Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1946

7/28/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1946

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ANOTHER GREAT

BOOK COMES OUTOF THE WAR!

WRATH INBURMA

BY FRED ELDRIDGE $3.00

The Dramatic Story of General Joseph

Stillwell and the War in the Far East. A

"Top Secret" from the C.B.I. Theater

ORDER NOW FROM

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

1218 CONNECTICUT AVENUE WASHINGTON 6, D. C.


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IF THE MULE COULD TALK, he might well sneer over his shoulder atthe gun, "I hope you knowand won't forgetwho started all this self-

propelled business!" Both the men and the mule in this picture are from

Battery C of the 611th Field Artillery Battalion which is stationed at Fort

Sill, Oklahoma. Readers will find some excellent pictures of all of our new

self-propelled weapons, together with a chart showing their comparative

characteristics, included in General Hibbs' article on page 407 of this issue.


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"Contributes to the Good of Our Country"

VOL. 36 JULY 1946 NO. 7

Cover: Proudly, the colors of the 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion ofthe 82nd Airborne Division march by in the Army Day Parade in Washington,D. C., on 6 April 1946. Picture by Sgt. Ric Bersin. Hq. AGF.

Frontispiece: Self-propelled artillery, old and new.EDITORIALS

Liberty on the Auction Block .................................................................................. 388Career Building ........................................................................................................ 420

ARTICLES

Fifth Wheel, by Col. Douglass P. Quandt, GSC..................................................... 390Army Ground Forces Report .................................................................................. 394Glorious Artillery Tradition, by Robert P. Patterson............................................ 401Observations of a Battery Commander, by Capt. John J. Norris, FA................. 403Report on the Field Artillery Conference, by Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs............. 407These Childish Things, by Francis Chase, Jr. ...................................................... 414Postwar ROTC Policy............................................................................................... 424Perimeters in Paragraphs, by Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Rtd.................................... 430

ARTILLERY NOTES

Welcome to the Field Artillery................................................................................. 402VII Corps Artillery Battle Experiences.................................................................... 425Addresses Requested ............................................................................................. 437

OTHER FEATURES

Boozers Beware ....................................................................................................... 393Of More Than Passing Interest ............................................................................... 405What's Your Artillery I.Q.?....................................................................................... 413Letters to the Editor................................................................................................. 422

BOOKS ........................................................................................................................... 440

THE ONLYBOOK OF ITSKIND!

HARD

POUNDINGBy Lt. Col. C. D. W. COURT, R.A.

HERE IS A

DEFINITIVE BOOK

ON TANK KILLING,

THE TACTICS AND

TECHNIQUE OF

ANTITANK

WARFARE.

$2.50

Published by

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSN.

1218 Connecticut Avenue

Washington 6, D. C.

COLONEL DEVERE ARMSTRONGEditor

MAJOR ROBERT F. COCKLIN LENNA PEDIGOAssociate Editor Business Manager

Published monthly by The United States Field Artillery Association. Publication office:3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore, Md. Editorial and executive offices: 1218 Connecticut Avenue,Washington 6, D. C. Address all communications to the Washington office. Entered as secondclass matter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore, Md. Accepted for mailing at thespecial rate of postage provided in Sec. 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Copyright, 1946, by TheUnited States Field Artillery Association. Subscription rates: $3.00 a year; foreign, $3.50; singlecopies, 35 cents; additional single copies to subscribers, 25 cents. The Field Artillery Journaldoes not accept paid advertising. It does pay for original articles accepted, but unsolicitedmanuscripts must be accompanied by return postage if they are to be returned.


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LIBERTY ON THE AUCTION BLOCK

"W

. . .Jellyfish nod "sold" at the lowest bid.

E HOLD these truths to be self-evident . . . that(all men) are endowed by their Creator with

certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." These wordswere written into the Declaration of Independence onehundred and seventy years ago this month. And a fewyears thereafter, the following words were set down inthe Preamble to the Constitution of the United States:"We the people of the United States, in order . . . tosecure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our

posterity . . ."

Cornerstone of the American way, and perhaps themost abused term in our language, what is liberty? Is itstill cherished as something truly worthwhile? Childish

sounding in a sense, these questions are anything butchildish. The American people have been for sometime, and still are, playing fast and free with theirlibertyunaware, apparently, that this pricelesssomethingwas won for them in the first instance by thespilling of much blood. It can't happen here, is theircomforting creed.

MEANING OF LIBERTY

To understand liberty, we must define its meaning.No easy task, definition by indirection may proveuseful. Thus, we shall strike for the meaning of libertyas we might for the meaning of another elusive term, "a

healthy mind," by visualizing a mind unfettered by theever-menacing diseases of hate, lust, jealousy, greedand intolerance. Eliminate these things from a man'smind and you have a "healthy mind." Similarly,eliminate the threats to liberty from our social order andliberty, itself, remains.

THREATS TO LIBERTY1

As old as social organization itself, the threats toliberty are twofold in number and always go hand inhand. They are: first, the abuse and denial, often bylegalized chicanery, of the blessings of liberty by anynumber of irresponsible and self-purposed minority

groups; and second, the so-called "deadly sin of sloth"of the jellyfish minority that all too often nods "sold"at the first bid when liberty is on the auction block.These wordy ideas need translation into something______________

1Excluded from consideration here are the threats to liberty that stemfrom external sources. Present nowadays, as they always will be so longas the nation state system survives, the external threats to our liberty aremore readily discernible, hence are relatively less menacingly insidious,than those springing from within our own society.

more concrete, lifted from the workaday world aboutus. The examples are legion. For brief analysis, let'shave a critical look at the principals in a tussle ofgiants, so fresh in memorythe three-corneredslugging match between corporate management,organized labor and government. What a beatingliberty takes! All parties scream its virtues and claim itfor their own. And what of us jellyfish? Are ourliberties involved? Good jellyfish, we don't seem togive a damn, if they are.

Corporate Giant. Few things, if any, havecontributed more than the corporate idea to theamazing growth of our industrial power and ourunparalleled standard of living. It's a great idea and it's

here to stay. However, few things have produced moresocial problems than have sprung, directly orindirectly, from and as a result of this idea. Where isliberty, for example, when a detached and all-powerfuland sometimes irresponsible corporate managementgroup can choose, in closed session, to stop the wheelsof productive process in a mill town thousands ofmiles distant? Where is liberty when such a groupclamors for "liberty" from government or labor"dictatorship," in order to protect its own dictatorial

power? And where are we jellyfish? We're right intheremuttering a bit, and paying the bill, and caringnot a whit apparently if liberty, our liberty, beravished.

Labor Unions. Hand in hand with the growth of thecorporation, labor unionism has brought a greater realwage, greater productivity, and greater power toAmerican workers than anywhere else in the world.It's a great idea and it's here to stay. But laborunionism has also brought terrific headaches to theworkers themselves, to management, to government,and to us jellyfish. Where is liberty when a detachedand all-powerful and sometimes irresponsible unionleadership can order a strike that cripples the economyof the greatest nation on earth? Where is liberty if a

small businessman is told by the union, "join up, payyour dues, conformor else!" The "or else" means nodeliveries, no merchandise, no businesseconomicdeath. Where is liberty if one of us jellyfish is picketed

because we dare to paint our own window sills? Oh,we jellyfish are still right in there muttering a bit,and paying the bill, and caring not a whit apparently ifliberty, our liberty, be ravished.


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Government. Only the biggest fool among foolswould deny the increasingly vital role of governmentin our complex society. More assuredly than either big

business or big unionism, government is here to stay,and will become more important with each passingdecade. But the crowning evil"jellyfishism" at itsslothful worstis for a great and a free people to takethe "government guaranteed" route to "free security"and pay for the passage in the coin of liberty. Suchrecklessness is exposed in its full irresponsibility whenone recalls that our liberty was once wrung forciblyfrom government itself, by common men likeourselves. Modern history is strewn with tragicillustrations of the folly of over-dependence on themagic of government, however benevolent. We'vetasted, all too deeply in recent times, of this intoxicantourselves. This is the proven road to complete statism.There is no liberty in such statism, be it communism,fascism, or any new-fangled "ism" yet to come down

the pike.Meaning of Liberty. Having touched ever so lightly

on a few, among many, of the towering threats to ourliberty, we are now better armed to strike for themeaning of liberty. We, the American people, can"secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our

posterity" only to the extent that we manifest the willand the capacity collectively to slough off the "deadlysin of sloth" and to carve out from our social order thefestering sores which result from the self-purposedabuse of irresponsible minority groups, both withinand without the many-layered structure of government.Then, and then only, will we find liberty underlaw.

THE SOLDIER'S PART

What place have such words and ideas as these in asoldier's journal? What is our interest in liberty,

particularly right now when we have just finisheddestroying the greatest threat to our liberty in historythe Axis powers?

In a narrow sense, such ideas may lie outside theobjects of our Association. And certainly there is noagency, either public or private, that will everchampion more militantly than this JOURNAL themagnificent record of American arms. But there is a

broader sense, one that has a profound meaning tosoldiers, and particularly to the Regular Officer. Thisturns about the oft-forgotten fact that all of us werecitizens before we became soldiers, and becomingsoldiers in no way divorced us from the basic dutiesand responsibilities of citizenship. Regrettably, too many

soldiers are "jellyfish" citizens. Too lazy to votewhat is far worse, many seek to build up a false creed,in illogical interpretation of one of the Army's oldestmottos"keep the Army out of politics and politicsout of the Army"that the "professional" soldiershould notvote, and should take pride in the fact thathe does not vote. This type of reasoning is denouncedas "jellyfishism" of the most irresponsible character.What is more, the expression professional soldier is

branded as incompatible, in connotation, with ourAmerican way. Henceforth, these two words willnever again appear side by side in any copy preparedfor publication in this JOURNAL by the presenteditorial staff.2 American soldiers are citizen-soldiers,and each one should mark well the order of the words.

