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1. REPORT DATE DEC 1953 2. REPORT TYPE
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Antiaircraft Journal. Volume 96,
Number 6, November-December 1953
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
UNITED STATES ARMYTHE CHIEF OF STAFF
17 November 1953
Dear General Lewis:
I recently wrote to the Association of the U. S. Army, of whichI
have long been a member, to express my view of the importance ofthe
Associationl s work and to encourage its continued support by allof
us in the Army.
I also want to express my great interest in your associationand
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In particular, I want to emphasize the role of the
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contribution tocurrent thinking in the arms and services but
provide a unique oppor-tunity for the professional development of
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I strongly urge the support of these fine military
associationsand their outstanding publications.
Lieutenant General John T. LewisPresidentU. S. ANTIAIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION631 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.Washington 4, D.
:;, -....AAR16 9:;-......
FOUNDED IN 1892Published from 1892 until 1922 as
THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERYPublished from 1922
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COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
COVER: Gun cre\\' of the 36th AAA Bn (Gun).LETTER FROl\1 THE
CHIEF OF STAFF Inside front coverATOl\lIC WARFARE. By Brig. Cell.
T. R. Phillips " 2GUIDED l\lISSILES. By Dr. Hellry H. Porter
5COORDINATION WITI-j THE INFANTRY.
By LieHt. John H. Alexallder 10SHARPEN YOUR BAYONETS. By Lt.
Col. Otho A. Moomaw 12ELECTRONICS-TOO TOUGH FOR G.I's. By Richard \
F. Cattail .. 13AIDS FOR THE RANGE Ul\IPIRE.
By Major \V Ill. H. Lambert alld Alajor Joseph S. Edgar 17RADAR
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GEORGIA 21ASSIGNMENTS OF OVERSEAS RETURNEES.
By Lt. Col. Herbert T. COlldon, Jr 23ASSIGNMENT OF AAA OFFICERS
By Lt. Col. Robert R. Corey 24i\IAGGIE'S DRA\VERS. By Lt. Col.
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BALLOT 42BOOK REVIE\VS 43YEARLY INDEX 46HONOR ROLL 48
OFFICERSLT. GEN. LEROY LUTES
LT. GEN. JOHN T. LEWISPRESIDENT
LT. GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZERVICE-PRESIDE:-7
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRISSECRETARY-TREASURER
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THEEXECUTIVE COUNCIL
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. MARQUAT
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BRIGADIER GENERAL H. RUSSELL DROWNE
COLONEL NORMAN E. HARTMAN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL FR ....NCIS X. BR....DLEy
MAJOR J ....MES E. C....LKINS
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VOL. LXXXXVI NOVEMBER.DECEMBER, 1953
Published bimonthly by the United States Antiaircraft
Association. Editorial and executive offices. 631 Penns,.lvani.
Avenue, :>.W..W&ahington 4. D. C. Terms: $3.00 per year.
Foreign subscriptions, $4.00 per year. Single copies. 75c. Entered
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Richmond. Va . under the Act of :\larch 3, 1879. Copyright. 1953,
b,. the United State.Antiaircraft Association.
PUBLICATION DATE: DECE~IBER I, 1953BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRIS,
USA, Ret., Editor
~I Sgt Fred A. Baker, Business ~IanagerSFC James E. Moore, Jr.,
SFC Paul M. Plum I.)",Cire. Mgr.
The first atomic artillery shell burst and the 280mm gun, Las
By BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, U.S.A. (Retired)
J\I ilitaTY Allalyst of tile Post-Dispatch
General Phillips was formerly an anloa".croft officer and olso a
well known Leaven-warfh instructor. for years he has been build.ing
his reputation as a military student andforthright .poke.man. He
presents here hisown views.
A\VESO?\IE but very general state-ments about new weapons and
their ef.feet on military plans and costs comingout of \Vashington,
primarily from highci,'ilian officials who attend meetings of
the National Security Council, do notrefer to any nel\' or
unknown weapons.They refer to atomic explosives which
Reprinted by permission from the Sr. LollisPosr-Dispt1uh.
are hardly in the new category.\Vhat is new and revolutionary is
the atomic explosives are becoming avail-able in such quantity
that they can besubstituted for conventional explosives atless cost
where\"er the target is large.
One atomic artillery shell can be sub-stituted for 10,000
conventional shellsto lay down a carpet barrage throughenemy
One city-buster bomb can do moredamage than a 1,000-plane raid
It has become possible to adapt atomicexplosives to almost any
weapon. Guidedmissiles, torpedoes and mines can beatomic. It is
even possible to make anatomic shell for the 105mm and
155mmhowitzers. The guns can then fire eitherconventional or atomic
explosives de-pending on the size and importance ofthe target.
It is quite apparent that if a forma-tion of 15 planes carrying
one atomicbomb can do more damage than 1,000planes loaded with
conventional explo-sives, fewer aircraft are needed for thejob of
Likewise, if one artillery shell can besubstituted for 10,000,
the Army's re-quirements for artillery, for reserves ofshells
costing billions of dollars, for am-munition dumps behind the
lines, andfor rail, sea and truck transportation toget shells to
the front, can be extensivelyreduced.
May Cut Back on ShellsThinking along these lines in the top
councils of the nation has gone so farthat serious proposals
have been made tocut back production of shells for the warreserVe
which was used up in Korea.
It was with all this in mind thatPresident Eisenhower at his
press confer-ence last Wednesday said that to say thatnew weapons
"would have no effect onthe composition of the military forceswould
be shutting your eyes to all historyand to the logic of a situation
of whichcertain facts are rather apparent."
The officers of all three services havebeen caught by surprise
by the secrecy\'\,"hich has surrounded the rapidity ofatomic
development. They still arethinking in terms of atomic
Whereas every officer of the land, seaand air forces should be
attempting tosolve the revolutionary changes in a warin which
atomic explosives are plentiful,few have given it a thought.
Gen. Alfred 1\'1. Gruenther, SupremeAllied Commander, Europe,
has had hismulti-nation staff war-gaming the atomicbattlefield.
some speculation has beenundertaken at our Command and Gen-eral
Staff College, and senior planners inthe Pentagon are scratching
their headsoyer it. but the vast majority of the offi-cers are
still unaware that they should bethinking of a new kind of warfare
whichmay make many of their weapons andtactical ideas obsolete.
No greater indictment of the exces-sive secrecy surrounding
atomic develop-ment can be made than this:
The mass of the military know so littleabout atomic development
and the possi-bilities of weapons being made for themto use that
they still are plugging alongon traditional lines with never a
thoughtthat war may be so changed in two orthree years as to bear
no resemblance tothe one they are training for.
The exception to this is in the AirForce where they are fully
alert to thepossibilities of strategic atomic bombing,although they
are quite unprepared men-tally to exploit the possibilities of
tacticalbombing with atomic weapons.
Three Schools of ThoughtThere are three schools of thought
about war with plenty of atomic explo-sives.
The first, found mostly in the AirForce and among senior
Republicans, isthe familiar one that strategic bombingwill bring
the enemy to his knees andwill be decisive without the need
forserious ground combat.
The second, prevalent in the Armyand Marines, discounts the idea
that warcan be won by strategic bombing aloneand believes that
atomic weapons can beadapted to the conventional battlefieldand
The third likewise discounts the ideathat strategic bombing
alone can win awar, but believes that tactical atomicweapons may so
change the nature of thebattlefield that many of our
conventionalweapons and conventional tactics areoutmoded.These are
differences of the utmost im-
portance. The. war could be lost if theconcepts for which we
provide weaponsand munitions are wrong.
For example, if ground and sea forcesare neglected and strategic
bombing failsor is thwarted by new defenses, Europecould be
O\'errun with ease; or, if great
emphasis is placed on winning the landbattle v.ith the help of
atomic artilleryused on conventional lines and the en-emy knocks it
all out with tacticalA-bombs. the ground battle could be lost.
The disaster that would ensue as a re-sult of a false estimate
of the capabilitiesand effects of the various atomic weap-ons
indicates that any clear-cut decisionto concentrate solely on
atomic strategicand tactical weapons is unlikely. Weprobably shall
continue to prepare bothfor atomic war and conventional warwhile we
gain experience and thinkthrough the problems posed by
Historically, the military have been farmore receptive to new
weapons than theyhave been to new ideas for their use.Even today
our military schools placetheir map problems in the standardframe
of past situations, with troops incontact and the war already under
way.The writer has never seen a map prob-lem dealing with the
outset of war al-though this is the only way the changesbrought
about by new weapons can beconsidered.
Air Strikes FirstThe important initial action in a war
today would not be the movement oftroops toward the borders, it
would be thestrikes of the strategic bombing forces.Our first
targets now are the Soviet long-range airdromes and nuclear
productionfacilities. This is a protective action toprevent
bombardment of the UnitedStates. When the Soviets had no
atomiccapability, our first targets were their in-dustrial and
By the same logic, the Russians' firsttargets would be our
strategic air bases,probably the peripheral air bases aroundthe
There is a significant by-product tothis change in the
situation. Formerlywe planned to retaliate against Sovietaggression
on Soviet ind~stry, which ofcourse means cities, with massive
Suppose the war did not start with at-tacks on cities. If our
President unleasbedan attack on Soviet cities, and he is thefinal
authority, he at the same time couldexpect the Russians to
retaliate onUnited States cities. His order to bombRussian cities
would be the equivalentto an order to bomb American cities.Would he
give the order? Would the
Russians bomb our cities if we did notinitiate it? 1\0one knows.
