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  • UNITED STATES ARMYTHE CHIEF OF STAFF

    17 November 1953

    Dear General Lewis:

    I recently wrote to the Association of the U. S. Army, of whichI have long been a member, to express my view of the importance ofthe Associationl s work and to encourage its continued support by allof us in the Army.

    I also want to express my great interest in your associationand every association which is dedicated to advancement in the fieldsof the various arms and services of the Army. I know of no moresignificant bond between men and women who have the progress ofour Armed Services at heart than to be fellow members and sup-porters of these outstanding organizations. To join an association ofthis nature and participate actively in its functions means to promotecooperation and good will, to exchange and disseminate valuableprofessional information, to develop esprit and mutual respect - ineffect measurably to strengthen the national capability for defense.

    In particular, I want to emphasize the role of the associationjournals. These journals not only make a significant contribution tocurrent thinking in the arms and services but provide a unique oppor-tunity for the professional development of the contributing members.

    I strongly urge the support of these fine military associationsand their outstanding publications.

    Lieutenant General John T. LewisPresidentU. S. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION631 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.Washington 4, D. C.

  • ~--T-H-E-U-N-I-T-E-D-S-T-A-T-E-S--

    ANTIAIRCRAFT

    ASSOCIATION

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    FOUNDED IN 1892Published from 1892 until 1922 as

    THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERYPublished from 1922 until 1948 as the

    COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

    COVER: Gun cre\\' of the 36th AAA Bn (Gun).LETTER FROl\1 THE CHIEF OF STAFF Inside front coverATOl\lIC WARFARE. By Brig. Cell. T. R. Phillips " 2GUIDED l\lISSILES. By Dr. Hellry H. Porter 5COORDINATION WITI-j THE INFANTRY.

    By LieHt. John H. Alexallder 10SHARPEN YOUR BAYONETS. By Lt. Col. Otho A. Moomaw 12ELECTRONICS-TOO TOUGH FOR G.I's. By Richard \ F. Cattail .. 13AIDS FOR THE RANGE Ul\IPIRE.

    By Major \V Ill. H. Lambert alld Alajor Joseph S. Edgar 17RADAR CAMOUFLAGE. By Lt. Col. Leollard M. Ormall 18CAPTAIN CANNON TAKES OVER. By Capt. Bellsoll E. Brister 19CRUSADE AT CAl\IP STEWART, GEORGIA 21ASSIGNMENTS OF OVERSEAS RETURNEES.

    By Lt. Col. Herbert T. COlldon, Jr 23ASSIGNMENT OF AAA OFFICERS IN AFFE.

    By Lt. Col. Robert R. Corey 24i\IAGGIE'S DRA\VERS. By Lt. Col. Edward D. Ll1Cas, Armor 24PUBLIC RELATIONS IN DEARBORN, MICHIGAN.

    By Pfc's Keith Felcyn alld Harry Roer , 25CAMP CLAYBANKS FIRING POINT. By Lieut. Donald D. Ellis 26UNIT ACTIVITIES " 27FORT BLISS NEWS , 36GENERAL WEIBLE PROMOTED 40NEWS AND COMl\IENT 41ASSOCIATION BALLOT 42BOOK REVIE\VS 43YEARLY INDEX 46HONOR ROLL 48

    I

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    IlI

    OFFICERSLT. GEN. LEROY LUTES

    HONORARY PRESIDEl'.7

    LT. GEN. JOHN T. LEWISPRESIDENT

    LT. GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZERVICE-PRESIDE:-7

    BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRISSECRETARY-TREASURER

    ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THEEXECUTIVE COUNCIL

    MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. MARQUAT

    BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT W. CRICHLOW, JR.

    BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES G. SAGE

    BRIGADIER GENERAL H. RUSSELL DROWNE

    COLONEL NORMAN E. HARTMAN

    LIEUTENANT COLONEL FR ....NCIS X. BR....DLEy

    MAJOR J ....MES E. C....LKINS

    The purpose of the Auociation shall be topromote the efficiency of Jhe AnJiaircrafJArtillery by maintaining ilS standards and tra-diJions by diueminating professional knowl.edge, by inspiring greater efforJ Joward theimprol'ement of materiel and methods oftraining and by fostering mutual understand-ing, respect and cooperation among all arms,branches and components of the RegularArmy, National Guard, Organized Reserl'es,and Reserve Officerl Training Corps.

    The JOURNAL print. .rtlcle. on subj.ct. ofprott-ssional and ..eneral intere.t to personnel ofthe Antl.lrcraft Artl11.ry in ord.r to .tlmul.t.thou.ht and provoke discussion. Howe'Yer.opinions expre ed and conclusion. drawn inarticle. are in no senle official. They do not re-flect the opinions or conclusion. ~f an,. officialor br.nch of the D.p.rtm.nt of the Arm,..

    Th. JOURNAL do not c.rry p.id .dverti.in&'.Th. JOURNAL P.,.. for orillin.1 .rticl uponpublic.tion. M.nu.cript .hould b ddr .... d tothe Editor. Th. JOURNAL i. not respon.iblefor manuscript. unaccompanied by returnPOlltace.

    VOL. LXXXXVI NOVEMBER.DECEMBER, 1953

    CONTENTS

    No.6

    Published bimonthly by the United States Antiaircraft Association. Editorial and executive offices. 631 Penns,.lvani. Avenue, :>.W..W&ahington 4. D. C. Terms: $3.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions, $4.00 per year. Single copies. 75c. Entered as second.class matter.t Wa.hington, D. C.: additional entry at Richmond. Va . under the Act of :\larch 3, 1879. Copyright. 1953, b,. the United State.Antiaircraft Association.

    PUBLICATION DATE: DECE~IBER I, 1953BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRIS, USA, Ret., Editor

    ~I Sgt Fred A. Baker, Business ~IanagerSFC James E. Moore, Jr., Editorial Assistant

    SFC Paul M. Plum I.)",Cire. Mgr.

  • The first atomic artillery shell burst and the 280mm gun, Las Vegas, Nev.

    By BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, U.S.A. (Retired)

    J\I ilitaTY Allalyst of tile Post-Dispatch

    USAF Pholo

    2

    General Phillips was formerly an anloa".croft officer and olso a well known Leaven-warfh instructor. for years he has been build.ing his reputation as a military student andforthright .poke.man. He presents here hisown views.

    A\VESO?\IE but very general state-ments about new weapons and their ef.feet on military plans and costs comingout of \Vashington, primarily from highci,'ilian officials who attend meetings of

    the National Security Council, do notrefer to any nel\' or unknown weapons.They refer to atomic explosives which

    Reprinted by permission from the Sr. LollisPosr-Dispt1uh.

    ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • are hardly in the new category.\Vhat is new and revolutionary is that

    the atomic explosives are becoming avail-able in such quantity that they can besubstituted for conventional explosives atless cost where\"er the target is large.

    One atomic artillery shell can be sub-stituted for 10,000 conventional shellsto lay down a carpet barrage throughenemy lines.

    One city-buster bomb can do moredamage than a 1,000-plane raid withconventional explosives.

    It has become possible to adapt atomicexplosives to almost any weapon. Guidedmissiles, torpedoes and mines can beatomic. It is even possible to make anatomic shell for the 105mm and 155mmhowitzers. The guns can then fire eitherconventional or atomic explosives de-pending on the size and importance ofthe target.

    It is quite apparent that if a forma-tion of 15 planes carrying one atomicbomb can do more damage than 1,000planes loaded with conventional explo-sives, fewer aircraft are needed for thejob of strategic bombing.

    Likewise, if one artillery shell can besubstituted for 10,000, the Army's re-quirements for artillery, for reserves ofshells costing billions of dollars, for am-munition dumps behind the lines, andfor rail, sea and truck transportation toget shells to the front, can be extensivelyreduced.

    May Cut Back on ShellsThinking along these lines in the top

    councils of the nation has gone so farthat serious proposals have been made tocut back production of shells for the warreserVe which was used up in Korea.

    It was with all this in mind thatPresident Eisenhower at his press confer-ence last Wednesday said that to say thatnew weapons "would have no effect onthe composition of the military forceswould be shutting your eyes to all historyand to the logic of a situation of whichcertain facts are rather apparent."

    The officers of all three services havebeen caught by surprise by the secrecy\'\,"hich has surrounded the rapidity ofatomic development. They still arethinking in terms of atomic scarcity.

    Whereas every officer of the land, seaand air forces should be attempting tosolve the revolutionary changes in a warin which atomic explosives are plentiful,few have given it a thought.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    Gen. Alfred 1\'1. Gruenther, SupremeAllied Commander, Europe, has had hismulti-nation staff war-gaming the atomicbattlefield. some speculation has beenundertaken at our Command and Gen-eral Staff College, and senior planners inthe Pentagon are scratching their headsoyer it. but the vast majority of the offi-cers are still unaware that they should bethinking of a new kind of warfare whichmay make many of their weapons andtactical ideas obsolete.

    No greater indictment of the exces-sive secrecy surrounding atomic develop-ment can be made than this:

    The mass of the military know so littleabout atomic development and the possi-bilities of weapons being made for themto use that they still are plugging alongon traditional lines with never a thoughtthat war may be so changed in two orthree years as to bear no resemblance tothe one they are training for.

    The exception to this is in the AirForce where they are fully alert to thepossibilities of strategic atomic bombing,although they are quite unprepared men-tally to exploit the possibilities of tacticalbombing with atomic weapons.

    Three Schools of ThoughtThere are three schools of thought

    about war with plenty of atomic explo-sives.