Being citizen-soldiers, our stake in liberty is as greatas our capacity for citizenship. How great is that? ThisJOURNAL has recently expressed some thoughts alongthese lines. ("The American Soldier as a Diplomat,"

March, 1946.) That editorial pointed out that thesoldier's nomadic life tends to foster severance with"local" ties and associations, with both good and badresults. Good is the fact that, unlike the majority of ourcitizens, soldiers invariably approach any problemwith a national outlook. Bad very badis the factthat in growing apart from local ties some soldierscrawl into a shell of cloistered unconsciousness,ignoring the politico-economic realities of the societythey serve. In this vacuum, they beat their chests inrighteous virility, muttering . . . "dirty politics" . . ."there oughta be a law" . . . "they (the great THEY)oughta shoot the whole kaboodle" . . . unmindful thatsuch empty phrases form the steps on which libertytreads to the auction block. This is "jellyfishism"liberty's mortal enemy.

And so, in July, 1946one hundred and seventyyears following the signing of our American charter oflibertylet every soldier search his soul. Does heknow the meaning of liberty? Does he fight for it in

peace as he does in war?

No question of law, or violence, or dirty politics,only the re-birth of the spirit can work a healing

power. Only when individual manbe he soldier,sailor or candlestick makerrediscovers his personalresponsibility for the preservation of the "blessings ofliberty" can our great American experiment indemocratic freedom be restored to health.

______________

2It should not be inferred that the Editor ever has or ever will seek tocensor in any way the ideas advanced by contributors to THE FIELDARTILLERY JOURNAL.


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FIFTH WHEELThe story of an "extra" outfit in the 11th Airborne

Division that paid off when the chips were down in combat.

By Col. Douglass P. Quandt,

GSC.*

THERE ARE FIVEBATTERIES in a parachuteartillery battalion: a headquarters

battery, three howitzer batteries offour 75 pack howitzers each, andthe "extra" batterythe antiaircraft-antitank battery.

I do not propose here to try toexplain how such a battery cameinto being, or why it was included

in a parachute artillery battalion.My sole purpose in writing this is totell of how one AA-AT Battery D Battery of the 457th ParachuteField Artillery Battalion of the 11thAirborne Division shook off thestigma of being the "fifth wheel"and firmly established its ownraison d'etre when the chips weredown in combat.

Gliderless Gliders. Duringtraining, when the other batterieswere making their battery jumps,the AT half of D Battery loaded

and lashed their 37's in "mockups,"since no gliders were available. Asthe training progressed to the"battalion jump" stage, the AT halfof D Battery also took over the

battalion guard, KP, and latrineorderly duties. In the combinedtraining phase, there was no placefor D Battery to go. The glidercombat team had its own AT

platoon and the "purist" parachutecombat team snubbed D Battery asglider riders without gliders. Everyglider that could be spared for the

parachute combat team wasutilized for badly neededtransportation. The morale of the

battery slowly declined. The men were______________

*Chief of Staff, 11th Airborne Division.Col. Quandt commanded the 457th PrchtFA Bn for approximately 18 months. Heleft the battalion in July '44 to become G-3of the Division. In November '45, ColonelQuandt was advanced to his presentassignment as Division Chief of Staff.


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1946 FIFTH WHEEL 391

jumpers, but they couldn't jump. Andeven if the antitank guns could jump, theAA-AT Bn would get the jobs.

Brighter Days. The divisioncommander generally used two or moreof the 75mm howitzers as assault cannon

with each regimental combat team.These guns accompanied the advanceelements of the infantry and destroyedroad blocks, machine gun nests, or otherstrong points delaying the advance. The

job was an exciting one, even inmaneuvers, and was eagerly sought byhowitzer crews. The commandinggeneral decided to obtain howitzers forD Battery, by hook or crook, and assignthem the assault mission permanently,thus maintaining complete 12-gunartillery battalions. The artillerycommander was ordered to train D

Battery for this duty.D Battery was delighted. They begged

and "borrowed" howitzers for training.Their intensive training in 37mm directlaying (there had been nothing else to dofor many months) stood them in goodstead when they got their howitzers. Inno time, four crackerjack howitzer crewswere available. With the addition of tenfeet of W110 wire stolen here and fifteenfeet borrowed there, a salvagedtelephone or two, and a couple ofmegaphones from Charlotte, NorthCarolina, enough communication

equipment was rounded up to organizethe crews into a battery. A battery jumpwas made, with all weaponsaccompanying the men to the ground.Morale soared. The men began to act asthough they really had a purpose in life.They did well in battery service practice,and finallyoh great daymarched outwith the rest of the battalion to service

practice. It must be admitted that thepersonnel of other outfits occupied OP'sin front of D Battery's gun position withsome hesitancy. At the end of the

practice, however, D Battery had earned

a permanent place in the firing battalion.Shortly thereafter they were presentedwith four howitzers of their own, andsoon departed for the Southwest Pacific.

Doughboy's Delight. There being nocannon company in an airborne division,D Battery became the substitute. At onetime in New Guinea, no infantry

battalion went on a mission without atleast a section of D Battery attached.

Normal employment was to attach aplatoon to each assault regiment.

In the training stage, infantrycommanders usually placed thehowitzers at the rear of the main bodyduring the approach march. Then, whenthe head of the column became engaged,the gun was called forward. Thedifficulty of passing the howitzerthrough the column and through junglegrowth, and the attention attracted by the

piece as it occupied position, led to thedecision to place the howitzer with thesupport of the advance guard. Thewisdom of this decision was laterconfirmed many times in combat.

The battery had been trained to carryout its assault mission with or without

prime movers, but without jeeps to towthe howitzers, it was extremely difficultto keep pace with the infantry. Only theAT half of the battery was assigned to

assault duty; the remainder continued toman antiaircraft machine guns. It wasdecided that whenever prime moverscould not be made available (as in a

jump without gliders) the machine gunportion of the battery would abandon itsarmament and form relief crews fortowing the howitzers by hand.

The constant and close associationwith the infantry in New Guinea had itsadvantages. The infantry grew

accustomed to having the howitzers upfront, and eventually accepted them sowholeheartedly as to volunteer freeadvice on the different methods oftowing. Incidentally, after the firstemployment of the howitzers in combat,the infantry provided volunteer relieftowing crews!

Prime Movers Sink. On the 31st ofJanuary 1945, the division made an


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392 THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL July

amphibious landing at Nasugbu (sixty-five miles south of Manila) with themission of proceeding rapidly inlandand, if tactical conditions warranted, toattack Manila from the south and makecontact with Sixth Army forces

approaching the city from the north.Between the landing beaches and thehigh Tagaytay Ridge overlookingManila, the Japanese had established astrong defensive position across thehighway in the defile formed by MountCarilao on the north and Mount Batulaoon the South. The landing strength of thedivision was slightly over 6,000 men,including all the service troops necessaryto establish, maintain, and operate a port.The strength of the Japanese south ofManila was around 50,000. To avoid

being driven into the sea, it was

imperative that the division advance to

Manila with all possible haste andestablish some contact with friendlyforces. This required the fastest possible

penetration of the Batulao-Carilaoposition.

All four guns of D Battery were

ordered to accompany the leadingregiment (188th Infantry). Frankly, the

joy the men felt at being given themission was somewhat diminishedwhen, during landing, they watched their

prime movers sink out of sight below thegentle waves.

Pay-Off. The division commenced itsmarch inland and upland (afoot) andshortly after midnight struck the firstdug-in position. Jap machine gunsenfiladed the route of advance and threwlead all over the place, while mortarsdropped their hollow-cracking shells

into our troops. Time after time thehowitzers went into position in place andfired at machine gun nests, strong points,and caves. It would be unfair to thegloriously fighting men of the twoinfantry regiments and artillery

battalions to give the impression that theassault cannon of D Battery blasted thehole in the Batulao-Carilao line throughwhich the remainder of the division

poured. Indeed, the rapid disruption ofthe Jap forces defending this line isattributable to so many factors beyondthe scope of this account that I can onlymention the artillery-infantry assault,supported closely by tactical aircraft,which played the largest part in thewhole scheme. The direct fire of DBattery's guns unquestionablycontributed to the success of the assault,

and as a result of their work the batterywas awarded the Presidential Citationfor heroism.

After the breakthrough, and thevertical envelopment of the Jap position

by the jump on Tagaytay Ridge, thedivision proceeded in calculated haste toManila and occupied the now famous65-mile-long, 100-yard-wide beachhead.Through surprise and rapid annihilationof outposts, penetration into Manila waseffected to a position across theParanaque River Bridge. Here thedivision came up against the Genko

Line, a position of mutually supportingsolid concrete and dirt pillboxes some6,000 yards deep, and about 4 milesacross. The guns of D Battery wereagain employed to shoot at the pillboxes,

but, alas, these fortifications proved toothick and formidable for their 75mmammunition. It was necessary for theinfantry to assault each one in turn, andthe guns were brought together andemployed as a battery of the directsupport battalion. By this time, the DBattery veterans passed easily from onerole to another, either shooting from the

hip in the front lines or methodicallyjerking the lanyard at the computer'scommand.

The picture above shows a section of D Battery, 457th Prcht FA Bn, firing point blank at

caves on hillside. The gun had been carried on foot, piece by piece, up a slick mountain trail.

Below, a Filipino pack party brings ammunition up the side of a mountain near Lipa,

Batanges, Luzon, P. I.