If he decidednot to, the whole theory of winning awar by strategic
bombing falls flat.
Important Opening MovesvVhat ""ill be the opening of the
atomic battlefield? Troops move towardthe borders. The greatest
threat to themis tactical atomic bombing. This can beprevented, not
by defenses, but by de-stroying the enemy aircraft and facilitieson
the ground. So the most importantinitial action in the ground
battle wouldnot be the contact of troops, but the mu-tual
bombardment of each other's air-dromes.
Airdromes are perfect targets for tac-tical atomic bombs-one
bomb, one air-drome and everything on it. The oppos-ing air forces
would rapidly diminish.
There is an overwhelmingly importantconclusion to be drawn from
this mu-tual effort to destrov each other's airforces-the side
which starts with airsuperiority should win the battle of mu-tual
destruction and come out of it withair domination.
Air domination means freedom to useatomic weapons on the enemy
groundforces. Without it, the ground battlealmost certainly would
be lost. Weareinferior in the air in Europe. The tacti-cal atomic
bomb has not decreased therequirement for tactical air-it has
in-creased it, and if superiority is not heldat the outset, it may
never be attained.
The old linear battlefield, clearlymarked, with troops echeloned
in depth,with artillery farther to the rear and sup-plies and
transportation in dumps, is aworthwhile atomic target in time
ofatomic plenty. Tactical bombs will com-pletely wreck the
conventional battle-field, including any atomic cannon thatmaybe on
Air-atomic power can now do what itsprotagonists have long
claimed, butwhich it never before was able to accom-plish. It can
wipe out the opposingground forces on the conventional
Necessary RearrangementsIf this is the case, the old-style
field will change. The nature of thechange can be foreseen.
Troops will bein small units, self-contained, concealedand so
widely dispersed in depth thatthey do not provide a target. TItis
sort ofa battlefield might be 50 miles deep.
Ground warfare would be more likeguerrilla war than like the old
wars weuse as a pattern. It appears that guerrillaformations might
be adopted at the out-set of a war to prevent atomic destructionof
If one side gets reasonably completeair domination, with the
atomic threatremoved, it then might begin to operatein more
conventional ways. The battle-field of past wars has the great
advantagethat it protects the rear and allows freemovement of
supplies and forces in rela-tive safety. Standard troop
formationswould easily overcome lightly armedguerrilla
It is apparent that the atomic battle-field will not dispense
with the need fortroops. As Gen. Omar N. Bradley, for-mer Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, once remarked; The Russianscould put
their men 100 yards apart andmarch across Europe regardless of
atomicbombs, if there were no ground forces tostop them.
The size of the ground forces may notchange .greatly, but their
compositionwill. When atomic shells are providedfor the smaller and
more maneuverablecannon, the field artillery can be greatlyreduced
in size, possible by three-fourths.This will bring a great
reduction in therear services, since conventional artilleryuses
shells in millions of tons. The pres-ent atomic cannon will allow a
substan-tial decrease in our long-range heavyartillery very
But with the reduction in field artil-lery, there will have to
be an increase inantiaircraft artillery. The threat of thetactical
atomic bomb is so great thatevery possible defense will be
required.Airdromes will be heavily defended,troop areas must be
protected. It is notunlikely that increased need for antiair-craft
artillery and guided missiles willuse up the savings in field
The atomic bomb has reduced the sizeof the strategic bombing
force already.We forget that we and the British wereusing 14,000
bombers against Germanyin 1945, where, because of short dis-tances,
these bombers could fly twice asmany missions a month as we now
canfly against Russia.
The strategic bombing force comprisesabout 1,500 planes. If this
is reduced byhalf, on account of the great distances tobe flown,
for comparison with the WorldWar II bombing force, it can be seen
it is approximately one-twentieth, in ef-fective numbers, to the
air forces usedagainst Germany. Further decreases onthe ground that
atomic weapons increaseits power do not seem to be warranted.
As to tactical support aircraft, it hasalready been shown that
they will haveto take over most of the ground supportof the troops
by use of tactical atomicweapons. There may be modest decreasesin
this requirement, but in view of thegreatly increased losses to be
expectedfrom the use of atomic bombs on air-dromes and from
stronger air defenses, itwould be rash to start cutting down.
Because of the constant threat of tac-tical atomic attack and
the disaster thatwould result from such attacks, moreinterceptors
for air defense will be re-quired. On the other hand, due to
theeffectiveness of tactical atomic attack, itmay be that the
numbers of fighterbombers for isolation of the battlefieldattack on
enemy airdromes and rear in-stallations mav be decreased.
On balance, it does not appear that anysubstantial reductions
can be made inair forces, but the composition willchange with
increased emphasis on de-fensive interceptors.
Balancing New FactorsThis is the type of complex balancing
of new factors and their effects that isgoing on in the top
levels of the Penta-gon. It is doubtful that any firm conclu-sions
have been reached.
The tendency is definitely to find away to reduce over-all
military expendi-tures by taking advantage of atomic capa-bilities.
There is always the danger thatenthusiastic civilians without an
ade-quate military background will fix theirattention solely on the
possibilities ofatomic warfare to the exclusion of limit-ing
factors which the military can see.
There is danger both of going too fastand of clinging to the
outmoded. Themilitary and civilian views in the Penta-gon will
probably meet by adopting thenew weapons that are surely an
advancewhile retaining the old that may berequired.
As to the three views about the effectof atomic plenty on
warfare, some tenta-tive conclusions can be drawn.
Those who believe that strategic bomb-ing with nuclear weapons
will be de-cisive argue that we actually are pursu-ing an
air-atomic strategy at the present
(Co1ltinued on page 39)
- ..... "".ss: esComments on Surface-Based Antiaircraft
By HENRY H. PORTER
Applied Physics Laboratory, Tile Joll11sHopkins Ulliversity
GUIDED 1\ IlSSILES is a broad held. Its possibilitiesha\'e
caught many imaginations, and guided missiles havebeen dreamed up
for every conceivable use and every pock-etbook, provided, of
course, that the pocketbook is bigenough.
It would be futile to trv to cover the whole field so Ishall
limit my remarks primarily to surface-based antiair-craft
All weapons should start from a tactical need, and eachweapon,
if effective, is soon met by countermeasures. Earlyin the nrst
\Vorld \Var planes were used primarily forreconnaissance. However,
the sporting blood of the pilotscalled for combat, and it is said
that the hrst missiles usedwere bricks. Thus, the lowly brick is a
direct ancestor ofthe modern guided missile. Sometimes missiles
seem tobehave like their ancestors and fly like bricks.
Subse-quently, pistols and machine guns were used in
air-to-aircombat, and antiaircraft guns were used from the
Since then, antiaircraft guns have been greatly im-proved;
proximity fuzes have increased the effectiveness ofthe system;
radar accurately locates the target; computers,from a knowledge of
the shell trajectories and the past tar-get course, predict the
point of intersection and aim theguns. But this is a losing battle.
The increased speed ofplanes, plus the possibility of guiding bombs
to the target,a possibility that would permit them to remain at
longranges, will render antiaircraft guns ineffective. At a rangeof
5 miles, a fast plane will fly over 2 miles after the shellleaves
the gun and before it arrives at the plane, and fewpilots are
skilful enough to fly that distance accuratelyenough to be hit by a
perfectly aimed shot. These consid-erations show the need for
guiding the missile to thetarget.
The primary characteristics needed in a guided missileare range,
accuracy, and damage potential. To be tacti-cally useful, other
requirements are: speed, automaticcontrol, traffic capacity,
reliability, and low cost for theeffect achieved.
Fortunately, scientific progress has developed in manyfields to
the point where it is possible to combine and ex-tend them to make
guided missiles work. These fields in-clude rocketry, jet
propulsion, supersonic aerodynamics,structures, miniaturized
electronics, servo-mechanisms,electronic computers, and radar.
Address delivered to the Washington Section, Institute of
theAeronautical Sciences, December 2, 1952, Washington, D. C.
*Reprinted from July '53 Aeronautical Engineering Review.
Design of an Antiaircraft MissileLet us make a rough preliminary
design of an antiair-
craft missile to get a feeling for the problems.First, we must
provide an air frame, light yet tremen-
dously strong and rigid, with lifting and control
surfacescapable of high maneuverability at great altitudes,
yetcontrollable also at sea level-that is, through a range of
airdensities of about 10 to 1.
\Ve must also provide a warhead. Present antiaircraftshells
weigh from 15 to 100 lbs., but, since we are using amuch larger and
more costly missile, we want to assurehigh kill probabilities.
Also, airplanes are becoming morerugged. \Ve will probably want to
allow something in theneighborhood of 100 to 500 Ibs. for the
To guide the missile to within lethal distance of thetarget we
must provide room for an amazing guidancesystem. It must be
accurate; it must average out the errorsfed to it; yet, it must be
fast enough to follow the target'se\'asive maneuvers.
\Ve must also allow space for the control system. Thisincludes
the power and mechanisms for moving the con-trol surfaces, plus the
computers to make the missile stableand maneuverable at all
altitudes and yet prevent exces-sive aerodynamic forces from being
imposed at low alti-tudes.