    The first, found mostly in the AirForce and among senior Republicans, isthe familiar one that strategic bombingwill bring the enemy to his knees andwill be decisive without the need forserious ground combat.

    The second, prevalent in the Armyand Marines, discounts the idea that warcan be won by strategic bombing aloneand believes that atomic weapons can beadapted to the conventional battlefieldand conventional tactics.

    The third likewise discounts the ideathat strategic bombing alone can win awar, but believes that tactical atomicweapons may so change the nature of thebattlefield that many of our conventionalweapons and conventional tactics areoutmoded.These are differences of the utmost im-

    portance. The. war could be lost if theconcepts for which we provide weaponsand munitions are wrong.

    For example, if ground and sea forcesare neglected and strategic bombing failsor is thwarted by new defenses, Europecould be O\'errun with ease; or, if great

    emphasis is placed on winning the landbattle v.ith the help of atomic artilleryused on conventional lines and the en-emy knocks it all out with tacticalA-bombs. the ground battle could be lost.

    The disaster that would ensue as a re-sult of a false estimate of the capabilitiesand effects of the various atomic weap-ons indicates that any clear-cut decisionto concentrate solely on atomic strategicand tactical weapons is unlikely. Weprobably shall continue to prepare bothfor atomic war and conventional warwhile we gain experience and thinkthrough the problems posed by newweapons.

    Historically, the military have been farmore receptive to new weapons than theyhave been to new ideas for their use.Even today our military schools placetheir map problems in the standardframe of past situations, with troops incontact and the war already under way.The writer has never seen a map prob-lem dealing with the outset of war al-though this is the only way the changesbrought about by new weapons can beconsidered.

    Air Strikes FirstThe important initial action in a war

    today would not be the movement oftroops toward the borders, it would be thestrikes of the strategic bombing forces.Our first targets now are the Soviet long-range airdromes and nuclear productionfacilities. This is a protective action toprevent bombardment of the UnitedStates. When the Soviets had no atomiccapability, our first targets were their in-dustrial and communications centers.

    By the same logic, the Russians' firsttargets would be our strategic air bases,probably the peripheral air bases aroundthe world.

    There is a significant by-product tothis change in the situation. Formerlywe planned to retaliate against Sovietaggression on Soviet ind~stry, which ofcourse means cities, with massive atomicattacks ../

    Suppose the war did not start with at-tacks on cities. If our President unleasbedan attack on Soviet cities, and he is thefinal authority, he at the same time couldexpect the Russians to retaliate onUnited States cities. His order to bombRussian cities would be the equivalentto an order to bomb American cities.Would he give the order? Would the

    3

  • Russians bomb our cities if we did notinitiate it? 1\0one knows. If he decidednot to, the whole theory of winning awar by strategic bombing falls flat.

    Important Opening MovesvVhat ""ill be the opening of the

    atomic battlefield? Troops move towardthe borders. The greatest threat to themis tactical atomic bombing. This can beprevented, not by defenses, but by de-stroying the enemy aircraft and facilitieson the ground. So the most importantinitial action in the ground battle wouldnot be the contact of troops, but the mu-tual bombardment of each other's air-dromes.

    Airdromes are perfect targets for tac-tical atomic bombs-one bomb, one air-drome and everything on it. The oppos-ing air forces would rapidly diminish.

    There is an overwhelmingly importantconclusion to be drawn from this mu-tual effort to destrov each other's airforces-the side which starts with airsuperiority should win the battle of mu-tual destruction and come out of it withair domination.

    Air domination means freedom to useatomic weapons on the enemy groundforces. Without it, the ground battlealmost certainly would be lost. Weareinferior in the air in Europe. The tacti-cal atomic bomb has not decreased therequirement for tactical air-it has in-creased it, and if superiority is not heldat the outset, it may never be attained.

    The old linear battlefield, clearlymarked, with troops echeloned in depth,with artillery farther to the rear and sup-plies and transportation in dumps, is aworthwhile atomic target in time ofatomic plenty. Tactical bombs will com-pletely wreck the conventional battle-field, including any atomic cannon thatmaybe on it.

    Air-atomic power can now do what itsprotagonists have long claimed, butwhich it never before was able to accom-plish. It can wipe out the opposingground forces on the conventional battle-field.

    Necessary RearrangementsIf this is the case, the old-style battle-

    field will change. The nature of thechange can be foreseen. Troops will bein small units, self-contained, concealedand so widely dispersed in depth thatthey do not provide a target. TItis sort ofa battlefield might be 50 miles deep.

    4

    Ground warfare would be more likeguerrilla war than like the old wars weuse as a pattern. It appears that guerrillaformations might be adopted at the out-set of a war to prevent atomic destructionof the forces.

    If one side gets reasonably completeair domination, with the atomic threatremoved, it then might begin to operatein more conventional ways. The battle-field of past wars has the great advantagethat it protects the rear and allows freemovement of supplies and forces in rela-tive safety. Standard troop formationswould easily overcome lightly armedguerrilla detachments.

    It is apparent that the atomic battle-field will not dispense with the need fortroops. As Gen. Omar N. Bradley, for-mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, once remarked; The Russianscould put their men 100 yards apart andmarch across Europe regardless of atomicbombs, if there were no ground forces tostop them.

    The size of the ground forces may notchange .greatly, but their compositionwill. When atomic shells are providedfor the smaller and more maneuverablecannon, the field artillery can be greatlyreduced in size, possible by three-fourths.This will bring a great reduction in therear services, since conventional artilleryuses shells in millions of tons. The pres-ent atomic cannon will allow a substan-tial decrease in our long-range heavyartillery very soon.

    But with the reduction in field artil-lery, there will have to be an increase inantiaircraft artillery. The threat of thetactical atomic bomb is so great thatevery possible defense will be required.Airdromes will be heavily defended,troop areas must be protected. It is notunlikely that increased need for antiair-craft artillery and guided missiles willuse up the savings in field artillery.

    The atomic bomb has reduced the sizeof the strategic bombing force already.We forget that we and the British wereusing 14,000 bombers against Germanyin 1945, where, because of short dis-tances, these bombers could fly twice asmany missions a month as we now canfly against Russia.

    The strategic bombing force comprisesabout 1,500 planes. If this is reduced byhalf, on account of the great distances tobe flown, for comparison with the WorldWar II bombing force, it can be seen that

    it is approximately one-twentieth, in ef-fective numbers, to the air forces usedagainst Germany. Further decreases onthe ground that atomic weapons increaseits power do not seem to be warranted.

    As to tactical support aircraft, it hasalready been shown that they will haveto take over most of the ground supportof the troops by use of tactical atomicweapons. There may be modest decreasesin this requirement, but in view of thegreatly increased losses to be expectedfrom the use of atomic bombs on air-dromes and from stronger air defenses, itwould be rash to start cutting down.

    Because of the constant threat of tac-tical atomic attack and the disaster thatwould result from such attacks, moreinterceptors for air defense will be re-quired. On the other hand, due to theeffectiveness of tactical atomic attack, itmay be that the numbers of fighterbombers for isolation of the battlefieldattack on enemy airdromes and rear in-stallations mav be decreased.

    On balance, it does not appear that anysubstantial reductions can be made inair forces, but the composition willchange with increased emphasis on de-fensive interceptors.

    Balancing New FactorsThis is the type of complex balancing

    of new factors and their effects that isgoing on in the top levels of the Penta-gon. It is doubtful that any firm conclu-sions have been reached.

    The tendency is definitely to find away to reduce over-all military expendi-tures by taking advantage of atomic capa-bilities. There is always the danger thatenthusiastic civilians without an ade-quate military background will fix theirattention solely on the possibilities ofatomic warfare to the exclusion of limit-ing factors which the military can see.

    There is danger both of going too fastand of clinging to the outmoded. Themilitary and civilian views in the Penta-gon will probably meet by adopting thenew weapons that are surely an advancewhile retaining the old that may berequired.

    As to the three views about the effectof atomic plenty on warfare, some tenta-tive conclusions can be drawn.

    Those who believe that strategic bomb-ing with nuclear weapons will be de-cisive argue that we actually are pursu-ing an air-atomic strategy at the present

    (Co1ltinued on page 39)

    ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • - ..... "".ss: esComments on Surface-Based Antiaircraft Missiles

    By HENRY H. PORTER

    Applied Physics Laboratory, Tile Joll11sHopkins Ulliversity

    Introduction

    GUIDED 1\ IlSSILES is a broad held. Its possibilitiesha\'e caught many imaginations, and guided missiles havebeen dreamed up for every conceivable use and every pock-etbook, provided, of course, that the pocketbook is bigenough.

    It would be futile to trv to cover the whole field so Ishall limit my remarks primarily to surface-based antiair-craft missiles.

    All weapons should start from a tactical need, and eachweapon, if effective, is soon met by countermeasures. Earlyin the nrst \Vorld \Var planes were used primarily forreconnaissance. However, the sporting blood of the pilotscalled for combat, and it is said that the hrst missiles usedwere bricks. Thus, the lowly brick is a direct ancestor ofthe modern guided missile. Sometimes missiles seem tobehave like their ancestors and fly like bricks. Subse-quently, pistols and machine guns were used in air-to-aircombat, and antiaircraft guns were used from the ground.

    Since then, antiaircraft guns have been greatly im-proved; proximity fuzes have increased the effectiveness ofthe system; radar accurately locates the target; computers,from a knowledge of the shell trajectories and the past tar-get course, predict the point of intersection and aim theguns. But this is a losing battle. The increased speed ofplanes, plus the possibility of guiding bombs to the target,a possibility that would permit them to remain at longranges, will render antiaircraft guns ineffective. At a rangeof 5 miles, a fast plane will fly over 2 miles after the shellleaves the gun and before it arrives at the plane, and fewpilots are skilful enough to fly that distance accuratelyenough to be hit by a perfectly aimed shot. These consid-erations show the need for guiding the missile to thetarget.