Another Boat Ride. D Battery wasnext removed from battalion control onthe 23rd of February when the divisionraided the Los Banos Prison Camp toliberate some 2,100 allied internees. Thestory of the rescue has been told manytimes, but for those who haven't heard,


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1946 FIFTH WHEEL 393

the operation went generally as follows.The camp was situated about 25 milesinside Jap territory, on the south shoreof a body of shallow water calledLaguna De Bay. We divided guerrillaestimates by ten and came up with the

guess that about 8,000 Japs were withinan hour's march from the camp. Thedivision plan was to assemble duringthe night of the 22nd in the vicinity of atown called Calamba, and at seven onthe morning of the 23rd, to launch astrong ground attack across the SanJuan River. At the same time, areinforced company would jump closeto the camp and join the Division RenPlatoon at the camp (a position towhich it was to infiltrate during thenight), complete the job of knifing theJap sentries, and organize the internees

for rapid evacuation. At 0400 of thatmorning, an amphibious task force ofone battalion of infantry (less the

jumping company) and D Battery,mounted in amphibious tractors,entered the shallow waters of Lagunade Bay with all the quiet of a thousandsubway trains. They steered a compasscourse (it was black as a coal mine aftertaps) for the beach opposite the camp.Well, you've heard the resthow at0700 a hundred and fifty paratroopershit the silk, the amtracs hit the beach,and the first artillery concentration of

the ground attack to the west echoedacross the rice paddies. The Japgarrison died where it stood, some onguard and some taking calisthenics. Allthe internees were evacuated, with onlyone of them being wounded slightly.The resistance to the landing came froma lone hill overlooking the beach. DBattery descended from the amtracs,wheeled to the right, and plastered thehill until the last internee was loadedand had shoved off. It then gathered itsguns, mounted its amtracs, and headedfor the friendly shore. Rejoining its

battalion, D Battery then moved with i tto support the attack on Ternate.

By Hand to Peaks. Three monthslater, the division was preparing toattack and capture Mount Malepunyo,the last Jap stronghold in SouthernLuzon. Meanwhile, since a company oftanks and a company of tank destroyershad been attached to the division, therewas little need for employing thehowitzers of D Battery in their assault

role. However, the cave positions ofGeneral Fujisige's last holdout were onthe peaks of the mountain massinaccessible even to carabao, let alonetanks or tank destroyers. Consequently,the commander of the regiment making

the main effort requested assault guns.D Battery took its howitzers as far as

they could go on wheels, disassembledthem and carried the parts to the tops ofthree peaks which had been taken bythe infantry, and from which theinfantry was to jump off in the finalattack. There they assembled theirweapons and trained them on the nextobjective: Mt. Mataasna Bundoc, asubordinate of Mt. Malepunyo. Fromthe positions, the guns could hit threesides of the mountain. Range was short(about 200 yards at the most) and the

firing was done across the canyonbetween the peaks. Three forwardobservers, with SCR-609communication to the guns,accompanied the infantry. One of themwas from Kentucky, an extraordinarilycool and brave youngster, who waslong on courage and short on rhetoric.On one occasion when his batterycommander, who was concerned aboutthe 2,400-foot uphill carry ofammunition, cautioned him to "go easyon area targets," back came the radioreply straight from deepest Kentucky,

"That warn't no area target. Hit war aJap!"

Stigma Forgotten. As the doughboysclimbed up the sides of the mountain, DBattery blasted the caves they pointedout above them. So close did theyfollow the bursts that fragments nickedtheir shoulders as they climbed.Malepunyo is past history, now. Onecombat photography unit obtainedstriking moving pictures of one assaultgun, both from the gun position andfrom the infantry lines, and the pictures

have since appeared in the news reels athome. We used to conduct liaison planetours over the mountain peaks so thatvisiting dignitaries could view thehundreds of Jap bodies on the slopesmute testimony to the effectiveness ofD Battery's last combat mission.

Needless to remark, the appellationFifth Wheel had long since been lost ina forgotten rice paddy along the road tovictory.

BBOOOOZZEERRSS

BBEEWWAARREE

UMEROUS American artillerymenwho were stationed in the south of

England undoubtedly visited Winchester

and viewed with interest the "Boozer's

Stone" which stands in front of the

cathedral. Young Thomas Thetcher's

violent death in 1764 from "drinking

small beer when hot" may still be

meaningful, to some artillerymen, in this

midsummer of 1946!

IN MEMORY OF

THOMAS THETCHER

a Grenadier in North Regt. of Hants Militia whodied of a violent Fever contracted by drinking

Small Beer when hot the 12 of May 1764 Aged26 Years

In grateful remembrance of whose universal goodwill towards his Comrades, this Stone is placed

here at their expense as a small testimony of theirregard and concern

Here sleeps in peace a Hampshire Grenadier Whocaught his death by drinking cold small Beer

Soldiers be wise from his untimely fall And whenyoure hot drink Strong or none at all.

This memorial being decayed was restored by theOfficers of the Garrison A.D. 1782

An honest Soldier never is forgot Whether he dieby Musket or by Pot

This Stone was placed by the North Hants Militiawhen disembodied at Winchester On 26th April1902 in consequence of the original Stone being

destroyed


12/67

ARMY GROUND FORCES

Report of

Activities WorldWar II

Extracts from a forty-eight page

report by the Commanding General,

Army Ground Forces, to the Chief of

Staff covering the worldwide

activities of Army Ground Forces

from its organization in March 1942

to the surrender of Japan.

All figures in the report are preliminary

and are subject to revision when final

returns are completed.

IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION

HE prime achievement of ArmyGround-Forces in World War II

was the American soldiercreated ingreater numbers than ever before, andorganized into fighting teams whichcarried the war across two oceans intothe heart of the enemies' territory.

Army Ground Forces found him acivilian a clerk, a mechanic, astudent and turned him out a betterfighting man than the professional Nazior fanatical Japanese.

The American ground soldier wasthe most elemental of modern warriors.He fought, not from battleships orairplanes, but hand to hand. Where hewas, there was battle; and where hewas, there was modern battle. Theground soldier of this war needed notonly the personal courage, but also a

high degree of skill to make himproficient in the use of complicatedmechanisms and to fit himself into theinterwoven ground-air-navy team. Hetook the ground and held it. Heimposed his will upon the conquered.He was in the tradition of Bunker Hilland Yorktown, of the Alamo, of Shilohand Gettysburg, of San Juan Hill, ofBelleau Woods and the Argonne. Most

of the sweat and blood were his. His

family shed most of the tears.The American ground soldier was

rushed to a maturity for which he hadnot planned or even dreamed. Yet, sostrong were his native hardihood, hisresourcefulness, his competitive spirit

and so skillfully were theseAmerican traits fostered and fashioned

by Ground Force leaders that heconquered, on the ground, face to faceand weapon to weapon, those Axiswarriors whose military upbringing had

been foreseen and unhurried.

BUILDING DIVISIONS

When Army Ground Forces wasformed early in the spring of 1942, twomajor factors had improved thecountry's military situation.

First was the repercussion fromPearl Harbor. The news of that sneakattack, reaching the army in its

barracks or in the homes of its

familiesreading the Sunday papersor listening to the radiohad made afundamental difference. Next morning,even close order drill had a significantmeaning. In the service schools, which

by this time had been expandedtremendously, Monday morningclasses had an unprecedentedseriousness and intensity. Moreover,in the universities and colleges, ROTCstudents took increased interest in theinstruction. Non-militaryundergraduates suddenly decided thatmilitary science might be a good

course to take. The army had gone intouniform; civilian clothes were out forthe duration.

Second, both men and officers hadimproved by the Spring of '42. The firstdraftees, who reached the line unitslater in 1941, were the cream of thenation's youth. Intelligent, strong, and

394

T


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1946 ARMY GROUND FORCES 395

eagercapable of learning anythingthey were the stuff from which a first-rate modern army could be made.

Yet, the future of the Allies lookedbleak indeed. In Europe, the Nazi warmachine had withstood the Soviet

counter-offensive and the Russian winteralong its main defense line, and oncemore menaced Moscow and the heart ofthe Soviet Union.

In the Pacific, the situation wasequally critical. We had been thrown offGuam and Wake Island. The Philippineswere lost, although a handful of gallantAmerican and Filipino troops still heldout in the foxholes of Bataan. TheJapanese had chopped up the British inMalaya and had overwhelmed theSingapore bastionin the words ofWinston Churchill, "the greatest disaster

to British arms which history records."Burma and the Netherlands East Indieshad fallen to the veteran and well-equipped jungle fighters. India itself wasthreatened. The Japanese were nearingthe high tide of their conquest in theSouthwest Pacific.

Faced with these facts, the Americanhigh command effected a reorganizationto better enable the Army to carry thewar to the Axis. Out of thisreorganization came Army GroundForces, as such, on March 9, 1942.

During the year 1942 the Army

Ground Forces raised thirty-sevendivisions, which, added to the thirty-sixalready in existence, made a total ofseventy-three divisions. This yearmarked its greatest expansion. Theground army, in World War II, neverexceeded a strength of eighty-ninedivisions.

Into the infantry division of 15,000men went as many varied skills as might

be found in a civilian community of thesame size. Transportation, equipment,and supply demanded the services ofmore than 1,500 men; communications,

nearly an equal number; administration,700; repair and maintenance ofequipment, 450; preparation of food,650; medical care, 600; and a variety ofminor duties occupied some 1,600 men.All of them were trained for combat aswell.

In order to pick up some 15,000American civilians out of the SelectiveService hat and have them ready forcombat within one year, a precision-

designed activation system was set up,building each division around a cadre of172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, alldrawn from an already active unit. Thiscadre was selected two or three months

prior to the division activation date and

then given special training.The prospective division commanderand his two principal subordinates,designated by the War Department 98days prior to the activation date, andother key infantry and artillery officers ofthe division-to-be, selected by ArmyGround Forces, were brought toheadquarters for a week of orientation.

