Perspectives on participation in economic policy reform in Africa

Perspectives on Participation in Economic Policy Reform in Africa

Derick W. Brinkerhoff, with assistance from Nicolas P. Kulibaba

This article examines two questions regarding participation in economic policy reform in Africa: how do the circumstances surrounding participation and the ways it occurs influence the economic policy reform process, and can changes to enhance participation lead to improved policy outcomes? The general findings are, first, that the pattern of participation is an important variable in the policy reform process, but that its effects on reform outcomes are strongly mediated by African political and governance factors. Second, increased participation appears to enhance prospects for sustainable reform outcomes, though the weak capacity and responsiveness of the state and the incipient nature of civil society's associational infrastructure in much of Africa limit opportunities for institutionalizing participation. It is important to be aware of participation's limits as well as its potential contributions to economic policy reform in the context of political liberalization, and to recognize the long-term nature of the transition to new modes of state-society cooperation.

S i nce the 1980s, t w o m a j o r t r ends h a v e r eca s t the ro les o f n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s

a n d the i r c i t i zens : the shi f t to o p e n - m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s and the m o v e t o w a r d

Derick W. Brinkerhoff, a senior social scientist with Abt Associates Inc., is research director for the Implementing Policy Change Project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, and is an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies. He has worked extensively in Africa and Haiti on policy, management, and institutional issues. Prior to joining Abt, he spent ten years at the University of Maryland's International Development Manage- ment Center. Dr. Brinkerhoff has published widely, including five books and numerous articles and book chapters. His latest publication is an edited special issue of World Development (Vol. 24, No. 9) devoted to policy implementation. He holds an Ed.D. from Harvard University and an M.Admin. from the University of California, Riverside. His current research focuses on government-NGO partnerships for policy reform. Nicolas P. Kulibaba is a senior policy analyst with Abt Associates Inc. He has wide experience in Africa in the livestock, export promotion, enterprise credit, and rural development sectors. He has also conducted political risk assessments in Africa and the Caribbean for a variety of multinational firms. Mr. Kulibaba holds a Diploma in social anthropology from Oxford University, Oxford, England. Correspondence address for both authors: Abt Associates Inc., 4800 Montgomery Lane #600, Bethesda, MD 20814 USA.

Studies in Comparative International Development, Fall 1996, Vol. 31, No. 3, 123-151.

124 Studies in Comparative International Development / Fall 1996

democratization. The linkages between the two, and whether they are synergistic or antagonistic, have been the subject of much attention worldwide.1 For developing countries the debate is especially critical, because it influences the policy and program conditionalities associated with international financial resource flows. In com- parison to the rest of the developing world, the 1980s for Africa have been termed a "lost decade," where both rural and urban populations ended up worse off by 1990 than ten years earlier (World Bank 1994a, 1989; Chole 1989). In the 1990s, though, the trends toward increased economic and political liberalization have spread across the continent, and the debate on the nature of the linkages between economic reform and political liberalization has been taken up in the African context. An issue central to both trends is participation, which has enjoyed something of a policy renaissance over the past several years. 2 This article reviews the literature that addresses participation in economic policy reform in Africa. It explores two questions: how do the circumstances surrounding participation and the ways it occurs influence the economic policy reform process and can changes to enhance participation lead to improved policy outcomes?

Key Issues

Embedded within these questions lies an array of issues of direct concern both to international donors and African governments. From the viewpoint of the international donor community, two types of issues emerge regarding participation. The first is an analytic problem: can the relationships between participation and various types of economic policy reform be sufficiently understood and unpacked so that more effective policy prescriptions and strategies can be developed? The second is an operational one: how can donors shape, influence, and reinforce participatory processes and mechanisms so as to increase the sustainability and impact of economic reforms? Of major debate is the extent to which donors should focus on helping African governments to work better, on strengthening civil society, or on both. Donors have the longest experience in institutional development (Israel 1987). Increasingly, however, they have turned attention to civil society, which as Dia- mond defines it, refers to formal and informal groups of "citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable" (1994, 5). 3 The notion here is that rather than emphasizing institutional supply, an approach that strengthens interest groups' ability to demand better government performance can yield fruitful results (see Goldsmith 1993).

Economic policy reform, public sector capacity-building, and the strengthening of civil society all converge in the current donor focus on governance. As defined by the World Bank (1992 1994b), governance has four components: efficient public sector management, accountability, a supportive legal framework, and transparent information flows. 4 Governance arrangements constrain and shape the possibilities for participation, and thus are important mediating factors in the links between participation and policy outcomes. In turn, broadbased participation is integral to

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good governance; without it, accountability turns to insularity, legal frameworks remain paper exercises, and transparency becomes opaque (see Hyden 1992; Jeffries 1993; Landell-Mills 1992).

From the viewpoint of African governments, the participation issues of greatest concern are the practical, operational ones. They too are concerned with keeping reforms on track, improving governance capacity, and addressing the demands of civil society, but with an immediacy that external assistance providers do not face (Fitzgerald et al. 1995; Mutahaba et al. 1993; Picard and Garrity 1994). Young captures this point in his discussion of the necessity of African governments to deal with the "imperative of democratization" where responding to pressures to liberal- ize, both economically and politically, is "no longer an option, but an obligation" (1994, 230). As the trajectory of economic reform moves from the earlier stages of stabilization, usually managed by a small team of technocrats, to liberalization and, ultimately, long-haul consolidation, where much larger numbers of actors are involved, African decision-makers and policy managers increasingly face the require- ment of building coalitions and managing consensus (Haggard and Kaufman 1994; Thomas and Grindle 1990). These tasks are intimately bound up with issues of participation. For example, how can commitment to reform be created and sustained among interest groups? How can the destabilizing effects of reform and the con- flicts they generate be coped with, and how can the losers in the reform process be compensated or coopted?