    The primary characteristics needed in a guided missileare range, accuracy, and damage potential. To be tacti-cally useful, other requirements are: speed, automaticcontrol, traffic capacity, reliability, and low cost for theeffect achieved.

    Fortunately, scientific progress has developed in manyfields to the point where it is possible to combine and ex-tend them to make guided missiles work. These fields in-clude rocketry, jet propulsion, supersonic aerodynamics,structures, miniaturized electronics, servo-mechanisms,electronic computers, and radar.

    Address delivered to the Washington Section, Institute of theAeronautical Sciences, December 2, 1952, Washington, D. C.

    *Reprinted from July '53 Aeronautical Engineering Review.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    Design of an Antiaircraft MissileLet us make a rough preliminary design of an antiair-

    craft missile to get a feeling for the problems.First, we must provide an air frame, light yet tremen-

    dously strong and rigid, with lifting and control surfacescapable of high maneuverability at great altitudes, yetcontrollable also at sea level-that is, through a range of airdensities of about 10 to 1.

    \Ve must also provide a warhead. Present antiaircraftshells weigh from 15 to 100 lbs., but, since we are using amuch larger and more costly missile, we want to assurehigh kill probabilities. Also, airplanes are becoming morerugged. \Ve will probably want to allow something in theneighborhood of 100 to 500 Ibs. for the warhead,

    To guide the missile to within lethal distance of thetarget we must provide room for an amazing guidancesystem. It must be accurate; it must average out the errorsfed to it; yet, it must be fast enough to follow the target'se\'asive maneuvers.

    \Ve must also allow space for the control system. Thisincludes the power and mechanisms for moving the con-trol surfaces, plus the computers to make the missile stableand maneuverable at all altitudes and yet prevent exces-sive aerodynamic forces from being imposed at low alti-tudes.

    Propulsion Systems

    \Ve must also provide space for a propulsion system. Asa hrst approximation, let us assume a missile diameter of2 ft. If we optimize the length and shape and providelifting and control surfaces, this missile will have a drag ofabout 6,500 Ibs. at a velocity of twice the speed of sound.This will require a propulsion system capable of providingover 25,000 hp., packaged inside our 2-ft missile, yet onethat is light and reliable.

    The first propulsion system that comes to mind is arocket, which has the characteristics of thrust and sizeneeded. The solid rocket is quite simple in principle. Itconsists of a chamber in which the propellants burn athigh pressure and a nozzle through which the jet acts. Ingoing to large sizes, the chambers become heavy since thehigh-pressure chamber, which must contain the propel-lants, becomes large. In a liquid rocket, the combustionchamber can be kept comparatively small and light sincethe propellants are stored outside the chamber, but this re-quires pumps, fuel metering, and other complications. Allthis has favored the use of solid rockets for small, short-range uses and liquid fuels for larger rockets. The German

    5

  • AIR BREATHING JET ENGINES

    .~==:tTURBOJET -"'-~- Fur::'. c""'eu5TIO:::-.----

    Fig. 1

    it only gi\'es thrust at high velocities and is ineffectivemuch below its designed speed. Because of its simplicity.however, the ram-jet can be very light, providing severalhorsepower per ounce. Its fuel economy also is good, sinceit attains a fuel specific impulse of about 1,200 Ibs. sec. perlb., or about six times as much as a rocket. It thereforeneeds to carry only about one-sixth of the propellant arocket requires, or, in our hypothetical missile, a .ram-jetwould only need about 330 Ibs. of fuel instead of a ton.The propellant weights are estimated for low-altitudeRight. At high altitudes, the drag is less, and less propel-lant is needed.

    Thus, it appears that the ram-jets (Fig. 2) are muchbetter than rockets. However, the decision is not alwaysso simple. For this comparison, we have assumed an aero-dynamic Right path, one similar to the Hight an airplanewould make. If a ballistic trajectory similar to a shell isconsidered, this considerably modifies the comparison infavor of rockets and extends the range at which rockets arecompetitive, but this in turn imposes certain limitations on

    PULSEJET

    INNER BODY,

    ... ~.RAMJET

    V-2 was a liquid-fuel rocket. Recent advances in thetechniques of solid-fuel rockets. howe\'er, ha\'e made themcompetitive, particularly if the handling problems of thecorrosive liquid propellants are considered. By its nature .a rocket must also carry the oxidizer, as well as the fuel.Since this is several times the weight of the fuel itself, onlya rather low specific impulse of 200 lbs. sec. per lb. ofpropellant is attained-i.e., 1 lb. of propellant will supply200 lbs. thrust for 1 sec. or 1 lb. thrust for 200 sec.)If weassume a time of Hight of 60 sec.. which means a range ofabout 20 miles for the hypothetical missile we were de-signing, we will require about a ton of fuel and oxidizer(6,500 X 60/200 = 1,950 Ibs.).

    This rough approximation shows that, while rockets aregood for short-range missiles, the propellant weight be-comes excessive where long range is needed. By far thegreatest amount of the propellant is the oxidizer. Thus, ifwe could use air as the oxidizer, the amount of propellantto be carried would be greatly reduced. Engines that dothis are the pulse-jet, the turbojet, and the ram-jet (Fig.1). These arc modifications of the rocket idea to admit airinto the combustion chamber to burn with the fuel.

    The pulse-jet operates intermittently, admitting air tothe combustion chamber through valves that automaticallyclose to contain the explosion pressure and force the jetout the nozzle. The pulse-jet was used by the Germans inthe V-I. It is not an efficien t propulsion system for super-sonic speeds.

    The turbojet, which is now commonly used in jet air-craft, uses a turbine compressor to force the air continu-ouslv into the combustion chamber under sufficientpressure to eject the jet of combustion products throughthe nozzle.

    At supersonic speeds, the ram pressure of the air due tothe velocity of the missile will provide enough pressure tomake the jet engine effective. The ram-jet is thus a sim-plified turbojet in which the compressor is not needed, but

    -- --~- -.Fig. 2. Large ram-jet launched at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, Calif. Its velocity was "far into the su-personic range." The ram-jet is boosted to near the speed of sound by a solid-propellant rocket, which falls away, andthe ram-jet engine takes over. It was developed for the Navy Bureau of Ordnance by The Johns Hopkins University

    Applied Physics Laboratory and its associate contractors.

    6 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • .........--_.

    rI

    Fig. 3.

    Fig. 4.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    Guidance Systems

    There are a number of possible guidance systems. Thechoice \'aries with the tactical conditions and the philoso-phy of use. These can be divided into systems where the

    7

    brains are built into the ground equipment, into the mis-sile. or divided between them.

    One philosophy is to make the missile as moronic as pos-sible so that as little as possible is lost with each missile.Therefore, the brains are built into the ground equip-ment, and the missile onlv has to follow orders. It there-fore is generally known as'the Command System (Fig. 4).The ground guidance installation must include: equipmentfor tracking the target, generally a radar; another equip-ment for tracking the missile: a computer to determinethe commands that should be gi\'en to guide the missile tothe target; and a communication link to the missile. Inthis system, the compromise has been made in favor ofcomplicated and expensive ground equipment that can beused many times over.

    Another system is to divide the brains between theground equipment and the missile so as to reduce theground equipment without overcomplicating the missile.The Beamrider is an example of this (Fig. 5). Here, theground guidance equipment consists of a radar that tracksthe target. The missile has enough intelligence to centeritself in the radar beam. In both the Command and

    I .Beamnder systems the accuracy falls off at long range.

    The final step is to put the brains in the missile. Thismeans building a target-seeking system into the missile(Fig. 6). This will prove necessary in very long-rangemissiles, since homing accuracy is not necessarily depend-ent on the distance from the launchino site. These S\'S-

    b

    tems are complicated, however, and often need mid-coursecontrol to guide them to the vicinity of the target. Thehoming problems can be appreciated when you considerthat the missile and target are closing at a rate of about] mile every 2 sec. so that little time is available for thehoming system to locate the target and make all correctionsrequired to achie\'e a "hit."

    I I

    ~-----~~-------- ~ILLUSTRATIONOF COMMAND

    GUIDANCE SYSTEM

    the ouidance system. In all, the rocket seems best forb

    short-range and the ram-jet for long-range antiaircraftmissiles. TIle only discussion is over the range at whichthis division comes.

    So far we have only considered the missile in Right.There is also the problem of launching the missile and ac-celerating it to flight speed. For antiaircraft use, wheretime is of great consequence, it is important to spend aslittle time as feasible in attaining Right velocity. This isbeing done by means of large rockets (Fig. 3) which accel-erate the missile to Right speed in a few seconds and thengenerally separate, leaving the missile to fly on unencum-bered.

  • MINUTES TO 80Me RELEASE

    ILLUSTRATION OF". BEAM RIDER

    GUIDANCE SYSTEM

    ILLUSTRATIONOF HOMING

    GUIDANCE SYSTEMS

    Fig. 6.

    Fig. 5.

    AIR DEFENSEGuided Missile In1ercep'tion

    Fig. 7.

    _==-~=--__ :::=:;"'- __ :::===1__ ==__ ='o l to,,'

    I MilES HIQllIllARGET I-=-=-=-=......_=-=-=I~I==-==i~ - - 000

    ~2' iii' ~~ @ 1;.i~ @ 4M-~"e ~IRELEASE ~

    ITAR'GET I

    JA

    Air Defense

    Guided-Missile Systems

    So much for the missiles themseh-es. They are only acomparatively small part of a guided-missile system. I havementioned the guidance equipment required, but, in ad-dition, launchers, handling equipment, stowage, and testequipment are necessary. E\'en all this is only a part of thesystem. It must be integrated into an o\'erall air-defensesystem, including detection of enemy attack, identificationof the attackers as hostile, display of the situation, analysisof the attack, and allocation of the role each defendingunit is to play.