The commander and his staff then spent amonth at the Command and GeneralStaff School at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. The assistant divisioncommander went to the Infantry Schoolat Fort Benning, Georgia, and the

artillery commander went to the ArtillerySchool at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. All otherofficers of the cadre simultaneouslyattended appropriate service schools.

The commander and the principalofficers of his staff arrived at thedivision camp 37 days before theactivation date. They were joined a weeklater by the remainder of the officer cadre


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Distribution of cumulative casualties (all

theaters) as of 31 July, 1945.Distribution of strength (all theaters)

as of 31 July 1945.

and the entire enlisted cadre. During the

next few days the complement of 452officers arrived from officer candidateschools, service schools, and officerreplacement pools. On "D-day," thedivision was formally activated, withflags and music, and, during the next 15days, the enlisted "filler" of 13,425rookies came in from the receptioncenters. In the meantime, about 50

percent of the division's equipment hadarrived and the stage was set fortraining.

The organization of the cadre, its pre-activation training, the concentration of

equipment and the actual welding of thedivision constituted a tremendous task.Only by the closest centralization ofcontrol and by complete cooperation ofthousands of military persons was it

possible to have the right things at theright place at the right time. Yetactivation orders were accomplishedwithout exception, and in August, 1943,the last division of World War II wasformed.

BUILDING SOLDIERS

The American ground soldier could

not have been successful in battlewithout superlative training. This wasaccomplished despite lack of timenormally considered necessary to traincompetent troops. In an average trainingcycle of 12 months, men were fitted tofight Axis troops which had trained formore than a decade and fought foryears.

Our soldiers possessed certainphysical and mental advantages heritages of the American pastbut

these very advantages complicated the

training problems. To maintain theirinterest in training and to keep themmentally and physically absorbed,leaders had to invent new and improvedtraining methods and bring the physicaltraining aids to a stage of refinementnever before approached. Obstaclecourses were made to resemble the

battlefield rather than the gymnasium.Entire villages were constructed, similarto those they would face in enemytheaters, to teach the troops house-to-house fighting. On infiltration coursestrainees crawled under actual machine

gun fire, and were jarred by explodingblocks of TNT to accustom them to"every sight, sound, and sensation of

battle" so that they would "act calmly,with sound judgment, regardless ofnoise, confusion, and surprise."

American ground army training wascontrolled in three ways byHeadquarters, Army Ground Forces.First, its training directives werecirculated throughout the command.Second, the actual conduct of trainingwas constantly inspected, all over thecountry, by the Commanding General

and his staff. Third, a system of trainingtests, made up by Army Ground Forces,was administered to all units beforetheir training phase was completed.Army Ground Forces thus exercisedcontrol and supervision through all

phases of the training cycle.

This supervisory control was guidedby certain basic principles, establishedearly and held throughout the war,

although altered constantly to meet

changing conditions.1. That a unit should be trained as a

unit rather than as a group of separateindividuals. This for teamwork.

2. That the troop commander himselfwas responsible for training rather thanthe specialist who might actuallyconduct it. This to foster the idea of

personal leadership.

3. Emphasis on general militaryproficiency. This to make the soldierfirst, the technician later.

4. Rigid performance tests on

successive training phases. These toinsure uniformity, early adjustment toexacting standards, and the earliestefficient completion of the trainingmission.

5. Free maneuvers of large units ofthe combined arms, with realisticumpiring, and under conditions asclosely as possible approaching battle.

6. Realism. The use of more than687,365 tons of live ammunition, andlife-sized maneuver areas were concreteexpressions of this fundamentalrequirement.

While American military doctrinewas sound at the beginning of the war,it was necessary that it be keptconstantly up-to-date. This wasaccomplished by maintaining a groupof observers in every theater. Theyfurnished written reports and returnedto this country periodically to make

personal reports to specific operatingagencies. Frequently they visited thetraining schools to bring a breath of combat


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to domestic soldiers. As the warcontinued, a limited number of combat-experienced officers were brought backto occupy positions on the staff of ArmyGround Forces and its subordinateelements. Some were assigned to the

teaching staffs of the various serviceschools to pass on their combat know-how to troops in training.

The Army Ground Forces schools,Infantry, Field Artillery, Antiaircraft,Armored, Coast Artillery, Cavalry,Parachute, and Tank Destroyer, trainedor produced most of the officers who ledthe World War II ground soldier to histen-front victory. The contributions ofthese schools, both in war and peace,were summarized by General of theArmy Dwight D. Eisenhower when hesaid, "The stamp of Benning, Sill, Riley,

and Leavenworth is on every Americanbattle in Europe and Africa." Thewartime expansion of these institutions

some of them built for the crisis,others going back nearly as far as U. S.military historywas almost incredible.

Individual daring and personalmilitary skill, while just as important inthe ground officer as in the officer who

was to fight in the air or on the sea, wereyet secondary, in him, to the ability todirect the efforts of scores of enlistedmen and the capacity to coordinate plansand actions amidst the hazards anduncertainties of immediate combat.

Leadership and a sense ofresponsibility were the two traits mostwanted in a ground officer.

By the war's end approximately123,000 men had been singled out fromthe normal allocation of Army GroundForces inductees for that process oforientation and training which ended inofficership.

In general, the hundreds of thousandsof men received by Army GroundForces came to it via reception centers,those processing installations set up bythe War Department to accept a man

from civilian life and start him on hisway toward becoming a member of theground fighting team. However, betweenhis arrival at the reception center incivilian clothes and his emergence onthe field of combat in battle dress, manyadministrative operations were necessaryto move him through the various stagesof training, which, when multiplied by

the millions of men involved, constituteda tremendous task of administrative and

personnel management. These behind-the-scene operations were much lessobvious in the making of a soldier thanwere the training programs, the field

maneuvers or even some of the off-dutyactivities.

As soon as the raw recruit arrived atthe replacement training center,immediate action was taken to assignhim into the training cycle according tohis physical capacity, the skills he had

possessed as a civilian, and the militaryneed for his particular ability.

Some men from the reception centershad not progressed far enough in theireducation to be able to absorb thetraining they would have to receive.Special Training Units were establishedto school them further in the three "Rs"and slow the pace of training to that

point where they could keep up. Theleading part which Army Ground Forcestook in the initial use of Special TrainingUnitsin the later stages ofmobilization the work of these units wastaken over by the reception centerswas

ANNUAL OUTPUT OF AGF OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS


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in keeping with the constantconservation of manpower.

From the reception centers men werealso allocated directly to the variousunits which were being constantlyactivated in accordance with the 90-

division army plan. This operationreached its height in 1942 and 1943when the largest demands for directassignment were made.

SPECIALIZATION

Specialized training was carried onas the necessity arose. When the AfrikaKorps rumbled to the doors of Cairo, atraining center was established in theCalifornia desert to teach Americanunits that kind of warfare. Whenvictory was won in Africa, the centerwas continued as the California-Arizona Maneuver Area, since it wasideal for the physical and mentalconditioning of troops for combat and itwas the only area in the United Stateswhere live ammunition could be usedalmost at will on large scale maneuvers.

Viewing the Alps and rememberingHannibal, Army Ground Forcesestablished a mountain warfare trainingcenter at Camp Carson, Colorado.

Noting the successful use of ski-shodsoldiers on the northern Soviet front,ground army leaders set up a skiingcenter at Camp Hale, Colorado. Withoperations in Alaska a certainty andwith the possibility of combat in the

Arctic, it was thought advisable tocreate a cold weather training center atCamp McCoy, Wisconsin. Correctlyforeseeing an amphibious war in thePacific, Army Ground Forces firstconducted training in landing

operations at Carabelle, Florida, as itsown activity. Later, this type of trainingwas taken over by the Navy and a large,continuous program of amphibiousinstruction was conducted in thevicinity of San Diego, California. Themutual development of doctrine andunderstanding of this AmphibiousTraining Center contributed greatly tolater Army-Navy successes in boththeaters.

The importance of airborne fighterswas recognized early. Formal trainingwas begun at the Parachute School,

Fort Benning, Georgia, in the Spring of1941. Though organized originally totrain a small number of officers andmen in the technique of jumping froman airplane in flight, the expansion ofthe school was rapid and enormous. Atthe height of the airborne effort the

parachute school graduated 1,250students per week in jumping courses,in addition to graduating troops fromthe demolition, riggers,communications, and jump-mastercourses. As of September 1, 1945,90,992 students graduated from the

parachute jumping courses. During

their course of instruction they made509,842 jumps.

In the American airborne division,parachute artillery and engineer unitswere provided to accompany the

parachute infantry spearhead, and these

same ground elements were a part ofthe spearhead's airbornereinforcements.

Jungle warfare in its early stages,when the extreme mobility of the far-sweeping Japanese seemed their moststriking characteristic, appeared todemand a very light-weight unit inwhich all impedimenta would be animalor man-packed. In answer, the so-calledlight division was created in the winterof 1942-43. Its main characteristic wasflexibility, aimed toward adaptability toany terrain without necessity of change

in the basic structure. Three lightdivisions were organized, with astrength of approximately 8,000officers and men, but two were laterconverted to standard divisions andonly one saw service as a special typeunit. This was primarily because the

Navy and the Amphibious EngineerBrigade furnished mobility in thePacific, and the weight and equipmentof standard divisions were foundnecessary to dislodge the Japanese from

prepared positions.During 1942, many "special type"

units were developed to meet expanding


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and varied battle conditions. Some ofthese were: amphibious tank battalions,amphibious tractor battalions, jointassault signal companies, an airbornearmy signal battalion, and rocket fieldartillery battalions.

DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPLY OFEQUIPMENT

The World War II equipment of theAmerican ground soldier was, with veryfew exceptions, the best on any

battlefield. This fact, known to him aboveanyone else, was a moral as well asmaterial contribution to his battle success.

