+Cold War and Global Hegemony

Cold War andGlobal Hegemony, 1945-1991

Melvyn P. Leffier

We are accustomed to viewing the cold war as a determinedand heroic response of the U.S. to communist aggressionspearheaded and orchestrated by the Soviet Union. TTiis im-

age was carefully constructed by presidents and their advisers in theirmemoirs (i). This view also was incorporated in some of the first schol-arly works on the cold war, but was thenrebutted by a wide variety of revisionisthistorians who blamed ofBcials in Wash-ington as well as those in Moscow for theorigins of the Soviet-American conflict(2). Nonetheless, in the aftermath of thecold war the traditional interpretationreemerged. John Gaddis, arguably themost eminent historian of the cold war,wrote in the mid-1990s that the coldwar was a struggle of good versus evil, ofwise and democratic leaders in the We.streacting to the crimes and inhumanity ofloseph Stahn, the brutal dictator in theKremlin (3).

This interpretation places the coldwar in a traditional framework. It is oneway to understand American foreignpolicy between the end of World War IIand the breakup of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1991.But for quite some time now, historians,political scientists, and economists havebeen studying the cold war in a muchlarger global context. They do so becausethe new documents from the SovietUnion and its former empire as well asolder documents from the U.S. and its al-lies suggest that Stalin conducted a morecomplex and inconsistent foreign policythan previously imagined and that U.S.officials initially did not regard Stalin,notwithstanding his crimes and brutal-ity, as an unacceptable partner witli whom to collaborate in stabilizingand remaking the postwar world.

Most scholars looking at Soviet documents now agree that Stalin

Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman, and Josef Stalin shake handsat the Potsdam Conference. July 23, 1945. (Image courtesy of theTruman Presidential Museum &. Library. Accession number: 63-1457-29.)

had no master plan to spread revolution or conquer the world. Hewas determined to establish a sphere of influence in eastern Europewhere his communist minions would rule. But at the same time. Sta-lin wanted to get along with his wartime allies in order to control therebirth of German and Japanese power, which he assumed was inevi-

table. Consequently, he frequently cau-tioned communist followers in France.Italy, Greece, and elsewhere to avoidprovocative actions that might frightenor antagonize his wartime allies. Withinhis own country and his own sphere, hewas cruel, evil, almost genocidal. justas Gaddis and other traditional scholarssuggest (4). Yet U.S. and British officialswere initially eager to work with him.They rarely dwelled upon his domesticbarbarism. Typically, President Harry STruman wrote his wife, Bess, after hisfirst meeting with StaHn: "1 like Stalin.. . . He is straightforward. Knows whathe wants and will compromise when hecan't get it." Typically, W. Averell Harri-man. the U.S. ambassador to Moscow,remonstrated that "If it were possible tosee him /Stalin/ more frequently, manyof our difficulties would be overcome"

(5)-Yet the difficulties were not over-

come. American fears grew. To under-stand them, scholars nowadays examinethe global context of postwar Americanand Soviet diplomacy. They see the con-test between American freedom and So-viet totalitarianism as part of an evolvingfabric of international economic and po-litical conditions in the twentieth century.After World War II, they say. U.S. leadersassumed the role of hegemon, or leader,

of the international economy and container of Soviet power. To explainwhy, scholars examine the operation of the world economy and the dis-tribution of power in the international system. They look at transna-

OAH Magazine of History * March 2005 65

tional ideological conflict, the disruption of colonial empires, and therise of revolutionary nationalism in Asia and Africa, They explain thespread ofthe cold war from Europe to Asia, Africa, the Middle East andLatin America by focusing on decolonization, the rise of newly inde-pendent states, and the yearnings of peoples everywhere to modernizetheir countries and enjoy higher standards of living. Yet the capacityofthe U,S. to assume the roles of hegemon, balancer, and containerdepended on more than its wealth and strength; the success ofthe U.S.also depended on the appeal of its ideology, the vitality of its institu-tions, and the attractiveness of its culture of mass consumption—whatmany scholars nowadays call "soft power" (6).

At the end of World War 11, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emergedas the two strongest nations in the world and as exemplars of compet-ing models of political economy. But it was a peculiar bipolarity. TheU.S. was incontestahly the most powerful nation on the earth. It alonepossessed the atomic bomb. It alone possessed a navy that could proj-ect power across the oceans and an air force that could reach acrossthe continents. The U.S. was also the richest nation in the world. Itpossessed two-thirds ofthe world's gold reserves and three-fourths ofits invested capital. Its gross national product was three times that otthe Soviet Union and five times that of the United Kingdom. Its wealthhad grown enormously during the war while the Soviet Union hadbeen devastated by the occupation by Nazi Germany. Around 27 mil-lion inhabitants ofthe U.S.S.R, died during World War II comparedto about 400,000 Americans. The Germans ravished the agriculturaleconomy of Soviet Russia and devastated its mining and transportationinfrastructure {7}.