\Ve must also provide space for a propulsion system. Asa hrst
approximation, let us assume a missile diameter of2 ft. If we
optimize the length and shape and providelifting and control
surfaces, this missile will have a drag ofabout 6,500 Ibs. at a
velocity of twice the speed of sound.This will require a propulsion
system capable of providingover 25,000 hp., packaged inside our
2-ft missile, yet onethat is light and reliable.
The first propulsion system that comes to mind is arocket, which
has the characteristics of thrust and sizeneeded. The solid rocket
is quite simple in principle. Itconsists of a chamber in which the
propellants burn athigh pressure and a nozzle through which the jet
acts. Ingoing to large sizes, the chambers become heavy since
thehigh-pressure chamber, which must contain the propel-lants,
becomes large. In a liquid rocket, the combustionchamber can be
kept comparatively small and light sincethe propellants are stored
outside the chamber, but this re-quires pumps, fuel metering, and
other complications. Allthis has favored the use of solid rockets
for small, short-range uses and liquid fuels for larger rockets.
AIR BREATHING JET ENGINES
.~==:tTURBOJET -"'-~- Fur::'. c""'eu5TIO:::-.----
it only gi\'es thrust at high velocities and is ineffectivemuch
below its designed speed. Because of its simplicity.however, the
ram-jet can be very light, providing severalhorsepower per ounce.
Its fuel economy also is good, sinceit attains a fuel specific
impulse of about 1,200 Ibs. sec. perlb., or about six times as much
as a rocket. It thereforeneeds to carry only about one-sixth of the
propellant arocket requires, or, in our hypothetical missile, a
.ram-jetwould only need about 330 Ibs. of fuel instead of a ton.The
propellant weights are estimated for low-altitudeRight. At high
altitudes, the drag is less, and less propel-lant is needed.
Thus, it appears that the ram-jets (Fig. 2) are muchbetter than
rockets. However, the decision is not alwaysso simple. For this
comparison, we have assumed an aero-dynamic Right path, one similar
to the Hight an airplanewould make. If a ballistic trajectory
similar to a shell isconsidered, this considerably modifies the
comparison infavor of rockets and extends the range at which
rockets arecompetitive, but this in turn imposes certain
V-2 was a liquid-fuel rocket. Recent advances in thetechniques
of solid-fuel rockets. howe\'er, ha\'e made themcompetitive,
particularly if the handling problems of thecorrosive liquid
propellants are considered. By its nature .a rocket must also carry
the oxidizer, as well as the fuel.Since this is several times the
weight of the fuel itself, onlya rather low specific impulse of 200
lbs. sec. per lb. ofpropellant is attained-i.e., 1 lb. of
propellant will supply200 lbs. thrust for 1 sec. or 1 lb. thrust
for 200 sec.)If weassume a time of Hight of 60 sec.. which means a
range ofabout 20 miles for the hypothetical missile we were
de-signing, we will require about a ton of fuel and oxidizer(6,500
X 60/200 = 1,950 Ibs.).
This rough approximation shows that, while rockets aregood for
short-range missiles, the propellant weight be-comes excessive
where long range is needed. By far thegreatest amount of the
propellant is the oxidizer. Thus, ifwe could use air as the
oxidizer, the amount of propellantto be carried would be greatly
reduced. Engines that dothis are the pulse-jet, the turbojet, and
the ram-jet (Fig.1). These arc modifications of the rocket idea to
admit airinto the combustion chamber to burn with the fuel.
The pulse-jet operates intermittently, admitting air tothe
combustion chamber through valves that automaticallyclose to
contain the explosion pressure and force the jetout the nozzle. The
pulse-jet was used by the Germans inthe V-I. It is not an efficien
t propulsion system for super-sonic speeds.
The turbojet, which is now commonly used in jet air-craft, uses
a turbine compressor to force the air continu-ouslv into the
combustion chamber under sufficientpressure to eject the jet of
combustion products throughthe nozzle.
At supersonic speeds, the ram pressure of the air due tothe
velocity of the missile will provide enough pressure tomake the jet
engine effective. The ram-jet is thus a sim-plified turbojet in
which the compressor is not needed, but
-- --~- -.Fig. 2. Large ram-jet launched at the Naval Ordnance
Test Station, Inyokern, Calif. Its velocity was "far into the
su-personic range." The ram-jet is boosted to near the speed of
sound by a solid-propellant rocket, which falls away, andthe
ram-jet engine takes over. It was developed for the Navy Bureau of
Ordnance by The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory and its associate contractors.
6 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL
There are a number of possible guidance systems. Thechoice
\'aries with the tactical conditions and the philoso-phy of use.
These can be divided into systems where the
brains are built into the ground equipment, into the mis-sile.
or divided between them.
One philosophy is to make the missile as moronic as pos-sible so
that as little as possible is lost with each missile.Therefore, the
brains are built into the ground equip-ment, and the missile onlv
has to follow orders. It there-fore is generally known as'the
Command System (Fig. 4).The ground guidance installation must
include: equipmentfor tracking the target, generally a radar;
another equip-ment for tracking the missile: a computer to
determinethe commands that should be gi\'en to guide the missile
tothe target; and a communication link to the missile. Inthis
system, the compromise has been made in favor ofcomplicated and
expensive ground equipment that can beused many times over.
Another system is to divide the brains between theground
equipment and the missile so as to reduce theground equipment
without overcomplicating the missile.The Beamrider is an example of
this (Fig. 5). Here, theground guidance equipment consists of a
radar that tracksthe target. The missile has enough intelligence to
centeritself in the radar beam. In both the Command and
I .Beamnder systems the accuracy falls off at long range.
The final step is to put the brains in the missile. Thismeans
building a target-seeking system into the missile(Fig. 6). This
will prove necessary in very long-rangemissiles, since homing
accuracy is not necessarily depend-ent on the distance from the
launchino site. These S\'S-
tems are complicated, however, and often need mid-coursecontrol
to guide them to the vicinity of the target. Thehoming problems can
be appreciated when you considerthat the missile and target are
closing at a rate of about] mile every 2 sec. so that little time
is available for thehoming system to locate the target and make all
correctionsrequired to achie\'e a "hit."
~-----~~-------- ~ILLUSTRATIONOF COMMAND
the ouidance system. In all, the rocket seems best forb
short-range and the ram-jet for long-range antiaircraftmissiles.
TIle only discussion is over the range at whichthis division
So far we have only considered the missile in Right.There is
also the problem of launching the missile and ac-celerating it to
flight speed. For antiaircraft use, wheretime is of great
consequence, it is important to spend aslittle time as feasible in
attaining Right velocity. This isbeing done by means of large
rockets (Fig. 3) which accel-erate the missile to Right speed in a
few seconds and thengenerally separate, leaving the missile to fly
MINUTES TO 80Me RELEASE
ILLUSTRATION OF". BEAM RIDER
AIR DEFENSEGuided Missile In1ercep'tion
_==-~=--__ :::=:;"'- __ :::===1__ ==__ ='o l to,,'
I MilES HIQllIllARGET I-=-=-=-=......_=-=-=I~I==-==i~ - -
~2' iii' ~~ @ 1;.i~ @ 4M-~"e ~IRELEASE ~
So much for the missiles themseh-es. They are only
acomparatively small part of a guided-missile system. I
havementioned the guidance equipment required, but, in ad-dition,
launchers, handling equipment, stowage, and testequipment are
necessary. E\'en all this is only a part of thesystem. It must be
integrated into an o\'erall air-defensesystem, including detection
of enemy attack, identificationof the attackers as hostile, display
of the situation, analysisof the attack, and allocation of the role
each defendingunit is to play.
To see what is involved in such a defense system, let usmake
some assumptions and view the overall situation. Itmust be
remembered that there is no such thing as a staticdefense. A
defense today may be useless next year. Allwe can do is plan our
defenses to meet the attack that anenemy can throw against us.
Therefore, I shall make as-sumptions for a hypothetical situation,
not based on anyparticular developments or time, primarily to
select roundnumbers that make the calculations simple. Let us
assumethat the attacking planes fly at 600 miles per hour or
10miles per min., that the guided missiles fly twice as fast asthe
planes, and that they ha\'e a range of 50 mile~
Since the bomb travels some distance after release, wemust
destroy the attacker before he reaches the bomb-release line, which
is at least some 5 miles from the target(Fig. 7). An important
target will probably be defendedby several missile sites
surrounding the city, about 25 milesout. Since the missile range is
50 miles, the first missilewill intercept the attacker 75 miles
from the defendedpoint, or 7 min. from bomb-release. Moreover,
attacking planes fly 25 miles during the time the missilesare
flying 50 miles, the missiles must be launched whenthe planes are
100 miles from the target.
If the missiles must be fired when the attackers are 100miles
from the target, the missile site must be warnedearlier in order to
man the equipment, ready the missiles,and fire (Fig. 8). If we
allow 5 min. for this, the missilesite must be alerted when the
attackers are 150 miles fromthe target, or 14.5 min. from
bomb-release line. Further-more, in order to alert the missile
site, the enemy planesmust be detected and tracked; the attack must
be analyzed,and the defense moves allocated to the defending
units.Time allowance for this means that the enemy should
bedetected 225 miles from the target.