Development of materiel peculiar tothe ground army was made theresponsibility of Headquarters, ArmyGround Forces, in March 1942. Aspecial section was charged with the

selection, development and servicetesting of all weapons, clothing, food,and miscellaneous materiel destined foruse by the combat soldier. In thiscapacity, it developed, modified,accepted or rejected more than 10,450items of equipment.

Observer boards were maintained, asalready noted, in the European,Mediterranean, and Pacific Theaters,with the primary function of collectinginformation on battle training,organization, tactics, and replacements.

Some of the ground weapons that

emerged as a result of this continualcontact with the troops in battle wererecoilless rifles, the automatic carbine,the flame thrower, and varied types ofheavy and of self-propelled artillery.Greatly improved floating bridges, skidand towing devices, field jackets, andcombat boots were a few of the allied

products so developed.The doughboy, in World War II, had

several implements which gave him anespecial advantage over the Nazi in theEuropean campaign. One was theGarand semi-automatic rifle, which

served equally well against the Japanese,and which was, unquestionably, the bestinfantry rifle ever made. It wasdeveloped prior to the war against agreat deal of peacetime opposition. Evengreater factors in the European conquestwere the jeep and the 2-ton cargo truckwhich, between them, moved andsupplied the ground army, whisking itfrom front to front with a facilityamazing to Nazis who had nocomparable equipment.

The extent to which development ofmateriel had progressed by 1945 is wellillustrated by the "Sphinx Project." After

the defeat of Germany, all emphasisswung to Japan and better weapons forcrushing that country were immediatelysought. The Sphinx Project, as the mostambitious of these seekings, was an air-ground test maneuver, conducted byArmy Ground Forces at Camp Hood,Texas, over terrain which resembledlarge sections of Japan in topography,foliage, and geological content. The areaassaulted, organized as a typicalJapanese defensive position with

provisions made for all the personneland weapons of a reinforced Japanese

infantry regiment, contained more than3,000 prepared strongpoints and 35 largecaves. More than 3,500 officers and men

participated, with control personnelincluding troops of extensive combatexperience in the Pacific. It was proven,

among other things, that the newrecoilless rifles, while very effectiveclose-support weapons, were not the

equal of tanks or self-propelled artilleryin closing or destroying caves. Themechanized flame thrower was shown to

be still essential. As a result of thisproject, a new training circular entitled"Reduction of Japanese FieldFortifications" was being prepared asJapan surrendered.

OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS

The final phase of training groundtroops in the United States was bringingthem to a state of complete combatreadiness and delivering them to ports as

required by theater commanders.During World War II, Army GroundForces put well over two million men,organized as units, aboard ships foroverseas combat. There were three

peak periods of shipment: the


18/67


month of September, 1942, when some90,000 ground troops left United States

ports to train in the United Kingdom asthe first move toward the then-

projected 1943 invasion of Europe andNorth Africa; the months of January,February, and March of 1944, when thefinal build-up for the actual Europeaninvasion sent some 315,000 groundfighters abroad; and the August-October period of 1944 when theimminent ground invasion of Germanyitself drew some 400,000 soldiers fromthe training areas of this country.

Early in the war, individual men toreplace losses within overseasorganizations were prepared forshipment at replacement trainingcenters, and through the use ofreplacement depots operated by ArmyService Forces.

In the latter part of 1944, thestalemate before the Siegfried Line,with its atrocious winter conditions,wore out men much more rapidly thanthe inadequate European port facilitieshad been supplying them. In somesectors our battle lines were thin. It was

just at this moment that the Nazis threwtheir final punch in the Ardennes.

This temporary setback was a climaxto an already strained reinforcement

problem. Seven divisions had beenalerted back in the United States at leastsix months ahead of schedule, and tensof thousands of men had been drawn asoverseas infantry replacements fromtheir parent divisions in this country.One staff actually trained the equivalentof three divisions before it was finallysent overseas with its own men.

The Nazis' last blow in the Ardennescreated such a crisis in the need forreplacements, particularly enlisted menand junior officers of the infantry, thatthe Air Forces were called upon to helpassemble men on the East Coast forshipment to Europe.

And, to meet the insatiable demandsfrom abroad, it was necessary to call onthe Air Forces for some of the men

previously given them in the days oftheir great expansion. In addition, menwere transferred from the ServiceForces into the hard-pressed units of theground troops.

STRIKING FACTS

During the war, Army GroundForces Headquarters administered morethan 4,194,000 men and 230,000officers. The ground forces absorbed 81

percent of the American Army's battlelosses. The infantry, which comprised

only 20.5 percent of the total strengthoverseas, took 70 percent of the totalcasualties.

The ground army captured anddisarmed 8,150,447 enemy troops.

Ground soldiers made more than 40major landings on hostile shores.

Of the 276 men thus far granted thenation's highest award, theCongressional Medal of Honor, 239have been members of the ArmyGround Forces, almost all of them fromthe infantry. Nearly half of them died intheir heroic service. Of the some 3,700Distinguished Service Crosses grantedfor World War II heroism, more than80 percent went to ground army

personnel.

In World War II Army GroundForces raised 89 divisions and

supporting troops, sent every oneoverseas and 88 into combat, andmaintained them there at or near theirstipulated strengththis, despite thefact that by January, 1945, 47 infantryregiments in 19 divisions had lost from100% to 200% of their strength in

battle casualties alone.

Over 2,453,000 men were processedthrough Replacement Training Centersfrom March 9, 1942, to July 31, 1945.

LOCATION OF U. S. DIVISIONS, JUNE 1945


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GGLLOORRIIOOUUSS

AARRTTIILLLLEERRYY

TTRRAADDIITTIIOONNAddress by the Honorable Robert P.

Patterson, Secretary of War, at the

Field Artillery School Commencement,at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, May 30, 1946

T IS A PRIVILEGE TO BE AT FortSill on Memorial Day, the day set

aside by the nation in honor of thosewho have laid down their lives in theircountry's cause. To you soldiers thisday has a personal message,therecollection of fellow-soldiers who fellin combat in Europe, in Africa, orsomewhere in the vast reaches of thePacific. Three hundred and eightthousand Americans died in battle in

World War Two, and of that total240,000 were soldiers in the UnitedStates Army.

Never Found Wanting. In the warour artillerymen lived up to theglorious traditions of their arm,traditions that go back to the smallcommand of Henry Knox in theContinental Army and the brass cannonof that day. The artillery was neverfound wanting. Counterbattery fire hasalways been their ordeal, but in thisstruggle they also faced the perils of air

bombardment, airborne assault,infantry infiltration and armoredattack. Yet they deliveredunflinchingly the supporting fire sovital to the success of the infantryassault. The great tribute to the artillerycomes from the foot soldiers, who liketo tell how on such and such a day thefire passing overhead was so heavy andwell directed that they walked into theenemy lines standing up.

Valorous Observers. As the warwore on, the teamwork betweenartillery and infantry reached a

perfection never before attained. Agreat part of the credit must go to theartillery forward observers. Theycalled the signals. Their heroism has

become a tradition in the Army. Nonobler case of courage has come out ofthe war than the record of the forwardobserver in the Philippines, who wasadjusting the fire of his artillery

battalion on a large force of Japanesethat was delivering a counterattack. His

posit ion was well in front, and his finalmessage was, "Those last rounds were25 yards in front of me. Come back 25yards and fire for effect. I'll takeAmerican Beauty roses. Over." He diedin the bursts, but so did the Japanese.

The Full Picture. The courage ofthe artillerymen, however bright, doesnot give the full picture of what wasachieved. In addition to bravery, thefactors that gave us our artillerysuperiority were sound doctrine,thorough training and powerfulweapons. The doctrine developed hereat Fort Sill, with emphasis onflexibility, control and concentration,stood the test of combat. The training,from the top down, left nothing tochance. The artillerymen always knewtheir jobs. The weapons and

ammunition spoke with an authoritynever known in the Army in any

previous war. The 105 howitzer, theself-propelled guns, the V-T fuze,these were outstanding examples in aline of weapons, ammunition and othermateriel that gave our forces the bestthat American science and Americanindustry could produce. There weretimes when we were concerned as toour ability to furnish enoughammunition, and it would have been

better if we could have delivered morein the fall of 1944. Those were anxious

days at the War Department. We wererushing shells by fast truck from Ohioto the ships at New York, and by fastships across the Atlantic. We were alsocrowding the shell plants and theloading lines for all they could possiblydeliver.

Kill or Be Killed. You know how itis overseas. The leaders who have theresponsibility of planning futureoperations must have the assurance thatthere will be an abundance ofammunition, trucks, gasoline and all

the other items that it takes to mount anoffensive. It is the same down the lineto the battery commander. If he is to dothe business, he must see the shellscoming in faster than they are beingexpended.

The requirements on artilleryammunition sent here by the overseascommanders were high, and properly

so. An abundant supply is anindispensable element of victory. Warsare won, when we are obliged to fight anation like the Germans or theJapanese, by killing more of the enemythan he can kill of us. To kill more ofthe enemy we must throw more steel athim than he can throw at us. Most of

that steel is in the shape of artilleryammunition. The lesson to be borne inmind is that in our planning for war wemust always make sure that we will bein a position to supply all calls forammunition, enough and on time.

Merited Trust. The Army came outof the war with a glorious record. It didnot let the country down. It never has, inany war in our history It serves thenation in days of peace also, with

patriotism, faith and devotion. In timeof emergency, and as late as last week,the country turns to the Army to stand

between it and domestic calamity, and itdoes so with the sure knowledge that theArmy can be depended on to do the joband then to return to its normaloccupation of keeping our land safefrom foreign enemies. The Army hasnever sought to encroach on the civilianauthority, and it never will. It is andalways will be an instrument of thenational policy that is declared by ourdemocratic system of government. Itwill do its duty, ever obedient to the callof the United States government. That isthe tradition of American soldiers.