The cathedral at Legharn, Italy, was one of the casualties of World War II, The war wrought untold devasta-tion; people yearned for 3 better future, (Image donated by Corbis-8ettman, BE048024,)

Compared to the U.S, in 1945, the Soviet Union was weak. Yet itloomed very large not only in the imagination of U.S, officials, but alsoin the minds ofpoiiticai leaders throughout the world. It did not loomlarge because of fears of Soviet military aggression, Contemporarypohcymakers knew that Stalin did not want war. They did not expectSoviet troops to march across Europe. Yet they feared that Stalin wouldcapitahzeon the manifold opportunities ofthe postwar world: the vacu-ums of power stemming from the defeat of Germany and japan; thebreakup of colonial empires; popular yearnings for postwar social andeconomic reform; and widespread disillusionment with the function-ing of democratic capitalist economies (8).

During World War II, the American economy had demonstratedenormous vitality, but many contemporaries wondered whether theworld capitalist system could be made to function effectively in peace-time. Its performance during their lifetimes had bred worldwide eco-nomic depression, social malaise, political instability, and personal dis-illusionment. Throughout Europe and Asia, people blamed capitalismfor the repetitive cycles of boom and bust and for military conflagra-tions that brought ruin and despair. Describing conditions at the end ofthe war, the historian Igor Lukes has written; "Many in Czechoslovakiahad come to believe that capitalism . . , had become obsolete. Influen-tial intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes of the war inblack and white terms: here was Auschwitz and there was Stalingrad.The former was a byproduct of a crisis in capitalist Europe ofthe 1930s;the latter stood for the superiority of socialism" (g).

Transnational ideological conflict shaped the cold war. Peopleseverywhere yearned for a more secure and better life; they pondered

alternative ways of organizing their political andeconomic affairs. Everywhere, communist par-ties sought to present themselves as leaders ofthe resistance against fascism, proponents of so-cioeconomic reform, and advocates of nationalself-interest. Their political clout gTew quicklyas their membership soared, for example, inGreece, from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945:in Czechoslovakia, from 28,000 in May 1945to 750,000 in September 1945; in Italy, from5,000 in 1943 to 1,700.000 at the end of 1945(10). For Stalin and his comrades in Moscow,these grassroots developments provided unsur-passed opportunities; for Truman and his advis-ers in Washington, they inspired fear and gloom."There is complete economic, social and politicalcollapse going on in Central Europe, the extentof which is unparalleled in history," wrote As-sistant Secretary of War John McCIoy in April1945 (ri). The Soviet Union, of course, was notresponsible for these conditions. Danger nonethe-less inhered in tlie capacity ofthe Kremlin to capi-talize on them. "The greatest danger to the securityofthe United States," the CIA concluded in one ofits first reports, "is the possibility of economic col-lapse in Western Europe and the consequent acces-sion to power of Communist elements" (12).

Transnational ideological conflict impelledU.S. officials to take action. They knew they hadto restore hope that private markets could func-tion effectively to serve the needs of humankind.People had suffered terribly. Assistant Secretary

66 OAH Magazine of History • March 2005

of State Dean G. Acheson told a congressional committee in 1945.They demanded land reform, nationalization, and social welfare. Theybelieved that governments should take action to alleviate their misery.They felt it "so deeply," said Acheson, "that they will demand that thewhole business of state control and state interference shall be pushedfurther and further" (13).

Policymakers like Acheson and McCloy, the officials who becameknown as the "Wise Men" ofthe cold war, understood the causes for themalfunctioning of the capitalist world economy in the interwar years.They were intent on correcting the fundamental weaknesses and vul-nerabilities. Long before they envisioned a cold war with the SovietUnion, they labored diligentlyduring 1943 and 1944 to designthe International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank. Theyurged Congress to reduce U.S.tariffs. They wanted the Ameri-can people to buy more foreigngoods. They knew that foreignnations without sufficient dollarsto purchase raw materials andfuel would not be able to recovereasily. They realized that govern-ments short of gold and short ofdollars would seek to hoard theirresources, establish quotas, andregulate the free flow of capital.And they knew that these actionsin the years between World WarI and World War II had broughtabout the Great Depression andcreated the conditions for Na-zism, fascism, and totalitarian-ism to flourish {14).

