Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1938

7/31/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1938

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28TH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

VOL. 28 NO. 5

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1938

THE

FIELD ARTILLERY

JOURNALCopyright, 1938, by

The United States Field Artillery Association

A PUBLICATION FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY OF THE REGULAR

ARMY, NATIONAL GUARD, AND ORGANIZED RESERVE

Patron Saint of Artillery

PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY FOR

THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

BY MONUMENTAL PRINTING COMPANY

32D STREET AND ELM AVENUE

BALTIMORE, MD.

Editorial Office, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.Michael V. Gannon, Captain, Field Artillery, Editor

Entered as second-class matter August 20, 1929, at the post office atBaltimore, Md., under the Act of March 3, 1879

Published without expense to the government

The Field Artillery Journal pays for original articles accepted


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Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for

disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the fieldartillery's progress, development, and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the

other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to

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THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

VOLUME 28 SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1938 NUMBER 5

Aspects of Modern War

BY COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA, FA

HE world is singularly troubled

with wars; with preparations forwars. Armaments are growing at

a prodigious rate; opposition to rearminghas all but disappeared. There is ageneral consent that another World Waris only a question of time, and thatarranging for the coming catastrophe is

just common sense.The money being expended for

armaments is greater than ever before intimes of peace. Hundreds of millions ofdollars are being annually appropriated.Many there are who suggest that theseamounts are not large enough; few askfor a reduction. Nations are convincedthat in the near future they are going toneed their armies, their navies, and theirair forces. All wish to be strong, andespecially stronger than the probableenemy.

Increases of armaments, and

inventions of new materiel, havechanged the art of war. War can not now

be successfully fought unless guns,ammunition, tanks, planes, andquantities of accessories are available tothe fighters. There are differences ofopinion as to how the modernlyequipped army can best utilize themeans at its disposal. But it is certainthat war will not be what it used to be.

In view of these conditions, and inview of the all-prevalent fear of a greatwar, let us examine a few aspects ofmodern war, which are going to affect

seriously many millions of human

beings, even to their deaths.A Principle of War:

Principles of war are immutable.Nevertheless, the war of materiel hasmodified their application. It behoovesus to examine them closely. Let usconsider one examplethe principle ofthe economy of force, which may bedefined as the use of the maximum

possible force against single objectives,successively, until the desired missionhas been accomplished.

In order to apply this principle it isnecessary to select the objectives againstwhich the maximum force is to be used.It has been agreed that these should be,not geographical points, but rather theenemy's main force. This interpretationhas been largely based upon thecampaigns of Napoleon, who, however,did not himself define his understanding

of this principle.Prior to the current century, forces in

war were concentrated into one or moremasses. When there were more thanone, spaces existed between them,which afforded opportunities formaneuver. The war of fronts continuousover long distances did not exist. Thedetermination of which of severalforces was the enemy's major oneseldom offered difficulties. Troopsmarched on foot, or on horses, andmovements were slow, limited by thethen means of transportation. Once

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established, the main force could movefrom one theater of operations to another

only after long and dangerous delays.Battles were fought to a conclusionwithin one or two days; rarely did theyextend over three days. Bringing upreserves after a battle had started waslimited to troops in the immediatevicinity. Distant reserves wereunavailable.

Beginning with the 20th Century, thedefensive has greatly increased instrength. It can no longer be overcome

within one, two or three days. Duringthe Russo-Japanese war, in 1904 and1905, battles lasted one to two weeks;during the World War they were

prolonged through weeks to months.Because the entire nation participates

in wars, enormous forces are engaged,and there are now two types of war: First,where fronts are not continuous, whichwas the rule until recent years; second,

where fronts are continuous for longdistances, which is the result of thetotalitarian type of war of nation againstnation, rather than armies against armies.

Wars on fronts not continuous aredecreasing, but they exist. During theWorld War they occurred in Serbia, inRumania, and in Palestine. There havesince been such wars in the Chaco, inEthiopia, in Spain, and in China.Success has depended on superiornumbers, materiel, maneuver, andleadership. The principle of the economyof force has applied, but with amodification.

Modern materiel makes the defensiveso strong that it can not be quicklyovercome, even by greatly superiorforces. With present means oftransportation, the situation during thecourse of a single battle may completely

change, owing to movements of reservesand of resources from one area toanother.

To obtain rapid decisions in openwarfare has been and is still the dream

of many. Recent wars make it doubtfulwhether this will be practicable, becauseof the delaying powers of the defense,and ability to shift reserves andresources rapidly.

The Chinese, according to their ownreports, had, in August, 1937, 80,000well-armed and well-supplied troops nearShanghai, with the mission of attacking aJapanese force on the defensive, andestimated by them at about 5,000 men.

The Chinese were so sure of victory thatthey felt the only alternatives possible tothe Japanese were annihilation, surrender,or retreat to neutral territory. Theyrequested the authorities of theInternational Settlement to take necessarymeasures to disarm and intern theexpected retreating Japanese forces.

Notwithstanding a superiority of 16 to 1,the Chinese were not able, in two months

of attacks, to overcome the defense,during which period no retreat occurredand Japanese reserves and resources were

brought from overseas to change thesituation completely.

Reserves and resources are now thereal main force, and no decision can beexpected until these have beenexhausted. Reserves and resources may

be shifted from one front to another, andthe main theater of operations willchange correspondingly. This hashappened in Spain and in China. Thetendency is for prolongation of warfare.However desirable, the possibility ofmajor-force employment of short warsgained by rapid maneuvers in openwarfare yet remains to be demonstrated.

Nations intend to use in future alltheir available man power, and all theirresources, to win a war in which they

may be engaged. The results of defeatappear to be so terrible that nonedesires to take the chance of losing

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ASPECTS OF MODERN WAR

by undertaking to fight with less forceand less materiel than it can provide.

This tendency has led to such anincrease of forces that wars oncontinuous extensive fronts are nowcommon.

Where fronts are continuous it is oftendifficult to decide which sector is moreimportant than another to determinewhich is the main opposing force.Modern railroads and motor roads afford

possibilities for quick concentrations oftroops and materiel. To pierce a

defensivethe only maneuver possibleon continuous frontsinvolves long andcostly attacks; requires time for

preparation; more for execution.During the World War efforts were

made to pierce continuous fronts inFrance, in Russia, and in Italy. Frontswere dented, but the operations took somuch time that the defense was alwaysable to bring reserves and materiel to the

threatened area in such numbers andquantities that no attack succeeded in

breaking through.In such cases how is the principle of

economy of force to be applied? What isthe enemy's main force?

The Allied campaigns of the latesummer and autumn of 1918 point to thecorrect answer. In a series of battles,Marshal Foch, having accumulatedsuperior forces, and greatly superiorresources, started continuous attacksagainst the German armies over aconstantly extending front. The attackssuffered large losses, but the Germanswere obliged to meet them, to engagetheir reserve divisions, one after another,until, at the beginning of November theyhad no reserves left.

It was then that Marshal Fochundertook to apply the principle of the

economy of force. He prepared a finalmain effort against the enemy's criticalfront. This was the area northeastthrough Metz, leading directly to the

German center of resourcesthey hadno reserves. An overwhelming force was

assembled for this attack. If itsucceeded, it could destroy the centersof resources, and at the same time wouldcut off the German armies in France andin Belgium by squeezing them betweenneutral Holland and the Allied armies.

In view of this situation the Germansapplied for an Armistice. The effort wasnot made. The threat sufficed.

Where fronts are continuous, attacksto exhaust the enemy's reserves and

resources are the initial steps to secure adecision. It may take a very long time toaccomplish this. In carrying out such a

policy, one part of a continuous front isnot necessarily more important thananother. The local situation,geographical possibilities, and the abilityto deploy large forces on one side, tocompel the enemy to use his reservesand resources, are the prime

requirements. After the time has beenreached when the enemy's reserves andresources approach exhaustion, it

becomes most important then to selectthe objective for the final effort.

In applying the principle of theeconomy of force, account must be takenof another variation from past practices,occasioned by the mass of materiel nowemployed. Changing troops and materielfrom one theater to another is relativelyeasy, but changing the direction of amaneuver once started is not easy.