Defining Participation

Participation is an extremely broad concept, one that has over the years enjoyed what Cohen and Uphoff, writing over fifteen years ago, called "popularity without clarity" (1980). That characterization still applies today, with perhaps even more salience than ever on the African continent as the trend toward more open forms of government and an expanded role for civil society continues to grow. International assistance agencies, academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and developing country counterparts have debated and discussed the definitions, roles, aims, and utility of participation in various fora over the years (see Nagle 1991). In general, participation conveys images of involvement, inclusion, and engagement; it invokes notions of joining in, of taking part. Our perspective on participation seeks to detail its parameters across a range of situations rather than advance a definition that tries to establish a clear line between what is, or is not, participation. This approach avoids attempting a specific definition of participation, which can lead to muddy, unresolvable debates over whether a specific instance of participation is "authentic" and "genuine" (and therefore good), or "false" and "invalid" (bad).

We define participation along three dimensions that accommodate a range of activities, actors, and actions. This framework adapts earlier work done on rural development project participation (Cohen and Uphoff 1980) to the larger sphere of policy reform. The answers to three questions provide participation's defining features: participation in what? by whom? and how?


The "what" question addresses the kind of participation being undertaken or con- sidered. The kinds of participation of major concern for our purposes relate to the sequential steps in the policy process. These are participation in policy: analysis. design and adoption, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Taken to- gether, these kinds of participation comprise a policy reform cycle, which, over the life of a given policy reform, can go through several iterations, with a variety of interactive feedback loops among, and refinements in, each of the steps. In the real world the policy process is never unilinear.

Looking at who participates in economic policy reform, the framework differenti- ates participants into several categories. External participants include international donor agencies, both multilateral and bilateral and technical assistance providers. In-country participants can be divided into national government personnel, local government staff, private sector actors, NGOs, various interest groups at different levels (professional associations, unions, religious groups, students, political parties, etc.), and local residents (merchants, traders, farmers, women, laborers). Of concern for this dimension of the framework is specification of the interests of each category of actors, the resources they bring to the policy process, their motivation to use those resources, and their likely impacts. Determination of winners and losers is key.

The "how" dimension addresses a number of issues that seek to clarify the qualitative aspect of participation. These issues are strongly associated with the sustainability of the policy reform. The framework looks at the source of initiative for participation such as: from an external donor agency or some domestic constituency, from the center or the grass-roots, from a broad set of actors or a single interest group. The incentives for participation are important; is participation voluntary, induced, or coerced? Another critical qualitative issue relates to the types of institutional structures used for participation (formal or informal, public or private, strong or weak, markets or hierarchies). The extent of participation deals with the time demands, the number and range of actors and activities involved, and the limits imposed. Finally, the "how" dimension considers the degree of empowerment associated with participation. This aspect is often singled out as the most important by many observers, and is the most frequently cited feature distinguishing whether participation is "genuine" or not.

Participation in Economic Policy Reform in Africa

The literature on participation in policy reform falls into three broad categories. 5 The first category, technical economic performance perspectives, contains analysis of structural adjustment programs, and focuses on how participation fosters or im- pedes appropriate policy choice and achievement of economic performance targets. Sources include case studies of individual country performance with policy reforms and multi-country cross-case analyses (Abbott 1993; Berg 1990; Husain and Faraqee 1994; Lieberson 1991; Mills 1989; Thomas et al. 1991; Vondal 1989; Zulu and Nsouli 1985). This category's orientation to participation concentrates on its contribution to getting the policies right.

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The second category, political economy, contains several streams. A large literature addresses the nature and role of the state and the implications for participation (Boye 1993; Callaghy 1990; Lemarchand 1992; Sahn and Sarris 1992; Shaw 1993; van de Walle 1994). Numerous authors analyze the impacts of interest groups on policy outcomes (e.g., Gulhati 1990a and 1990b; Krueger 1993; Skalne 1993; Toye 1992; Widner 1993, 1994), including individual country cases (e.g., Chazan 1983; Herbst 1993; and Rothchild 1991 on Ghana; Bates and Collier 1992; and Kydd 1989 on Zambia; Kiondo 1989 on Tanzania). Other authors look at NGOs and the private sector (Bienen and Waterbury 1989; Bratton 1989b and 1990; Shaw 1990) and at participation of civil society in the policy process (Harbeson et al. 1994; Migdal 1988. Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Another stream contains authors who see participation in terms of the relative power distri- butions between the international financial institutions and individual countries (Fearon 1988; Good 1989; Schoenholtz 1987). A substream of African analysts focuses on the roots of political economy in indigenous cultural patterns and practices (Ake 1990; Ayittey 1990 and 1991; Etounga-Manguelle 1991; Heilbrunn 1993; Tadesse 1992). Literature in this category can be characterized as emphasizing participation' s place in getting the politics of policy reform right.

The third literature category looks at the institutional and management dimensions of participation and policy reform. Major emphases here are on institutional capacity, both as a constraint to participation in the policy process and as an area for technical assistance (Fitzgerald et al. 1995; Frischtak 1994; Hirschmann 1993; Lamb 1987; Sutton 1987); civil service reform and the role of bureaucrats in policy change (Brown 1989; Garvey 1991; Leonard 1991; Montgomery 1988); management tools and techniques that can help deal with interest groups (Brinkerhoff 1991; Crosby 1992a and 1992b; Grindle and Thomas 1990; Robinson 1990; White 1990a and 1990b); and the institutional requirements for effective participation of civil society in policy reform (Bratton 1989a; Hyden 1990; Talbott 1990). African public administration specialists constitute a sub-stream of literature in this category (Balogun and Mutahaba 1989; Kiggundu 1989; Mutahaba et al. 1993; Picard and Garrity 1994). The viewpoint here can be summed up as concentrating on linking who participates and how to get the institutions right for effective policy reform.

What Kind of Participation?