"Now,asintheyeari92o," Presi-dent Truman declared in early Marcli1947, "we have reached a turningpoint in history. National economieshave been dismpted by the war. Tliefiiture is uncertain everywhere. Eco-nomic policies are in a state of flux."Governments abroad, the presidentexplained, wanted to regulate trade,save dollars, and promote recon-struction. Tliis was understandable;it was also perilous. Freedom flourished where power was dispersed. But regi-mentation, Truman warned, was on the march, everywhere. If not stoppedabroad, it would force the U.S. to curtail freedom at home. "In this atmosphereof doubt and hesitation," Truman declared, "the decisive factor will be ttie typeof leadership tliat the United States gives the world." If it did not act decisively,tlie woi'ld capitalist system would flounder, providing yet greater opportunitiesfor Gormmmism to grow and for Soviet strength to accrue. If the U.S. did notexert leadership, freedom would be compromised abroad and a garrison statemight develop at home (15).

Open markets and free peoples were inextricably interrelated. Towin the transnational ideological conflict, U.S. officials had to makethe world capitalist system function effectively. By 1947, they realizedthe IMF and the World Bank were too new, too inexperienced, and toopoorly funded to accomplish the intended results. The U.S. had to as-

Palmjro Togliatti, the leader ofthe Italian Communist Party, addresses a large crowdgathered in Rome to hear him speak. The communists offered one alternative to abetter future. In countries like Italy, they enjoyed a huge following. (Image courtesyof Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBtS, HU008913.)

sume the responsibility to provide dollars so that other nations hadthe means to purchase food and fuel and, eventually, to reduce quo-tas and curtail exchange restrictions. In June 1947, Secretary of StateGeorge G. Marshall outlined a new approach, saying the U.S. wouldprovide the funds necessary to promote the reconstruction of Europe.The intent ofthe Marshall Plan was to provide dollars to likemindedgovernments in Western Europe so they could continue to grow theireconomies, employ workers, insure political stability, undercut the ap-peal of communist parties, and avoid being sucked into an economicorbit dominated by the Soviet Union. U.S. officials wanted Europeangovernments to cooperate and pool their resources for the benefit of

their collective well-being andfor the establishment of a large,integrated market where goodsand capital could move freely. Inorder to do this, the U.S. wouldincur the responsibility to makethe capitalist system operate ef-fectively, at least in those parts ofthe globe not dominated by theSoviet Union. The U.S. wouldbecome the hegemon, or over-seer, of the global economy: itwould make loans, provide cred-its, reduce tariffs, and insurecurrency stability (16).

The success of the MarshallPlan depended on the resuscita-lion ofthe coal mines and indus-tries of western Germany (17).Most Europeans feared Germa-ny's revival. Nonetheless. U.S.officials hoped that Stalin wouldnot interfere with efforts tomerge the three western zonesof Germany, institute currencyreform, and create the FederalRepublic of Germany. MarshallPlan aid, in fact, initially was of-fered to Soviet Russia and its al-lies in eastern Europe. But Stalinwould not tolerate the rebuildingof Germany and its prospective

integration into a western bloc.Nor would he allow eastern Eu-

ropean governments to be drawn into an evolving economic federa-tion based on the free fiow of information, capital, and trade. Sovietsecurity would be endangered. Stalin's sphere of infiuence in easternEurope would be eroded and his capacity to control the future of Ger-man power would be impaired. In late 1947. Stalin cracked down oneastern Europe, encouraged the communist coup in Czechoslovakia,and instigated a new round of purges (18).

German/s economic revival scared the Erench as much as it alarmedthe Russians. The French feared that Germany would regain power toact autonomously. The French also were afraid that initiatives to reviveGermany might provoke a Soviet attack and culminate in another occu-pation of France. Erench officials remonstrated against American plansand demanded military aid and security guarantees (19).

The French and other wary Europeans had the capacity to shape

OAH Magazine of History • March 2005 67

their future. They exacted strategic commitments from the U.S. TheNorth Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 as a result of their fears aboutGermany as well as their anxieties about Soviet Russia. U.S. strate-gic commitments and U.S. troops were part of a double containmentstrategy, containing the uncertain trajectory of the Federal Repubhcof Germany as well as the anticipated hostility of the Soviet Union.Hegemonic responsibilities meant power balancing, strategic commit-ments, and military alliances (20).

