AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT August 5, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.

2. An offensive has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen and may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.

3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into an assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military secrets as a result of the nuclear deal.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkThe confirmation of Mullah Omar’s death will have an effect on al Qaeda’s position within Afghanistan, as the Taliban will probably continue to fracture. The Afghan Taliban named Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as its new leader and named Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, as a deputy alongside Haibtullah Akhunzada. The succession was probably decided in advance. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat to Mullah Omar, who was called emir al mumineen, or commander of the faithful. It is not clear whether Zawahiri will swear bayat, allegiance, to Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.

Outlook: Al Qaeda’s position in Afghanistan, which had relied on the Afghan Taliban for strength, will be weaker as the Taliban continues to fracture following its leader’s death.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesPakistani security forces strengthened their offensive against terrorism and were able to successfully target leadership of a couple of the militant groups. Pakistani police killed Malik Ishaq, the leader of Lahkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a group responsible for sectarian violence throughout Pakistan, on July 29. Police killed Ishaq during a shootout that ensued when LeJ militants attacked a police station in Muzzafargarh, where Ishaq was detained. In the attack, police also killed Ishaq’s two sons as well as 11 other LeJ members. Pakistani security forces also killed Umar Lateef, the commander of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) branch in Balochistan and south Punjab, during a raid on his hideout in Balochistan.

ISIS Wilayat Khorasan appears to be establishing a base in Pakistan’s tribal areas. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan claimed a camp in Waziristan and stated that a faction of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had pledged allegiance to the group. The arrival of ISIS in Pakistan’s tribal areas may result in direct clashes with al Qaeda and TTP groups that have strongholds in the region. This defection may be related to the announcement of Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s death and highlights the further fracturing of the TTP, which previously had several of its commanders defect to ISIS.

Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Khorasan may attempt to increase its presence in Pakistan.

AL QAEDA

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PoliticalThe UAE may play a key role in brokering a political solution to the conflict in Yemen. Yemeni Vice President Khaled Bahah returned to Abu Dhabi after a symbolic visit to Aden, and Emirati officials are highly engaged in the recent developments. The UN envoy to Yemen just concluded a series of talks in Cairo, which included meetings with members of the ruling party, the General People’s Congress. Separately, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi issued decrees appointing key political figures as advisers and integrated southern popular resistance militias into the Yemeni army in an effort to bolster political support.

Outlook: The momentum behind the current offensive against the al Houthis may be enough to bring all parties to the negotiating table again; however, Saudi Arabia may differ from the UAE on what is an acceptable solution in Yemen.

SecurityForces operating under the Saudi Arabia-led “Operation Golden Arrow” continued to advance northward from Aden. A significant deployment, which includes an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces operating alongside freshly trained Yemenis, facilitated the recapture of al Anad Airbase in Lahij governorate, a strategic position from which to run operations both in Taiz and Abyan. Additionally, popular resistance forces retook the city of al Hawta, the capital of Lahij governorate on July 30.

Outlook: The retaking of al Anad Airbase is a significant victory for anti-al Houthi forces and will likely propel resistance forces to retake more southern territory from the al Houthis.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP may be seeking to expand its influence within Hadramawt, eastern Yemen. AQAP militants attacked a military checkpoint in al Qatan, Hadramawt, after a significant break in attacks in the area. The group also claimed to have flogged individuals in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, under shari’a-based punishments. Separately, ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device on July 29, targeting a mosque frequented by members of the Isamili sect in the al Jifra area of Sana’a. Outlook: The continued focus on the conflict with the al Houthis will continue to distract from AQAP’s expansion and activities in eastern Yemen. AQAP will continue to exploit the conflict in order to expand its presence throughout the country.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) 03 AUG: Operation Golden Arrow forces retook al Anad Airbase in Lahij. 2) 30 JUL: Southern popular resistance forces retook al Hawta in Lahij.3) 03 AUG: Saleh loyalists reportedly clashed with the al Houthis in Sana’a. 4) 31 JUL: AQAP detonated an SVBIED at a military checkpoint in al Qatan, Hadramawt.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Somali federalization process continues to stall as its 2016 deadline approaches. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed and the Somali parliament announced that they believe “one man, one vote” elections will not be able to occur in August 2016 as currently scheduled. Separately, a communique released from the High-Level Partnership Forum headed by President Mohamed and UN Special Representative to Somalia Nicholas Kay recognized the importance of stabilizing parts of Somalia recovered from al Shabaab.

Outlook: Tensions between regional governments and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) are likely to rise as the federalization process stalls and if the SFG does not provide adequate support to areas recovered from al Shabaab.