Participation in policy analysis and design in general has been relatively restricted by both weak African policy analytic capacity and lack of demand. Numerous sources cite the low level of technical analytic skills as an important constraint to African participation in policy dialogue (Commonwealth Secretariat 1990; Gulhati 1990b; McCleary 1991; Mutahaba and Balogun 1992; Nunberg 1990; Paul 1990; Sutton 1987). The capacity constraint diminished during the 1980s as a result of training and increased experience (World Bank 1991), but indigenous demand for policy analysis remains limited. The political economy literature notes that in many cases African leaders have been little interested in technical arguments for or against


policies, being more concerned with regime maintenance and political survival (Bienen 1993; Crook 1990; Evans 1992; Hyden 1992). This factor is also mentioned in explaining why leaders pursued economically irrational policies in the first place. In authoritarian regimes, the conduct of independent, critical policy analysis has been discouraged, thus limiting the growth of independent analytic capacity. In- creasing indigenous demand for policy analysis is seen as one way to increase African ownership for policy reform (World Bank 1991; Johnson and Wasty 1993).

Regarding policy design/adoption, the impact of donor procedures and timetables is frequently noted (McCleary 1991; Nelson 1990). The design process is usually conducted by a small technical team and a closed circle of national actors (Gulhati 1990b). Institutional constraints limit African technocrats' effective role in the process (Gulhati 1990a; Mutahaba and Balogun 1992). In many countries, decision- makers have seen little need to consult elements of civil society beyond symbolic, tightly managed opportunities for popular ratification of policy choices already made, although political liberalization is modifying this pattern somewhat (Hyden and Bratton 1992; Nyang'oro and Shaw 1992). However, policy designs that build political support for reform measures are more successful than those that do not (Corbo and Fischer 1990; White 1990a and 1990b). Participation in policy design is expanding via a range of consultative mechanisms such as: national conferences (Heilbrunn 1993: Sall 1989). social marketing (Corbo and Fischer 1990). involvement in polls and surveys (Atherton et al. 1992; Monga 1994b; Vondal 1989). Sources agree that participation is more likely in democratizing countries (Hyden and Bratton 1992). Botswana is cited as exemplary in this regard; Molutsi and Holm (1992, 82) note that "top officials have come to believe that government programs work better if the public can be induced to participate.. , in governing processes. The Government has sought to obtain popular consent for specific programs through public consultations" (see also Picard 1987; Wiseman 1990).

All the streams of literature stress participation in implementation as having the most influence on the achievement or failure of policy objectives. The recognition that, in practice, policy implementation is not simply a mechanical process of carry- ing out measures decided upon previously is in large part responsible for the blur- ring of the boundaries between the steps in the linear policy process model and its recasting in terms of an interactive, multidirectional frame (Brinkerhoff 1991; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Kulibaba and Rielly 1993; Thomas and Grindle 1990; White 1990a and 1990c). Participation in policy implementation can be divided into two categories: participation by implementing agents and by groups that are the target of reforms. Regarding the former, the literature notes the issues of capacity, civil service reform, and the need for a stronger state apparatus to implement policies even if the role of the state in economic activity is reduced (Berg 1990; Callaghy 1990; Nunberg 1990; Silverman 1996). 6 State agents are often seen as obstacles to policy implementation, viewed as (at best) captives of vested interests, or (at worst) the predatory personification of the abusive state apparatus, driven by the desire to maintain elite control over public resources for rentseeking and patronage purposes (Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Garvey 199l; Lemarchand 1992). But, as Grindle points out (1991), bureaucrats are not always simply the sum of the preferences of

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their strongest patrons/lobbies; some are sincerely interested in reform, as Leonard (1991) illustrates in his study of the careers of four African civil servants.

Regarding participation by reform targets, their impact is greater in long-haul reforms than stroke-of-pen ones (Healy and Robinson 1992; Nelson 1989; Bienen and Waterbury 1989; CSIS 1992). Successful implementation over time highlights the importance of coalition-building among key stakeholders. Hawkins (1991), for example, credits the failure to build such coalitions as a major contributor to the demise of Zambia's economic reform program under Kaunda (Bates and Collier 1992; Callaghy 1990; Gulhati 1989). Participation here is of two types: voice and exit (Hirschman 1969). 7 Formal voice options are: participation in national conferences, rallies, and other organized fora (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Ouane 1990); policy/program review committees (USAID n.d.); information dissemination campaigns and/or the media (West and Fair 1993); through NGOs and other voluntary associations (Widner and van der Veen 1993). Informal voice includes: sponta- neous protests, rumor campaigns, one-on-one meetings with officials. Exit reflects such actions as: withholding support, non-participation in services or policy benefits (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin 1987), boycotts, retreat into the informal sector (MacGaffey et al. 1991), evasion of policy provisions through bribery and side-payments (Bates and Krueger 1993), and migration (Kom 1993).

Participation in policy monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is relatively limited. There is not much M&E in inward-looking public sector agencies, and thus M&E capacity needs to be developed (Brinkerhoff 1991; Kiggundu 1989; Wiesner 1993; White 1990a). Participation in policy impact surveys and reviews is one way of involving target groups in M&E (Atherton et al. 1992). Civil society can serve an important governance function here as an independent watchdog; this is a role for NGOs, the media, and universities (see Charlick 1992; Fowler 1991 ; Harbeson et al. 1994; Wedelt 1986; World Bank 1994b).

Who Participates?

