AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

September 13, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments.

2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations.

3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology.

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri identified the movement’s main efforts: 1) to move the battlefield into the West; 2) to unite the ranks of the mujahideen; and 3) to support and shape popular revolutions. Zawahiri additionally focused on black Americans in his statement commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Zawahiri urged them to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice, which he stated had failed them in the United States. Zawahiri decried the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which has polarized the Salafi-jihadi movement and he emphasized al Qaeda’s power as providing a unifying “message” instead of a physical group.

Jabhat Fatah al Sham may have a support base that extends outside of Syria. The leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, established Jabhat Fatah al Sham to be without “affiliation to any external entity”—a reference to al Qaeda—on July 29 and announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra operations. Jabhat Fatah al Sham’s objectives remained the same as Jabhat al Nusra’s, but the group sought to galvanize local Syrian support within the armed opposition. An Emirati man who reportedly pledged allegiance to Jabhat Fatah al Sham attempted to kill an American citizen with his car in the United Arab Emirates and may have intended to attack media targets in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It is not clear whether there is a direct operational link between Jabhat Fatah al Sham and this attack in the UAE.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to build its global network by embedding within local Salafi-jihadi groups and marginalized populations.

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PoliticalThe Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government hardened their stances against the al Houthi-Saleh alliance. The coalition announced a new phase of military operations targeting al Houthi-Saleh forces and leadership responsible for attacks on the Saudi border. Hadi government officials refused to return to negotiations until the al Houthi-Saleh Sana’a-based governing body, the Supreme Political Council (SPC), is abolished. President Hadi said that his government will not make any concessions to the al Houthi-Saleh alliance.

Outlook: Peace talks are unlikely to resume under current conditions.

SecurityHadi government forces continued shaping operations in preparation for an offensive to seize control of Sana’a city, Yemen’s capital. Hadi government and allied forces seized positions east of Sana’a in Sirwah district, Ma’rib governorate and northeast of Sana’a in al Ghayl district, al Jawf governorate. Hadi government forces also attacked al Houthi-Saleh forces in Kirsh and Hayfan districts, on the border between Taiz and Lahij governorates. The Saudi-led coalition intensified airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions in northern Yemen.

Outlook: Hadi government and allied forces will not achieve a decisive victory in Sana’a.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP maintains a support base in southern Yemen. AQAP detonated three suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting Hadi government-allied security forces in Abyan governorate on September 8 and 11.Separately, three militants declared the formation of an unconfirmed ISIS wilayat (province) in al Mahrah governorate, an AQAP support zone. The U.S. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed the Critical Threats Project’s assessment that AQAP and ISIS cooperate on a “tactical level” against common domestic enemies in Yemen, but do not collaborate on external plots. ISIS probably does not have the capability to direct external attacks from Yemen.

Outlook: AQAP will remain as the dominant Salafi-jihadi organization in Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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1) 11 SEP: AQAP detonated a SVBIED targeting security forces in al Wuday district, Abyan.2) 11 SEP: Hadi government forces interdicted an AQAP VBIED in Aden city.3) 10 SEP: Hadi government forces seized Sirwah district, Ma’rib.4) 08 SEP: Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed 30 civilians in Arhab district, Sana’a.5) 11 SEP: Al Houthi-Saleh forces seized Saudi positions and equipment in al Hanjar, Asir region.

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PoliticalSomali officials have not resolved controversies on the composition of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Officials from the Jubbaland and Puntland state walked out of talks due to a dispute about Upper House representation on September 11. Officials also failed to resolve disputes between Hiraan and Middle Shabelle region elders over the formation of the Hiraan-Middle Shabelle state. Regional heads of state are expected to discuss the Somali elections during the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Mogadishu on September 13.

Outlook: Unresolved disputes between Somali regional governments may delay the Upper House elections.

Security Somali Special Operations Forces (SOF) continue to target al Shabaab militants in southern Somalia. U.S.-trained SOF from the elite Danab unit killed an al Shabaab commander and six militants in Qoryoley, in Middle Shabelle region on September 12. Southwest Administration SOF killed at least 12 militants near Labaatan Jirow in Bay region September 9. SOF raids targeting al Shabaab commanders and High-Value Targets (HVTs) have become more frequent since May 2016.