Just as western Germany needed to be integrated into a westernsphere lest it be sucked into aSoviet orbit, so did Japan. U.S.officials worried that their oc-cupation of Japan might failand that the Japanese mightseek to enhance their own in-terests by looking to the Sovietsor the communist Chinese asfuture economic partners. In1948, U.S. policymakers turnedtheir attention from reformingJapanese social and politicalinstitutions to promoting eco-nomic reconstruction. Japan'spast economic growth, theyknew, depended on links toManchuria. China, and Korea,areas increasingly slipping intocommunist hands. Japan need-ed alternative sources of rawmaterials and outlets for hermanufactured goods. Studyingthe functioning of the globalcapitalist economy. America'scold warriors concluded thatthe industrial core of north-east Asia. Japan, needed to beintegrated with its underdevel-oped periphery in southeastAsia, much like Western Eu-rope needed to have access topetroleum in the Middle East(21). It was the obligation of thehegemon of the world capitalisteconomy to make sure compo-nent units of the system couldbenefit from the operation ofthe whole.

But, as hegemon, the U.S.also had to be sensitive to theworries and responsive to theneeds of other countries. In Asia, as in Europe, many peoples fearedthe revival of the power of former Axis nations. Trutnan promisedthem that U.S. troops would remain in Japan, even as Japan regainedits autonomy, and that the U.S. would insure peace in the Pacific, evenif it meant a new round of security guarantees, as it did with the Philip-pines and with Australia and New Zealand (22).

Yet, much as American officials hoped to integrate Japan withSoutheast Asia, revolutionary nationalist movements in the regionmade that prospect uncertain. During World War II, popular indepen-

NATO MEMBERSSOVIET BLOC COUNTRIESOTHER

dence movements arose in French Indochina and the Netherlands EastIndies. Nationalist leaders like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Sukarnoin Indonesia wanted to gain control over their countries' future (23).Decolonization was an embedded feature of the postwar internationalsystem, propelled by the defeat of Japan and the weakening of tradi-tional European powers. Decolonization fueled the cold war as it pro-vided opportunities for the expansion of communist influence. ThirdWorld nationalists wanted to develop, industrialize, and modernizetheir countries. They often found Marxist-Leninist ideology attractive as

it blamed their countries' back-wardness on capitalist exploi-tation. At the same time, theSoviet command economyseemed to provide a model forrapid modernization. Stalin'ssuccessors, therefore, saw end-less opportunities for expand-ing their influence in the ThirdWorld; leaders in Washingtonperceived dangers (24).

As hegemon of the freeworld economy, U.S. officialsfelt a responsibility to containrevolutionary nationalism and tointegrate core and periphery. TheTruman administration prod-ded the Dutch and the French tomake concessions to revolution-ary nationalists, but often couldnot shape the outcomes of colo-nial stru^les. When the French,for example, reflised to acknowl-edge Ho Chi Minh's republicof Vietnam and established apuppet government under BaoDai in 1949, the U.S. chose tosupport the French. Otherwise.Truman and his advisers fearedthey would alienate their allies inFrance and pennit a key area togravitate into a communist orbitwhere it would be amenable toChinese or Soviet iiifiuence. Fall-ing dominos in Southeast Asiawould sever the future economiclinks between this region and Ja-This 1950 map of Europe demonstrates the split between the Soviet Bloc in Eastern

Europe and the members of NATO in the West, (from Dorjs M. Condit, History of theOffice of the Secretary of Defense. Volume II: The Test of War. 7950-1953 [Washington, DC:Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988].)

pan, making rehabilitation in theindustrial core of northeast Asiaall the more difficult (25).

In the late 1950s and 1950sJapan's extraordinary economic recovery, sparked by the Korean Warand fueled by subsequent exports to Norih America, defied Americanassumptions. Yet. by then, American officials had locked the U.S. intoa position opposing nationalist movements led by communists, likeHo Chi Minh. U.S. officials feared that if they allowed a communisttriumph in Indochina, America's credibility with other allies and cli-ents would be shattered. Hegemons needed to retain their credibility.Otherwise, key allies, like Western Germany and Japan, might doubtAmerica's will and reorient themselves in the cold war (26).


Hegemony and credibility required superior militai7 capabilities.Leaders in Washington and Moscow alike believed that perceptions oftheir relative power position supported risk-taking on behalf of alliesand clients in Asia and Africa, In the most important U,S. strategy doc-ument ofthe cold war, NSC 68, Paul Nitze wrote that military powerwas an "indispensable backdrop" to containment, which he called a"policy of calculated and gradual coercion," To pursue containment inthe Third World and erode support for the adversary, the U,S. neededto have superior military force (27). Prior to L949, the U-S- had a mo-nopoly of atomic weapons. But after the Soviets tested and developednuclear weapons of their own, U.S. officials believed they needed toaugment their arsenal of strategic weapons. Their aim was not only todeter Soviet aggression in the center of Europe, but also to support tlieability ofthe U,S. to intervene in Third World countries without fear ofSoviet countermoves.

