AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

January 31, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack against a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic.

2. The Libyan National Army militia coalition is concluding the fight for Benghazi city and will continue to pursue a military solution to Libya’s civil war.

3. Al Shabaab has the momentum against AMISOM. It is regaining territory in Lower Shabelle region and conducted a mass-casualty attack on Kenyan AMISOM forces on the Somali-Kenyan border.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS) is consolidating control over Idlib and western Aleppo provinces in preparation for the next phase of its campaign against Bashar al Assad’s regime. JFS attacked U.S.-backed opposition forces, including Jaysh al Mujahideen, on January 23-26. JFS and its allies announced their dissolution and merging into a new entity, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.

Al Qaeda seeks to exploit public outcry over recent changes to U.S. policies in order to expand its support base. Pro-al Qaeda Telegram channels highlighted U.S. President Donald Trump’s temporary travel ban on citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries and the reports of civilian casualties sustained during a U.S. raid on an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) headquarters in central Yemen as proof of America’s “hatred toward Muslims.” Current al Qaeda rhetoric is similar to al Qaeda’s responses to U.S. drone strikes under prior administrations. Outlook: Al Qaeda will be able to consolidate the armed Syrian opposition under its leadership. Al Qaeda will use U.S. policies as both a recruiting call and justification for violence.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesPakistan reduced its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in a possible response to U.S. pressure to crack down on militant organizations. Pakistani authorities placed LeT leader Hafez Saeed under house arrest on January 30. Pakistani security forces rely on LeT as a proxy to attack Indian military targets in the disputed Kashmir region.

Outlook: Pakistan will allow continued LeT activities in Kashmir despite Western pressure.

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PoliticalThe Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government do not accept current terms for a political settlement and are pursuing military gains on the ground to change the conditions for a negotiated settlement. The Hadi government rejected the UN Special Envoy’s ceasefire proposal due to a condition requiring the coalition to lift restrictions on Yemen’s airspace and ambiguity concerning Hadi’s future powers.

Outlook: The Hadi government and the coalition seek to consolidate gains in Taiz and possibly al Hudaydah governorates before re-engaging seriously in the peace process.

SecurityAl Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a reported suicide boat attack on a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen that may have intended to target a U.S. vessel. The Saudi-led coalition responded by intensifying airstrikes on targets in al Hudaydah governorate on the Red Sea coast. The use of suicide attacks marks a shift in tactics by al Houthi-Saleh forces.

Outlook: The coalition may respond more aggressively to small boats in the Red Sea, increasing popular backlash against the coalition campaign in western Yemen.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenThe U.S. conducted a ground raid targeting an AQAP headquarters and senior leadership in central Yemen, which may denote a shift away from the U.S. reliance on drone strikes to degrade AQAP leadership and disrupt operations. U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted the raid, which killed women and children, in northwestern al Bayda governorate in central Yemen. The Pentagon reports that the women were killed in combat. AQAP’s media outlets responded to President Trump’s immigration restrictions and alleged civilian casualties with numerous propaganda pieces.

Outlook: Public support for AQAP among Yemenis will most likely increase in the aftermath of the U.S. raid.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 24 JAN: AQAP ambushed an al Hizam supply truck in Lawder, Abyan.

2) 26 JAN: AQAP repelled al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Ibb.

3) 29 JAN: U.S. SOF raided an AQAP HQ in northwestern al Bayda.

4) 30 JAN: Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired rockets at a UN building in Dharan al Janoub, Saudi Arabia.

5) 30 JAN: Al Houthi-Saleh forces attacked a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea.

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PoliticalSomalia is preparing for the presidential election scheduled to occur on February 8. International organizations are monitoring the presidential election for cases of fraud and corruption, which plagued federal parliamentary elections in late 2016. Incumbent presidential candidate Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with 180 parliamentarians on January 29 to boost his chances for re-election.

Outlook: President Mohamud will likely win re-election, but adversaries may attempt to challenge his legitimacy.

Security Tactical failures of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces threaten to undermine security in Somalia. A recent UN report criticized AMISOM for causing substantial civilian casualties, including 92 casualties in the last four months of 2016. AMISOM forces bombarded suspected al Shabaab positions in residential areas in Bulo Marer district and Qoryooley town in Lower Shabelle region on January 26 and 29, killing four civilians and wounding 15 others. Al Shabaab militants may embed militants in populated areas to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties.

Outlook: AMISOM could lose popular support and control of territory to al Shabaab should it continue to kill civilians.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab pursues multiple lines of effort to destabilize Somalia’s government and expel foreign military presence. Militants conducted a complex attack, which combines explosive capabilities and gunmen, on the Dayah Hotel in Mogadishu, killing 28 people on January 25. Al Shabaab has increased operational tempo in Mogadishu in recent weeks to disrupt the current electoral process. Al Shabaab also conducted a complex attack on a Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) base in Kolbio town near the Somali-Kenyan border on January 27. Pro-Al Shabaab Telegram channels claimed that al Shabaab militants killed 57 KDF troops in the attack. Al Shabaab conducted a similar raid on a KDF base at El Adde in January 2016.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will attack KDF bases to set conditions to recapture territory in Gedo and Lower Jubba regions.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 25 JAN: Al Shabaab attacked Dayah Hotel in Mogadishu.