So far, we have considered only the guided-missile sys-tems, but
we will also want to use interceptors (Fig. 9).They should operate
beyond the range of the guided mis-siles; so they must complete
their attack before missile-intercept range, 75 miles from the
target, to avoid con-fusing the defense. If we allow 10 min. for
the entireinterceptor engagement, they must intercept the
attackersat 175 miles. Now, the interceptor bases need alerting
toprovide time for the interceptors to be manned and climbto
altitude; therefore, they must be alerted when the at-tacking
planes are 300 miles from the target. Time for
AIR DEFENSEGuided Missile Eorly Wornino ond Detection
MINUTES TO 80we RELEASE
l 1 9-1ft """'2 U
MILES fRO" TARGET,...-~
I' " " "'" '"~ -- ---I ~FIREALERT DETECTlOfrll
MISSILE OfSITE ENEMY
8 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL
AIR DEFENSE.. qhler Interception and Guided Missiles
It would not be complete to discuss guided missileswithout
giving some consideration to the economics in-\'olved. One is too
prone to compare the cost of one mis-sile to the cost of one shell
and feel convinced that onecannot alford to use them. This is not a
of how big, let us take \Vashington as the enemy's targetand use
various points northeast of \Vashington to indi-cate how far away
each stage of the attack takes place(Fig. 10).
The enemv attack must be detected O\'er Boston. Theinterceptors'
base must be alerted when the enemy reachesHartford, Conn. The
interceptors reach the enemy overNewark, N. J. The guided missile
site is alerted as theattackers reach Trenton, N. J.: the first
missiles arelaunched as the enemy approaches \ Vilmington, Del.,
andthe first enemy planes are shot down by guided missilesnear
Elkton, 1\ Id. This is the scale of the action underthe
hypothetical conditions we ha\'e assumed.
"'I"llUTE"S TO 80"8 RELE.1SE
------------=-=..:=--~--=-=-.=~=-=-=--=--=-=-() 1 ~W't "-012
2'9-- l ~?
WILES F~O" TARGET...--.:-.----==---===-===-===-===--===-I~ l'-.t
ClO ~ lOG)~
early warning, identification, and display means that theenemy
must be detected about 375 miles from the targetor 37 min. from
These distances sound big. but, to get a clear realization
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1953 9
parison. At the least. one should compare the cost of
de-stroying an enemy plane by each method. Since. at thealtitudes
of expected attacks. guns do not haye a highprobability of kill per
shot, it is not surprising to find thatguided missiles will bring
down more enemy planes thanguns for a giyen amount of money
e......pended for ammuni-tion. In other words, a stock of guided
missiles will shootdown more enemy planes than a stock of
antiaircraft shellsof equiyalent cost.
It is true that in a single heavy attack a far greater costcould
be expended by the guided missiles launched thanthat e;,..pended by
any available number of guns. Underthese conditions, too, guided
missiles cost less per planeshot down, and the high cost is a
criterion of the extremelyhigh le\'el of defense. Past experience
has indicated thatan attrition level of 5-10 per cent proyided an
adequatedefense, but now a near-perfect defense is needed.
Guidedmissiles give promise of such a defense.
But the missile cost is only a part of the economic situa-tion.
The cost of the equipment and the annual cost ofoperation must also
be considered. For frequent heayy at-
tacks. the missile cost is important, but for few
small-scaleattacks it may account for less than 10 per cent of the
oyer-all cost, e\'en if the capital costs are amortized oyer
It turns out that for most systems-guns, guided mis-siles. and
interceptors-the capital cost is about twice theannual operating
cost, or, if the capita~ costs are amortizedO\'er 4 years. they
contribute an additional 50 per cent tothe cost of the annual
operation, Thus, it turns out thatthe major costs of any defense
system are the men andtheir support.
This points out the advantages of long-range systemsthat require
fewer installations to co\'er the same area. Butthe longer the
range, the higher the cost; the fewer theinstallations, the more
easily they can be saturated or de-stroyed. The basic problem is to
use the funds available toprovide the best defense for the attacks
the enemy canmake. This defense must include all weapons that
contrib-ute usefully and must provide for continuing imprm'ementto
meet the threat of a possible enemy's increasing capabil-ities.
COORDINATION WITH THE INFANTRYBy LIEUTENANT JOHN H.
3rd AAA AW BII (SP)
CpI Kim Hang Sik, 3rd AAA A \X' Bn gunner, ready with twin 40mm
guns on1\119 mount.
IN Korea the liaison between the in-fantry battalion and
supporting artilleryhas in a great way been responsible forthe
gigantic toll United Nations artil-lery has taken on the enemy.
This co-ordination involves precise timing, ade-quate
communication, careful planning,and, finally, perfect execution.
And forthe AAA SP platoon, whose four f\ 116'sand four M19's may
encompass fourmiles of front, the problems of propercoordination
are manifestly enlarged.
The platoon leader's first commitmentin a SP platoon
move-whether goinginto established positions, in a platoonrotation;
or moving with the infantryinto new sites-is to immediately
con-tact the battalion's S3 section, and theartillery liaison
officer. Of the two, theS3 is of most importance in the
initialmove. If the site has never been occupiedby AAA AW, he
decides upon the pla-toon's positions; if the positions havebeen
previously occupied, a new infantrybattalion, and/or a new S3 may
dictatechanges. The platoon leader discusseswith him the
capabilities and limitationsof tracks and weapons. Can the
track"pull" this hill which would offer goodposition; can the
"forties" effectiyely cov-
er hill "325"; will the quad mount de-press enough to hit this
possible avenueof approach; will harassing and interdic-tion fire
be effective at this range? The
53 learns the number of tracks availablefor the support of his
battalion sector.From him, the platoon leader learns howmany tracks
are to be used primarily for
10 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL
defensi\Oe fire, and how many are tobe employed for offensive
work-bunker"busting," sniper shooting, harassing fire.and direct
support of infantry patrolaction.
If in a new area, tentative positionsare chosen by map
\'1iOrk,then, the pro-posed sites are reconnoitered by the S3and
the platoon leader. Here the pla-toon leader must know the
capabilitiesof his weapons; for at the selected site,he must tell
the S3 exactly what can beeffectively hit and covered. Althoughthe
field of fire may be good, perhapsthe targets, on close
observation, do notwarrant emplacement of a track; or may-be an
outdated map has not detailedterrain features, or does not show
re-cently constructed roads which mightmake a position accessible;
or perhapsthere is a question as to the effectivenessof an Ml9's
long-range fire on a "76"position. Together they must decide ifa
commitment of a track on the site isadvisable.
Once it has definitely been determinedto occupy the position,
there are otherconsiderations. An overhead for the trackis always
advisable, but sometimes im-practical. If the position is
temporary,often an overhead is not worthwhile;again, perhaps all
the firing is to be doneat night, and the track is removed
fromfiring position during daylight hours; orperhaps the overhead
restricts the fieldof fire, or prohibits high-angle, 50-cali-ber,
plunging fire. The S3 can informthe platoon leader of the enemy's
artil-lery activity in the area. If the two deeman overhead
mandatory, plans for its con-struction are laid.
Through the S3, arrangements for thefeeding of the crew, and
bunker "accom-modatIons," are made with the infantrycompany
commander whose people oc-cupy the area. Targets of primary
in-terest are pointed out by the S3 to theantiaircraft platoon
leader, on maps andat the position. Areas for harassing
andinterdiction fire are noted. If the posi-tion is primarily
defensive, the time andplace for supporting fires are
designated.The S3 provides the platoon leader withoverlays and all
counterattack data; it isthe latter's responsibility to see that
themovement of his tracks at such an emer-gency is closely
coordinated with theproposed infantry action. And lastly,once the
positioning of the tracks hasbeen definitely established, the
leader must submit to the infantry bat-ta~ion an exacting
Q\oerlayof thei~ loca-tions and fire concentrations.
Once the platoon is established. vir-tually all coordination is
carried onthrough the artillery liaison officer at-tached to the
infantrv battalion. \Vithhim, the platoon lead~r reviews
prospec-thoe targets. Details are thoroughly dis-cussed. If the LNO
wants an area "Hand I'd,'" the quantity of ammunitionneeded to do
the job effectivelv is con-sidered. Generallv the liaison officer
hasa specific time ~hen he wants fire ina certain area for
harassing work. Per-haps enemy patrols are known to beusing a
certain path down a finger atdusk each evening; or a draw is
beingused as an assembly area. With suchobjectives in mind, a
harassing. andinterdiction program is Jet up by theplatoon leader
and the LNO: Thev de-cide how much ammunition is to beexpended on
specified targets; how longin one area the fire is to continue,
andin what volume; the most advantageoustime for fire; and how the
fire is to beconducted-whether, for instance, withthe 1\116's, it
might be better to fire fourhundred rounds sporadically over a
halfhour period, with the probability of mini-mizing activity in
the area for that peri-od of time; or whether it might not bemore
advantageous to fire all four hun-dred rounds in a five minute
period,with the possibility of finding an enemytroop concentration
in the open. A"harassing and interdiction" schedule, oneither a
nightly or weekly basis, is ar-ranged. A weekly schedule, with
timesof fire and targets varying nightly, gen-erally more
efficiently precludes the pos-sibility of error and
misunderstandingwith the crew. With this schedule, andan overlay of
the SP positions, the liaisonofficer can make changes through
theplatoon leader, should any of the sched-uled fire interfere with
To complete the coordination, the pla-toon leader must contact
the forwardobservers who win be directing fire forthe tracks; the
observers will be locatedby the liaison officer. From the
observa-tion post, and on the maps, the platoonleader designates
the desired targets. Of-ten these are supplemented, and alteredbv
the forward observer. A schedulea~d overlay are given the observer,
andarrangements for target registration are
completed. Usually each evening theweapons are reregistered on
the targetsto be "H and I'd" during the night..And, of course. the
ohsenoer periodicallyregisters on his "direct fire" targets.