Nuclear weapons, therefore, produced paradoxical results. Their enor-mous power kept the cold war from turning into a hot war between theU.S. and the Soviet Union.Leaders on both sides rec-ognized that sucti a warwould be suicidal. But atthe same time nuclearweapons encouraged of-ficials in both Washingtonand Moscow to engage inrisk-taking on the "periph-ery," tliat is, in Asia, Africa,the Middle East, and theCaribbean because eachside thought (and hoped)that the adversary wouldnot dare to escalate thecompetition into a nucle-ar exchange (28). WhenRonald Reagan revivedthe determination of theU.S. to regain militarysuperiority in the 1980s,he sought to use thosemilitary capabilities, notfor a preemptive attackagainst the Soviet Union,but as a backdrop to sup-port U.S, interventionson behalf of anti-com-munist insurgents from Nicaragua and El Salvador to Afghanistan andAngola, In other words, Reagan viewed superior strategic capabilitiesas a key to containing communism, preserving credibility, and support-ing hegemony (29).

For U.S, officials, waging the cold war required the U.S. to winthe transnational ideological struggle and to contain Soviet power.To achieve these goals, the U.S, had to be an effective hegemon. Thismeant that the U.S. had to nurture and lubricate tlie world economy,build and coopt western Cermany and Japan, establish military allianc-es and preserve allied cohesion, contain revolutionary nationalism, andbind the industrial core of Europe and Asia with (he underdevelopedpcriphei7 in the Third World. To be effective. Cold Warriors believedthat superior militaiy capabilities were an incalculable asset. They fo-cused much less attention and allocated infinitely fewer resources to

NATO was formed as part of a double conlditimeiiL itidtegy: containing the Soviet Union and Ger-many, Here, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman signs the NATO charter on April 4,1949, {Imagedonated by Corbis-Bettman, U89965MCME,)

disseminating their values and promoting their culture. Yet scholars ofthe cold war increasingly believe that America's success as a hegemon,its capacity to evoke support for its leadership, also depended on thehabits and institutions oC constitutional governance, the resonance ofits liberal and humane values, and the appeal of its free market andmass consumption economy (30}. •

Endnotes1, For exarTiple. see Harry S Triinian, Memoirs, Voi I: 1945, Year of Decisions,

rfpriiit (New York: Signet, Kjfjj, 1955): Truman, Memoirs. Vol. 11: Years ofTrial and Hopir, 1946-1^52, repritU (New York: Signet, 1965, 1956}: Dwight D.Hiserihower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, ig5J-i956 (GardenCity, N|: DoiiWeday, i96ii}; Di aii C, Acheson, Prestnl at the Creation: MyYears at the State DepaiimenI (Nfw York: Norton. 1969); George F. Kennan,Memoirs, 2 vnl, paperback ed, (New York: Bantam, 1967-1972),

2. See, for example, |oyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The Worldand United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972);for a discussion of the dirFerent historiographical approaches, see my essay,•'The Coid War Over the Cold War." in Gordon Martel, ed., American Foreign

Policy Reconsidered. iHgo-199J (London; Routledge,1994).3, John Lewis Caddis, WeNow Know: Rethinking ColdWar History (New York:Oxford University Press.

1997)-4, For some of the best newscholarship on Stalin, seeSimon Sebag Montefiore.Stalin: The Court of theRed Tsar, reprint (NewYork: Knopf, 2004, 2003);Norman M. Naimark,The Russians in Germany;A History of the SowetZone of Occupation, 1945-'949 (Cambridge, MA;Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, 1995);Vojtech Mastny, The ColdWar and Soviet Insecurity:77ie Stalin Years (New York;Oxford U n iversity Press,1996): Eduard MaximilianMark, "Revolution byDegrees; Stalin's NationalFront Strategy for Fiirope,1941-1947," Cold War

International History Project Working Paper No. )i (Washington, D,C.;Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2001): Geoffrey Roberts,"StaliTi and the Grand Alliaiice: Public Discourse, Private Dialogues, and theDirection of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1941-1947," Slovo 13 (2001): 1-15.