    To see what is involved in such a defense system, let usmake some assumptions and view the overall situation. Itmust be remembered that there is no such thing as a staticdefense. A defense today may be useless next year. Allwe can do is plan our defenses to meet the attack that anenemy can throw against us. Therefore, I shall make as-sumptions for a hypothetical situation, not based on anyparticular developments or time, primarily to select roundnumbers that make the calculations simple. Let us assumethat the attacking planes fly at 600 miles per hour or 10miles per min., that the guided missiles fly twice as fast asthe planes, and that they ha\'e a range of 50 mile~

    Since the bomb travels some distance after release, wemust destroy the attacker before he reaches the bomb-release line, which is at least some 5 miles from the target(Fig. 7). An important target will probably be defendedby several missile sites surrounding the city, about 25 milesout. Since the missile range is 50 miles, the first missilewill intercept the attacker 75 miles from the defendedpoint, or 7 min. from bomb-release. Moreover, since the

    attacking planes fly 25 miles during the time the missilesare flying 50 miles, the missiles must be launched whenthe planes are 100 miles from the target.

    If the missiles must be fired when the attackers are 100miles from the target, the missile site must be warnedearlier in order to man the equipment, ready the missiles,and fire (Fig. 8). If we allow 5 min. for this, the missilesite must be alerted when the attackers are 150 miles fromthe target, or 14.5 min. from bomb-release line. Further-more, in order to alert the missile site, the enemy planesmust be detected and tracked; the attack must be analyzed,and the defense moves allocated to the defending units.Time allowance for this means that the enemy should bedetected 225 miles from the target.

    Interceptors

    So far, we have considered only the guided-missile sys-tems, but we will also want to use interceptors (Fig. 9).They should operate beyond the range of the guided mis-siles; so they must complete their attack before missile-intercept range, 75 miles from the target, to avoid con-fusing the defense. If we allow 10 min. for the entireinterceptor engagement, they must intercept the attackersat 175 miles. Now, the interceptor bases need alerting toprovide time for the interceptors to be manned and climbto altitude; therefore, they must be alerted when the at-tacking planes are 300 miles from the target. Time for

    AIR DEFENSEGuided Missile Eorly Wornino ond Detection

    MINUTES TO 80we RELEASE

    .--=:>--==---==-__ =---==---=:>--==---=::J--==--==---==llo l 1 9-1ft """'2 U

    MILES fRO" TARGET,...-~

    I' " " "'" '"~ -- ---I ~FIREALERT DETECTlOfrll

    MISSILE OfSITE ENEMY

    Fig. 8.

    8 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • Fig. 9.

    AIR DEFENSE.. qhler Interception and Guided Missiles

    Costs

    It would not be complete to discuss guided missileswithout giving some consideration to the economics in-\'olved. One is too prone to compare the cost of one mis-sile to the cost of one shell and feel convinced that onecannot alford to use them. This is not a reasonable com-

    of how big, let us take \Vashington as the enemy's targetand use various points northeast of \Vashington to indi-cate how far away each stage of the attack takes place(Fig. 10).

    The enemv attack must be detected O\'er Boston. Theinterceptors' base must be alerted when the enemy reachesHartford, Conn. The interceptors reach the enemy overNewark, N. J. The guided missile site is alerted as theattackers reach Trenton, N. J.: the first missiles arelaunched as the enemy approaches \ Vilmington, Del., andthe first enemy planes are shot down by guided missilesnear Elkton, 1\ Id. This is the scale of the action underthe hypothetical conditions we ha\'e assumed.

    FIRSTOETEtttO'4

    ........ALEOf IIIo(ISSILESITE

    "'I"llUTE"S TO 80"8 RELE.1SE

    ------------=-=..:=--~--=-=-.=~=-=-=--=--=-=-() 1 ~W't "-012 2'9-- l ~?

    WILES F~O" TARGET...--.:-.----==---===-===-===-===--===-I~ l'-.t ClO ~ lOG)~

    early warning, identification, and display means that theenemy must be detected about 375 miles from the targetor 37 min. from bomb-release.

    These distances sound big. but, to get a clear realization

    Fig. 10.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953 9

  • parison. At the least. one should compare the cost of de-stroying an enemy plane by each method. Since. at thealtitudes of expected attacks. guns do not haye a highprobability of kill per shot, it is not surprising to find thatguided missiles will bring down more enemy planes thanguns for a giyen amount of money e......pended for ammuni-tion. In other words, a stock of guided missiles will shootdown more enemy planes than a stock of antiaircraft shellsof equiyalent cost.

    It is true that in a single heavy attack a far greater costcould be expended by the guided missiles launched thanthat e;,..pended by any available number of guns. Underthese conditions, too, guided missiles cost less per planeshot down, and the high cost is a criterion of the extremelyhigh le\'el of defense. Past experience has indicated thatan attrition level of 5-10 per cent proyided an adequatedefense, but now a near-perfect defense is needed. Guidedmissiles give promise of such a defense.

    But the missile cost is only a part of the economic situa-tion. The cost of the equipment and the annual cost ofoperation must also be considered. For frequent heayy at-

    tacks. the missile cost is important, but for few small-scaleattacks it may account for less than 10 per cent of the oyer-all cost, e\'en if the capital costs are amortized oyer seyeralYears.

    It turns out that for most systems-guns, guided mis-siles. and interceptors-the capital cost is about twice theannual operating cost, or, if the capita~ costs are amortizedO\'er 4 years. they contribute an additional 50 per cent tothe cost of the annual operation, Thus, it turns out thatthe major costs of any defense system are the men andtheir support.

    This points out the advantages of long-range systemsthat require fewer installations to co\'er the same area. Butthe longer the range, the higher the cost; the fewer theinstallations, the more easily they can be saturated or de-stroyed. The basic problem is to use the funds available toprovide the best defense for the attacks the enemy canmake. This defense must include all weapons that contrib-ute usefully and must provide for continuing imprm'ementto meet the threat of a possible enemy's increasing capabil-ities.

    COORDINATION WITH THE INFANTRYBy LIEUTENANT JOHN H. ALEXANDER

    3rd AAA AW BII (SP)

    CpI Kim Hang Sik, 3rd AAA A \X' Bn gunner, ready with twin 40mm guns on1\119 mount.

    IN Korea the liaison between the in-fantry battalion and supporting artilleryhas in a great way been responsible forthe gigantic toll United Nations artil-lery has taken on the enemy. This co-ordination involves precise timing, ade-quate communication, careful planning,and, finally, perfect execution. And forthe AAA SP platoon, whose four f\ 116'sand four M19's may encompass fourmiles of front, the problems of propercoordination are manifestly enlarged.

    The platoon leader's first commitmentin a SP platoon move-whether goinginto established positions, in a platoonrotation; or moving with the infantryinto new sites-is to immediately con-tact the battalion's S3 section, and theartillery liaison officer. Of the two, theS3 is of most importance in the initialmove. If the site has never been occupiedby AAA AW, he decides upon the pla-toon's positions; if the positions havebeen previously occupied, a new infantrybattalion, and/or a new S3 may dictatechanges. The platoon leader discusseswith him the capabilities and limitationsof tracks and weapons. Can the track"pull" this hill which would offer goodposition; can the "forties" effectiyely cov-

    er hill "325"; will the quad mount de-press enough to hit this possible avenueof approach; will harassing and interdic-tion fire be effective at this range? The

    53 learns the number of tracks availablefor the support of his battalion sector.From him, the platoon leader learns howmany tracks are to be used primarily for

    10 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • defensi\Oe fire, and how many are tobe employed for offensive work-bunker"busting," sniper shooting, harassing fire.and direct support of infantry patrolaction.

    If in a new area, tentative positionsare chosen by map \'1iOrk,then, the pro-posed sites are reconnoitered by the S3and the platoon leader. Here the pla-toon leader must know the capabilitiesof his weapons; for at the selected site,he must tell the S3 exactly what can beeffectively hit and covered. Althoughthe field of fire may be good, perhapsthe targets, on close observation, do notwarrant emplacement of a track; or may-be an outdated map has not detailedterrain features, or does not show re-cently constructed roads which mightmake a position accessible; or perhapsthere is a question as to the effectivenessof an Ml9's long-range fire on a "76"position. Together they must decide ifa commitment of a track on the site isadvisable.

    Once it has definitely been determinedto occupy the position, there are otherconsiderations. An overhead for the trackis always advisable, but sometimes im-practical. If the position is temporary,often an overhead is not worthwhile;again, perhaps all the firing is to be doneat night, and the track is removed fromfiring position during daylight hours; orperhaps the overhead restricts the fieldof fire, or prohibits high-angle, 50-cali-ber, plunging fire. The S3 can informthe platoon leader of the enemy's artil-lery activity in the area. If the two deeman overhead mandatory, plans for its con-struction are laid.

    Through the S3, arrangements for thefeeding of the crew, and bunker "accom-modatIons," are made with the infantrycompany commander whose people oc-cupy the area. Targets of primary in-terest are pointed out by the S3 to theantiaircraft platoon leader, on maps andat the position. Areas for harassing andinterdiction fire are noted. If the posi-tion is primarily defensive, the time andplace for supporting fires are designated.The S3 provides the platoon leader withoverlays and all counterattack data; it isthe latter's responsibility to see that themovement of his tracks at such an emer-gency is closely coordinated with theproposed infantry action. And lastly,once the positioning of the tracks hasbeen definitely established, the platoon

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    leader must submit to the infantry bat-ta~ion an exacting Q\oerlayof thei~ loca-tions and fire concentrations.