The participation of national government personnel is critical, since they are frequently the major actors in the policy process (Evans 1992; Rondinelli and Mont- gomery 1990). Sources note their capacity to subvert policies, the fact that bureaucrats are often beholden to special interests (Callaghy 1989; Johnson and Wasty 1993), and the weak institutional structures national staff operate within (see Sahn and Sarris 1992; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). International donor agencies are also key players, and their participation is critical to initiating reforms and determining reform targets and conditionalities (Beckman 1992; Healey and Robinson 1992; Nelson 1990). The private sector is often the target of reform efforts (Bienen 1990; Young 1991). The sector falls into two groups: formal and informal. The former is small, urban, male, and protected by close links to state (Gordon 1991). The latter is large and rural, contains many women, participates minimally in the policy process, but tends to be responsive to policy changes (Gladwin 1991; Kulibaba 1993a and 1993b, Lele 1986).


The importance of the urban middle class as participants in policy reform is noted by various sources (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Widner 1994). In many African countries the members of this group are the most powerful, and most vocal constituencies for economic and political reforms (Bratton and van de Walle 1992). Studies of the impacts of economic stabilization and structural adjustment confirm that in many cases the middle class, which includes civil servants and students, has suf- fered greater declines in income and welfare as a result of reforms than rural residents (Sahn and Sarris, 1992; Shaw 1993). The derailment of Zambia's adjustment program is a widely cited cautionary tale of the need for government to take into account the urban middle class in pushing reforms ahead (Bates and Collier 1992; Gulhati 1989; Hawkins 1991; Kydd 1989). The participation of urban middle class interest groups in reform-minded coalitions is critical to the maintenance of government commitment to reforms, and to the ultimate success of long-haul liberalization programs (Johnston and Wasty 1993; Nelson 1989; Rothchild and Foley 1988; Toye 1992).

NGOs are the subject of a large literature (see Edwards and Hulme 1992). They are important as interest aggregators, and play a mediating role between the state and individuals (Clark 1991; Fowler 1991; Shaw 1993). 8 International NGOs are a lobbying force, and operate in some African countries too. Besides NGOs, African civil society contains other, diverse associational groups (Bratton 1989a; Harbeson et al. 1994). Though not recognized by the state, there is a significant amount of informal participation by people in a wide range of horizontal voluntary associations (Chazan 1992b). Bates' now classic study (1981) points out the fallacy of the assumption that rural Africans were largely quiescent and disengaged from policy-making due to their geographical dispersion, low socioeconomic status and the rigors of agrarian life. He argues that the extent of agrarian organization was a consequence of whether there were large farmers with a special stake in more favorable policy; whether the loyalty of larger, more militant farmers could be co-opted through selective administration of subsidies, and whether or how much heads of state and political elites derived personal income or support from rural constituencies (see also Bates 1988). Similar conclusions can be drawn about other interest groups, underlining the fact that absent opportunities for formal participation in the policy process, stakeholders devise their own subtle yet effective means of exerting influence on policy outcomes. As Colboum (1989) notes, strategies of non-compliance (including foot dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance, or sabotage) provide a means by which groups in civil society can "critique" policy, without drawing the wrath of the authorities (see also Ela 1992).

Experience with this kind of participation constitutes an important source of social capital, which can be tapped for reform (Amrthier 1989; MacGaffey et al. 1991; cf. Putnam et al. 1993). With political liberalization, civil groups and the media are more vocal, putting pressure on African governments for change (Monga 1995, 1994a). Local residents, the poor, and other disenfranchised groups have very limited direct participation in reform (Ela 1992; Mikell 1989). The poor, however,

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are a topic of discussion by others regarding the impacts of adjustment on their well-being (Jolly 1988; Lele 1986 and 1990; Sahn 1990; Sarris 1990; Taube 1993).

The configuration of who outside of government participates in policy reform is strongly influenced by the broader political system in a particular country. The role and scope of interest groups, whether in the private sector or civil society, differ considerably under authoritarian, democratic, transitional, or collapsed systems (Rothchild and Foley 1988; Young 1994; Zartman 1994). African governments in many countries are searching for ways of creating an enabling environment that fosters greater interest group participation, in both the political and economic spheres (Hyden 1990; Rothchild 1994).

How Does Participation Take Place?

The impetus for reform is often donor-driven. The perceived need for reform by African leadership is linked to crisis situations, where the urge to reform develops as a function of the elimination of other options (Grindle and Thomas 199 I; Krueger 1993; Kulibaba and Rielly 1993; Mosely et al. 1991). Political liberalization in many countries, however, is accompanied by popular demand for economic liberalization, so it is too simple to say that reforms have been forced on Africa by donors. In fact, the actual process of negotiating and implementing reforms involves a large degree of joint initiation of proposals and counterproposals (Berg 1990, 1991; Brinkerhoff and Morgan 1989; White 1990c).

Incentives for participation are related to the classic interest-maximization prin- ciple, where the motivation to participate is a function of groups seeking to advance their interests (Liddle 1992). The uncertainty and complexity of policies, though, can make identification of interests difficult (Bates and Krueger, 1993). Key vari- ables, therefore, in determining incentives for participation are: a) how different groups perceive the policy and its impact on them, and b) how they define their interests as they relate to the policy and its impact. A common conclusion regarding adjustment policies and governments' ability to sustain commitment to measures agreed to is that reform costs are immediate and clearly hurt key constituencies while benefits are diffuse, uncertain, and take a long time to be realized (Bienen 1990; Johnson and Wasty 1993; van de WaUe 1994). Some authors suggest strategies for addressing this pattern of incentives. For example, based on the Zambian reform experience, Hawkins (1991) offers four possible strategies that could help to deal with winners and losers: repress opposition, appeal to patriotic sentiment, promote new constituencies among winners, and/or make short-term transfer payments to loser groups.