5, Robert H, Frrrell, ed,. Dear Bess: The Leltersfrom Harry to Bess Truman, J910-1959 (New York: Norton, 1983), 522: Harritnan to Truman, June 8, 1945,Department of State, foreign Relations ofthe United States: The Conference ofBerlin: Hie Potsdam Conference, 1945 (2 vols,, Washington, D,C,; GovernmentPrinting Office, 1960), 1; 61.

6, For soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Succts,s in WorldPolitiis (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): Nyc, The Paradox of AmericanI'ower: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002).

7, Paul M, Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofthe Creat Powers: Economic Change andMilitary Conflict From iôoto2000 (New York: Random House, [987), 347-72;R, j . Overy, Russia's War (London; Penguin Books, 1997); Allan M. Winkler.

OAH Magazine of History • March 200^ 69

Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War II, 2nd ed, (Wheeling, IL:Harlan Davidson, 2000}.

8. Meivyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. Nationd Security, the Truman Administration,andtheCoid War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 1-141.

9. Igor Lukes, "The Czech Road to Communism," in Norman M. Naimarkand L. IA. Gibianskii. eds., The E'itablishment of Communist Regimes inFastem Furope. 1944-1949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 29; WilliamI. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The TurbuletU History of a DividedContinent. 1945 Jo the Present (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 1-12 .

10. Adam Westoby, Communism Since World War I! (New York: St. MartinsPress, 198)). 14-5.

11. Memo for the President, by |ohn McCloy, April 26,1945, box 178, President'sSecretary's File, Harry S Truman Presidivilial

12. Centra] IntelligenceAgency, "Review of theWorld Situation As ItRelates to the Securityof the United States,"September 26, 1947, box203, ibid.

13. Testimony by Dean G,Acheson, March 8, 1945,U.S. Senate, Committeeon Bankingand Currenq',Bretton Woods AgreementAct. 79th Cong., I sess.(Washington, D.C:Government PrintingOffice, 1945), i: 35.

14. U.S. Department olCommerce, The UnitedStates in the WorldFconomy (Washington.D.C: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1943);Harley A. Notter. PostwarForeign Policy Preparation.'9J9''945 (Washington.D.C: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1950),128; Georg Schild, BrettonWoods and DumbartonOaks: American Fconomicand Political PostwarPlanning in the Summerof 1944 (New York: St.Martin's, 1995).

15. Harry STnunan, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1947 (Washington,D.C: U.S.G.P.O., 1963). 167-72; sec also his Tniinan Doctrine speech whidifollowed a few days later. 176-80, and his special message to ihe Congress on theMarshall Plan, 515-29.

16. Michael |. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America. Britain, and the Reconstructionof Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987):David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Furope. America and PostwarReconstruction (New York: Longmans, 1992); Thomas W. Zeiler, Free Trade.Free World: The Advent ofGATT (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1999).

17. John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford. CA: StanfordUniversity Press, r976); Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the line: TheAmerican Decision to Divide Cennany, 1944-1949 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. 1996).

18. Geoffrey Robert.s, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology andthe Onset ofthe Cold War, 1947." Europe-Asia Studies 46 (December 1994):1371-86: V. M. Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's ColdWar: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,19961.46-53.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (right) is warmly greeted by Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno(second from left) at an Indonesian reception in 1960 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria. U.S. officialsfeared nationalist leaders of emerging nations would look to Moscow and Beijing. (Image donatedby Corbis-Bettman, BE060377.)

19. William I. Hitchcock. Erance Restored: Cold War Diplomac)' and the Quest forLeadership in Furope. 1944-1954 (Chapel Hi!!: University of North CarolinaPress, 1998).

20. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins ofthe NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1981).

21. Michael Schaller, 77ie American Occupalionofjapan: The Origins ofthe Cold Warin Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Howard B. Schonberger.Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of japan. 1945-J952 (Kent, OH:Kent State University Press, 19S9); )ohn W. Dower. Embracing Defeat: japanin the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 271-3. 525-46.

22. LefRer, Preponderance of Power. 346-7, 393-4. 428-32, 464-5; Roger Dingman,"The Diplomacy of Dependency: Tlie Philippines and Peacemaking with|apan," joumal of Southeast Aman Sl«iJit;s 27 (September 1986). 307-21:

Henry W. Brands, "FromANZUS to SEATO: UnitedStates Strategic Policy towardAustralia and New Zealand,1952-1954" International HistoryRemew 9 (May 1987): 25070.

23. Por the emerging nationaliststnigês in Indochina andIndonesia, see William j . Duiker.Saavd War. Nationaiism andRevdution in a Diinded Vu:tnam(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1995);George McTtiman Kahiii.Nationalism and Revolution inIndonesia (Ithaca, NY: ComellUniversity Press, 1952).

