AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT April 5, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy and allies interdicted three weapons shipments likely originating from Iran within a month.

2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader Hassan Ali Dhore, who may have been planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.

3. The UN-backed Libyan unity government entered Tripoli, but opposition from major political and military factions, as well as ISIS’s campaign on Libya’s oil infrastructure, will make it difficult for the new government to wield power.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen and Syria have used recent U.S. airstrikes targeting leadership and training camps as fodder for their message that the U.S. and the West are opposed to a Sunni victory, and in Yemen’s case, trying to keep the Muslim community at war with itself. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) held a rally in al Mukalla, Yemen’s third-largest port city that has been under AQAP control since April 2015, against a U.S. airstrike that killed low-level fighters reputedly training to fight in a Yemeni province. A U.S. airstrike targeted Abu Firas al Suri, a senior al Qaeda leader in Syria, which may underscore Jabhat al Nusra’s narrative that the U.S. is opposed to the Syrian Sunni.

Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns, building strength and local resilience.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesPakistani military forces have launched a campaign against militants in Punjab province in Pakistan after the Easter Sunday bombing by Jamatul Ahrar that killed 74 people. At least 450 people have been detained for their ties to militancy in the region, and Pakistani law enforcement agencies claimed to have killed five “high-profile” terrorists.

Outlook: Pakistani security forces will continue the crackdown on radical militant Islamist groups in Punjab.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalYemeni President Hadi dismissed Vice President and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah and appointed LTG Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as Vice President and Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr as Prime Minister. Bahah was the likely next president of Yemen, and he has been at odds with Hadi for the past few months. Ali Mohsen’s appointment may garner support among northern tribes, but will alienate the al Houthis and southerners. Daghr is a former official in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party.

Outlook: Hadi will probably reshuffle his cabinet further in advance of political negotiations to secure his and Saudi interests.

SecurityThe U.S. Navy intercepted a third illicit weapons shipment assessed to have originated in Iran destined for the al Houthis. There has been an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis. Separately, the al Houthi-Saleh bloc is counterattacking in Taiz and Hajjah to reverse losses. The coalition resumed airstrikes on al Houthi positions in Sa’ada, breaking an unofficial border ceasefire. Hadi government forces continued efforts to clear AQAP militants from al Mansoura district in Aden.

Outlook: Increased Iranian support may provoke a Saudi response that could negatively impact direct al Houthi-Saudi talks. The combatants will continue to contest key terrain before the April 10 ceasefire.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenThe U.S. and the Saudi-led coalition continued airstrikes against AQAP in southern Yemen. The coalition targeted AQAP positions in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and in Lahij. Reported U.S. airstrikes targeted suspected AQAP positions in Azzan, Shabwah, and al Mukalla. AQAP released multiple statements that criticized U.S. and coalition strikes for prolonging the anti-al Houthi fight as part of its ongoing efforts to cast itself as the leader of Yemen’s Sunni insurgency.

Outlook: AQAP will continue to use U.S. and coalition airstrikes as propaganda tools to gain popular support.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 28 MAR: U.S. Navy vessel intercepted a suspected Iranian weapons shipment in the Arabian Sea.2) 04 APR: Coalition renewed airstrikes in Sa’ada.3) 02 APR: Al Houthis captured al Wazi’iyah, Taiz.4) 30 MAR: Pro-Hadi forces cleared suspected AQAP militants in al Mansoura, Aden.5) 30 MAR: U.S. airstrikes targeted AQAP camps in al Riyan and al Mukalla, Hadramawt.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Puntland Administration agreed on April 3 to a unified model for the 2016 Somali Federal Government (SFG) elections. Puntland was one of the last federal states to oppose the SFG’s preferred clan-based election model, known as the 4.5 formula, which the SFG will likely use in the upcoming election. The 2016 election, to be held by the end of August, marks the first time Somalis will vote for federal officials since the SFG came into power in 2012. The outcome of the elections will likely affect the SFG’s future policy for combatting al Shabaab.

Outlook: Al Shabaab may conduct attacks on candidates in order to influence the election’s outcome.

SecurityThe Pentagon confirmed that the U.S. conducted its second drone strike in Somalia within a month. The strike killed Hassan Ali Dhore, a senior al Shabaab intelligence official, near Jilib in Middle Jubba region. Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops began an offensive to liberate Janale town in Lower Shabelle region from al Shabaab. Militants counterattacked and prevented government forces from securing the town. Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely fight to retain Janale due to the town’s position on and near key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Lower Shabelle region.

Al ShabaabAn al Shabaab suicide bomber assassinated a Puntland official in Galkayo, Mudug region. Galkayo is a divided city and a core faultline between the Puntland and the Somali Federal governments. Al Shabaab has had safe haven in parts of north-central Somalia. The group also continued its assassination campaign in Mogadishu, killing multiple Somali intelligence officials. Al Shabaab attacked charcoal traders in Lower Jubba region to enforce its ban on the charcoal trade.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to assassinate Somali and Puntland government officials in Galkayo to exacerbate tensions.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

1) 03 ARP: Al Shabaab attacked charcoal merchants in Jubbaland State territories.2) 02 APR: SNA and AMISOM attempted to capture Janale, Lower Shabelle region. 3) 31 MAR: Al Shabaab killed Turkish hospital workers in Mogadishu, Banadir region.4) MAR 31: Al Shabaab conducted an SVEST attack in Galkayo, Mudug region.