To include the 19th Centuryapplications of the principle of theeconomy of force involved mobilizationof separated major and minor forces.These were then directed against onemajor objective, and such minor ones aswere absolutely necessary. The directionof movements of columns could readily

be changed from day to day. Troops hadsmall trains; required very moderateamounts of ammunition; had littlemateriel. Modern armies do not operate

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in this fashion. Artillery, tanks,airdromes, enormous quantities of

ammunition, and much materiel areessential. Armies are relentlessly tied todepots and lines of communication,without which they are unable to receivethe daily supplies of shells, gasolene,new guns, and materiel, necessary tosuccess. Modern battles are long, anddependent for their outcome on whichside can bring to the front the greaterquantity of guns, ammunition, andmateriel. This forces intensive use of

depots and lines of communications.

Once established, only minor changescan be made in the direction of attacks,or maneuvers. It is indeed possible towithdraw troops and materiel to the rear,and forward them to other theaters,

provided the necessary supplyarrangements are in existence. It is nolonger possible materially to change amaneuver which has commenced.

Battles now last over long periods. Thedays when campaigns and wars weredecided in a single theater, andsometimes in a single battle, are not nowwith us. During the Napoleonic wars,Austerlitz in 1805; Jena in 1806; Wagramin 1809; and Waterloo in 1815, decidedthe fates of nations in one to three days.In 1866 the fate of Austria-Hungary wasdecided in one battle; in 1870, that of

France by a campaign of about onemonth. In each of these cases, thedecision was determined in one theater.

Times have changed. Wars may nowhave several theaters of operation;difficult to determine which is the moreimportant. During the World War, theCentral Powers shifted main forces inturn against France, Russia, Serbia,Rumania and Italy. The Allies changedthe main front from Verdun to the

Somme, and afterwards to other sectors.Reserves and resources decided thesematters. It took many weeks to prepare

supplies for a shift in operations fromone area to another. With the possibility

of holding defensive positions forconsiderable periods of time, such shiftsbecame common. They must hereafterbe expected to occur.

Constantly increasing stocks ofmateriel, armaments, and man power,for war, in which the entire nation takes

part, makes improbable the defeat of anenemy in one battle, or in one shortseries of battles.

Reserves and resources constitutemain force. Until nearly the end of awar, it may be difficult to reach thesedirectly. The modern application of the

principle of the economy of force istoward wearing out reserves andresources, until the enemy has noneremaining. It is obvious that wastage ofan enemy's reserves and resources offersno advantage unless one's own lossescan be replenished proportionately faster

than those lost by the other side.Failure to observe this rule was a

prime cause of the defeat of the Germanarmies in 1918. Their offensives of thespring and early summer of that yearwon territory, and inflicted very seriouslosses on the Allies. But the latter wereable to increase through American

participation, both reserves andresources, while those of Germany

decreased. By July, 1918, the tableswere turned. The Allies attacked. Theyindeed suffered severely, but they wereable to restore their ranks and theirmateriel from new stocks. The Germanscould not do this. By November,reserves had nearly ceased to exist;resources were insufficient; the sourceof these was threatened by a new attack.Resistance was useless; the war ended.

As long as the enemy has reserves

and resources, a piercing of a front isimprobable. And as long as reservesand resources are available, the theater

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Tribune Photo

NIGHT FIRING, BATTERY F 14TH FA

of operations may be shifted from an oldto a new area by either side.

The principle of the economy of forcehas not changed; the application of the

principle has.Initiative:

A battle is a terrifying experience. Itcalls for moral, physical, and intellectualqualities of the highest order.

Through the volume and accuracy of

modern fire, an individual at the front isforced to the ground. Danger isimminent; it is everywhere; death is athand; many are overcome; unable tomove. Minds do not function. When anadvance is in progress, those able selecta shell hole, a depression, anything thatoffers shelter, not too far away, crawl,rush, move desperately from one

position to another.

An officer sees a few men nearby.He cannot control the majority. Hisview is limited by his proximity to theground; obscured by bursting shells,

smoke, dirt, bombs. With camouflageand indirect fire he sees little ornothing of the enemy. The rear of the

battle prevents distinguishing wherehostile fire is coming from. Thetelephone lines are cut; radio jammed;messengers shot down. He receives noorders; no advices; observes almostnothing. A person in the attack knowsonly what is happening in his

immediate vicinity; is ignorant of whatis going on only a short distance to theright and left. He is so overwhelmed bythe awful sights and sensations of the

battlefield, that he seldom writes amessage; rarely succeeds in having amessage sent back. He is so absorbed indashing from one shelter to another;dodging shells and bullets; watchingfor enemy tanks, machine guns,

batteries; knowing that a minute's lackof attention may mean sudden death;that he has neither time, ability, nordesire to send messages, sketches, reports to

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higher authority, or to that best friend ofthe infantrythe artillery.

There is no place where initiative ismore required than a battle. Yet withoutinformation from the front, it is hardintelligently to exercise initiative.Troops at the front need to decidewhether to move or stand; artillery,where and when to direct their firewhere mass fire should be concentrated;infantry in what direction to employreserves; higher commanders how toutilize large units, where to distribute

ammunition, and other supplies, moreartillery.

In the World War, it was noted thatinformation from the front during the

battle was generally lacking. No oneknew where the infantry was, nor what itwas doing, nor whether it needed help,and if it did, where. The usual display ofinitiative by commanders

a. Issued orders for continuing the

attack, or holding the position,without regard to adjacent units.

b. In an attack, prohibited theartillery (less division artillery inliaison with the infantry, if any)from firing, for fear that either theartillery might fire on its owninfantry, or that its fire might

prevent the infantry fromadvancing by not being liftedsoon enough.

Initiative of this kind has been fatal tosecuring victories. Where there isopposition, infantry can not attack ordefend without regard to adjacent units;neither can it advance without artilleryfire, and plenty of it. Lessons of theWorld War in this line have been socommonly repeated since, that the rulecan be considered general; that battles arewon when, among other requirements, the

commander exercises initiative.With so little information from the

front, how then are commanders todisplay initiative, so necessary in battle?

The successful commander in modernwarfare is he who on scant information

divines the probable situation, and whoacts; who does something intelligent. Ofcourse, there should be no loss ofopportunity to seek information. If it cannot be had from combat elements, itmust be sought from the air, and allother available sources. Every bit ofnews about the situation must be foundand utilized. But it is senseless toattempt to utilize initiative based uponcomplete knowledge of the progress of a

battle. In days long ago, it was possiblefor a commander personally to observethe battle, and the disposition of thetroops thereon. Those days are goneforever.

The modern commander does not see;knows only a part of what is happening;must nevertheless exercise initiative, and

promptly. It means using the artillery,not suspending its fire. It means sending

in the reserves, not holding them out. Itmeans no waiting for improbable

possible events, or for completeinformation which may never come. It is

better to exercise initiative than tohesitate; better to use artillery, than tostop its fire for fear that it mightinterfere with other arms; better to act intime than to wait for information whichmay never come.

These statements apply particularly tothe artillery. An artillery commanderneeds to show initiative, and mass his fire

power for the common good. To wait forOP's, infantry, liaison officers, to indicatetargets, is to pass the initiative toindividuals none of whom have a point ofview of the wholeit is the road tofailure; acting by steps, when what iswanted is mass action by the artillery.

Targets are now only exceptionally

visible. To try and handle artillery fire asif all targets could be seen is to usemethods applicable to past days, whensuch conditions were the

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rule. The modern battlefield presentsfew targets to observers; and yet to win,

artillery fire must be had. Artillerycommanders must have the initiative todirect fire, notwithstanding lack ofcomplete information. This results inammunition being expended inenormous quantities. All reports fromrecent wars comment on theextraordinary amount of ammunitionrequired by the artillery. It has surpassedall expectations, but without this fire,

battles could not be won. And to direct

it, requires initiative.Initiative is not successful when it is

limited to directing subordinate units totake advantage of the situation withoutwaiting for orders from higher authority.In modern war, units must act incooperation with units on both flanks,and with the artillery, and this can only

be assured by higher commanders.It was at one time during the World

War customary to charge divisions withthe conduct of minor operations, such asa raid, which was to take place entirelywithin their own zones of action. Suchoperations frequently failed, the enemy'sreaction extending outwards beyond theflanks. This led to the corps beingcharged with this planning. It naturallyarranged for support, particularlyartillery fire, from adjacent units, andsuccess became the rule. Similarly thearmy was charged with planning andsupervising operations which involved acorps.