    Once the platoon is established. vir-tually all coordination is carried onthrough the artillery liaison officer at-tached to the infantrv battalion. \Vithhim, the platoon lead~r reviews prospec-thoe targets. Details are thoroughly dis-cussed. If the LNO wants an area "Hand I'd,'" the quantity of ammunitionneeded to do the job effectivelv is con-sidered. Generallv the liaison officer hasa specific time ~hen he wants fire ina certain area for harassing work. Per-haps enemy patrols are known to beusing a certain path down a finger atdusk each evening; or a draw is beingused as an assembly area. With suchobjectives in mind, a harassing. andinterdiction program is Jet up by theplatoon leader and the LNO: Thev de-cide how much ammunition is to beexpended on specified targets; how longin one area the fire is to continue, andin what volume; the most advantageoustime for fire; and how the fire is to beconducted-whether, for instance, withthe 1\116's, it might be better to fire fourhundred rounds sporadically over a halfhour period, with the probability of mini-mizing activity in the area for that peri-od of time; or whether it might not bemore advantageous to fire all four hun-dred rounds in a five minute period,with the possibility of finding an enemytroop concentration in the open. A"harassing and interdiction" schedule, oneither a nightly or weekly basis, is ar-ranged. A weekly schedule, with timesof fire and targets varying nightly, gen-erally more efficiently precludes the pos-sibility of error and misunderstandingwith the crew. With this schedule, andan overlay of the SP positions, the liaisonofficer can make changes through theplatoon leader, should any of the sched-uled fire interfere with friendly patrolaction.

    To complete the coordination, the pla-toon leader must contact the forwardobservers who win be directing fire forthe tracks; the observers will be locatedby the liaison officer. From the observa-tion post, and on the maps, the platoonleader designates the desired targets. Of-ten these are supplemented, and alteredbv the forward observer. A schedulea~d overlay are given the observer, andarrangements for target registration are

    completed. Usually each evening theweapons are reregistered on the targetsto be "H and I'd" during the night..And, of course. the ohsenoer periodicallyregisters on his "direct fire" targets. Theplatoon leader can often be of great aidto the obsenoer in the registration of theplatoon's weapons. For instance, it maybe helpful to tell him with ranges of3500 yards and up, the "50's" can bemost easily registered at dusk or earlydark, when the Hash of the hittingrounds may be readily located, long aftertracer burn-out. Further, the observermust be aware of proposed locations ofthe tracks, should they move to alter-nate positions to take up defensive roles.And again the platoon leader reviews,with the obsen'er, the firing capabilitiesand characteristics of his weapons.

    Because of the length of front encom-passed by the SP platoon, coordinationdifficulties are constantly arising, evenwith the platoon positioned, registered,and functioning normally. The greatestof these involves communications. Linesbetween liaison officer and platoon lead-er, and between platoon command postand tracks, must at all times be intact.The lateral lines, between the observa-tion posts and tracks, are particularlysubject to enemy fire. Alternate routesbetween all parties must be established.Should line communication fail, radiocontact must be maintained. This com-munication is imperative for control andcoordination. With a harassing and in-terdiction program, the platoon leadermust check daily with as many as threedifferent liaison officers. Invariably theprogram involves firing from one battal-ion sector into another; and patrol clear-ance must definitely be established witheach infantry unit. Should an emer-gency arise, displacement of tracks mustbe cleared through the infantry battal-ion; and critical targets must be desig-nated. Firing information for patrol andarmor support must often be relayed.And of course the observer's adjustmentsmust be transmitted to the crew. Thuscommunication between the SP platoon,the liaison officer, the observer, the 53,and the tracks is imperative for the coor-dination so essential to effective opera-tion.

    Overall coordination requires the con-stant attention of the antiaircraft platoonleader. First, his platoon is positioned

    (Continued on page 23)

    11

  • --~-- - --""'1"1"'"' .......I- ,- ...By LT.COLONEL OTHO ANTHONY MOOMAW

    601st AAA GUll Battn/ioll

    SHORTLY after my arrival in Koreain ~Iay 1952, I was assigned to the 3dAAA A\\1 Bn (SP), 3d Infantry Divi-sion, I Corps. Commanded by Lt. Gen-eral John \\1. (Iron ~like) O'Daniel.Very soon I noticed that the motto ofthe I Corps was "Sharpen Your Bayo-nets." At first I thought this was a rath-er silly motto but somehow it impressedme-at least it impressed me enough tomake me study and analyze its truemeaning and what the man who choseit was thinking about when he decidedto use it as a motto. I am sure he wastrying to get a point across, which wasto stress the "1i\IPORT/\NCE OFFUNDAMENTALS."

    About four weeks after first seeing thismotto I decided to learn if it had a truemeaning. Headquarters Batlery, 3d 1\1\1\En (SP) was scheduled for a BattalionCommand Inspection soon. 1\ few daysbefore the scheduled inspection, 1 in-structed the Battery Commander to tryto have maximum attendance and tomake special effort to have each man,so authorized, to wear his bayonet. Theinspection was held as scheduled; 89men out of an assigned strength of 107stood the inspection, 79 men had bayo-nets, the other 10 being truck driverswere not authorized bayonets. Out ofthe 79 bayonets inspected, 21 were de-fective, six had about ~~ inch broken offthe point, se\'en had badly bent andmarred points, and the remainder wereeither dull, rusty or had loose handles.1 was rather amazed to find that such asmall piece of equipment-a bayonet, anarticle which is not used on the averageof once in a lifetime, could be in sucha poor state of maintenance. Further-more these were not even front linetroops. They would only upon rare oc-casions have use for the bayonet. I mightadd that the appearance of the soldiers

    in ranks and their quarters looked justabout like their bayonets,

    After the inspection, instructions weregiven that all bayonets would be straight-ened, cleaned and sharpened. In thosecases where abuse was evident, the sol-dier was held pecuniarily liable for thecost of a new bavonet, The next Battal-,ion Command Inspection was held 5weeks later. Not only were all bayonetsinspected in a good condition but wherecombat boots were just passable before,at this inspection they were shining,brass was gleaming, the soldiers had abright countenance and their posturewas erect. Now I really knew what"Sharpen Your Bayonets" meant andwhat was more pleasing, I realized thatthese soldiers also had learned,

    \Vith this I Corps motto in mind, Iinstructed my staff to start inspectingeverything that should have a sharp orsquare point on it and insist upon clean-ing and sharpening all weapons andtools. \Ve concentrated upon screwdriv-ers, chisels and axes. Many screwdrivershad broken and bent points, chisels weredull and frayed, presenting safety haz-ards in some cases, and axes were in adeplorable condition. They had loosehandles, were rusty, and had dull andchipped bits, caused by striking stonesand chopping into the ground. I knowof no one tool that gets more abuse thanthe average axe in the hands of a 20thCentury U. S. Soldier. Not only wasthis true in Korea but the same condi-tion was later found to exist in the Bat-talion to which I am presently assignedhere in the United States.

    The U. S. Soldier does not like todig. He has the ready answer, "Sir, wehave requested a bulldozer," or "Sir, wedo not have any picks." 1-I00ve\'er,whenthe shells fall close or someone in thesquad gets killed or wounded they dig

    like gophers. I recall a twin 40mm ;\ I19Squad of Brry B which was supportingthe 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantrvlast 1\ larch. The weapon was emplacednear the i\lain Line of Resistance(1\ ILR) in a shallow position. I urgedthe squad leader to dig the position deep-er. However, a later inspection revealedonly small signs of an improved position.The squad leader said the position wasused only at night and the enemy neverfired any weapons at the position. Thenone evening at dusk, just after the weap-on went into the position, the enemynred just two rounds of 76mm artilleryat the position. One round was "over"and the second round just "short,"throwing stones and shell fragments intothe position and wounding one of theammunition handlers. The ne~xteveningI inspected the position. \Vithout ques-tion it was by then one of the best pre-pared positions in the sector. No furtherlectures were needed by this squad onthe subject of digging in.

    Storing and policing ammunition onthe battlefield, laying and picking upfield telephone wire and the use of sandbags, for other than fortincation pur-poses are some of the other problems acombat commander is confronted within the combat zone. \Vith the funda-mental principle of "Practice SupplyEconomv" drilled into the minds of all,key personnel these critical items can becontrolled satisfactorily.

    And so we stress the importance offundamental teaching. 'Take care of thesmall things and the large things willtake care of themselves."

    If vou want to nnd an efficient soldier.look for one with a sharp bayonet. Ifyou have a dull battery or battalion andwould give it zest, "sharpen your bayo-nets."

    12

    BEINGTRANSFERRED?

    If so, send us vour new address. If vou do not vet know the new address, writeus to suspend m'ailing your JOUR~AL: Then we 'hold it here and forward whenwe do get your new address. That will give you better sen'ice. The Postmasterwill not fonvard or return your JOUR~AL,

    ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • .,... - or- .- ..,.... ~ ~~ I----~-- ~ -......~

    Machines of modern warfare have become so complex

    that training men to operate them is a major problem

    By RICHARDS W. COTTONCIUlirmml, Electrollics Productioll Board

    As a whole, the armed forces of theUnited States are not now qualified tohandle at top efficiency the advancedelectronic equipment our scientists havegiven them. \Ve are not trainingenough men in this complex science tooperate and maintain what has beendeveloped.