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

The Secretary of War

401

I


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WELCOME TO THE

FIELD ARTILLERYThe following are the Field Artillerymen who were recently

nominated by the President for appointment in the Regular

rmy. Permanent rank is shown first, with temporary rank in

arenthesis. See "Career Building," page 420.1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) N. D. Aboosh1st Lt. (Capt.) H. D. Adams1st Lt. (Maj.) John D. Adams1st Lt. (Capt.) L. J. Aebischer1st Lt. (Maj.) G. G. Ackroyd1st Lt. (Capt.) John R. Agulia1st Lt. (Capt.) F. F. AhlgrenMaj. (Lt. Col.) William M.

Albergotti1st Lt. (Maj.) A. W. Albrecht1st Lt. (Capt.) John C. Allan1st Lt. (Capt.) H. J. Allbee1st Lt. (Maj.) W. S. Alldredge1st Lt. (Col.) Ben E. Allen1st Lt. (Capt.) Tyrus R. Ambron1st Lt. (Capt.) A. C. AndersonCapt. (Col.) C. H. AndersonCapt. (Lt. Col.) D. P. Anderson2nd Lt. (2nd Lt.) Douglas A.

Armstrong1st Lt. (Capt.) E. B. Armstrong1st Lt. (Capt.) Jack P. Ancker1st Lt. (Capt.) C. T. Anders1st Lt. (1st Lt.) E. B. Andersen1st Lt. (Maj.) G. L. Anderson1st Lt. (Capt.) C. W. Andresen1st Lt. (Maj.) H. F. Antrim1st Lt. (Capt.) Irvine Appleton1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) T. S. ArnoldCapt. (Lt. Col.) Harry Auspitz1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. T. Avery, Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) Clarence F. Ax1st Lt. (1st Lt.) W. B. Aycock

2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) J. L. Aylor1st Lt. (1st Lt.) Robert G. BabbCapt. (Capt.) C. S. BabcockCapt. (Lt. Col.) Harry T. Baker1st Lt. (Maj.) Arthur C. Ball1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) E. T. Barco, Jr.1st Lt. (1st Lt.) N. H. Barnhart1st Lt. (Maj.) W. S. Barrett1st Lt. (Capt.) T. A. Barrow1st Lt. (Capt.) C. C. Batson2nd Lt. (Capt.) Haynes M.

Baumgardner1st Lt. (Maj.) E. Bautz, Jr.Capt. (Lt. Col.) George E. BayaMaj. (Maj.) Harry K. Bayless1st Lt. (Capt.) H. E. BeamanCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. O. Beets

Lt. (Maj.) Wilfred C. BeckerMaj. (Lt. Col.) Hugh BeldenCapt. (Lt. Col.) James K. Bell1st Lt. (Capt.) Roy F. BenjaminCapt. (Lt. Col.) T. W. Bender1st Lt. (Maj.) W. E. Bennett1st Lt. (Maj.) V. W. Bennett1st Lt. (Capt.) W. P. Berger1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. S. Benson1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) R. J. BestorCapt. (Lt. Col.) T. F. Bienvenu1st Lt. (Capt.) Alfred C. Bieri

1st Lt. (Capt.) C. P. Biggio1st Lt. (Maj.) R. H. BinghamCapt. (Lt. Col.) H. E. BisbortMaj. (Lt. Col.) J. H. F. Bittner1st Lt. (Capt.) William W.

BlackburnCapt. (Lt. Col.) J. S. Blair II1st Lt. (Capt.) L. A. Blakely1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) A. A. Blinn1st Lt. (Col.) Jack S. Blocker1st Lt. (Maj.) P. E. Blumensaadr1st Lt. (Maj.) Carl E. Bobo, Jr.Capt. (Lt. Col.) Paul Bodbey1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) C. BognerMaj. (Lt. Col.) Joy R. Bogue1st Lt. (Capt.) James O. Bolick1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. H. BolingMaj. (Maj.) Lewis A. Bonifay1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Charles M.

Bowling, Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) Beryl L. Boyce1st Lt. (Capt.) K. BrabsonLt. (Capt.) Stuart F. Brady2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) H. W.

Brandenburg1st Lt. (Maj.) D. L. Bristol1st Lt. (Col.) W. P. Brooks1st Lt. (Capt.) J. P. Brubaker1st Lt. (Maj.) W. E. Brubaker1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Thomas R.

Bruce, Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) Ray K. Bruch2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) A. J. Brown

1st Lt. (Capt.) R. D. Brown1st Lt. (Maj.) F. R. Brownyard2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) David L. Bruns1st Lt. (Capt.) W. R. BuelowMaj. (Lt. Col.) R. T. Bunker1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) E. H. Burba1st Lt. (Capt.) F. X. BurgasserCapt. (Maj.) Lyman D. Burkett1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Jean E. BushCapt. (Lt. Col.) Robert B. Bush1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) B. Butler, Jr.Capt. (Lt. Col.) J. H. Buys1st Lt. (Capt.) J. B. Cagle, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) Marlin W. Camp1st Lt. (1st Lt.) R. J. Canfield1st Lt. (Maj.) L. K. Cannon, Jr.Capt. (Maj.) James Cantey

1st Lt. (Maj.) B. D. Capshaw, Jr.1st Lt. (Col.) R. P. Carlson1st Lt. (1st Lt.) B. L. Carroll1st Lt. (Capt.) Edward T. Casey1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) G. C. CassadyCapt. (Maj.) H. H. ChamplinCapt. (Maj.) R. T. Chapman1st Lt. (Capt.) F. A. Chance, Jr.Maj. (Lt. Col.) J. A. Channon1st Lt. (Maj.) L. B. Cheek, Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) Abb Chrieizberg1st Lt. (Capt.) H. P. Garke

1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Jack A. Clark1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Roy U. Clay1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) W. R. ClarkCapt. (Col.) Harold V. Clayton1st Lt. (Maj.) Robert J. Cleary1st Lt. (Capt.) R. E. Cleveland1st Lt. (Capt.) Charles L. Cline1st Lt. (Maj.) R. W. Clirehugh1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Donald Coates1st Lt. (Maj.) D. G. Cogswell

1st Lt. (Maj.) David E. CondonCapt. (Lt. Col.) Robert H. ConkCapt. (Col.) Richard Collins, Jr.1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Charles ConnCapt. (Lt. Col.) R. J. Conran1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Karl Conner1st Lt. (Capt.) George I. Connolly,

Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) J. E. Cook, Jr.Capt. (Col.) Frederick J. Cooke1st Lt. (Capt. George T. Cooper1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) C. A. Corcoran1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) E. N. Cory, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) Charles T. Cox2d Lt. (1st Lt.) W. P. Craddock,

Jr.

1st Lt. (Maj.) K. C. Crawford1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) G. R. Creel, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) H. J. Cronin2d Lt. (2nd Lt.) E. P. Crovo1st Lt. (Capt.) Elbert R. CurtisCapt. (Lt. Col.) J. Curtiss, Jr.2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) Gene M.

Cushman1st Lt. (Capt.) J. W. Dale, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) H. W. Darrow1st Lt. (Capt.) Paul W. Davis1st Lt. (Capt.) C. W. Davis, Jr.1st Lt. (1st Lt.) P. A. Davis, Jr.Capt. (Lt. Col.) H. L. Davisson1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) John W. Dean,

Jr.1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) R. H. Deason

1st Lt. (Capt.) D. J. DelaneyCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. M. DelaneyCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. V. DeLoach1st Lt. (Maj.) Hilton Densley1st Lt. (Maj.) R. DexheimerMaj. (Lt. Col.) C. A. L. Dickey1st Lt. (Capt.) J. H. Dickson1st Lt. (1st Lt.) Allan G.

Dingwall, Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) O. M. DoerflingerCapt. (Maj.) T. W. DonnellLt. (Capt.) C. H. Dornacker2d Lt. (Capt.) J. E. Dougherty2d Lt. (Capt.) J. P. Downer1st Lt. (Capt.) W. G. Downey1st Lt. (Capt.) E. P. Downing

1st Lt. (Capt.) John C. Dozier1st Lt. (Maj.) Edward DreissCapt. (Lt. Col.) P. A. DresserCapt. (Maj.) Edwin H. DruleyMaj. (Lt. Col.) G. A. Duerr1st Lt. (Capt.) Jack W. Duffy1st Lt. (Capt.) James H. DysonCapt. (Maj.) A. G. Eagle1st Lt. (Col.) H. D. Easton, Jr.Maj. (Lt. Col.) K. A. Eddy1st Lt. (1st Lt.) W. C. Edler2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) K. J. Edwards, Jr.

1st Lt. (Maj.) Richard A.Edwards, Jr.

Capt. (Lt. Col.) R. H. Elliott1st Lt. (Capt.) C. H. Ellis, Jr.Capt. (Maj.) Bill A. Evans1st Lt. (Capt.) Byrne A. EvansCapt. (Maj.) G. W. Evans2nd Lt. (2nd Lt.) V. G. Evans1st Lt. (Maj.) T. P. Ewing1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) P. V. Fahey

1st Lt. (Capt.) F. A. Farnsworth2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) W. J. Farrell1st Sgt. (Maj.) L. R. Fausset1st Lt. (1st Lt.) K. S. Field1st Lt. (Capt.) J. W. Fielder1st Lt. (Maj.) Gieson R. Finley1st Lt. (Capt.) T. C. Finneran1st Lt. (1st Lt.) C. M. Firebaugh2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) S. N. Fitzpatrick,

Jr.1st Lt. (Maj.) E. P. Fleming, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) J. C. Flenniken1st Lt. (Capt.) Marvin W. FloraCapt. (Maj.) Ira H. Fowler1st Lt. (Capt.) J. C. Fralish1st Lt. (Maj.) D. C. France, Jr.