One reason why the Loyalists inSpain have failed to win battles has beentheir doctrine that orders must beexplained, and if desired, debated,

before execution. This has killedinitiative. Initiative requires action bythe commander; there is little time in a

battle available for discussions. TheNationalist forces have not beenhampered by such a doctrine, and theirsuccess has been almost uniform.

Initiative of a negative nature isseldom successful. So, a general order

issued by Loyalist GHQ, signed byNegrin, the prime minister, stating thatin view of the powers of the defensestrong defensive positions tenaciouslyheld were all that were necessary toinsure ultimate victory, has led to theLoyalist armies being slowly, but surely,driven from one position to another. Anydefense can be overcome, providedsufficient time, men and resources areexpended. The policy ordered can only

succeed where the enemy lacks one ormore of these three essentials.

Modern warfare requires men withinitiative. There is need for training inthis line. To develop initiative,opportunities to exercise it should behad at maneuvers, and at CPX's, and itshould be based on incomplete battleinformation, such as is probable today.Tactical exercises based on complete, or

nearly complete, information both as tothe enemy, and as to our own forces,

belong to a past age, and call for anentirely different kind of initiative thanwhat is required nowadays.Command:

Command may be exercised directly,or through a staff. Both methods havehad successes in war; both methods havesometimes failed. Why? If the reasoncan not be determined, nations maytravel a road to disaster in the next war.

The leading example of staff controlhas been Germany. Starting after thecampaign of Jena, in 1806, itreconstructed an army, and led it tostartling victories in 1866 and in 1870.The German staff system consisted inassigning commands of armies to kingsand princes, trained and able men, butnot necessarily the best leaders of the

nation.To assure the highest possible

leadership, general staff officers wereappointed as chiefs of staff and assistants,

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to GHQ, armies, corps, and divisions.These officers were the real commanders,

and it was customary to consult them,rather than the kings and princes who werethe nominal commanders. General staffofficers were the elite of the army. Trainedin the same school, personally known toeach other, they thought and reasonedalike; agreed among themselves. Tocoordinate the action of separated units,general staff liaison officers circulated

between GHQ and subordinate staffs.Liaison officers were selected men.

They were familiar with the views oftheir chiefs, and when away, were readyto interpret their desires before anyunexpected situation. During the wars of1866 and 1870, and during thesubsequent long peace, this systemworked so well that it was widely copied.But it did not win in the World War,when it was opposed to the Frenchsystem of direct command.

The modern exponent of directcommand is Napoleon. Napoleon used

staffs, but entirely as an adjunct. The staffneither outlined proposed lines of actionfor their leader, nor did they make seriousstudies for him. He did this himself. TheFrench command on the west front in1914 to 1918 was of this type. Both Joffreand Foch made their own plans, attendedto their own liaison; inspected andcommanded directly.

Why did the German system windecisive victories between 1866 and

1870, and lose the war between 1914 and1918? Disregarding the tactics betweenthe two periods, which certainlyinfluenced results, there was a markeddifference in leadership.

In 1866, Austrian leadership waspoor. Their army was enveloped, and inone battle was placed in such asituation that a continuance of the warwould have been difficult. In 1870,

THE REFUGEES

By Kerr EbyCourtesy Charles Sessler, Philadelphia

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French leadership was worse than poor.We will not waste the reader's time in

recounting the reasons; it will sufficethat the French are the first to admit it.Against incompetent opponents theGerman staff system producedwonderful results. For nearly half acentury the World admired it. May notthe lack of effective opposition have

been the explanation for winning thesewars?

In 1914, von Moltke was the Chief ofStaff at German GHQ. He was the real

commander. Moltke did not visit hissubordinates; tried to maintain contact withthem through staff liaison officers; was notvery successful in doing so. The Frenchand English were competent opponents.When the decisive day of the battle of theMarne arrived on 11 September, 1914, itwas an obscure general staff officer, alieutenant colonel, who as liaison officerfrom GHQ, seems to have advised the

German right wing to retire, and indicatedto them the direction of the retreat. Neitherthe nominal head of the German army northe Chief of Staff knew of this decisionuntil it was too late to intervene. It lost the

battle for Germany.At this same time, the French army

had a commander. Joffre was this man;few can name his chief of staff. Joffremade his own plans. He instructed hischief of staff; told G-3 what to do.Contrary to the practice of the Germans,Joffre traveled extensively; saw his armycommanders and some subordinatecommanders, and at first hand learnttheir problems. As to this he copied themethods of Napoleon, who rarely failedto investigate the situation personally

before issuing his orders.During the World War, both French

and Germans maintained their respective

systems for commandthe former,directly; the latter through the staff. Yetthe Germans made some modifications.

In 1918, the German chief of staff didtravel, and he did hold consultations

with his subordinates. But it was thechiefs of staff who attended conferences,and whose advice was sought, and notthe nominal commandersthe staffdecided.

The American army in France hadbeen trained on the German system.Prior to the St. Mihiel campaign, thecommanders of corps were convened inan effort to establish direct command.They discussed the proposed plan of

battle. Each general present had a plan;but none were alike. Everyone votedagainst all plans not his own. Each planhad one vote for it, and the field againstit. No decision was arrived at, and thecommanders were not again convened.

In their place, chiefs of staff wereconsulted. Like the German staff, theyhad been similarly trained at Leaven-worth. They were well known to each

other. They could see merit in eachother's plans, and they quickly agreedupon what ought to be done. After theconference the chiefs of staff returned totheir own commanders with orders basedupon staff recommendations. In mostcases the chief of staff was the realcommander.

General Pershing spent considerabletime visiting his corps and divisions, butfor tactical matters he generallyfollowed the advice of his staff. As inthe years of 1866, and 1870, theAmerican army did not have an equalopponent. The German leadership wasgood, but the Americans so greatlyexceeded the Germans in men, guns andammunition, as to make them greatlysuperior in strength.

Staff-directed command has beensuccessful when it has had time to

prepare plans, and when it has beenopposed by an enemy inferior in strength,or leadership. History indicates that a

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competent commander exercising directcommand, such as Napoleon, Frederick

the Great. Alexander, Hannibal, has abetter chance for achieving success inwar than a collection of officersorganized as a staff.

Modern war is complex. Comparedwith the beginning of our own century,we have new armsaviation, tanks; newweapons; more powerful cannon;extraordinary increases in sizes of forcesand quantities of materiel. To coordinatethe parts of this great mass, to direct the

men who handle it; to handle the neededsupplies, control is necessary. In somearmies this is still exercised through astaff; in others by a commander.

When staffs are relied on to advisecommanders, there is a tendency for themto grow in size, in order to furnishspecialists on every weapon and arm, andfor every possible question. It takes timefor a staff so organized to grasp a

problem, to agree; more time to act.Divided into sections, and assisted byservices, a headquarters staff is frequentlya collection of officers, supposedlyspecialists, each in some line. Discussionsand conferences are frequent; papers areinnumerable. Often at maneuvers, and atCPX's, before the nominal commandermakes a tactical decision, an opinionmust first be had from G-2 as to what theenemy is doing, and will do. G-3 thenoutlines what he thinks our own actionshould be, with reasons therefor. Somegenerals consult other members of theirstaff; there may be a general conference.The result is usually that the G-3 plan andrecommendations, with or withoutmodifications, are adopted.

Whenever a commander finds itnecessary to engage in conversations orconsultations before he can safely make

a decision, uncertainty is present, andthere is doubt as to whether properorders will issue in time. A commander

who understands the employment of thearms and services himself, to an extent

that he can issue suitable orders withoutdelaying for investigation and advice,has confidence in his own abilities, andhas the power to make clear decisionswith an executive ability intelligently tocarry them out.

Some armies appear to have gone toofar on staff control. Staffs are too largeand have too many specialists. It takes toolong to consult them all; still longer tocoordinate divergent interests and views.

From the point of view of time, acommander who can order, withoutwaiting for staff consultations, has adistinct advantage over an opponent whofeels he must consult. Modern warfarerequires commanders, who while notignoring advice, will themselves observeevents as they occur, and order promptly.

A commander proficient in the art ofwar is independent at critical moments.