24. Odd Ame Westad. "TheNew International History ofthe Cold War Three (Possible)Paradigms." Dif^matic History24 (Fall 2000): 551-65; David C.Engerman, Nils Gilinan, MarkH. Haefele. and Michael E.Latham, eds.. Staging Growth:Modemizaiion,Dei'ehpment.andthe Global Cold War (Amherst;University of MassachusettsPress. 2003).

25. Mark Atwood ljwrence,"Transnational Côalition-Building and the Making ofthe Cold War in Indochina,1947-1949," Diplomatic

History 26 (Summer 2002); 453-80; Andrew Jon Rotter, Tlie Path to Vietnam:Origins oj the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca. NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1987).

26. For the importance of credibility, see the pathbreaking article by Robert J.McMahon. "Credibility and World Power." Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991):

455-71-27. NSC 68. "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April

14, T950, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Caddis, eds., Containment:Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1978), 401-2: NSC 114/2, "Programs for National Security,"October 12. 1951, Department of State. Foreign Relations ofthe United States.1951; National Security Affairs: Foreign Fconomic Policy (Washington. D.C:Government Printing Office, 1979), i: 187-89,

28. For Soviet policy, see A. A. Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftah. "Ont; Hell ofa Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy. ig^^-igC-tjf (New York: Norton.1997); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War(New York: Norton, 2005).

29. Peter Schweizer, Reagan's War. The Fpic Story of his Forty Year Struggle andFinal Triumph Over Communism (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

30. C, John Ikenberry, Ajier Victory: Institutions. Strategic Restraint, and the


Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars [Princeton, N]: Princeton University*Press, 2OO!), 163-214; Robert O. Keoliane, After Hegemony: Cooperation andDiscord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1984}. especially 135-81; Michael Mandelbaum. The Ideas thatConquered the World: Peace. Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-FirstCentury {Uew York: Public Affairs Press, 2002): Geir Lundestad, "Empire" byIntegration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (New York:Oxford University Press, 1998); Gaddis, We Now Know.

Bibliographical NoteMost governments publish primary source docutnents regarding

the history of their foreign policy. These documents are publishedmany decades after the fact, but we now have many documents for the1940s, 1950s. and 1960s. For the evolution of the role of the U.S. in thecold war, see U.S. Departmentof State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States (Washington:Government Printing Office);for Britain and the cold war,see Foreign and CommonwealthOffice, Documents on BritishPolicy Overseas. Since the endof the cold war, the Cold WarInternational History Projecthas been publishing (and dis-tributing free of charge) pri-mary source documents fromthe Soviet Union and otherformerly communist nations,including the People's Repub-lic of China. They are indis-pensable for understandingthe global context of the coldwar. See the Cold War Interna-tional History Project, Bulletin(Washington. D.C.: WoodrowWilson International Center.1992-2004). The Central In-telligence Agency (C!A) haspublished several volumes ofdocuments. See, for example,Woodrow J. Kuhn.s. ed., Assess-ing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Springfield, VA; Centerfor the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, 1997); ScottA. Koch, ed., Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, J^ô-icj^c} (Washing-ton, D.C.: History Staff. Center for the Study of Intelligence. CentralIntelligence Agency. 1995); Ben B. Fischer. At Cold War's End: U.S. In-telligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, igSg-iggi (Reston, VA:Central Intelligence Agency. 1999}.

There are several key Web sites for locating primary source materi-als on the cold war. The most important are the Cold War InternationalHistory Project. <http://vwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topicJd=i4O9&fuseaction=library.col]ection>; the National Security Archive. <htt.p://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>; the Parallel History Project for information onNATO and the Warsaw Pact, <http://wvvw.isn.ethz.ch/php/>; and theDeclassified Documents Reference Service, <http;//www.galegroup.com/psm>. The Federation of American Scientists also has a Web sitewith valuable documents on many issues, like the nuclear arms race.See <http://www.fas.org/>. Many U.S. government agencies also haveWeb sites containing documents on current and past foreign policy.

China's Chairman MaoZe Dong (left) chats with Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh (right) at areception given for Ho in Beijing in 1955. (Image donated by Corbis-Bettman .BE045953.}

For the Department of State, see <http://www.state.gov/history/>; forthe Department of Defense. <http://wvinA'.defenselink.mil/>; for theCentral Intelligence Agency, <http://www.cia.gov/>. The presidentiallibraries have sites containing selected documents, speeches, oral his-tories, and other infonnation. You can access them through <http;//www.archives.gov/presidentiaLlibraries/index.htmI>.

