AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT June 28, 2016

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt’s coordinated attack in al Mukalla is part of an assessed campaign challenging the re-establishment of the coalition-backed Yemeni government.

2. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu.3. Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations against ISIS- and al Qaeda-linked

groups as cover to contest territory in eastern Libya, reigniting conflict and providing opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to expand.

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ASSESSMENT:

al Qaeda NetworkGroups that are part of the al Qaeda network continue to re-affirm their association with al Qaeda and the Taliban, distancing themselves from splinter factions that have pledged to support the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Abdul Haq al Turkistani, rejected the ISIS “Caliphate” in a video released on June 24 in Arabic. He also criticized the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) for originally breaking its allegiance to the Taliban and al Qaeda, citing this decision as the reason for the IMU’s decimation. A June 14 IMU statement noted a small group had remained loyal to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and renounced ties to ISIS. The TIP’s Islam Awazi Media Center released the original Uighur-language video on May 28.

Outlook: More groups in the al Qaeda network may re-affirm their support for al Qaeda and its methods as ISIS suffers tactical setbacks.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Yemeni delegations suspended the UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the end of Ramadan. Both sides continue to disseminate conciliatory rhetoric, but likely hold irreconcilable goals based on current ground conditions. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed proposed a roadmap for peace to which neither side assented, and the al Houthis continue to reject any unity government headed by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the talks to encourage progress, but his overtures appear ineffective. Assessed fissures within the al Houthi movement are increasingly visible as factions differ over the way forward. Outlook: The peace talks will not resume after the end of Ramadan barring the unlikely introduction of a renewed ceasefire.

SecurityHadi government forces are escalating preparations for a large-scale offensive on Sana’a, coinciding with the suspension of peace talks. The Saudi-led coalition reportedly sent material reinforcements towards Ma’rib to prepare for the battle. Al Houthi fighters also clashed with government forces in the eastern capital suburb of Nihm. Fighting slowed in Lahij governorate near the strategic al Anad base, which military leaders insist is secure. Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, remains contested.

Outlook: Coalition-backed forces will launch an offensive to recapture Sana’a once peace talks are officially suspended.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenISIS intensified its ongoing Ramadan explosive campaign in al Mukalla. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted a large-scale complex attack against multiple military locations, killing more than 40 people. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty complex attack on May 12. AQAP is solidifying control in Ja’ar, its former stronghold in Abyan governorate, by freeing members from prison and assassinating local oppositional figures. Outlook: ISIS will attempt to conduct another explosive attack in Aden or al Mukalla before the end of Ramadan on July 5. AQAP will continue to strengthen its presence in Abyan.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 20 JUN: AQAP fighters raided a prison and released prisoners in Ja’ar, Abyan.2) 26 JUN: A Salafi militia laid siege to popular resistance fighters in Aden city.3) 26 JUN: Saudi airstrike targeted al Houthi-Saleh positions in Dhubab, Taiz.4) 26 JUN: Hadi government forces clashed with al Houthi-Saleh fighters in Nihm, Sana’a governorate.5) 27 JUN: ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted suicide bombings in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalAfrican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing nations’ threats to withdraw from the coalition are a response to domestic political pressures and a desire to absorb less of the AMISOM budget. Uganda’s planned withdrawal of its forces from AMISOM in December 2017 is a political ploy to force Europe and Kenya to absorb a greater percentage of AMISOM financing. Likewise, Kenya’s threat of withdrawal is an effort by President Uhuru Kenyatta to please constituents during election season.

Outlook: Both Kenya and Uganda will continue to supply forces to the AMISOM mission through 2018 despite rhetoric otherwise because their withdrawal from AMISOM would significantly decrease regional security.

Security Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM forces remain vulnerable to attack in southern Somalia, where al Shabaab conducted four grenade, improvised explosive device (IED), and direct fire attacks on AMISOM forces this week. Infighting amongst SNA troops continues to support the narrative that SNA forces independent of AMISOM are incapable of providing security. Al Shabaab militants destroyed Kenyan telecommunications equipment that led to a communications blackout.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue its campaign of terror in southern Somalia to discredit the Somali Federal Government before the expected fall 2016 elections.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab fighters conducted a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu on June 25, likely the last major attack of al Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive that will target civilians. The militants used a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound and detonated a suicide vest (SVEST) once inside. Four al Shabaab gunmen resisted Somali special forces personnel for several hours. The attack killed 16 individuals, including Somali Minister for the Environment Buri Mohamed Hamza, and wounded at least 24 others.