Institutional structures for participation have traditionally been dominated by the state and a coterie of privileged elites, but governments are facing new demands for accountability and transparency from vocal civil society (Hyden 1992; Young 1994). Weak capacity constrains the effectiveness of the public sector, but a revised role for the state offers institutional space for civil groups to participate more broadly in reforms, for example, through NGOs and/or legally recognized local-level associa-


tions (Chazan 1992b; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Widner and van der Veen 1993). The potential extent of broader participation is limited by policy type. More opportunities exist in long-term reforms, such as privatization (Bienen and Waterbury 1989) or natural resources policy (Brinkerhoff 1995), than in what van de Walle (1994) calls "price-based policies" (e.g., exchange rates) where there is little scope for participation beyond a small team of donor and national technocrats in the finance ministry and the central bank. Haggard and Kaufman (1994) note that economic liberalization and consolidation policy reforms greatly expand the options for participation, in that successful outcomes depend upon the creation and maintenance of supportive coalitions of stakeholders.

Regarding the degree of empowerment available for participants in the reform process, popular protest is often cited (Monga 1995, 1994a), but this is not the only mechanism for voice. Other options include, for example, lobbying, policy dialogue, and media campaigns, all of which can be used to bring pressure to bear on politicians and policy-makers. While visible and vocal outbursts in opposition to specific policy effects may cause governments to seek tactical policy adjustments in the short-term (Bratton and van de Walle 1992), long-term empowerment of groups to participate in the policy-making process in liberalized systems is strongly related to their ability to translate economic demands into political ones, something that the urban middle class is better positioned to do than the rural poor (Woods 1992). Bratton (1990, 89) states that the challenge for the 1990s is, "how can the poor majority reach the makers of public policy?" As mentioned above in the section on who participates, regime type strongly influences the degree of empowerment available to citizens and interest groups (Widner 1994).

Dominant Themes in the Literature

As the above overview makes clear, the participation literature is vast and relatively diverse. This section singles out a set of topical areas that emerge from the literature as dominant themes and issues. These are grouped into three categories.

The Political Economy of the African State

The state provides the principal context in which participation occurs, determining the kinds of contributions that the private sector and civil society can make to policy reform and implementation. 9 Initially, authoritarian regimes were thought to be more able to cope effectively with implementing unpopular economic stabilization measures. Numerous studies have investigated the link between regime type and reform success (Bates and Krueger 1993; Greenaway and Morrissey 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Lindenberg and Devarajan 1993; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). However, they find no clear relationship between regime type and success in economic reform, although democratizing regimes offer more opportunities for participation in policy reform than do authoritarian ones (Widner 1994). Most par-

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ticipation is largely informal, with interest groups able to influence policy decisions by petitioning "their" representatives in government to act in their favor.

Policy-making in this context is limited to a closed elite circle (Gulhati 1990b), is relatively arbitrary, and lacks the rationality and empirical content characteristic of technically based policymaking (Hyden 1992). This closed process creates a kind of "black market government," with parallel structures of persuasion and influence that guide economic policy, but which are neither publicly acknowledged nor formally sanctioned. Studies by Ziegler (1978), Pran (1983), Smith, Combeaud and Moutout (1990), and Smith and Glaser (1992) focus on the influence of private interests on policymakers, noting how the patterns of interlocking mutual interests create policy distortions that favor elite personal and commercial interests. Opening up the policy process is also difficult because the African state has traditionally guarded information jealously, but transparency is vital to policy debate and consensus-building for reform. In many countries, civil society's demand-making capacity is growing, thus some increases in transparency can be expected (Landell-Mills 1992; World Bank 1994b).

However, most studies conclude on a cautionary note regarding the prospects for significantly more participatory state-society relations. Africa's weak states have traditionally depended upon clientelist arrangements with elite groups for support and survival (Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Widner 1994; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). As Rothchild points out, broadbased cooperative links and collaborative norms between African governments and citizenry remain to be built (1994). The democratizing measures countries have taken to date are but the first steps in a long process toward increased participation and democratic governance.

Donor Participation in Reform

Donor participation is strong, particularly in the analysis and design stages of reform, but good design of technical policy prescriptions is not enough (White 1990a). Reform success requires education and consensus-building, negotiation and compromise, and active reform "marketing" (Thomas et al. 1991; World Bank 1994a; Waterbury 1989). Donor procedures are cited as inhibiting country participation in the policy reform process (Mosely et al. 1991; Toye 1992), although local officials and technicians can be valuable participants in reform design and initiation. This situation is changing for the better as some donors are modifying their practices and procedures to incorporate participation more broadly and easily (Atwood 1993; Bhatnagar and Williams 1992; USAID n.d.; Vondal 1989; World Bank 1994c).

Policy-based aid is a mixed blessing for African governments (Winter 1984). The access to quick-disbursing financial mechanisms to meet emergency expenditures is desirable, but engages leaders in a process that risks dismantling the instruments that assure their power base (White 1990c). For the international financial institutions, the economic prescriptions of stabilization and adjustment are ostensibly apolitical. Yet if those prescriptions are implemented, they are certain to have political outcomes (Cohen et al. 1985). This technical orientation, accompanied by the avow-


edly apolitical nature of reform prescription, often leaves donors without explicit strategies for dealing with the political reservations of African decision-makers. 1~ The problem of conflicting views and agenda can be further compounded by the absence from the negotiating table of key stakeholder groups whose compliance with or opposition to reform is ultimately critical (Brinkerhoff and Morgan 1989; Crosby 1992b). Country cases show elaborate strategies for non-compliance, raising issues about commitment to reform (Johnson and Wasty 1993; Kulibaba and Rielly 1993). Conditionality can induce initiation of reform, but is not an effective tool for enforcing compliance or sustaining change (Berg 1991; Hermann 1986; McCleary 1991; White 1990c). Interestingly, the reasons governments give for failing to meet conditionalities are often participation-related: the need for consultation with stakeholders, election calendars, democratization timetables, public unrest and insecurity, the need to train bureaucrats and other government agents, and the need to educate the public about reform rationale. Although such reasoning is often legitimate, it is also sometimes little more than game playing (Berg 1991).