Security UN-sanctioned missions in Somalia will continue past the end of their current authorizations, which are set to expire later this year. The UN Security Council unanimously voted to extend the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandates until March 30, 2016 and May 30, 2016, respectively. Separately, the U.S. government gave Kenya approximately $94 million of assistance for the fight against al Shabaab, $58 million of which is to go to AMISOM.

Outlook: It is likely that the UN renews UNSOM and AMISOM’s mandates again in early 2016 as the Somali federalization process fails to meet deadlines on its current timetable.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab militants continue to clash with Ethiopian and Somali troops in the Hiraan, Galgudud, and Bakool regions as forces allied with the Somali government conduct operations to drive the militants from those regions. Death tolls are likely high on both sides, with al Shabaab claiming to have killed 60 Ethiopian troops and Ethiopia reporting 16 militants dead in a July 29 clash in the Bakool region.

Outlook: Al Shabaab is likely to remain inactive in regions outside of the Hiraan, Galgudud, and Bakool regions as the group continues to defend its territory in those regions from Ethiopian and Somali troops.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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GULF OF ADEN

HORN OF AFRICA

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1) 28 JUL: Al Shabaab militants publically executed a man charged with murder in Bu’aale, Middle Jubba region.2) 29 JUL: Foreign citizens residing in Mogadishu hotels were relocated to an African Union base in the city.3) 31 JUL: Ugandan AMISOM troops killed six civilians in Marka, Lower Shabelle region.4) 03 AUG: SNA and AMISOM recaptured El Dher and El Ali, Hiraan region, from al Shabaab militants.

HORN OF AFRICA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 28 JUL-03 AUG

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalThe General National Congress (GNC) announced its willingness to rejoin the unity government discussions in Sakhirat, Morocco. The GNC’s current demands focus on the acceptance of new amendments to the draft agreement that will increase the influence of its members in the final government. In the south, the Tebu-Tuareg clashes have ended in Sebha, Libya. However, the Tebu-Zwai conflict continues in Kufra, Libya.

Outlook: Secretary Kerry’s pivot to Libya could either provide much needed influence to convince the GNC to return to Sakhirat, or the presence of the U.S. may push the GNC to spurn negotiations in order to preserve its revolutionary image.

SecurityThe LNA continues to make progress in its various operations throughout Benghazi. LNA advances in Sabri and Suq al Hut in northwest Benghazi continue to see successes with the consolidation of new territory and the death of Ragab al Agouri, a prominent ISIS military leader in the city. In the south, the LNA is unable to quell the violence between the Tebu and the Zwai tribes, which threatens the stability of tribal relations throughout SW Libya.

Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus on completing its Benghazi mission above all other priorities. The establishment of a secure perimeter along the port in Suq al Hut will provide a secondary bulwark to prevent resupply or an escape route for ISIS. In the south, continuing Tebu violence may incite other tribes to declare war on the Tebu in other regions of Libya.

Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in LibyaISIS and Ansar al Sharia continue to lose territory in Benghazi. The remaining Ansar al Sharia militants have substituted direct combat for guerilla warfare and have deployed snipers throughout the city. ISIS militants continue to launch direct offensive operations, but it is unclear if this can be maintained against the loss of operational leaders and dwindling supplies. Outside of Benghazi, alleged ISIS forces stormed an LNA checkpoint on the Ajdabiya-Tobruk highway. The capture of an estimated 18 men may embarrass the LNA, but the greater danger comes from the potential force projection into Tobruk.

Outlook: If ISIS can hold the checkpoint, they can both prevent further LNA reinforcements from reaching Ajdabiyah and open an escape route for its remaining soldiers outside of Derna, Libya.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM Algerian authorities continued to conduct counter-terrorism operations in the wake of AQIM’s resurgence in the region. Algerian forces increased interdictions of smuggled weapons along the Malian border, seizing arms likely intended for militants in the north. Military units also clashed with terrorists near Bouira, northern Algeria, in an attempt to clear the AQIM sanctuary of remaining jihadists.

Outlook: AQIM will likely retaliate against increasing counter-terrorism operations by carrying out small scale attacks in order to preserve its safe havens in the northern mountains.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisia continued its expansion of political and security power in order to address recent threats. President Beji Caid Essebsi extended the state of emergency for another two months, giving security forces significant freedom to arrest suspects on undisclosed charges. Tunisian authorities also dismantled three ISIS-linked cells in Sidi Bouzid, Ariana, and Bizerte, Tunisia from July 29 to August 1.

Outlook: Popular unrest will continue to grow after the state of emergency renewal. Jihadist organizations may seek to take advantage of the widespread discontent through increased recruitment and small-scale attacks.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Attacks escalated throughout Mali despite the army’s recent aggressive sweeping operations. Militants linked to Ansar al Din killed ten Malian soldiers near Timbuktu. Militants also ambushed a French Special Forces convoy in Kidal and a Malian Army convoy near the Mauritania border.