Theplatoon leader can often be of great aidto the obsenoer in the
registration of theplatoon's weapons. For instance, it maybe
helpful to tell him with ranges of3500 yards and up, the "50's" can
bemost easily registered at dusk or earlydark, when the Hash of the
hittingrounds may be readily located, long aftertracer burn-out.
Further, the observermust be aware of proposed locations ofthe
tracks, should they move to alter-nate positions to take up
defensive roles.And again the platoon leader reviews,with the
obsen'er, the firing capabilitiesand characteristics of his
Because of the length of front encom-passed by the SP platoon,
coordinationdifficulties are constantly arising, evenwith the
platoon positioned, registered,and functioning normally. The
greatestof these involves communications. Linesbetween liaison
officer and platoon lead-er, and between platoon command postand
tracks, must at all times be intact.The lateral lines, between the
observa-tion posts and tracks, are particularlysubject to enemy
fire. Alternate routesbetween all parties must be
established.Should line communication fail, radiocontact must be
maintained. This com-munication is imperative for control
andcoordination. With a harassing and in-terdiction program, the
platoon leadermust check daily with as many as threedifferent
liaison officers. Invariably theprogram involves firing from one
battal-ion sector into another; and patrol clear-ance must
definitely be established witheach infantry unit. Should an
emer-gency arise, displacement of tracks mustbe cleared through the
infantry battal-ion; and critical targets must be desig-nated.
Firing information for patrol andarmor support must often be
relayed.And of course the observer's adjustmentsmust be transmitted
to the crew. Thuscommunication between the SP platoon,the liaison
officer, the observer, the 53,and the tracks is imperative for the
coor-dination so essential to effective opera-tion.
Overall coordination requires the con-stant attention of the
antiaircraft platoonleader. First, his platoon is positioned
(Continued on page 23)
--~-- - --""'1"1"'"' .......I- ,- ...By LT.COLONEL OTHO ANTHONY
601st AAA GUll Battn/ioll
SHORTLY after my arrival in Koreain ~Iay 1952, I was assigned to
the 3dAAA A\\1 Bn (SP), 3d Infantry Divi-sion, I Corps. Commanded
by Lt. Gen-eral John \\1. (Iron ~like) O'Daniel.Very soon I noticed
that the motto ofthe I Corps was "Sharpen Your Bayo-nets." At first
I thought this was a rath-er silly motto but somehow it
impressedme-at least it impressed me enough tomake me study and
analyze its truemeaning and what the man who choseit was thinking
about when he decidedto use it as a motto. I am sure he wastrying
to get a point across, which wasto stress the "1i\IPORT/\NCE
About four weeks after first seeing thismotto I decided to learn
if it had a truemeaning. Headquarters Batlery, 3d 1\1\1\En (SP) was
scheduled for a BattalionCommand Inspection soon. 1\ few daysbefore
the scheduled inspection, 1 in-structed the Battery Commander to
tryto have maximum attendance and tomake special effort to have
each man,so authorized, to wear his bayonet. Theinspection was held
as scheduled; 89men out of an assigned strength of 107stood the
inspection, 79 men had bayo-nets, the other 10 being truck
driverswere not authorized bayonets. Out ofthe 79 bayonets
inspected, 21 were de-fective, six had about ~~ inch broken offthe
point, se\'en had badly bent andmarred points, and the remainder
wereeither dull, rusty or had loose handles.1 was rather amazed to
find that such asmall piece of equipment-a bayonet, anarticle which
is not used on the averageof once in a lifetime, could be in sucha
poor state of maintenance. Further-more these were not even front
linetroops. They would only upon rare oc-casions have use for the
bayonet. I mightadd that the appearance of the soldiers
in ranks and their quarters looked justabout like their
After the inspection, instructions weregiven that all bayonets
would be straight-ened, cleaned and sharpened. In thosecases where
abuse was evident, the sol-dier was held pecuniarily liable for
thecost of a new bavonet, The next Battal-,ion Command Inspection
was held 5weeks later. Not only were all bayonetsinspected in a
good condition but wherecombat boots were just passable before,at
this inspection they were shining,brass was gleaming, the soldiers
had abright countenance and their posturewas erect. Now I really
knew what"Sharpen Your Bayonets" meant andwhat was more pleasing, I
realized thatthese soldiers also had learned,
\Vith this I Corps motto in mind, Iinstructed my staff to start
inspectingeverything that should have a sharp orsquare point on it
and insist upon clean-ing and sharpening all weapons andtools. \Ve
concentrated upon screwdriv-ers, chisels and axes. Many
screwdrivershad broken and bent points, chisels weredull and
frayed, presenting safety haz-ards in some cases, and axes were in
adeplorable condition. They had loosehandles, were rusty, and had
dull andchipped bits, caused by striking stonesand chopping into
the ground. I knowof no one tool that gets more abuse thanthe
average axe in the hands of a 20thCentury U. S. Soldier. Not only
wasthis true in Korea but the same condi-tion was later found to
exist in the Bat-talion to which I am presently assignedhere in the
The U. S. Soldier does not like todig. He has the ready answer,
"Sir, wehave requested a bulldozer," or "Sir, wedo not have any
picks." 1-I00ve\'er,whenthe shells fall close or someone in
thesquad gets killed or wounded they dig
like gophers. I recall a twin 40mm ;\ I19Squad of Brry B which
was supportingthe 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantrvlast 1\ larch.
The weapon was emplacednear the i\lain Line of Resistance(1\ ILR)
in a shallow position. I urgedthe squad leader to dig the position
deep-er. However, a later inspection revealedonly small signs of an
improved position.The squad leader said the position wasused only
at night and the enemy neverfired any weapons at the position.
Thenone evening at dusk, just after the weap-on went into the
position, the enemynred just two rounds of 76mm artilleryat the
position. One round was "over"and the second round just
"short,"throwing stones and shell fragments intothe position and
wounding one of theammunition handlers. The ne~xteveningI inspected
the position. \Vithout ques-tion it was by then one of the best
pre-pared positions in the sector. No furtherlectures were needed
by this squad onthe subject of digging in.
Storing and policing ammunition onthe battlefield, laying and
picking upfield telephone wire and the use of sandbags, for other
than fortincation pur-poses are some of the other problems acombat
commander is confronted within the combat zone. \Vith the
funda-mental principle of "Practice SupplyEconomv" drilled into the
minds of all,key personnel these critical items can becontrolled
And so we stress the importance offundamental teaching. 'Take
care of thesmall things and the large things willtake care of
If vou want to nnd an efficient soldier.look for one with a
sharp bayonet. Ifyou have a dull battery or battalion andwould give
it zest, "sharpen your bayo-nets."
If so, send us vour new address. If vou do not vet know the new
address, writeus to suspend m'ailing your JOUR~AL: Then we 'hold it
here and forward whenwe do get your new address. That will give you
better sen'ice. The Postmasterwill not fonvard or return your
.,... - or- .- ..,.... ~ ~~ I----~-- ~ -......~
Machines of modern warfare have become so complex
that training men to operate them is a major problem
By RICHARDS W. COTTONCIUlirmml, Electrollics Productioll
As a whole, the armed forces of theUnited States are not now
qualified tohandle at top efficiency the advancedelectronic
equipment our scientists havegiven them. \Ve are not trainingenough
men in this complex science tooperate and maintain what has
But what makes these statements sovital is that we are making
still anothermistake. To most Americans the aver-age Russian is a
bearded, bomb-throwingdullard whom our highly trained andwell
equipped troops could quicklyknock out. That just is not so at
thistime. Russia has a huge armed forceof highly skilled and
trained men whoseelectronic equipment compares favor-ably with our
own. It is true that theirequipment may not be as
technicallyperfect, nor as expensive as ours, but itis designed for
the intelligence level ofher operating troops. They should
getbetween 80 and 90 per cent maximumutility out of their
electronic gear. Oursis unquestionably superior-but, com-bat
officers tell me, too often we onlyget approximately 60 per cent of
its po-tential value. This is caused by insuf-ficient training, and
equipment whichis overly complex, especially from amaintenance
Our readiness for an electronic war,even after two years of
Korea, can onlybe described as half-and-half-we arehalf trained and
Let us admit that soldiers cannot bemade into proficient
technicians in atwo-year draft. But I am not recom-mending
extension of the draft period.