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ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalThe UN-backed Government of National Accord’s (GNA) arrived in Tripoli and took control of the capital with the support of Libyan and international backers. The unity government remains largely symbolic, however. Political and military powerbrokers in eastern Libya, including the House of Representatives, have not endorsed the GNA.

Outlook: The GNA will struggle to wield power in Libya without support from eastern Libya, even if international sanctions pressure some powerbrokers into endorsing it.

SecurityThe tenuous anti-ISIS alliance between the Islamist Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD), which contains Ansar al Sharia elements, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) is breaking down. The MSCD and the LNA clashed near Derna this week. The LNA has provided air support for the MSCD, which is preventing ISIS Wilayat Barqa from retaking territory in Derna. ISIS militants are exploiting the discord to conduct small-scale operations in eastern Derna.

Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Barqa may redouble its offensive on Derna, should the LNA withdraw air support.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is increasing its attacks on oil infrastructure throughout Libya’s oil crescent, though it is not yet known if these attacks are opportunistic or part of a sustained campaign. ISIS Wilayat Fezzan may be responsible for an attack on oil infrastructure near Sebha, indicating that ISIS is continuing to develop its affiliate in southwestern Libya. ISIS operations south of Sirte may also be meant to secure ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between the group’s coastal stronghold and the southwest. ISIS’s targeting of oil infrastructure may be timed to hinder Libya’s political unification process.

Outlook: ISIS will expand its area of operations in southwestern Libya and pursue operations aimed at destabilizing the Libyan political process.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 02 APR: Misratan forces clashed with ISIS Wilayat Tarablus militants near Abugrein.2) 02 APR: ISIS militants attacked the 47 al Baida oilfield near Marada.3) 02 APR: LNA forces clashed with MSCD militants in Derna.4) 03 APR: Suspected ISIS militants attacked a security checkpoint near Sebha.5) 04 APR: ISIS militants attacked a security checkpoint in Waddan.

ASSESSMENT:

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM and ISIS continue to develop cross-border terrorist networks between Algeria and Tunisia. Algerian security forces arrested an Algerian businessman accused of funding jihadist training camps in neighboring Tunisia and Libya. Security forces also killed three suspected terrorists in El Oued, in the Algerian border region, where AQIM- and ISIS-linked militants are active.

Outlook: AQIM and ISIS will use Tunisian safe havens and cross-border networks to launch attacks in both countries. Attacks may escalate as AQIM and ISIS compete to lead the Salafi-jihadi movement in the Maghreb.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)AQIM reported an Uqba Ibn Nafa’a attack after months of silence, signaling that the group is still active and affiliated with AQIM. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a ambushed Tunisian national guards in Kasserine governorate on March 30, its first claimed attack since December 2015, amidst reports that ISIS has been siphoning support from the weakened group. The timing of the attack indicates that AQIM is messaging its continued presence in Tunisia to counter ISIS’s growth in the region.

Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will conduct more AQIM-claimed attacks in order to reaffirm the group’s prominence in Tunisia.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) The arrest of a suspected Ansar al Din leader may yield information about its little-known southern affiliate. Malian security forces captured Souleymane Keita, the alleged leader of Ansar al Din’s Khaled Ben Walid Battalion, in the Segou region as he traveled northward to meet with senior leadership. Ansar al Din coordinates with its southern brigade to conduct attacks that delegitimize and destabilize the Malian government. Ansar al Din also launched mortars at UN camps in Kidal region in northern Mali, where it aims to prevent the reconstitution of a strong Malian state. Ansar al Din claimed 15 separate rocket attacks in the past month, but likely exaggerated this claim in response to recent arrests.

Outlook: Ansar al Din and its affiliates will attack local and international security forces to destabilize the Malian government.

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA

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1) 30 MAR: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a ambushed Tunisian national guards in Bouchebka, Kasserine.2) 30 MAR: A landmine wounded a member of the Tunisian national guard at Jebel Samama, Kasserine.3) 30 MAR: Tunisian security forces thwarted an alleged attempt to establish an ISIS wilayat in Gafsa.4) 04 APR: Algerian security forces killed four suspected terrorists in El Oued.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 30 MAR: Malian security forces arrested a suspected Ansar al Din leader near Sokolo, Segou region. 2) 01 APR: Ansar al Din launched rockets at a UN camp in Tessalit, Kidal region. 3) 01 APR: Suspected Ansar al Din militants attacked a civilian outpost in Ibdekkene, Kidal region.4) 02 APR: Ansar al Din launched mortar shells at a UN camp in Aguelhok, Kidal region.

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ACRONYMSAfrican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569