Outlook: Raids targeting HVTs will continue on a limited scale, but the leadership deaths will not reduce al Shabaab’s territorial control in southern Somalia.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab may be recruiting women to conduct attacks on soft targets. Three women armed with petrol bombs and knives attacked a police station in Mombasa, Kenya on September 11, wounding two police officers. The attack comes approximately one week after a Swahili jihadi magazine called for women to play a more active role in jihad. A recent IGAD publication noted al Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate al Hijra’s efforts to expand its recruitment of women. Pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) media claimed that the female attackers had pledged allegiance to ISIS.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely recruit more female operators to conduct suicide missions as Somali security forces become more effective at identifying male operatives.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalThe Libyan National Army (LNA) scuttled efforts by the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to resume oil exports from eastern Libya. The LNA, led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports from GNA-allied militia forces on September 11. The House of Representatives (HoR), a rival government supported by the LNA, is now encouraging Libya’s National Oil Company to resume oil exports from the ports under LNA control. The GNA’s Presidency Council (PC) issued conflicting responses to the takeover, indicating internal dissent. The U.S. and its European allies condemned the takeover.

Outlook: The LNA’s takeover will weaken the GNA and may spark armed conflict with GNA-allied militias over oil sites.

SecurityArmed actors in Tripoli may be targeting GNA sites and GNA-allied Misratan militias in the capital. Some Salafi militias in Tripoli have begun to push back against the dominance of Misrata-based armed groups in the GNA. Popular support for the GNA has waned due to a series of governance failures, including worsening blackouts and an ongoing liquidity crisis.

Outlook: Violence levels may spike in Tripoli in the near term as local militias seek to capitalize on the GNA’s weakness.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS militants are operating behind the frontline in Sirte. GNA-allied militias paused operations to clear the few remaining ISIS-held neighborhoods in Sirte due to the threat of attacks from the rear. Likely ISIS militants conducted three attacks on the militias’ line of communication between Sirte and Misrata in the past two weeks. Misratan security forces apprehended two suspected ISIS suicide bombers en route to Misrata on September 7.The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, demonstrated its ability to defend its safe havens with a series of attacks on LNA forces in contested Qawarsha, Benghazi.

Outlook: ISIS may attempt to conduct retaliatory attacks against the GNA and allied forces in Misrata and possibly Tripoli.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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1) 07-12 SEP: GNA-allied militias clashed with ISIS militants in Sirte.2) 09 SEP: The al Saadawi militia clashed with a Misratan militia in Sidi al Masri, Tripoli. 3) 09 AUG: The LNA conducted airstrikes targeting the Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna.4) 09 SEP: The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council attacked LNA forces in Qawarsha, Benghazi.5) 11 SEP: The LNA seized four oil ports from the PFG.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM leadership continues to rally support to the al Qaeda network in North and West Africa. The leader of AQIM’s Council of Notables, Abu Obeida Yousef al Annabi, called on fighters, especially those in prison, to remain steadfast in an audio speech commemorating the Eid al Adha holiday. He praised mujahideen in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Sahara region.

Outlook: AQIM will continue to support the formation of a Salafi-jihadi base in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.

Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Escalating economic protests in Tunisia threaten to destabilize the new unity government and provide opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to attack. Protests began on September 7 after a resident of Fernana, northwestern Tunisia self-immolated to protest the municipality’s closure of his workplace. Similar protests in Ben Guerdane, a poverty-stricken town on the Libyan border, will include a general strike in late September. Officials called for peaceful demonstrations and warned that Salafi-jihadi militants may seek to infiltrate protests. The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade called for assassinations in Tunisia, indicating that the group may seek to resume offensive operations during a period of unrest.

Outlook: Tunisian security forces will divert counterterrorism resources in order to quell social unrest.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)A schism within Boko Haram may strengthen ISIS in West Africa. ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, formerly known as Boko Haram, attacked members of the Boko Haram faction led by Boko Haram leader Abubakar al Shekau in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria in early September. ISIS recognized Abu Musab al Barnawi as the governorate of Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya in early August, sidelining Shekau.

Outlook: The pro-ISIS faction of Boko Haram will likely grow stronger, expanding ISIS’s network in West Africa.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569