2) 25 JAN: Al Shabaab recaptured Badhadhe town, Lower Jubba region.

3) 27 JAN: Al Shabaab raided a KDF base in Kolbio town, Lower Jubba region.

4) 29 JAN: Somali SOF killed a senior al Shabaab commander in Tulo Barwaqo area of Gedo region.

5) 30 JAN: ISIS-linked militants executed three Somali soldiers near Qandala town in Puntland.

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PoliticalLibyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is prioritizing a military solution over political dialogue . Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria attempted to organize a meeting between Haftar, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj, and House of Representatives (HoR) President Ageela Saleh. Haftar has not confirmed his attendance, despite close cooperation with Egypt. The LNA’s impending victory in Benghazi reinforces Haftar’s position as the most powerful military leader in Libya and reduces his incentive to negotiate. Haftar-aligned HoR leadership continues to block UN-backed efforts to modify and legitimize the GNA.

Outlook: Haftar will pursue agreements to bolster his military power, including an alleged arms deal with Russia.

SecurityThe Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi is culminating. The LNA seized Qanfouda district in southern Benghazi from the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, after months of fighting. Militants detonated a VBIED targeting the LNA in Benghazi on January 25. The LNA intensified its attacks on Derna city, controlled by the al Qaeda-linked Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD).

Outlook: A Salafi-jihadi insurgency will continue in LNA-controlled areas in eastern Libya. The LNA will escalate operations intended to seize Derna city from the MSCD.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS likely aims to secure safe havens in western Libya. Suspected ISIS militants established a checkpoint near the key crossroads of Abugrein, west of Sirte, according to an unconfirmed report. The position would support ISIS’s efforts to rebuild its capabilities in northwestern Libya following U.S. airstrikes on training camps southwest of Sirte on January 19.

Outlook: ISIS may seek to move capabilities and personnel to southwestern Libya, a long-established militant safe haven, as well as maintain positions in northwestern Libya.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 25, 28 JAN: The LNA conducted airstrikes targeting Islamist militants in Derna.

2) 25 JAN: The LNA seized Qanfouda district, Benghazi from Islamist militants.

3) 25 JAN: A militant detonated a VBIED targeting the LNA in Benghazi.

4) 26 JAN: Suspected ISIS militants established a checkpoint near Abugrein.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebISIS in Libya may have funded and armed an attack cell in Morocco. Moroccan security forces arrested the self-proclaimed emir of ISIS in Morocco, along with six other militants preparing to conduct an attack, on January 27. The alleged support from ISIS in Libya may indicate that ISIS coordination nodes in Libya continue to function after the loss of the group’s headquarters in Sirte city in late 2016.

The Algerian state remains the primary target of AQIM’s senior leadership. AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel released an audio speech calling on Algerians to join jihad against the Algerian regime.

Outlook: ISIS will pursue a spectacular attack in Morocco. AQIM will release intermittent statements focused on the grievances of the Algerian people in an effort to generate popular support.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The Malian Army’s disregard for civilian rights is compromising its counterterrorism mission. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), a Fulani militant group affiliated with AQIM’s Ansar al Din, is positioned to benefit from widespread Fulani anger against the Malian government. MLF raids and landmines in Mopti region, central Mali, threaten the Malian Army’s supply lines. Malian and coalition forces operating in northern Mali increased their operational tempo in response to a large-scale al Murabitoun bombing in Gao city on January 18.

The Boko Haram faction recognized as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (Boko Haram-Barnawi) is staging operations out of two distinct safe havens in Nigeria. Boko Haram-Barnawi claimed responsibility for a complex attack that overran a Nigerian Army base in southern Borno State, Nigeria on January 27. Its militants are carrying out successful operations targeting multinational forces near the Ajingin Forest in southern Borno State. Boko Haram-Barnawi may consolidate its recent battlefield gains into territorial control in a new area outside of its stronghold in northern Borno State.

Outlook: Fulani discontent with the Malian government will increase popular support for the MLF. Boko Haram-Barnawi will increase operations on the southern border region of Yobe and Borno States, Nigeria.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 27 JAN: Moroccan security forces dismantled an ISIS cell in al Jadida province and arrested the self-proclaimed emir of ISIS in Morocco.

2) 27 JAN: The Algerian People’s National Armed Forces (ANP) dismantled two five-member militant cells in Setif province and Boumerdes province, Algeria

3) 31 JAN: The ANP discovered an arms cache in Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Algeria.

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1) 24-25 JAN: French forces arrested 13 AQIM militants in Gao city, Mali, in connection to the 18 JAN attack on a base in Gao.

2) 25 JAN: Malian soldiers executed three Fulani men in Yirma, Mopti, Mali.

3) 26 JAN: Boko Haram-Barnawi seized a Nigerian military base near Kamuya, Borno State, Nigeria.

4) 28 JAN: Boko Haram-Shekau ambushed an aid convoy near Bulabulin, Borno State, Nigeria.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569