For short books locating the cold war in a global context, see Rob-ert J. McMahon. TJie Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (New York:Oxford University Press. 2003); David S. Painter. The Cold War: AnInternational History (New York: Routledge. 2002); Geoffrey Roberts.The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War,1945-1991; (New York: Routledge, 1999): Geir Lundestad, East, West,North, South: Major Developments in International Relations since 1945.4th ed. {Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999).

Many scholars are nowusing primary documentsfrom the former Soviet Unionand other communist coun-tries to study the cold war.In addition to the books andarticles listed in note 3. seeDavid Holloway, Stalin andthe Bomb: the Soviet Unionand Atomic Energy. J9J9-i9_56(New Haven. CT: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1994); WilliamTaubman, Khrushchev: TheMan and His Era (New York:Norton. 2003); Hope M. Har-rison, Driving the Soviets Upthe Wall: Soviet-East GermanRelations, 1953-196] (Princ-eton. NJ: Princeton Univer-sity Press. 2003}. Some of themost fascinating books dealwith Chinese foreign policyand the relations betweenMaoTse-tungand Stalin. See,for example. S. N. Goncharov,John Wilson Lewis, and LitaiXue. Uncertain Partners: Sta-

lin. Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,r993); Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill; Univer-sity of North Carolina Press, 2001),

For key books on the effort to reconstruct the world economy af-ter World War II. see Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy inCurrent Perspective: The Origins and ihe Prospects of Our InternationalEconomic Order {Uevj York: Columbia University Press, 1980); HermanVan der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy, 1945-19S0(Berkeley; University of California Press. 1986); Alfred E. Eckes andThomas W. Zeiler. Globalization and the American Century (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003).

For transnational ideological conflict and the cold war, see Joyceand Gabriel Kolko. The Limits of Power The World and United StatesForeign Policy, lg^yig^^ (New York; Harper & Row. 1972): Walt W. Ros-tow. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 3rd.ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Francois Furet. ThePassing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century(Chicago; University of Chicago Press. 1999); Odd Arne Westad, Cold

OAH Magazine of History • March 2005 71

War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalr)' and the Origins ofthe Chi-nese Civil War. 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);Michael E. Latham, Mode^mization as Ideology: American Sodal Scienceand "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press. 2000): David C. Engerman, Modemization fromthe Other Shore: American Intelkctuals and the Romance of Russian Dei'cl-opment (Cambridge, MA: Hai-vard University Press, 2003); John LewisGaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1997)-

There are some wonderful studies on decolonization, revolutionarynationalism, and the cold war. See, for example, Robert 1, McMahon,Colonialisfn and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indone-sian Independence. ig4y'ig (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981);Frances Goiida and Tliijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions oftheNetherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign PoUc)'and Indonesian Na-tionalism, I92o-i9<f9 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002);Matthew lames Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for In-dependence and the Origins ofthe Post-Cold War Era {New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002): Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana.Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina Press, 2002). The Vietnam War is often examined in thiscontext; see, for example, William [. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policyand the Conflict in indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1994}: George C. Herring. America's Longest War: Tiie United StatesandVietnam, 'gô-igy^, 4th ed, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002).

For power and the cold war, see Mark Trachtenberg, A ConstructedPeace: The Making ofthe European Settlement, 1945-196^ (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): William Curti Wohlforth, TheElusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1993); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, [992). Raymond L, Garthoffhas written two lengthy and illuminating books that link power andideology. See Garthoff Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Rela-tions From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C: Brookings institution,1985) and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End ofthe Cold War (Washington, D,C,: Brookings Institution, 1994)-

For discussions ofthe end oi the cold war that tocus on ideas andtransnational movements, see Matthew Evangelista. Unarmed Forces:The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press. 1999); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea oftheWest: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End ofthe Cold War (New York:Columbia University Press, 2000): Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nucle-ar Abolition: A History ofthe World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971(0 the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

For discussions of hegemony and soft power, see the citations innotes 5 and 29, Zi

Melvyn P. Leffier is the Edward Stettinius Professor of American History atThe University of Virginia. Currently, he is a Jennings Randolph Fellow atthe United Stafes Institute of Peace and holds the Heniy Kissinger Chair atthe Library of Congress. His hook. A Preponderance of Power Nationalecurity, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford Uni-vevsity Press, 199J/, won the Bancrofi. ferreli and Hoover prizes. He is nowwriting a book about why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why itended when it did.

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