1st Lt. (Capt.) G. M. Frasor1st Lt. (Maj.) E. Frederickson1st Lt. (Capt.) Floyd FrederickCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. R. Frederick,

Jr.Capt. (Lt. Col.) T. B. Freema1st Lt. (1st Lt.) J. E. Freestone2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) John H. Fye1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) William J.

Gallagher1st Lt. (Capt.) H. B. Gallinger1st Lt. (Maj.) Neal C. Galloway1st Lt. (1st Lt.) H. L. GarrisCapt. (Col.) W. C. Garrison1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Silas Gassett1st Lt. (Maj.) Floyd D. Gattis1st Lt. (Col.) L. G. Gavalas1st Lt. (Capt.) Wayne J. Gaynor,

Jr.1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. G. Georgelas1st Lt. (Maj.) E. P. German1st Lt. (Capt.) Wells H. Gibbs1st Lt. (Maj.) Floyd L. Glauser1st Lt. (Capt.) W. C. Glover1st Lt. (Capt.) J. R. Gissell2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) R. C. Goforth1st Lt. (Capt.) J. L. GoodnowCapt. (Maj.) J. B. Goodwin1st Lt. (Capt.) F. C. Goodwin1st Lt. (Capt.) D. B. Gordon1st Lt. (Capt.) T. L. Gordon1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. W. Grady2d Lt. (1st Lt.) C. V. Graft, Jr.

2d Lt. (Capt.) Neil J. Graham1st Lt. (Maj.) Thomas A. Graham,

Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) J. M. GrantCapt. (Maj.) C. K. GraydonMaj. (Lt. Col.) John N. Green1st Lt. (Maj.) Oliver E. Griest1st Lt. (Capt.) J. D. Griffiths1st Lt. (Capt.) K. G. Groom1st Lt. (Capt.) M. G. Guinn

(Continued on page 406)

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OBSERVATIONS OF ABATTERY COMMANDER

By Captain John J. Norris, FA

COMMANDED A LIGHT ARtillerybattalion of an Infantry Division

which entered combat on the WesternFront on the 4th of November, 1944. I

joined this battery shortly after itsactivation and served as AssistantExecutive, Executive, and BatteryCommander. I had the opportunity ofguiding the training of my organizationand of watching the results of thattraining in combat. I now feel that I am

prepared to make some observations,the veracity of which my experiencehas emphasized repeatedly. I shalldiscuss them under the headings ofleadership, training, morale, discipline,standard, tactics factors thatdetermine success or failure in battle.

Leadership. Leadership in theAmerican Armyespecially at thelevel of the battery commander is

based on example.Leadership based onexample is the only means to guarantee

respect, without which leadership does

not exist. Setting an example involvestwo things: first, the mental and

physical ability to lead others; andsecondly, the character andconscientious attention to duty whichdemands that the leader himself adherestrictly to the orders he issues.

The American soldier is intelligent.You cannot fool him. He demands twothings of his officers: first, that theyknow their business; second, that theyexact obedience to orders. This is the

proper approach to genuine goodwilland loyalty. To seek popularity outright

by relaxing orders for fear of offendingis one of the worst mistakes an officercan make. Men quickly sense thisweakness.

Leadership is a fair and squarepolicy. Treat all men alike; do not relaxorders or favor any individual or anygroup. To practice favoritism is to put

command on a personal basis. To dothat is to lose the respect of all.

Nothing is quite so sobering or

satisfying as the responsibility

and privilege of commanding a

battery of American soldiers.

This young commander has

learned quickly and well the

immutable principles of

leadership. Artillerymen, old and

young, will benefit by reading his

observations.

Captain Norris graduated from

West Point in January, 1943. After

finishing a battery officer's course

at the Field Artillery School, he was

assigned to Battery "C," 379th FA

Bn, where he served as motor

officer and battery executive officer

before becoming battery

commander in February, 1944. His

battery entered combat in Holland

with the 102nd Infantry Division on

4 November 1944, and was on the

Elbe River on V-E Dav. He was

awarded the Bronze Star Medal for

meritorious service during the

period he was in combat. Recorded

originally merely as a matter of

personal interest in preserving

impressions while still fresh in his

mind, Captain Norris' observations

reflect throughout a strong and

justifiable pride in his unit and in

soldi-ringthe keys, as he so

rightfully observes, to morale and

discipline. Captain Norris is servingpresently as S-2 of 1st Infantry

Division Artillery in Germany.

Leadership is diplomacy. One mustlearn to give orders in a manner thatdoes not offend but inspires, does notaccentuate the element of rank butelicits cooperation. The American

soldier is a citizen of a free countrywho is giving the better years of his lifeto a duty demanded by his country. Hewishes to sacrifice no more of hisindividuality and civil rights than arenecessary. To be unnecessarily harshand crude in giving orders isdetrimental to the best interests of the

purpose intended. This does not meanthat a forceful manner is not required attimes.

Leadership is personal interest inyour men. Show them you areconcerned in each one individually. Ittends to relieve the feeling that is apt togrow among enlisted men that they aremerely a group of underprivilegedwhom the officers enjoy orderingaround.

Leadership is psychology. Acommander must quickly sense thefeelings of his men and readily graspthe remedy. He must pick upmisunderstandings of orders,

dissatisfaction with policies. He mustsingle out the men who arediscontented and work on them. Suchmen must be handled intelligently.

Leadership is orientation. Much ofthe unpleasantness of a distasteful ordervanishes if the man understands thereason behind the order. Take pains tohave your men understand your

policies, prepare them in advance fororders you anticipate. Get them in thereceptive frame of mind. Thoroughunderstanding through orientation

produces gratifying results.

Leadership is versatility. You mustbe the driving force when there isunpleasant work to be done, the "heel"that enforces the standards of disciplinein garrison, the inspiration in battle, the

priest to rend your men in sorrow. Eachof these requires that you develop awide understanding of life and the

403

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psychology that governs the soldier'sthought and emotion.

Leadership is enthusiasm, energy,initiative. A commander must havethese qualities to inspire those beneathhim.

Leadership is good judgment. Dailythere are decisions to be made thatrequire good sound judgment. On the

battlefield a commander is frequentlycalled upon to make up his mindquickly, but equally there are decisionsinvolving policies and principles thatdemand more thought. An error in

picking your leaders weakens yourorganization and calls for futureunpleasantness.

Lastly, leadership is the ability to"get along" with your associates. Manyofficers have forced the Army to deny

them the best use of their abilitiesbecause of their lack of effort to workwith other members of a team.Teamwork, cooperation, andcoordination are essential to success incombat.

Training. It is my firm belief that thestandard of success of a unit against theenemy is a direct function of the qualityof training in the zone of the interior.True, it is frequently necessary toeliminate dead wood, to relieve officersand noncommissioned officers who lackthe mental alertness, the physicalstamina, moral courage, theaggressiveness that leads to success in

battle. But among the men you havetrained will spring the vigorous, freshleadership which has been awaiting itschance.

In many ways the commander'sgreatest test comes in the training

period. In spite of all, men will notunderstand the full reason behind ordersgiven. Obviously, it is not the popularthing to correct a man for not wearinghis steel helmet when there are no shellsabout. But the firmer and moredetermined a commander carries out histraining mission the more he contributesto later combat success, particularly inthe saving of lives lost. This does notmean that time should be spentunnecessarily, but it does mean that thetime taken should be utilized inintensive work. The commander musthave the guts to do the right thing in theface of much opposition from those whoare either shortsighted or less interested

in their duty than he. Commanders whopushed training intelligently andrelentlessly are deserving of greatercredit than many received foroutstanding service to our country.

Morale. Morale is a factor which iscreated by circumstance. Morale ishighest when there is much activity.Morale in our unit was highest incombat on the swift advances from theRoer to the Rhine. The men wereoccupied; each felt that he wascontributing directly to the final victory.But during periods of inactivity thesoldier begins to think too much abouthis grievances and is inclined to becomeinvolved, hence require disciplinaryaction.

The first lesson towards maintaininghigh morale is the provision for keepingthe men occupied. This may be done byvarious means, but must be done.Provide as much recreational activityand variety as possible. The second is to

provide the men with all conveniencesthat the situation will allow. In combatthis meant hot meals, lighting facilities,rest passes, and wholeheartedcooperation by the officers in an effortto think of ways to make life morelivable.

A point of morale arises when a unitbreaks away from combat and is placedinto rest areas. A commander mustgradually break his men once again intothe idea of garrison life and the highstandards that go with it. The Americansoldier naturally dislikes many thingsthat go with garrison living such asfrequent inspections, police, close orderdrill. But each commander knows thatthose things are necessary in order tomaintain the discipline, health, andgeneral welfare of his unit. It is achallenge to a commander to use histact, ingenuity, leadership, orientation,and diplomacy to get these thingsrolling with the minimum harassing ofhis men and sacrifice to their morale.

Discipline. A matter of firstimportance to a commander, it must bekept high at all times. A commandermust always be on the alert to detectlaxity in discipline. When the discipline

becomes lax the unit is on the roaddown.

Discipline may be defined and isdefined quite differently by different

individuals. I have heard batterycommanders say, "We don't salute, yetwe have the best discipline in thedivision." I have also heard enlisted mencall officers by their first names, as ageneral policy, when in combat.