Lt. Gen. Orval Cooke of the USAFpoints out that we do have
tremendousnational assets in the basic trainabilityof our men-if
they can be held in serv-
*Reprinted from April 1953 issue of Na-tion'J BUJineJJ.
ice long enough-and in the potentialoutput of our production
"These," he says, "compensate forthe fact that the so-called
American in-ventive genius is not what we like tothink it is. \Vho
invented jet aircraft?Radar? The British. \Vho inventedsuch things
as the recoilless cannon?The Germans and the Swiss. But weare great
borrowers and producers. Ourstrong points are in the
quantitativefield rather than the qualitative."
Admitting that in the past 20 yearsthe world's greatest
inventions havenot been American and our forte is massproduction, I
also believe that we areimproving our position qualitatively,both
in industry and in the training ofour troops in electronic
The hard core of modern electronicwar is the vacuum tube, or
"bottle" asthe GI calls it. 1'lilitary electronic gearrequires a
high degree of training, notonly to operate it, but also to service
iteither behind the lines, or in actualcombat. For instance, normal
attritionaccounts for a daily loss of three tubesout of every 200
in normal rear echelonmilitary bench use. The B-36 carries2,700
tubes of all sorts, so you couldexpect 40 to blow every day. In
eachcase the trouble must be diagnosed,located and repaired, while
under wayor even under fire.
Freeing the armed forces from theneed to contract for civilian
electronicexperts to perform necessary mainte-nance work will
require far more thanthe two years a draftee is now requiredto
serve. Industry and the armed forces,meeting on equal terms in the
Elec-tronics Production Board, agree that ittakes not less than
five years of inten-sive training to make an across-the-board
electronics man out of a highschool graduate with a good IQ.
AFTER a draftee has finished hisfirst nine weeks of basic
training andfinally has started on his "commonblock> or basic,
electronics, he findsmany other distractions which take himfrom the
classroom. All these demandsmay be important in themselves,
but,together, they mean that a draftee canonly be trained on a
single phase in theelectronics field. On this single pieceof gear
he gives the service only anaverage of ten months usefulness out
ofhis two-year hitch.
Of course there are solutions for theseproblems. Some are in
industry, somein the armed forces-but most are-right-fully-in the
laps of the American peo-ple. It's their survival and the
survivalof their sons which we are really dis-cussing and it will
be their responsibilityto see that we take remedial action.
The meaning of all this might bemade clearer by going back to an
incidentin World War II.
At that time, the gunnery officer onI-1.1'l.S. H.ood was looking
with vexa-tion at the radar reading given by hisnewfangled
electronic fire-control sys-tem. It couldn't be right, he
thought,so he took an optical reading, trans-mitted the data to the
gun turrets, firedat the distant German battleship Bis-marck-and
missed. In the next fewseconds the Bismarck's radar-directedsalvo
crashed inboard and the Hood wasdoomed.
1\ lilitary electronics-of which radaris one of many-actually
came into be-ing in World War II, principally thebrain child of Sir
Robert \Vatson-\Vatt.The impact upon our world has beenprodigious.
Because of electronics-andnuclear fission-we, as a nation, are
inmuch the same position as the Hood'sgunnery officer-in the next
war therewill be no time for a mistake.
Before the war ..\Ir. \Vatson-\YaHwas trying to measure the
exact distancebetween the earth and its encompass-ing ionosphere
\vith a carefully timedtransmitter-receiver. It seemed thate\"ery
time he got his instruments setand began transmitting, a plane
wouldroar o\'erhead from a nearby airfield.Out of patience, the
young scientistcalled up the Air Ministry and com-plained. The
planes caused what hecalled "disturbing echoes."
"Echoes?" echoed the Air Ministryincredulously. "From planes in
Right?Are you sure?" Watson-Watt was quitesure. 'We'll be right
around," said theAir Ministry.
That was the beginning of radar.
IONOSPHERIC measurements wererelegated to an assistant and the
youngscientist became a full-time 'Top SecretBoffin;' or top
echelon "Back-RoomBoy," working on the development ofthe devices
which were the forerunnersof those now torturing the minds of
The Germans later developed a micro-wave radar and, until
effective counter-measures were developed, they madelife miserable
for our bombers, patrolcraft and raiders. The famous Diepperaid,
when so many British and Cana-dians died on what seemed a
uselessmission, actually was not just anotherraid. Our Intelligence
knew that theGermans had something new in radar.If we were to learn
how to jam it wehad to get in to see it. The Dieppe raidwas set up
to take a certain stocky,medium-sized, ruddy Scotsman ashoreand let
him look-see. Actually, the raidwas a success. But, for security
reasons,we could not explain at that time.
I feel that I am somewhat qualifiedto comment brieRy on the
current situa-tion. I have been engaged in electricalengineering
and electronics all my life,I believe I was the only American
everto serve as an official of the British Gov-ernment-during the
last war I was ap-pointed controller of signals and equip-ment in
the British Air Commission.Shortly after my return to this
country,I was asked to become director of theelectronics division
of the NationalProduction Authority and chairman ofthe Electronics
Production Board, Oneof the arms of our defense mobilizationeffort.
Having lived with electronics
e\'er since it was wireless and havingworked on its military
application allthrough a war and a half, I must con-fess that I
feel a considerable alarmover the immediacy of the problem
ofelectronic-atomic total war.
Let us start with equipment.Once a Brass Hat came back from
naval maneuver, a faraway look in hiseyes. "If I only had a
piece of equip-ment that would spot a snorkel at 100miles without
picking up waves or drift-wood, we could lick the world."
Hisdreamboat idea went in time to the re-search people. Smart and
capable, theyare, however, not always practical. Theresearchers
designed a monster whichwould do all that was asked of it
andperhaps a bit more, but it was so com-plex that only the
designers themselvescould operate or maintain it.
Finally it got to the manufacturerwho said it must be simplified
for pro-duction. The simplifying procedure con-tinued as the
production engineerspointed out Raws. The design for a pieceof
electronics frequently comes from re-search including a type of
vacuum tubethat does not even exist, except as anequation on
In making it, the manufacturer's en-gineers may find that 99
ohms performbetter than the 100 ohms the specifica-tions call for.
The resulting paper chasemay require weeks-even months.
And, always, before we get into fullproduction we must solve two
severeproblems-complexity of design andcontract formalities. I am
reminded ofa v':artime example of what happenswhen, as an air vice
marshal on Gen-eral Eisenhower's staff said to me, "theBoffins
forget that the ultimate productmust be suited to the mentality of
In World War II, the United Statesobtained the sonar target
depth deter-mining device from the British. It con-tained something
less than 30 vacuumtubes, took up little shipboard space,and needed
one crewman. Since thewar we have "improved" it. Our versionhas
about 235 tubes, takes up half aroom, and requires two more men
justto keep it operational. Its increasedefficiency is slight.
A good rule-of-thumb is that, forevery man aboard a fighting
ship, youhave to add eight tons displacement forsuch things as
fuel, water, food, cloth-ing and gear. On top of that is the
electronics equipment itself. the addi.tional tubes and spares
necessary fotday-to-day maintenance.
The electronics industry, left free touse its own ingenuity,
mowd in the op-posite direction. The typical televisionreceiver of
19-1-9 used 26 tubes. Todav'stypical set uses 21 tubes, gives
betterperformance, has simplified comrols,more reliability and
A radar device of considerable Com-plexity was installed in a
ship whoseidentity isn't important here. Its cap-tain brought the
vessel into a navy yardand the electronics technical officer
hur.ried aboard to check on performance.The captain was almost
ecstatic.' Hepointed with pride to a steadily rotatingscanner on
"Couldn't get along without it," heburbled. ".:\1arvelous
thing." Elatedby this praise, the ETO went belowand found a young
lieutenant with acouple of ET-3s (electronic technician,third
class) poring over a massive vol-ume of circuits. The ETO asked
howthe equipment was operating. One tech-nician carefully closed
"That thing!" grated the lieutenant."It hasn't worked for three
days. I justkept the scanner rotating to please theold man. He sees
it going around andaround and thinks everything is dandy."
THE ETO sent one of his Tech Reps,known as contract engineers,
aboardand in a day he had it working prop-erly. These contract
engineers-aver.aging ten years' experience in main-taining all
types of electronic gear-goto the armed sen'ices from the
electronicindustry to teach the officers and crewhow to maintain
and operate their ownequipment. But in practice they oftenwind up
doing the repair work them-selves and rarely have time for
in-struction. VVhen I complained of thisto one admiral he insisted
that it \vasnecessary because he "had to maintainconstant battle
I pointed out that, in demanding bat-tle readiness. he was
losing his warreadiness. There simply would not beenough men to do
a full wartime job ifenough enlisted men were not trainedto meet
the vastly increased demandsof an all-out \var.
While an Army hitch is likely to betwo years, a ~avy cruise is
for three orfour and an Air Force enlistment for
four vears. A draftee's sen'ice in anybranch is for hvo vears.
The latter twosen'ices obviously have a much easiertime licking the
training problem if theyobtain all the men thev want.
Both the Air Forc; and the Nan'are "ven', ven- nice" to the bovs
the lastfew mo~ths 0' their l:erms of ;nlistment.If they can get a
man to stay on fornm enlistments they know that, at,,'orst, they
have a fully trained elec-tronics man in the resen'oir of the
na-tion's resen'e manpower. At best theyha\'e been able to show him
that, aftercompleting eight years, he is nearlyhalfway to the
2o-year retirement period-\,,:hich means a basic retirement payof
more than $50 a week and a com-pletely learned trade at a probable
ageof only 38. He is then in a position togo into priyate business
in a field whichis now avid for stable and knowledge-able young
If we are forced into a war in Europeit is important to us that
electronic gearsupplied to our allies be kept operable..Where we
are providing our allies withsuch equipment, it seems to me withthe
draftee's length of service in NATOcountries being only 18 months,
it isvital that we also provide the necessaryelectronic engineers
to train allied per-sonnel.