Outlook: Al Shabaab may attempt one more major attack against a SNA or AMISOM military base in south-central Somalia before the end of Ramadan on July 5.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

1) 21 JUN: Al Shabaab assassinated Chief of Intelligence for the Middle Shabelle region in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region. 2) 23 JUN: Al Shabaab conducted grenade attack on AMISOM forces in Marka, Lower Shabelle region.3) 25 JUN: Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. 4) 25 JUN: Al Shabaab destroyed telecommunications equipment near Damasa, Mandera County, Kenya.

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ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Libyan National Army (LNA), allied with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), is contesting territory occupied by the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) under the guise of counterterrorism operations. The LNA can now use an HoR ban on weapons and military vehicles between Tobruk and PFG-held Ben Jawad to justify attacks on the PFG. The PFG, an ally of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), announced a counterterrorism campaign in Ajdabiya that is likely meant to counter LNA advances and may limit the PFG’s presence on the eastern flank of ISIS’s besieged stronghold in Sirte.

Outlook: The LNA and PFG will prioritize the political struggle over the counter-ISIS or counter-al Qaeda fight.

SecurityThe LNA is prioritizing control of Benghazi and Ajdabiya over Derna. The HoR and LNA negotiated a two-week ceasefire agreement with the Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD), which previously declared support for an Islamist coalition fighting the LNA in Ajdabiya but now appears to be prioritizing its hold on Derna. Misratan militias clashed with local fighters near Tripoli, indicating that they lack popular support in all of the areas in which they operate.

Outlook: The LNA will likely mobilize additional forces to Ajdabiya. The Misratans’ unpopularity in Tripoli may undermine stability in northwestern Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaAl Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia is driving a surge in Islamist opposition to the LNA in Ajdabiya and Benghazi, likely in an effort to preserve its safe havens on the eastern Libyan coast. The head of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Council of Dignitaries, Abu Obeida Yusuf al Annabi, announced his support for Islamist coalitions in Benghazi and Ajdabiya, underscoring these coalitions’ alignment with the al Qaeda network.

Outlook: Islamist militants will likely retain safe havens in Benghazi and Ajdabiya, despite losses, as the LNA focuses on securing its interests in Libya’s unresolved political conflict.

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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1) 21 - 27 JUN: Misratan forces approached ISIS’s remaining strongholds in central Sirte city.2) 21 JUN: Misratan militias clashed with local fighters in Garbulli, causing up to 80 deaths. 3) 23 JUN: LNA forces took control of the Qawarhsa and Garyounis districts in Benghazi.4) 24 JUN: Misratan militias clashed with local militias in Tripoli.5) 26 JUN: The LNA launched airstrikes against an Islamist coalition in Ajdabiya.

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM and ISIS continue to compete to be the vanguard of the Salafi-jihadist movement in North Africa. Moroccan security forces dismantled a 10-member suspected ISIS cell in Oujda, Morocco, and Algerian security forces destroyed two assessed AQIM shelters in Batna, Algeria. The Moroccan cell is the largest dismantled since August 2015. It operated near the Moroccan-Algerian border and included an Algerian national, possibly indicating that ISIS is able to move personnel from Algeria to Morocco.

Outlook: ISIS will continue efforts to build its network in Morocco, which likely remains limited to independent cells.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)The Tunisian government is increasing security measures to combat Salafi-jihadi activity in Tunisia, as well as the ISIS threat from northwestern Libya. Tunisia closed the Ras Jedir border crossing after militants kidnapped 12 Tunisians and four Libyans on the Libyan side. Tunisia’s Public Security Minister inspected security forces in preparation for the tourist season. ISIS attacks on Tunisian tourist sites in 2015 severely damaged Tunisia’s economy.

Outlook: ISIS will likely focus on cross-border attacks on security targets in the coming months, though a spectacular attack on a tourist site remains a possibility as Ramadan draws to a close.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)AQIM associate Ansar al Din intensified its campaign against French and UN peacekeeping forces, MINUSMA, in northern Mali. The group claimed two attacks on MINUSMA outposts in Kidal region, and Ansar al Din leader Iyad Ag Ghaly threatened French and UN forces in his first public statement in nearly two years.

Outlook: Ansar al Din will maintain its recently increased operational tempo against French and UN forces in northern Mali.

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MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

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1) 21 June: Tunisian security forces discovered explosives near Jendouba University.2) 23 June: Moroccan security forces dismantled a suspected ISIS cell in Oujda.3) 24 June: Algerian security forces destroyed two terrorist shelters in Batna.4) 26 June: Algerian security forces arrested three suspected terrorists in Illizi.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

1) 21 JUN: Militants attacked a Malian checkpoint in Timbuktu, Mali.2) 21 JUN: Militants assassinated Ganda Izo leader Hamidou Toure Battou in Bourem Sidi Amar, Gossi, Mali.3) 22 JUN: Algerian security forces discovered a weapons cache in Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Algeria.4) 25 JUN: French forces arrested 20 people south of Aguelhok, Mali.

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ACRONYMS

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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569

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