    But what makes these statements sovital is that we are making still anothermistake. To most Americans the aver-age Russian is a bearded, bomb-throwingdullard whom our highly trained andwell equipped troops could quicklyknock out. That just is not so at thistime. Russia has a huge armed forceof highly skilled and trained men whoseelectronic equipment compares favor-ably with our own. It is true that theirequipment may not be as technicallyperfect, nor as expensive as ours, but itis designed for the intelligence level ofher operating troops. They should getbetween 80 and 90 per cent maximumutility out of their electronic gear. Oursis unquestionably superior-but, com-bat officers tell me, too often we onlyget approximately 60 per cent of its po-tential value. This is caused by insuf-ficient training, and equipment whichis overly complex, especially from amaintenance standpoint.

    Our readiness for an electronic war,even after two years of Korea, can onlybe described as half-and-half-we arehalf trained and half equipped.

    Let us admit that soldiers cannot bemade into proficient technicians in atwo-year draft. But I am not recom-mending extension of the draft period.

    Lt. Gen. Orval Cooke of the USAFpoints out that we do have tremendousnational assets in the basic trainabilityof our men-if they can be held in serv-

    *Reprinted from April 1953 issue of Na-tion'J BUJineJJ.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    ice long enough-and in the potentialoutput of our production lines.

    "These," he says, "compensate forthe fact that the so-called American in-ventive genius is not what we like tothink it is. \Vho invented jet aircraft?Radar? The British. \Vho inventedsuch things as the recoilless cannon?The Germans and the Swiss. But weare great borrowers and producers. Ourstrong points are in the quantitativefield rather than the qualitative."

    Admitting that in the past 20 yearsthe world's greatest inventions havenot been American and our forte is massproduction, I also believe that we areimproving our position qualitatively,both in industry and in the training ofour troops in electronic warfare.

    The hard core of modern electronicwar is the vacuum tube, or "bottle" asthe GI calls it. 1'lilitary electronic gearrequires a high degree of training, notonly to operate it, but also to service iteither behind the lines, or in actualcombat. For instance, normal attritionaccounts for a daily loss of three tubesout of every 200 in normal rear echelonmilitary bench use. The B-36 carries2,700 tubes of all sorts, so you couldexpect 40 to blow every day. In eachcase the trouble must be diagnosed,located and repaired, while under wayor even under fire.

    Freeing the armed forces from theneed to contract for civilian electronicexperts to perform necessary mainte-nance work will require far more thanthe two years a draftee is now requiredto serve. Industry and the armed forces,meeting on equal terms in the Elec-tronics Production Board, agree that ittakes not less than five years of inten-sive training to make an across-the-board electronics man out of a highschool graduate with a good IQ.

    AFTER a draftee has finished hisfirst nine weeks of basic training andfinally has started on his "commonblock> or basic, electronics, he findsmany other distractions which take himfrom the classroom. All these demandsmay be important in themselves, but,together, they mean that a draftee canonly be trained on a single phase in theelectronics field. On this single pieceof gear he gives the service only anaverage of ten months usefulness out ofhis two-year hitch.

    Of course there are solutions for theseproblems. Some are in industry, somein the armed forces-but most are-right-fully-in the laps of the American peo-ple. It's their survival and the survivalof their sons which we are really dis-cussing and it will be their responsibilityto see that we take remedial action.

    The meaning of all this might bemade clearer by going back to an incidentin World War II.

    At that time, the gunnery officer onI-1.1'l.S. H.ood was looking with vexa-tion at the radar reading given by hisnewfangled electronic fire-control sys-tem. It couldn't be right, he thought,so he took an optical reading, trans-mitted the data to the gun turrets, firedat the distant German battleship Bis-marck-and missed. In the next fewseconds the Bismarck's radar-directedsalvo crashed inboard and the Hood wasdoomed.

    1\ lilitary electronics-of which radaris one of many-actually came into be-ing in World War II, principally thebrain child of Sir Robert \Vatson-\Vatt.The impact upon our world has beenprodigious. Because of electronics-andnuclear fission-we, as a nation, are inmuch the same position as the Hood'sgunnery officer-in the next war therewill be no time for a mistake.

    13

  • Before the war ..\Ir. \Vatson-\YaHwas trying to measure the exact distancebetween the earth and its encompass-ing ionosphere \vith a carefully timedtransmitter-receiver. It seemed thate\"ery time he got his instruments setand began transmitting, a plane wouldroar o\'erhead from a nearby airfield.Out of patience, the young scientistcalled up the Air Ministry and com-plained. The planes caused what hecalled "disturbing echoes."

    "Echoes?" echoed the Air Ministryincredulously. "From planes in Right?Are you sure?" Watson-Watt was quitesure. 'We'll be right around," said theAir Ministry.

    That was the beginning of radar.

    IONOSPHERIC measurements wererelegated to an assistant and the youngscientist became a full-time 'Top SecretBoffin;' or top echelon "Back-RoomBoy," working on the development ofthe devices which were the forerunnersof those now torturing the minds of ouryoung enlistees.

    The Germans later developed a micro-wave radar and, until effective counter-measures were developed, they madelife miserable for our bombers, patrolcraft and raiders. The famous Diepperaid, when so many British and Cana-dians died on what seemed a uselessmission, actually was not just anotherraid. Our Intelligence knew that theGermans had something new in radar.If we were to learn how to jam it wehad to get in to see it. The Dieppe raidwas set up to take a certain stocky,medium-sized, ruddy Scotsman ashoreand let him look-see. Actually, the raidwas a success. But, for security reasons,we could not explain at that time.

    I feel that I am somewhat qualifiedto comment brieRy on the current situa-tion. I have been engaged in electricalengineering and electronics all my life,I believe I was the only American everto serve as an official of the British Gov-ernment-during the last war I was ap-pointed controller of signals and equip-ment in the British Air Commission.Shortly after my return to this country,I was asked to become director of theelectronics division of the NationalProduction Authority and chairman ofthe Electronics Production Board, Oneof the arms of our defense mobilizationeffort. Having lived with electronics

    14

    e\'er since it was wireless and havingworked on its military application allthrough a war and a half, I must con-fess that I feel a considerable alarmover the immediacy of the problem ofelectronic-atomic total war.

    Let us start with equipment.Once a Brass Hat came back from a

    naval maneuver, a faraway look in hiseyes. "If I only had a piece of equip-ment that would spot a snorkel at 100miles without picking up waves or drift-wood, we could lick the world." Hisdreamboat idea went in time to the re-search people. Smart and capable, theyare, however, not always practical. Theresearchers designed a monster whichwould do all that was asked of it andperhaps a bit more, but it was so com-plex that only the designers themselvescould operate or maintain it.

    Finally it got to the manufacturerwho said it must be simplified for pro-duction. The simplifying procedure con-tinued as the production engineerspointed out Raws. The design for a pieceof electronics frequently comes from re-search including a type of vacuum tubethat does not even exist, except as anequation on paper.

    In making it, the manufacturer's en-gineers may find that 99 ohms performbetter than the 100 ohms the specifica-tions call for. The resulting paper chasemay require weeks-even months.

    And, always, before we get into fullproduction we must solve two severeproblems-complexity of design andcontract formalities. I am reminded ofa v':artime example of what happenswhen, as an air vice marshal on Gen-eral Eisenhower's staff said to me, "theBoffins forget that the ultimate productmust be suited to the mentality of thesergeants' mess."

    In World War II, the United Statesobtained the sonar target depth deter-mining device from the British. It con-tained something less than 30 vacuumtubes, took up little shipboard space,and needed one crewman. Since thewar we have "improved" it. Our versionhas about 235 tubes, takes up half aroom, and requires two more men justto keep it operational. Its increasedefficiency is slight.

    A good rule-of-thumb is that, forevery man aboard a fighting ship, youhave to add eight tons displacement forsuch things as fuel, water, food, cloth-ing and gear. On top of that is the new

    electronics equipment itself. the addi.tional tubes and spares necessary fotday-to-day maintenance.

    The electronics industry, left free touse its own ingenuity, mowd in the op-posite direction. The typical televisionreceiver of 19-1-9 used 26 tubes. Todav'stypical set uses 21 tubes, gives betterperformance, has simplified comrols,more reliability and easier maintenance.

    A radar device of considerable Com-plexity was installed in a ship whoseidentity isn't important here. Its cap-tain brought the vessel into a navy yardand the electronics technical officer hur.ried aboard to check on performance.The captain was almost ecstatic.' Hepointed with pride to a steadily rotatingscanner on his mast.

    "Couldn't get along without it," heburbled. ".:\1arvelous thing." Elatedby this praise, the ETO went belowand found a young lieutenant with acouple of ET-3s (electronic technician,third class) poring over a massive vol-ume of circuits. The ETO asked howthe equipment was operating. One tech-nician carefully closed the door.

    "That thing!" grated the lieutenant."It hasn't worked for three days. I justkept the scanner rotating to please theold man. He sees it going around andaround and thinks everything is dandy."

    THE ETO sent one of his Tech Reps,known as contract engineers, aboardand in a day he had it working prop-erly. These contract engineers-aver.aging ten years' experience in main-taining all types of electronic gear-goto the armed sen'ices from the electronicindustry to teach the officers and crewhow to maintain and operate their ownequipment. But in practice they oftenwind up doing the repair work them-selves and rarely have time for in-struction. VVhen I complained of thisto one admiral he insisted that it \vasnecessary because he "had to maintainconstant battle readiness:'

    I pointed out that, in demanding bat-tle readiness. he was losing his warreadiness. There simply would not beenough men to do a full wartime job ifenough enlisted men were not trainedto meet the vastly increased demandsof an all-out \var.