Outlook: Attacks are likely to continue in northern and central Mali despite recent militant losses in border areas. Army operations concentrating on border areas in southern Mali are likely to be ineffective in curbing militant activity throughout the country.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 28 JUL: ISIS launched a complex assault on a LNA position IVO Suq al Hut, Benghazi.2) 29 - 31 JUL: Tebu and Zwai clashes resumed in Kufra, Libya. Dozens estimated killed.3) 31 JUL: Alleged ISIS militants launched a surprise attack on a LNA checkpoint.4) 02 AUG: ISIS kidnapped the president of Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC) at a checkpoint outside of Sirte, Libya. Libya Significant Activity 28 JUL-03 AUG

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA

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1) 29 JUL: Tunisian authorities arrested ISIS-linked terrorists in Sidi Bouzid.2) 01 AUG: Tunisian authorities dismantled an ISIS-linked terrorist cell in Tunis.3) 01 AUG: Tunisian forces launched a military operation to eliminate militant outposts on Mount Ouergha. 4) 03 AUG: Algerian forces clashed with militants in Bouira during a sweeping operation.

MAGHREB SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 28 JUL-03 AUG

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA1) 28 JUL: An IED targeting a French Army convoy injured several French soldiers in Kidal.2) 01 AUG: Unknown militants ambushed a Malian Army convoy in Nampala.3) 03 AUG: AQIM militants killed at least 9 Malian soldiers in an army base outside of Timbuktu. The militants also burned army vehicles and seized military equipment.

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SAHEL SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 28 JUL-03 AUG

ASSESSMENT:

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Nuclear TalksGovernment officials reframed Iran’s rhetorical stance on foreign visits to military sites into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by Iran and the P5+1. Prior to reaching the final agreement, the regime had expressed strong opposition to military site inspections; Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for example, called the ban on such visits his fourth red line during a speech on June 23. On July 30, however, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated, “All the concerns on the inspections of the military sites have been removed…we guarantee that in no way will there be access to sensitive and military documents.” On August 2, President Hassan Rouhani stressed, “There is no reason to worry at all as what Iran has agreed to under the JCPOA [regarding military sites inspections] is nothing extraordinary.”

Outlook: Iranian officials will assuage domestic concerns that Iran will not surrender any military or national security secrets under the JCPOA.

Economy Regime officials stressed that Iran’s increased economic interaction with the West in the post-nuclear deal environment will not result in the warming of relations. On July 30, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that, “in upcoming [economic] cooperation with [other] countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not forget the past…” On August 3, Hardliner Parliamentarian Gholam Ali Haddad Adel said, “There will be conflict between the U.S. and Iran for as long as the [Islamic] Revolution is strong.”

Outlook: As Iran gradually opens up its market to the West, leaders will try to block Western political and cultural influences which threaten the revolutionary ideology of the regime.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

28 JUL: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini held a joint press conference in Tehran.

28 JUL: Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi suggested that counterterrorism could be an area for Iran-U.S. cooperation.

29 JUL: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati called sections of UNSC Resolution 2231 on Iran’s missiles “unacceptable.”

29 JUL: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi stated that the Supreme Leader called for 1,000,000 Separative Work Units (SWUs) of enrichment capacity to meet Iran’s long-term energy needs.

29 JUL: Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met his French counterpart Laurent Fabius to discuss the nuclear agreement, terrorism, and environment issues in Tehran.

29 JUL: The Guardian Council re-elected Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati as Guardian Council Secretary. 29 JUL: Ahlul Bayt News Agency reported that two brothers from Razavi Khorasan province, Mostafa and Mojtaba

Bakhti, were killed in Syria “over the last few days.” 30 JUL: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the “resistance economy” doctrine does not mean a “cut

off… of our economic transactions with the world.” 30 JUL: Araghchi stated, “All the concerns on the inspections of the military sites have been removed…in no way will

there be access to sensitive and military documents.” 31 JUL: Royal Dutch Shell Company and Italy’s Eni stated their interest in returning to Iran; there is no timetable for

the return. 31 JUL: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei stated that the nuclear “negotiating team

observed the redlines.” 02 AUG: During a live televised address to the nation, President Rouhani stated that “Iran’s military capabilities…will

by no means” be compromised. 03 AUG: Ali Akbar Velayati stated that the “missile issues and defense capabilities” were not part of the agreement

and the country will never negotiate with other countries over its missiles.

28 JUL – 03 AUG 2015

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569