Institutional Capacity for Participation in Policy Reform

The literature stresses the need for sufficient capacity on the part of the institutions involved in the policy process in order for participation to take place. This capacity is linked to: a) quality of leadership, b) capacity of the government bureaucracy, and c) the nature of the interaction among leaders, bureaucrats, and external actors (Gulhati 1988). Regarding leadership, in Africa where systems governed by personal rule are more commonplace than other regions, leaders take on a particular importance. The absence of institutionalized checks and balances in the postcolonial state has allowed the African leader to control closely who has access to resources and decision-making (Adamolekun 1988; Obasanjo and d'Orville 1991). The role of national leaders stands out in several country cases of economic policy reform; for example, Rawlings' remarkable achievements in Ghana's economic recovery pro- duced one of the few success stories of adjustment in Africa (Chazan 1992a; Jeffries 1991). Malawi's Banda and the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny, on the other hand, held off deep institutional reform while preserving pro-business approaches to development (Harrigan 1991; Pryor 1990; Widner 1993). In Tanzania, Nyerere's charisma and commitment to African socialism created an ideological atmosphere that stifled progress toward market reforms, which only became possible upon his retirement (Bierman 1988; Campbell 1992; Kiondo 1989).

Although national leaders can create a favorable climate for reform, they are not the major actors in the day-to-day implementation of economic policy. Senior technocrats are. If available from among this pool, a "policy champion" can enhance the chances of reform success by: organizing constituencies for reform, convincing leaders of the need for reform, overcoming bureaucratic barriers, and mitigating public outcry (Leonard 1991; Rielly 1993; Rondinelli and Montgomery 1990). Such superstar participants in the policy process are in short supply, however. Donors sometimes end up competing for the same pool of committed, technocratic talent to fulfill the policy champion role.

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On the subject of public sector capacity, bureaucratic systems suffer from acute capacity weaknesses: inability to deliver even the most basic services, tendency of civil servants to extract rents and/or take second jobs as salaries slip below subsis- tence levels, inappropriate and ineffective organizations for managing public services, low personnel competence levels, and failure to use appropriate technologies and management techniques (Lamb 1987; Pinto 1994; Silverman 1996; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). On the one hand, these bureaucratic systems need to be strengthened; but economic stabilization measures often call for reductions in the civil service at the same time that ambitious structural adjustment programs impose new challenges on public sectors (Balogun and Mutahaba 1989; Frischtak 1994; Mutahaba et al. 1993; Picard and Garrity 1994).

Compounding the capacity problem is the fact that the number of participants in the economic policy reform process is large (Haggard and Kaufman 1994; Thomas and Grindle 1990; Toye 1992). For example, Oyugi (1994) illustrates this complexity in the case of policy implementation in Kenya; Ka and van de Walle (1994), writing about Senegal, credit the failure of the Diouf government to build a broad coalition with stalling the reform implementation process. Because of the interlinked nature of long-term reform measures, and the increasingly recognized importance of sequencing (Thomas et al. 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1994), reform progress risks being limited by the capacity of the policy management network's weakest member(s). This situation can provoke a "snowball effect" of delays, where one missed deadline leads to a cascade of postponements, deferrals, and suspensions. In the pressured environment of adjustment, the response of donors and recipient governments is often to devise makeshift interim modifications, and accept pro forma compliance with targets and conditions in order to keep tranche disbursements on track.11

Regarding the interaction among leaders, the bureaucracy and external actors, increasing access to policy debates raises the possibility of more numerous and potentially conflicting demands being placed on decision-makers and administrative systems, and increases the risk of alienating supporters. For example, increasing information flows and transparency can reveal the points of corruption where government resources are diverted through patronage to supporters and/or used to extract rents, thus calling into question the legitimacy and probity of the regime (van de Walle 1994; World Bank 1994b). In many African countries, however, ruling elites and govemments have to some extent been overtaken by events; liberalization has pushed them to be more responsive in order to maintain stability and survive (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Young 1994).

As a function of these changes, issues arise about the capacity of civil society to participate in the policy process. These deal with the demand side of participation in policy, as a complement to the supply side relating to government institutional commitment and capacity to cope with participation by external actors (Landell-Mills 1992; Mbembe 1993). Much attention in the literature focuses on the capacity of NGOs to aggregate interests effectively and communicate to members, politicians and policy-makers (Bratton 1989b, 1990; Chazan 1982; Fowler 1991; Shaw 1990). For example, NGOs can help rural residents channel their views into national policy


debates if the NGOs have sufficient technical expertise in the policy area, basic managerial skills, a willing constituency, and a recognized track record (VanSant 1989). The institutional strengths and weaknesses of the media are also critical given the centrality of information flows to a participatory policy process (West and Fair 1993; Zaffiro 1993). ~2

A debate within the civil society literature exists regarding the extent to which the groups classed as members of civil society are themselves, or should be, democratic and participatory in nature. Civil society is often promoted as a sort of "incubator" for democracy (Diamond 1994).13 Yet Bratton points out that "associational life" in Africa should not automatically be assumed to be democratic; rather, this assumption needs to be posed as a topic for investigation: "Is there internal democracy in the organizations of civil society? Or do these structures mirror and reinforce the personalistic and authoritarian patterns of rule that prevail at the political center?" (1989a, 430). Monga (1995), for example, echoing Bratton's questions, notes the tendency in Africa for groups in civil society to be exclusionary, and cautions against excessive expectations for civil society leading the way to better governance arrangements. A dilemma for participatory governance is how to structure state- society relations so that one set of clientelist relations is not simply replaced with a new one, where the clients are the most powerful civil society groups rather than the old elites (Rothchild 1994; Rothchild and Foley 1988). Government responsiveness to demands for participation in the policy process can foster democracy to the extent that state-society relations allow space for multiple groups to compete for access to decision-makers. In weak African states, however, creating and maintaining this space can be problematic (Migdal 1988; Harbeson et al. 1994; Hyden and Bratton 1992).