    While an Army hitch is likely to betwo years, a ~avy cruise is for three orfour and an Air Force enlistment for

    ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • four vears. A draftee's sen'ice in anybranch is for hvo vears. The latter twosen'ices obviously have a much easiertime licking the training problem if theyobtain all the men thev want.

    Both the Air Forc; and the Nan'are "ven', ven- nice" to the bovs the lastfew mo~ths 0' their l:erms of ;nlistment.If they can get a man to stay on fornm enlistments they know that, at,,'orst, they have a fully trained elec-tronics man in the resen'oir of the na-tion's resen'e manpower. At best theyha\'e been able to show him that, aftercompleting eight years, he is nearlyhalfway to the 2o-year retirement period-\,,:hich means a basic retirement payof more than $50 a week and a com-pletely learned trade at a probable ageof only 38. He is then in a position togo into priyate business in a field whichis now avid for stable and knowledge-able young men.

    If we are forced into a war in Europeit is important to us that electronic gearsupplied to our allies be kept operable..Where we are providing our allies withsuch equipment, it seems to me withthe draftee's length of service in NATOcountries being only 18 months, it isvital that we also provide the necessaryelectronic engineers to train allied per-sonnel.

    We have spent more than $15,000,-000,000 on military electronics sincethe war and are now up to a nationalannual expenditure of $2,500,000,000a year. This is very big business, as wellas a vital part of our survival. It isreasonable to state that, if electronicsalone can't win a war, no modern warcan be won without it. It thus ceasesto be a purely military problem. Wecannot surrender our civilian control ofwell planned military progress. Wemust demand that it be properly man-aged and fully exploited.

    THE Germans standardized theirmanufacture for wartime on 16 types ofvacuum tubes. On our JAN (JointArmy Navy) preferred lists are morethan 300 with probably another 1,000or so special purpose tubes. The hugenumber complicates both productionand usage.

    Such a list needs ruthless editing. Ispeak both as one .with some govern-mental background and also as a prac-tical industrialist.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    Simplification in maintammg andoperating the Hying and fire controlsystems of supersonic aircraft must beginwith the designer and continue e\-enafter the prototype has been acceptedand the device placed in sen'ice. Oneanswer is to extend "The Little BlackBox," or the "Go, l\o-go" technique ofmaintenance.

    "The Little Black Box" is a completeunit which can be plugged into a circuitor system. Using such a box, all theoperator maintenance man has to do isto plug a mobile testing console intoeach box on a "Go, No-go" test. If it isa case of no-go, the faulty box is rippedout as a complete unit, replaced with aperfect one and the failure sent back tothe factory.

    Many oppose this policy of immedi-ate return to the factory, but, as a fac-tory man, I know that we frequentlyget con:Hictingreports of equipment fail-ures from the fighting front. This isespecially true when field repair workhas been attempted. But, as one pilotput it, "When you are traveling 600miles an hour it is a bad time to be ina quandary." If 'The Little Black Box"is returned to the factory, persistentbreakdowns can be isolated and remedialmeasures taken.

    The Air Force is improving this sys-tem. In World War II, it hauled outwhole engines or gun assemblies andreplaced them; the repairs or cannibali-zation coming later, at leisure and in therear. The Navy complains, however,that carrying "The Little Black Boxes"aboard ship is tantamount to carryinganother radar or sonar set on an alreadyovercrowded vessel. The Army con-tends, with wisdom, that it is logisticallyimpossible to send the boxes back acrossa sea for repair and that we must estab-lish small shops in rear areas, which ineffect would be little factories.

    We have already taken one long steptoward efficiency and simplification. Weare getting away from the cry of "secur-ity" every time a nonmilitary man makesa suggestion or asks a pertinent ques-tion. But, in the solution of this over-all problem, industry must have an in-creasing voice and the opportunity tomake changes in design. Incentive con-tracts should be let which would re-ward the contractor for recommenda-tions and actions leading to reductionsin the number of operational controls,size, weight, the number of components

    and cost in a device which will stillproduce the same or a better operationalresult.

    The present system of contracting isone of the major faults in the world ofmilitary electronics. Frequently onecompany receives a research and devel-opment contract, completes it satisfac-torily and then finds that the manu-facturing contract is awarded elsewhere.The reason is an archaic lowest-bidderlaw. In the past few months I haveseen more than $6,000,000 of contractsawarded to companies that were un-able to carry them out. Two companies,in fact, went bankrupt in their effortsto carry out contracts which, for theirown sakes alone, thev never shouldhave been allowed to ~ndertake.

    Such contracts should be awardedonly to qualified electronics manufac-turers. I have recommended that, in ourall-important guided missile program, itshould be mandatory that the work cov-ering electronic research, developmentand production be subcontracted onlyto qualified manufacturers .

    THE guided missile known as theMatador, for example, presented sucha problem in the early days that 95 percent of the tubes delivered for use hadto be rejected. A guided missile deliverssuch a terrific shock in its period ofinitial fast acceleration that a wholeseries of new problems arise. The mis-sile at one time required a lieutenantcommander and his staff to check it outelectronically for flight; it now takes onechief petty officer and a mobile consoletesting unit. I asked a chief one daywhat he thought of the complete boxunit and the "Go, no-go" theory.

    Grinning, he said, UNobody dismountsa tire and patches the tube on the roadany more, does he? He just takes thetire off, slaps another one on, and sendsthe old one in to the experts for repair,nicht 'tlJahr?"

    The next time I saw that chief withhis scraps of various foreign languagespicked up in six years of service, he wasin civilian clothes, doing about the samesort of job. I asked him about it. Theanswer was simple.

    "1\lore money, Skipper."He had left the Na,,'Y and joined the

    field staff of a major manufacturer atnearly double the pay.

    There, for one example, is the type of

    15

  • problem o\'er which I could develop afine case of schizophrenia. As a manufac-turer, I know that my industry as awhole is understaffed for engineers; wego to great lengths to obtained trainedmen, At the same time, as a part-timegoyernment official, I am anxious thatthe senrices obtain and retain the tre--mendous numbers of electronicallytrained men they require now-a needwhich will be multiplied in wartime.

    Maj. Gen. Kirk B. Lawton, recentlydeputy chief signal officer and now com-manding general of the Signal Schoolat Fort Monmouth, N. J., and I werediscussing this problem recently. Iasked him where he thought he was go-ing to find the men to operate and re-pair his equipment if war came. Hegrinned, then said: 'Where will we getthem-? From you. As things standnow we'll just have to draft them rightout of industry." I pointed out that, ifall the affected services did that, theywould SOOnfind that no new electronicequipment was being delivered to them.Again, in this scarce field, industry andthe services must collaborate and notcompete.

    Lest you get the impression thatmodern electronics is a mass of poppingtubes and inadequate personnel, let mestate that large numbers of competentmen, both in and out of the services,are seriously trying to solve the riddles.However, they are restricted in theirefforts by enlistment and draft periods,limitations on promotions, pay and otherconsiderations which only Congresscan correct.

    But ridiculous things can happen,too, to leaven the urgency of the search.Take the strange case of the USS NewJersey. The New Jersey steamed out ofthe Gulf of Panama and swung north-west for Sasebo, Japan. Her searchradar began going a little erratic. Somedays it would be effective for 80 miles,other days it would drop to a mere tenor 20.

    After a time in which the watchseemed inadequate to locate the trouble,an officer and the electronic crew of 33specialists went to work without results.Then the ship reached Sasebo. A youngcivilian expert came aboard and, in ashort time, \vas climbing up the mast

    grinning broadly. There was the wave-guide-a small screen about five by eightinches and similar to the one you mighthave on your tele\rision-and in it was asmall dead Panamanian crow. The birdhad been caught in the waveguide whilethe New Jersey was going through thelocks and had been fried to a crisp. Thesearch radar continued to work after afashion, but, whenever it rained, thebird's body picked up moisture whichshorted out the set until the sun andelectric current dried it out again.

    ONE Reet commander estimatedthat, mostly due to incompletely trainedpersonnel, ten per cent of his electronicgear was always out of commission, thatanother 50 per cent was unreliable.Thus, in that Reet 60 per cent of thetotal of vital electronic equipment inservice was in poor condition.

    The Navy is not unique in this.Electronics are new and most of theofficers of today are not. The majoritywent through their academies beforeultra-high frequencies were common;most of the rest have received basictraining with a lot of theory enablingthem to administer installations, but notreally to teach and carry out detailedrepair work under field conditions. Pity,then, the enlisted man whose basictraining is not adequate to cure prompt-ly a complex disorder in a unit of vitalequipment, and whose officers angrilydemand that it be fixed immediately.By working all night he may stumbleacross the answer. That answer maybe to get out of the Navy.

    The new bombsight in our B-36plane is basically an electronic device.It costs about $250,000, as contrastedwith the $8,000 bombsight of WorldWar II. The new bombsight is onlyone of dozens of items of essential com-bat equipment. Some of these items onthe B-36 cannot be reached from insidefor repair while in Right. But most ofthe vital equipment can be, and re-design has spread it around the inside ofthe aircraft in such a manner that oneshell or rocket hit will not disable theplane's entire system.

    In arguing for simplicity of equip-ment as a first step toward breaking

    the personnel training impasse, it mustnot be misunderstood that we want tohold back the scientist in his develop-ment of new weapons. It is, perhaps,a matter of conditioning our young mento modern progress. I cannot believethat the young men of today are anybrighter than those of 25 or 50 yearsago-and they certainly are no duller.

    Human capacity to absorb newknowledge will, in time, reduce taday'sproblem in electronics to nothing-butthat makes taday's problem no less real,its solutions no less urgent.