His staff informs him as to the facts,about men, about supplies; carry out hisorders. They do not delay decisionsthrough any necessity for studies andconsultations. They assist theircommander as he may direct. Thetotalitarian states have leaders of thistype. One man has the authority, and thewill to decide. The heads of these statescan and do act, sometimesinstantaneously, without previouslydivulging their intentions throughdiscussions or need to await advice. Theefficiency of this type, from a military

point of view, is so superior to a systemof consultations and agreements, that onefear of the World today is that some oneof the totalitarian dictators will takeadvantage of the possibilities of his kindof government to engage in war at anunexpected moment. This situation is so

real, or appears to be so, that it constitutesan emergency for the democratic nations,and is a main cause for their haste to

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arm to the maximum extent of theirresources.

A competent commander does notdepend on a staff, either for an opinionas to what the enemy will do, or for arecommendation as to what our ownforces should do. He watches events,supervises his own troops, and decidessuch things himself. He issues his ownorders, and instructs his staff andsubordinates as to his wishes. Our greatAmerican military chiefs. Washington,Grant, Lee, followed this plan. They

marched in the footsteps of Napoleonand other great commanders, and both invictory and in defeat they were generals.

Modern wars indicate that these menmade no mistake in their method ofcommand. It is more important to trainofficers to be commanders, than to trainthem for staff duty.

How should commanders be trainedfor war? All nations recognize this as

necessary, but there is some difference ofideas of how to accomplish this. Thetotalitarian states have each, as a leader, aman of great executive ability, and ofwide knowledge, who unites withinhimself all powers of the state, military,naval, economic. There is no detail aboutwhich he can not issue orders. Operatingunder the dictators are commanders oftheir GHQ's, groups of armies, andarmies, who with their staffs are

permanently assigned. Throughmaneuvers, and CPX's (war games),commanders train and lead the same staff,and the same troops which they areexpected to command in war.

Other nations are preparing for theexpected great war through staff studies.In some states, the commanders,nominal or actual, and the staffs, areregularly changed every few years.

Maneuvers and CPX's are held, but thecommanders and staffs are the officerswho happen to be in the area at the dates

prescribed. Would it not be worthwhilepermanently to assign commanders and

staffs to armies and to corps, or corpsareas, rather than to maintain a policy ofperiodic changes, which from astrategical or tactical point of view isunnecessary, and generally undesirable?Permanent commanders, with permanentstaffs, commanding the same troops in

peace and in war; leaders and menknown to each other, training together,form the basis for future victories.

Democratic states have need for more

and better generals, to meet the advantageswhich totalitarian states have already

provided themselves with, in havingleaders competent to act, with, without, oragainst the advice of their staffs.Democratic states need no dictatorialgovernments, but they do need generals tolead their armies for the next war.

Changes in Tactics:

It is a dangerous habit, fraught withdisaster, to imagine that in the future,

battles will be fought in some particularmanner, on a certain kind of terrain, orthat some special form of tactics is initself superior.

Tactics are a function of terrain andfire power; the latter varies with troopsand materiel. It is impossible to foreseecorrectly how a battle to occur at adistant day should be fought. Tacticschange. New materiel, with old materielin increased numbers, demandsmodifications of old ideas.

So, for example, prescribing that theoffensive had notable advantages over thedefensive, and should be generallyundertaken as a matter of national policy,was a prime cause of the disasters that fellupon the French armies during August,1914. In this case, the terrain of heavily

wooded territory, with numerous lines ofhills, made an offensive difficult. Thedefenders were able to stop, with bloody

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losses, the French attacks, while othertroops gained time to execute a wide

enveloping movement.So also, prescribing that artillery fire,while desirable is not indispensable, andthat infantry can advance in an attackregardless of support from other arms,caused disastrous losses and repulsesduring the campaigns in the autumn of1918. This idea was true in the past, butit is no longer so.

Short-range weapons, troops on foot,or on horseback, formerly made it

possible to march large bodies incolumns. The last time this wasattempted appears to have been by theFrench in 1914. It was so severely

punished that this form of tactics hasnot since reappeared in war. It has beenreplaced by advances in deployed, or

partly deployed, lines, by bounds fromone position to another, whenevercontact with hostile forces is expected.

At the present time, advance lines areequipped with armored cars or tanks,with numerous machine guns, and withconsiderable forces of artillery. Asthere is no fire power while in motion,the necessity to halt in order to fight isstill present. Any halt in unsuitableformation, or on unfavorable terrain, isliable to be disastrous before an activeantagonist. Bounds, both by artillery,and by other troops, by echelons, fromone fighting position to another, at thisdate, seem to be the probable method ofadvance in battle. Failure to observethis rule has resulted in severe lessonsduring recent wars.

During the first years of the WorldWar, great importance was placed ontrenches and barbed wire for defence.This began to pass out as early as 1916.With the increasing size of guns, their

increase in numbers, and the increase ofavailable ammunition, trenches weredeath traps under artillery fire, as they

could be completely demolished withina relatively short time. Wire could have

practicable breaches blown through iteither by a heavy artillery barrage, or bytanks. In place of what is already an out-of-date system, infantry is now fordefence deployed irregularly in depth,and in front.

There has never been a time whentactics have changed so radically in soshort a time. The new weapons; theincreasing numbers of men,ammunition, and materiel now

everywhere available create a doubt asto what will be the best tactics for thefuture battle. Terrain and fire power are

bound to control; the uncertainty is asto the effects of fire from modernweapons against modern targets. Canthe artillery stop fast-moving armoredvehicles? How fast should tanksadvance in an attack? Just how muchartillery fire is required to blast an

enemy out of his position? What kindof a barrage should artillery furnish toforce through a rapid modern assault?

In the absence of conclusive evidence,the best method for entering the new

battles of the future, will be to avoidhaving preconceived opinions as to whatis going to happen; to enter the battle withcaution; watch carefully; according toevents, act with determination and with

promptness.To insure the use of correct tactics,

observation, evaluation, and commandare necessary.

Blockades and Bases:Blockades are an important means for

securing victory. In modern war, suppliesof many kinds must be had. If one side can

provide and operate materiel, as against anopponent who can not, the one withmateriel wins. It is evident that food is

essential. Stopping an enemy in part or inwhole from securing raw materials formanufacture into war supplies, and food for

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support of armies and people, is apowerful factor in winning a war.

Few nations are self-supporting. TheUnited States, fortunately, comes nearto being so. To be completely

blockaded would be an unlikely eventfor us, but if it did occur, we couldcarry on for a long time without outsideassistance either for food or for rawmaterials. Other nations are not sofavorably situated. Some who feel thatwar is approaching, and that they may

be blockaded, are striving to provide in

advance for needed foods and suppliessufficient to last for the expected

probable duration of the war. Nationswho do not fear a blockade owing toexpected control of the sea, and to theirown satisfactory condition of resources,may desire to blockade their enemies.

The sea is the great route forsupplies. When the sea is open to a

belligerent it may secure all, or many,

supplies absolutely necessary formodern armies. When the sea is closed,through lack of supplies a belligerentmay be forced to abandon the war.

This principle was prominentlybrought out during the World War whenthe blockade of Germany materiallycontributed to the winning of the war bythe Allies. The lack of food in this casecaused by the blockade reduced themoral and physical condition of the

people to such an extent as to make themunwilling to continue longer to fight.

The rule of international law used tobe that marine blockades, in order to berecognized, must be close-in to the portsdeclared as blockaded, so that a shipabout to enter would by the presence ofthe blockading fleet be made aware of the

blockade. It was further required that thenumber of ships in the blockade must be

sufficient to ensure enforcement, andmake it manifestly hazardous to attemptto pass.