Key Findings and Condusions

This final section summarizes the major findings and conclusions synthesized from the literature reviewed. The discussion addresses both the analytic and operational issues presented in the introduction as of key concern to international donors and African governments. The section concludes with a note of caution about over- estimating the degree to which increased participation can contribute to better policy reform in Africa.

Participation and Successful Policy Reform

Regarding the questions this article explores, the general findings are, first, that the pattern of participation is an important variable in the policy reform process, but that its effects on reform outcomes are strongly mediated by African political and governance factors. Second, increased participation appears to enhance prospects for sustainable policy reform outcomes, though the relative absence of institutionalized mediating structures and processes makes increasing participation highly vulnerable to the discretion of political authorities. Given the limited capacity and


r e s p o n s i v e n e s s o f the s ta te and the i n c i p i e n t na tu r e o f c i v i l s o c i e t y ' s a s s o c i a t i o n a l

i n f r a s t ruc tu r e in m u c h o f Af r i c a , c r e a t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s fo r p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d in s t i t u -

t i o n a l i z i n g the p r o c e s s o v e r t i m e are e x a c t i n g t a sks fo r r e f o r m e r s . T h e f o l l o w i n g

spec i f i c c o n c l u s i o n s e m e r g e :

�9 No single regime type is optimal for reform success. However, democratizing regimes offer more numerous and varied opportunities for participation than authoritarian ones. Since economic reform consolidation requires a broadbased supportive coalition, the ability of democratizing regimes to forge and maintain interest group support gives them an implementation advantage in the later phases of the economic policy reform sequence. The policy space such regimes create offers suitable fora for debate, negotiation, and consensus-building among affected stakeholders, both inside and outside government.

�9 Reform is not a mechanistic process and cannot be implemented by fiat. Reform is interactive, requiring negotiation, modification of views, compromise, concessions, and management of risks. Even stroke-of-the-pen reforms require public education and political marketing. The key to success is the ability of government and stakeholders to forge consensus, deal with opposition, and develop reform strategies and sequencing that soften negative impacts for the most vulnerable while increasing the chances for intended long-term benefits.

�9 A society rich in social capital and associational life provides numerous channels for interest articulation and participation. However, broader participation in the policy arena becomes more likely when affected groups can translate their economic interests into political pressures. In the African context, this translation process remains constrained by ethnic and cultural particular- ism, although in some countries the growth of an urban middle class offers the possibility of broader-based economic policy coalitions.

�9 More participation in policy reform leads to better technical content in policies. Involvement of well-trained technocrats and informed stakeholders provides a stronger basis for designing and sequencing reforms and grounds reform prescriptions in local realities.

�9 More participation leads to greater sustainability because more affected interests can be in- cluded and satisfied, but also to greater uncertainty and conflict, particularly where losers are relatively powerful and well organized. Governments are more willing to pursue reforms when their concerns about the political risks are addressed, and donors need to find ways of helping governments to overcome these concems.

�9 More participation is harder to manage and requires a flexible, strategic approach. This calls for new management skills and a supportive institutional framework.

Techniques for Promoting Participation in Policy Reform

To s u p p o r t i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the r e f o r m p r o c e s s , n e w a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h e s

and tools a re c a l l e d for. T h e resu l t s o f ou r s tudy s u g g e s t the f o l l o w i n g o p e r a t i o n a l

c o n c l u s i o n s :

�9 Better political and institutional analysis can help to anticipate policy blockages and problem areas. Analysis should be an ongoing part of implementation as well as input to policy design, and African policy managers need to be central participants in these analytic exercises.

�9 A collaborative design process that integrates implementation considerations into policy content builds participation and increases sustainability. Collaborative design fosters consensus and increases technical efficiency.

�9 The technical content of reforms can be redesigned to increase opportunities for participation; for example, decentralization, matching grants, revenue-sharing mechanisms, development foun- dations; or design of the M&E component, where research centers and/or local NGOs can be built in as participants in data collection on policy impacts.

�9 Institutional capacity-building is needed as a complement to reform. Policy champions are important but cannot singlehandedly overcome ingrained institutional weaknesses and the power of vested interests. Targets of capacity-building are not just public agencies, but include NGOs

138 Studies in Comparative International Development I Fall 1996

and civil society, private sector groups, political parties, and the media. Reform is uncertain and so is participation. Contingency planning is needed with more flexibil- ity, openness to "mid-course" corrections in implementation, and less reliance upon pre-identifying targets and fixed disbursement triggers.

The Limits of Participation

The existing literature provides a rich base of experience and lessons for addressing the issue of increased participation in policy reform, as evidenced by this review. Nevertheless, because participation has once again become "fashionable," we need to be aware of the pitfalls of expecting too much from efforts to promote increased participation. The sociopolitical and economic dynamics in today's Africa create significant uncertainties and obstacles. One astute Africa scholar, Thomas Callaghy, sounds an apprgpriately cautionary note, saying that, "Africa will not b e . . . a neighborhood where either Western-style liberal democracy or African 'imag- ined republics' with mass participation and development are very common" (1994, 144). However, participatory policy prescriptions currently advocated for Africa from both international donor and African sources appear to subscribe, at least implicitly, to these scenarios. Several of the bilateral donor agencies and the international NGO community, for example, are strongly advocating democratization and increased reliance on civil society. Yet, political liberalization, in and of itself, will not lead to increased state effectiveness and responsiveness, or to the reduction of corruption and of the influence of entrenched, self-interested authorities; nor will it automatically ensure the harmonious, broad interplay of competitive societal interests. Similarly, increasing civil society's capacity to cooperate with, and make demands on, the state will not, in and of itself, lead to better governance and more development in the absence of a functioning institutional framework for such interaction (Rothchild 1994). In far too many African countries, the existing framework is under a high degree of stress and/or showing signs of disintegration. In extreme cases, the state has collapsed, with authority structures imploded, and basic government operations in disarray (Zartman 1994).