    But, meanwhile, it is my belief that,when an idea for a new military itemis given to the research and developmentengineers, it should be clearly spelledout that the resultant equipment mustbe such that it can be operated efficient-ly and maintained readily by men withan average level of intelligence andtraining such as presently constitute ourarmed services.

    I do not agree with the recent Assist-ant Secretary of Defense, Anna M.Rosenberg, when she replied to a letterof mine on this subject, saying: "Theservices' career programs have devel-oped ample promotion opportunities forqualified personne1." Nor do I agree thatshe is correct when she insists that theservices have been able to supply suf-ficient personnel to conduct their operat-ing electronics programs.

    This attitude on personnel is unreal-istic and the services know it. Not onlymust our draftees and enlistees be givenmore in-service inducements to take upthe severe mental strain of this careerwithin the Army. A man must also beattracted to it because of its identificationwith high-paying civilian jobs, when andif he should return to civilian life.

    One plan that has been suggested isthat after a man has been in the Armyfor a year and shown some aptitude forthis type of work, he should at that timebe given opportunity to re-enlist for aperiod of four or five years to obtain thistraining in full, including the necessarymath for true proficiency-and all withthe proviso that he will remain availablein the reserves when he takes his ac-quired skills into private industry.

    16

    No man is fit to command another that cannot command himself.-WiIliam Penn.

    ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL

  • AIDS FOR THE RANGE UMPIREBy MAJOR WILLIAM H. LAMBERT and MAJOR JOSEPH S. EDGAR

    As a battalion or battery commander,have you silently "cussed" the recordssection when the BC scope operatorswere unable to find the sleeve? Or, asa records section officer, have you franti-cally attempted to assist the O2 station inlocating the target, being able to giveonly vague directions in purely descrip-tive terms? This situation arose frequent-ly at the Katakai Firing Range on theeast coast of Japan. (The range is oper-ated by the 138th AAA Group underthe command of CoL H. B. Hudiburg.)Scattered clouds, or extra bright days,when no white sleeves were available,contributed to this difficulty.

    The problem was overcome by thecreation of a simple plotting board,which could easily be made for any AMrange. The instrument (christened lo-cally, the "Pogo Stick") consists of 3pieces of plexiglass. One is in the shapeof a cross section of a gymnasium dumb-bell with an etched center line represent-ing the base line. It has an azimuthcircle etched on each end, in properorientation with the base line. A holefor a bolt is drilled at the exact centerof each azimuth circle, and the center ofeach hole represents one end of the 0,-00 line. A scale of 1 inch = 1000 vardsw;s used for the base line and for ir-adu-ating the two range arms, which are oneinch in vvidth and thirty inches inlength. The range arms are bolted tothe base line piece, but are free to rotateeasily. Each arm is graduated in 1000yard increments, with the left edge de-lineating the line of sight of each azi-muth BC scope.

    When the O2 station loses the targetat the far end of the course, the observer

    notifies a computer at 0, by telephone.The computer quickly obtains azimuthand slant range from the unit radar bytelephone. He sets the left edge of the0, arm at the radar azimuth and sets theO2 arm to intersect the 0, arm at theslant range from 0,, Then he reads theazimuth under the left edge of the O2arm and transmits it to the O2 operator.The O2 BC scope searches on this azi-muth. The 0, computer keeps obtain-ing azimuth and slant range from theradar and sending new azimuths to 02'until the target is found. The O2 opera-tors are able to estimate the elevationclosely enough to bring the sleeve withintheir field of vision, as long as they havean azimuth to search on, and easily lo-cate the target.

    The "Pogo Stick" also provides a quickand convenient means of checking thepointing data computed for O2 prior tofiring calibration or trial fire problems.Inexperienced range officers occasionallymake errors in these computations, butthe "Pogo Stick" reveals the mistake atonce.

    This simple instrument could be elab-

    Bore Plug 90mm

    rI

    3.55"

    orated to have the base line and azi-muth circles adjustable so that it couIdbe readily adapted to any AAA range.It could also be machined with suchprecision that O2 pointing data could betaken from it directly and lengthy com-putations avoided.

    Another scoring aid improvised for theKatakai Range was a bore plug of plexi-glass for scoring the emplacement test.Under the scoring system outlined inTM 44-234, October 1952, the umpiremust determine whether the target iscarried in the inner one-half bore radiusor outer one-half bore radius of the guntube.

    The bore plugs, for both 90mm and120mm guns, were made in the shapeof a Hattened doughnut, with the cen-ter hole the exact size of a circle havinga radius equal to one-half of the boreradius. The outside diameter of the boreplug is slightly larger than the muz-zle of the gun tube, and a ~ inch gapis cut completely through each plug.This permits it to be compressed slightlywhen being inserted in the muzzle endof the tube, a~d expansion holds it firmlyin place.

    The umpire then has a clear hole forvie'wing targets carried within the centerone-half of the bore radius, and targetscarried in the outer one-half will beviewed through the plexiglass.

    Gun batteries of the 138th AAAGroup firing at Katakai Firing Range arethus assured of minimum delay due tothe O2 station failing to find the sleeve,and of a fair score on the emplacementtest phase of the service practice. Guess-\vork on this part of the scoring istotally eliminated.

    NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953

    WRITE FOR AND SUPPORT YOUR JOURNAL

    17

  • RADAR CAMOUFLAGEBy LT. COL. LEONARD M. ORMAN

    IT was inevitable that with the firmestablishment of radar in the family ofmilitary detecting devices, consider-able thought should be given to meansto thwart this instrument. Both activeand passive measures have been used.The active measures consist of somemethod of creating signals on the scopeof the radar, either to hide the real signalor to create a deceptive signal. The hid-ing of the true signal is called JAM-MING. This may be done either elec-tronically or mechanically. El~tronicjamming is accomplished by the trans-mission of modulated radio signals. Me-chanical jamming is performed by drop-ping window or some similar substance.The active measures, by this date, arewell known to radar operators sinceinstruction in them is included in allradar courses. (See "Radar Countermeas-mes"-Coast Artillery Journal, Sept.-Oct.1946.)

    Passive Measures. However, little hasbeen published about passive measures.These have two general categories, eva-sion and camouflage. Evasion consistsof tactics that are designed to take ad-vantage of the limitations of radar to pre-vent or postpone radar detection, or toavoid revealing the true position of anattacking force. If attacking planes takeevasive action it may be impossible todetermine the height at which they areflying or the planes may be detected toolate for an adequate defense to be madeready. It is common practice for planesto approach "on the deck" thus exploit-ing both the poor low coverage of low-frequency, long-range radars and limita-

    lieutenant Colonel Orman has been a fre-quent author of articles on radar in thisJournal since 19M, a number of which (in-cluding "Radar Countermeasures") were se-lected for publication in the Journal pamphlet,Radar. He is also author of the book, Elec-tronic Navigation. USMAgraduate in 1940,he has attended radar courses at Harvard andM. I. T. and took his master's degree in elec-tronics at Pennsylvania in 1951. He nowserves on AFF Boord No.4, at Fort Bliss, asChief of the Test Group.

    18

    tions of coverage imposed by curvatureof the earth.

    Camouflage. Camoul:l~ging a targetconsists in finding a means of reducingthe radiation returned to the receiver ofthe radar set which illuminates the tar-get. This radiation may be either ab-sorbed or reflected away from the radar.Both methods of camouflaging have beenconsidered.

    Absorption of incident radiation maybe accomplished by a "paint" (whichmore nearly resembles linoleum in itsmechanical properties). Such paint issensitive to wave length, so that in gen-eral only one band of radar frequenciescan be effectively nullified. Physicallim-itations on a reasonable thickness forthis absorbent coating indicate that itwould be useful in only the microwaveregion (about 10cm or less).

    During the war the Germans used ananti-radar coating on their Schnorkels.Their material was about %" thick andreported to be effective at both S- andX-bands. Comparison of the radar signalsfrom the coated and uncoated sides ofan object showed that this paint is effec-tive in reducing the strong broadsidesignal but that it does not reduce thesignal at angles more than a few de-grees off broadside.

    It is doubtful if such material will beused on airplanes. The speed and rangeof aircraft would be considerably re-duced by the application of paint thisthick. Then too, as indicated above,even with the anti-radar coating theaspect of the target plays a large part inthe size of the echo. Since aircraft changeaspect much more than surface vessels,the reduction of echo from a plane bythe application of an anti-radar paint isextremely dubious.

    In general, the use of anti-radar paintmay prove useful in some special appli-cations, but its rather critical dependenceon wave length and angle of incidence,and its present limitation to the micro-wave region, make its general use forcamoul:lage of doubtful value. A com-

    bination of anti-radar paint and shapedsurfaces might be used.

    Eff~t of Shape on Refl~tion. Bothaspects of this problem are of interest,i.e., increasing a radar echo and decreas-ing a radar echo. There are many ap-plications of devices which have been

    o

    B

    cP-e/cI )h../18/

    B' VFigure 1. Illustration of basic principle

    of corner reflector.

    built to deliberately give good echoes.Comer reflectors are being used to pro-vide good echoes from meteorological bal-loons, from AA targets, as aids in locatingrafts at sea, as orienting devices forradars, as markers for channel buoys andobstructions to marine navigation. Theprinciple used is illustrated in Figure 1and is easily understood. Other devicessuch as the use of metal mesh inter-woven with cloth materials have beenused to increase radar reflectivity.

    The decreasing of radar echoes hasalso been investigated. The energy re-turned to a radar set by a target may bedivided into two types: the specular re-~tion, which occurs at those areas atwhich the radar beam strikes the tar