No nation now pays any attention tothis ancient rule. Air forces and

submarines make it impossible tomaintain blockades close to ports.Since 1915, sea blockades have beenenforced by notice; blockade forces

being posted at distant control points.So, when Italy, in 1935, went to war

with Ethiopia, there was a strongworld-wide sentiment that a blockadeof Italy ought to be established. Fewnations had fleets equal to, or superiorto, the Italian fleet. It was suggested

that the British Empire shouldundertake the blockade, as agent for theLeague of Nations. Without acceptingthe detail, the British fleet concentratedat Malta, obviously in a position to starta blockade of the Italian peninsula.Immediately strong submarine and airforces were assembled in Sicily, and it

became apparent that it would bedifficult to maintain a war fleet at

Malta against bombing and submarineraids. The British fleet withdrew, in

part to the east end of theMediterranean, based on Egypt, and in

part to the west end of theMediterranean, based upon Gibraltar.Except for control of local traffic, sealanes to and from Italy could beeffectively closed or opened, as well atthe entrances to the Mediterranean as

by a close blockade of Italian ports.As soon as this occurred, Italy

assembled an army of about 5 divisionsopposite the west frontier of Egypt,obviously threatening the British basein that country. Other forces, Arabs,appeared opposite the east frontier inPalestine. Although not of a formidablenature, the Arab forces were notnegligible. Near Gibraltar, a strongforce of field artillery, including 12

mortars, deployed north of that stationand within range of the harbor, whileother artillery took position on the

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south side of the strait, obviously capableof interfering with navigation entering or

leaving the Mediterranean.Danger of war did not becomesufficiently acute to require the British totake measures to meet this situation attheir threatened bases. But, had it beennecessary to do so, the blockading forces

based on Egypt could have withdrawn toAden, from where the traffic to theMediterranean from the east could have

been effectively controlled. It could bewithdrawn still farther, through bases on

the line Muscat, Mauritius, etc. Similarly,blockading forces based on Gibraltarcould have withdrawn to the EnglishChannel, or to the Azores, Canaries, andother islands, from where the sea routesleading to the Mediterranean from northEurope, and from the two Americas,could have been cut. This illustrates thedifficulties of close blockades, which areno longer to be expected; and the

advantages of having numerous sea bases,properly defended, by nations proposingto establish blockades.

Land forces may interfere withblockade operations, provided thegeographical situation is favorable.Laying siege to a base, such as Gibraltar,or to Port Arthur as occurred in 1904,may prevent use, even if capture has nottaken place. Military air forces, based onthe Balearic Islands, have maintained afairly effective blockade of the SpanishLoyalist coast. In narrow seas, such as theEnglish Channel, artillery from the shoremay close to a belligerent a section of thechannel. The Germans establishedrailroad artillery along the Belgian coastduring the World War, and prevented a

band of sea from being available tohostile shipping, while protecting theirown naval forces.

Shallow seas, like the EnglishChannel, which is not over 50 metersdeep, except for a narrow channel not

over 150 meters deep, lend themselvesto antisubmarine measures, through air

observation and bombing from air fields,and by mining. A deep sea, like theMediterranean, where depths of 1,000 to2,000 meters close to shore are common,are favorable to submarine action. Thisis the reason why air forces have beenunable to stop submarine operationsalong the Spanish coast. On the otherhand, both mines and air forces areeffective in the shallow North Sea andthe English Channel.

Materiel is a main factor in modernwar. Blockades may be the easy methodof stopping a flow of supplies which amodern army needs. The great nations areengaged, one set in preparing to enforce

blockades; the other set to avoid theeffects of them. In the first case, thismeans increased sea power, and more and

better protected bases; in the other case,autarchy.

The two greatest sea powers aredemocratic nations, with common ideals,which are likely to stand together in thenext crisis. They are the powers againstwhom blockades are improbable; butwho could in all probability impose

blockades if they so desire. Thesenations see no necessity for establishinglarge stocks in advance of war. They canobtain them, as and when required,locally and by keeping the sea lanesopen.

A report was recently made by a BritishCommission headed by Lord Falmouth,appointed to investigate, report, and submitrecommendations, upon the supply ofgasoline and other oil products for GreatBritain should war occur. It was found thatabout 5,000,000 tons of oil products would

be required yearly. It would be practicableto manufacture this quantity from coal, of

which England has ample supplies, but thiswould require 150,000 miners to extractthe coal. Men to operate oil plants would

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number tens of thousands more. It wasclear that this method would considerably

deplete man power for the militaryservices.From the point of view of cost, it was

found that if 50,000,000 sterling wasinvested in plants, this would produceonly about 1,000,000 tons of oil products

per annum, just 1/5 of the total needed.The same amount of money wouldconstruct 32 tank ships, capable ofcarrying at least 320,000 tons of oil

products in one voyage, or nearly

1,000,000 tons in three round trips.Assuming that the tankers could make sixround trips in one year, which wouldappear to be a very reasonable estimate,money invested in tankers would producetwice as much oil as the same suminvested in plants, and would at the sametime release for other war purposes some60,000 miners.

From the point of view of safety and

certainty of supply, oil plants in Englandmight be destroyed by air bombing;would in any case need considerable andexpensive protection.

Taking everything into consideration,provided it would be possible to purchaseoil products from friendly or neutralcountries, and that the sea routes theretocould be kept open, a large saving in man

power, in money, and in defenseestablishments would be had through

buying refined oils, rather than indeveloping a home oil-production industry.

The situation with regard to oil appliesto other articles which have to beimported. Nations which have the sea

power and the bases for blockadinghostile naval forces, and who are able tomaintain the ocean routes for their ownuse, need not go to the expense ofstocking materials in excessive quantities,

except where the articles are a monopolyof probable enemy nations. Fortunatelyfor the democratic nations, raw materials

and food which would be needed in warcan be obtained within their own

territories, or from nations which can bereasonably expected to be allied orfriendly.

This condition does not apply to thetotalitarian states, including Russia. Thesecountries have neither the sea powerrequired to maintain sea routes, nor dothey have all the raw materials, or plants,or food, needed for their purposes forwar. There are several ways for meetingthis problem, which must be solved

before these states will be ready for aworld war. One is to stock in advancestores required; a second is tomanufacture synthetically within theirown territories substitutes for materialsneeded but not possessed; a third methodis to acquire first, through minor limitedwars, new territories which providedesired food and raw material products.

The nations which are commonly

classed as the Have Nots are using allthree methods to prepare for the decisiveday. For material which will be needed insmall quantities only, such as somealloys, medicines, special tools,instruments, it is entirely practicable tostock these in advance, in quantitieswhich should last for the expectedduration of the war.

The manufacture of substitutes, such assynthetic oil products, textile products, andthe like, is practicable, but it requires largeinvestments of money, construction of

plants, vulnerable to bombing or shelling;withdrawal of large forces of workers frommilitary reserves; and troops and materielfor protection of plants.

In Germany, the production ofsynthetic gasoline from coal andlignites, of which Germany has amplequantities, increased from 350,000 tons

in 1936, to 850,000 tons in 1937. It isto be still further increased to 2,000,000tons by 1939. This will be about

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sufficient for peace purposes, but willhardly be enough for war. The

manufacture of lubricating oils has notbeen so successful. These are beingproduced, but they are of an inferiorquality. Research is in progress tocorrect this defect.

Similar examples for other articlescould be quoted, but the ones givenillustrate the extraordinary efforts beingmade to provide materiel for the next war.

Securing new territories throughminor wars, in order to obtain access to

raw materials, and food supplies, to beavailable for the expected future majorwar, has been a policy of opportunity forthe Have Not powers. Within the pastten years, desirable lands or entirecountries have been seized in SouthAmerica, Africa. Asia, and Europe. This

policy has had so much success that itmay be expected to continue, and evenspread, as new desirable occasions

present themselves.In fact, the uniform successes of these

minor wars, and the securing thereby ofvaluable resources, has improved themilitary position of the Have Not

powers. It has alarmed the Have powers,who since the end of the World War,controlled major raw materials, much ofthe food, and held control of the sea. Ithad been the hope of the Have powersthat through sea power, which affordedopportunities for blockades, and throughcontrol of materials absolutely necessaryfor a major war, and not obtainable insufficient quantities except from them,war could be abolished. They intendedto effect this much-wished-for objective

by using their superior power andresources, by blockading sea routes anddenying needed material to other nationswho entered, or threatened to enter, upon

war. In this way, the world was to bemade safe for democracy, for it was thegreat democratic nations that held

control of the sea, and who owned themajor sources of raw materials.

The Have powers expected that thiscondition would continue. Theyattempted by treaty to have the Have

Not powers agree that the latter wouldnot maintain armies or navies in excessof assigned percentages of those of theHave powers. The latter would therebycontinue to have superior forces, capableat any time of requiring certainstandards of political conduct from thesmaller nations, through a mere threat to

use their superior power, and to deny useof resources alone obtainable from theHave powers.

What they did not foresee was thatthe Have Nots would in time object tothe ability of the Have powers to dictatesolutions to political questions byinterfering with supplies of materialsand foods to nations opposed to theirideas.

