outlook: President Farmajo will consolidate support for his new government by prioritizing anti-corruption measures.

Security Drought and famine in the Horn of Africa may reduce AMISOM troop contributing countries’ (TCCs) ability and will to fight al Shabaab in Somalia. Insufficient assistance from the international aid community, which is overstretched, may force TCCs like Kenya and Ethiopia to direct security and economic resources inward to address the crisis.

ISIS-linked militants conducted an attack targeting a militia leader in an effort to degrade local security forces in Boosaaso, northern Somalia. ISIS media outlets promoted the attack.

Outlook: Strained AMISOM resources may allow al Shabaab to increase its area of operations in southern or central Somalia. ISIS-linked militants will conduct assassinations and kidnappings targeting security forces in northern Somalia.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab reaffirmed its commitment to fighting the Somali government as President Farmajo begins his first term. Al Shabaab militants overran two military camps in Tihsile and Warmahan towns, located 15 kilometers from strategic Afgoi town in Lower Shabelle region, on February 12. Militants subsequently ambushed a Somali reinforcement convoy travelling from nearby Baledogle base. Al Shabaab displayed tactical sophistication by drawing out reinforcements into an ambush.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase its operational tempo in the near term to drain support for the new administration.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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1) 08 FEB: Somali MPs elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo.

2) 08 FEB: ISIS-linked militants attacked a hotel in Boosasso, Bari region.

3) 08 FEB: AMISOM secured a base attacked by al Shabaab near Mogadishu.

4) 13 FEB: Al Shabaab militants attacked multiple SNA positions outside Afgoi town.

5) 14 FEB: Al Shabaab militants raided a SNA base near Balad, Middle Shabelle region.

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PoliticalLibyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is not responding to pressure from international backers to participate in negotiations. Haftar backed out of a planned meeting with UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj in Cairo on February 14. Egypt, the LNA’s main backer, brokered the abortive talks with support from Algeria, Tunisia, and Russia.

Outlook: Haftar will pursue a military solution to the Libyan civil war. Political polarization in Libya will worsen.

SecurityThe establishment of a new militia coalition threatens security in Tripoli. Militias aligned with a defunct Islamist parliament formed the Libyan National Guard (LNG) in an effort to increase their power in Tripoli and undermine the GNA, which lacks a loyal military force. Meanwhile, the LNA intensified a campaign against the Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB), an Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, in central Libya. The LNA seeks to degrade Islamist militant groups and prevent the BDB from reviving a campaign to seize critical oil infrastructure from the LNA.

Outlook: The LNG will challenge GNA-allied militias for control of state buildings in Tripoli. Islamist militias from western Libya will rally to support the BDB against a sustained LNA campaign, increasing the risk of open conflict in central Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS seeks to rebuild military and leadership capabilities in central and northwestern Libya after its defeat in Sirte. ISIS militants are based near Bani Walid city in northwestern Libya, in southern Sirte district in central Libya, and in southwestern Libya near the Algerian border. ISIS militants may also be cultivating relationships in Sebha, a key smuggling hub in southwestern Libya .

Outlook: ISIS will attack water and energy infrastructure in Libya’s interior to pressure Libya’s competing factions and prolong the civil war. ISIS will develop business relationships with marginalized groups to support its reconstitution.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 08 FEB: The LNA conducted two drone strikes and three airstrikes against the BRSC in Qanfouda district, Benghazi.

2) 09 FEB: RUMINT The BDB shot down a LNA helicopter in south Sirte district.

3) 09-12 FEB: The LNA conducted airstrikes targeting the BDB in Jufra district. 

4) 12 FEB: RUMINT The LNA conducted airstrikes on the Mabrouk oilfield in southern Sirte, destroying a convoy of forty BDB vehicles.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebThe Tunisian state is cracking down on Salafi-jihadi recruitment networks. Tunisian security forces dismantled an ISIS-affiliated recruiting cell in Monastir governorate, northeastern Tunisia on February 10. Authorities also dismantled an all-female AQIM-affiliated recruiting cell in Sfax governorate, eastern Tunisia on February 4. The leader of the Sfax cell was in contact with the Tahrir al Sham Assembly, al Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria. Amnesty International warned that Tunisia’s extended state of emergency, declared in response to ISIS attacks in 2015 and 2016, promotes human rights abuses.

Outlook: Al Qaeda and ISIS will maintain recruitment networks in Tunisia despite the crackdown.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel region may affiliate with ISIS to advance their local objectives. The leader of the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Salafi-jihadi militant group drawn mainly from the Fulani ethnic group, may be in talks to partner with Abu Walid al Sahrawi, the leader of the self-declared “ISIS in the Greater Sahara,” according to unconfirmed reports. The goal of this partnership would be a Fulani caliphate. The MLF’s alleged realignment, if confirmed, would reflect dissatisfaction with its subordination to Ansar al Din and other non-Fulani groups in the AQIM network.

Boko Haram-Shekau is prioritizing attacks on military and aid convoys as the famine in northeastern Nigeria worsens. Shekau’s faction relies on raids to seize food and supplies, since it no longer controls territory. Boko Haram-Shekau militants may defect to Boko Haram-Barnawi or lay down their arms altogether if the faction is unable to seize sufficient resources. Boko Haram-Barnawi (ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya) seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Nigeria in line with ISIS’s global messaging. Boko Haram-Barnawi released a video calling for attacks on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria, as well as Western military targets in Chad and Mali.

Outlook: The MLF may conduct joint attacks with Sahrawi’s group or Fulani militants based in neighboring Burkina Faso. Boko Haram-Shekau’s operational tempo will remain low in the near term.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 04 FEB: Tunisian security forces dismantled an AQIM-affiliated recruiting cell in Sfax governorate.

2) 06 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrested six ISIS militants in Mnihla and Intilaka, Ariana governorate.

3) 10 FEB: Tunisian security forces dismantled an ISIS recruiting cell in Bekalta, Monastir governorate.

4) 13 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrested five militants in Moknine, Monastir.

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1) 08 FEB: Ansar al Islam kidnapped a Colombian nun in Koutiala, Sikasso Region, Mali.

2) 08 FEB: Boko Haram-Shekau ambushed a Nigerian military convoy near Mafa, Borno State, Nigeria.

3) 10 FEB: AQIM detonated an IED near Timbuktu, Timbuktu region, Mali, killing one Malian soldier.

4) 13 FEB: The Malian Army killed four Fulani civilians in a raid of an MLF cache in Dialoube, Mopti Region, Mali

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569