Common danger certainly draws mencloser together, but I do not believe thisis the correct approach to gooddiscipline. True, some officers do notneed the Army Regulations and Courts-Martial Manual to establish theirauthority. This is ideal, but even underthese conditions a commander makes amistake to invite familiarity. It maywork with one officer, but it does notwork with all. Invariably some men willabuse the privilege; there is meaning inthe adage, "familiarity breedscontempt." A commander who has the

spontaneous respect of all his men caneasily insist and obtain the essentials ofmilitary courtesy which always markthe disciplined unit.

In combat, then, discipline can bemaintianed by military courtesy applied practically and sensibly, butappliedand sanitary living. Insistconstantly on personal cleanliness, cleanclothes, sanitary quarters, haircuts, well-kept materiel, neatness and orderlinesseverywhere to the very limit thesituation will permit.

Like training in general, if discipline

is well established in the zone of theinterior, it will present no problem incombat. I seldom found it necessary toraise my voice overseas and used my

battery punishment book only once.

The theory behind good discipline isto catch the little things. Never let themslip past you. If you do, you will soonhave serious violations of orders onyour hands, requiring unpleasant actionthat breeds bitterness and constitutes adetriment not only to the individual'srecord but also to your organization.Psychologically, a commander mustknow when to cease corrections to avoidharassing. He must always commendgood work, be pleasant, and showinterest in the men. But never let thediscipline slip. Keep those hats onstraight, clothes buttoned. It keeps themen in the habit of obeying orders andthe officers in the habit of performingtheir duty. Make corrections right now,when you observe the need.


23/67

1946 OBSERVATIONS OF A BATTERY COMMANDER 405

Strangely, perhaps, and most certainly,good discipline causes free men inuniform to fight willinglywith spirit,determination, initiative, and success.

Standard. This is the factor that

separates the superior officer from theaverage and the successful unit fromthe mediocre. The higher the standard,the more successful the unit. And it isthe commanding officer who sets thatstandard and maintains it. A unit is ameasure of the man who commands it.

The unit commander must have theproper conception of a high standardin order to pass it on to his officersand men. It is of first importance, ofcourse, that the officerstheleadersbe instilled with a highstandard. Effort is made to accomplish

this very important purpose at OfficerTraining Schools, but there is notsufficient time there to inculcate idealsin addition to putting across thetechnical military knowledge that must

be acquired in a limited time.Therefore this responsibility oftraining junior officers devolves uponthe commanding officer. Nothing isfiner than for a young officer to havethe right type of commander.

Units with high standards are easyto spot. It is generally true, moreover,

that a unit whose standards are highalong one particular line areuniversally high. And the level ofsuccess attained in combat reflects,almost universally, the standardattained in the training in the zone ofinterior. Demand the highest standardsin police, appearance, discipline,sanitation, and training. Have a betteroutfit in every way than the next onedown the line. To have a winning teamis to have pride, high morale, and

spirit. In war we must win; we cannottie or lose. And it is high standards,

more than anything else, that results inthe pride, the spirit, and thedetermination that brings victory onthe battlefield.

Tactics and Miscellaneous. Thebattery commander is seldomconcerned with tactics. But here aresome ideas that I have foundworthwhile.

Be aggressive. This factor is vital tosuccess. The commander must beaggressive himself and he must instillthis spirit into each and every man andofficer.

Plan ahead. Never go into anyundertaking poorly prepared. As far aspossible detailed reconnaissance andplans should be made to insure thecoordination of all elements of one'scommand. Above all, do not takeanything for granted. I repeat, do nottake anything for granted. There is nosubstitute for personal checking. Askquestions. Find out for yourself if yourmen know what their business is andthat orders are being carried out. Donot go about a job so hastily that itcannot be well planned and

coordinated. Incidentally, planningahead does not stifle initiative; itstimulates it.

Avoid hasty decisions. That is thequickest way to lose confidence andmany lives. Always think out yourdecisions carefully. Careful thought

prevents frequent changes in orderswhich are demoralizing and inspire alack of confidence in the commander.Further, be cautious when the situationallows. This will help to build up theconfidence of your men for aggressiveaction when cautionas it mustsometimesbe cast aside.

Pick the right men. You will get thejob done better and save lives. Do notsend four men up with a forwardobserver if three will do.

Select positions carefully. It meansthe safety of your men as well as theaccomplishment of the mission.

Command Your Battery. Don't letanybody run your battery for you ormake decisions for you that you are in

a position to make yourself. I firmlybelieve I would have lost fully onefourth of my battery had I allowedothers to change my decisions.

The battery commander thecompany commanderis the man towhom so much is owed. It is he who ischarged with the execution of orders.He is the man who has supplied thedriving force to Victory!

OF MORE THANPASSING INTERESTHappy Birthday. The Air Training

School at Fort Sill was four years old onJune 6th. The School received acertificate of merit for its outstandingsafety record: one fatality in over200,000 flying hours.

Auspicious (?) Birth. Ravaged byyears of war and enemy occupation, itseconomy disrupted and capital in ruins,its treasury empty and people hungrythese were the grim internal realities at

the birth, on 4 July 46, of the newPhilippine Republic. Long on the love ofliberty but short on experience in self-government, the problems confrontingthe Filipinos are the equal if not greaterthan the problems confronting the 13American States 170 years ago. Certainto help them, the American people alsowish the Filipinos strength and Godspeedin meeting the challenge of their future.

AGF Board No. 4. The CG, AGF, hasannounced the establishment, at FortBliss, Texas, of the Antiaircraft andGuided Missile Center, and Army GroundForces Board No. 4. Major General John

L. Homer will be in command.Permanent Generals.

Congratulations to former artillerymen:Generals Jacob L. Devers and Thomas T.Handy, recently confirmed as permanentMajor Generals, USA; LieutenantRaymond S. McLain (President of ourAssociation), recently confirmed as a

permanent Brigadier General, USA.

At Long Last. According to officialcommunications published in the May-June, 1946, issue of the Cavalry Journal,the President-approved Simpson Boardrecommendation to merge the Cavalryand Armored Force into a singleArmored Cavalry arm confirms, in

principle, the recommendation made bythe Chief of Cavalry over six years ago.Outstanding lesson for soldiers today,quoted in the above-mentionedcorrepondence from a report of the Chiefof Infantry in opposition to theestablishment of a separate ArmoredCorps: The fallacy of shapingorganization on the basis of weapons,rather than adapting weapons to themission, is a constantly recurring one.


24/67


WELCOME TO THE FIELD ARTILLERY Cont'd1st Lt. (Capt.) John R. GuthrieCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. A. HadfiCapt. (Lt. Col.) B. E. Hagen1st Lt. (1st Lt.) N. R. Haley1st Lt. (Maj.) J. B. Hallums2nd Lt. (2nd Lt.) Luther P.

Hampton, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) C. W. HancheyCapt. (Lt. Col.) James D. Hand1st Lt. (Maj.) Robert D. Hand1st Lt. (1st Lt.) G. E. Handley1st Lt. (Maj.) R. W. HannahLt. (1st Lt.) R. H. HansenCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. B. Hardin1st Lt. (Maj.) John E. HardingCapt. (Lt. Col.) W. HardmanCapt. (Col.) D. B. Harriott1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) F. A. Harris1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. H. HarrisonCapt. (Maj.) W. E. Harrison1st Lt. (Capt.) John M. Hart1st Lt. (Maj.) L. G. Haskell1st Lt. (Capt.) G. D. Haskins

1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) M. G. Hatch1st Lt. (Maj.) T. F. HayesCapt. (Lt. Col.) J. R. HectorCapt. (Maj.) L. A. HedgesCapt. (Lt. Col.) Hans W. HelmCapt. (Lt. Col.) G. J. Helms1st Lt. (1st Lt.) K. R. Helms1st Lt. (Capt.) John HendricksLt. (Capt.) J. T. HennesseyCapt. (Lt. Col.) C. W. Henry1st Lt. (Capt.) John F. Henry1st Lt. (Capt.) Philip B. Henshaw,

Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) I. C. Hensor, Jr.1st Lt. (Capt.) C. R. Hiatt1st Lt. (Maj.) M. D. Hickman

1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) P. S. Hicks1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. F. P. HillCapt. (Lt. Col.) A. E. Hintz2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) R. C. Hixon1st Lt. (Capt.) A. P. Hobrecht1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Donald E.

Hoffmeister1st Lt. (Maj.) Julian L. Hogan2nd Lt. (1st Lt.) W. C. Hoge1st Lt. (Capt.) E. J. HolmesCapt. (Col.) R. H. Holmes, Jr.Capt. (Col.) J. W. Holsinger1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) Walter G.

Hopkins1st Lt. (Capt.) B. S. HopperCapt. (Lt. Col.) C. E. Howard

Maj. (Lt. Col.) L. M. HowelCapt. (Lt. Col.) John T. HoyneCapt. (Lt. Col.) C. G. Hubbard1st Lt. (Capt.) T. W. Huck1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. S. Hughes1st Lt. (Lt. Col. W. M. HughesMaj. (Lt. Col.) L. B. HumphreyCapt. (Lt. Col.) R. C. HumphreyCapt. (Lt. Col.) G. M. Hunt1st Lt. (Capt.) Paul E. Hunt1st Lt. (Capt.) John B. HunterCapt. (Lt. Col.) R. E. HuneycuttCapt. (Capt.) C. W. Hutchins

1st Lt. (Capt.) M. J. Hutchison1st Lt. (Capt.) E. B. HrdlickaCapt. (Lt. Col.) J. W. Ireland1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) J. D. IsemanCapt. (Maj.) A. H. Jackman1st Lt. (Maj.) M. H. Jackson1st Lt. (Maj.) Roy A. Jameson1st Lt. (Lt. Col.) C. A. Jenkins1st Lt. (Capt.) P. T. JenkinsMaj. (Col.) W. A. Jennings1st Lt. (Capt.) M. A. JeffersCapt. (Lt. Col.) A.

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Jul 1946