But the Have Nots have now arrivedat a point where they have openlyexpressed their intent no longer to abidein a condition of acknowledgedinferiority, either as to maintainingsmaller forces, or as to dictation in theirefforts (through minor wars) to improvetheir access to resources and foodsupplies. Efforts to establish through

sanctions, pressure on nations notaccepting the policies of the Have

powers, have failed.The Have Nots have grown greatly

in strength; they are improving theirmilitary position by all availablemethods; they are preparing for anothermajor war. The Haves realize this.They are not ready on their part quite toagree to what appears to be a growingsentiment for dictatorial governments,involving the overthrow of minor

states. They would like to maintaintheir previous unchallenged position ofsupremacy in the world by

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still being able to control the seas, andalso sufficient resources, so as to make it

impossible for nations opposed to themwaging war without their consent.Thus has arisen the present armament

race in the world. The Have Nots desireto secure additional resources; theHaves, for their own safety, and for thecontinuance of democratic ideals, areopposed. The Haves have expressedtheir disapproval of the policies of theHave Nots, but they have not yetthreatened war. The Have Nots are not

now prepared for war with the Haves;they are however rapidly becoming moreso. Both sides understand that control ofresources will be an important factor, inthe next World War.

In the securing of resources and food,blockades and bases are bound to havedecisive effects.Shelling and Bombing of Cities:

The world has been shocked, or has

pretended to be shocked, by the shellingand bombing of populous cities,resulting in the death and maiming ofwomen, children, and noncombatants,and the destruction of private property.

Neutral nations have protested tobelligerents concerned, stronglyexpressing disapproval, and suggestingarrangements be made to exempt cities,not in the zones of action of field armies,from shelling by long-range artillery, or

bombing by air forces. Meetings havebeen held where prominent statesmenhave indicated their horror at such things

being done, and where they haveannounced that if their people go to war,they most certainly will not initiate anysuch inhuman acts.

A large part of the population lives incities. To them it is a matter ofconsiderable moment to know whether

in the next war, they are likely to beshelled and bombed, and their womenand children slaughtered. A general

agreement that such things are unethical,barbarous, undesirable, will not ward off

the evil.Why are cities shelled and bombed?Is the killing of noncombatants anobjective? Are there other reasons?What is the cost of such shelling or

bombing? Are results commensuratewith costs?

Some experience was had during theWorld War in shelling and bombing ofcities. Everyone remembers that Pariswas shelled; London was bombed. What

was accomplished that was useful to thebelligerent responsible? Many fled fromParis, and the number of workers wasappreciably reduced; outside of this,damage to property, and losses of

personnel, although serious, was not ofmilitary importance. In London, generaldisruption of production and cessation ofcirculation occurred, with considerabledamage to property and losses of

personnel.Bombing was frequent during 1917

and 1918. Cities were bombed; if not toofar from the front they were shelled byartillery. Accurate reports as to theresults were made.

Our artillery shelled Metz; the firewas so badly adjusted that that city didnot know it was being shelled. No hitswere obtained. Shelling of Montguyonwas more effective; important CP's feltit necessary to move to the rear.Shelling of Conflans and of Mars-la-Tour interrupted main rail lines ofsupply for the time the shellingcontinued, and thereafter until the

personnel could be recalled and dutiesresumed.

In those days bombing from the airwas not accurate; the target was seldomstruck; other objects were. People were

killed and wounded; fires, sometimesdestructive, were started; much

property damage occurred.

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Bombing invariably caused an alarmto be sounded, not only at the place

attacked, but in other places sufficientlynear as to believe themselves to be indanger. Everybody, over a wide area,rushed to shelter, abandoning whatevertask they were at; sirens screamed, therewas extraordinary excitement, someconfusion; all work stopped,transportation ceased to move; there wasan almost complete arrest of activity.When the danger had passed, people wereslow to return to their posts. Workers

wanted to look at the killed and wounded,watch the ambulances; rush after the fireengines; assist in extinguishing fires.Many went off to determine whether theirfamilies and homes were safe, and seewhat had happened to their neighbors.Workers were required to repair utilities,gas, water, phones, electricity; manyworkers just ran around getting in theway. Work for the balance of the day was

so difficult that it was customary not toattempt it. Production was seriouslycurtailed.

Complete reports on recent bombingsin Spain and in China, and of shelling ofcities in Spain, are not yet available. Theevidence so far agrees as to characterwith the results obtained twenty yearsago. Because the bombardment forcesare now more numerous, the amount of

bombing is much greater. It is muchmore accurate. Targets are frequentlydestroyed. More and better bombs, andmore and better hits, has caused moredamage, and has killed and woundedmany more than in past wars. Amongthese were numerous noncombatants,women and children.

From the viewpoint of the attacker,the results seem to have been:

a. Destruction of utilities of all

kinds; of transportation, both railand marine; facilities; factories;shelter.

b. Serious losses to civilians inkilled and wounded.

c. Large losses to private property,including charitable institutions,such as schools, hospitals,churches.

d. Cessation of work.e. Where shelling and bombing has

been frequent, partialabandonment of cities, therebyresulting in reduction of

production, disarrangement ofservices, and refugee problems.

It is useless to claim that shelling andbombing of cities, with killing of men,women and children, produce no results.Unfortunately, for many they do. Thequestion is, Are nations going tocontinue this in the next war in whichthey engage? The answer depends on,

a. Is shelling and bombing of citiesof prime value to the attacker?

b. Even if it is, will it nevertheless

be abandoned, as unethical?The cost of shelling by the artillery is

the cost of the batteries, if speciallyfurnished for that purpose, plus theammunition used. If the batteries are forgeneral combat purposes, the increasedcost is only that of ammunition fired.This has been the case at Madrid, wherethe artillery shelling that city was there

primarily to support the field troops. Itmight be the case where long-rangeartillery was provided for interdictionfire on important centers ofcommunication. In general, shelling byartillery is relatively inexpensive.

Bombing by air forces requires largeexpenditures. European nations foreseesuch bombing; they have madeextensive provisions for maintainingthis service. Besides the bombs,aviation gasoline and oil are of course

absolutely necessary. Recent estimatesby Germany (Deutsche Volkswirth, April,1937) indicate that about 1,000,000

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tons of oil products would be requiredper annum, in war, for German

bombardment air forces. If this quantitywould have to be manufactured, whichseems probable, about 30,000 workerswould be needed to produce it, exclusiveof the distribution service. These menand women would reduce the numberavailable for the army, or for other work,to just that extent. The fact that this isso, is a measure of the value placed on

bombing, including cities.Shelling is decidedly cheaper than

bombing, but it is only practicable forsome objectives. An increase in verylong range artillery, and an increase intheir range, is to be expected. Theartillery has the advantage that it can fireat any time, regardless of weather, andcan also maintain an uninterrupted fire ifdesired.

The real reason for shelling andbombing of cities is that modern war is a

war of materiel. Without materiel, nomodern army can function. Materielcomes from cities. More men engaged inwinning the war are in back areas, andfewer men are in front lines. In 1914,70% of armies were infantry fightingwith hand weapons. They were the

backbone of armies, around whicheverything else revolved. By 1918, the

proportion of infantry had fallen toabout 45% of the whole. By this date,materiel had become the backbone of thearmies; guns, ammunition, tanks, planes.Without these there was no victory. Theartillery in 1914 numbered around 15%for armies. It had doubled by 1918, andstopped at this figure only because moreguns, and ammunition for guns alreadyconstructed, could not be furnished. Inthe battle, the artillery outnumbered theinfantry; caused 70% to 85% of the

casualties. Without it no attacksucceeded. In the infantry, the handweapons were of so little use that many

rifles were never fired; they had beenreplaced by tanks, machine guns.