We have spent more than $15,000,-000,000 on military electronics
sincethe war and are now up to a nationalannual expenditure of
$2,500,000,000a year. This is very big business, as wellas a vital
part of our survival. It isreasonable to state that, if
electronicsalone can't win a war, no modern warcan be won without
it. It thus ceasesto be a purely military problem. Wecannot
surrender our civilian control ofwell planned military progress.
Wemust demand that it be properly man-aged and fully exploited.
THE Germans standardized theirmanufacture for wartime on 16
types ofvacuum tubes. On our JAN (JointArmy Navy) preferred lists
are morethan 300 with probably another 1,000or so special purpose
tubes. The hugenumber complicates both productionand usage.
Such a list needs ruthless editing. Ispeak both as one .with
some govern-mental background and also as a prac-tical
Simplification in maintammg andoperating the Hying and fire
controlsystems of supersonic aircraft must beginwith the designer
and continue e\-enafter the prototype has been acceptedand the
device placed in sen'ice. Oneanswer is to extend "The Little
BlackBox," or the "Go, l\o-go" technique ofmaintenance.
"The Little Black Box" is a completeunit which can be plugged
into a circuitor system. Using such a box, all theoperator
maintenance man has to do isto plug a mobile testing console
intoeach box on a "Go, No-go" test. If it isa case of no-go, the
faulty box is rippedout as a complete unit, replaced with aperfect
one and the failure sent back tothe factory.
Many oppose this policy of immedi-ate return to the factory,
but, as a fac-tory man, I know that we frequentlyget
con:Hictingreports of equipment fail-ures from the fighting front.
This isespecially true when field repair workhas been attempted.
But, as one pilotput it, "When you are traveling 600miles an hour
it is a bad time to be ina quandary." If 'The Little Black Box"is
returned to the factory, persistentbreakdowns can be isolated and
The Air Force is improving this sys-tem. In World War II, it
hauled outwhole engines or gun assemblies andreplaced them; the
repairs or cannibali-zation coming later, at leisure and in
therear. The Navy complains, however,that carrying "The Little
Black Boxes"aboard ship is tantamount to carryinganother radar or
sonar set on an alreadyovercrowded vessel. The Army con-tends, with
wisdom, that it is logisticallyimpossible to send the boxes back
acrossa sea for repair and that we must estab-lish small shops in
rear areas, which ineffect would be little factories.
We have already taken one long steptoward efficiency and
simplification. Weare getting away from the cry of "secur-ity"
every time a nonmilitary man makesa suggestion or asks a pertinent
ques-tion. But, in the solution of this over-all problem, industry
must have an in-creasing voice and the opportunity tomake changes
in design. Incentive con-tracts should be let which would re-ward
the contractor for recommenda-tions and actions leading to
reductionsin the number of operational controls,size, weight, the
number of components
and cost in a device which will stillproduce the same or a
The present system of contracting isone of the major faults in
the world ofmilitary electronics. Frequently onecompany receives a
research and devel-opment contract, completes it satisfac-torily
and then finds that the manu-facturing contract is awarded
elsewhere.The reason is an archaic lowest-bidderlaw. In the past
few months I haveseen more than $6,000,000 of contractsawarded to
companies that were un-able to carry them out. Two companies,in
fact, went bankrupt in their effortsto carry out contracts which,
for theirown sakes alone, thev never shouldhave been allowed to
Such contracts should be awardedonly to qualified electronics
manufac-turers. I have recommended that, in ourall-important guided
missile program, itshould be mandatory that the work cov-ering
electronic research, developmentand production be subcontracted
onlyto qualified manufacturers .
THE guided missile known as theMatador, for example, presented
sucha problem in the early days that 95 percent of the tubes
delivered for use hadto be rejected. A guided missile deliverssuch
a terrific shock in its period ofinitial fast acceleration that a
wholeseries of new problems arise. The mis-sile at one time
required a lieutenantcommander and his staff to check it
outelectronically for flight; it now takes onechief petty officer
and a mobile consoletesting unit. I asked a chief one daywhat he
thought of the complete boxunit and the "Go, no-go" theory.
Grinning, he said, UNobody dismountsa tire and patches the tube
on the roadany more, does he? He just takes thetire off, slaps
another one on, and sendsthe old one in to the experts for
The next time I saw that chief withhis scraps of various foreign
languagespicked up in six years of service, he wasin civilian
clothes, doing about the samesort of job. I asked him about it.
Theanswer was simple.
"1\lore money, Skipper."He had left the Na,,'Y and joined
field staff of a major manufacturer atnearly double the pay.
There, for one example, is the type of
problem o\'er which I could develop afine case of schizophrenia.
As a manufac-turer, I know that my industry as awhole is
understaffed for engineers; wego to great lengths to obtained
trainedmen, At the same time, as a part-timegoyernment official, I
am anxious thatthe senrices obtain and retain the tre--mendous
numbers of electronicallytrained men they require now-a needwhich
will be multiplied in wartime.
Maj. Gen. Kirk B. Lawton, recentlydeputy chief signal officer
and now com-manding general of the Signal Schoolat Fort Monmouth,
N. J., and I werediscussing this problem recently. Iasked him where
he thought he was go-ing to find the men to operate and re-pair his
equipment if war came. Hegrinned, then said: 'Where will we
getthem-? From you. As things standnow we'll just have to draft
them rightout of industry." I pointed out that, ifall the affected
services did that, theywould SOOnfind that no new
electronicequipment was being delivered to them.Again, in this
scarce field, industry andthe services must collaborate and
Lest you get the impression thatmodern electronics is a mass of
poppingtubes and inadequate personnel, let mestate that large
numbers of competentmen, both in and out of the services,are
seriously trying to solve the riddles.However, they are restricted
in theirefforts by enlistment and draft periods,limitations on
promotions, pay and otherconsiderations which only Congresscan
But ridiculous things can happen,too, to leaven the urgency of
the search.Take the strange case of the USS NewJersey. The New
Jersey steamed out ofthe Gulf of Panama and swung north-west for
Sasebo, Japan. Her searchradar began going a little erratic.
Somedays it would be effective for 80 miles,other days it would
drop to a mere tenor 20.
After a time in which the watchseemed inadequate to locate the
trouble,an officer and the electronic crew of 33specialists went to
work without results.Then the ship reached Sasebo. A youngcivilian
expert came aboard and, in ashort time, \vas climbing up the
grinning broadly. There was the wave-guide-a small screen about
five by eightinches and similar to the one you mighthave on your
tele\rision-and in it was asmall dead Panamanian crow. The birdhad
been caught in the waveguide whilethe New Jersey was going through
thelocks and had been fried to a crisp. Thesearch radar continued
to work after afashion, but, whenever it rained, thebird's body
picked up moisture whichshorted out the set until the sun
andelectric current dried it out again.
ONE Reet commander estimatedthat, mostly due to incompletely
trainedpersonnel, ten per cent of his electronicgear was always out
of commission, thatanother 50 per cent was unreliable.Thus, in that
Reet 60 per cent of thetotal of vital electronic equipment
inservice was in poor condition.
The Navy is not unique in this.Electronics are new and most of
theofficers of today are not. The majoritywent through their
academies beforeultra-high frequencies were common;most of the rest
have received basictraining with a lot of theory enablingthem to
administer installations, but notreally to teach and carry out
detailedrepair work under field conditions. Pity,then, the enlisted
man whose basictraining is not adequate to cure prompt-ly a complex
disorder in a unit of vitalequipment, and whose officers
angrilydemand that it be fixed immediately.By working all night he
may stumbleacross the answer. That answer maybe to get out of the
The new bombsight in our B-36plane is basically an electronic
device.It costs about $250,000, as contrastedwith the $8,000
bombsight of WorldWar II. The new bombsight is onlyone of dozens of
items of essential com-bat equipment. Some of these items onthe
B-36 cannot be reached from insidefor repair while in Right. But
most ofthe vital equipment can be, and re-design has spread it
around the inside ofthe aircraft in such a manner that oneshell or
rocket hit will not disable theplane's entire system.
In arguing for simplicity of equip-ment as a first step toward
the personnel training impasse, it mustnot be misunderstood that
we want tohold back the scientist in his develop-ment of new
weapons. It is, perhaps,a matter of conditioning our young mento
modern progress. I cannot believethat the young men of today are
anybrighter than those of 25 or 50 yearsago-and they certainly are
Human capacity to absorb newknowledge will, in time, reduce
taday'sproblem in electronics to nothing-butthat makes taday's
problem no less real,its solutions no less urgent.
But, meanwhile, it is my belief that,when an idea for a new
military itemis given to the research and developmentengineers, it
should be clearly spelledout that the resultant equipment mustbe
such that it can be operated efficient-ly and maintained readily by
men withan average level of intelligence andtraining such as
presently constitute ourarmed services.