The above caveat notwithstanding, the "Afro-pessimism" that characterizes much of the debate about the future of economic and political reform on the continent is overstated. Not all the news is bad. In some countries--for example, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia--economic and political reforms have begun to bear fruit, which has led to renewed hope that Africa's decline can be reversed. Nonetheless, it is important to be aware of participation's limits as well as its potential contributions to economic policy reform in the context of political liberalization, and to recognize the long-term nature of the transition to new modes of state-society cooperation.

Notes

This article is a revised and shortened version of a study conducted by the authors for the U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau for Africa, funded through USAID's Implementing Policy Change

Brink~rlaoff and Kulibaba 139

Project, in support of the multi-donor Working Group on Economic Policy Reform in the Context of Political Liberalization, Special Program for Africa (SPA). Earlier versions were presented at a USAID seminar in Washington for the Agency's Africa Bureau senior staff, at a meeting of the SPA Working Group hosted by the Commission of the European Community, Directorate General for Development, in Brussels, and subsequently at a staff seminar at the European Centre for Development Policy Manage- ment in Maastricht. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and should not be attributed to USAID or the members of the SPA.

1. Three informative compilations that illustrate the current state of the debate are the October 1994 special issue of the Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5; the chapters in Haggard and Webb (1994) and those in Widner (1994).

2. The head of the U.S. Agency for International Development affirmed the centrality of participation in USAID policy and procedures and established a working group on participation (Atwood 1993). Simi- larly, the World Bank set up a learning group on participation that has commissioned numerous analyses of participation, held several conferences to discuss findings and their policy implications, and issued a summary report, which concludes with recommendations on "mainstreaming" participation in Bank activities (see World Bank 1994c). Interest in participation is far from new. In the late 1960s donor agencies were urging developing country governments to encourage popular participation as a means to further development impacts and to reduce political instability (see, for example, Hapgood 1969).

3. Interest in civil society has mushroomed dramatically among both scholars and practitioners. In the wake of the global trend toward democratization, the power and potential of popular mobilization to drastically reconfigure sociopolitical landscapes hold a strong allure. Studies such as Putnam's (1993) have focused international donors' attentions on the catalytic properties of civic associations for economic development. Regarding Africa, there is ongoing debate over the features and potential of civil society in the African context, and how the conceptualization is applicable (see for example Bratton 1989a; Harbeson et al. 1994; Jeffries 1993; Lemarchand 1992; Monga 1995; Woods 1992). For an informative overview of the literature, see Coston (1995).

4. See the discussion of the governance concept, with a focus on the links to economic reform, in Frischtak (1994); for an extensive review of these issues in Africa, see Healey and Robinson (1992). See also Hyden's seminal study (1983), as well as his later work (1992). The World Bank's approach to framing governance issues has been widely accepted by other international donor agencies.

5. This article limits its inquiry to participation in the economic policy reform process in Africa. This choice ruled out the vast literature on political and electoral participation, except as it relates to economic development. However, several important early sources deserve mention for laying some of the conceptual and analytic groundwork upon which later studies have built. These include, among others, Hirschman's (1969) classic on citizen responses to government policies (exit, voice, loyalty), Pateman's (1970) study of the relationships between participation and democracy, and Huntington and Nelson's (1976) work on how governments can manage citizen participation. In addition, this study did not delve in-depth into the huge literature on project participation and community development. For overviews see Cohen and Uphoff (1980), Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin (1987), and Nagle (1991). Further, the study takes an instrumental focus on participation, concentrating on literature that discusses what participation contributes, or doesn't, to the economic reform process. Thus, the review deemphasizes the literature whose major orientation to participation is in terms of human rights, cultural authenticity, moral impera- tives, and so on.

6. The requirements of stabilization and adjustment policies call for more, not less, government, leading to what Callaghy (1990) terms the "orthodox paradox." For discussion of the need for improved government capacity in post-apartheid South Africa, see the chapters in Fitzgerald et al. (1995).

7. The World Bank links participation via voice and exit to governance in that opportunities to either articulate preferences and express them to decision-makers or to choose alternative service delivery arrangements (exit) can increase accountability at multiple levels (1992: 22-28).

8. For some, NGOs are key to redefining development in terms of community empowerment, local control, and sustainability (see for example, Korten 1990).

9. A vast body of literature discusses the nature of the state in sub-Saharan Africa, most of it in the political economy stream cited earlier. Chazan et al. (1992) define the state as "a set of associations and agencies" that exercises control over defined territories and their populations through decision-making structures (executives, parties, parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, parastatal organizations, and security forces) and decision-mediating bodies (primarily courts, tribunals, and investigatory com- missions). This perspective is useful in that it places emphasis on the organic functioning of institutions.


See also Harbeson et al. (1994) and Widner (1994). 10. The World Bank's approach to governance is an interesting example of treating a fundamentally political

arena in largely technical terms (1992, 1994b). To see how the Bank has sought to operationalize the approach for civil service reform, consult Pinto (1994).

1 I. See, for example, the country case studies in Widner (1994). In a similar vein, see Berg's (1990) and Ka and van de Walle's (1994) analyses of Senegal's adjustment experience. See also Rondinelli and Mont- gomery (1990).

12. As Zaffiro observes, "to study the press and broadcasting [in contemporary Africa] is to unavoidably and deeply enter the realm of political and social policy analysis" (1993, 7). West and Fair echo this perspective: "political decisions made by African governments have precluded decentralization or democratization of mass media forms such as newspaper or radio" (1993, 98).

13. See also Diamond's earlier work on democracy in Africa (Diamond et al. 1988). For further discussion and additional sources on this topic, see the literature review in Coston (1995).

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Documents

Perspectives on participation in economic policy reform in Africa