All arms now require large quantitiesof materiel. The artillery must have gunsand plenty of ammunition; battles are nolonger won unless these are provided.Tanks must be had for offensives.Engineers require large amounts ofmateriel to open communicationswhether advancing or retreating, and fordemolitions, or repairing demolitions.Air forces must have planes, bombs,airdromes. All troops need motor

transportation, gasoline, and oil. Moderndivisions each require 1,200 to 2,100motor vehicles, depending onmotorization or mechanization, and thegreat powers expect to employ divisions

by the hundreds in the next war.In the World War. France started with

500,000 workers in arsenals and inprivate establishments producing warmateriel. By 1918, this number had been

increased to 2,000,000. Such increasesno longer suffice. To fight a modern warrequires such an extraordinary amountof materiel, that it can only be producedif all man power is mobilized to obtainmaximum possible quantities. Thenations are doing it: the race forarmaments is on; it is realized thatfurnishing ammunition and materiel totroops in line will have to be done inenormous tonnages, and that theoutcome of the war will depend onwhich side can the better equip itsfighting men.

A mechanized, industrial civilizationhas brought into being "the nation atwar." Modern communications andtransport enable more men to be broughtinto action on a given field. Theylikewise demand more of their owncharacteristics for their own maintenance,

and for the supply and replacement oftheir own using and constructing

personnel. Along these channels,

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extending from the farms and cities tothe active front, there are divisions of

work, duty, and responsibility onlyartificially and arbitrarily demarcated,and then but for administrative purposes.

The machine-gunner aims and fireshis piece, and an assistant hands him theammunition. The latter has been

brought, perhaps by hand, from thedump. It was trucked to that place by thedivision trains, who had received it atthe railhead. The rails had been thechannel for its passage from the factory,

where denim-garbed workers, many ofthem women, in wartime, had assembledthe ammunition from materials mined,extracted, and processed by otherworkers. The farms, ranches, andreservoirs supply the human necessitiesfor all engaged in this chain, and where,along it, is the dividing line betweencombatants and noncombatants?

This is the reasoning process

employed by those nations who pridethemselves on a realistic concept, and itmay be that they have so indoctrinatedtheir peoples that their soldiers supply the

pressure for warfare on civil inhabitants,since it is no pleasure to any soldier to beshot, and he would rather the shot thatmight kill or wound him be stayed as far

back from his person as possible.As nearly as can now be determined,

cities will escape bombing and shellingonly when they are located beyond theeffective range of aircraft. Russia ismaking a strong effort to increase hernatural facilities in this regard; our owngeographical situation affordsconsiderable protection. With constantimprovement in size and operation rangeof air forces this partial immunity,limited principally to but two nations,may entirely disappear.

What has been mentioned with regardto shelling and bombing of cities appliesequally to sinking of ships by

submarines, artillery, and aircraft. Thepresence of noncombatants on board has

not saved them: probably will not savethem.

Accuracy of Bombing and Long Range

Shelling:

If cities are to be bombed and shelled,how accurate will this be?

Bombing by modern air forces isaccurate, provided the target is visible,and that antiaircraft defenses do not

prevent planes from descending to low

levels before releasing their bombs.Antiaircraft artillery is also accurate.

If present in numbers commensuratewith the size of the target to bedefended, it can force hostile planes toremain at altitudes exceeding 5,000meters. At this altitude bombing is

practicable, but accuracy is lessened,and the area of dispersion increased. Ifthe target is small and protected, it

stands a chance of being missed bydropped bombs; if the target is large, orunprotected, its vulnerability isincreased. If the target is surrounded byother buildings, the target itself may bemissed, but the surroundings may suffer.

An estimate of the probable effect tobe expected from bombing a harbor,such as Malta, which is nearly enclosed

by land containing naval, military, andcommercial establishments, showedthat antiaircraft defenses were such thathostile planes would probably notdescend to lower levels than about5,000 meters. By ascending to higherlevels, then diving to 5,000, andreleasing bombs directed at the centerof the harbor, the probable dispersionfor 1,000 bombs would cover theharbor with sufficient hits to strike allships present. Bombs that missed the

harbor would fall on surroundingterritory, and cause important damage.The mission of preventing the use of the

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harbor as a base for surface craft couldprobably be accomplished.

A small industrial establishment,located by itself, and using smoke andcamouflage to conceal its exact position,and by use of AA batteries to forceenemy planes to high altitudes, mightescape unhurt from a hostile

bombardment. An establishment in acity can be protected to the extent offorcing the enemy to disperse his bombs,

by dropping them from high altitudes. Inthis case repeated bombings may be

required to destroy the target, but eachattempt will incidentally damage

property within the zone of dispersion;will cause loss of life; will stop workthroughout an extensive territory aroundthe objective; will temporarily stop

production. By the theory ofprobabilities it is only a matter of timeuntil sufficient direct hits will beobtained on any particular target.

Antiaircraft protection of cities forcesrepeated bombings, to accomplish amission of destroying an objective. Itdelays the ultimate event. It probablyalso increases the loss of life todefenders. When there is no protection,less bombing can be expected toaccomplish a mission. In this case theloss of military objectives will begreater, and they will occur in less time;also there will be probably less loss oflife, due to less dispersion of bombs.Reports from China indicate that theJapanese bombers have destroyed a fair

proportion of targets, because of theabsence or inefficiency of AA artilleryand defense air forces. In Spain, wherethe AA artillery is reported as havingconsiderable efficiency, accurate

bombardment has not always beenpracticable. Repeated bombings, with

widespread destruction to nonmilitaryestablishments, because of largedispersion, have resulted in astounding

losses to life and property, much of itnonmilitary.

The rule seems to be that AAprotection can and will delaydestruction of particular targets, byrequiring a greater number of

bombings, involving more time.Incidentally, such repeated bombingswill cause greater loss to life and

property in the neighborhood of thetarget. In locating AA defenses,consideration should be given as towhether it is worth while to cause the

enemy to disperse his bombs, and coverincreased surfaces, in order to delaydamage to a special target.

Long-range shelling by artillery willoccur whenever a city in enemy territoryis within range, and is a source of supplyor of distribution. Depending on therange, shelling may, or may not, be moreaccurate than bombing. It has theadvantage that neither visibility nor

weather conditions affect it. It can beused at any time, day or night, and itsaction may be continuous.

Shelling is cheaper than bombing,and does not require the installation ofanything elaborate like airdromes. The

batteries can go into position almostanywhere, and can be shifted from onelocation to another with facility. Gunscan be camouflaged, and are not liable tointerference by enemy air forces to theextent that air fields are.

An increase of very long rangeartillery, both in number of batteries,and in the range of batteries, may beexpected in the next war, in order toreduce the high cost of bombing, and inorder to release air forces for missions atgreater distances.

For shelling cities of general woodconstruction, any caliber using HE shell

may be used. Against cities constructedsubstantially of stone, concrete or steel,8-inch batteries are the

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smallest calibers effective. If nothing elseis on hand, batteries of around 6-inch

caliber can be used, and will giveconsiderable effect, but it will take moreammunition by weight, and more time, toaccomplish a mission with this caliberthan with the larger calibers.

* * * * * *

SUMMARY

1. Principles of war have notchanged, but the adaptation of them has.

Do not expect to apply the principles inthe future, as in the past.

2. Command requires initiative, Thisused to be based on personalreconnaissance and observation of the

battle by the commander. Battles are nolonger observed; neither the commander,the OP's, nor the air forces see, or follow,the majority of the rapidly moving eventsof a modern battle, covering an extensiveterritory. The successful commander is hewho seizes the initiative, and with, orwithout, information, acts. Doing nothing,or instructing subordinates to act, withoutspecifying how, is fatal. The modern

battle needs coordinated action byinfantry, tanks, artillery, aviation, and theservices; can be had only through theinitiative of the commander.

3. Artillery requires initiative. Artilleryfire controlled by OP's, who could see all, or

most of the targets, and who could followthe movements of troops in battle, has notoccurred in this century. That system

belongs to past ages. At present the artilleryhas become the most numerous force on the

battlefield; causes the majority of losses;without its fire success is impossible. It mustfireinformation or no information. Theartillery must have the initiative to place itsfire in mass volume, in time, and at the

critical place; it must determine theseessentials itself.4. Staff control is unsuited for

modern war. With motor transportation,

aviation, large armies and larger theatersof operation, events move so rapidly that

time is lacking for "studies,"recommendations, discussions, eitherfrom staff sections, specialists andservices. The commander, although notrefusing advice, must be able to dowithout it; must act instantly as occasionrequires.

5. Tactics are changing every yearbecause of new inventions, new weapons,increased quantities of materiel andammunition. Tactics depend on theterrain, and on fire power. It is not exactlyknown what the fire power of the newweapons in new numbers will be. Makeno assumptions that, in the next war,some particular form of tactics is the

preferable one. Be cautious; watchcarefully; act promptly.