I do not agree with the recent Assist-ant Secretary of Defense,
Anna M.Rosenberg, when she replied to a letterof mine on this
subject, saying: "Theservices' career programs have devel-oped
ample promotion opportunities forqualified personne1." Nor do I
agree thatshe is correct when she insists that theservices have
been able to supply suf-ficient personnel to conduct their
operat-ing electronics programs.
This attitude on personnel is unreal-istic and the services know
it. Not onlymust our draftees and enlistees be givenmore in-service
inducements to take upthe severe mental strain of this careerwithin
the Army. A man must also beattracted to it because of its
identificationwith high-paying civilian jobs, when andif he should
return to civilian life.
One plan that has been suggested isthat after a man has been in
the Armyfor a year and shown some aptitude forthis type of work, he
should at that timebe given opportunity to re-enlist for aperiod of
four or five years to obtain thistraining in full, including the
necessarymath for true proficiency-and all withthe proviso that he
will remain availablein the reserves when he takes his ac-quired
skills into private industry.
No man is fit to command another that cannot command
AIDS FOR THE RANGE UMPIREBy MAJOR WILLIAM H. LAMBERT and MAJOR
JOSEPH S. EDGAR
As a battalion or battery commander,have you silently "cussed"
the recordssection when the BC scope operatorswere unable to find
the sleeve? Or, asa records section officer, have you franti-cally
attempted to assist the O2 station inlocating the target, being
able to giveonly vague directions in purely descrip-tive terms?
This situation arose frequent-ly at the Katakai Firing Range on
theeast coast of Japan. (The range is oper-ated by the 138th AAA
Group underthe command of CoL H. B. Hudiburg.)Scattered clouds, or
extra bright days,when no white sleeves were available,contributed
to this difficulty.
The problem was overcome by thecreation of a simple plotting
board,which could easily be made for any AMrange. The instrument
(christened lo-cally, the "Pogo Stick") consists of 3pieces of
plexiglass. One is in the shapeof a cross section of a gymnasium
dumb-bell with an etched center line represent-ing the base line.
It has an azimuthcircle etched on each end, in properorientation
with the base line. A holefor a bolt is drilled at the exact
centerof each azimuth circle, and the center ofeach hole represents
one end of the 0,-00 line. A scale of 1 inch = 1000 vardsw;s used
for the base line and for ir-adu-ating the two range arms, which
are oneinch in vvidth and thirty inches inlength. The range arms
are bolted tothe base line piece, but are free to rotateeasily.
Each arm is graduated in 1000yard increments, with the left edge
de-lineating the line of sight of each azi-muth BC scope.
When the O2 station loses the targetat the far end of the
course, the observer
notifies a computer at 0, by telephone.The computer quickly
obtains azimuthand slant range from the unit radar bytelephone. He
sets the left edge of the0, arm at the radar azimuth and sets theO2
arm to intersect the 0, arm at theslant range from 0,, Then he
reads theazimuth under the left edge of the O2arm and transmits it
to the O2 operator.The O2 BC scope searches on this azi-muth. The
0, computer keeps obtain-ing azimuth and slant range from theradar
and sending new azimuths to 02'until the target is found. The O2
opera-tors are able to estimate the elevationclosely enough to
bring the sleeve withintheir field of vision, as long as they
havean azimuth to search on, and easily lo-cate the target.
The "Pogo Stick" also provides a quickand convenient means of
checking thepointing data computed for O2 prior tofiring
calibration or trial fire problems.Inexperienced range officers
occasionallymake errors in these computations, butthe "Pogo Stick"
reveals the mistake atonce.
This simple instrument could be elab-
Bore Plug 90mm
orated to have the base line and azi-muth circles adjustable so
that it couIdbe readily adapted to any AAA range.It could also be
machined with suchprecision that O2 pointing data could betaken
from it directly and lengthy com-putations avoided.
Another scoring aid improvised for theKatakai Range was a bore
plug of plexi-glass for scoring the emplacement test.Under the
scoring system outlined inTM 44-234, October 1952, the umpiremust
determine whether the target iscarried in the inner one-half bore
radiusor outer one-half bore radius of the guntube.
The bore plugs, for both 90mm and120mm guns, were made in the
shapeof a Hattened doughnut, with the cen-ter hole the exact size
of a circle havinga radius equal to one-half of the boreradius. The
outside diameter of the boreplug is slightly larger than the
muz-zle of the gun tube, and a ~ inch gapis cut completely through
each plug.This permits it to be compressed slightlywhen being
inserted in the muzzle endof the tube, a~d expansion holds it
The umpire then has a clear hole forvie'wing targets carried
within the centerone-half of the bore radius, and targetscarried in
the outer one-half will beviewed through the plexiglass.
Gun batteries of the 138th AAAGroup firing at Katakai Firing
Range arethus assured of minimum delay due tothe O2 station failing
to find the sleeve,and of a fair score on the emplacementtest phase
of the service practice. Guess-\vork on this part of the scoring
WRITE FOR AND SUPPORT YOUR JOURNAL
RADAR CAMOUFLAGEBy LT. COL. LEONARD M. ORMAN
IT was inevitable that with the firmestablishment of radar in
the family ofmilitary detecting devices, consider-able thought
should be given to meansto thwart this instrument. Both activeand
passive measures have been used.The active measures consist of
somemethod of creating signals on the scopeof the radar, either to
hide the real signalor to create a deceptive signal. The hid-ing of
the true signal is called JAM-MING. This may be done either
elec-tronically or mechanically. El~tronicjamming is accomplished
by the trans-mission of modulated radio signals. Me-chanical
jamming is performed by drop-ping window or some similar
substance.The active measures, by this date, arewell known to radar
operators sinceinstruction in them is included in allradar courses.
(See "Radar Countermeas-mes"-Coast Artillery Journal,
Passive Measures. However, little hasbeen published about
passive measures.These have two general categories, eva-sion and
camouflage. Evasion consistsof tactics that are designed to take
ad-vantage of the limitations of radar to pre-vent or postpone
radar detection, or toavoid revealing the true position of
anattacking force. If attacking planes takeevasive action it may be
impossible todetermine the height at which they areflying or the
planes may be detected toolate for an adequate defense to be
madeready. It is common practice for planesto approach "on the
deck" thus exploit-ing both the poor low coverage of low-frequency,
long-range radars and limita-
lieutenant Colonel Orman has been a fre-quent author of articles
on radar in thisJournal since 19M, a number of which (in-cluding
"Radar Countermeasures") were se-lected for publication in the
Journal pamphlet,Radar. He is also author of the book, Elec-tronic
Navigation. USMAgraduate in 1940,he has attended radar courses at
Harvard andM. I. T. and took his master's degree in elec-tronics at
Pennsylvania in 1951. He nowserves on AFF Boord No.4, at Fort
Bliss, asChief of the Test Group.
tions of coverage imposed by curvatureof the earth.
Camouflage. Camoul:l~ging a targetconsists in finding a means of
reducingthe radiation returned to the receiver ofthe radar set
which illuminates the tar-get. This radiation may be either
ab-sorbed or reflected away from the radar.Both methods of
camouflaging have beenconsidered.
Absorption of incident radiation maybe accomplished by a "paint"
(whichmore nearly resembles linoleum in itsmechanical properties).
Such paint issensitive to wave length, so that in gen-eral only one
band of radar frequenciescan be effectively nullified.
Physicallim-itations on a reasonable thickness forthis absorbent
coating indicate that itwould be useful in only the microwaveregion
(about 10cm or less).
During the war the Germans used ananti-radar coating on their
Schnorkels.Their material was about %" thick andreported to be
effective at both S- andX-bands. Comparison of the radar
signalsfrom the coated and uncoated sides ofan object showed that
this paint is effec-tive in reducing the strong broadsidesignal but
that it does not reduce thesignal at angles more than a few
de-grees off broadside.
It is doubtful if such material will beused on airplanes. The
speed and rangeof aircraft would be considerably re-duced by the
application of paint thisthick. Then too, as indicated above,even
with the anti-radar coating theaspect of the target plays a large
part inthe size of the echo. Since aircraft changeaspect much more
than surface vessels,the reduction of echo from a plane bythe
application of an anti-radar paint isextremely dubious.
In general, the use of anti-radar paintmay prove useful in some
special appli-cations, but its rather critical dependenceon wave
length and angle of incidence,and its present limitation to the
micro-wave region, make its general use forcamoul:lage of doubtful
value. A com-
bination of anti-radar paint and shapedsurfaces might be
Eff~t of Shape on Refl~tion. Bothaspects of this problem are of
interest,i.e., increasing a radar echo and decreas-ing a radar
echo. There are many ap-plications of devices which have been
B' VFigure 1. Illustration of basic principle
of corner reflector.
built to deliberately give good echoes.Comer reflectors are
being used to pro-vide good echoes from meteorological bal-loons,
from AA targets, as aids in locatingrafts at sea, as orienting
devices forradars, as markers for channel buoys andobstructions to
marine navigation. Theprinciple used is illustrated in Figure 1and
is easily understood. Other devicessuch as the use of metal mesh
inter-woven with cloth materials have beenused to increase radar
The decreasing of radar echoes hasalso been investigated. The
energy re-turned to a radar set by a target may bedivided into two
types: the specular re-~tion, which occurs at those areas atwhich
the radar beam strikes the tar