6. Reserves and resources are themain forces. Enemy reserves andresources may be destroyed by forcing

their expenditure in battle at a rateproportionately greater than our own.Thus to exhaust reserves and resources,

battles may occur at places not inthemselves of prime importance.Resources in rear areas may beinterrupted or destroyed by blockade or

by direct hostile action.

7. Shelling and bombing of cities,centers of supply, and of distribution,

with attendant widespread loss of life andproperty, with a view of destroyingresources and reducing reserves throughcasualties, refugee problems, and forcingdetachments for defense purposes, willoccur.

8. Modern war is a war of materiel,and of men to handle it. The outcomedepends on which side can furnish andmaintain the greatest force of artillery,

aviation, tanks, etc., with the necessaryservices, ammunition, supplies, and men,required to serve them efficiently.

Nations in modern war concentrate on.

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a. Maximum production ofmateriel, and men to handle it.

b. Maximum destruction ofenemy materiel, and men.

To secure these objectives, nations.

c. Mobilize their entirepopulations.

d. Assume the enemy has donethe same, and that all enemy troopsand workers, regardless of age or sex,are fair targets, as opportunity

presents itself.

* * * * *

Modern war is cruel and horribleisnow so in Spain and in China; has beenso elsewhere. Nations now endeavor todestroy their antagonists. They have

been destroying cities, with theirnoncombatants, since 1917; are doing itnow; will do it in the future.

War is not humane; cannot now be

made so. When wars were fought bysmall bodies of men, rules of chivalrymight be enforceable, but nothing of thatkind exists today. Modern wars are of an

unlimited character. The entire nationtakes part, and seeks complete

domination of its opponent. Thisrequires complete destruction of theenemy's power to resist. With the desirenot to allow the enemy the slightestopportunity to secure an advantage, warscommence with both sides engaging inhorrors and destruction.

The loss of a war entails such adisaster to a nation that it stops atnothing to insure success. If one sideuses frightful methods, the other sidemust do likewise, or give up the contest.Starting, or accepting, a war, means thecommencement of an era of frightfulnesswhich modern materiel makes possible

beyond anything imagined in the past.

It is this fact, and the uncertainty ofthe effects of modern weapons, whichhave been a main factor in preventing amajor war from breaking. How long thiscondition will continue, no man knows.

Let us maintain our vigilance, and ourtraining, so that we will not be foundwanting when the day of trial arrives.

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING, U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY

ASSOCIATION

In compliance with Article VII,Section I, of the Constitution, notice ishereby given that the Executive Councilhas fixed 4:45 PM, Wednesday,December 14, 1938, as the time of theannual meeting of the Association, to beheld at the Army and Navy Club,Washington, D. C.

The business to be disposed of will be

the election of three members of theExecutive Council (of these, two are to

be elected from the Regular Army, and

one from the Field Artillery section ofthe Officers' Reserve Corps) and thetransaction of such other business asmay properly come before the meeting.

Proxy cards are being sent to allactive members of the Associationwithin the continental limits of theUnited States, as required by theConstitution, and it is desired that they

be returned promptly. Nominations maybe made on the proxy cards, or from thefloor at the meeting.

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A Graphical Shortcut for K-TransfersBY CAPT. HAROLD F. HANDY, FA

HE set of curves shown in thefigure is a graphical device forfinding and applying K. It

eliminates taking from the firing tablesthe "yards per mil" at check-point (base

point) and target map ranges. It saves agood bit of repetitious multiplying,dividing, and thinking, thereby savingtime and reducing the chance of error.Any intelligent soldier can operate it

dependably. It finds its best use on thosenot-so-rare occasions when the overlayarrives late and many concentrations haveto be figured against time.

Map Rn El for Map Rn Site Init. El.Check Point .............................. 4840 176.7 +7.6 184.3Target ....................................... 6320 315.3 +14.2 329.5Registration on check point gives adjusted elevation of 172.6.Finding and applyingKby the usual method:

Check Point

34.94.84

14.411.7

rangemapof1/1000

milperyds =

=

=

K

Target

25.48.7

6.3234.9

milperyds

rangemapof1/1000Correction =

=

=

K

Abscissas are map ranges. Ordinatesare "," a symbol here used to meanadjusted elevation minus initial elevation.(Note that if one follows the conventionof subtracting algebraically the initialelevation from the adjusted elevation thesign ofK determines itself by rule ofthumb and the likelihood of a commonerror is considerably reduced.) The curves

are curves ofKin yards per thousand.

Having registered, use the chart asfollows: (1) Compute for the checkpoint (base point). (2) On the chart findthat point which lies opposite (in this

step disregard the sign of) and directlyabove check-point map range. (3) Selectthe curve which passes closest to the

point found in (2) and follow this curve tothat point on it which lies directly abovetarget map range. (If a value ofKcloserthan the nearest 10 yards per thousand isdesired, sketch through the point found in(2) an interpolated curve and use itinstead of the "nearest 10" curve. So

doing requires practically no time oreffort, is likely to give rather better resultsand is therefore recommended.) (4)Directly opposite the point found in (3)read a new for the target and applythis new , which is the elevationcorrection due to K, with the same sign asthat of check point , to the initialelevation for the target. The result is thequadrant elevation for attacking thetarget.

Example: 75-mm. guns, M 1897(French), firing shell Mk I, normal

charge, fuze long.

Quadrant elevation is, then, 329.525.4, or 304.1.Chart method, using interpolated

curve: The problem is worked on the

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T


31/83

A GRAPHICAL SHORTCUT FOR K-TRANSFERS

form provided by the chart (see figure).The elevation so found is 304.5, whichdiffers by only 0.4 of a mil from thatcomputed above by taking K to thenearest tenth of a yard per thousand.(A soft pencil is recommended for useon the chart as it facilitates erasures forfuture use.) Note that in the entire

process only six numbers need be

written, two of which (initial elevationsfor check point and target) wouldgenerally be recorded prior toregistration.

In the arithmetical illustrationKis takento the nearest tenth yard per thousandmerely to show the degree of precision to

be had from the chart when theinterpolated curve is used. Using the chartresult of 304.5, either 305 or 304 wouldnormally be fired. HadKbeen taken to thenearest 10 yards; that is, as 30, theresulting elevation would have been 308,

three or four mils greater. Four milselevation change at 6320 gives a rangechange of about 35 yards. This tends toshow that in the long run the additional

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precision given by the interpolated curveshould be of some value. Certainly it can

do no harm although it is, of course, moreapparent than real."Yards per mil at map range" being a

function of materiel and ammunition, it isnecessary to have a different set of curvesfor each combination of weapon,

projectile, charge and fuze. Thisdrawback is partly offset by the fact thatthe charts are very easy to make. Given afiring table, a pencil, dividers, and cross-section paper, anybody can make a

perfectly usable one in a few minutes. Itis important to note, by inspection of the

construction formula ( milperydsR/1000

=

K )

that the vertical interval between adjacentcurves is the same throughout for any given

abscissa. Thus, one abridges the process byfirst constructing the K=100 curve, thendividing into ten equal parts each of variousselected ordinates under this curve andsketching in all remaining curves throughthe sets of points thus plotted.

To anyone who finds desirable thismethod of dealing with K I wouldrecommend making a chart for eachcombination of charge, projectile, andfuze and pasting each chart in its proper

section of the firing tables. By so doinghe will get a considerable amount ofthird-grade arithmetic permanentlyattended to and out of the way.

MILITARY BOOKS

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professional value as well as interesting content:

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THE STORY OF RECONSTRUCTIONHenry ......................................................... 5.00COMBAT INTELLIGENCESchwien ..................................................................... 2.00INFANTRY IN BATTLE ........................................................................................... 3.00THE INFANTRY BATTALION IN WARLt. Col. Walter R. Wheeler..................... 3.00CAVALRY COMBAT .............................................................................................. 2.50MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WORLD WARCol. G. L. McEntee ....................... 7.50THE SIEGE OF ALCAZAR(McNeill-Moss) ......................................................... 3.50ARMY MESS MANAGEMENT SIMPLIFIEDMaj. E. A. Hyde ............................... 2.00

A reduction of 10% will be made to JOURNAL readers who purchase any of the above books

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Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Sep 1938